


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
PREPARING TO BE DECEIVED: COUNTERDECEPTION AT THE
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PREPARING TO BE DECEIVED: COUNTERDECEPTION AT THE
OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

by

Major Michael B. Weimer
Infantry

School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

8 May 1988

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traces the historical development and use of counterdeception at the operational level of war by analyzing five World War II European theater operations: the 1940 German invasion of France, the German invasion of Russia (BARBAROSSA), the Kharkov operation, the Allied landings at Normandy (FORTITUDE), and the German Ardennes counteroffensive (Bulge). Theoretically- and historically-derived capabilities are contrasted with current U.S. and Soviet doctrine, followed by a contemporary analysis of Soviet/Warsaw Pact deception against NATO. The final section draws conclusions and implications concerning operational counterdeception in the U.S. Army, focusing upon the areas of doctrine, training, resources and command and staff processes.

This study concludes there is a significant gap between what should be and what actually is a U.S. operational force's capability to counter enemy deception. Doctrinally, the Army doesn't recognize the concept of counterdeception, nor is it a subset of counterintelligence. DOD definitions of the term exclude identifying foreign deception operations. Proponency for counterdeception is unclear. All U.S. Army doctrinal manuals on deception exclude the concept of countering enemy deception operations. Moreover, Corps and echelons above corps deception elements currently omit counterdeception training in their mission statements and operations. The study concludes that counterdeception operations require talented analysts skilled in thinking like the enemy and capable of using alternative hypothesis, competitive analysis (devil's advocate) and brainstorming techniques to avoid preconceptions concerning Soviet vulnerabilities and NATO superiority. Predictive intelligence and mathematical analysis are particularly harmful, while commander/staff relationships which stress candor are particularly beneficial.

This study recommends the Army review its doctrine to determine the sufficiency of counterdeception concepts by appointing an Army level proponent. Furthermore, it should focus its efforts and resources to improve the training, resourcing, and command/staff procedures to implement the doctrine. In short, counterdeception doctrine must be integrated into AirLand battle doctrine to counter Soviet/Warsaw Pact deception operations.

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ABSTRACT

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SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION

"We are never deceived --
we deceive ourselves."¹

The value of operational deception as a means of achieving advantage through surprise is clearly recognized by military theorists, and has been demonstrated consistently throughout the course of military history. Sun Tzu emphasized its significance by stating,

"All warfare is based upon deception, possible by adopting ... measures to drive the enemy into making erroneous judgments and taking erroneous actions, depriving him of his superiority and initiative."²

Deception in war multiplies combat power. When two combatants are of strength, deception can amplify the available strength by allowing it to be more economically and effectively employed. A weaker force can compensate for numerical or other inadequacies through deception operations.³

Recognizing the significant value of deception, it is illogical that so little emphasis is placed upon avoiding enemy deception ploys. Any prudent military artist must credit his enemy with possessing an equal capability for operational deception. Our knowledge and study of Soviet doctrine assures us their deception will be equally as extensive and decisive as ours. Major Charles Burgdorff concluded in a recent monograph that the U.S. is particularly vulnerable to Soviet deception, due to: ineffective U.S. intelligence assets; preconceptions concerning the signals indicating the beginning of hostilities; an exaggerated view of Soviet inflexibility; assumed western superiority

on a fluid and fast-paced battlefield; Soviet knowledge of U.S./NATO doctrine, force structure and wartime dispositions; overreliance upon technology and the lack of appreciation for the importance of operational deception.⁴

It seems logical, then, that our operational doctrine should equally stress countering enemy deception efforts. It should concentrate on detecting enemy deception operations, defeating or exploiting them and minimizing their effects. Accordingly, this monograph seeks to answer the question, "What should the U.S. Army's capability be to counter Soviet deception at the operational level?"

To counter an opponent's deception scheme, a military planner must first understand the principles of deception. While deception is fundamental to both Soviet and U.S. warfighting, success in incorporating deception into operational doctrine varies significantly between the two superpowers. The U.S. Army, until recently, has been slow in developing deception doctrine and in training, organizing and equipping units and staffs to conduct or counter deception operations. U.S. deception doctrinal manuals admit that the Army had

deemphasized ...the use of deception to support planning, direction and conduct of military operations during peacetime. As a result, many of the deception-related skills have been forgotten or failed to be incorporated into our warfighting doctrine.⁵

In fact, U.S. Army doctrine does not recognize "counterdeception" as a distinct operational concept or term. The term first appears in JCS PUB 1, which defines counterdeception as "efforts

to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of or gain advantage from a foreign deception operation." Interestingly, the publication specifies that counterdeception does "not include the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations."⁶ Contrary to common opinion, counterdeception is not synonymous with counterintelligence, defined in FM 34-1 as activities designed to "detect, evaluate, counteract or prevent hostile intelligence collection"⁷

This study focuses upon counterdeception at the operational level of war in the European theater. The historical and contemporary analyses concern "western" Armies, Army Groups and modern corps and Soviet Armies and Fronts.

Tactical and operational deception operations differ. FM 90-2 states that

operational deception plans are designed to facilitate the conduct of campaigns and major operations by "setting the terms of battle" before battles and engagements occur [while] tactical deception plans are designed to exploit the tactical situation being immediately confronted by the tactical commander.⁸

Although deception and surprise are commonly associated, their relationship is distinct. Figure 1 shows that of 67 "strategic" type cases, 60 included strategic surprise and 56 involved strategic deception.

	Strategic Level		tactical Level	
	No.	%	No.	%
Both surprise and deception	49	73.1	25	53.2
Surprise only	11	16.4	19	40.4
Deception only	7	10.5	3	6.4
TOTALs:	67	100.0	47	100.0

Figure 1⁹

The relationship between deception and surprise is best described as "cause and effect" -deception causes surprise.¹⁰

Section Two of this monograph analyzes deception and counterdeception theory from the writings of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, Barton Whaley and other modern theorists to determine what theory suggests our counterdeception capabilities should be. Section Three traces the historical development and use of counterdeception at the operational level by analyzing five World War II Operations in the European theater. Section Four examines current U.S. Army and joint doctrine to determine what counterdeception capabilities they require/suggest, while Section Five provides a contemporary analysis of Soviet deception and NATO vulnerabilities. Section Six draws conclusions and discusses implications.

SECTION TWO - COUNTERDECEPTION THEORY

Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, Barton Whaley and other theorists recognized the importance of deception in military theory, albeit with different degrees of emphasis. The majority of their writings, however, are preoccupied with deception rather than counterdeception. Discussion of activities specifically designed to discover, defeat or minimize enemy deception operations is rare. Yet, their theories present useful insights into counterdeception theory.

Sun Tzu believed that the basis of counterdeception lies in the decisiveness of "moral strength and the intellectual faculty of man ... in war." ¹¹ Recognizing that "all warfare is based

upon deception," he also stated that the wise general cannot be manipulated. Speed and flexibility are employed to regain the initiative and create a situation for a counterstroke. Sun Tzu recognized the critical importance of altering plans in light of constantly changing circumstances. Mao described this as:

a process ... [where] there is a need to examine the plan ... with actualities ... and accordingly form new judgments and decisions.¹²

Mao also stressed "comprehensive ... reconnaissance."¹³ Finally, Sun Tzu's chapter on the employment of secret agents to gain "foreknowledge" is particularly applicable to countering enemy deception since agents provide the interface between opponents. Sun Tzu's spies and agents were active everywhere gathering information, sowing dissension and nurturing subversion. He placed the greatest emphasis on double agents and concluded

secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move. An army without secret agents is like a man without eyes or ears.¹⁴

Clausewitz, on the other hand, believed deception had limited value at the operational level of war. Even though

the wish to achieve surprise is common ... surprise can rarely be outstandingly successful. [Generals] opposing each other in craft, cleverness and cunning in which surprise led to decisive results were rare.¹⁵

Woven throughout Clausewitz's cautions about intelligence, however, are three key thoughts useful in counterdeception. The statements that "most intelligence is false" and that "many intelligence reports in war are contradictory, even more are false, and most are uncertain" confirm the difficult endeavor the deceiver pursues and provides a glimmer of hope to the counter-

deceiver attempting to thwart enemy deception.¹⁶ Second, Clausewitz' suspicion of intelligence is explained in his description of chance. Today, he would challenge the accuracy of and dependence upon predictive intelligence and scientific approaches and, instead, place a premium on the ability to detect (or guess) enemy intentions. Finally, he recognized the pitfalls which arise when preconceptions override fact. His suggested antidote is reliance upon the "more essential elements of character: accurate and penetrating understanding."¹⁷

Liddell Hart integrated deception and surprise into his theory of maneuver and the indirect approach. To him, surprise involved the combination of deceiving the enemy's mind, depriving his freedom to respond, and overextending his forces.¹⁸ Therefore, he implied that the counterdeceiver must maintain both balance and freedom of action. The "false move" by the deceived accomplishes his demise, as in ju-jitsu where one's own momentum contributes to his fall.

Barton Whaley, a current leader in deception theory and author of perhaps the most comprehensive historical analysis of deception in war, also recognizes the need for counterdeception. He quoted McLachlan, the semi-official WW II British Naval Intelligence historian, who cautioned

There must be constant alertness against deception, for those who practised it with the ruthless and methodical ingenuity developed by the British... found their best targets in the obsessions of the enemy.¹⁹

Whaley surfaces the ironic fact that even the best deceivers are easy targets for deception. His study presents evidence that the

deceiver is almost always successful regardless of his victim's prowess. He suggests that counterdeceivers utilize an analogous decisional model specifically designed to analyze the signals of deception rather than the synthesis of potentially false signals.²⁰ For example, he concluded that most intelligence analysts biased the information they received. They used findings only to correct their regular situation reports, rather than asking whether the data fit any patterns suggesting alternative enemy objectives.

Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Post Graduate School and a member of the CIA for 18 years, summarized common biases and their implications for deception and counterdeception.²¹ He concluded there were two primary dilemmas affecting the counterdeceiver. First, perceptual tendencies and biases strongly favor the deceiver if he is trying to reinforce rather than change the target's preconceptions.²² He noted Barton Whaley's observation that 91 percent of deception attempts were successful, and 79 percent of those cases exploited the targets preconceptions.²³ Second, he concluded that deception efforts are rarely leak proof, and need not be since counterdeception analysts tendency to rationalize discrepant information commonly offsets the leaks.²⁴

Admitting that detecting deception is extraordinarily difficult, Heuer offers three approaches to overcome the problem. First, obviously, he suggests improved intelligence collection, but simultaneously cautions that technological improvements

contribute little toward improving the analysis process. He states that "any systematic counterdeception program must focus primarily on problems of analysis, only secondarily on collection."²⁵ A second approach requires increased alertness; however, in theory this often causes the analyst to become over sensitive to deception, and to overestimate the enemy's capabilities. In reality, the good deceiver, like the magician, commonly exploits this alertness to control his audience. The third approach suggests that the counterdeceiver should focus upon tactical indicators distinct from strategic assumptions, a process similar to distinguishing between new information and pre-existing beliefs. He quoted Ben-Zvi's conclusions that when strategic assumptions and tactical indicators coincide, an immediate threat is perceived and action is taken. However, when they are divergent, strategic assumption seem to always prevail, as noted in the fateful experiences at Pearl Harbor, the German attack into Russia in 1941, the Chinese intervention into Korea, and the Arab attack on Israel in 1973.²⁶ Finally, he suggests a better understanding of how the human mind works, specifically in how it processes information. Practical suggestions aimed toward avoiding preconceptions include such practices as competitive analysis, use of the devil's advocate approach to analyze deception scenarios, interdisciplinary brainstorming, and the formation of a staff charged with the responsibility to represent the perspective of the deceiver.²⁷

In summary, counterdeception theories from Mao, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, Barton Whaley, Richards Heuer and other contemporary theorists agree that the deceiver holds numerous advantages, implying that counterdeception is very difficult. Nonetheless, they suggest modern operational units must possess certain counterdeception capabilities. Intelligence concerning the enemy is vitally important; however, the processing and interpretation of that information is the most critical process. Although there are pitfalls associated with watching too carefully for the deception plot, counterdeception analysts must be specially focused upon their enemy, and they need direct access to the commander and operations officer. Additionally, counterdeception analysts must consciously review their preconceptions, avoiding fixation in a "mind set." Acumen, the ability to take the role of another and to think as he might is particularly useful in counterdeception operations. Finally, since deception is usually successful, an operational unit must conduct counterdeception operations not only in the hopes of discovering the enemy's deception, but keep the enemy off balance and guessing by posturing forces and resources to rapidly counter the effects of deception once it is detected.

SECTION THREE - HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

The European theater during World War II was the scene of many classic operational level deception schemes which significantly determined success or failure of major operations and campaigns. In fact, every significant operation in WW II devoted

a significant effort to deception.²⁸ This section describes five such operations, but takes a reverse view of deception by focusing upon what the intended victim did or failed to do to counter the deception plot. These five historical operations provide a broad background to counterdeception and suggest ways in which doctrine, training, resources, command and control staff procedures should be changed to counter enemy deception.

The Western Front - May 1940

Robert Doughty's intriguing book, The Seeds of Disaster, vividly explains why the French failed to predict or stop the German blitzkrieg during the early summer of 1940. Doughty describes the development of a doctrine which led to overreliance on the Maginot Line and to a strategy wholly inappropriate in the emerging era of mechanized warfare.²⁹

The autocratic leadership of Marshals Petain and Foch stifled subordinate independence and initiative. Uniformity and consensus were the watchwords. Since there was nothing to be learned from other Armies, they forbade French troops from adopting "German style maneuvers."³⁰ This same attitude caused the French leadership to ignore a French eyewitness account of the German attack into Poland, after which the observer and the French Intelligence section accurately predicted the form of maneuver eventually used against France.³¹ Moreover, the defensive doctrine of the French assumed that no mechanized force could penetrate the Ardennes. Therefore, General Gamelin envisioned a northern thrust through Belgium and the Netherlands as

the most probable German option. He postured 10 divisions forward of the Escault (Scheld) River into Belgium to contest a larger portion of Belgium, to provide early warning and to tie in with Belgium forces, thereby stiffening resolve against German pressure. Fearful of losing their neutral status, Belgium hesitated to coordinate war plans and reconnaissance -- resulting in tragic consequences.

The Germans initial plan (FALL GELB or Plan Yellow), captured from a misoriented German officer named Helmuth Reinberger flying across Belgium, mirrored General Gamelin's prediction. This discovery reinforced French expectations, and caused Gamelin to reposition his most mobile divisions (30 in total) to reinforce the Belgium and Netherlands approach. The 2d Army guarding the Ardennes would position its best divisions on the south, leaving his weakest to guard the center at Sedan. Gamelin kept just 18 Divisions, 3 of them armored, in reserve.³² But Hitler changed his mind, and adopted General Manstein's more daring plan involving a main attack of 45 divisions (mostly Panzer) through the Ardennes, with a supporting and diversionary attack in the northern low countries (See Map 1).

Despite the German deception efforts, the French received numerous warnings that the main attack axis would come through the Ardennes. In March, the French observed numerous German reconnaissance flights photographing the northern portion of the Maginot line. Large mechanized forces were detected near Trier and the Rhein, bridges were being built across the Rhein between

Bonn and Bingen and Germans were known to be making efforts to obtain information about roads between Sedan and Abbeville. In fact, a Swiss agent report warned the French military attache that the Germans would attack between 8 and 10 May with the main effort toward Sedan.³³ Further, French agents reported that German intelligence was completing studies of the Sedan-Charville sector, and they predicted a German offensive in early May through the Ardennes.³⁴ In fact, by April, aerial reconnaissance confirmed specific locations of Panzer divisions entering the Ardennes. However, French reconnaissance efforts were dismal. Few aircraft were allocated to coordinate with the Army and these were vulnerable to German antiaircraft and fighter aircraft. Few pilots relished overflying Germany.³⁵ On 19 May 1940, the German blitzkrieg annihilated the French Army.

BARBAROSSA: GERMAN DECEPTION AGAINST THE
SOVIET UNION, 1940-41.

In July 1940, Hitler directed the development of plans to attack in the opposite direction -- toward the Soviet Union (see Map 2). He underscored the importance of deception by stating

" it is of decisive importance that our intention should not be known.... Premature knowledge of our preparations ... might entail the gravest political and military disadvantages."³⁶

Two grand deceptions surrounded Barbarossa: the Russo-German Non-aggression Pact of August 1939 and the war with Britain. Interestingly, these were not originally conceived as deceptions at all. Even though the lack of air superiority and poor weather forced Hitler to abandon his invasion of Britain, he continued

operations there to reinforce political and military beliefs that he still intended to invade. Additionally, Hitler took advantage of a military coup in Yugoslavia to intervene militarily in the Balkans, a "supposedly" deliberate action to prevent British expansion from Crete onto the European mainland. This explanation quelled Soviet demands for clarification about the military buildup.³⁷ The German movement into Rumania was "explained" in a similar manner. Many other subsidiary operations in the Mediterranean reinforced the deception plan for Barbarossa and directed attention away from the Soviet Union.

The Germans patterned their entire deception effort within the logic of the Russo-Germany Pact and the invasion of Britain. The stationing of troops in occupied Poland was explained as necessary for quartering troops, averting food shortages, and rest and recuperation. More conspicuous Panzer and motorized formations were described to both the German and Soviet people as necessary for defense against possible aggression from newly acquired territories.³⁸ The Propaganda Branch of OKW directed public opinion. Even more extensive was Hitler's deception of his own troops. He convinced them that their movement to the border frontier and frequent rail loading drills were designed to hold off the Russians and use better training areas while he attacked Britain. As a result, movement of 77 divisions from France and Germany and 44 divisions in Poland, East Prussia and Rumania to the eastern frontiers was accomplished gradually using railroads with peacetime movement schedules.

Secrecy of the plan, released to very few men in the German hierarchy and withheld from the field commanders until the day before, prevented the Soviets from verifying any information. Moreover, during the period February through 21 June, the Germans elaborately concealed the headquarters and formations being massed for the attack. The Luftwaffe was prohibited from establishing any forward basing until the day before. Nonetheless, extensive German reconnaissance was accomplished through dummy air mapping agencies, a pilot training school, and Lufthansa facilities in Helsinki which operated flights to all major Soviet air bases and ports.³⁹ Soviet soldiers were restricted from firing on the German aircraft to avoid provocation. A major bomber offensive against Britain in mid-March also aided the deception plot. During the last 28 days, strict radio silence was imposed, negating Soviet wire intercepts.⁹⁶ Infantry and Panzer divisions were moved into their assembly areas beginning only 12 days and 4 days respectively prior to the attack. Night tactical movement and avoidance of the local population minimized Soviet information from agents and informers. To insure surprise, air force strikes upon Soviet airfields were restricted to hours of darkness immediately preceding the ground attack with only 30 of their bombers.

Despite the German's elaborate deception and operational security operations, the Soviets had every possibility of discovering and correctly interpreting German invasion intentions. However, Stalin personally controlled the intelligence

apparatus. The purges of 1937/8 prevented any military leader from questioning his decisions or assessments. Information from British and American spies, anonymous letters received by the Soviet military attache in Berlin, intelligence from the capture of Rudolph Hess, and Soviet agents in Germany and France all provided information of the pending attack. Yet the infallible Stalin passed these reports off as capitalist attempts to provoke war with Germany.⁴⁰ The 4th Army facing the German concentration along the Bug River was all too aware of German activity by 7 June, particularly German bridging operations. By 17 June, the NKVD knew the exact date of the attack.⁴¹ Yet, none of this information was distributed laterally or integrated beyond the collecting command. As such, no information received by Stalin was sufficiently unambiguous to convince him of an all-out surprise attack.

Soviet forces were positioned far forward. However, reconnaissance troops were kept away from the borders to prevent antagonizing the Germans. No large mobile reserves were created, despite the pleading of Zhukov who stressed modern offensive operations integrating mechanized and combat aviation units.⁴² Soviet forces were caught transitioning from the "Stalin Line" to forward positions, abandoning supplies and installations, and severing lines of communications.

In summary, Stalin was not prepared to change his view that the Germans were focusing upon Britain and would not risk a war with him until 1942. His view was consistent with the Non-

aggression Pact.⁴³ Politically, Stalin expected gradually increasing demands from the Germans before they would use military force to implement their demands.⁴⁴ The German deception worked because: the Soviets were deployed mainly in the Ukraine, they were technologically unprepared (tanks, airframes and aircraft engines) to spoil or deter an attack, they failed to recognize the tactical signs of attack and were overwhelmed by the superior mobility of the Germans. On June 22, 1941, the Germans attacked.

OPERATION CITADEL AND RUMYANTSEV: KURSK JULY 1943

"The Bolsheviks are our superiors in only one field --
espionage." Hitler, 17 May 1942⁴⁵

In the summer of 1943, the Russians countered the surprise armored pincer attack against the Kursk salient mounted by Field Marshal Manstein commanding Army Group South. Soviet operations there portray how the rapid reactions of the intended victim can foil initial successes of the deception plot (see map 3).

Hitler desperately needed a victory to resume the offensive and thereby cripple the Soviet capability to mount a summer offensive. Mannstein felt victory could be achieved with an April counteroffensive; however, critical delays in positioning troops, sustainment, and deployment of the new Panther and Tiger tanks delayed the attack until 4 July.

Early discovery of the intended German surprise attack via a Soviet agent "Lucy" in mid-April enabled the Soviets to alter their offensive plans and prepare impregnable defenses. Receipt of reliable information about the attack allowed them to ignore, and in fact exploit, the German deception plans. They con-

centrated two armies in eight defensive circles around Kursk. The Soviet defense were far more formidable than the Germans expected and were greatly strengthened by the imaginative use of numerous new T-34 tanks. The Soviets maintained air superiority from the outset. Aggressive reconnaissance combined with the targeting of German rail and road networks tripled. As a result, the Soviet Air forces were able to launch a preemptive air strike (albeit indecisive) prior to the German artillery preparation.⁴⁶ After early success, General Hoth, commanding the German IV Panzer Army (main effort) in the south maneuvered directly into the Soviet defenses. The 1st Tank Army repositioned from the Voronezh Front reserve near Oboyan. Attempts to avoid the strong Soviet defenses were countered by the 5th Guards Army and 5th Guards Tank Army from the reserve (Steppe) Front. Hoth was soundly defeated in the greatest tank battle in history. The stalled offensive pincer in the north coupled with the Allied landing on Sicily completed the German demise in the East.

Although neither side achieved complete operational surprise, the operations at Kursk reveal important counterdeception lessons. First, despite Soviet "perfect intelligence," the Germans (Hoth) were still able to achieve limited surprise. Relying upon assumptions provided by the intelligence, the Soviets had to reposition critical reserves early in the operation to avoid defeat by Hoth's change in plans. Nevertheless, the balanced posture of the Soviets allowed them to absorb the initial disadvantages of the deception effort and respond

successfully. Second, Manstein recounts in his book Lost Victories the critical absence of accurate operational and strategic information about Soviet operational reserves, particularly the five Armies of the Steppe Front.⁴⁷ The Germans lacked both aerial and ground reconnaissance in depth, and could not break the Soviet signal codes. Finally, the Germans had underestimated the Soviet capability to recover quickly from heavy losses, and resume the offensive.

OPERATION FORTITUDE: JUNE 1944

... the largest, most elaborate, most carefully-planned, most vital, and most successful of all the Allied deception operations. It made full use of the years of experience gained in every branch of deceptive art - visual deception and misdirection, the deployment of dummy landing craft, aircraft and paratroops, fake lighting schemes, radio deception, sonic devices and ultimately a whole fictitious Army Group.⁴⁸

In reality, FORTITUDE SOUTH was only one, although undeniably the most important, of many deception schemes involved in Plan BODYGUARD. This overall deception plan for the invasion of Normandy served a multiplicity of threats to the Axis. It divided the enemy's attention, fixed his forces in locations removed from the real landing sites and convinced them that the invasion of France would occur later than actually planned.

The details of the Allied deception plan are fairly well known; however, several key factors deserve reiteration. The Allied planners realized they must prevent the commitment of German strategic and operational reserves to insure success of the D-Day landings. As General Erfurth suggests, total surprise was neither necessary nor would it be achieved; only relative

surprise was important.⁴⁹ Success depended upon disguising the location, time, and strength of the Allied landings. Therefore, Fortitude NORTH (invasion of Norway) was a main part of the deception effort. It involved the creation of the fictitious British 4th Army in Scotland and Ireland which caused the Germans to position vital forces in Norway rather than reinforce Rommel in Normandy.⁵⁰ Likewise, the deception plan accompanying the Normandy invasion involved the false massing of troops (First U.S. Group - FUSAG) at Kent, England to be commanded by General George S. Patton, with the mission of landing at the Pas-de-Calais. The deception plan thus reinforced German preconceptions that the main attack would involve the First Army Group at the Pas-De-Calais because of the shorter air and sea lines of communications and operations, and rapid access to the Ruhr and Rhine. Misinformation campaigns, elaborate camouflage and fake facilities (landing craft, ammunition dumps, hospitals, and kitchens) provided the visual deception. False convoys and bombing raids aimed at Calais continued past the invasion date, fixing critical German operational reserves in the north.

FORTITUDE's author, Roger Fleetwood Hesketh, states that a few controlled agents, assisted by the British maintenance of absolute operational and strategic security, were the most valuable deception asset. These "special means" became the paramount instrument, while physical, visual and other deception methods were secondary "risk insurance." Additionally, Allied overestimation of the German reconnaissance, espionage and

intelligence capabilities required them to employ all the normal invasion deception preparations. Hesketh concluded that the deception staff must answer directly to the Commander-in-Chief, independent of the operational staff. Detailed planning of both the real and the false operation in the same staff tended to divide rather than unify. Here he credited Prime Minister Churchill with the personal strength and leadership to create new organizations to wage political, economic and secret warfare, and with the foresight to mobilize civilian intellectual talent.⁵¹

In summary, the Germans failed to detect the elaborate Allied deception plan. Nonexistent German air reconnaissance (due to Allied air superiority) and signal compromise forced the German General Staff to rely almost solely upon the reports supplied by British-controlled agents. Allied successes were greatly assisted by German preconceptions, particularly Hitler's obsessive fears about an Allied landing in Scandinavia.⁵² Hesketh states that "what is or is not possible matters less than what the enemy believes to be possible."⁵³ In the end, German forces were malpositioned and unable to prevent the Allied landings.

THE BULGE: WINTER 1944/45.

The Allies, despite their deception prowess during Operation FORTITUDE, proved that even the best deception experts can fall prey to a skillful deception plan. In December 1944, the Allies were threatening a breakthrough at the German west Wall (Siegfried Line) near Aachen, and preparing for a continued winter

offensive toward the Ruhr industrial region. Hitler, fighting defensive operations in both the east and west, desperately needed a victory. He decided to strike an offensive blow to separate the American and British Army Groups, secure the port of Antwerp and hope for a negotiated peace.

The Germans devised a deception plan to exploit Allied preconceptions. Code named WACHT AM RHEIN (WATCH ON THE RHINE), they used their existing defensive positions along the Rhine River to portray the buildup of forces intended to blunt the Allied penetration. In reality, their objective was to prevent the Allies from concentrating in the Ardennes where Hitler had chosen his counteroffensive⁵⁴ (see Map 5). The Germans moved the Sixth Panzer Army onto the plains near Cologne, intentionally obvious to Allied intelligence. Likewise, the 5th Panzer Army Headquarters and a fictitious 25th Army headquarters moved from Lorraine to Aachen, presumably to bolster the German defense against Allied armored thrusts. Meanwhile, preparations for the Ardennes counteroffensive were kept in strict secrecy. Troops were moved only at night, all movement and activity within the Ardennes was masked with overhead aircraft flights and noise and light discipline was strictly observed. Moreover, Hitler restricted details of the deception plan and counteroffensive to a handful of military commanders, and insisted that any communications concerning it be handled by courier only, thus negating the ULTRA intercepts the Allies depended upon.

On 16 December 1944, the Germans attacked with 24 Divisions, 10 of them armored. Eight Panzer Divisions seemingly appeared from nowhere and descended upon the U.S. VIII Corps. Eisenhower was forced to commit his operational reserves in piecemeal fashion to block the penetration. The German deception plan achieved its intended surprise effect by advancing to within a few kilometers of crossing the Meuse at Dinant.

Although Hitler's desperate gamble eventually failed, it is important to analyze why the Allies, particularly the U.S., were victim of his deception effort. First, the Allies were overconfident. They were enjoying success in pushing the Germans back to their borders and knew Hitler was facing defeat. Moreover, the Ardennes was used as a resting area for battle-weary units, as well as an indoctrination area for new troops arriving in theater. For these reasons, tactical intelligence and reconnaissance were extremely poor. Second, the Allies were fixated upon the predisposition of enemy intentions and capabilities. Reinforced by the supposed "impregnable" Ardennes terrain, they assumed the enemy incapable of offensive action, and would therefore continue defense of the West Wall. A German offensive there was considered a supporting attack only. Third, the intelligence estimate and planning process reflected this same complacency. No alternative plans or sequels were planned. No one asked "what if..."? Had this been done, the appropriate intelligence information would have been sought. Fourth, the Allies failed to assess accurately the enemy leadership or, indeed, who

was in charge. The Germans called from retirement the conservative von Rundstedt to lead the offensive; however, Hitler was the real "operational" commander. Finally, the over reliance upon ULTRA to penetrate the enemy intelligence network and discover or confirm intended operations lulled the Allies into complacency. The Germans bypassed this technological advantage by keeping their deception plans off the wire. Tactical indicators and intelligence leaks signalling the pending German offensive were discounted because ULTRA failed to confirm them.

In summary, a review of theory and history suggests that the U.S theater Army possess the following counterdeception capabilities. First, a special staff element formed to model the enemy should continually wargame courses of action with the alternative assumptions that the enemy is and is not utilizing deception. Therefore, not all staff analysts and operational planners need assume they are being deceived, since this often leads to operational paralysis. Second, operational commanders and staffs should maintain an accurate assessment of enemy capabilities, doctrine, operations and command personalities. Moreover, they should continually reassess how the enemy may use training, exercises and operations as deception activities. Third, the intelligence staff and analysts must continually maintain an awareness of friendly preconceptions and biases when interpreting intelligence information, as well as an appreciation of operational and intelligence system weaknesses and strengths. Conditioning is the principle technique used by the deceiver to

reduce alertness. This causes the victim to form an inaccurate picture of the deceiver's capabilities, resulting in imbalance, procrastination and inactivity. Fourth, the operational commander must maintain operational balance in his forces and maintain the highest possible readiness in his equipment, doctrine and organizational structure. Fifth, the operational planner must insert frequent and random changes. Seizure of the initiative, even at the tactical level, will often upset the enemy's deception plan, reduce enemy confidence in his deception plan, and perhaps persuade him to abandon it altogether. Moreover, he must maintain active reconnaissance while confirming each indication with multiple sources of collection rather than rely upon technological sources alone. At the same time, he must deny information to the enemy information through strict operational security measures. Finally, when an enemy deception plan has been discovered, he should exploit it. This requires a reliable direct feedback channel (such as agents) from the deceiver's decision-making element to determine if his counterdeception activities have been transmitted, received and accepted.

SECTION FOUR - COUNTERDECEPTION DOCTRINE

FM 100-5, Operations, FM 100-6, Large Unit Operations, FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception, and FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations define deception at the tactical and operational levels and suggest general capabilities of units to perform deception. However, these references do not mention or endorse the concept or doctrine of counterdeception.

Nonetheless, the tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine emphasize "the ability of the leader to avoid the enemy's efforts to degrade his own capabilities before or during battle".⁵⁵ The discussion of initiative [forcing the enemy to conform to our operational purpose and tempo while retaining freedom of action] describes the role of intelligence to "seek advance warning" and frustrate or preclude adjustments by the enemy once he is committed to a particular action.⁵⁶ The discussion of agility, a prerequisite for initiative, begins to suggest pro-action to disrupt enemy plans and identify his vulnerabilities. It also stresses the importance of acting without complete information to avoid lethargy or inactivity which is precisely the intent of enemy deception efforts.⁵⁷ Likewise, operational depth provides one measure of protection of friendly vulnerabilities.

Two principles of war contained within AirLand battle doctrine are applicable to counterdeception: security and surprise. Security means that "we must never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage on the battlefield."⁵⁸ It enhances the commander's freedom of action by reducing his vulnerability to enemy deception. In this sense, effective counterdeception can prevent the enemy from achieving surprise, as well as cause him to expend valuable resources pursuing an unproductive deception operation. FM 100-5 cautions, however, that security measures should "not be allowed to interfere with the flexibility of thought and action, since rigidity and dogmatism increase vulnerability to enemy surprise."⁵⁹ Similarly,

the principle of surprise stresses the concealment of one's intentions and capabilities, accomplished by such factors as speed and enthusiasm, deception, alternative tactics and operations, operational security and effective intelligence.⁶⁰

FM 100-6, Large Unit Operations, is more specific regarding intelligence functions at the operational level of war, but does not acknowledge the concept of counterdeception outright. However, it does present five applicable points. First, operational intelligence is more uncertain and must project operations well into the future, rendering it uniquely vulnerable to enemy deception. Second, operational intelligence tasks must probe the mind of the enemy commander. Third, political, economic and technological factors materially affect the operational battlefield. Therefore, the operational commander often relies upon or requires access to information normally accessible only through strategic collection means. Fourth, providing strategic intelligence even to operational level commanders risks compromise, particularly in a combined or coalition organization such as NATO. Finally, these risks can be mitigated by insuring that facts are clearly distinguished from assumptions and estimates, and by ensuring that estimates and recommendations are not constrained by preconceived expectations or preferences.⁶¹

Perhaps one reason for our doctrinal failure to recognize counterdeception is because the JCS Pub 1-DOD definition clearly divorces "counterdeception [from] ... the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations."⁶² Furthermore, the

DOD definition of counterintelligence only mentions activities "to prevent hostile intelligence collection", and omits counterdeception as well. In short, a doctrinal gap exists. The Army does not recognize counterdeception, nor is it a counterintelligence function. This doctrinal gap is true in practice as well. Phone conversations with deception and intelligence and electronic warfare officers in NATO's Central Army Group, the Combined Field Army in Korea, and the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth confirmed that neither intelligence officers or deception officers are responsible for counterdeception operations.⁶³

This doctrinal gap prompted an Intelligence School observer at the Joint Exercise ULCHI FOCUS LENS 87 to comment

"due to voids in doctrine, the intelligence community does not analyze intelligence data to identify enemy deception plans. Additionally, there is no doctrine to develop counterdeception plans."⁶⁴

Discussions concerning the above problem stated the need for improved G-2/3 interface, better analysis and identification of enemy deception plans by intelligence analysts and the production of a counterdeception plan to gain advantage. It recommended the Army should develop counterdeception doctrine.

The Intelligence School acknowledges that counterdeception is not currently included in the mission area development plan (MADP). Current intelligence doctrine does not address the possibility of enemy deception and the need to analyze collected intelligence data for deception."⁶⁵ Furthermore, the Combined Arms Center confirmed the validity of the observation, and stated that "increased awareness of deception, both friendly and enemy,

is being created by emerging command, control, and communications countermeasures (C³CM) doctrine, and in recently published deception doctrine, FM 90-2."** In fact, while FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception corrects many of the problems in integrating deception into the doctrine of AirLand Battle, it does not address the identification or defeat of enemy deception schemes.

In summary, none of these U.S. Army doctrinal references include counterdeception, suggesting that AirLand Battle doctrine is incomplete. It is not enough to have two opposing deception plans rivaling each other; history suggests an active, aggressive plan to counter enemy deception is a necessary ingredient.

Knowledge of deception operations and theory is a logical and fundamental prerequisite to counterdeception operations. This realization convinced the U.S. Army to begin training and providing deception staffs within U.S. divisions, corps and Echelons Above Corps (EAC) beginning in 1987. A 10-man planning staff (only) is envisioned for USAREUR, USARSO, AND WESTCOM.

However, the mission statements of the Corps/EAC level deception staff omit any requirement for counterdeception analysis or plans. Their stated capabilities require them to

provide technical employment, deployment and operational assistance in deception operations to subordinate units; develop plans for deception operations; develop deception annexes; coordinate the integration of deception planning and execution into actual campaigns and battles or engagements; plan friendly deception events using friendly force profiles and signatures and determine friendly OPSEC vulnerabilities and enemy susceptibilities using established data bases

on threat reconnaissance and surveillance assets.⁶⁷

Only two of those capabilities have applicability to counter-deception, namely the requirement for the integration of deception planning and the identification of friendly susceptibilities to enemy deception operations. Equally discouraging, the TO&E for the Theater Army Headquarters Company is still being developed and validated. This must occur before deception staffs at EAC are identified, trained and become operational in the field.

In summary, it is clear that our doctrine does not recognize the requirement to detect and counter enemy deception operations. As a result, proponency for counterdeception doesn't exist at all. Soviet deception doctrine, on the other hand, has realized significant improvements.

SECTION FIVE - SOVIET DECEPTION AND NATO VULNERABILITIES: A CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS

Deception and surprise in Soviet doctrine has slowly recovered from the legacy of Stalin. Prior to World War II, leaders often lacked confidence in their offensive operation abilities and seldom conducted deceptive and large-scale surprise operations.⁶⁸ Moreover, Stalin generally discounted the efficacy of deception and surprise, downgrading them to so-called "non-military operating factors" of the war. The full integration of operational surprise and deception came about only after Stalin's death in 1953, prior to which discussions of deception were not permitted.⁶⁹ Since then, the Soviets have thoroughly integrated deception into their operational doctrine. They vowed never again

should the USSR be caught unaware by a surprise enemy attack experienced on June 22, 1941.

The Soviets do not distinguish between tactical and strategic surprise; rather, they emphasize only that the means of deception can vary. These include misleading the enemy as to their intentions by tactical and operational camouflage, feigning action or disseminating false information, neutralization and active jamming of enemy communications, maintenance of a high level of combat readiness and concealment of mobilization. Operational surprise is one of the most important principles of military art, entailing the selection of proper timing, mode and manner of military action, striking the enemy when he least expects it and paralyzing his will to resist.⁷⁰ The invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan illustrate the use of training exercises and maneuvers (much like the Germans did prior to BARBAROSSA) as deceptive covers for the deployment of military forces. Finally, Soviet Intelligence has been expanded and standardized since the purges of Stalin. The Information Center at the Central Committee coordinates intelligence gathering and assessments. In 1959, deception planning was centralized in a special KGB department called the Disinformation Department.⁷¹

Today, the Soviets conclude that advantages produced by surprise and deception operations are essential. A war with NATO must be won quickly, namely during the period between the start of hostilities and NATO's mobilization, concentration and deployment and before defensive preparations can be completed or

nuclear weapons employed.⁷² NATO's reinforcement plans would be preempted and obstacle fortifications would be reduced, resulting in a series of meeting engagements rather than breakthrough operations. Also, large forces would be unnecessary, thus avoiding the massing of vulnerable large concentrations. Operational maneuver groups would be easier to insert with longer lasting effects and casualties and logistical burdens would be reduced.⁷³

Richard K. Betts, in his book entitled Surprise Attack, offers several reasons a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack in NATO might succeed, underscoring NATO's vulnerability to deception operations and surprise attack. First, warning is a necessary but insufficient condition for avoiding surprise. The issue in most cases is not whether warning or response time exists, but how much warning there is and how soon response begins. Each step of the intelligence process (data acquisition, correlation and decision to warn, communications with decisionmakers, deliberation, assessment and decision to respond, and implementing response) consumes time relative to the attackers speed in preparation. Second, there are significant bureaucratic organizational and procedural obstacles which delay warning. The volume of data, the scattering of warning indicators across units (compartmented for security's sake) and the relaying of information distort its meaning. Third, there are limits to predictability. Mathematical probability is of little use when there is a small number of cases on which to base data. Constant and routine tensions lower the sensitivity of intelligence observers

to the dangers of war. Moreover there is inherent danger in basing predictions on extrapolations of the past behavior. Fourth, data accumulation and policy decisions outpace analysis during crisis situations. Uncertainty reflects inadequacy--the analyst's dilemma. When the environment lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data and allows no time for assessment, intuition and wishfulness drive interpretation. The allure of deferring decisions such as waiting for the enemy to play more diplomatic moves, giving diplomacy one more chance, or erroneously thinking one still has the initiative or time to sufficiently react result in indecision and inactivity. NATO's deterrent strategy promotes this attitude, presenting a significant dilemma between deterrence, provocation or preemption. Finally, effective deception inhibits the revision of estimates. The attacker can conceal changes behind normal procedures, or flood the intelligence system with indicators to confuse and delay the response. Even new technology and doctrinal applications, although temporary in effect, may produce sufficient relative surprise.⁷⁴

Considering Soviet deception doctrine and NATO's susceptibility to such operations, the "perfect Blitzkrieg" scenario in NATO may resemble Vigor's example described in his book, Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory.⁷⁵ He believes the Warsaw Pact would launch an attack from a "standing start" using only those 62 divisions in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The advantages of surprise achieved through the speed of these "smaller" formations fully compensate for the lack of mass. The attack would take

place at an unexpected time and place, for instance Christmas Eve, catch NATO off balance, induce a paralyzing effect (similar to the Manchurian and Vistula-Oder campaigns) and take advantage of winter and longer hours of darkness. To avoid unnecessary warning, Soviet reconnaissance in front of forward detachments would not be used extensively, and only to secure critical junctions rather than to contact NATO forces. Simultaneously, Soviet airborne forces would attack key NATO installations in the rear. Ground forces such as the 3d Shock Army could reach the outskirts of Hannover within 4 hours (30 kilometers per hour) while NATO forces are just responding. It would bypass these areas to attack deeper, more vital territory on the Rhine, accompanied by missile and air strikes at NATO nuclear delivery means, C3 nodes and logistical supply centers. Deception will be central to the operation, particularly during pre-hostilities.

This analysis of Soviet doctrine, NATO vulnerabilities, and a possible Soviet deception/surprise attack against NATO suggest U.S. operational forces must possess certain capabilities to counter enemy deception operations. First, the Soviets have not totally discarded the Stalinist image; originality and perhaps eccentricity is neither encouraged nor tolerated. Disagreement or alternative ideas or schemes are stifled. In this regard, U.S. operational analysts should be capable of discovering Soviet deception practices due to repetitive, consistent patterns. For instance, the Soviets do not try to hide their troop formations; but rather attempt to explain and justify them under other guises

such as field maneuvers (cases in point -- Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan). Second, U.S. planners must capitalize on Soviet multisource reconnaissance which provide many opportunities for U.S. counterdeception operations. Third, perhaps the best counterdeception method to use against the Soviets is to convince the Soviet commander his deception effort will not work as planned by overburdening his intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities, interrupting his command and control and invalidating his data bases required for decision making. Fourth, Soviet deception operations can backfire in several ways. Recognizing the deception ploy, the target may bolster his defenses. If the deception effort is to hide a vulnerability, the "bluff" may be called and the weakness exploited. Moreover, there always exists the potential of self-deception, accepting one's own bluff as reality.⁷⁶ Finally, some regard technology to detect enemy intentions as a Soviet weakness and a U.S. strength. Certainly U.S. capabilities to exploit sophisticated surveillance technology (satellites, electronic support, communications intercepts, and data analysis computerization) are impressive. However, Major General F.W. von Mellethin wisely cautions NATO by suggesting

intelligence means have made it unlikely that a Warsaw Pact offensive in Central Europe could achieve strategic surprise. However, history is replete with examples of successful surprise attacks achieved under equally difficult circumstances through secrecy, deception, and the shuttered mind-set of the defender.⁷⁷

In reality, a technological advantage in surveillance may be only temporary. The Soviets believe

Although modern means make it difficult to fully conceal preparations for a large scale offensive, concealment of the true scale, and especially the direction and timing of the main attack are ... quite achievable tasks which always occupy the center of attention.⁷⁸

Experts who rely on technology, analogous perhaps to the Allied reliance on ULTRA during WW II, may ignore three significant points. If the aggressor's objective is limited, then tell-tale preparations will be correspondingly limited. Second, surveillance merely provides voluminous data. The key is rapid and accurate interpretation and dissemination. Finally, surprise need not be total, only relative. In many cases, technology makes deception easier, certainly when attempting to distinguish between offensive and defensive preparations and exercises.⁷⁹

In summary, NATO operational units must perfect their capabilities to use, not abuse, their technological advantages and training against Soviet vulnerabilities to detect enemy deception, defeat it through counterdeception measures, and maintain a balanced posture to respond to enemy deception if discovered in progress.

Despite NATO vulnerabilities to Soviet deception, Betts suggests several effective methods to counter it. First, since the Soviets would desire complete and continuous surprise through the disruption of NATO C3 capabilities to cause confusion, panic and chaos and keep NATO off-balance, NATO must improve its interoperability, coordination and resistance to electronic counter-measures. Second, operational speed is the most powerful antidote to surprise. Therefore, NATO planners should concentrate on ways

to countersurprise the Soviets by doing the unexpected such as targeting C3 nodes rather than units. Third, mechanized forces should dismount, fight grudgingly for terrain, and thus upset the Soviet timetable. Fourth, while the necessity and consequent problems of forward defense prohibit operational depth, plans must be quickly and easily adjustable (flexibility and choice). Additionally, although sure to meet with obvious objections, averting surprise suggests delegating greater authority to operational commanders to institute and accelerate high levels of alert without NATO council or governmental authorization. Perhaps a more flexible alert program which emphasizes "tit-for-tat" responses to East German/Czechoslovakian maneuvers would reduce the cry-wolf syndrome and increase the readiness obstacle the Soviets must overcome to achieve surprise. Fifth, a better fixed forward defense might release troops for a more mobile reserve (unlike the Maginot Line where the defenses did not extend far enough and where mobile reserves were significantly lacking).⁸⁰ A fortified belt, for which the Soviets historically have the utmost respect, would delay the surprise effects, force the enemy to echelon his forces and require him to use reserve forces earlier. Operational flexibility is also desirable to cope with unexpected tactics, technologies and doctrinal surprise. Said differently, NATO's senior commanders should accept the high probability of deception, and plan alternative offensive actions. Finally, Betts suggests that rehearsals in political decision

making and contingency planning would enhance response time and interpretation of strategic and operational indicators.

SECTION SIX - CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This study concludes that there are significant gaps between historical and theoretically-derived requirements to counter enemy deception and our current ability to do so at the operational level. These gaps lie specifically in the areas of doctrine, training, resources and command and staff processes.

DOCTRINE: First and foremost, there is no recognition of the concept of counterdeception in the Army. Moreover, the current DCD definition of counterdeception does not include the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations, nor is it a counterintelligence requirement. This doctrinal gap requires an immediate solution.

There is no recognized Army deception doctrine requiring the analysis of intelligence data to identify possible enemy deception operations for Echelons Above Corps in a joint and combined environment. JCS MOP 116 and the AirLand Forces Application Agency publication of the Joint Deception Operations Manual do not meet this doctrinal shortfall. Before counterdeception at the operational level can be tackled, deception at that level must be understood and institutionalized.

Although deception proponency has been transferred to Fort Huachuca from Ft. Leavenworth's Combined Arms Center, neither claims proponency for counterdeception. The C³CM directorate at CAC should assume this responsibility.

FM 100-5 and 100-6 stress offensive action and initiative. These same ingredients must be incorporated into an aggressive counterdeception doctrine. The attitude should be anticipation rather than the practice of purely defensive measures. Lethargy and inactivity are the prime goals of Soviet deception.

TRAINING: Deception elements for division and corps levels currently training at Fort Huachuca do not study counterdeception doctrine, operations, or techniques. Moreover, deception and counterdeception training is not a stand alone function for the Intelligence School; they must be accepted and implemented throughout the Army. Likewise, Training Support Task Lists submitted by Fort Huachuca for inclusion in TRADOC military schools lack the same emphasis. The Army currently uses the Air Force's C³CM school for leader and staff deception training. This school should be expanded to include counterdeception, with particular emphasis on joint and combined operations.

Similarly, our operational exercises (ULCHI FOCUS LENS, REFORGER) and CPX simulations such as BTCF fail to consider, incorporate, integrate or rehearse counterdeception operations into the scenarios, preventing the learning of lessons and the development of doctrine.

If enemy deception is discovered too late, then a defensive posture which emphasizes balance, as well as speed of reaction, is the best antidote. Units must train to this standard.

In summary, if the U.S. Army recognized counterdeception doctrinally, certain training requirements would naturally

follow. Training methods and technologies must emphasize the detection of enemy deception, the exploitation of the enemy's plan, and the flexibility to react to enemy deception operations.

RESOURCES: The 10-man Army level (EAC) deception element has not been developed or approved. If it has a charter similar to tactical counterparts, it will omit the mission of conducting counterdeception operations. Moreover, the current single deception officer at Army and Army Group levels is incapable of planning and conducting counterdeception operations, let alone receiving and incorporating counterdeception activities conducted by national/strategic assets.

Intelligence support, to include surveillance technology, "special measures" and data processing is essential to counterdeception operations. However, the key lies in the analysis rather than the collection of enemy information.

COMMAND AND STAFF PROCESSES: Counterdeception operations require very talented deception analysts skillful in thinking like the enemy. The collection, processing and interpretation of enemy deception operations requires the use of alternative hypothesis, competitive analysis (devil's advocate) and brainstorming to avoid stereotyping or inducement to preconceptions projected by the enemy deception effort. Standardized or predictive intelligence can greatly assist in the accumulation, sorting, and interpretation of volumes of data, but must not constitute the sole basis for decision or counterdeception operations. Overcentralization to facilitate information collec-

tion and analysis must not fall victim to party line interpretation. Moreover, the commander must have a continuous flow of important information. This requires active reconnaissance (to include agents and national strategic assets) and special organizations or staffs with direct access to the commander.

Staffs and commanders must work diligently to eliminate preconceptions, particularly those which endorse "standardized" descriptions of Soviet operational limitations ("templating and predictive intelligence tools") and infallible Allied operational and technological superiority. Likewise, the commander and staff must be aware of enemy deception operations and be willing to reevaluate expectations (openmindedness) about his own as well as the enemy's vulnerabilities. A commander/staff relationship which stifles candor and subordinate opinion is easy prey to enemy deception. Decision aides and guides which indicate enemy deception activities and suggest methods of defeating or exploiting them will accelerate the counterdeception effort.

Finally, operational staffs and commanders must develop alternative plans which emphasize balance, agility and the possibility of unexpected and unanticipated enemy actions.

In conclusion, counterdeception must become an integrated part of AirLand Battle doctrine if there is any hope of defeating or avoiding being victimized by Soviet/Warsaw Pact deception operations. Armed with the proper doctrine, training, equipment and command/staff procedures, U.S. Army operational units can develop the capabilities to defeat the Soviets at their own game.

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
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
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GERMAN INVASION OF FRANCE

MAP 1



----- ARMY GROUP BOUNDARY

----- ARMY BOUNDARY

■ INFANTRY DIVISION

□ PARATROOP DIVISION

■ PANZER DIVISION

□ REFITTING
OR
FORMING

MILES

150

KILOMETERS

250

NORTH SEA

NETHERLANDS

ROTTERDAM

18 Pz

ANTWERP

1 SS Pz

BRUSSELS

GERMANY

Rhine

GREAT
BRITAIN

LONDON

CALAIS

BOULOGNE

ENGLISH CHANNEL

DIEPPE

CHERBOURG

LE HAVRE

Fifteenth Army
(Salmuth)

OB West (Rundstedt)

Army Group 'B'
(Rommel)

116 Pz

21 Pz

12 SS Pz

Pz Lehr

ORLEANS

Loire

Loire

XXXXX

LE MANS

Seventh Army
(Dollmann)

ST NAZAIRE

275

F R A N C E

17 SS Pz Gr

First Army
(Chevallier)

11 Pz

BORDEAUX

159

276

2 SS Pz

TOULOUSE

Army Group 'G'
(Blaskowitz)

189

Nineteenth Army
(Wiesel)

9 Pz

MARSEILLES

157

271

277

272

TOULON

148

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