The Development of the Theory and Doctrine of Operational Art in the American Army, 1920-1940
Abstract
Operational art as a focus for U.S. military doctrine has only recently emerged in our manuals. Initially, operational art emerged during the interwar period. Reflecting upon the experience of World War I, German and Soviet theorists recognized that mass armies and new technologies required successive military operations. Operational art was developed to provide the conceptual framework for successive operations. This monograph seeks to answer the question, Was operational art developed in the U.S. Army during the interwar years? This paper uses lectures and texts from the curricular archives of the Command and General Staff College and the War College to analyze the theory and doctrine of the interwar period. The criteria used to evaluate the doctrine are: elements of campaign planning, sophistication of approach (role of logistics, joint and combined operations), and operational concepts. The key operational concepts examined are phased operations, culminating point, center of gravity, and lines of operation. This study concludes that operational art did exist in the American army during the interwar period. The implications of this study suggest that the interwar emphasis on concentration and planning may be useful to current doctrine developers.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 22, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA195657
Entities
People
- Michael R. Matheny
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College