The Military-Political Linkage in Coalition Warfare: A Korean Case Study
Abstract
This monograph examines the linkage between military operations and political goals in the setting of coalition warfare. The next war for the US army is likely to be fought for limited ends, with limited resources and limited freedom of action. The military commander must be able to plan operations which support the nation's political aims. He must further do so with the scarce resources made available to him and within the restraints placed upon his freedom of action by political decision makers. At the same time he must be able to reconcile US goals with those of the other member(s) of the coalition within which the US is fighting. The Korean War provides an excellent vehicle for examining the military-political relationships as well as the friction caused by differences within an alliance. The monograph begin by tracing the evolution of US strategy and foreign policy to determine US reasons for entering the war. It then examines the war in four phases. In each phase South Korea and US political goals are compared, military operations reviewed, and a determination made as to whether military operations supported the political objectives of that phase. This methodology leads to the conclusion that the failure of the military, notably MacArthur, to understand and/or accept the concept of limited war and the restraints it entails unnecessarily widened and prolonged the war.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 26, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA196041
Entities
People
- Thomas M. Schmidt
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College