


AD-A197 328

DTIC FILE COPY

2



AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT REPORT

A Strategy for Leading

Major Annabelle D. Solis 88-2460

"insights into tomorrow"

DTIC
ELECTE

JUN 15 1988

E

D

This document has been approved
for public release and sale in
distribution is unlimited.

88 5 31 101

DISCLAIMER

The views and conclusions expressed in this document are those of the author. They are not intended and should not be thought to represent official ideas, attitudes, or policies of any agency of the United States Government. The author has not had special access to official information or ideas and has employed only open-source material available to any writer on this subject.

This document is the property of the United States Government. It is available for distribution to the general public. A loan copy of the document may be obtained from the Air University Interlibrary Loan Service (AUL/LDEX, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 36112-5564) or the Defense Technical Information Center. Request must include the author's name and complete title of the study.

This document may be reproduced for use in other research reports or educational pursuits contingent upon the following stipulations:

- Reproduction rights do not extend to any copyrighted material that may be contained in the research report.

- All reproduced copies must contain the following credit line: "Reprinted by permission of the Air Command and Staff College."

- All reproduced copies must contain the name(s) of the report's author(s).

- If format modification is necessary to better serve the user's needs, adjustments may be made to this report--this authorization does not extend to copyrighted information or material. The following statement must accompany the modified document: "Adapted from Air Command and Staff College Research Report _____ (number) _____ entitled _____ (title) _____ by _____ (author)."

- This notice must be included with any reproduced or adapted portions of this document.



REPORT NUMBER 88-2460
TITLE A STRATEGY FOR LEADING

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR ANNABELLE D. SOLIS, USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR MAJOR TRACEY L. GAUCH, ACSC/EDC

SPONSOR MAJOR WILLIAM MCGILL, ACSC/EDM

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of
requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112-5542

A197328

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT STATEMENT A Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 88-2460			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION ACSC/EDC		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5542			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) A Strategy for Leading					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Solis, Annabelle D., Major, USAF					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1988 April	
				15. PAGE COUNT 22	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) This analysis shows how the leadership style that emphasizes quality and excellence can be effectively applied to the military and can enhance war fighting capability. The first two chapters show how weak leadership is the major cause of our lack of combat readiness and traces the evolution of military leadership to the preferred "visionary" style. Chapter three demonstrates how the "visionary" style enhances war fighting capability by illustrating the accomplishments of General Wilbur L. (Bill) Creech, USAF (Retired) at Tactical Air Command and Colonel Larry S. Schumann, USA (Retired) at the White House Communications Agency. (SLU) <i>ef</i>					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☐ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☒ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL ACSC/EDC Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5542			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (205) 293-2867		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL

PREFACE

Realizing the critical correlation between war fighting capability and effective leadership, the military has tried for years to improve its leaders. This paper shows that the visionary leadership style which emphasizes excellence, quality, and service is most effective toward increasing military readiness. Our current state of readiness points to a need for improved military leadership. A review of old leadership styles is followed by illustrations of two visionary leaders, General W.L. Creech, USAF (Retired) and Colonel Lawrence J. Schumann, USA (Retired). Their accomplishments at Tactical Air Command and the White House Communications Agency respectively show that the visionary style can improve readiness. A reference guide that applies the basic elements of the visionary style: people, product, communications, and vision, is provided for military leaders.

This paper will be used by the Leadership Department of Air Command and Staff College as an analysis tool for a proven leadership style, and by future military officers as a guide to improve their own leadership.

I worked at the White House Communications Agency from December 1983 to July 1987. I was the Chief of the Resource Management Division responsible for the agency's budget and programming on a day-to-day basis, and reporting directly to the Commander, Colonel Schumann. My responsibilities as a Trip Officer for the President's travel included establishing connectivity equivalent to the White House capability.

I wish to acknowledge the help provided by Col James J. Winters and Dr. Barton J. Michelson of the Air War College, my advisor, Major Tracey L. Gauch of the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and my colleagues whom I interviewed.



Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	☒
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Annabelle (Tina) D. Solis graduated from the University of South Florida in 1972 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Mathematics and received a Masters in Business Administration degree from the Southern Illinois University - Edwardsville, Illinois, in 1978.

In 1975, she was assigned to the Military Airlift Command (MAC) Headquarters, at Scott AFB, Illinois, where she created and implemented aircrew voice security systems for command and control application on all MAC aircraft. She inspected base-level communications as a member of the MAC Management Effectiveness Inspection team, and coordinated communications support for MAC elements of the Tactical Air Control System for JCS exercises and contingency planning.

Major Solis was the Commander of Detachment 13, European Special Activities Area, Classified Location, in 1983 where she was responsible for a DoD-unique, jointly manned communications facility directly supporting national level and USEUCOM intelligence requirements.

In 1983, Major Solis came to the White House and served on the President's Military Staff at the White House Communications Agency (WHCA). As a Presidential Communications Trip Officer, she travelled with the White House advance party and had full responsibility and authority for all on-site decisions regarding audio-visual and telecommunications support to the President, the National Security Council, and the travelling staff. As Chief, Resource Management Division Officer, Major Solis was responsible for developing and defending the WHCA Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and Budget Estimate Submission. As Plans Officer, she defined communications requirements for new and replacement Presidential aircraft, and integrated new communications systems on these aircraft with existing White House and DoD command and control systems.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	iii
About the Author	iv
Executive Summary	vi
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION	
Overview	1
Congressional View on Military Leadership	1
The Stark Incident: Weak Leadership?	2
CHAPTER TWO - FOUR LEADERSHIP STYLES	
Overview	4
The Historical Style	4
The Knee-Jerker	5
The Caretaker	5
The Visionary	6
CHAPTER THREE - TWO VISIONARY MILITARY LEADERS	
Overview	7
Starting Out	7
Facing the Challenges	9
CHAPTER FOUR - GUIDE FOR MILITARY LEADERS	
Overview	19
A Visionary Application	19
A Reference Guide	20
BIBLIOGRAPHY	23



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part of our College mission is distribution of the students' problem solving products to DOD sponsors and other interested agencies to enhance insight into contemporary, defense related issues. While the College has accepted this product as meeting academic requirements for graduation, the views and opinions expressed or implied are solely those of the author and should not be construed as carrying official sanction.

"insights into tomorrow"

REPORT NUMBER 88-2460

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR ANNABELLE D. SOLIS, USAF

TITLE A STRATEGY FOR LEADING

I. Purpose: To illustrate that the visionary leadership style which emphasizes excellence, quality, and service can be effectively applied to the military.

II. Problem: Our war fighting capability is suffering due to weak and ineffective leadership.

III. Data: Leadership is important to all military officers and the ability to fight is largely dependent upon leadership. The approach taken in this paper is direct: it presents the issue and some background, then illustrates the thesis through two military leaders. Finally, it provides some ideas on how to apply this leadership style.

Chapter 2 presents the problem: lack of readiness to fight a war due to weak military leadership. It lays the foundation for the need for improvement. A congressional account of war readiness and the recent USS Stark incident both point to the need for improved leadership.

Chapter 3 describes the characteristics of four predominant leadership styles: historical, knee-jerker, caretaker, and

CONTINUED

visionary. It reviews trends in military leadership to establish a common ground and further implies the need for change and improvement. Finally, it explains how the visionary approach is the most effective.

Chapter 4 identifies critical elements of effective leadership: people, product, communications, and vision. It discusses the accomplishments General Wilbur L. (Bill) Creech, USAF (Retired) and Colonel Lawrence J. Schumann, USA (Retired) achieved in enhancing war fighting capability by using these elements. General Creech was the Commander of Tactical Air Command from May 1978 to November 1984. Colonel Schumann was the Commander of the White House Communications Agency (WHCA) from December 1983 to May 1985. This chapter describes the challenges they faced when they took command of their respective organizations, and then it illustrates the elements of effective leadership through examples each used to resolve those problems.

IV. CONCLUSION: A framework is presented where the elements of effective leadership described in this paper have been put to use. Practical guidelines and applications are provided for future military leaders.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW

Congress thinks the military is not prepared to fight a war and recent military action only seems to reinforce this view. What is the problem? Weak military leadership is the primary cause of our lack of combat readiness. This chapter presents the Congressional view of our combat readiness. Congress concludes poor leadership is the reason. (17:902) A closer look at the result of today's leadership in a recent international incident such as the USS Stark, confirms the need for a renewal of our military leadership.

CONGRESSIONAL VIEW ON MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Is the United States really ready to fight a war? Do we have the kind of leadership it takes to prepare the military to defend our country? These are the kind of questions the public is concerned about during periods of heightened tensions. These are the kinds of issues that the press exploits in challenging the government and in turn Congress relies on when reviewing the Department of Defense (DoD) budget. Looking closely at readiness status shows us that improved leadership is the key to successful wartime readiness.

Hearings before a congressional subcommittee on DoD Appropriations for 1985 cites many ways poor leadership is responsible for our lack of war readiness. (17:902) The report attributes USAF inability to meet wartime taskings to the shortage of aircraft spare parts but does not blame this shortage on limited funding. Instead the report blames "ineffective planning and the acceptance of shortages as a normal condition of command." (17:902) Leadership, therefore must be seriously weak to be accused of such critical deficiencies. Moreover, this behavior reflects an intolerable irresponsible attitude if the military must be prepared for war. Unfortunately, the report illustrates this attitude in leadership is not unusual. For example, there is evidence of deviating reporting procedures and manipulating factors to falsely report unit shortages. In fact,

some policy has gone so far as to direct shortages in "essential wartime supplies be excluded from the measurement process which assesses the correct readiness status." (17:1029) Also many commanders have admitted that their subjective assessments in readiness reports are "usually positive and upgraded even when the units lack critical spare parts needed to sustain their wartime tasking." (17:914) Not only are shortages incorrectly reported, but commanders tend to work around actions by shifting the problem to out year programs and establish get well dates rather than dealing with the immediate impact on mission capability. (17:903) Finally, the lack of senior and midlevel NCOs and an overabundance of inexperienced enlisted personnel reportedly "strains training systems, limits efficiency, and decreases quality of work, thereby adversely affecting readiness." (17:922) Consequently, the leadership problem is compounded by the challenge of inexperienced subordinates who tend to be poorly trained and produce low quality work. Does the problem exist in real world situations, or only under inspection and exercise activities?

THE STARK INCIDENT: WEAK LEADERSHIP?

Questions raised as a result of the recent USS Stark incident this past October attribute lack of readiness to the lack of leadership. (10:1) The most critical question is why the Stark did not fire its weapons against the two Exocets missiles from the Iraqi fighter aircraft. Rear Admiral Grant Sharpe released a report in October 1987 as a result of the Navy's formal investigation of the Stark. (10:1) He describes a crew without discipline and officers who were reluctant to make decisions. (10:1) His report clearly attributes damage to the Stark to four main factors:

1. Failure in general of the commanding officer and watch team to appreciate and respect the hazards to the Stark inherent in the Iraqi air campaign in the Persian Gulf.
2. Improper watch manning and standing.
3. Improper understanding by the commanding officer and watch team of the use of fire-control radar to deter the Iraqi fighter as a measure short of deadly force.
4. Failure of the commanding officer and watch team to "institute a state of proper weapons readiness." (10:1)

Each of these factors illustrates the lack of leadership on the Stark either by citing the failure of the commanding officer directly or by citing watch team and procedural weaknesses that are ultimately the commanding officer's responsibility. For example, only four minutes before the missiles hit, a weapons-control console operator was absent from his post for more than 15 minutes (allegedly not returning from the bathroom). The

second console operator who should have been in the Combat Information Center (CIC) watching the radar, was sent to look for the first. Consequently, neither operator was in the CIC when the missiles hit. Their inattentive and irresponsible behavior perhaps only echoed that of their commanding officer. Although the commanding officer claims the SLQ-32 radar warning receivers did not work as the Navy said they would, a House of Representatives Armed Services Committee report concludes no evidence of malfunction. (10:2) In addition, the SLQ-32 was left in the "INHIBIT ALL" mode which suppresses its audible alarm according to the Sharpe report. Further evidence of weak leadership is the action of the officer in charge of the weapons systems who "dismissed a crew member's suggestion to issue a radio warning when the fighter was 43 nautical miles (80 kilometers) out." (10:2) It can be concluded, therefore, that weak leadership led to the Stark's failure to defend itself.

A significant limitation in our combat readiness can be a direct result of weak military leadership as shown in the USS Stark incident. Our national security is at stake as it relies heavily on combat readiness. Therefore, the challenge is how to improve today's leadership. If Congress continues to have low confidence in our war fighting ability and attributes this weakness to poor leadership, then our energies clearly should be focused on improving military leadership today at all levels of command. Fiscal support from an unbelieving Congress can be brutal to military programs. In addition, improving military leadership will help preclude situations such as the recent Stark incident. This incident confirms that combat disaster results from the lack of initiative and irresponsibility. A closer look at what leadership styles the military has developed and used will help focus attention on how to revitalize today's military leadership.

Chapter 2

FOUR LEADERSHIP STYLES

Intelligence, imagination, and knowledge are essential resources, but only effectiveness converts them into results.

---Peter F. Drucker, 1966
The Effective Executive

OVERVIEW

Military leadership can be categorized into four predominant leadership styles: historical, knee-jerker, caretaker, and visionary. The author selects these four categories and terms to describe leadership styles based on extensive research and 16 years of experience in this subject area. A discussion of the characteristics of each style points to trends in military leadership. These trends establish a common ground and further imply the need for change and improvement. The visionary approach is the key to revitalizing today's military leadership.

The evolution of effective leadership is a product of the changes in how to motivate people. In other words, as people change, leadership will also have to change to remain effective. In the past, when life styles were less sophisticated, it did not take the complexities of today to keep people responsive and motivated. Describing the four styles shows how military leadership has evolved from the most simple (historical), through the unimaginative (knee-jerker) and very structured (caretaker), and finally to a style that is very much in touch with people's needs as well as mission needs (visionary).

THE HISTORICAL STYLE

The historical style includes the beginning, "boy scout basics", the X-Y theorist, and finally the believer in Management by Objectives (MBO). The beginning is called "boy scout basics" because most documentation prior to the mid-fifties simplified good leadership into being clean, fit, and trustworthy ... like a boy scout. (11:vi) The X-Y theory, however, took its analysis of man a bit deeper. Theory X maintains that man is a lazy, untrustworthy animal who resists change and must be supervised

closely and strictly, thus the authoritarian leader. (1:33) On the other hand, theory Y considers man motivated, willing to work and share in responsibilities of the work-group, and responsive to the democratic leader. (1:33) The leader who believes in Management by Objectives stresses clarifying what is expected of the follower, explaining how to meet those expectations, and spelling out the criteria for performance evaluation. (1:263) He may be inflexible as a result of constraints of forecasting and defending past actions. He is likely to get bogged down in the mechanical process and waste time with documentation and procedures. Consequently, MBO often stifles initiative and creativity. (4:7) The evolution of military leadership is seen in the historical style as it progressively becomes more structured, i.e. from the simplicity of "boy scout basics," through the X-Y Theory, to the formalities of MBO. Other styles further expand on this evolution.

THE KNEE-JERKER

Everyone has seen and perhaps worked for the knee-jerker who is driven to action based solely upon the situation at hand. This leader does not have a good grasp of most situations, much less confidence in his own abilities. He kills internal communications with his autonomous traits and, as a result, makes bad decisions based on limited information. This leader wastes valuable resources in supporting his bad decisions and creates confusion and disharmony within any organization. Under the knee-jerker's leadership, goals are limited, progress halts, energies are misdirected, and morale decreases. (1:32) A less reactive leadership style, however, may also bring little progress to an organization.

THE CARETAKER

The leader who simply wants to make it to retirement exemplifies the caretaker. He is effective only on a very limited scale and is afraid to make important decisions. The result is a "ho-hum" leader of a "ho-hum" organization bent on maintaining the status quo. His success is dependent upon his ability to respond to the needs of his subordinates. In this way, he is similar to the transactional leader who satisfies his followers by creating mutual dependence through bartering for goods and rights. (18:5) The caretaker is more concerned with keeping everyone happy than he is with making any progress or solving problems. He is the type of leader who keeps the store clean while just getting by in supporting the mission. He is certainly not the one to add vision to an organization.

THE VISIONARY

The visionary is an innovator who believes in people and progress. He is a leader of action and great purpose. His ability to direct people towards a goal, is outweighed only by his ability to identify that common purpose. In addition, the visionary places great emphasis on personal control and the responsibility of workers in an organization. He "empowers" followers by giving them a value system to manage themselves and others in a positive manner. The visionary leader establishes the boundaries so people know when they should act on their own and when they should not. (7:75)

The visionary approach is similar to transformational leadership based on the personal values and beliefs of the leader. There is no exchange of commodities between the leader and the follower. The visionary's goal is to unite followers and gain commitment to common goals. (18:7) He gains influence by demonstrating important personal characteristics such as: "goal articulation, personal image building, demonstration of confidence, and motive arousal." (18:8) More important than his ability to optimize his own personal skills, is his ability to get things done through people.

The visionary leader is more effective than other types of leaders because he cares foremost about his people, is committed to quality, keeps in touch with the organization, and has the wisdom and courage to make the right decisions. An illustration of military leaders who practiced and perfected the visionary style of leadership provides a better appreciation.

Chapter 3

TWO VISIONARY MILITARY LEADERS

The basics...quick action, service to customers, practical innovation, and the fact that you can't get any of these without virtually everyone's commitment.

--Thomas Peters & Robert Waterman, Jr., 1982
In Search of Excellence

OVERVIEW

This chapter first identifies critical elements of effective leadership: people, product, communications, and vision, and then illustrates how these elements can be used to enhance war fighting capability by looking at two military visionaries. General W.L. (Bill) Creech, USAF (Retired) and Colonel Lawrence J. Schumann, USA (Retired) both achieved enhanced war fighting capability by using these critical elements. General Creech was the Commander of Tactical Air Command from May 1978 to November 1984. Colonel Schumann was the Commander of White House Communications Agency (WHCA) from December 1983 to May 1985. Both leaders faced unique challenges when they took command. A description of their respective organizations and the problems they faced will lend more meaning to the way they applied the critical elements of effective leadership.

STARTING OUT

Tactical Air Command

General Creech faced many problems when he took command of Tactical Air Command. He recognized the biggest dilemma: the low sortie rate made TAC unprepared to fight. The low sortie rate was caused primarily by aircraft parts shortages. Prior to General Creech assuming command of TAC, half of the \$25-billion fighter fleet was not battle ready at any one time. More than 220 planes were grounded for at least three weeks due to a shortage of spare parts and maintenance. (9:42) In a testimony to Congress in 1981, General Creech stated:

On a given day in Tactical Air Command, alone, we have three and one-half wing equivalents grounded for the lack of parts. In even our best supported systems (the F-4 and the RF-4) we have 12 to 14 percent of the aircraft out for parts at all times. And in our most poorly supported systems--the F-111 and F-15--the out-for-supply rates are in the high 20's to low 30's. Thus, each day, our people are confronted with one-fourth to one-third of the force totally incapacitated for parts. As things now stand, a mechanic on a grounded aircraft only one time out of two will find a part was not even authorized for base level stockage in the first place (The rules being driven by overall scarcities). (16:18)

Two additional problems attributed to the low sortie rates and adding to the lack of readiness were seriously unskilled pilots and a soaring accident rate. For example, the average utilization rate (UTE RATE) for all TAC fighters dropped from 32 flying hours per month in 1969 to 17 hours in 1978. (8:35) General Creech had his work cut out for him upon taking command of Tactical Air Command.

The White House Communications Agency

Descriptions of WHCA's mission and the job of a Presidential Trip Officer will lend more meaning to the dilemmas that Colonel Schumann faced when he took command of the White House Communications Agency.

The WHCA is a joint military organization under the operational control of the President's Chief of Staff. Its mission is to provide all telecommunications support to the President, the Vice-President, the US Secret Service, the National Security Council, and all others as directed. WHCA is responsible for ensuring the President has the same quality support, e.g. secure phones and messages, as well as audio visual support (lighting and public address) as he does when he's in the White House. Every aspect of this support is "the very best, all the time ... no failures accepted."

A Presidential Trip Officer (TO) is in charge of the WHCA team of some 20 to 50 military people who set up the telecommunications needed to support the President. The TOs must meet a series of "gates" passing a checkride at each "gate" to qualify to lead the next higher level of trip. The levels include: events in Washington D.C., a trip where the President goes "in and out" of a location the same day, remains overnight, or travels overseas. TOs work closely with the White House Staff and US Secret Service under some very unusual conditions. There are no "hard, fast" rules and requirements change constantly

making the TO's job a continuous challenge.

Colonel Schumann faced two overwhelming dilemmas when he took command of the WHCA: old technology and resistance to change. He found an organization steeped in 1940's technology. For example, heavy, bulky equipment that could only provide low speed teletype and poor quality secure voice was common place. In addition, he faced people stuck in a "we've-always-done-it-this-way" attitude. (20:--) It seemed many old timers had been there forever. The "good old boy" network evolved from some senior NCO's who had been in WHCA 20 plus years and some officers assigned to the WHCA over seven years. Colonel Schumann saw a tremendous resistance to change and an unacknowledged decrease in quality resulting from having many personnel with such long tenure. (23:--) The organization was definitely not properly meeting the needs of its customers.

The effects of the AT&T divestiture and an information explosion also added to Colonel Schumann's challenge. The divestiture ultimately caused a slow down in the telephone companies' response to WHCA's needs and a corresponding increase in cost. (20:--) At the same time, White House customers, in particular the National Security Council, wanted more secure data and voice capability on the road. Many White House customers were not using secure capability as often as they may have wanted because of the relative poor quality and inconvenience involved. (23:--)

FACING THE CHALLENGES

Although the challenges each commander faced were unique to their organizations, both directed their actions in similar areas in meeting those challenges. The approach they used to increase readiness involved four basic elements: people, product, communications, and vision. Each element is first explained and then further illustrated with examples of applications by both General Creech and Colonel Schumann.

People

People are the most important element in leadership because without them, there is no leadership. Motivating people toward a common goal with commitment to excellence is the biggest challenge of a good leader. (3:394) This kind of motivation and commitment can be achieved in many ways. Major General Perry Smith, USAF, (Retired), talks of keeping morale up by making people feel special: every week the base newspaper carried headlines and laudatory stories like, "Supply Squadron Establishes Record for Servicing F-15's", "Fighter Squadron and Maintenance Unit Set New Flying Time Record," etc. (6:70) People

were motivated because they were proud and because they felt some ownership for the mission. The idea of ownership is not new; in 1942, Fortune magazine printed an article that contended, "the person doing the job knows far better than anyone else the best way of doing that job and therefore is the one person best fitted to improve it." (7:74)

Creech Gaining Peoples' Commitment.

General Creech succeeded in significantly increasing peoples' commitment by creating a sense of ownership and by instilling a deep sense of pride. He helped people accept responsibility for their work by bringing authority down to the lowest levels within the organization. To do this, General Creech formed squadron-level maintenance units, called Combat Oriented Maintenance Organization. These units created a deep sense of ownership because they were responsible for maintaining only the aircraft in their squadron. (8:35) The dedicated crew chief program was started to get the more experienced NCOs back on the flightline and to put a sense of belonging into the work. (12:118) Under this program, maintenance people were not repairing "just any old airplane" anymore; they were working on one of their "own" aircraft. This sense of ownership was strengthened by having the squadron schedule maintenance for their own aircraft on their own computer. (3:238) Therefore, people had a greater sense of responsibility and commitment toward their work. Not only were people more committed to their work, but they were doing better work. When asked why he liked squadron scheduling, an NCO responded, "It lets us make our own mistakes. And we make fewer all the time." (21:26) People quite naturally had a greater sense of pride for work they felt they partly owned. General Creech placed much emphasis on pride and implemented several programs to instill pride in the people of TAC. Project "New Look" was designed to improve the facilities and job conditions for maintenance people. Buildings were painted, new furnishings were added, and recognition programs were started to help give pride to maintenance units. (12:136) Results of project "New Look" were so positive that similar projects for munitions storage areas and transportation units were implemented. (12:140) Another tack General Creech instituted to increase pride in the transportation units was the semiannual "drive-by." A triumphant parade of shiney pickup trucks, jeeps, and other support vehicles allowed the motorpool technicians to show off their vehicles. (3:239) Aircraft appearance was also treated with pride and the philosophy that an aircraft that doesn't look good probably isn't combat ready became widespread in TAC. (22:) General Creech best summarizes his sentiments on pride:

I could paint all of TAC for the price on one F-15. My philosophy is that if equipment is shabby looking, it

affects your pride in your organization and your performance. You can't preach to a young man that an airplane can be shabby on the outside but has to be spic-and-span on the inside. You either have a climate of professionalism, or one of deterioration and decay. You can't segment it. Only on TV do you have these Black Sheep squadrons. Good outfits look sharp and act sharp. The great pilots--the Chuck Yeagers--are not sloppy people. (9:48)

Creech Motivating People.

General Creech motivated people by creating an environment of competition and recognition. He instituted maintenance recognition and incentive programs that caused units to try to outperform each other for extra time off or for a trophy. He initiated the Maintenance Professional of the Year award for the most outstanding maintenance airman and NCO at each base. (12:119) General Creech put into practice what the organization theorist Mason Haire preached: "What gets measured gets done." (4:268) When information is made available about something, it brings attention to it and it is more likely to get done. Comparative numbers of one squadron versus another were readily available and led to increased competition. (3:238) To capitalize on the positive effects of competition and recognition, General Creech placed great emphasis on unit identification and symbols that reinforced unit cohesiveness. The aircraft for a particular squadron were marked with one color; maintenance ball caps and aircrew scarves reflected that same color. Unit identification helped the spirit and enthusiasm involved in healthy competition. (12:36) "The concept [was] that inherent in the competition between units [was] the increased combat capability of both air and ground crews." (12:37) General Creech never forgot that the other half of competition is recognition. He gave many lavish awards for top performers, including regular awards banquets for support people. (3:49) He even had special statue trophies specifically designed for maintenance award banquets. (23:--) As a result of the many competition and recognition programs, General Creech increased the spirit and motivation of the people at TAC immensely. "He motivated, celebrated, and virtually canonized the typically unsung support people." (3:49)

Schumann Rewarding Innovation.

Colonel Schumann recognized the importance of a truly motivated work force in the high pressure environment of Presidential communications. Tremendous work loads and limited free time left the former WHCA commander little time to recognize the accomplishments of his people. (23:--) However, Colonel Schumann missed no opportunity to publicly reward outstanding accomplishments. He instituted an unusual award called the

"Chicken Award" to demonstrate his belief in implementing new systems. The award was based on the experiences of Rolles Royce's jet aircraft engine test facilities where the simplest, and most common sense test (the ingestion of birds), was not performed on new engines, resulting in numerous engine failures during operations after bird strikes. (3:130) Schumann believed new communications systems supporting the President should be thoroughly tested before being turned over for daily support. (23:--) For this task, he had WHCA staff officers and noncommissioned officers use the systems in their daily environment at work or home to see if they could "break" the systems to reveal weak points. It wasn't the least bit unusual to see WHCA people walking around Washington, D.C., in shopping malls with their families on weekends, carrying the most sophisticated light weight communications gear.

Imagine the pride Schumann's people had to realize they were trusted with so important a responsibility? Everybody became part of the mission of fielding new systems, even if they were in quite different career fields. It was from these testers' experience and recommendations that system changes were initiated. Monthly, Colonel Schumann would select the most unusual test program that had resulted in revealing the most significant problems. An informal ceremony around a keg of beer was set up in the testing laboratory. He would award a small stuffed chicken doll, called the "Chicken Award," to the honored individual. It was a trifling award coveted by all in the organization! Schumann motivated people by rewarding innovation.

Schumann Creating Ownership.

On another note, shortly after Schumann took command of the WHCA, he implemented a sweeping reorganization that decentralized operations. With this reorganization, he empowered many officers and NCOs with responsibility and authority in the past reserved for a select few officer division chiefs. He took what was essentially a functionally-oriented organization with maintenance facilities, operations areas, and production shops, and restructured it so that geographically separate units with single product responsibilities (such as audio visual, or communications transmission systems) were commanded by separate people who reported directly to him. (20:--) Improvements in deployed operational ready communications equipment was immediate because people became identified with specific systems. When problems arose, you knew who to call for help to fix something. A sense of pride of ownership was created that replaced the old crutch that "they can't keep this equipment working" or "someone will fix this when we get home so don't screw with it now." (23:--)

Product

Product involves what you do: your mission, your capability, the service you provide. It involves dedication to the customer and demanding high quality. Know if you're meeting the users needs. Find out if the system works the way it's supposed to work. Be willing to take some risks and make changes to meet users' needs and to get the mission accomplished right. Encourage innovation in your people. The best ideas often come from the people working directly with a system because they are closer to the issues. Maintaining the highest level of quality does not just happen, you have to make it happen. Lieutenant Stock of the Santa Barbara, California Police Department summarized it well when he said, "Our product--providing public peace and safety--will never go out of demand, and we don't have the incentive of having to be profitable. It's easy to get complacent and give rotten service--unless we keep challenging ourselves." (5:156)

Creech on Quality.

General Creech recognized that one of the most serious problems attributing to the limited combat readiness when he took command of TAC in 1978 was the lack of adequate logistic support. The utilization rate for all TAC fighters had declined an average of 7.8 percent a year 1969 to mid-1978. (8:35) He acknowledged that "no matter how good the equipment, without adequate spare parts it simply cannot be maintained." (16:17) He proved his point in October 1980 by demonstrating the operational capability possible when adequate spare parts were available. At his direction, TAC took an F-15 squadron to its wartime operating base in Germany and maintained a 24-hour average of 80 percent of the aircraft fully mission capable. What made this possible was that this squadron was given the numbers and kinds of spares each operational F-15 squadron would have if spare accounts were adequately filled. (16:19) A similar test was conducted with an F-111D squadron deployed to its wartime base in England. This squadron flew over half the total number of wartime type missions, at nearly twice the required wartime rate, once again with adequate spare parts. The F-111D squadron achieved an 84.6 percent aircraft fully mission capable rate as opposed to its 34 percent peacetime rate with the normal shortage of spare parts. (16:20) Having proven that adequate spare parts availability significantly increases combat readiness on a test basis, General Creech set out to correct the problem on a permanent basis.

The Combat Oriented Supply Organization (COSO) was created to respond to a combat readiness environment with increased aircraft utilization rates. Prior to the creation of COSO, the supply system was designed to respond equally to the security police squadron, the civil engineering squadron, and the fighter squadron. (12:121) Lots of paperwork and bureaucratic procedures

complicated and slowed down the process. The average time to deliver a part to a TAC aircraft had been 91 minutes with up to four-hour delivery times on occasion. After COSO, the TAC average was brought down to twenty minutes to fill a demand with a ten-minute response time. (8:35) The success of COSO was a result of moving authority and responsibility down to the lowest level. COSO involved assigning supply people to the flight line maintenance units, relaxing critical supply withdrawal procedures, and establishing a "parts store" on the flight line. (12:122) The final result of the COSO effort: "Aircraft [were] fixed faster, there [were] more mission capable aircraft on hand, and [TAC's] supply and maintenance people are much happier!" (21:37)

Schumann and Quality.

Schumann stayed close to his customers to analyze what they needed. On many occasions you would see him looking over customers shoulders to see what they were doing so he could apply advanced telecommunications techniques and modern systems to simplify the tasks they were performing. (23:--) He was always there, so WHCA customers became accustomed to his probing style often turning to him and asking how electronics could make the task easier. He spent one day reading teletype messages in the White House Communications Center to see what was being handled by his operators. Afterwards, he concluded several changes were needed. One was that office secretaries only needed to send computer diskettes containing messages to the communications center instead of neatly typed text. WHCA operators were retyping large volumes of messages that were already available in an electronically compatible format. (20:--) Another change was applied to draft quality material being sent to the communications center to be typed into messages for electronic transmission. Consequently, new facsimile equipment was ordered and installed to speed draft material to the end destination without having to be sent as messages. On another occasion, Colonel Schumann found many newspaper accounts and articles were being clipped and forwarded by courier to Presidential trip site locations. He quickly suggested that these articles also be forwarded by facsimile to save time and people. His suggestions received such acclaim that transmission speeds had to be increased four-fold to handle the increase in traffic that weeks before had not even existed. (23:--)

Communications

Communications is essential to getting the job done, but more importantly, to making the job fun. Communications is the planning process. As IBM's Chief Executive Officer, John Akers puts it, "You shouldn't call it a planning process, although what you get out of it is a plan. What you have accomplished is

communication." (7:51) Organizations with good communications insist on informality and open door policies. They insist that managers get out from behind their desks and find out what's going on at all levels. Successful companies have coined the phrase, "Management By Wandering Around" (MBWA) to refer to the constant informal contact. (4:122-123) If you know how information flows in an organization, you will understand the culture and structure of that organization. Practicing MBWA has a two-fold effect: it gives you the visibility and credibility as the leader and it gives you the invaluable opportunity to gather feedback and confirmation.

Creech Gathering Data and Feedback.

General Creech placed the highest emphasis on the importance of communications. He had a reputation for being "everywhere, all the time" and for showing up when least expected. This was especially true when he travelled to a TAC base. Sometimes before the local wing commander was advised, General Creech would be on the flight line talking to maintenance crews and pilots. (22:--) The priority he placed on communications is expressed here:

The excellent leader communicates, communicates, communicates. And when I talk of communication, I'm talking two-way communication. He doesn't go through with his microphone transmitter button wired down; he also has his receiver working--and working very well. He makes himself accessible so that he can hear the views from the troops. In fact, he works hard to establish a feedback loop. He freely delegates authority and responsibility. He trusts his people. (21:14)

General Creech stressed increased communications within TAC. He aggressively pursued any avenue to open the door for better flow of information. He convened an Aircrew Concerns Conference (ACC) at Headquarters TAC to discuss readiness issues, career irritants, and management practices that effected aircrew morale, motivation, and career orientation. (12:15) The ACCs continued to be regularly convened and information resulting from them passed to all levels within the command. (12:16-18) General Creech listened well enough to people at the ACCs that he understood many unit level frustrations and was able to improve on virtually all important areas in TAC. (12:86) He expressed his appreciation for the importance of keeping communications open when he said, "You shouldn't have (ACCs) just when you're in trouble, you should have them all the time . . . we're changing TAC not for those that are leaving, we're changing it for those that are staying." (12:21)

Schumann Getting Feedback.

There was a time at WHCA when the commander was hardly ever seen during the day in Washington, or at a deployed trip site location. (23:--) Colonel Schumann changed that by typifying what MBWA means. The knowledge he gained during his many forays into the field surpassed what he received in briefings during his morning staff meetings. When he wandered, he was the spokesman for change within the organization by articulating what new systems were about to be implemented. He didn't believe in surprises, so he wasn't about to let new systems be fielded by just dropping them on the operations staff without a thorough check out.

When Schumann couldn't meet with everybody, he made video tapes describing his vision for the organization. These tapes were an excellent means of communicating his intentions to everyone in the organization. Shift workers and people working at geographically separated locations were also able to keep up with the direction and goals of the organization. He never missed an opportunity to spread the word. Periodically, he would gather all his officers and key NCOs at a secluded location away from day-to-day interruptions to discuss new ideas. He made sure all the officers understood how important he thought they were by sending each one of them a letter which started out, "You play a most critical role in assuring that the President and his staff while traveling have the communications they require at all times, from the moment they arrive at your location." (15:1)

Vision

Vision gives the effective leader not only the ability to recognize the most critical problems, but moreover to establish goals to solve those problems. Vision is the ability to make the right decisions so it is possible to meet the goal. Two aspects are important here: communicate the vision and make sure it's achievable. General Walter Ulmer, a retired US Army combat commander, captured the significance of communicating vision when he said: "The essence of a general's job is to assist in developing a clear sense of purpose...to keep the junk from getting in the way of important things." (3:285) An unachievable vision will destroy morale and is totally useless. Both Patton and Montgomery were given dispirited armies in North Africa, so they concentrated their efforts on internal discipline with one main objective: teach their soldiers they could win. (3:286) Those soldiers were given an achievable vision. It improved their morale and made it possible for them to fight with pride. Many leaders have vision; it is only the most effective who know how to make their visions happen. A successful finance expert has a sign above her desk that reads: "The concept is easy;

implementation is a bitch." (7:84)

Creech's Vision.

General Creech had an uncanny ability to get to the heart of a problem and press on toward a solution with strong leadership and direct simplicity. One of the first things he did when he took command of TAC was to have a study conducted to "quantify for [him]--no ifs, ands, or buts about it--how much [they] were not flying compared to how [they] once did." (12:10) This allowed him to immediately direct his energies toward solving the tough problem. The result of this study became known as the "Slippery Slope" briefing which enabled him to simply state the problem in TAC: "a steady decline in sortie productivity over the years--with resultant decrease in aircrew combat proficiency and readiness." (21:18) He attacked this problem with improved maintenance and logistic support, increased morale and retention rates, and a greater emphasis on realistic training to improve pilot combat skills. (8:34) He expressed his concern for maintaining realism not only in training but in weapons systems when he said, "Let's not build our whole system around a weak link. I have these dreams about wartime and the computer. Suddenly I sit there in the middle of the war and the screen says, 'PLEASE STANDBY'." (19:6) General Creech was a man of vision and commitment. When speaking of being prepared to face the Soviet challenge, he said:

The question is not whether or not we have the capacity to resist . . . the question is rather one of commitment . . . the pursuit of goals that transcend selfish interests or personal comfort. (13:15)

Schumann's Vision.

Colonel Schumann passionately cared about providing superior telecommunications service to the President of the United States. He established simple goals for the organization which he repeated with uncanny regularity and clarity. High quality secure voice with voice recognition that rivalled commercial long distance telephone service used in the civil sector, and a truly paperless work environment where everything created was done electronically by computers. His goals were translated into action by the entire staff. He allowed his subordinate organizations which he created with his early sweeping reorganization to attack the problems and recommend solutions. He published goals, but let his people put the meat into his plans--he had no preconceived solutions he was trying to sell. His final product was always EXCELLENCE.

Both General Creech and Colonel Schumann increased the

readiness of their respective organizations through their respective visionary leadership. General Creech improved pilot wartime skills through realistic training and increased pilot proficiency by providing more operational aircraft than TAC had seen since 1969. Colonel Schumann brought critical communications to the White House that was never before provided. Colonel Schumann made sure the President had high quality (with voice recognition) secure voice all the time and provided critical secure data capability in the travel environment to the National Security Council. The visionary style of both leaders helped them achieve these vast improvements in readiness.

Chapter 4

A GUIDE FOR MILITARY LEADERS

OVERVIEW

A look at the kind of leadership we need in the military today should be of value to military officers. The poor image that the Congress holds of current military leadership coupled by the unfortunate weak leadership seen in the USS Stark incident points to a drastic need for improvement. A review of military styles like the historical, the knee-jerker, and the caretaker shows that these styles are no longer effective in today's world. The visionary style, however, works in today's turbulent "peace-time" service as shown by two strong leaders, General Creech and Colonel Schumann. They applied the four basic elements of people, product, communications, and vision further illustrating the effectiveness of the visionary style. This chapter presents an example where the four basic elements of effective leadership have been most recently applied. Finally, a reference guide with practical conclusions and applications is provided for tomorrow's military leaders.

A VISIONARY APPLICATION

An Air Force officer who worked for both General Creech and Colonel Schumann learned from their leadership styles and techniques. This officer, now as a group commander, passes the following guidance to his people:

Our CUSTOMERS are the ONLY REASON we exist. All of us are CONNECTIVITY EXPERTS--our job is to "connect" people to the information they need. . . . it's customers who need access to information in order to make educated and timely decisions. Never lose sight of this purpose, and never forget about the customer. If you don't know what our customer needs, YOU have the responsibility to find out! At least once each day, ask: "What have I done for my customers?"

YOU as an INDIVIDUAL are the most IMPORTANT asset that we have. As such, you have TWO RESPONSIBILITIES: you must develop yourself, and you must contribute to the

organization. Only you know how to do YOUR job best. .
. .If you see a better way, you have a responsibility to
do something about it. . . . You are the most important
resource we have, and TEAMWORK is that vital ingredient
that makes things happen. There is no "I" in TEAM!

Life is too short for you to go home at the end of the
day and be frustrated or hate your job. Our work should
be exciting and FUN! If it's not, then in some way
we've both failed. If you think your job has no point,
talk to your boss: you might be right, and some
creative thinking may be in order to help both you and
us improve. COMMUNICATE! (14:1-2)

A Reference Guide

Leadership Techniques

Leadership traits are the personal characteristics leaders
display on a day-to-day basis. Ideal leadership traits are all
the finest traits that will enable an organization to excel.
These ideal traits can be divided into two categories: those
traits associated with the external perception others have of the
organization and those associated with the internal operations.

Traits Influencing External Perceptions.

Ability to Establish Goals. The ability to establish
short-range goals of service excellence that can be attained
during your tenure is of paramount importance. It will serve as
your vision of things to come, and allow you to articulate long
range goals (your architecture) for future leaders. (7:222-228)

Ability to Communicate Your Goals. Once goals are
established, you must be able to clearly communicate your vision
and architecture to your staff so your subordinates understand
and support them through daily performance. (5:394)

Stay Close to the Customer. Your leadership style must
keep you in close contact with the user of your services. You
must constantly be on the alert for improving what you offer.
Listen to the customers--adapt your service to meet their needs.
(5:149-156)

Be an Innovator. Never accept the traditional answer
that something can't be done. Remain current in your specialty
and apply new technological solutions to old problems. Don't
wait for requirements to find you, go out looking for them. You
are the expert in your field--it's your job to bring your
professional expertise to bear on others' problems. (3:115-127)

Consider the External Environment. Don't lead in isolation. Your actions must be consistent with an environment that drives your peoples' actions. Operation in a peace time or combat environment should change some aspects of your style of leadership, but not affect your goals. Understand what job is expected in the assignment you are working--know the mission. (4:295)

Traits Influencing Internal Operations.

Ability to Establish Internal Organization Harmony. As a leader, it is your primary job to establish a positive working environment that respects the dignity of your people. You must treat your staff maturely, respect them personally, and give them recognition for their accomplishments. Within the organization, everyone must have some sense of dignity in the job they perform, because every job is important to the organization as a whole. Attach great significance to this concept because with it comes a critically important feeling of "ownership" or responsibility for the mission which leads to excellence. (3:238-241) As a team player, an individuals' best efforts contribute to the accomplishment of the organization's goals.

Be the Architect of Change. You must be the primary master planner in your organization. Identify your organizational capabilities and shortfalls, create innovative solutions to overcoming those shortfalls, and drive the organization to solve them. Don't assign this job to anyone else--draw your plan out as you think and talk. Change it often as your environment dictates. (7:64-67) Let your subordinates put "the meat" on the architecture and implement it, but don't cast it in concrete.

Measure Performance. Measure unit performance with meaningful factors that are most easily understood by your customers. (4:268) The success rate of getting an AUTOVON line after lunch is an example of one such meaningful measure of performance in the telephone business.

Manage By Wandering Around (MBWA). Find out how your people are supporting your goals. Manage by wandering around--ask questions, listen attentively--get out and be seen. Meet your people, find out what they are doing. Be interested in their problems. Ask how the organization is doing, and what can be done better. Take action on their suggestions--they probably have better ideas than you because they are closer to problems. Your actions imply more than just a passing concern for your subordinates, it shows them you respect their judgment and acknowledge them as team players and experts. (3:378-391)

Decentralize. Delegate responsibility and authority to the lowest organizational level. Decentralization can lead to

organization economies, and will improve efficiency. Transferring authority to subordinates also improves their self-esteem because of the trust you place in them. (7:75-76)

Use Common Sense. Don't fall back on regulations and manuals as prohibiting new and innovative solutions. Directives are guides for people without common sense. (5:378-380)

Take Risks. Approach difficult tasks with a positive, can-do attitude. Look at tasks as being possible, though they may be difficult. Resist the temptation to rationalize why a difficult task can't be performed. Take risks if the payoffs exceed the costs of failure. (7:289-290)

Never Say No. Provide service, service, and more service! Emblazon in everybody's mind the idea that the word "no" does not exist. Encourage all to make extraordinary efforts to provide service. Live for your customers' good; provide them extraordinary service, and make sure they know it! (4:13-16)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

REFERENCES CITED

Books

1. Bass, Bernard M. Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership. New York: The Free Press, 1981.
2. Drucker, Peter F. The Effective Executive. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967.
3. Peters, Thomas J. and Austin, Nancy. A Passion for Excellence: The Leadership Difference. New York: Random House, 1985.
4. Peters, Thomas J. and Waterman, Robert H., Jr. In Search Of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-run Companies. New York: Harper & Row, 1982.
5. Peters, Thomas J. Thriving on Chaos: Handbook for a Management Revolution. New York: Knopf, 1987.
6. Smith, Perry M. Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1986.
7. Waterman, Robert H., Jr. The Renewal Factor. Toronto: Bantam Books, 1987.

Articles and Periodicals

8. Berry, F. Clifton, Jr. "TAC's Training Pays Off." Air Force Magazine, February 1983.
9. Finegan, Jay. "Four Star Management." INC., January 1987, pp. 42-51.
10. "Navy Reports Raise New Questions About Stark." The Institute, The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 1-2.
11. "Principles and Techniques of Leadership First Class Course." A Leaders' Guide for Instruction in the Principles of Leadership. West Point, New York:

CONTINUED

United States Military Academy, 1953, pp. 2-0-1, 3-1-3.

Official Documents

12. Blazek, Miroslav F., Colonel, USAF, Cooper, Marcus F., Colonel, USAF, O'Keefe, Timothy F., Jr., Colonel, USAF, Ball, William J., Lt Col, USAF, Hobgood, Henry M., Lt Col, USAF, and Roehling, Edwin A., Jr., "A Case Study: Leadership and Management Initiatives: The Tactical Air Command Approach, 1977-1981." Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air War College, April 1982.
13. "Commitment to Excellence." AF Policy Ltr Supplement, Washington, D.C.: HQ USAF, December 1981.
14. Author and Office of Primary Responsibility withheld at their request, "Our Philosophy," dtd. 5 January 1988.
15. Schumann, Lawrence J., Colonel, USA. "Presidential Communications Support." Internal Letter, White House Communications Agency, The White House, 22 March 1984.
16. "Tactical Air Command Readiness." AF Policy Ltr Supplement, Washington, D.C.: HQ USAF, August 1981.
17. United States Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1985. Hearings, 98th Congress, 2d Session, March 1, 1984, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984.

Unpublished Materials

18. Kuhnert, Karl W. and Lewis, Philip. "Transactional and Transformational Leadership: A Constructive/Developmental Analysis." Unpublished Manuscript, Auburn, Alabama: Auburn University, October 1987.
19. Opfer, James, Lt Col, USAF. Notes, Undated.

Other Sources

20. Barbi, Kenneth W., Lt Col, USAF. Student, Air University Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Interview, 5 November 1987.

CONTINUED

21. Creech, W. L., General, USAF. "Leadership and Management -- The Present and The Future." Keynote Address Presented to the Armed Services Leadership and Management Symposium. Sponsored by: Air University Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 11-14 October 1983.
22. Gatliff, Robert, Lt Col, USAF. Student, Air University Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Interview, 3 September 1987.
23. Opfer, James, Lt Col, USAF. Telecon, 23 December 1987.