Military Intelligence: Its Role in Counterinsurgency,
Abstract
This monograph examines current US Army IEW operational concepts for counterinsurgency, doctrinal literature, current practices in Latin America, lessons learned from Southeast Asia and British Army experiences. This doctrinal and historical base together with its theoretical underpinnings is analyzed and evaluated in light of the military intelligence experiences of the French Army in its counterinsurgency roles form Indochina to Chad, 1946-1984; the Uruguayan suppression of the Tupamaros, 1963 - 1973: and the Portuguese Army campaign in Mozambiques, 1964 - 1974. The study concludes that case studies of the French, Uruguayans and Portuguese offer no new IEW principles to the US Army. The enhancements that the study of these armed forces drive home to US IEW doctrine and operations are the dire necessity for governmental legitimacy to include the humane treatment of people, the necessity for improved police-military relations in LIC and the primacy of HUMINT among the intelligence disciplines in counterinsurgency. In a larger sense, the study of the French, Uruguayans and Portuguese confirms that political ends must be translated into military means to achieve operational success in a counterinsurgency. Additionally, their study confirms the notion that an art of war approach to counterinsurgency is valid and substantiates the premise that security stands as the center of gravity for an insurgent force. Keywords: Unconventional warfare, Military intelligence. (KT)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 20, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA195567
Entities
People
- Julian M. Campbell Jr
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College