Peacetime Campaign Planning Versus the Realties of Combat, the Need for an Operational Mechanism
Abstract
This monograph explores the issue of whether or not the United States Army should have an institutional mechanism to collect, interpret and apply the lessons of operational combat in order to correct the inevitable errors of peacetime planning and the lack of experience in waging war at the operational level. It begins by accepting von Moltke's observation that no plan survives first contact with the enemy and examines the implications of that statement for an Army that must prepare in peacetime for the complex task of waging war at the operational level. The paper first defines the operational level of war and then examines how operational doctrine and theory are effected by the harsh realities of combat. This is accomplished through the medium of a campaign analysis using the Soviet Operation Gallop of January 1943 as a vehicle. This campaign is one of the best examples of an operationally inexperienced army learning from the lessons of combat and applying those lessons to future operations successfully. By conducting a campaign analysis of this operation, focusing on the after action reporting mechanisms and the elements of operational design, the study assesses whether or not a mechanism for learning the lessons of operational combat existed then and what its utility might be for the US Army today. Keywords: Army operations, Military doctrine, Army planning.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 28, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA197256
Entities
People
- Michael D. Heredia
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College