A Clausewitzian Victory: The 1973 Ramadan War

Abstract

This monograph analyzes the 1973 Yom Kippur War in light of the interrelationship between successful military actions and the attainment of political objectives. The major proposition that evolves from this analysis is instructive in the study of the strategic level of war. The central relationship of means, ways and ends form the foundation of this study. Both the Israelis and the Egyptians discovered the importance of this relationship at various times during the campaign. The Arab use of political pressure and the 'oil weapon' caused the Israeli long-term definition of victory to be something very different from what was initially sought. The Egyptians employed military actions in an attempt to achieve limited political objectives. Keywords: End stage, Strategic goals, Operational art.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 25, 1988
Accession Number
ADA196037

Entities

People

  • Alvin Washington

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Air Defense
  • Air Force
  • Defense Systems
  • Doctrine
  • Early Warning Systems
  • Geography
  • Lessons Learned
  • Military Operations
  • Military Strategy
  • National Security
  • Security
  • United States
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare
  • Warning Systems
  • Weapons

Fields of Study

  • Education

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies