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PARAMETERS



US ARMY
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Book Reviews

By Russell Weigley, Julian Ewell, Stansfield Turner,
John Elting, Richard Trefry, and Douglas Kinnard

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- The Influence of Geopolitics on the East-West Struggle Michael Howard
- On NATO Strategy: Escalation and the Nuclear Allergy Wallace J. Thies
- The American Political Culture Frederick M. Downey
and Strategic Planning and Steven Metz
- Campaign Planning: - William W. Mendel
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- Congressional Resurgence and the
Destabilization of US Foreign Policy Wallace Earl Walker
- Perestroika and Glasnost in the Soviet Armed Forces Natalie A. Gross
- New Directions in Franco-German Military Cooperation John L. Clarke
- Austria and US Security John M. Luchak
- Japan and the East Asian Balance of Power Jerome K. Holloway
- The Army and the Great Depression Thomas W. Collier
- View From the Fourth Estate: -
Behind the Arms Scandal Edward Luttwak

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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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The Media and Our Next Intervention: Scenario

WILLIAM A. RUSHER

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"The power of the media not merely to influence but to determine and even make events is growing. That is bound, in the end, to lead to a popular demand that it be subjected to more democratic control."

—Paul Johnson.

The Spectator, 1 November 1986

At 10:00 a.m. EST on Saturday, 15 February 1989, the President of the United States addressed the nation. His talk was carried on all major television and radio networks. It was brief and dramatic:

"My fellow Americans: As you know, our relations with Nicaragua have deteriorated gravely in recent years. The Sandinista regime, having consolidated its hold on the country after Congress ended military aid to the Contras, has stepped up its pressure against its non-communist neighbors. Guerrilla forces based in Nicaragua, and supplied by communist nations through that country, are gravely threatening the freely elected government of El Salvador through repeated bombings in its capital, San Salvador, and are also active in Honduras and Guatemala. I regret to say that there is evidence that revolutionary forces inspired by the communist bloc are preparing to strike in our closest neighbor, Mexico, in the near future.

"The United States has repeatedly warned Nicaragua and its communist allies that it cannot tolerate the steady, indefinite expansion of communism by force northward through Central America to our very border. In particular we have made it clear that the introduction of new weapon systems in that area would not be permitted, since they would fundamentally alter the strategic balance there and compel a reevaluation, and probably a major reduction, of this country's global military commitments.

"Despite these warnings, Nicaragua and its supporters in the communist bloc have persisted in their attempts to destabilize the free and democratic countries to the north. And I very much regret to say that last week, in express disregard of our solemn and repeated warnings, three squadrons of Soviet-made MiG-29s—the most modern and deadly fighter planes in the Soviet arsenal—arrived at Nicaraguan military air bases in what is very clearly an attempt to change fundamentally the military balance in Central America.

"Under these circumstances, the United States is left no choice but to act before the situation becomes even worse and perhaps gets out of control altogether. Accordingly, after consultations with the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the relevant Cabinet members, and leaders of both parties in both Houses of Congress, I have directed the armed forces of the United States to occupy the territory of the Republic of Nicaragua and secure it for the forces of freedom, in preparation for early elections to choose a new government. Operations to that end began just a little over four hours ago, and will continue until the assigned objectives have been achieved.

"I am confident that these steps will meet with the full approval of the American people, and that they will also be endorsed by Congress if they are still proceeding in 60 days when congressional approval of the overseas deployment of US forces is required by the War Powers Act. Meanwhile, today our hearts are with our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, on whom so much depends. Let us pray that casualties on both sides will be light, that the battle will be over shortly, and that all of Central America will soon know, once again, the blessings of freedom.

"Thank you, and God bless America."

The first attacks of American forces—by landing craft on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Nicaragua, by land across Nicaragua's border with Honduras, and by parachute and helicopter onto certain small airfields which could then be used to fly in supplies—were almost uniformly successful, and the mood in the White House and the Pentagon was described as one of "cautious optimism." In Congress, only a handful of extreme leftist congressmen condemned the operation, while many in both parties praised it. A majority of members of the House and Senate, on both sides of the aisle, acknowledged privately that there seemed little else the President could do, in view of the brazen deployment of the MiG-29s.

William A. Rusher is the publisher of *National Review* magazine and a syndicated columnist. His books include *The Rise of the Right* (Morrow, 1984) and *The Coming Battle for the Media: Curbing the Power of the Media Elite* (Morrow, 1988). The present article is taken from Chapter 11 of the latter work, which will be reviewed in a future issue of *Parameters*.

The major media too, during that first week, contented themselves with reporting the military operations, with due regard for the security of troop movements, etc. In fact, just about the only discordant notes came from foreign sources. In a special emergency session the UN Security Council, by an overwhelming margin, condemned the American attack. The nations voting for the resolution included some of America's closest allies, but the resolution was technically void because the US representative vetoed it.

Reaction throughout the communist bloc and the Third World was vociferously anti-American from the start. There were riots and anti-American demonstrations in almost every capital; bombs exploded near the American embassies in six countries; and three US Information Agency libraries were set ablaze. In NATO Europe, the gloom was intense; the conviction was almost universal that the United States had committed a disastrous blunder. The British prime minister insisted on suspending judgment until the situation became clearer, but was hooted down in the House of Commons.

These negative reactions were, of course, duly reported to the American people by the media, but they had little effect as long as the news from the battlefronts remained consistently upbeat.

During the second and third weeks of the invasion, the various fronts were stabilized. US forces had consolidated their hold on much of the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, as well as on a smaller segment of its Pacific coast, and also over a portion of its northern sector where Nicaragua borders Honduras. However, it had become apparent that the Sandinista armed forces, including their "international" component, weren't going to be any pushovers. The Sandinistas were digging in grimly around Managua, Estelí, and Granada, and their large and well-equipped army was giving a good account of itself in pitched battles with US forces. The US Navy had, of course, effectively blockaded the country the moment hostilities began, and the Air Force could claim air supremacy over the battlefronts most of the time, though anti-aircraft missiles had managed, by the Pentagon's own admission, to shoot down six US helicopters and three troop carriers.

Now, however, opposition to the invasion was increasing and mobilizing on the domestic Left. By mid-March demonstrations—small at first, but growing in size and number—were being staged in almost every major American city, and there were "teach-ins" or other protest actions on virtually every college campus. Television coverage of these was, of course, intensive. Abroad, too, the protests (and the riots, and the bombings) grew; one American military attaché was gunned down as he stepped out of his car.

In Congress, now, there was grumbling in the cloakrooms and the corridors. How long, exactly, did the President expect members of Congress to take this heat? Was this operation going to be a quick, surgical strike, on the order of a bigger Grenada, or was it going to drag on for years, like Vietnam? Just how important was Nicaragua to American security anyway? It

had been communist-controlled, for all practical purposes, since 1979, yet the world hadn't vanished in a blast of flame, had it? Certain prominent liberals in both the House and the Senate told their countrymen, on the evening news programs of the major TV networks, that the President owed the American people an explanation.

What, exactly, was the *goal* of this invasion? The people of Nicaragua certainly weren't welcoming our soldiers with open arms. Besides, three squadrons of fighter planes were scarcely much of a threat to American sovereignty in the skies. "How many more American soldiers," one Senator demanded, "will have to be shipped home in body bags before we learn why this invasion was necessary, or call a halt to it?"

Meanwhile, in El Salvador, guerrilla forces launched a massive campaign of terrorism, and the country's chief executive was assassinated. His successor declared a national state of emergency.

On 20 March, on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President authorized the commitment of 30,000 additional combat troops, to augment the initial invasion force of 50,000, and called up elements of the Reserve and the National Guard. This, however, simply increased the protests in Congress, in the country at large, and abroad. "Where will it all end?" demanded one of television's most prominent anchormen, who thereupon decided to use that question as his sign-off words every night.

And now, as March drew toward a close and the enemy, though slowly giving ground, fought with desperate intensity, the mood of the American people turned somber. Casualty reports were now a familiar phenomenon, and every sizable American city counted its dead and wounded. On television, the grim reality of war was brought home to the public every night by newsmen the vast majority of whom had opposed the invasion, at least privately, from the very start.

From a crater carved by an exploding shell of the battleship *New Jersey*, fired during the early days of the invasion, one TV correspondent picked up a fragment of shrapnel and held it out toward the camera.

"This particular shell did no damage," he explained with a smile. "It landed here, in an empty field. The only losers were the taxpayers who paid for it in the first place. But another shell"—and here he gestured with the shrapnel—"scored a direct hit over there. On an orphanage."

One of the battleship's 16-inch guns had indeed, it seemed, by accident hit an orphanage in a nearby town where enemy soldiers were holding up the American advance. The scene now shifted to a makeshift hospital, where nursing nuns were caring for children injured by the shell. They had nothing to say to the American TV crew, but their looks—and the sad-eyed faces of the children—told volumes.

On another network that evening, the reporter was interviewing wounded American soldiers. Most of them were pretty matter-of-fact about

it all. One young man with his arm in a sling just wanted to say hello to his folks back home. Another, who had lost a leg, was less exuberant. The war, he said, was "pretty bad." The camera moved on.

There was straight battle reportage too, of course: camera footage of American soldiers scurrying forward across a road and through a line of trees. ("The gooks are over there," a big black sergeant explained.) There was the sound of shots, and pictures of some sort of smoky fire. Then the reporter appeared onscreen: The village had been taken. Two American soldiers were dead. On, tomorrow, to the next village. But, "Where will it all end?"

By the beginning of April, five weeks into the invasion, polls indicated that most of the American people still supported it, but the percentage opposed had grown from 17 percent in late February to 26 percent in mid-March. Now it stood at 39 percent. In Congress, the rumbles had become a roar. Most congressmen, like most of the public, still supported the invasion, but they were growing increasingly uneasy as 25 April drew nearer—the 60th day of the operation and the one on which the President must, by law, recall America's troops unless Congress had by then authorized their continued deployment abroad.

Public uneasiness was heightened by a sharp increase in Soviet military activity in the neighborhood of the Persian Gulf. Suddenly it seemed possible that what had begun as a quick, relatively painless military operation on our southern flank might escalate into a global conflict, with incalculable consequences.

The savage week-long battle for possession of Nicaragua's capital, Managua, which ended in victory for the Americans on 7 April, was nevertheless depicted on American television as a disastrous defeat, because American casualties had been high. Closely paraphrasing Pyrrhus, one TV newsman declared that "one more such 'victory' and we will be ruined." His camera crew took Americans, watching horrified in their living rooms, on a grim tour of a road on the city's outskirts. Clearly visible were the bodies of seven American soldiers killed by a land mine. "I talked to this boy yesterday," the reporter mused, gesturing. "He was going to be married in September."

Another of the bodies was identified as that of Corporal Harry Flint, 22, of Rochester, New York. The scene switched to Rochester, where, by one of those miracles of modern television, Harry Flint's mother could now be seen, "live," watching this very program. A camera closed in tight on her homely face—puffy and red from weeping. But she was composed now, as she began to speak in a high-pitched, querulous voice.

"Harry loved the Army," she began. "He really loved it. I know, if he had to die, this . . . he would have"—her chin was trembling now—"I only hope, somehow, that some good comes of all this killing. I didn't want"—and now the eyes brim and overflow—"to lose my boy." She covers her sobbing face with her hands.

(In December 1989 a special citation for distinguished reportage was awarded to the director of that program by a committee of the television industry.)

By coincidence it was later that very evening that another network carried an interview with the Nicaraguan foreign minister, taped earlier in the day through the facilities of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in Toronto. He was a mild-mannered, bespectacled man who spoke excellent English. He described mournfully the carnage the American invasion was causing in his country, and demanded reproachfully, "What have we done to you, to deserve this?" The interviewer raised the matter of the MiG-29s, only to be told that America's invasion proved why they were necessary—a point the interviewer seemed unable to refute. "Leave us in peace," the Nicaraguan begged; "we wish you no harm."

In vain the administration strove to remind the public of the stakes in this battle: Was Central America going to become a forward base of the Soviet empire, armed with its most advanced weapons (and requiring, therefore, correspondingly advanced defenses), or wasn't it? The daily inundation of news from the battlefronts rubbed the public's nose in the human tragedy that war has always been—but which it had never before, even in Vietnam, so vividly and constantly been seen to be. As one furious general pointed out, a viewer watching the war on TV in his own home—morning, noon, and night—actually heard far more gunfire than the average combat infantryman, and saw more American corpses.

Television was, of course, the major medium that shaped American opinion, but the print media were not to be disregarded. And even radio, which receives far less attention than television but retains a vast audience and is dominated by producers, directors, and writers with exactly the same spectrum of leftist and liberal political attitudes, did its Herculean share. (One New York radio station began every news report from the battlefronts with the deadpan phrase, "On the Nicaraguan killing ground . . .")

By mid-April, America was a nation torn asunder. A little over half of the public sincerely believed that unless the invasion was carried through to a successful conclusion, the Soviet Union would have succeeded in planting a forward military base in America's own backyard, ready to create still further trouble in Mexico and elsewhere. About 40 percent (the rest "didn't know") believed, equally sincerely, that no possible military or diplomatic objective could possibly be worth the slaughter unfolding before their eyes on the evening news programs. In Congress, which was controlled by the opposition party, it now appeared that narrow majorities in both Houses were prepared to deny authorization (required, after 60 days, by the War Powers Act) for the invasion to continue after 25 April. The President was staring disaster—military for the nation, political for himself—in the face.

On the morning of 18 April he summoned the owners of the major television networks, newsmagazines, wire services, and national newspapers to the White House for an all-day, off-the-record discussion. (Verbatim accounts of its key parts were published and broadcast the next day.)

"Ladies and gentlemen," the President began somberly, "I have asked you to come here to consult with me because this nation faces a crisis that is truly constitutional.

"None of us wishes our country ill. If we disagree, it is over means, not ends. I ask you, therefore, to believe me when I say that my military and civilian advisers and I—this administration, if you will—sincerely believed, and continue to believe, that the introduction of Soviet MiG-29s into Central America represented a threat so grave that it warranted an immediate military response. I may add that this belief was, at least until the middle of March, common ground between the two major parties, including the great majority of congressmen in both. That is why there was, in the beginning, as little opposition to the invasion, in Congress, as there was.

"But in the nearly two months since the invasion began, there has been a dramatic swing in public opinion. Although the military operations are succeeding and my military advisers tell me that we will prevail, casualties have been somewhat higher than expected and we are about four weeks behind our timetable. Far more ominously, public support for the invasion has fallen from over 80 percent at the outset to only a little over 50 percent today, and polls indicate that many of its critics are not only against it but furiously so.

"The reason is perfectly plain. Modern technology, which is nobody's fault, has made it possible for the news media to cover a war more rapidly, more intensively, and more vividly than ever before in history. The coverage of the Vietnam War, to which many people, rightly or wrongly, assign responsibility for America's failure to finish that job, was not half as effective, in terms of its impact on the home front, as the coverage of this invasion has already been.

"Now, the freedom of the American press is a precious thing. Certainly neither I nor any responsible member of my administration wants to infringe on it. Ordinarily, in any case, you can generally figure in politics"—and here the President permitted himself a weary smile—"that pressure from one side will tend to be canceled out by pressure from the other.

"But, in the case of the major American media and this invasion, the fracture line runs, not through the media (which are now in almost unanimous opposition to it), but between the media and certain of their allies on the one hand and, on the other, those groups and forces in American life that have normally supported me.

"Well, there's nothing wrong with that." (Another smile.) "I've been in this game too long to be surprised by, or angry at, opposition. But,

ladies and gentlemen, we are approaching a point at which our media, dominated by people who are still in the minority politically, may nonetheless be able to impose their political will, thanks to the virtuosity of the news technologies they control. And I'm not sure that would be democracy.

"I have called you together, therefore—the people who, in effect, control what the American people see and hear about this war—to ask you to modify your reportage. I am not asking you to say or do anything that is false, or to suppress anything that is relevant. I *am* asking you to make your coverage better balanced, and to avoid taking cheap shots with what George



DOD Public Affairs

One device for keeping the news flowing during military emergencies is the DOD National Media Pool. Here, Carl Rochelle, Cable News Network reporter, videotapes a report from the *USS Kidd* in the Strait of Hormuz.

Will once called 'the pornography of grief.' My military advisers estimate that we should be able to complete this operation by mid-July, but we can't do it by April 25th. Unless Congress authorizes continuation of the operation it will fail. Nicaragua will remain communist, all of our dead will have died for nothing, and communist efforts to seize control of the rest of Central America and Mexico will have received an enormous boost. I can't believe," he concluded, "that you want that any more than I do."

There was a thick silence. Then a prominent publisher spoke up.

"What bother some of us, Mr. President, are your assumptions. For example, plenty of people think your military advisers are wrong. What if there's no light at the end of the tunnel? What if this war drags on endlessly, like Vietnam, grinding up more and more human lives? And anyway, what makes you think that a communist El Salvador and Nicaragua necessarily mean a communist Guatemala or Honduras or Mexico? And if so, so what? The peoples of those countries have every right to decide for themselves what kind of government they want. If they decide they want to buy some Soviet MiGs to defend themselves (and I saw the Nicaraguan foreign minister on TV the other night, and he *pledged* they would only be used defensively), I say let 'em. The American people are turning against this war, and they're right."

There were murmurs of agreement around the long table. The President stared at the tabletop, then slowly replied.

"You may be right. But the toughest thing about this job of mine is making the hard decisions. You know, Jimmy Carter said that all the easy decisions get weeded out on the way to the President's desk. The only ones that wind up here are the ones nobody else can make—or, perhaps, wants to make. And in this case I have made my decision. Now, under the law, Congress must ratify that decision within 60 days, by authorizing the further deployment of our forces abroad, or, in effect, reverse it. I don't think that law was such a hot idea, but it *is* the law, and I respect it as such. And Congress may very well refuse authorization to continue the operation beyond April 25th. Frankly, I think it *will* refuse, unless you people in the media lay off. No people has ever had to undergo the kind of psychological assault and battery you have been subjecting the American people to in the last month or so. I seriously question whether any people ever ought to be compelled to."

"What about freedom of the press?" The speaker was the controlling stockholder of a major television network. "Are you telling us to shut up and put our tails between our legs and start praising this cockeyed expedition? Do you have any right to do such a thing? Anyway, even if we did what you want us to, I doubt our news staffs would go along. I think mine would walk right out from under me. And it'd be right."

"After all, Mr. President," another voice took up the argument, "these things that you don't like to see on TV or in the newspapers are happening. That's not our fault. We just report what's there to be reported."

"I don't think it's quite that simple, Pete," the President replied. "War is hell. We all know that. But one of your TV crews can go down there and make an important achievement like the capture of Managua look like a disaster simply by concentrating on the American casualties."

"Suppose we do," someone else interjected, "—just for the sake of argument. Don't we have that right? Doesn't the First Amendment to the Constitution guarantee it? Even if we are in the minority as you contend, don't we have the right to be heard?"

Again the President spoke slowly. "You have the right to speak, of course. But what I am facing here is not simply opposition but something no President has ever faced before—certainly not to anything like this extent. I am facing a situation in which the entire American media, or at any rate virtually all of them that count in the shaping of public opinion, have not only chosen to oppose this operation but are very deliberately using their control over the dissemination of news about it to turn public opinion against it. In the present state of news technology, that amounts to the power to decide the issue. The power to broadcast and to publish has become, at least in certain circumstances, the power to destroy."

The discussion continued for several hours, more or less along the lines outlined above. Tempers grew heated; voices were raised. One or two of those invited to the White House tended to side with the President, and urged their colleagues to agree to modify their coverage of the invasion to reduce the amount of "tear-jerk stuff," as one publisher put it. But the great majority were unmoved. They actually broke into applause when one magazine owner told the President bluntly, "Face it: You don't have the country behind you on this one, and you should never have launched this invasion in the first place. Now your best bet is to end it as quickly as possible."

The President's face was hard, but his voice was almost inaudible as he responded.

"Maybe so, Sam; maybe so. But I'm the guy who was elected President, and I swore to protect and defend the Constitution of this country to the best of my ability, so help me God. And I would urge you to look carefully at that Constitution. To be sure, the First Amendment says that 'Congress shall make no law' abridging freedom of speech or of the press. But neither it nor anything else in the Constitution places any limitation on the president in his capacity as commander in chief of the armed forces. We have had military censorship, to one degree or another, in every war we've ever waged. If Abraham Lincoln could suspend the writ of habeas corpus throughout the United States by executive proclamation and get away with it, I see no reason why I cannot, as commander in chief, limit far less extensively the right of journalists to brainwash the American public, by highly

selective reportage, into bugging out on a military operation *in media res*. And I might add that my attorney general agrees with me."

There was a long silence. Then somebody breathed, "You wouldn't dare."

"Wouldn't I?" the President retorted. "Want to try me?"

In considering the above scenario, it is important not to be distracted by irrelevancies. The scenario concerns a military operation against Nicaragua, and therefore risks entanglement with whatever the reader's attitude toward Nicaragua may be. But Nicaragua was chosen for the scenario merely because military intervention there, in the event of the introduction of MiG-29s to the area, has long been an acknowledged likelihood. It would be almost as easy, however, to devise a scenario involving an American military operation in the Middle East or Angola or the Philippines which would likewise pit an American president and his administration against the nation's dominant media.

Similarly, there is nothing inherently implausible, or even particularly strained, about the various journalistic tactics described. Many of them—e.g. the media's generous coverage of the accidental bombing of an orphanage, and the radio station that began each evening's news with the words "On the Nicaraguan killing-ground . . ."—are modeled carefully on actual episodes during the Vietnam War or in more recent United States military operations.

The discussion between the embattled President and the media owners is intended only to present the two sides of the argument, with somewhat greater emphasis on the President's side because it is, of course, less widely or often heard in the country today. But I certainly don't mean to suggest that the dilemma, in our wide-open and lustily democratic society, is an easy one to resolve, still less that all justice is on one side or the other.

I *do* suggest that the present distribution of forces in American politics, in which presidents are often able to amass impressive electoral majorities, only to find the major media allied with their opponents and almost unanimously opposed to administration programs and goals, presents a very serious problem when the currently available techniques of news gathering and news presentation are used by the media to turn public opinion against an ongoing military operation.

It is certainly not enough merely to quote the First Amendment, as the President in our scenario pointed out. There is another rule of law as old as Rome: *Salus populi suprema lex*—The safety of the people is the supreme law. What shall we do, if and when those two great principles collide?

It would be far better to face the matter now, and thrash it out as far as possible before the event, or we may find ourselves confronting it some day under far more urgent and much less satisfactory circumstances. □

The Influence of Geopolitics on the East-West Struggle

MICHAEL HOWARD

A Review Essay on: **The Geopolitics of Super Power.** By Colin Gray. 274 pages. The University Press of Kentucky, 1988.

The argument of Colin Gray's book can be simply stated. There is an inevitable and permanent confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, created not by ideological diversity but by the facts of geopolitics. Geopolitical imperatives drive the Soviet Union to expand outward until it controls the entire Eurasian "World Island," whence it would dominate the rest of the world. To combat this drive the United States must continue to dominate the oceans so as to hold "the Rimlands" of the World Island, notably Western Europe and Japan, and also prevent Soviet expansion to the south.

The strategy the United States should pursue in fulfilling this objective, continues Dr. Gray, should be neither that of isolating itself in "Fortress America," nor the impractical aspiration of "roll-back," nor even the relatively passive policy of "containment." It should consist of "dynamic containment": "the organization and where necessary the arming of actual and potential resistance around the Rimlands of Eurasia," without too much concern about the political complexion of the groups it is supporting. Strategic defenses should be built up, not to make the United States invulnerable but to "render perception of nuclear risk more manageable in American domestic politics." Finally, "extended deterrence" for Western Europe should consist not of barely credible threats of nuclear first use, but of a capacity for sustained conventional war, fought on battlefields of America's own choosing, which her mobility, her technology, and her industrial muscle would enable her to win.

This thesis is set out with all the lucidity and learning we have come to expect from Dr. Gray, whose emigration to the United States has been a

sad loss to the British world of strategic studies. There is much good sense in it, though few people would endorse all his recommendations. But the pseudo-science of geopolitics is a fragile basis on which to build any theory. It has never been taken very seriously, either by historians or by political scientists. That geographical location plays a large part in shaping political development is self-evident, but to attribute to that a dominant role in social and political evolution is crudely reductionist. Geopolitics has not been ignored by the academic community. It has been appraised, and appraised rather critically.

The thesis of a World Island, control of which depends on control of an ill-defined "Heartland," was first set out by the Englishman Halford Mackinder in a lecture in 1904. This lecture was occasioned by the newly acquired capacity of Russia to transport troops over the Trans-Siberian railway to fight the Japanese, a capacity which worried the leaders of a British Empire whose frontier marched with the Russian in Central Asia. A member of the audience, in an intervention not chronicled by Dr. Gray, suggested more plausibly that simultaneous events at Kittyhawk were of rather greater relevance, and that the future of the world in fact lay in the hands of the power which, irrespective of geographical location, could gain a lead in inventive technology and maintain the industrial base to support it. Mackinder ignored, and continued to ignore, this fundamental criticism. He surfaced again with a book, *Democratic Ideas and Reality*, written in the darkest days of 1918 when the Germans had broken the Russian resistance and were advancing across Central Asia to the same sensitive outposts of the British Empire. In that work he restated his thesis with oracular dogmatism:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland
Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island
Who rules the World Island commands the World.

To this one can only reply that it is self-evident nonsense. There are few areas of less importance to the hegemony of the world than East Europe, however defined. I am reminded of the splendid rejoinder made by Marshal Blücher during the Allied invasion of France in 1814, when a pedantic member of his staff advised him to establish his army on the plateau of Langres

Michael Howard is Regius Professor of History at Oxford. He served with the British army's Coldstream Guards in Italy during 1943-45, being twice wounded and awarded the Military Cross. His books include *The Franco-Prussian War* (1961), *Studies in War and Peace* (1970), Volume IV in the *Grand Strategy* series of the UK history of World War II (1972), *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the World Wars* (1973), *War in European History* (1976), and (with Peter Paret) the definitive edition and English translation of Clausewitz's *On War* (1976).

since that was "the key to the country." Blücher examined the map and grunted, "I can see that if I stand on the plateau and piss to the north it will drain into the Atlantic, while if I piss to the south it will drain into the Mediterranean. But I don't see how that will help me to win the war."

A comparatively robust skepticism is in order when confronted with the analyses and warnings of the geopoliticians. They simply leave out too much. Too many other factors go into the development of societies capable of exercising and willing to project political power—factors which actually operate far more effectively in Rimland states, with their better communications, intense commercial activity, and advanced industrial and technological development, than they do in Heartland ones. After all, the Russians were defeated by the Japanese in 1904. They were defeated again by the Germans in 1918—and would have been so in 1942-45 had they been fighting alone. The Heartland has in fact been able to survive the repeated incursions of the Rimland states only by imitating them. If one took geopolitics seriously it would be the Russians, not the West, who would have to worry; as indeed they do.

This reductionist emphasis on geopolitics at the expense of any analysis of those other factors making for social change—mobility, modernization, literacy, urbanization, mass communications—on which historians and social scientists place such emphasis, enables Dr. Gray to present a picture of a Soviet Union frozen forever in the mold imposed on it by the Revolution and Civil War of 1917-23. "Soviet ideological commitment to an essentially conflictual relationship with the West is thoroughly inalienable," he states. "Because it is rooted in a conflictual world view, the character of Soviet power and purpose is unlikely to alter in a benign direction." But the influence of ideological or religious dogma in society depends on political and social conditions which are as subject to change in the Soviet Union as anywhere else. It is, after all, some time since the Inquisition operated in Spain. Nor has ideology prevented a complete transformation in the foreign policy of the Peoples Republic of China, as Dr. Gray admits; but he gives no explanation as to why it should have been possible for one major Marxist-Leninist state to enter into friendly relations with the West, while it is intrinsically impossible for the other.

Readers of *Parameters* would thus be wise to suspend judgment on the intellectual underpinnings of Dr. Gray's proposals and concentrate on their substance. Of course if one entirely rejects Gray's belief in the inalienable hostility and expansion of the Soviet Union, very few of them will command much support; but it would be prudent to agree with him that for the moment at least the Soviet Union is ideologically hostile and militarily powerful, and that a shrewd deployment of Western military strength will for long be necessary to dissuade the old guard in the Kremlin from using military force to sustain or extend their influence. One might however enter the caveat that we should not deploy it in such a fashion as to discourage

those Soviet elements who are in favor of what Dr. Gray calls "benign" change. Whether the full projected SDI program would be desirable in the light of this is a matter of legitimate controversy, but I for one find Dr. Gray's hope that any foreseeable development of strategic defenses would "render perception of nuclear risk more manageable in American domestic politics" highly unrealistic.

Dr. Gray's advice that the United States should lean on the Soviet Union by "aiding and abetting local elements among Soviet clients who wish to reverse the course of their incorporation into the socialist commonwealth" makes good sense; the Soviet Union should not be permitted peacefully to extend her influence through surrogates. One can also sympathize with the hard-nosed warning that "the focus of American policy should be on the essentials of its security needs, not on the attractiveness or otherwise to Americans of the local political game." But such intervention calls for at least some understanding of the local political game. Such understanding would imply a refusal to back players who, like the Contras, do not have a hope in hell of winning; or those whose victory in the short run, like those of Marcos in the Philippines, Galtieri in Argentina, or Pinochet in Chile, builds up in the long run a growing store of resentment toward the United States among those very elements whose support the Americans wish to attract. To regard the Third World simply as an arena in which the United States and the Soviet Union can *fight out their geopolitical battles* without any concern for, or understanding of, the needs of the countries concerned is to ensure that in the long run those battles will be lost.

Finally, one can applaud Dr. Gray's robust defense of the American commitment to the security of Western Europe and share his concern about the credibility of the nuclear guarantee without accepting his alternative solution: "to substitute the threat of long duration and global geographical scope of conflict for that of nuclear escalation at the end of the sputtering fuse from war in Europe . . . the extended deterrent should be the total mobilizable potential of the United States and its allies . . . the core of deterrence would be the Soviet understanding that, however well they might fare in a campaign in Europe, they could not guarantee that the campaign would be synonymous with the war as a whole."

It is hard to see this as anything other than an appeal to the United States and its allies to tool themselves up to fight a global, non-nuclear World War III; a war which would begin as did World War II, with the loss of Western Europe. Apart from any feelings the West Europeans might have in the matter, the obvious question arises: how much is this going to cost? As Dr. Gray himself states elsewhere, "It does not much matter what goals American statesmen believe the United States should pursue in the international order: what matters is what the United States and its allies are prepared to pay for." Dr. Gray does not put a price tag on his recommendations. Indeed,



General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan toast each other during the Moscow summit of May-June 1988.

his whole book is as short on economic as it is on social and political analysis. He does not address the argument that the United States is already dangerously weakened by financial overstretch. Until he does so, and is prepared to spell out not only the financial but the general economic implications of his preferred strategy, his book is not likely to be taken very seriously by decisionmakers in Washington.

Published in the twilight months of the Reagan Administration, this book already has the look of a period piece. Dr. Gray confidently restates the two dogmatic assumptions on which President Reagan based his defense policy at the beginning of this decade: the unchanging nature and ineluctable hostility of the Soviet Union, and the willingness of the American people to bear whatever burdens were needed to contain it. Now both these pillars are crumbling. A huge question mark hangs over the whole future of the Soviet Union, with whose leaders President Reagan seems to have established relations of almost embarrassing intimacy. The lavish expenditure of Secretary of Defense Weinberger's tenure at the Pentagon is already being pruned back, and is likely under any successor administration to be pruned back still further. We are moving into a very different world in which Dr. Gray's arguments are likely to be of greater interest to his fellow academics than to those responsible for shaping American defense policy for the 1990s. □

On NATO Strategy: Escalation and the Nuclear Allergy

WALLACE J. THIES

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It has become increasingly apparent in recent years that the strategy of flexible response has become a liability rather than an asset for the Atlantic Alliance. The gap between what NATO's formal strategy calls for and what the publics of the European members will support has widened considerably during the 1980s. Public opinion in many of the countries of Western Europe has reacted strongly against reliance on nuclear weapons for defense against a Soviet attack, and a broad consensus has emerged that the interests of all NATO members would be well served by a greater capability for conventional defense.¹ Yet neither of these goals—diminished reliance on nuclear weapons or stronger conventional forces—is likely to be attained in the absence of a thorough-going reassessment of the strategy that has guided NATO planning since the mid-1960s.

There have always been tensions and strains within NATO concerning the nature and location of any fighting that might be required. Each member has sought to ensure that it would not have to fight alone, yet each has also hoped that any fighting could be kept as far from its national territory as possible. Discussions of strategy and supporting plans have proven incessantly divisive, because they inevitably bring to the fore two fractures in the core of common interests that has helped sustain the alliance for almost 40 years now: on the one hand, the cleavage between those who hope to confine any fighting to a limited area and those who fear their country will be the likely

battlefield; on the other, the cleavage between those who fear their country will be devastated by a nuclear exchange if NATO escalates too fast and those who fear their country will be overrun if NATO escalates too slowly.

For 40 years these cleavages have been papered over by vaguely worded compromises. Vagueness may be helpful for deterrence by keeping an adversary uncertain of how an aggressive move will be met, but it can also lead to unwarranted fears among the peoples the alliance is intended to reassure. Vagueness can also complicate the task of judging the adequacy of NATO's forces for the missions assigned to them. Instead of forces adequate for deterrence and defense, the alliance may be saddled with a force structure that is well-suited for neither. A more clearly defined strategy would make it easier to judge the adequacy of NATO's forces, identify areas of military weakness and excess, and establish priorities for needed improvements.²

The rest of this article proceeds in three steps. Part one considers the reasons why flexible response has become an inadequate basis for strategic collaboration in peacetime and for successful military operations in wartime. Part two considers the requirements that any new strategy will have to meet to be a viable replacement, while part three proposes an alternative approach based on the principle of symmetrical response.

I. Flexible Response: Erosion of a Strategy

Flexible response was formally adopted by the NATO allies in 1967, and it remains the officially approved strategy despite significant changes in the strategic environment over the past two decades.³ The strategy calls for an initial defense with conventional forces followed by deliberate escalation across the nuclear threshold in the event that resistance with conventional forces alone proved unable to halt a Soviet advance. Pronouncements by NATO military commanders have been ambiguous about when and how the nuclear threshold would be crossed and the purposes that such a move would be intended to serve,⁴ but it is nonetheless possible to infer two broad rationales from the arguments used to justify a willingness to engage in deliberate escalation.

Dr. Wallace J. Thies is a member of the Department of Politics at the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C. During 1979 and 1980 he worked in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department as an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a graduate of Marquette University and holds an M.A. in international relations and M.Phil. and Ph.D. degrees in political science from Yale University. He is the author of *The Atlantic Alliance, Nuclear Weapons, and European Attitudes: Re-examining the Conventional Wisdom* (1983) and *When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict* (1980).

The military rationale for deliberate escalation suggests that since Soviet forces would be required to concentrate in order to have a good chance of breaking through NATO's defenses, they would offer lucrative targets for the alliance's theater-based nuclear systems. Nuclear weapons, in this view, can serve as instruments of defense as well as of deterrence. Their role in the event deterrence failed would be to retard and ultimately to halt a Soviet advance by destroying Soviet formations, supply depots, and other militarily significant targets.

The military rationale for crossing the nuclear threshold has been prominent in discussions of NATO strategy ever since the alliance was formed, but it has also been recognized that deliberate escalation would be important not only for its effects on the military fortunes of the combatants in a European war but for the political signals that such a move would send. The deliberate introduction of nuclear weapons into a European conflict has been variously described as a powerful signal of the West's determination to compel a halt to a Soviet advance and/or a monumental gamble aimed at terrifying the Soviets into halting their advance by raising the specter of uncontrollable escalation leading to inestimable costs.⁵ Regardless of which variant is deemed more plausible, the "compellent"⁶ rationale suggests that deliberate escalation would be important less for the military effects such a move would produce than for its impact on the will of the Soviet leadership to continue fighting.

Both the military and the compellent rationales were the product of circumstances very different from the present situation in Europe, yet both have proven tenaciously resistant to change. The military rationale for introducing tactical nuclear weapons into a European conflict was first formulated during the early 1950s, when it was generally believed in the West that the use of such weapons favored the defense and when the United States had a virtual monopoly on low-yield, short-range nuclear systems and overwhelming preponderance in strategic nuclear forces.⁷ Theorizing about compellence reached its intellectual apogee during the mid-1960s, by which time the American monopoly on theater nuclear systems had disappeared, although the United States still possessed significant advantages in both the number and quality of strategic nuclear forces deployed.⁸ A strategy that envisaged early and massive use of nuclear weapons against Soviet forces was in some respects an appropriate choice for an era in which European memories of the vulnerability of their countries during and after the Second World War contributed to their desire to be sheltered under the American nuclear umbrella and American superiority in strategic nuclear forces offered at least a hypothetical chance of escalation dominance in the event of war.⁹ Changes in the strategic environment over the past two decades, however, leave little room for doubt that the deliberate escalation component of NATO's strategy is no longer a suitable basis for military planning in

peacetime and for employment of the alliance's forces in wartime. Three changes in particular suggest that the question of a new strategy for NATO cannot be deferred any longer.

First, the emergence of strategic parity between the United States and Soviet Union has eroded the credibility of threats of deliberate escalation, which detracts from NATO's ability to use nuclear threats both to deter non-nuclear attacks and to compel a halt to a Soviet advance in the event deterrence failed.¹⁰ Strategic parity has eliminated even the hypothetical possibility of escalation dominance by NATO at higher levels of violence, with the result that the compellent rationale for deliberate escalation has become a two-edged sword. The risks associated with crossing the nuclear threshold would weigh heavily on both sides in a European war, but a strong case can be made that they would seem larger and more oppressive to the side that had to take upon itself the onus of crossing into such dangerous and unfamiliar territory.¹¹ Continued reliance on a strategy that envisages deliberate escalation despite the enormous risks involved is a prescription for paralysis and even defeatism rather than decisive action in an emergency.¹² Reasonable people can disagree as to whether there would be a significant compellent advantage associated with being the first to cross the nuclear threshold, but discussions of this sort beg the question of whether responsible democratic leaders could bring themselves to gamble the very existence of the societies they represent on the hope that the Soviets would not retaliate in kind. Viewed in this light, a commitment to deliberate escalation appears as a grave psychological handicap that very likely reduces the chances of successful resistance by the NATO countries in the event of war.

Second, the acquisition by both the United States and the Soviet Union of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and the development by both sides of a spectrum of nuclear forces, ranging from battlefield nuclear systems to strategic nuclear forces, undermines both of the rationales used by NATO to justify the deliberate escalation component of the strategy of flexible response.¹³ The plenitude of nuclear weapons makes it unlikely that there would be a military advantage to NATO from introducing nuclear weapons into a war started by the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets could use their knowledge that they were about to attack to disperse their forces and bring them to a higher alert status, which would limit NATO's ability to strike a blow that would halt a Soviet advance in its tracks.¹⁴ While no one can say for sure how the Soviets would respond, it would seem likely in view of the number and variety of nuclear systems they have amassed that deliberate escalation by NATO would be met by extensive retaliation by the Soviets, which would result in heavy damage to the alliance's armed forces and to the societies it is pledged to protect.¹⁵

On the other hand, nuclear plenty undermines both the credibility and the efficacy of the compellent rationale for deliberate escalation. A

compellent campaign presumes an asymmetry in either the capabilities or the will of the combatants in favor of the party embarking on such a step.¹⁶ The accumulation by both the United States and the Soviet Union of thousands of nuclear delivery vehicles, many of which can carry more than one warhead, makes it unlikely that either will be able to attain a meaningful numerical advantage over the other. More important, even if one side could achieve numerical preponderance in nuclear systems deployed, the existence of secure second-strike forces on both sides makes it unlikely that either could convert a numerical lead into a decisive psychological advantage.¹⁷ The sheer number of nuclear weapons available to both sides has made it increasingly difficult for the NATO countries even to discuss openly how a compellent campaign might be conducted.¹⁸ Khrushchev's rocket-rattling made it relatively easy for Western leaders to convince their electorates that it was necessary to fight fire with fire, but two decades of detente have eroded the ability of presidents and prime ministers to issue convincing threats of deliberate escalation while at the same time assuring their electorates that they are responsible enough to be trusted with control over the future of their societies.

Third and most important, the deliberate escalation component of NATO's strategy has undermined the cohesion and vitality of the alliance by suggesting to many in Western Europe that the alliance and its military plans are a source of danger rather than safety. Thirty years ago a strategy that threatened massive retaliation in response to an attack was reasonably in accord with the prevailing mood in Western Europe, in large part because the salience of issues having to do with military strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in defending Western Europe were much less than at present. Most Europeans felt that war was unlikely in the near term, and many were hopeful that the use of nuclear weapons could be avoided even if another world war did occur.¹⁹ Confidence in American leadership was relatively high, and included in this confidence was a belief that the United States could be trusted not to act rashly when coming to the aid of its European allies.²⁰ It was this combination of indifference, optimism, and trust in the Americans that made it possible for the European allies to win the consent of their electorates to a strategy that threatened early resort to nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet attack.

A climate of opinion in which the overwhelming majority of Europeans are either supportive of or indifferent to the alliance's plans to rely on nuclear weapons as instruments of both deterrence and defense no longer prevails in Western Europe. Fear of war and especially of nuclear war has increased considerably since the early 1960s. Between 1963 and 1983 the percentage of British respondents believing that a nuclear war was likely someday more than tripled. Fears of nuclear war have also increased in West Germany, particularly among the young and well-educated activists in the German peace movement.²¹

Confidence in the United States has also declined considerably over the past two decades. European doubts about the wisdom of American policies are nothing new, but what is new is the sharp increase in the number of Europeans expressing little or no confidence in the United States—as many as 70 percent of British respondents in a January 1983 survey, compared with only 24 percent expressing considerable or great confidence. A similar drop has occurred in the confidence of West German respondents in the ability of the United States to deal responsibly with world problems. Interestingly, this lack of confidence does not extend to a fear of abandonment in the event of war—between 1975 and 1981, the percentage of British respondents expressing a great deal of trust in the United States to come to Britain's aid should war break out actually went up, from 45 to 62 percent.²²

As a result of these changes, the characteristic willingness of Europeans to defer to their governments on questions of military strategy has been replaced by a climate of opinion increasingly skeptical of plans envisaging the deliberate introduction by NATO of nuclear weapons into a European conflict. Between 1954 and 1984, the percentage of West German respondents believing that NATO should not use nuclear weapons under any circumstances more than tripled, from 14 to 44 percent. Conversely, by 1984 the percentage of Europeans expressing support for first use by NATO of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack ranged from only seven percent in Denmark to 18 percent in Great Britain. As of the mid-1980s, European publics were for the most part not only unconcerned about the possibility of a Soviet invasion but confident that "the conventional deterrent is adequate and that NATO can successfully defend against a conventional attack without resorting to nuclear weapons."²³

There is considerable irony in the way in which both the strategic environment and the climate of opinion in Europe have changed during the past three decades. It has long been taken as axiomatic in the West that the NATO countries were so outnumbered and outgunned in conventional forces that they had no choice but to rely on superior technology and greater firepower—most prominently in the form of theater-based nuclear weapons—to compensate for their numerical inferiority. But the weakest link in the chain of NATO strategy has proven to be the nuclear one. The combination of strategic parity and nuclear plenty has made the deliberate initiation of nuclear war neither credible nor sensible, since deliberate escalation promises neither a military nor a coercive advantage. Moreover, to the extent that the alliance's military authorities call attention to the deliberate escalation component in NATO's strategy, they run the risk of unleashing public outcries that threaten the cohesion of the alliance. The conventional wisdom of the early 1980s notwithstanding, sentiment in favor of leaving NATO remains relatively weak in Western Europe,²⁴ but it will very likely grow if the alliance should prove unable to adapt its strategy to the changed conditions of the 1980s and beyond.

II. Facing Up to the Nuclear Allergy

The foregoing suggests that a reorientation of NATO strategy is urgently needed and that such a reorientation should take as its starting point the need to replace the deliberate escalation component of flexible response with something more appropriate to the conditions of strategic parity and nuclear plenty, and to a climate of opinion in Europe grown increasingly sensitive to the dangers inherent in any crossing of the nuclear threshold. But if the threat of deliberate escalation is to be discarded, with what should the alliance replace it? Three considerations help clarify the direction that NATO should take in forging a new strategy.

First, for an alliance like NATO, which aspires to remain in existence for as many years as are required to overcome the division of Europe into a democratic West and a non-democratic East, the function of strategy must be more than an efficient marshalling of military power in pursuit of a few vital objectives. The principal function of strategy for an alliance of democratic states is to serve as a means of bridging the gap between the requirements of external security and the requirements of internal cohesion.²⁵ It cannot be assumed that a strategy and force posture that are well-suited to the former will automatically satisfy the latter. Nor can it be assumed that a strategic consensus that manages to reconcile these two at one point in time will automatically do so for the indefinite future. The need to cope with changes both in the external environment and in the internal climate of opinion suggests that continual strategic adjustments will be required to enable the alliance to function effectively. The combination of strategic parity, nuclear plenty, and public unease over the extent to which NATO has become dependent on nuclear weapons for defense suggests the need for just such an adjustment to bring the alliance's strategy more into line with what the publics of the European allies are willing to support.

This is not to suggest that the adjustment process should work in one direction only. If it could be shown that continued reliance on threats of deliberate escalation offered substantial and otherwise unattainable advantages for NATO's effort to deter and if necessary defend against a Soviet attack, then a strong case could be made that the adjustments should take the form of renewed efforts to persuade those publics of the wisdom and necessity of continued reliance on the nuclear option. Under conditions of strategic parity and nuclear plenty, however, it seems unlikely that a strategy relying on increasingly incredible threats of deliberate escalation will be able to contribute much toward satisfying either of the two sets of requirements mentioned above, much less bridge the gap between them. Even a small number of nuclear explosions in the vicinity of populated areas would mean the loss of any semblance of proportionality between the objectives at stake in a European war and the means used to pursue them. More important, continued reliance on threats of deliberate escalation runs the risk of so alienating the

publics of Western Europe that they will grow reluctant to sanction any use of force on their behalf, lest resistance lead only to annihilation.

Second, a reorientation of NATO strategy should be based on a clear understanding of what it is that NATO, as a defensive alliance, is trying to prevent. The United States and the Soviet Union have been engaged in a struggle for the allegiance of Western Europe ever since the end of the Second World War, but the nature of this struggle has not always been well understood in the West, especially in the United States. The essence of the problem is not so much to prevent a Soviet invasion that would sweep over Western Europe in a few days or weeks as it is to reassure the Europeans that they can safely continue to rely on the United States to help balance the power that the Soviet Union could otherwise bring to bear against them. The consistent goal of Soviet policy these past 40 years has been to convince the peoples of Western Europe of their vulnerability to Soviet power and of their inability to find safety by aligning with the United States. Toward this end they have repeatedly sought to maneuver NATO in general and the United States in particular into politically untenable positions, such as threatening to initiate nuclear war in order to uphold the status quo, which is in effect a policy that threatens to destroy Western Europe in order to save it.

Discussions of NATO strategy by American officials have often begun from the premise that a Soviet invasion is the most demanding challenge facing the alliance and thus that invasion scenarios should be the benchmark against which the adequacy of the alliance's efforts are judged. This kind of reasoning neglects the political challenge posed by Soviet power, which is in many respects a far greater danger than that of an invasion. Deterring a Soviet invasion of Western Europe is relatively easy compared to the requirements the United States must satisfy in order to compete successfully in the political struggle with the Soviets. The Soviets can win the political struggle simply by encouraging the already widespread belief that the Americans are no better than they are: if a majority of Europeans should come to see the superpowers as indistinguishable, what then is the point of maintaining their alignment with the one that is far away and which plans to come to their aid by unleashing a nuclear war that would destroy their societies?

For the United States to compete successfully in the political struggle, it must be able to convince a majority of Europeans not only that it is different from and better than the Soviet Union but that continued alignment with it will not run an unacceptable risk of annihilation should resistance to Soviet demands be pressed to the point of war. Satisfying these requirements will not be easy—surveys taken during the first half of the 1980s suggest that there has been an increase in the proportion of European respondents who see the United States and the Soviet Union as essentially the same, in the sense that both intervene in the affairs of smaller states, both see war as a political

instrument, both neglect the interests of their allies, and both pose a threat to world peace.²⁶ This apparent trend toward equidistancing is not the result of any tendency on the part of Europeans to see the Soviet Union as becoming more benign or less threatening; rather, it is almost entirely the result of changes in European attitudes toward the United States.²⁷ These changes are especially noticeable in the tendency of Europeans to identify the United States with policies that increase the likelihood of war. The view that the United States is no different from the Soviet Union is held by only a minority of West Europeans, but their numbers have grown steadily during the 1980s, which can have only ominous implications for the future of the alliance.

Overcoming this tendency to see the superpowers as indistinguishable will require changes not only in declaratory policy but in the way in which Americans understand the struggle for Europe. The more that American officials speak of the need to engage the Soviets and their proxies in a variety of theaters and to prevail against them in either conventional or nuclear wars, the more they contribute to European fears of becoming pawns in a US-Soviet struggle to be fought out on and over the homelands of the European allies.²⁸ The more that American officials concentrate on finding ways to make nuclear weapons "usable" (enhanced radiation weapons, nuclear "demonstration shots") against an invasion that few Europeans believe will ever take place, the more they contribute to an impression the Soviets have long sought to foster—i.e. that of the Americans as outsiders who cannot be trusted and who are themselves the principal danger to the peace and tranquility which all Europeans, the Soviets included, have come to value so highly.²⁹ The more that American military officers insist on retaining the option of deliberate escalation across the nuclear threshold, the more they contribute to an unfortunate misconception of an America that is prepared to fight to the last European for the sake of destroying the Soviet Union.³⁰

But what if there is no alternative to continued reliance on threats of deliberate escalation? For years NATO military commanders have warned of Soviet superiority in conventional forces, and prominent Europeans have

The more that American officials concentrate on finding ways to make nuclear weapons "usable," the more they contribute to the impression that Americans cannot be trusted and are the principal danger to peace and tranquility.

argued against any renunciation of the option of deliberate escalation lest Europe thereby be rendered safe for conventional war.³¹ Treatises on military strategy have traditionally counselled in favor of retaining the initiative so as to keep the opponent off balance and unable to concentrate his strength for a decisive blow. Thus the third point in our assessment of the possibilities for change in NATO's strategy must be a reappraisal of the prospects for conventional defense in Europe. We must determine whether the option of deliberate escalation can safely be dispensed with. The purpose of such a reappraisal is not to make the case that conventional defense has suddenly become much more feasible than in the past but to reinforce the arguments made earlier concerning the need for changes in the way Americans have traditionally thought about the military balance in Europe.

During the 1950s, it was standard practice within the alliance to base assessments of the military balance on simple division counts, a practice that led inexorably to the conclusion that NATO had no choice but to rely on nuclear threats since there did not seem to be any way that its 25 or so active divisions along the Central Front could hope to withstand for long an assault by the 175 divisions that were traditionally credited to the Soviet Union alone. The misleading nature of comparisons of this kind was effectively demonstrated by the systems analysts brought into the Defense Department during the Kennedy Administration. As described by two of the key participants:

Eliminating paper divisions, using cost and firepower indexes, counts of combat personnel in available divisions, and numbers of artillery pieces, trucks, tanks, and the like, we ended up with the same conclusion: NATO and the Warsaw Pact had approximate equality on the ground. Where four years earlier it had appeared that a conventional option was impossible, it now began to appear that perhaps NATO could have had one all along.³²

Since then, Soviet forces have increased in size and improved qualitatively, but a strong case can be made that the Soviet strategic position has deteriorated to such an extent that the prospects for conventional defense remain about as promising as they were in the 1960s when American analysts were discovering that NATO forces were not vastly outnumbered on the ground.³³ Roughly one-third of the Soviet Union's ground and tactical air forces are tied down astride the borders with China, Afghanistan, and Iran, and it seems unlikely that they could be withdrawn for use in Europe without causing undue concern in Moscow for the security of the Soviet Union's southern and eastern territories.³⁴ More important, even a cursory review of the often-troubled relations between the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe suggests that the forces of the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact, with the possible exception of the East Germans, should be subtracted from rather than added to Soviet forces in estimating the size of

the threat that NATO faces. Developments in Poland during the 1980s suggest that Soviet lines of communication through that country could be secured in the event of war only by garrisoning the country with large numbers of Soviet troops to neutralize the Polish army and guard against sabotage. Large numbers of Soviet troops would also be required to assure the reliability of Czechoslovakia and Hungary.³⁵

To suggest that the option of deliberate escalation can safely be dispensed with because the prospects for conventional defense are better than are generally realized is not to suggest that a conventional war in Europe would be either easy or desirable. Rather, it is an attempt to steer the focus of discussions of NATO strategy back to where it belongs, namely, the political contest between the United States and the Soviet Union for the allegiance of Western Europe. Military strategists are inherently conservative because of the well-known tendency of soldiers to anticipate the worst and prepare for it. But if the contest for Europe is in essence a political-psychological struggle in which military force serves mainly as an instrument of intimidation and reassurance, then exaggerating Soviet strength can be as dangerous for the West as underestimating it. To take the position that the West has no alternative but to rely on threats of deliberate escalation because Western Europe is indefensible by conventional means is in effect to strengthen the Soviets' hand in the political struggle, because such a position not only serves as a tacit reminder to the publics of Western Europe of their vulnerability to Soviet power but also makes it easier for the Soviets to portray Western statesmen as reckless and irresponsible persons who would lead the world over the edge of the nuclear abyss.

By the same token, the more that Western leaders insist on retaining the option of deliberate escalation to compensate for alleged conventional weaknesses, the more they invite renewed Soviet attempts to foster discord within the alliance by proposing additional "zero-zero" agreements to cover short-range nuclear missiles and projectiles and nuclear weapons delivered by aircraft. The Soviets have already accepted the Western zero option for intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and it is highly likely that they will propose additional such agreements, which will face Western leaders with a choice between appearing opposed to further reductions in nuclear arsenals (thereby adding credence to the Soviet claim that it is the Americans who are the real threat to peace in Europe) or admitting that the West has had a conventional option all along (thereby undermining the credibility of arguments in favor of increased defense spending).

In this situation, what the West needs is a strategy that strengthens rather than undermines its ability to compete with the Soviets in a political-psychological struggle that has been going on for more than four decades and seems likely to continue for at least that much longer. What form should such a strategy take?

III. From Flexible to Symmetrical Response

The preceding sections suggest that a reorientation of NATO strategy is both desirable and feasible, and that what is needed is an approach that aims to dissuade the Soviets from attempting to change the status quo in Europe by force but which is more sensitive than the current strategy of flexible response to concerns in Europe about the risks inherent in crossing the nuclear threshold. Alleviating those concerns will require more than just a change in declaratory policy ("no first use"); what is required is a new strategy that communicates clearly and persuasively the alliance's determination to maintain the tightest control possible over events should deterrence fail and to obtain the earliest termination of any fighting consistent with preserving the territorial integrity of the NATO countries. Since it is both unnecessary and dangerous to continue to rely on threats of deliberate escalation to deter non-nuclear attacks and to compel the Soviets to accept an early termination of whatever fighting might occur, NATO's current strategy of flexible response should be replaced by one that rests instead on the principle of symmetrical response.

Under this approach, the alliance would orient its military plans and supporting programs toward the goal of developing a force structure capable of denying the Soviets a political advantage in the peacetime struggle for the allegiance of Western Europe as well as a significant military advantage at whatever level of conflict they might choose in the event deterrence failed. In effect, a strategy of symmetrical response would be one of denial combined with tit-for-tat retaliation. A Soviet conventional attack would be met by a determined conventional defense, followed by a counterattack intended to restore the status quo ante. Soviet use of battlefield nuclear weapons would be answered by similar strikes on the first echelon of a Soviet attack. Soviet use of longer-range theater or strategic nuclear forces would also be answered in kind.

In view of the importance that has been attached to the deliberate escalation component of NATO's strategy, such a reorientation might appear as a radical departure for the alliance. However, a strategy that combines defensive preparations with a capability for tit-for-tat retaliation has already been tacitly accepted by the NATO allies as the means for dissuading the Soviets from resorting to chemical weapons in the event of another European war.³⁶ More important, a change from flexible to symmetrical response should be seen as a return to ideas developed by American strategists during the 1950s, when the rapid expansion of nuclear arsenals threatened to destroy any semblance of proportionality between the objectives at stake in a future conflict and the means used to pursue them.³⁷ A strategy of symmetrical response would also mark a return to the principles that guided the Kennedy Administration during the initial formulation of its ideas on flexible response.

As conceived within the Kennedy Administration, flexible response was a strategy that sought to maintain control over events should deterrence fail and to place the onus for crossing the nuclear threshold on the Soviets rather than on NATO.³⁸

A "permanent" alliance of democratic states like NATO is likely to be conservative and cautious in its consideration of strategic issues, especially in view of the absence of war in Europe for more than 40 years now. A reorientation of NATO strategy along the lines proposed here will almost certainly encounter opposition, from both those reluctant to tamper with policies that appear to be working and those in Europe fearful of "decoupling" or even abandonment by the United States. There is an obvious trade-off between the goals of keeping the Soviets uncertain of how an aggressive move might be met and reassuring the publics of Western Europe, but of the two the latter would seem to take precedence. No alliance can endure if the means on which it relies frighten those it is intended to reassure more than those who are supposedly being warned off. There are, moreover, at least three reasons for believing that NATO's efforts to deter a Soviet attack would not be seriously affected by a switch from flexible to symmetrical response.

First, as noted earlier, threats of deliberate escalation have already lost most of whatever credibility they may have had in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of the combination of strategic parity and nuclear plenty. Second, the conventional balance is not nearly as unfavorable to NATO as is generally supposed. The prospect of a determined conventional defense, including counterattacks, can be a powerful force for dissuasion, suggesting that barely credible threats of deliberate escalation can safely be dispensed with.

Third and most important, it should not be taken for granted that a strategy of symmetrical response would remove all or even many of the uncertainties that the Soviets would face in contemplating an attack on Western Europe. A Soviet attack on Western Europe would be tantamount to starting World War III. Even if the NATO countries were publicly committed to a strategy of symmetrical response, could the Soviet leadership know with confidence what the outcome of such a war would be? Would they be willing to gamble the future existence of their society and their place in it on the belief that events would not slip out of their control? Could they be confident of their ability to maintain their grip on Eastern Europe in view of the turmoil that such a war would entail? NATO should at least be clear as to what the principal deterrent to war in Europe really is. It is not so much increasingly incredible threats of deliberate escalation that serve as the principal obstacle to such a war but rather fear of war itself, which is the product of uncertainty both as to the course that events would follow and as to what the outcome would be. Fear of war of any kind is the real deterrent, and this fear will continue to exert a powerful restraining effect on both sides even if NATO strategy is revised along the lines proposed here.³⁹

European fears of being decoupled or even abandoned are real, but they are unlikely to be alleviated by a continuation of current policy. American strategic nuclear forces have already been decoupled from the defense of Western Europe as a result of strategic parity and nuclear plenty.⁴⁰ The solution to this problem is to offer assurances that are believable—namely, that the United States will continue to maintain roughly 300,000 American military personnel plus their dependents in Western Europe; that it is prepared to send large-scale reinforcements to Europe in the event of war; that it is prepared to contribute to the building of even stronger conventional defenses in Western Europe; and that it is prepared to stand with its European allies and to match any escalatory steps that might be taken by the Soviets.

In addition to serving as a more realistic basis for planning the defense of Western Europe, a strategy of symmetrical response would offer three advantages over current NATO strategy. First, a renunciation of deliberate escalation would place the alliance in a stronger position to compete politically with the Soviets in peacetime by reducing Soviet opportunities to play on European fears of a trigger-happy United States and by encouraging the development of stronger conventional defenses in Western Europe. An important obstacle to progress toward stronger conventional defenses is the extent to which threats of deliberate escalation have come to serve as an excuse for avoiding improvements in conventional forces that are within reach of countries that are so much wealthier than their main opponent. Continued reliance on threats of deliberate escalation introduces an element of fatalism into discussions of conventional force improvements—if escalation is inevitable, why bother to try? But escalation may be inevitable only because of the self-fulfilling prophecy created by an unwillingness to recognize that a robust conventional defense is within reach.

Second, a strategy of symmetrical response would strengthen NATO's ability to dissuade the Soviets from embarking on a military adventure by increasing the credibility of the alliance's warnings about what it would do in response. Since NATO members would be threatening only to match what the Soviets had already done, the onus of crossing into the realm of the unknown would be removed from the West and placed squarely on the Soviets. The longer the alliance chooses to rely on threats of deliberate escalation, the greater the danger that the Soviets may someday be tempted to call the bluff in the expectation that Western leaders would cave in to their demands rather than accept the risks of starting a nuclear war. Conversely, the more certain it appears that an attack would be met by tenacious resistance, the more difficult it will be for the Soviets to convince themselves that there could be any profit in a resort to force.

Third and finally, a strategy of symmetrical response would contribute to a strengthening of the ties between the United States and its

European allies by reviving the idea of a US-European partnership to thwart Soviet efforts to expand the area under their control. That is what the Alliance was intended to be at the time it was founded, and that is what it should continue to be as it approaches its fifth decade.

NOTES

1. Henry Kissinger, "A Plan to Reshape NATO," *Time*, 5 March 1984, p. 20; Peter Langer, *Transatlantic Discord and NATO's Crisis of Cohesion* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), p. 47.
2. This point was suggested by Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Defense Policy: Departure from Containment," in *Eagle Resurgent*, ed. Kenneth Oye et al. (Boston: Little Brown, 1987), p. 76.
3. A concise description of the adoption of flexible response as official NATO strategy is provided by David Schwartz, "A Historical Perspective," in *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question*, ed. John Steinbruner and Leon Sigal (Washington: Brookings, 1983), pp. 12-16.
4. The ambiguity in NATO pronouncements is discussed further in *ibid.*, p. 16.
5. The former interpretation is found most often in official pronouncements by NATO military commanders or representatives of one of the alliance's nuclear-armed members. The latter has been advanced mainly by non-governmental observers skeptical of the ability of governments to use nuclear weapons in a controlled fashion. See, for example, Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1984); and Leon Sigal, *Nuclear Forces in Europe* (Washington: Brookings, 1984).
6. The term was coined by Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 69-91.
7. Three very useful accounts of the development of Western military thought concerning the role of nuclear weapons in compensating for Soviet superiority in manpower and tanks are those by Charles J. V. Murphy, "A New Strategy for NATO," *Fortune*, 47 (January 1953), 80ff.; Robert C. Richardson, "NATO Nuclear Strategy: A Look Back," *Strategic Review*, 9 (Spring 1981), 35-43; and André Beaufre, *NATO and Europe* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), pp. 48-78. See also William Kaufmann, "Nuclear Deterrence in Central Europe," in *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question*, pp. 33-34.
8. See, for example, Schelling; Herman Kahn, *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios* (New York: Praeger, 1965); and Bernard Brodie, *Escalation and the Nuclear Option* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966).
9. Even in the 1950s there were plenty of doubts of the wisdom of basing NATO strategy on threats that seemed likely to diminish in credibility as Soviet strategic forces grew in number and quality. The definitive account of the emergence of those doubts remains Robert Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962).
10. The erosive effect of strategic parity on the credibility of threats of deliberate escalation has been noted by analysts on both sides of the American political spectrum. See, for example, Irving Kristol, "What's Wrong With NATO," *New York Times Magazine*, 25 September 1983, pp. 64ff.; Kissinger, pp. 20, 23; Kaufmann, "Nuclear Deterrence....," pp. 28-32; and Richard Barnet, "The Four Pillars," *The New Yorker*, 9 March 1987, p. 80.
11. This point was conceded by Schelling, who discussed at length why being the first to cross the nuclear threshold would likely be more difficult than responding in kind, pp. 43-55. See also Kaufmann, "Nuclear Deterrence....," pp. 31-32.
12. Kissinger, p. 20.
13. For estimates of the total number of nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, see the following articles by Richard Halloran in *The New York Times*: "U.S. Atomic Arsenal Viewed as Growing to 29,000 Warheads," 8 January 1984, p. 18; and "Soviets' Lead in Warheads Estimated by U.S. at 8,000," 18 June 1984, p. 4.
14. In view of the concentration of NATO's forces, both conventional and nuclear, on a relatively small number of well-defined and well-known military bases, there may be a military advantage to the Soviets from accompanying a conventional invasion with a preemptive nuclear strike. It is essential that the Soviets be denied any such advantage by continuing efforts to reduce the vulnerability of NATO's forces. This point is developed further by Kaufmann, "Nuclear Deterrence....," p. 33.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35, provides a concise review of the evidence calling into question the belief that the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into a European war would favor the defense. The recently signed US-Soviet treaty on intermediate nuclear forces seems unlikely to alter this situation, since the

Soviets will still have many thousands of nuclear warheads that can be delivered by a variety of means against NATO forces.

16. The requirements that must be satisfied to conduct a successful "compellent" campaign are described in Schelling, pp. 69-91. The difficulties involved in satisfying these requirements are elaborated upon in Wallace J. Thies, *When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1980), chapters 5-8.

17. This point is developed at greater length by Jervis, chapters 4-6.

18. Note in this regard the controversy generated in 1981 by the comment by then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig that NATO had developed plans for a nuclear "demonstration shot" in the event of a Soviet attack that could not be readily halted by conventional forces.

19. On these points, see the survey results presented in Richard Merritt and Donald Puchala, eds., *Western European Perspectives on International Affairs* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 189-94, 338-59, 381; Elizabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, eds., *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1947-1966* (Allensbach and Bonn: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1967), pp. 516-17; and Anna and Richard Merritt, *Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1980), pp. 239-40.

20. Merritt and Puchala, p. 259; Anna and Richard Merritt, pp. 239-40.

21. David Capitanchik and Richard Eichenberg, *Defense and Public Opinion*, Chatham House Papers No. 20 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 21-22; Harald Mueller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Origins of Estrangement: The Peace Movement and the Changed Image of America in West Germany," *International Security*, 12 (Summer 1987), 81-84.

22. Capitanchik and Eichenberg, pp. 23, 65. See also R. W. Apple, Jr., "Deployment of U.S. Missiles a Key Issue for the British," *The New York Times*, 16 February 1983, p. 8; and Bruce Russett and Donald Deluca, "Theater Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, 98 (Summer 1983), 184.

23. Anna and Richard Merritt, p. 240; Stephen Szabo, "European Opinion After the Missiles," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, 24 (Spring 1986), 11, 13-14.

24. I have developed this point at greater length in *The Atlantic Alliance, Nuclear Weapons, and European Attitudes: Re-examining the Conventional Wisdom* (Berkeley: Univ. of California, Institute of International Studies, 1983), pp. 5-15. See also Capitanchik and Eichenberg, pp. 23-24, 32-33, 45-48, 54-56, 64-66; Russett and Deluca, pp. 185-88; Szabo, p. 15; and Mueller and Risse-Kappen, p. 56.

25. This point was suggested by Osgood, p. 2.

26. Szabo, p. 15; Mueller and Risse-Kappen, p. 58.

27. Szabo, p. 17.

28. The depth of these fears is discussed by Capitanchik and Eichenberg, pp. 22-25, 53-56, 61-68.

29. European expectations of the likelihood of a Soviet invasion are discussed in Szabo, pp. 11-12. In an October 1983 poll, 73 percent of British respondents said they believed that the American promise that Britain would have veto power over the firing of the ground-launched cruise missiles based there could not be trusted (Barnaby Feder, "Britons Shying Away From Missiles," *The New York Times*, 31 October 1983, p. 9).

30. European fears of American intentions are discussed in more detail in Mueller and Risse-Kappen, pp. 82-83.

31. See, for example, Karl Kaiser et al., "Nuclear Weapons and Preservation of Peace: A German Response," *Foreign Affairs*, 60 (Summer 1982), 1157-70.

32. Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 140-41. See also Schwartz, p. 13.

33. See, for example, William Kaufmann, "Nonnuclear Deterrence," in *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question*, pp. 43-90; William P. Mako, *U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe* (Washington: Brookings, 1983); Posen and Van Evera, pp. 83-85; and Benjamin Lambeth, "Conventional Forces for NATO," P-7311 (Santa Monica: The RAND Corp., February 1987).

34. Kaufmann, "Nonnuclear Deterrence....," p. 51.

35. Ibid., p. 55.

36. Ibid., p. 73.

37. See, for example, William Kaufmann, "Limited Warfare," in *Military Policy and National Security*, ed. William Kaufmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956), pp. 123-24, 126.

38. Schwartz, p. 14.

39. The uncontrollability of a European war and the restraining effect that this is likely to exert on the Soviets is discussed in more detail by Jonathan Alford, "Perspectives on Strategy," in *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question*, p. 93.

40. This point has been accepted by analysts on both sides of the American political spectrum. See, for example, Kristol, p. 65; and Kaufmann, "Nuclear Deterrence....," pp. 29, 32.

The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning

FREDERICK M. DOWNEY and STEVEN METZ

The job of the military strategist is not an easy one. In addition to dealing with dangerous enemies, unreliable or vulnerable allies, and inadequate resources, he must also confront the distractions of politics. However much the strategist might prefer to ignore it, both the objectives of strategy and the context of strategy formulation are political. Simultaneously balancing the dictates of politics and the need to deter or defeat an enemy is perhaps the core dilemma of strategy formulation.

All strategic advice must pass three tests: it must be suitable, feasible, and acceptable.¹ Suitability and feasibility can accurately be called the rational criteria of strategy formulation. Tests for suitability and feasibility are admittedly complex and require mature professional judgment, but reduce well to a linear, almost mathematical thought process. Since they are prepared by training and education, most officers have little trouble with this. Acceptability, however, is partly rational and partly not. It requires the strategist to assess not only military costs, but also the preferences, moods, values, and proclivities of decisionmakers and the public. The test for strategic acceptability, in other words, is based in a political as well as strategic culture.

Every nation has a political culture which comprises the context of strategy.² It is the source of the nonrational criteria for strategy formulation and is composed of preferences, values, and proclivities derived from the nation's historical experience, ideology, and political and economic organization.³ Political culture provides the equivalent of battlefield friction that erodes the cold rationality of the strategic process.

A strategy that fails to integrate the political culture, however well it may meet the rational criteria of suitability and feasibility, is doomed to failure. This is particularly true in the United States, where civilians dominate national decisionmaking, public opinion affects strategic choices, and separate military subcultures exist. As Liddell Hart noted, "He who pays

the piper calls the tune, and strategists might be better paid in kind if they attuned their strategy, so far as is rightly possible, to the popular ear."⁴ This means that the sensitivity of the military strategist to political culture helps determine the eventual acceptability of his product.

American political culture is particularly complex and changes rapidly, but there are certain constants and enduring themes. While there is little the military strategist can do to transcend the distractions of politics, understanding key themes of the political culture is the first step in assuring that his advice passes the test of acceptability.

Attitudes Toward Time

Americans often behave as if the world were created in 1945. In US foreign policy there is little of the deep sense of history that pervades the statecraft of European and Asian nations. This should not be surprising: obsession with new things is central to American culture. Whether in popular songs, clothing, automobiles, breakfast cereal, or public policy, the newest is usually considered the best. The American culture is decidedly anti-classical, and history books are thus considered dusty obstacles to a schoolboy's graduation rather than reservoirs of guidance on the motives and intentions of other states.

The successful strategist must overcome this narrowness of historical vision, and integrate deeper antecedents into his analysis. At the same time, he must be sensitive to this characteristic of the American political culture, and package strategic advice in such a way that its newness is accentuated. Even when "old wine" is best, the strategist must sometimes decant it into new bottles. A clear example is seen in the current development of a strategy for low-intensity conflict. Much of this is derived from 1960s-style counterinsurgency experience, but anything labeled "LIC strategy" stands a better chance of acceptance than "counterinsurgency strategy," which

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick M. Downey is an action officer in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army. He holds a B.A. from Virginia Military Institute and an M.A. from the University of Kansas, and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. Colonel Downey has served in troop and staff assignments in the United States, Germany, Vietnam, and the Middle East, directed the strategist program at the Army Command and General Staff College, and written for *Military Review*.

Dr. Steven Metz is a member of the Strategic Studies Committee, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, US Army Command and General Staff College. He holds a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of South Carolina and a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Metz has written for *Military Review*, *Comparative Strategy*, *Conflict*, *Political Science Quarterly*, *Diplomatic History*, and *The National Interest*.

smacks of defeat in Vietnam and thus is politically unpalatable. Even those dimensions of counterinsurgency doctrine which have stood the test of time must be repackaged so as to appear new.

The desire for quick and conclusive resolution of conflict is closely linked to this narrowness of historical vision. Impatience places the United States at a decided disadvantage when dealing with steadfast antagonists such as the North Vietnamese or Soviets.⁵ The US electoral cycle accentuates impatience, since the security strategy of any presidential administration must generate tangible results before the next campaign.

For the strategist, impatience creates problems. Even when aware that recommendations likely to generate quick solutions will find a receptive audience among political decisionmakers, the astute strategist also knows that it is precisely those types of recommendations that can easily fail once implemented. The strategist is often put in a position of choosing between giving bad advice that is likely to be heeded and good advice that will probably be ignored. There is no easy solution to this dilemma. The best the strategist can do is to remain aware that political costs must be factored in when recommending courses of action unlikely to generate quick results. Because of these political costs, recommendations in behalf of long-drawn-out courses should be made only on pressing issues where the long-term benefits justify short-term political costs.

Attitudes Toward Political Power

Ours is a tempestuous and lusty democracy; such is both a blessing and a burden. Authority in the American political system is diffused and, at times, fragmented. The division of powers in the Constitution institutionalizes some diffusion of power, but its actual extent varies according to shifting popular attitudes and moods. From the late 1940s until the 1960s, the belief prevailed that the United States should speak with a single voice on security issues. The result was a great deal of deference to the president and his top advisers. Vietnam shattered this. Congress challenged presidential leadership on national security by legislation such as the War Powers Resolution and the Jackson-Vanik, Clark, and Boland amendments, and built a counterweight to the executive branch bureaucracy through enlargement of congressional staffs.

The strategist deals directly or indirectly with legislators who have widely differing political constituencies and different ideas about what constitutes national security. These two factors affect the priority assigned domestic and international aspects of security by the legislator. Thirty-thousand congressional aides support these legislators, and each is vying for influence and authority. Some are knowledgeable; many are not. The 25-year-old congressional aide attempting to influence strategy can be a real

problem for the military strategist. But at the same time that staffs grew, authority within Congress was shattered by the decline of the seniority and committee systems. Today, Congress with its numerous princes and political fiefdoms would exasperate and confound even the ideal military genius adumbrated by Clausewitz.

This diffusion of authority is a vital safeguard of individual liberty. As Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert noted, "When strategy is freed from effective political control, it becomes mindless and heedless, and it is then that war assumes that absolute form that Clausewitz dreaded."⁶ But at the same time, diffusion of political authority hampers strategic coherence.⁷ To the extent that strategy formulation is political, it becomes less a rational matching of means and ends and more the application of clout to enforce compromises and produce acceptable political outcomes. The strategist must be aware that acceptance of his recommendations is in part contingent on their congruence with the world view of the top political elite. However much this may hinder dealing with the enemy efficiently and effectively, it is reality. And the more that authority is diffused—the larger the pertinent elite—the more that compromises must be made during strategy formulation.

Consensus constrained partisanship on strategic questions before Vietnam. Temporarily a sense of imminent threat stoked the belief that politics should "stop at the water's edge," but as a result of the war in Indochina strategy became grist for partisan politics.⁸ Once the Pandora's box of partisan disagreement concerning the war in Southeast Asia was opened, more general politicization of strategy was unloosed upon the land. Since this situation persists, the military strategist must understand the ebbs and flows of domestic politics.

Despite occasional protests from early critics like Emory Upton, American political culture traditionally held that the military should be quarantined from politics. When the nation was founded, the professional military was considered an element of state power: to the extent the military was strong or a military style of thinking dominated public policy, individual rights were deemed threatened. This attitude changed during World War II and its immediate aftermath.⁹ In the early years of the Cold War the impact of former officers such as George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower and the institutionalization of a system for military input into strategy formulation, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff, raised the influence of the uniformed military over foreign and national security policy.

After this brief ascent, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and Robert McNamara's use of systems analysis in strategy formulation once again began to limit the role of the military.¹⁰ Since Vietnam, the influence of the military over national policy has shifted according to public attitudes and the proclivities of the president. As the recent furor surrounding the Iran-Contra hearings showed, distrust of the military actor at the strategio-

political level persists in some quarters. "Ollie for President" bumper stickers notwithstanding, Americans do not want strategy and policy run solely by the military, even though they seem to admire the personal qualities the uniform exemplifies. The idea of trading arms for hostages and using the profits to support the Contras may have been a "neat idea" and a logically sound approach, but it clearly failed the test of acceptability.

Anti-militarism means that any recommendation perceived as strictly military is likely to encounter problems. The uniform sometimes brings credibility, but can also be a political liability. In communicating recommendations, then, the military strategist must make use of non-military political allies from both the executive and legislative branches of the government. The credibility of strategic advice is contingent on having the support of both military and civilian thinkers.

Attitudes Toward Military Force

Historically, Americans have distrusted the use of military force for the attainment of national objectives, but this began to change when the nation assumed global responsibilities following World War II. From the late 1940s until the 1960s, US strategy increasingly relied on military force. The NSC-68 version of containment dominated national strategy, and military power was often considered a panacea for political problems. Following Vietnam, public attitudes swung strongly in the other direction, with a resulting depreciation of any use of military power. In the 1980s, this feeling declined somewhat, but national strategists no longer placed the same blind trust in military force as in the 1950s and early 1960s.

A corollary to mistrust of military means in the attainment of national objectives is the de-coupling of politico-diplomatic initiatives and military force. Americans have traditionally assumed a clear demarcation between peace and war, with different rules for each. Force and diplomacy were mutually exclusive alternatives, with force to be used only when all diplomatic initiatives failed. As the debate over the Grenada intervention showed, the decision to intervene was initially challenged on the basis that it was not clear that all diplomatic options had been pursued or exhausted. This attitude leaves the United States ill-prepared to deal with conflicts that

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fall somewhere between war and peacetime diplomacy, including military operations short of war such as the reprisal bombing of Libya, and all of the other activities now classified under "low-intensity conflict."

The successful military strategist must be aware of this tendency, but must also recognize the organic relationship of diplomatic and military elements of national power; strategic recommendations should reflect this. A strategy which relies heavily on military force must be coupled with the use of non-military elements of national power in a multi-track approach. Multi-track strategies are intrinsically useful when dealing with ambiguous problems in low-intensity conflict, but the astute strategist represents the tracks as essential and mutually reinforcing rather than as separate alternatives.

Attitudes Toward Other Nations

If the United States is not solipsistic, it is at least terribly self-centered. To some extent, of course, all nations tend to impute their own perceptions, values, and motivations to others in what is called "mirror imaging."¹¹ The United States, however, often carries this tendency to extremes, with the result that American strategy overlooks key differences in the perceptions, values, and motivations of both allies and opponents.¹² The military strategist should attempt to transcend this tendency and remain sensitive to cultural differences in friends and enemies. In fact, Liddell Hart argued that "a nation might profit a lot if the advisory organs of the government included an 'enemy department,' covering all spheres of war and studying the problems of war from the enemy's point of view."¹³ Even while the strategist attempts to think like the enemy, he should also be aware that in those instances where differences in national perceptions play a major role in his strategic recommendations, such a spin may be difficult to explain to decisionmakers not equally sensitive to cultural differences.

One important perceptual difference which flavors US strategy concerns technology. As befits a nation with great technological prowess, the United States often attempts to solve strategic and political problems with technological fixes. The air war in Vietnam and the use of the battleship *New Jersey* off the coast of Lebanon are clear illustrations. According to André Beaufre, this infatuation with technology and superior firepower led to a general depreciation of strategy, while Edward Luttwak argued that reliance on technology caused the United States to rely on "nonstrategies."¹⁴

A military strategist cognizant of this propensity will be better prepared to avoid its pitfalls. American technological superiority clearly is a factor in strategic analysis, but it is not a panacea: there are no strategic panaceas. Strategy involves at least two actors, each with different, culturally determined attitudes to technology. Any strategy which imputes American perceptions—including an infatuation with technology which sometimes

borders on awe—to others is suspect. The strategist must also be sensitive to the domestic impact of the American fondness for technological solutions. Since political pressure to seek technological solutions will exist, the strategist can explore these before recommending more ambiguous and expensive alternatives. A rationale for the rejection of purely technological solutions could then form part of the strategic recommendations.

Attitudes Toward World Role

The epic historical accomplishments of the United States—continental expansion, the building of the world's preeminent industrial economy, technological prowess, and the creation of a stable, free, and democratic society—spawned in its citizens a sense of optimistic exuberance. Thus, as Colin Gray noted, "It was believed that Americans could achieve anything that they set their hands to in earnest."¹⁵ Confidence of such magnitude makes it difficult to establish priorities. If, after all, everything can be accomplished, there is little need for the arduous labors of prioritizing objectives. The frequent result is a means/ends mismatch such as the two-and-a-half-war strategy and John Kennedy's promise to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe."

However justified this sense of omnipotence might have been in the 1960s, it is less valid today given the economic limits of American power and the arrival of US-Soviet strategic parity. Strategic recommendations today must not only indicate what means should be used to attain certain objectives, but also justify the priority assigned objectives. The strategist must be aware that even when given fairly limited objectives and asked to discover means of attaining them, there are always a number of other national objectives which demand resources. The skilled strategist thus knows that his immediate task is part of a larger fabric, and occasionally the immediate task must be sacrificed for the greater good.

Another traditional element of the American political culture is a sense of "specialness." The United States was the first nation organized by a written constitution based on protection of individual liberties; this set us apart from the European powers. For 150 years this sense of specialness supported isolationism in foreign affairs, as the United States believed that involvement in great-power politics would force the nation to compromise its ideals. When isolationism was no longer possible, this sense of specialness facilitated the acceptance of leadership of the Western world.

The tendency toward isolationism remains deeply embedded in the American national psyche. This reality is important to the strategist because it often causes a difference in perspective between decisionmakers, who tend to be more internationalist, and the general public where isolationism remains strong. This is especially true when assigning priorities among

domestic and international issues since the public generally focuses on domestic problems unless a clear and present international threat exists. This tension results in boom-or-bust defense budgets and periodic swings between engagement and disengagement from world responsibility. These factors make steady, long-term planning difficult, but are an immutable part of the American strategic environment.

World responsibility also makes American strategy ripe with symbolic content. For the rest of the world, American inattention to a problem carries meaning. For example, failure to censure Israel for its treatment of West Bank Palestinians or to force the government of South Africa to dismantle apartheid are seen by many Third World nations as tacit acceptance of and support for these practices. Inaction, in other words, is as symbolically important as action. The pressure to take a stand on every world problem complicates the task of matching means and ends. There is nothing the individual strategist can do about this, but he should attempt to ascertain the symbolic content attached to American actions (or inactions) by others, and use this in pursuing national interests.

Conclusion

The successful strategist must remain aware that certain combinations of means and ends are preferable or unacceptable because of cultural factors. If not so aware, he may create a theoretically efficacious strategy which cannot or will not be implemented. Or, the strategist might overreact in the opposite direction, consciously or unconsciously avoiding the travails of politics and cultural factors by over-generalization. This results in a strategy that lacks priorities and discrimination.¹⁶

To be sure, the successful military strategist must not let cultural factors dictate strategic decisions. He should never forget that he is charged with the efficient attainment of political objectives. But he also knows that efficiency and probability of success are only part of the equation. They are joined by the criterion of acceptability which is determined by the perceived congruence of strategic recommendations and political culture. Unfortunately, perceptions make packaging nearly as important as content. That is reality.

The successful strategist must understand American political culture. Attaining such understanding is a life-long endeavor. There are enduring themes of the political culture, but other elements emerge, disappear, and change in importance. A simple checklist will not suffice, because the themes of the political culture are not of equal importance in every situation. The strategist must be alert to social conditions which cause shifts in values. For example, changing American attitudes toward race since the 1950s have affected the political acceptability of strategic cooperation with South Africa. Other identifiable trends such as public concern with drug trafficking, the

desire for a balanced federal budget, and the growing political importance of Hispanic Americans will soon begin to take on strategic implications. The strategist who ignores such factors and recommends something like strategic cooperation with South Africa on strictly military grounds is egregiously at fault for failing to apply the test of political acceptability. Since evaluation of the political culture requires insight, it is best approached by a serious, rigorous, and continuous study of American military and social history and current events. Formal professional and civilian education alone is not enough.

The strategist must not only create a strategy that will achieve the desired end, he must also sell it. One can argue that this is not the task of the military strategist, but rather of civilian political leaders. This is true, but it is also naive. A strategist who creates a product solely according to the criteria of suitability, feasibility, and acceptable military cost has done the most important three-fourths of his job, but that missing fourth—failure to package the strategy in a politically palatable fashion—may make the other three-fourths irrelevant.

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Campaign Planning: Getting It Straight

WILLIAM W. MENDEL and FLOYD T. BANKS

Incredibly, there exists today no properly sanctioned doctrine for campaign planning in either the joint or combined arenas. Further, within these two planning communities, there is no consensus on the terminology of planning discourse. In this article our purpose is to get planners singing from the same sheet of music.

With the recognition that something called a campaign plan is important, several questions come to mind. Exactly what are campaigns and campaign plans? What is contained in them? What is a campaign plan designed to do and how do you recognize one when you see it? The answers to these questions are only partially available in current official publications, although there has been no shortage of opinions expressed among planners, instructors, and operators.

Among the stabs at definition of a campaign are the following:

FM 100-1, *The Army*—A campaign is a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war. . . . [T]heater commanders and their chief subordinates usually plan and direct campaigns.¹

FM 100-5, *Operations*—A campaign is a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war. Simultaneous campaigns may take place when the theater of war contains more than one theater of operations. Sequential campaigns in a single theater occur when a large force changes or secures its original goal or when the conditions of the conflict change. An offensive campaign may follow a successful defensive campaign, for example, as it did in Korea in 1950. Or a new offensive campaign may have to be undertaken if strategic goals change or are not secured in the initial campaign.²

Clearly a campaign is characterized by its broad scope, joint activity and linkage to a series of operations designed to achieve strategic objectives. A new Army manual, FM 100-6, *Large Unit Operations*, now being staffed, will provide further information about campaigns and campaign plans. Yet, doctrine proffered by Army manuals is not binding on the other services or on the forces of allies.

Only one current joint publication provides a definition of a campaign plan:

Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (1986)—A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space.¹

As can be seen, this definition is so general that it could apply to almost any plan; it provides little insight into what a campaign plan is or what it is designed to do. Before we flesh out a complete definition of the campaign and campaign plan, let us first consider an essential prerequisite—planning guidance.

The assertion that campaign planning has become a lost art is confirmed when one reviews current campaign planning doctrine and procedures. The problem is that campaign plans are not an integral part of the joint planning process. There is no document approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as doctrine for theater warfighting, campaigning, or campaign planning. Similarly, there are no such documents in the combined theaters that contain major US forward-deployed forces—Europe and Korea. This lack of comprehensive doctrine is the basic factor contributing to the ambiguity surrounding what a campaign plan is, who should prepare it, what it should address, and what the process is for developing it. In the United States, the Joint Operations Planning System, or JOPS (and the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System under development), is the DOD-directed, JCS-specified system for joint planning in the areas of mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment. JOPS establishes the systems to be used in both deliberate and time-sensitive planning for joint operations. It does not, however, specifically address campaign planning, and there is no formal relationship between JOPS and campaign planning.

Recognition of these realities is a first step toward providing insight about campaign planning. Though work to address many of these problems is going on at the US Army War College, the National Defense University,

Colonel William W. Mendel is an instructor at the US Army War College and former strategic research analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute. He is a graduate of Virginia Military Institute and the US Army War College and holds a master's degree in political science from the University of Kansas. His last overseas assignment was with Headquarters USAREUR, ODCSOPS, as Chief, War Plans Branch.

Lieutenant Colonel Floyd T. Banks, Jr., is Deputy Commander, US Army Field Artillery Training Center, Fort Sill. In 1986-87 he was an Army Research Associate at the US Army War College. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy and holds a master's degree in area studies from the University of Florida. His recent assignments include command of the Fourth Battalion, 77th Field Artillery; and Politico-Military Planner in the Directorate of Plans and Policy, OJCS.

the US Army Command and General Staff College, and the Advanced Amphibious Study Group, there remains a lack of doctrine on campaign planning. The thoughts that follow may help planners in the near term and provide a foundation for writers of future joint and combined campaign planning doctrine.

Defining the Campaign and the Campaign Plan

A campaign is the military activity in which the commander of a theater of war or theater of operations coordinates, employs, and sustains available resources in a series of joint actions across a regional expanse of air, land, and sea in order to achieve strategic objectives. It is a phased series of major operations along the intended line (or lines) of operation to bring about decisive results from battles. The effect of these phased joint operations creates the operational advantage, or leverage, that makes the enemy's position untenable. A key characteristic of a campaign is the commander's calculated synchronization of land, sea, and air effort to attain his strategic objective.

Campaigns are conducted throughout a theater of war: the total land, sea, and air space that may become involved in military operations. In large theaters of war where campaigns may be conducted along more than one line of operation, theaters of operations can be established to conduct operations along each separate line of action. The theater of war campaign synthesizes deployment, employment, sustainment, and theater of operations supporting campaigns into a coherent whole. Theater of war campaigns seek to attain national and/or alliance strategic objectives; theater of operations campaigns seek to achieve theater strategic objectives.

But what is a campaign plan? Contrary to common belief, a campaign plan isn't a document that springs into existence only after a war begins; rather, it continues through time as the operational extension of the commander-in-chief's theater strategy for peace and crisis, as well as war. A campaign plan translates strategic guidance into operational direction for subordinates. It provides broad concepts for operations and sustainment to achieve strategic objectives in a theater of war or theater of operations. It provides an orderly schedule of strategic military decisions that embody the commander's intent. The campaign plan is the commander's vision of how he will prosecute his portion of the war effort from the preparation phase through a sequence of military operations to a well-defined conclusion that attains the strategic objective. The campaign plan clearly defines the initial phase(s) of the campaign and unambiguously establishes what spells success at the end of the campaign; however, in recognition of how war's "fog and friction" can affect planning and operations, the mid-phases of the campaign plan may necessarily show less definition. Campaign plans therefore are

supplemented with options (contingency or outline plans) for shifting lines of operation and accepting or declining battle in order to provide flexibility in dealing with the changing situation. Other contingency plans (called "sequels" in FM 100-5) address options to be taken that will exploit success or minimize losses depending upon the outcomes of battles.

A campaign plan orients on the enemy's center of gravity in order to make his position in the theater disadvantageous, rob him of the initiative or his will to continue the fight, and defeat him. At the strategic level of war, the theater of war commander may often see the enemy center of gravity in complex and abstract forms, such as alliance solidarity or national will. At the operational level of war, the theater of operations commander is likely to focus upon a concrete center of gravity—main enemy forces. The notion of center of gravity is less important for the simple or complex manner in which it describes the enemy's main strength than in the way it enjoins decisive thinking at the strategic and operational levels of war.

The campaign plan synchronizes land, sea, and air effort against the enemy center of gravity. It does this principally by establishing command relationships concerning the joint or combined commander and his land, sea, and air component commanders and the commanders of other assigned commands. It also synchronizes by describing the joint concept of operations and by assigning tasks. The campaign plan composes the forces assigned to the joint or combined commander. The plan's concept for sustainment includes direction for procuring national resources from the sustaining base, establishing a forward base of operations, opening and maintaining lines of communication, providing intermediate bases of operations to support phasing, and establishing priorities for services and support by phase throughout the campaign. The sustainment part of the campaign plan is equal in importance to the concept of operations. The following tenets summarize what a campaign plan is and does.

Seven Tenets: A Campaign Plan . . .

- Provides broad concepts of operations and sustainment to achieve strategic military objectives in a theater of war or theater of operations; serves as the basis for all other planning and clearly defines what constitutes success.
- Provides an orderly schedule of strategic military decisions; displays the commander's vision and intent.
- Orients on the enemy's center of gravity.
- Phases a series of related major operations.
- Composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships.
- Provides operational direction and tasks to subordinates.
- Synchronizes air, land, and sea efforts into a cohesive and synergistic whole; is joint in nature.

While the format for a campaign plan is secondary in importance to its content, the format itself can be very useful to guide the planner in accommodating the tenets of a campaign plan. In existing campaign plan formats there appear to be some good choices. The basic plan format of the Joint Operational Planning System is adequate for the experienced planner who understands the need to infuse the tenets of a campaign plan into this format. Although no longer in joint publications, the campaign plan format found in Appendix C of the 1974 JCS Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, provides greater assistance in ensuring the tenets are incorporated. Unfortunately, the campaign plan format is not contained in the 1986 JCS Publication 2 which superseded the 1974 edition. The plan format in the 1974 edition will reappear with some modification in a future JCS publication to be produced under the aegis of the OJCS Joint Doctrine Master Plan. In the meantime, most useful is an update of the JCS Publication 2 campaign plan format which was developed at the US Army War College. This format provides refinements that are closely aligned with current doctrine, including the concept of the center of gravity and the concept of deception as an integral part of operations.

The five-paragraph format, which is characteristic of these examples, accommodates the tenets of a campaign plan and is a universally understood instrument within US, NATO, and Republic of Korea military establishments. The format allows for a relatively brief plan which provides an overarching concept for the campaign. Based on such a conceptual plan, individual component and assigned major headquarters develop their own detailed implementing operation plans and orders.

Who Should Prepare Campaign Plans?

The theater of war CINC has an obligation to his subordinate commanders to translate broad strategic guidance into the operational direction that is required to coordinate military effort within his theater. The CINC must transform strategic military concepts into incisive instructions that are useful at the next lower echelon: who, when, where, why, how. He does this in his campaign plan, which provides necessary information such as specified and implied missions, identity of the enemy center of gravity, overarching concept with phasing and contingency concepts, command relationships, task organization by phases, and logistical concepts for sustainment. This information presents a complete picture of the CINC's vision for the theater from the beginning of a campaign through various phases to the achievement of the strategic objective. When the theater of war commander has land, sea, and air components under his direct command, his campaign plan may include considerable detail in order to synchronize Phase I of the campaign. In this case, the campaign plan loses its brevity and takes on the

appearance of a large operation plan. This is especially true when the CINC serves as his own land component commander and must provide detailed instructions to his ground elements.

When the theater of war commander does not directly command warfighting components, as when he divides the entire theater of war into subordinate theaters of operations, he still needs a campaign plan. This theater of war plan may be briefer than the theater of operations plans because the theater of operations commanders provide the detailed employment specifics for their components in subordinate campaign plans. Yet the theater of war commander uses his own campaign plan to provide for the phased apportionment of resources in accordance with his concept (e.g. air squadrons, engineer support, supplies). The theater of war campaign plan synchronizes the several theaters of operations warfighting efforts. Further, the theater of war commander may not apportion all forces, but rather retain control of some forces and resources. He withholds strategic reserve forces for later employment or assignment. He directs theater-wide deep reconnaissance and interdiction efforts; he employs Special Operations Forces through a sub-unified Special Operations Command or Combined Unconventional Task Force; he employs units for deception operations; he employs strategic psychological operations units and guides the tactical psychological operations effort. All these things must be done in accordance with a plan—a campaign plan—if they are to provide the advantage of coordinated effort on the battlefield.

The theater of operations commanders key on the campaign plan of their theater of war commander and ensure that their concepts for operations, phasing, and logistics are supportive of the higher campaign plan's concept, phasing, and priorities. Normally theater of operations campaign plans are prepared concurrently with or subsequent to the theater of war campaign plan.

Other joint force commanders may prepare campaign plans. For example, the theater Special Operations Command, as a subordinate unified command of the theater of war CINC, may develop a campaign plan if assigned a broad continuing mission that includes a strategic objective. Also, a combined special operations command may develop a campaign plan.

A Joint Task Force is normally established to achieve specific, limited objectives. When the JTF mission is of sufficient scope as to require the phasing of major operations to achieve a strategic objective, the JTF develops a campaign plan.

The joint command components with employment (warfighting) roles develop operation plans to direct major operations in support of the theater of war or theater of operations campaign plan. Components with sustainment (supply, services) roles prepare plans for support. The campaign

plan is essential to compel the coordinated effort of the component commands to jointly achieve strategic objectives.

Campaign Planning: For Theater Contingencies and Prosecuting War

Within the outline of the commander-in-chief's theater strategy for peace, crisis, and war, the campaign plan is developed to achieve strategic objectives that counter a strategic threat. It is developed in peacetime to protect national interests which are assumed to be threatened by a possible occurrence, or contingency. In this sense, all plans (as opposed to operation orders) are "contingency" plans. The campaign plan, however, has aspects (described above under the tenets of a campaign plan) that set it apart from other plans, and it is unique to the theater of war, theater of operations, and joint forces with strategic objectives. Campaign planning is much more difficult in peacetime than in war because the commander must make more planning assumptions (warning time, enemy intentions, location of the strategic threat) than would be required in war. The campaign plan developed in peacetime may require numerous options for changing orientation, disposition, and direction and for changing to new phases of defensive or offensive operations—attack, exploitation, pursuit, defense, retrograde. Indeed, within large unified commands during peacetime, several campaign plans may need to be developed to protect US interests in anticipation of possible theaters of operations. Then, when war unfolds, the campaign plan becomes effective for execution, and operation orders will accordingly be issued to begin the first phase of the campaign.

Some planners contend that campaign planning is not appropriate, or not possible, in peacetime. For example, typical theater planning under the Joint Operations Planning System has seen concentrated effort on developing deployment and sustainment concepts within a "theater plan," and then supplementing this base plan with various "contingency" plans for possible occurrences throughout the theater. This approach, however, has not provided the CINC's overarching vision and intent for coordinated theater operations and sustainment to achieve strategic objectives. At best, it has provided guidance only for what may be the first phase of a campaign.

Other planners prefer "prosecution planning" as the appropriate planning activity for campaign planning.⁴ Prosecution planning, aimed toward the actual employment of forces in combat, follows what in the Joint Operations Planning System is referred to as "execution planning" (covering the transition from peace to war, as conflict becomes imminent). But in reality campaign planning is a continuing deliberate planning process, while execution planning and prosecution planning are forms of operation-order development. The "planning" involved in execution and prosecution is akin

In reality campaign planning is a continuing deliberate planning process, while execution planning and prosecution planning are forms of operation-order development.

to coordination for impending and ongoing operations, respectively; it is likely to develop the operation order for a major operation or the first phase of a campaign. The notion of waiting until contact with the enemy is imminent before writing the campaign plan suggests a loss of valuable planning time. Of course, campaign planning is done during wartime also, and, as war within the theater continues, new requirements for campaign plans may develop. These plans would be written for future campaigns.

Several peacetime factors tend to militate against combined campaign planning within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's integrated military structure. First, campaign plans are thought to be inappropriate because NATO is a defensive alliance with a primary aim to deter war. NATO planners have been constrained by the inability, or unwillingness, of politicians to differentiate between offensive operations within the context of a strategic defense and a strategy of aggression. Mutual defense is the glue that holds together the alliance, and it has been feared that offensive planning could break the bond. Second, the strategy of Flexible Response includes a nuclear aspect which is difficult to conceptualize. In crossing the nuclear threshold, it becomes problematic whether the commander's vision and intent can be sufficiently reliable and predictive to provide an orderly basis for military decisions. Third, with its emphasis on deterrence as opposed to warfighting, the strategic concept of forward defense as far east as possible has carried with it the heavy baggage of inhibition against any type of cross-border operations. Finally, there are differing national views on the nature and capabilities of the threat, enemy intentions, and his anticipated attack options (e.g. no notice, partially reinforced or fully reinforced attack against NATO). The timeliness of the decision to begin moving forces (a mere 48 hours is important) can make a significant difference in NATO's ability to execute a cohesive defense. Thus NATO planners tend to focus their efforts as much on the transition from peace to war as on the prosecution of the war itself.⁵ As a result of all the foregoing considerations, the concept of a campaign plan is not embodied in NATO's peacetime planning procedures. The result of this lack of campaign planning in peacetime is that there is little operational guidance concerning how SACEUR will fight after the first phase (general defense) of war.

Whatever the political constraints and the inherent difficulty in developing planning assumptions, *peacetime campaign planning* is important for the continuous multiservice and multinational coordination, formal agreements, understanding, and trust that the process engenders. Viewed thus, the campaign planning process becomes as important as the plans produced. Should war come, a preexisting campaign plan would provide the basis for the operation orders that initiate the campaign, and the command would have enjoyed the benefit of peacetime deliberate planning for theater exigencies.

What About Air, Land, Interdiction and Other Specialized Campaigns?

Imprecise terms are found in doctrinal literature, periodicals, and plans which confuse the issue of campaign planning responsibilities. The colloquial use of the word "campaign" has led to such terms as the "land campaign," the "land-air campaign" of a ground component, the "interdiction campaign," the "Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (J-SEAD) campaign," and on and on. These expressions may have some utility, of course, because they describe the dominant characteristic of an activity or major operation that supports an overall campaign. But we believe these terms lead to confusion as to who should conduct campaigns and write campaign plans. For example, the Commander, Central Army Group (a land component of Allied Forces Central Europe), uses the term "land-air campaign" to describe the conceptual "jointness" inherent in the group's operations, which include follow-on forces attack methodology. Yet, the Commander, Central Army Group, should not (and does not) write a campaign plan because he has neither the authority to compel land-air synchronization nor the scope of mission to achieve strategic objectives. The term "campaign" is also misused when discussing air operations. This can be traced, in part, to the colloquial use of the term in official publications. For example, JCS Publication 26, *Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations*, uses the term "counterair campaign."⁶ Yet counterair operations do not achieve strategic objectives: "The objective of counterair operations is to gain control of the air environment and protect the force."⁷

While the counterair operation contributes toward achieving the theater commander's objective by affording freedom of action to all forces of the command, the counterair effort is merely a part of the overall effort and does not constitute a campaign. The term "campaign" is also misused in Publication 26 in its discussion of the Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD):

SEAD objectives are specified by the joint forces commander, who will consider the unique capabilities of each component to contribute to the counterair campaign. Initial campaign objectives will be to protect friendly airborne

standoff systems, disrupt the cohesion of enemy air defense, and assist in attaining tactical flexibility for friendly aircraft in the medium- and high-altitude regimes.⁸

The objective of J-SEAD is to protect friendly aircraft and not to achieve a strategic objective.

The Army and Air Force biservice pamphlet *General Operating Procedures for Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK)* refers to the "interdiction campaign." Yet, it clearly defines the effort in terms of tactical and operational objectives:

The objectives of joint attack of second echelon targets is to divert, disrupt, delay, and destroy the enemy's capability for continuous operations by altering the momentum of his effort. Success in this objective will provide time and space for commanders to fight the battle at the forward line of own troops (FLOT), prepare to continue the fight, and take advantage of opportunities for offensive actions.⁹

Though it is an important part of the joint effort, the "interdiction campaign" is thus not a campaign at all because by itself it cannot achieve the strategic objective.

The land components (Northern Army Group and Central Army Group) and the air component (Allied Air Force Central Europe) write operation orders for the conduct of operations in support of the Allied Forces Central Europe campaign plan. Using the air component commander's role as an example, we can visualize a hypothetical illustration of Allied Air Force Central Europe support to a possible Allied Force Central Europe campaign. Close air support for Commander, Northern Army Group, and Commander, Central Army Group, would be provided through the Allied Tactical Air Forces. The deeper battle is supported by general support attack missions consisting of battlefield air interdiction and air interdiction. These two interdictory efforts are not a campaign because they do not achieve a strategic objective, are not a joint effort, and do not comprise a phase of a war. The interdictory efforts are focused upon portions of Commander-in-Chief Central Europe's area of operations and would directly support a phase of his campaign plan.

In essence, commanders with strategic objectives and the authority to compel synchronization of air, sea, and land effort at the operational level of war should write campaign plans. These are typically theater of war commanders with employment (warfighting) missions (e.g. NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, US Commander-in-Chief Central Command, US Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command, and Republic of Korea-US Commander-in-Chief Combined Forces Command). Theater of operations commanders should write supporting campaign plans (e.g. NATO Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe, Commander-in-Chief

Allied Forces Central Europe, and Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe).

Summing Up

In the aggregate, the foregoing views represent an argument for the promulgation of joint and combined doctrine to guide the application of operational art—the employment of forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations in theaters of war and operations.

While the US Army Command and General Staff College is developing doctrine concerning the Army role in campaign planning, the responsibility for promulgation of joint and combined doctrine for the strategic and operational levels of war resides within other domains. Until guidance concerning the process of campaign planning and who should write campaign plans is institutionalized in joint and combined doctrine, the issues will remain the object of debate and the source of much confusion. Our joint and combined staffs are manned by skilled planners who are fluent in the language of operational art. This reflects well upon the instruction at the various service schools and upon the officer corps. In the main, headquarters that should do campaign planning are working at it. Where exceptions are found, as in NATO, officers are responding to the guidance of the political leadership. The skills and knowledge necessary to fight successfully as a joint or combined team are extant; what is needed now is the authoritative guidance to unify the actions of our forces at the strategic and operational levels of war.

NOTES

This article is based upon the authors' study, *Campaign Planning*, published by the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 4 January 1988, Chapters 2 and 6.

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Congressional Resurgence and the Destabilization of US Foreign Policy

WALLACE EARL WALKER

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Wars agitate Congress. In the grand arena of institutional politics, large-scale wars have intensified the legislative-executive struggle for dominance in policymaking. The great containment struggle waged by the United States from 1941 to 1966—what most call World War II and the Cold War—was an exception. The Vietnam War was not.

Following the Revolutionary War, the Confederation and the Constitutional Congresses were the dominant institutions in the government. The brilliant maneuvering of Thomas Jefferson and the populism of Andrew Jackson provided but fleeting exceptions to this rule.¹ During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln turned the presidency into the ascendant branch in the federal government. Motivated by Lincoln's unprecedented assertions of power, Congress reasserted its policymaking authority after the Civil War and continued to rule through the end of the 19th century.² The same pattern was evident during and after World War I: executive branch preeminence followed by congressional reassertion of power. As E. S. Corwin and Theodore Lowi have taught us, there is a cyclical nature to presidential power, and since the Great Depression and World War II, presidents have aggrandized power to turn government into an active, reforming force both at home and abroad.³

External threats to national security invite a presidential response, because only the US chief executive possesses the necessary resources and

horizons to react. Historically, such responses have entailed an expansion of power as exemplified by Lincoln's blockade of the South during the Civil War or Franklin Roosevelt's lend-lease agreement with Great Britain. These executive assertions of power threaten the institutional arrangements established by the Constitution. Congress has no choice but to reassert itself after such episodes; to fail to do so is to risk irrelevance in foreign affairs and ultimately in domestic concerns as well.

Thus the great containment crusade under a unified national banner was anomalous. Although Congress did seek in a tentative way to reassert itself immediately after World War II in such areas as aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, and the 1947 National Security Act, the arrival of the Cold War in 1947 and 1948 seemed almost immediately to relegate Congress to the role of a minor actor. Congress did not seek to reestablish its authority after the Korean War. Thus the rise of the Soviet empire, the threat of nuclear war, and the necessity for the United States to play a dominant role in world affairs provided the executive branch with a tailor-made opportunity for national security policy dominance. In fact, as Arthur Schlesinger has noted, a global foreign policy swallowed up congressional power.⁴

This article will explain how Congress reasserted itself during the Vietnam War and thereafter. Essentially, I will argue that congressional reactions to the war itself were less significant than the statutes Congress imposed on the executive branch as a result of the Vietnam War. Those statutes have dramatically restrained the presidency in conducting national security affairs. The result of these laws is the domestication, the democratization, and the destabilization of national security policymaking.

Congressional Reactions to the Southeast Asian War

Congress supported the war in Vietnam. Indeed Congress and Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon served as partners for that war. As Leslie Gelb has observed, the weight of congressional actions regarding Vietnam both "reinforced the stakes against losing and introduced constraints

Lieutenant Colonel (P) Wallace Earl Walker (USMA, 1967) is Professor of Public Policy in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. Colonel Walker served as a White House Fellow in 1980-81 in the Department of Energy and in the White House Office of Policy Development. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of *Changing Organizational Culture* (Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1986) and editor of the book *National Security and the U.S. Constitution*, forthcoming. The present article was adapted from Colonel Walker's chapter titled, "Domesticating Foreign Policy: Congress and the Vietnam War," in *Democracy, Strategy and Vietnam: Implications for American Policymaking*, ed. G. K. Osborn et al. (Lexington Books, 1987), which was reviewed in *Parameters*, June 1988. Colonel Walker emphasizes that the views in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of the Army or USMA.

against winning."⁵ Thus, from the early 1950s through the introduction of American combat troops in Vietnam and extending to their withdrawal in 1973, Congress as an institution backed presidential initiatives in Southeast Asia and routinely appropriated funds for the war.

It is equally fair to say, however, that Senate doves were outspoken in their opposition to the war from the first introduction of ground troops. The incursion of US troops into Cambodia in April 1970 was perhaps the seminal event which crystallized broad congressional opposition. Once troops were withdrawn from Southeast Asia and the American prisoners of war were released in 1973, Congress moved quickly to end US involvement.

Congressional concern for not "losing Southeast Asia" to communist influence dates to the early 1950s. This attitude was clearly evident in the Eisenhower Administration's consultations with senior members of Congress in April 1954 over the use of American combat support to relieve the beleaguered French fortress at Dien Bien Phu. It was also evident in the Senate's approval of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization that same year.⁶

With the deterioration of the political situation in South Vietnam in the early 1960s, the increased success of the Viet Cong guerrilla movement, and the reaction of North Vietnam to increased US military presence in Southeast Asia, Congress was more than willing to sustain President Johnson's initiatives. After the alleged attack by North Vietnam on the US destroyer *Maddox* in August 1964, Johnson won support for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution by a House vote of 414-0 and a Senate vote of 88 to 2. The following spring Johnson again handily won congressional support after declaring that his proposal for \$400 million to support military operations in Vietnam would constitute a referendum on his policies.⁷ Subsequent congressional votes were equally supportive. *Congressional Quarterly* calculated that from 1965 through the end of 1972, over 95 percent of congressmen present and voting approved war-related appropriations on the final votes in each chamber.⁸ To put the matter another way, of the 113 recorded votes on the Vietnam War in this period, almost all sustained presidential initiatives.⁹

Congressional hearings did raise objections to the manner in which the chief executive managed the war. Within one year after the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, began to have serious doubts about his support for the Resolution and for US actions in Vietnam. Hearings held by his committee in 1966 and 1968 provided legitimacy for those opposed to the war and later prompted opposition to the war.¹⁰

After the Cambodian incursion, Senate doves were able to gain congressional support for some of their initiatives.¹¹ In January 1971 the Cooper-Church Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act banned the further use of ground combat troops in Cambodia. Also in that month, Congress repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. After the Christmas bombings of 1972 and the

return of all American prisoners, Senate doves were able to win passage of a bill which prohibited the reintroduction of US combat forces in Vietnam after 15 August 1973.¹²

In 1974 Congress heavily cut Administration requests for military aid to South Vietnam. In the face of a coordinated and massive North Vietnamese military assault in South Vietnam, President Ford objected to these cuts, but Congress would not restore them.¹³ In April 1975 Congress refused to provide any further military aid to South Vietnam. These actions further eroded the morale of the Saigon government in the face of a rapidly deteriorating situation. By May, the North had overrun all of South Vietnam.

Thus Congress sustained support for military prosecution of the Vietnam War as long as US troops were engaged in combat or held prisoner. Once US troops had departed, Congress cut US aid almost immediately and ended it altogether soon thereafter.

Congressional Reaction to Executive Ascendancy in Foreign Policy

Congressional reactions to the Vietnam War itself were less significant than congressional reassertiveness in foreign affairs. The impact of the war on presidential hegemony (and congressional subservience) in national security policymaking was profound. Without question the war shattered the post-World War II myth of executive infallibility in foreign and defense affairs and the consensus on containing communism. In turn, the war promoted a wholesale restructuring of government procedures in policymaking.¹⁴

Congressional resurgence in national security policymaking during the 1970s was stunning both in its speed and its breadth. Listed in the accompanying table are the more significant pieces of legislation that followed the demise of popular support for the war in early 1968.¹⁵ Beyond these landmark statutes were a host of other congressional actions that impinged upon the formulation and conduct of foreign policy during the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Congress imposed limits on trade with the Soviet Union, prohibited covert operations in Angola, and restricted arms sales to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In 1988 it first cut off all US aid to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, and then proceeded to consider various carrot-and-stick aid formulas intended to achieve Congress's own vision of a desirable diplomatic outcome. Former Senator John Tower has counted over 150 restrictions on executive influence in the 1970s alone.¹⁶

The predisposition of Speaker of the House James Wright to negotiate with President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo, the Roman Catholic Primate of Nicaragua, over US policy in Central America is unheard-of in the post-World War II period.¹⁷ Other examples of such assertiveness include the Fiscal Year 1988 reductions in State Department operating funds and recent congressional decisions restricting

*Congress Reasserts Itself:
Post-Vietnam Statutes that Transformed Foreign Policymaking*

1970	Legislative Reorganization Act	Enhanced congressional oversight by expanding congressional staff and increasing the power and responsibilities of the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service.
1972	Case Act	Required details on all executive agreements to be submitted to Congress.
1973	War Powers Resolution	Required presidential reporting on use of troops overseas and subsequent congressional authorization for such troops remaining beyond 90 days.
1973 & 1975	CIA Restrictions	Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1973 required all CIA operations to be reported; 1975 resolutions created Select Committees on Intelligence in both chambers.
1974	Budget and Impoundment Control Act	Implemented greater congressional control over the budget and restricted presidential reappointment and impoundment of funds.
1974	Freedom of Information Act Amendments	Made agency documents more easily available by reducing the hurdles erected by executive bureaucracies.
1974 & 1976	Amendments to Arms Export Control Act	Provided for notice of foreign arms sales and opportunity for Congress to veto such sales.
1976	National Emergencies Act	Restricted presidential use of national emergency legislation and required him to inform Congress of any action he takes under this legislation.
1976	Harkin Amendment	Created a human rights coordinator in the State Department, required annual reports for each country receiving security assistance, and placed security aid restrictions on countries violating human rights.

funding of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon. Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead urged a delegation of foreign ambassadors to lobby legislators directly to collect these peacekeeping funds because, as he put it, the State Department had little or no influence over Congress.¹⁸ John Felton has aptly observed that many members of Congress have sought to play secretary of state in enacting State Department authorization bills.

The final 1988 Senate bill "staked out a position on virtually every foreign policy issue facing the United States, as well as some matters over which Washington has little influence."¹⁹

The Vietnam War appears to be the central cause of congressional resurgence in national security affairs. Analysts list a host of explanations that have contributed to this new congressional assertiveness. Among the more significant are the following: the Watergate scandal; impoundment of congressionally appropriated funds by the Nixon Administration; a new generation of congressmen impatient with established internal norms of seniority and policy procedures; the severalfold increase in congressional staff; detente between the Soviet Union and the United States; US-Soviet parity in nuclear forces; and the new salience of such economic issues as energy and international trade in foreign policy.²⁰ One common but erroneous explanation is the pattern of Republican presidents and Democratic congresses witnessed so frequently since the Eisenhower years. The truth is, however, that there was just as much dissonance between the two branches during the Carter Administration, when the Democratic Party dominated both branches of government, as during the Reagan years.

In the final analysis, then, the public rancor and congressional frustration over the conduct of the Vietnam War remain either the most significant explanation for congressional resurgence or are coequal in prominence with Nixon's impoundment of funds and Watergate. Some analysts even argue that Watergate and the impoundments were in fact the result of the sense of isolation and paranoia enveloping the White House over public reaction to Nixon's prosecution of the Vietnam War.²¹

Implications of Congressional Resurgence

Congressional reassertion of power has had three effects on national security affairs: domestication, democratization, and destabilization.

- *Domestication.* Post-World War II presidents used two very different approaches to policymaking. On domestic issues intensive effort was required to design a new initiative, to dramatize the need for change, to build a supporting coalition inside and outside Congress, and to appease constituencies whose interests were threatened by the proposal.²² The success rate for such initiatives was never very high, nor for that matter did presidents expect easy victories.

They did expect to be more successful in national security affairs. In this realm, the president possessed a more plentiful range of options: propaganda initiatives available through the US Information Agency, arms sales or economic aid to foreign governments, secret executive agreements, CIA covert action, or military intervention. The choices in national security policymaking involved deciding what to do in initiating a new policy or what

response was appropriate for a crisis; the options in both areas were usually unappealing. However, once the decision was made, the president needed only to explain his policy to perhaps a half dozen senior congressmen and provide a few cryptic public announcements.²³

This distinction between domestic and national security policy-making no longer applies.²⁴ The statutes listed in the table have deprived the president of his readily available options. To cite but a few examples, the Arms Export Control Act makes foreign military sales subject to congressional approval, while the Case Act no longer permits secret executive agreements. National security policymaking must now be conducted largely in the open.

Furthermore, Congress has disaggregated into what might be called member-centered government.²⁵ In other eras, Congress was dominated by the political parties. In the early 1900s, party government gave way to committee government. As a result of the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act, the Budget Act, and numerous other resolutions, Congress has fragmented its power centers even further. Member-centered government is characterized by vastly reduced power of party and committee leaders and by enhanced resources and influence for individual members of Congress. This fragmentation has forced the president to search for fresh coalitions on virtually every foreign policy measure in order to achieve his ends. In fact the president's failure to build such coalitions and to appease opposing constituencies affects not only his reputation at home, but his credibility abroad. Allied and neutral nations are increasingly less disposed to negotiate with an administration unable to obtain congressional support for its initiatives. Indeed, Congress has become a principal obstacle to coherence in US national security policy.²⁶

Presidential comments on the difficulty in conducting US affairs under these conditions further confirm the domestication of national security policy. Former President Gerald Ford has described his attempt to consult with Congress as required by the War Powers Act in the 1975 *Mayaguez* rescue effort, which occurred during a congressional recess:

Not one of the key bipartisan leaders of Congress was in Washington. . . . This, one might say, is an unfair example, since the Congress was in recess. But it must be remembered that critical world events, especially military operations, seldom wait for Congress to meet. In fact most of what goes on in the world happens in the middle of the night, Washington time.²⁷

Former President Carter and Vice President Mondale have been equally critical about coordinating with Congress on foreign affairs.²⁸ Thus, in an era of member-centered government, presidential consultation with Congress during periods of crisis borders on the undoable. In an era of member-centered government, presidents can no longer confidently negotiate

with a small number of congressional leaders, as President Eisenhower did in 1954 over the siege at Dien Bien Phu.

In many ways the burdens on presidents pale in comparison to the demands on cabinet and subcabinet officers. Francis Wilcox has counted 16 committees in the Senate alone which call for foreign policy testimony from the administration. It is more often the case than not that cabinet secretaries, their deputies, undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries must provide essentially the same testimony two or more times before various congressional committees. For example, initiatives on foreign military sales often require testimony before the House International Affairs Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the Senate Armed Services Committee. In fact, former Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher has calculated that he and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance spent more than 25 percent of their time dealing with the Congress.²⁹

Congressional intervention in national security affairs does have certain advantages which presidents are often loathe to advertise. Given that policymaking is now more open and the executive branch is no longer viewed as infallible, the president needs protection.³⁰ There is much to be said for a presidential strategy that blames intractable foreign policy problems on congressionally mandated statutes, statutes which can plausibly be claimed to "shackle the president in the conduct of foreign policy." Thus a president could blame a deteriorating situation in Angola on congressional restraints on covert activity or the refusal of Nicaragua's Sandinista government to liberalize on legislative restrictions on military aid to the Contras.

• *Democratization.* Paralleling the domestication of the foreign- and defense-policy processes has been the increasing activism and influence of new players heretofore excluded from the system. These players operate from both inside and outside Congress. Positioned to take advantage of existing congressional repertoires for authorization, budgeting, and oversight, these players have been able to influence Congress on national security matters.

The authorization process is now much more detailed in the area of national security affairs. For example, prior to the 1960s, Congress would authorize a new weapon system and then appropriate funds for the purchase of an entire set of weapons. Now, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees annually must authorize each new ship, airplane, and tank, and then the House and Senate Appropriations Committees must appropriate funds for every one of these weapons.³¹ Passage through this legislative labyrinth provides numerous opportunities for changing or deleting a program to such an extent that the end result is often unrecognizable.

To fund all national security agencies and programs, the budgeting process must be negotiated. The 1974 Budget Act provides for new Budget Committees in each chamber and for a new repertoire for moving funding requests through the Congress. This new repertoire has impeded and constrained

national security policies. As often as not, no budget is passed, and programs must survive on continuing resolutions or previous-year funding levels.

The oversight process is less routinized, but equally accessible to outside interests. Further empowered by the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act and the 1974 Budget Act, the legislative and government operations committees in both chambers have become much more active in conducting oversight since the Vietnam War. For instance, congressional committees monitor both the reports on human rights behavior of foreign governments that receive security assistance and reports on executive agreements. More oversight has meant more executive accountability, but it has also meant that executive officials are required to spend more of their time calculating congressional reactions before they initiate or implement policies. Thus, in the aggregate, the authorization, budgetary, and oversight processes have all been modified by the post-Vietnam reforms initiated by Congress and have opened up national security affairs to review and influence more fully than at any time in US history.

Not only have the policymaking processes been altered, but the players have changed as well. Inside the Congress, the House has become as influential in national security affairs as the Senate. The statutory reforms listed above give the House every bit as much influence over such issues as executive agreements and foreign military sales. More committees are also involved. The Budget Committees and the Select Committees on Intelligence are new additions. Older committees such as the Commerce and Interior Committees have expanded their domains to include such issues as foreign trade, energy, and transnational pollution. Subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, such as the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, chaired by Representative Stephen J. Solarz, have amassed considerable influence in the foreign policy community.³² All this attention on *national security affairs means both more openness and more conflict* as each committee and subcommittee seek to stake out their domains. More openness and more conflict add up to more influence for congressmen, who can now intervene in many more ways, and for outside interests groups, who find national security policymaking conducted more openly.

There are two other new sets of players within the Congress, each of which has been shaped by the Vietnam War. The first is a new generation of congressmen who are disposed to member-centered government.³³ A number of them became politically active in reaction to the Vietnam War. Many in this generation see themselves as liberals committed to the idealism of John Kennedy and the Great Society programs created by Lyndon Johnson. They tend to view US involvement overseas with skepticism, if not outright hostility. Congressmen Michael Synar and Bruce Morrisson, for example, were both actively involved in the antiwar movement. Both have been unsupportive of US intervention in Lebanon and Central America.³⁴

The second set of new players on Capitol Hill are congressional staffers. During the 1970s, their numbers increased severalfold. Now virtually every member has at least one legislative assistant whose full-time, or at least principal, concern is national security affairs. Committee staffs have grown enormously too. Whereas in 1947 when Francis Wilcox served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff with only three clerks, today the committee has some 60 staff members, most of whom are highly trained professionals.³⁵ The principal preoccupation of each of these staffers is to find racy issues for their subcommittee chairman, issues which will enhance their patron's stature or influence. Such issues are willingly provided by interest groups preoccupied with their own special concerns.³⁶

Outside the Congress, many more groups now actively influence national security affairs than before the Vietnam War. Both the Freedom of Information Act Amendments and the Case Act provisions have provided such groups with sufficient intelligence to enable them to take activist roles in advising both the Congress and the executive on a host of issues. Ethnic organizations representing Greeks and Jews, for example, have played an increasingly active role in foreign arms sales to Turkey and to Arab countries. Most commercial interests are now represented by full-time lobbyists working out of trade associations or out of newly created Washington headquarters. Lobbying has become much more aggressive and tends to be based on shifting coalitions which create temporary "war rooms" to organize their efforts on issues coming before the White House or Congress.³⁷

The Gulf and the War Powers Act.
WHOSE WAR IS IT, ANYWAY?

**A Tug of War
Over Peace**

**Capitol Hill Broth
Being Seasoned by a Lot of Cooks**

*The Senate makes 'sausage'
of the State Department*

*Ortega tries to rope Washington into cease-fire
talks, and the speaker of the House muscles in*

House Again Rebuffs Reagan Arms Policies

**U.S. official
says Contra
war 'is over,' lost on Hill**

Still a third set of new outsiders includes ideological groups and think tanks representing all points along the political spectrum. The Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution, the Committee on the Present Danger, the Nuclear Freeze Political Action Committee, and the Center for Defense Information—to name only a few—have allied themselves with various supporters on Capitol Hill.³⁸ The final cluster of outside groups seeking influence on national security affairs in Congress are foreign governments, who in former years did their influence-peddling solely within the executive branch. Aware that congressional sensibilities need to be stroked, foreign leaders now seek to spend as much time on Capitol Hill as they do in the White House. Furthermore, foreign embassies such as those of Jordan, Israel, and Canada openly lobby congressmen on such issues as security assistance and fisheries treaties.³⁹ Embassies or designated lobbyists such as those representing Korea and South Africa also seek to build grass-roots support. As one observer noted, the effort of embassies “to influence American opinion has become less surreptitious and far more sophisticated and subtle.”⁴⁰

Thus it would seem that groups outside the Congress have become more intrusive, while new players inside the Congress have become more polarized on foreign and defense policy.⁴¹ Intrusiveness and polarization have promoted democratization in national security policymaking as groups inside and outside Congress demand the attention of political executives and congressmen.

• *Destabilization.* Congress has responded to this clamor by becoming involved in everything and therefore capable of acting on almost nothing. Thus the result of domestication and democratization of US national security policy is destabilization.

In member-centered government, no issues are considered sacrosanct. All are subject to intervention or at least frantic, episodic review through the authorization, appropriation, budgetary, or oversight processes.⁴² Impasse often results when the president is deprived of freedom of action and is unable to sustain more than a few initiatives in foreign affairs or when Congress is predisposed to suspiciousness toward presidential initiatives in all facets of national security affairs. Thus treaties go unratified—as in the 1979 fisheries agreement with Canada—or are ratified at the price of debilitating “deals” forced upon the president and with direct Senate involvement in the negotiations—as in the Panama Canal Treaty. Other manifestations of this impasse are the numerous country-specific restrictions on foreign economic and security aid, restrictions which weaken US relationships abroad (such as the foreign aid restrictions on Turkey after the Cyprus invasion) or humiliate foreign governments (as in congressional restriction on Hawk missiles sold to Jordan).

Statutory constraints have limited the president’s ability to forge a new consensus on foreign affairs and to guarantee American support to allies

or friendly Third World nations. The Harkin Amendment's emphasis on human rights has served as a polarizing issue, both within and without the government. Thus we have observed dramatic diplomatic shifts on this issue from the Carter to the Reagan Administrations. The War Powers Act, the CIA restrictions, and liberal concerns in Congress about "another Vietnam" have impeded US ability to sustain a military or paramilitary intervention, thereby creating doubts about the reliability of an American response in a crisis. Allies must now hedge against the unwillingness of the United States to intervene in the first place or, in the event of intervention, against precipitate American withdrawal regardless of the international consequences.⁴³ Potential adversaries, superpower and Third World alike, are no longer faced with what one senior foreign policy official called the "long shadow of military force" that can intervene and remain in place to back up American negotiating stances. The recent intervention in Grenada and the bombing attack against Libya clearly demonstrate that any US military involvement will be short-lived.

Just as congressional frustration over the handling of the Vietnam War begat the War Powers Act, so that act begat the Weinberger doctrine which has imposed a number of preconditions on the use of military force: e.g. clearly defined political and military objectives, a commitment to winning, and clear support of the Congress and the American public.⁴⁴ Such preconditions have created considerable strain in the national security establishment, with Secretary of State George Schultz and then-National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane having, at one point, been critical of the Defense Secretary and these preconditions.

US national security policy is thus destabilized with no consensus over what aims should be pursued and what means are appropriate. Clearly congressional resurgence has played a central role in creating this state of affairs.

Conclusions

The Vietnam War brought executive-legislative relationships over national security policy full circle. The unusual quiescence of Congress after World War II and Korea ended during and after the Vietnam War.

Congress relearned from the Vietnam War that presidential power cannot go unchecked if Congress is to retain its constitutional powers. What presidents have learned, or should have learned, is that they must forge alliances on Capitol Hill. Arrogance in the face of these Constitutional provisions will, in the end, deprive presidents of their initiative in national security affairs.

Another conclusion to be drawn from the post-Vietnam War period is that a consensus sustained by a recognizable theme in national security

affairs is crucial to executive-legislative relations. Neither President Carter nor President Reagan attended to this requirement to build a new consensus around some predominant strategic idea, preferring instead to pursue an ad hoc approach to security affairs by focusing on specific episodes or issues as they emerged in the course of events. Members of the Reagan Administration have privately stated that they should not articulate a strategic theme, because the details would invite criticism as outsiders contrasted performance with aspirations. What the last two administrations seem not to have realized is that in the absence of a grand strategic theme and consensus in behalf of that theme—as there was for containment before Vietnam—success in specific policy areas is much more difficult to achieve. This is so because congressional supporters find presidential policy initiatives easier to promote if they can make the case that these initiatives sustain a broadly articulated national strategy and thereby serve the national interest.

One must also conclude that a coherent and cohesive foreign policy seems unlikely under conditions of congressional resurgence, unless Congress limits itself to the role of developing consensus on the broad parameters of grand strategy and pressing the executive branch to develop and implement specific policies within that grand design. Such self-limitations on the part of Congress are not likely in the near term. Yet, the longer we wait, the greater the risks to US prestige and influence abroad. Destabilized foreign policymaking is synonymous with drift, not mastery. Drift by the United States means a free world without leadership, a condition unlikely to promote international arrangements that are supportive of US goals and interests.

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Perestroika and *Glasnost* in the Soviet Armed Forces

NATALIE A. GROSS

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During the year of the INF Treaty, Mikhail Gorbachev's buzzwords *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (public openness) have become part of our political vocabulary, but we are still puzzled and confused about their meaning. Does the Soviet leader harbor a plot to deceive the gullible Western public, or is he genuinely interested in liberalizing Soviet society? To explore possible answers to these questions, this essay will examine how Soviet generals have been implementing Gorbachev's policies in the armed forces.¹

Perestroika: Changing the Leadership and Command Concepts

Shortly after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, he outlined the policy of *perestroika*, which stressed the role of the individual in revitalizing the sluggish Soviet economy and ossified party bureaucracy. To restore trust and confidence in the system and make Soviet citizens responsible for their work, Gorbachev claimed, corruption should be eradicated, the public should enjoy more freedom, and party leadership should respond to the public's needs. The leader made it clear that he expected restructuring to be implemented in all Soviet institutions, including the military.

The USSR's history of experiments with reform suggests that in the past civilian reform leaders relied on the military to support their programs. For their part, the military establishment usually approved economic changes when it could anticipate from them the long-term growth of its own capabilities. Conforming with this historical pattern, the current Soviet military has appreciated the urgency of Gorbachev's economic reforms for developing sophisticated military technologies and weapon systems,² but has a hard time understanding the link between enhanced military power and a more

open society. Initially, officers at different levels of command, from the Defense Minister down to platoon leaders, resisted the restructuring policy.³ They were naturally confused about ways of implementing *perestroika* in the armed forces: the very idea of granting more autonomy to subordinates ran counter to the core premise of the centralized Soviet military system, which is rooted in deference to authority and unquestioned obedience to the commander. As the new Defense Minister, army General Dmitrii Yazov, admitted:

Generals, admirals and officers have no profound understanding of restructuring, they have not identified their role and place in it and have not come to understand that they have to start restructuring with themselves. They do not serve as models in enforcing discipline, upgrading professionalism, and ideological tempering of troops.⁴

It was only after June 1987, when Gorbachev had reshuffled the Soviet high command following the Cessna aircraft incident in Red Square, that restructuring of the armed forces got off the ground.

Restructuring the Soviet army meant some decentralization of decisionmaking to lower levels, reduction of red tape, and a freer exchange of views, especially regarding shortcomings in training and cadre policies. Initiative and individual suggestions are now encouraged, some criticism of command decisions is permitted, and closer interpersonal relations between leaders and those being led are sought.⁵ Not unlike Western military experts, under *perestroika* reform-minded Soviet commanders stress realistic and flexible training, "accessible leadership," and self-motivated commitment in place of subordination and blind obedience.⁶ Traditionally, Soviets regarded the highly centralized senior command authorities which implemented elaborate operational plans as the linchpin of total combat power. Today, Soviet military reformers emphasize smaller combat units, junior leaders and individual combatants as critical elements of success on the ever-changing modern battlefield, which is characterized by an accelerated tempo of operations, unforeseen changes in situation, and massive disruptions in command and control systems. This shift in Soviet thinking has been reflected in the gradual transition to the regimental/brigade structure as the building block of the Warsaw Pact armies.⁷

Natalie Gross is a professor of political-military studies at the US Army Russian Institute, Garmisch, West Germany. Born in the Soviet Union, she received her undergraduate degree and reserve officer commission from Moscow State University in the Soviet capital. She holds an M.A. in Russian area studies from Georgetown University and is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Los Angeles. During 1987-88 she has been a visiting research fellow at the Soviet Army Studies Office, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and at the RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior.

There is nothing new or surprising about Soviet attention to flexibility and soldiers' initiative—these discussions have continued in the military press for years. What seems new today is that the debate has evolved into an authoritative, doctrinal reappraisal of the rigid, centralized military system, which is now seen as a potential liability in modern combat. The Soviets have come to recognize the positive relationship between a more accommodating military system in peacetime and a soldier's motivation and initiative on the battlefield during war. In reexamining some of their leadership and training concepts, the Soviets have responded to Western technological and doctrinal developments (e.g. high-precision weapons, assault breaker techniques, AirLand Battle doctrine, and Follow-on Forces Attack), which will fundamentally change the nature of battlegrounds of the future. As First Deputy Minister of Defense, army General P. Lushev, has noted:

The main component [in combat readiness] is the human element. . . . Achieving high training standards is a difficult mission. . . . This is due to changes in military affairs, the conduct of operations under conditions of use by the enemy of high-precision weapons, when defenses against fire, strike and reconnaissance complexes will have to be set up.⁸

Gorbachev's new military establishment favors *perestroika* precisely because it recognizes the potential benefit of making the Soviet soldier more effective on the technologically complex modern battlefield.

Although the Soviet high command may find *perestroika* compatible with the army's military-technological requirements, Gorbachev's policy has not been easily accepted by military bureaucrats with vested interests in the old system. As with civilian bureaucracies, groups of senior officers who owe their careers to the traditional ways obviously feel threatened by a more open military where their performance is subject to greater scrutiny. The right to criticize command decisions granted to the lower ranks has provoked angry complaints from seasoned officers that *perestroika* is eroding the sacred unity of command.⁹ To mitigate the conflict between competing interests within the military, General Yazov has reassured officers that the Marxist dialectical approach can reconcile subordinates' criticism with the unity of command. Holding out a carrot to opponents of military *perestroika*, Yazov has promised his military improved housing and consumer services as part of the military restructuring package.¹⁰ Again, as in the civilian sector, losers in the military restructuring are the older, less technically competent career officers and NCOs, who are entrenched in the military bureaucracy and are used to manipulating it for personal gain without having their performance subjected to scrutiny. On the other hand, restructuring is more fully supported by the younger, motivated, and technically versatile combat arms officers, many of whom have grown to maturity in the fighting army in Afghanistan.

Military Glasnost

In Russian history, *glasnost* in the military, as in civilian society, was designed to occasion an exchange of opinions and ideas which was in the best interests of the leadership. In mid-19th-century Russia under Nicholas I, the champions of *glasnost* promoted critical debates to correct the failures of the bureaucracy and thwart corruption, which thrived among Russian officers of the time. The Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, who sponsored such discussions in the naval establishment, believed that an artificially induced debate (*iskusstvennaia glasnost*) would promote a constructive ferment of opinion about new naval regulations.¹¹ These debates—held within limits strictly defined by the central government—contributed to Russian naval professionalism and made the military system of the time more effective.

Not unlike its predecessor in Imperial Russia, *glasnost* in the military today stands for discussions critical of bureaucratic mismanagement and corruption. During the *glasnost* campaign in the military and civilian press, senior military officers and the Ministry of Defense as an institution have been criticized for inefficiency and misappropriation of funds.¹² The Soviet public has learned, for instance, that its highly revered two-star generals have built private saunas and spas at the army's expense, and have made profits on the side by sending cadets to work on local farms. By castigating these activities, Soviet military reformers believe, public openness will assist in correcting some of the army's present discipline and morale problems.

Glasnost is also used to promote discussions in the military on topics ranging from awards and punishments to shortcomings in training and exercises. Commanders are now requested to solicit recommendations from junior personnel on issues related to education and training.¹³ According to the Chief of the Political Administration of the Air Force, Colonel General L. Batekhin, public openness should be used to discuss possible improvements in training standards, specifically, to introduce higher standards of combat readiness.¹⁴ A new deemphasis of indoctrination (*vospitanie*) in favor of training (*obuchenie*) means that the Soviet military can tailor *glasnost* to promote *perestroika*, that is, improve training methodologies and the quality of Soviet military manpower on an individual basis, especially within its junior command component.

Another aspect of *glasnost* encourages grass-roots initiative in suggesting improvements in military hardware and training procedures—changes intended to make the military system more cost-effective. For instance, within the framework of *glasnost* Soviet logistics experts are encouraged to improve the efficiency of resource allocation and cargo transportation, and to promote more extensive incorporation of computer technology.¹⁵ Admiral A. Sorokin, the First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Administration, also recognizes the role of public debate in facilitating

the decisionmaking process, namely, making the military bureaucracy more responsive to suggestions from the lower ranks.¹⁶ He has emphasized the need to keep the soldier informed about command decisionmaking—a prerequisite for developing lower-rank initiative in peace and wartime.

The level of *glasnost* enjoyed today by a professional soldier in the Soviet Army depends on rank and party membership. The Chief of the Political Administration of the Ural Military District has warned military personnel that unrestricted criticism of commanders and their decisions will not be tolerated, but party members among soldiers and junior officers can use authorized party channels to criticize their superiors.¹⁷ The new policy has produced tension, however, in units where low-ranking personnel petition senior authorities to investigate misconduct of their commanders. Military personnel reportedly suffer reprisals for publicizing grievances or voicing criticisms. For instance, a navy captain stationed at the Leningrad Naval Base was reprimanded for informing senior military authorities that his commander employed enlisted men in his illegally run private souvenir workshop on post, as well as in menial jobs in his home.¹⁸ Because of this fear of reprisal, the majority of enlisted men and NCOs do not engage in critical discussions. Military writers report that during public meetings military men are reluctant to criticize the army's political departments or their representatives.¹⁹ As General Lushev admitted, "Since criticism is not respected in all military units, criticism from below is expressed in the form of timid suggestions, with caution."²⁰ This suggests that the Soviet armed forces have a long way to go before a degree of openness is attained that will translate into personal motivation and initiative in combat.

Glasnost in the Military Press

The Soviet military press, which is clearly more open today than it has been since the 1920s (at least on some subjects), challenges the stereotyped image of the Soviet soldier as a Communist Superman. It discusses the plethora of social problems which the Soviet army shares with many other modern militaries: alcoholism and drug abuse, nationality conflicts, draft-dodging, violence between first- and second-year draftees, AWOLs, corruption among senior officers, and illegal arms trading in units stationed in central Asia.

Some truthful reports about the war in Afghanistan and candid discussions by unofficial veterans organizations concerning their demands for more benefits and public recognition have found their way into the military press. The media have acknowledged reluctance among conscripts to risk their lives in combat, and disclosed methods used by parents to keep their children from being drafted.²¹ Military *glasnost* has, however, not allowed an open policy debate to develop over the costs and benefits of the Soviet invasion.

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Another aspect of *glasnost* in the military press has been the new candor in assessing Soviet military performance during World War II. Though criticism of selected aspects of Soviet operations (e.g. organization of the logistic and medical services during the initial period of war) appeared in the military press during the late 1970s to early 1980s, recent discussions have scrutinized Soviet military failures during all phases of the war. For instance, a Soviet military historical journal has provided an in-depth analysis of Soviet failures during offensive operations in 1944. Since the Soviets view military history as a model for refining their operating concepts for future war, their military theory is likely to benefit from this manifestation of *glasnost*. At the same time, the military press has continued to suppress specific information about the country's military and technological capabilities, force development, strategies, and operational planning for future war. The quality of statistical reporting in this area has not improved: the figures related to the defense budget, allocations for defense programs, and arms sales to Third World countries remain secret.

Compared to the relatively open current discussions of touchy political subjects in the civilian media, reporting of political issues in the military press has not changed markedly. The military press still reports only haphazardly on Gorbachev's economic reforms and foreign policy initiatives (though, it must be noted, political reportage is not the purpose of the military press). Mikhail Gorbachev's speech before the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which called for broad reforms and attacked opposition to his program, appeared in an abridged, highly sanitized version. In the military press, criticism of Stalin as a military commander and of his use of terror against the officer corps has been limited to an academic journal for senior officers. The civilian press, on the other hand, has been carrying on an unprecedented de-Stalinization campaign which blames Stalin's dictatorship for current Soviet economic and political failures.

The military establishment finds the application of Gorbachev's *glasnost* policy in civilian society disquieting. The military press now regularly takes civilian journals to task for misconstruing Soviet World War II failures, overstating the extent of morale and cohesion problems in today's army, and discrediting the military profession and military officers in the

eyes of the public. The political leadership, infuriated by the military's incompetent handling of the Cessna incident, has set the tone for critical attacks on the military in the press. In June 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev accused his generals of a lack of professionalism and of having compromised Russia's international prestige as a military power.²² At that time, Boris Yeltsin, the former First Secretary of the Moscow party organization, scolded the command of the Moscow Military District for insubordination to the political leadership. Today the military, perhaps even more often than the party *apparatchiks* or the KGB operatives, draws fire in the civilian media. Naturally, the military establishment, which in the past had enjoyed unquestioned prestige in Soviet society, views *glasnost* as a detriment to its public image. As a military writer bitterly complained: "Criticisms of the army more and more often spill into the press. Following one after another, these statements become a factor which creates around the army an unhealthy feeling of animosity."²³ But the military establishment's attitude is probably ambivalent, since *glasnost*, as we have seen, does contribute to both the long- and short-range enhancement of military effectiveness.

The military recently blamed *glasnost* for the army's continuing discipline problems and for the growth of pacifism among this year's conscripts.²⁴ The Soviet military naturally also fears that Gorbachev's *glasnost* will soften traditionally stringent Soviet assumptions about the endemic conflict between the socialist and capitalist systems. General D. Volkogonov, Deputy Chief of the Main Political Administration and a prominent military expert on psychological warfare, continues to warn military personnel that the regime's traditional view of the West's military threat remains valid.

There is no and will be no parity with our class enemy as far as the human factor is concerned. As always before, the Marxists do not condemn war in general. This would amount to . . . pacifism. Our support will always be with those nations who conduct a just struggle for social and national liberation, against imperialist domination and aggression.²⁵

This statement portrays genuine concern by the Soviet military about the ramifications of Gorbachev's *glasnost* policy for the fighting spirit of the army.

As we can see, the Soviet military has mixed feelings about *perestroika* and *glasnost*. On one hand, it hopes to benefit from Gorbachev's reforms by making the tightly controlled military system more responsive to Western technological and doctrinal challenges. On the other hand, these new policies bring into question the legitimacy of the military institution in Soviet society and create tensions between civilian and military elites. *Glasnost* jeopardizes the vested interests of many senior officers and generates apprehensions about the disruptive effects a more open society may have on the army's morale and political reliability.

On balance, Western defense planners should be aware that the ultimate goal of *perestroika* and *glasnost* for the Soviet high command is to create a less rigid military system, emphasizing flexible training patterns and autonomy, initiative, and improvisation for military personnel. In the long term, these changes, if successful, may make the Soviet soldier a more formidable opponent. Yet, because centralized control, rigidity, and inertia are entrenched in the Soviet military system and military thinking, it will be a long time before restructuring can really produce substantial change in the Soviet army. In the meantime, while Gorbachev remains in power, *glasnost* and *perestroika* will continue to drive wedges between military and civilian authorities, and between groups within the military.

NOTES

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4. D. T. Yazov, "Restructuring in the Work of the Military Cadres," *Voyenno-Istoricheski Zhurnal*, 7 (July 1987), 3-12.
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11. Jacob and Maia Kipp, "The Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich: The Making of a Tsarist Reformer, 1827-53," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 34 (1986), 3-18.
12. "To Think and Work in New Ways," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 22 March 1986; and "Stains on the Uniform," *Pravda*, 21 March 1987.
13. M. Popkov, "Party Democracy and Party Discipline," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, 16 (1986), 18-26.
14. L. Batekhin, "The Time For New Approaches," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, 21 (1986), 17-24.
15. *Tsli Snabzhenie*, 11 (1986), 17-21.
16. A. Sorokin, "A Human Element To The Center of Party Work," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, 22 (1986), 9-18.
17. O. Zinchenko, "Criticism and Self-Criticism," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, 18 (1986), 52-59.
18. "A Deficiency of Glasnost," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 17 March 1987.
19. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 14 January 1988.
20. P. Lushev, "High Responsibility of the Cadres," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* 5 (1987), p. 17.
21. "Man's Job," *Pravda*, 18 May 1987.
22. *Pravda*, 26 June 1987.
23. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 12 December 1987.
24. *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, 5 December 1987.
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New Directions in Franco-German Military Cooperation

JOHN L. CLARKE

Since the Reykjavik summit of October 1986, and particularly since the prospects for a successful Soviet-American arms agreement on theater nuclear weapons became apparent, the European allies of the United States have directed serious thought to alternative defense structures and to increased cooperation in the policy coordination and military spheres.¹ The specter of a diminished American presence in Europe has prompted a search for ways to bolster the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. This has been particularly true for France and Germany, whose *Erbfeindschaft*, or hereditary animosity toward one another, seems to have dissolved in a flurry of proposals aimed at increasing the collective military capabilities of the two nations. This article explores the military dimensions of increased cooperation between Bonn and Paris, examining the policy implications and prospects for success.

After the plan for a European Defense Community collapsed in 1954 (owing to French opposition to West Germany's membership) and West Germany's entry into NATO the next year, Franco-German military cooperation was very much an open question. With Charles de Gaulle's accession to power in 1958, France's position began to crystallize. For Germany, the French desire for a more influential and independent role seemed possible only at the expense of Germany's position in the alliance.² It was clear to Konrad Adenauer that Germany's security lay with the United States; Germany would not play junior partner to France's world-class power ambitions.³

The opportunity to moderate this division came in January 1963, with the signing of the Elysée Treaty and, with it, the first phase of Franco-German military cooperation.⁴ Unfortunately, this effort was to have little

effect, coming as it did when French participation in the NATO integrated military command was being increasingly called into question by De Gaulle. With the rupture between France and NATO in 1966, Franco-German military cooperation fell into a state of dormancy, if not regression, with efforts largely limited to general staff talks and personnel exchanges.⁵

This state continued until 1982 when, partly as a result of changes in the leadership of both France and Germany, an effort to revitalize the 1963 treaty was made. French President François Mitterand's declared support for the modernization of NATO's theater nuclear weapons, coupled with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's visit to Paris immediately after his election in October 1982, paved the way for increased cooperation. This cooperation took several forms.

The first was an agreement to conduct biannual meetings of foreign and defense ministers. The second was to establish the standing French-German Committee for Security and Defense to oversee cooperative efforts on a routine basis. This committee, in turn, directs the work of three groups: political-strategic, military cooperation, and armaments cooperation. Existing subcommittees are currently devoting their attention to such areas as the Strategic Defense Initiative, France's *Force d'Action Rapide* (hereinafter referred to simply as *Force d'Action*), interoperability, and air defense issues.⁶ Indeed, the establishment of the *Force d'Action* itself can be traced to the 1982 agreements. Another significant result has been the French promise to consult with the Germans, insofar as practical, before France employs its theater (or "prestrategic") nuclear weapons.

Items of particular interest under the rubric of military cooperation include the coordination of exercises, particularly those of French forces in Germany and the possible employment of the *Force d'Action* in support of German units.⁷ Since 1982 the number of bilateral exercises has increased markedly, culminating in the *Moineau Hardi/Kecker Spatz* (Bold Sparrow) exercise of September 1987, the largest joint exercise ever held by the two countries. Personnel exchanges and common training programs have also registered significant increases, particularly at the unit and general staff levels.

The pace during 1987 was particularly intense. On 19 June, Helmut Kohl proposed the formation of a joint Franco-German brigade, which was followed by the announcement by President Mitterand of the formation of a

Major John L. Clarke is currently assigned as a Special Operations officer in Europe and is a recent graduate of the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre in Paris. He holds a B.A. degree from Norwich University, an M.A. from the University of Southern California, and is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Salzburg, Austria. A graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, he has served in command and staff positions in Germany and Korea, as well as on the Joint Staff in Washington. He has published frequently on military affairs.

combined Franco-German Defense Council. The announcement was made during the course of exercise *Bold Sparrow*. Although a number of proposals of this type have been made before, these two are currently enjoying the patronage of the political leadership of both countries.⁸ However, these initiatives are not without their attendant problems. Let us look at these three particular issues—the creation of a joint brigade, the proposal of a joint defense council, and the combined exercise *Bold Sparrow*—within the framework of the security concerns of the two countries.⁹

The Franco-German Brigade

German Chancellor Kohl's proposal to create a joint brigade of French and German troops has received a great deal of publicity in the French media, though less in the German press, since its announcement on 19 June 1987. Subsequent ministerial talks have fleshed out a number of the details but also have left a number of issues unresolved.

Kohl's proposal envisioned a brigade composed of equal numbers of German and French troops, with the command initially French and then rotating between the two countries.¹⁰ The brigade would presumably be available for operations agreed to by the two nations through a command relationship yet to be specified. The brigade is to be composed of combat units, as opposed to support units, and thus would be expected to carry out combat missions.

The question of mission is the first of the unresolved issues. The brigade must have a realistic combat mission if it is to avoid becoming simply a parade-ground unit. One suggested mission would be to function as a "Rhine brigade" to assist in the crossing of the Rhine by French forces stationed west of the river in the event that French authorities decide to commit their forces to battle.¹¹ Alternatively, mention has been made of a "fire brigade" mission, in which the forces would be available for employment throughout the Central Region in support of committed forces. The lack of a realistic mission would be certain to cause discontent in defense ministries and general staffs already hard pressed to match resources to missions.

The difficulty in settling on a suitable mission is a function of the different security perspectives and requirements of the two countries. France, independent and with a strong emphasis on nuclear forces, is clearly unwilling to place such a brigade under a NATO integrated military command. Further, any such unit containing French soldiers would have to be supported, from a doctrinal standpoint, by French nuclear forces. Doing so would involve a *de facto* extension of their nuclear deterrent to cover the West German units assigned to the brigade, as operationally it would be nearly impossible to distinguish among individual units lower than brigade. The French, however, are not as yet willing (and probably are unable) to make a credible extension of their nuclear guarantee.¹² Thus, any mission acceptable

to the French necessarily would be outside the framework of Allied Forces, Central Europe, and tethered reasonably close to French territory to insure nuclear coverage by France's tactical nuclear systems based in France.

West Germany, on the other hand, remains resolutely conventional and integrated into NATO. The 36 active-duty brigades of the field army, organized into 12 divisions, are committed to the SACEUR. Only the 12 home defense brigades of the territorial army, which serves the role of local protection, remain under national command.¹³ Any West German components of the joint brigade would of necessity come from one of these home defense brigades, some of which are manned at only 50-percent active-duty strength. Assignment to the brigade would mandate an upgrading of their status. The West Germans are not likely to be receptive to the prospect of the French providing tactical nuclear fire coverage for the French component of the brigade. Further, the Germans undoubtedly would strongly prefer a mission related to assisting in the reinforcement of the NATO forward defense effort.

The composition of the brigade has been determined, although its size was the subject of some debate. German brigades generally contain some 3500-4000 soldiers, while the French, who do not use the brigade in their combat organization, have some divisions with as few as 6000 men.¹⁴ The French unit to be used as a building block will be the regiment, which, with some 800-1000 men, approximates the size of a German battalion. The brigade will consist of two battalion-sized units from each country. France will supply a light armored battalion equipped with AMX10RC wheeled reconnaissance vehicles and a motorized infantry battalion equipped with wheeled armored personnel carriers. Germany will furnish a motorized infantry battalion and an artillery battalion. Combat support (air defense, engineers) and service support (supply and maintenance units) will be divided between the two countries. The brigade will total some 4000 soldiers.

The lack of commonality in the types of equipment used by the French and the West Germans would render the operations of a brigade composed of armored and mechanized forces most difficult. It was thus proposed that the brigade be composed, initially at least, of parachute or light infantry units, whose lack of heavy equipment would tend to alleviate the worst of the sustainability problems.¹⁵ In the event, the French decided to use light armored and motorized units to avoid the worst aspects of this problem. These units are scheduled to come from the divisions of the *Force d'Action* stationed in France, rather than from the armored divisions assigned to the 2d French Corps in Germany. The German units will come from Home Defense Brigade 55, which is stationed in Böblingen. As Kohl had proposed, the brigade will be under the command of a French general initially, and command will rotate between the two countries.

The support infrastructure of the brigade poses a problem that threatens to retard the project. As noted above, despite a reasonably impressive



The French contribution to the joint brigade includes a light armored battalion equipped with AMX10RC wheeled vehicles (shown above) in lieu of tracked tanks.

record of armaments collaboration in the past (Transall, Alphajet, etc.), German and French army units have little equipment in common.¹⁶ Effective functioning of the brigade would seem to necessitate the adoption of certain common items of equipment, particularly major end items such as vehicles, weapons, and radios. Failure to do so would necessitate the maintenance of parallel logistics infrastructures, seriously degrading the combat effectiveness of the brigade. The brigade's current organization does not deal effectively with this problem.

Operational procedures are another difficult matter: the *Bundeswehr* is a fully integrated force within NATO, is accustomed to operating with NATO standardization agreements, and is proficient in the use of English as the de facto NATO operational language; *L'Armée de Terre*, on the other hand, employs operational concepts that differ in important ways from NATO's and has little operational need for any language other than French.¹⁷ To some extent this problem will be mitigated by using German territorial forces. Although there is substantial exchange training between the two armies at the platoon and company level, employment considerations for brigade-level operations require significant staff coordination in order to develop common operational concepts.¹⁸

The budgetary underwriting of such a brigade represents another potential difficulty. France, already committed to an extensive modernization program of its nuclear forces, may be tempted to resurrect the slogan of 1918: *L'Allemagne paiera!* ("Germany will pay!")¹⁹ Germany is clearly in a better

position to afford the presumed burden at present; however, this may not always be the case. It is, in any event, difficult to estimate how much such a brigade might require in additional outlays, particularly if existing units are used to man it.

Thus the idea of a joint brigade, while innovative and decidedly appealing to both the French and West German publics, remains fraught with a number of problems which threaten to render it stillborn. If it is just a symbol, lacking a meaningful mission, it will not likely receive the support of the two militaries; in order to have operational significance, it must overcome some big obstacles, many of them political.

The Joint Defense Council

At a joint news conference with Chancellor Kohl on 24 September 1987, French President Mitterrand proposed the establishment of a joint Franco-German defense council which would attempt to "coordinate decisions and harmonize analyses in the areas of security, defense, research, armaments and the organization and deployment of joint units."²¹ He went on to declare that such an organization would be open to other European members as well, such as Italy and Spain.

Although the precise role and functioning of such an organization have yet to be specified, apparently the council would be more than just an amplification of the standing Committee for Security and Defense. Mitterrand stressed that its objective would be to coordinate political and economic policy as well as military policy.²² The council is likely to be made up of senior ministers and military officers.²³ The idea of charging it with overall defense policy coordination holds out the possibility that it might have powers analogous to the French National Defense Council.²⁴ If so, it would represent an opportunity for policy coordination at the highest level.

It has been suggested that the council could serve as a link between France and NATO, while providing West Germany with an opportunity to gain information about and perhaps influence French nuclear targeting strategies.²⁵ The primary purpose of the council, however, would probably be to provide France with a way to enhance its leadership role in Europe without rejoining NATO's integrated military structure. German acquiescence in what is essentially a French initiative may be viewed as indicative of the Federal Republic's desire to reengage France in a commitment to forward defense in the Central Region.

A number of problems are associated with giving the council the power it needs to be truly effective. Given the existence of a number of other consultative bodies, such as the Western European Union, whose purpose is to provide a forum for policy coordination on defense issues, it is hard to see how the proposed defense council could play a significant role without

replicating the existing forums. The fact that it is essentially a French initiative renders the idea of such a council worthy of consideration, as France appears to be searching for an appropriate vehicle for its ambition of playing the leading role in European security. In any event, however, the French have made it clear that the council will have no supranational authority, with all questions of cooperation remaining within the competence of national authorities.²⁵

It seems reasonable to assume that domestic politics are likely to be the key factor in determining the success of the council. The current debate in France concerning the employment of tactical nuclear weapons, which has caused a significant gulf between the major parties of the *cohabitation* of government and President, as well as the widening gap between the ruling and opposition parties in Germany concerning security issues, has rendered any effort at serious cooperation hostage to internal political developments.²⁶ It is by no means evident that either side, and the French in particular, is prepared to endow the council with powers that would represent a distinct departure from past practice. Clearly, any policy coordination will likely have to await the consolidation of national positions.

The Combined Maneuver Bold Sparrow

The largest-ever Franco-German combined exercise took place in Bavaria from 17 to 25 September 1987. The primary purpose of the exercise was to determine how effectively units of France's *Force d'Action Rapide* could intervene in support of committed German units. The participants included 55,000 troops of the II German Corps (consisting of the 1st Mountain Division, 4th Armored Infantry Division, 10th Armored Division, and the 56th Home Defense Brigade) and 20,000 French troops of the *Force d'Action* (the 4th Airmobile Division and the 6th Light Armored Division, as well as smaller units from the 9th Marine Infantry Division and the 11th Parachute Division). The maneuver scenario envisioned the *Force d'Action* intervening at the request of German authorities and being placed under the operational control of II Corps in order to help stem an attack by a "red" aggressor and to assist in a subsequent counterattack.

The maneuver was significant for a number of reasons aside from the numbers of troops employed. It marked the first time that large units from the interior of France had participated in maneuvers beyond the Rhine and was also the first time that French units of the *Force d'Action* had been placed under the operational control of a West German commander. Moreover, it was the first large-scale test of the *Force d'Action* itself, which was created in 1983 specifically for the purpose of intervening at long distances in support of allies. For the exercise, some units of the *Force d'Action* had to move more than 1200 kilometers just to reach the exercise area.

While the actual conduct of the exercise posed no insurmountable problems, a number of important questions have arisen as a result of the exercise. The first concerns that of French nuclear strategy. The divisions of the *Force d'Action* participated in the exercise without the nuclear fire support planning that French doctrine dictates for all French units. Indeed, the planning for the employment of French tactical nuclear weapons played no role whatsoever in the exercise. This has caused significant debate about the role of the *Force d'Action* in the national deterrent scheme. It remains unclear how French authorities would actually employ their intervention force—whether it is intended to operate independently, with or without nuclear coverage, or with the 1st French Army, as part of the national nuclear deterrent array.²⁷ In this sense the combined maneuver begged more questions than it answered.

A second problem area involved the organization of the *Force d'Action* itself. The two complete divisions employed in the exercise represented about half of the total strength of the five-division *Force*, but nearly all its helicopters and tanks. While the 4th Division, equipped with over 200 helicopters, seemed to acquit itself well, serious questions were raised regarding the combat effectiveness of the light wheeled tanks of the 6th.²⁸ The transit distances of the 6th Division, with its headquarters at Nîmes in southern France, to a battle area in Germany, raise questions about just how rapid the *Force d'Action* can be in responding to an order to engage in combat in support of the West Germans. During the exercise the *Force* was required to operate far in advance of its support bases; in fact, it operated in advance of *Bundeswehr* units and thus had to rely on German support rather than its own logistics organization. It is most unlikely that the *Force d'Action* would be employed in this fashion in actual combat.

Related to this problem is the question of interoperability. Many of the problems already alluded to in the discussion of the joint brigade surfaced during the exercise: lack of familiarity with operational procedures, language difficulties, and the logistics problems created by the use of non-standardized equipment. Some French officers have estimated that it will take a decade before French and German units are truly interoperable.²⁹ Moreover, it is the French who will undoubtedly have to adapt their procedures to those of NATO, since the Germans can hardly do the reverse.

The last major problem area during the exercise involved the chain of command. The French insisted that the exercise take place without NATO sponsorship; to that end they refused to invite General Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander, or General Altenburg, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, to visit the exercise. This created a number of problems for the West Germans, as II German Corps is directly subordinated to NATO and required the permission of the SACEUR to participate in the exercise. The French sought to portray the maneuver as a strictly bilateral exercise, thus creating an aura of unreality—it would be highly unlikely for a West German

corps to demand reinforcement outside of NATO channels in combat. With certain exceptions, the French have indicated that they remain largely opposed to maneuvers within the NATO framework, although there is some evidence that this may be changing.³⁰

What Conclusions Can Be Drawn?

Driven by the imperatives of a changing security situation in Europe, Franco-German military cooperation has clearly turned a page and begun the process of living up to the expectations envisioned as long ago as 1963. The initiatives of 1987 form a definite and ambitious start; the obstacles, however, are many.

Of those initiatives, the proposal for a joint defense council holds the most promise of fundamental change and therefore is likely to be the most difficult to achieve. The participants have so far demonstrated little propensity for sacrificing the degree of national sovereignty necessary to provide such a council with the authority necessary to deal with the magnitude of change taking place in Europe. Europeans have little need of another consultative body that can, and thus will, be ignored.

The joint brigade probably is a lasting innovation. The political stakes are quite high, and it is clear that both the German and French publics would like to see this gesture succeed. In order to achieve this, the strategic and operational difficulties described above probably will be set aside in the interests of harmony. The French and Germans realize that the symbolism of the brigade is so significant that its creation has an imperative of its own, and thus they need not await resolution of the outstanding difficulties.

The future is likely to see a substantial increase in the number of combined training exercises, though their scale is likely to remain modest to limit interoperability problems and questions of NATO sponsorship. These exercises are much desired by the respective militaries, particularly the French, as they permit a kind of functional reintegration without the attendant political difficulties.

France and Germany, and all Western Europe, for that matter, must overcome a history that is replete with failure in the field of common military undertakings. NATO is, perhaps, the shining success. But for political reasons NATO is not likely to be the venue for progress on this front. France in particular feels obligated to find another vehicle for its ambitions, but past performance cannot be considered encouraging. The initiatives reviewed above will amount to little if fundamental changes are not made in the strategic and budgetary postures of the participants.

Unless these fundamental changes are made, it will become increasingly difficult to reconcile a France which, despite the creation of the *Force d'Action Rapide*, has become more nuclear than ever and threatens to increase

this dependence with a West Germany in the process of becoming more conventionally oriented.³¹ Given the dual imperatives of a prospective reduction in the American presence in Europe and a markedly improved Soviet conventional posture, the possibility that France and Germany might act in concert is not to be dismissed. They might start with agreement on Adenauer's warning that "*Die Lage war nie so ernst!*"³²

NOTES

1. This is not to imply that significant efforts have not been made in the past, despite their lack of success, such as the European Defense Community and the Multilateral Nuclear Force. Rather, one of the important effects of the INF Treaty has been to spur European efforts to consider alternatives or adjustments to current security arrangements. For a short survey of those alternatives, see David Yost, *Alternative Structures of European Security*, Working Paper No. 81 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1987).

2. French desires to reformulate the alliance seemed to challenge the German notion that NATO's primary purpose was the security of Germany as the linchpin of Europe. For a related discussion, see Nicole Gnesotto, "Der Sicherheitspolitische Dialog 1954 bis 1986," and Lothar Rühl, "Der Aufschwung der Sicherheitspolitischen Zusammenarbeit seit 1982," in *Deutsche-Französische Sicherheitspolitik*, ed. Karl Kaiser and Pierre Lellouche (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1986), pp. 5-26, 27 (published in French under the title *Le Couple Franco-Allemand et la Défense de l'Europe*).

3. Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg, "Das Ende der 'Erbfeindschaft,'" *Der Mittler-Brief* (3d quarter, 1987), p. 3.

4. Gnesotto, pp. 11-12.

5. Rühl, pp. 27-30.

6. For a discussion of the organization of these subcommittees, see Hartman Bühl and Christian Millotat, "Die Intensivierung der Deutsch-Französischen Zusammenarbeit seit 1982," *Der Mittler-Brief* (3d quarter, 1987), p. 4.

7. Bühl and Millotat, p. 4.

8. In 1984, former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt made a number of sweeping proposals aimed at increasing European military cooperation. These included a Franco-German army of 30 divisions under French command.

9. Additional initiatives include seminars for general staff officers from both countries and increases in exchange training.

10. French command of the brigade is a German proposal.

11. General E. Copel, "Des unités allemandes en France: Pourquoi Pas?" *Défense Active* (July-August 1987), p. 1. General Copel has also proposed that the French permit *Luftwaffe* units to be stationed in France as a gesture of reciprocity and to ameliorate the problems posed by the lack of airspace in Germany. See also Jacques Richard, "Brigade franco-allemande: un trait d'union sur le Rhin," *Nice-Matin*, 24 July 1987, p. 1.

12. "French, Germans Discuss Army Units," *International Herald Tribune*, 7 July 1987, p. 2.

13. Although the *Territorialheer* is not a NATO-committed force, some of its units carry out NATO missions. For example, some 90,000 soldiers of the *Territorialheer* are committed to assisting in the arrival of US reinforcements under recent Host Nation Support agreements.

14. French organizational structures make comparisons difficult: for example, the 12th and 14th Light Armored Divisions have less than 6000 soldiers each; the 4th Airmobile division some 6500 and the 6th Light Armored Division 7600. By comparison, German *Panzer* divisions range between 17,000 and 21,000; US armored divisions have some 16,000. In US terminology, a brigade is a tactical headquarters to which units are assigned according to mission requirements, while German brigades have a fixed structure, usually totaling some 3500 soldiers. French regiments (800-1000 men) are more strictly analogous to US and German battalions, rather than US regiments, which approximate brigade-sized structures.

15. Kurt Kister, "Die Gemeinsame Verteidigung ist nur eine Fassade," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 23 June 1987, p. 6.

16. Due primarily to France's position outside the integrated military command, commonality of equipment between French and German units is nearly zero. Even some consumables, such as munitions, differ markedly. For example, while both nations share Milan antitank and Roland antiaircraft missiles,

artillery and tank munitions are not wholly interchangeable; nor are some small arms ammunition. See David U. Isby and Charles Kamps, Jr., *Armies of NATO's Central Front* (London: Jane's Publishing Company, Ltd., 1985), p. 107; and David Yost, *France and Conventional Defense in Central Europe*, EAI Paper No. 7 (Marina Del Ray, Calif.: European American Institute for Security Research, 1984), p. 40.

17. Twenty years of acting as the conventional component of the *Manoeuvre de dissuasion nationale* has had a profound impact on the French army's view of its operational role. Although organized to facilitate offensive action in support of nuclear strikes (and thus lacking the support infrastructure necessary for an extended defense), French planning exercises nevertheless tend to emphasize defensive and retrograde operations. The French, who hold that military forces must be designed to prevent a war, not fight one that cannot be won, tend to draw a distinction between deterrence and defense. This bifurcation has left some army officers unsure of how to adapt the national strategy to increased cooperation with the Germans, who are wholly committed to defending forward.

18. Exchange training of general staff officers has recently been emphasized by both countries. The Germans would like to quadruple the number of officers attending the French general staff college; there is some doubt that the French would like to (or are able to) reciprocate.

19. The current French *Loi de programmation* for the years 1988-92 emphasizes nuclear forces at the expense of conventional forces; the acquisition of expensive new systems (such as the *Leclerc* main battle tank) will undoubtedly limit the funds available for cooperative ventures such as the joint brigade. The quotation refers to French demands for German reparations at the end of the First World War. See Pierre Lellouche, "Une Brigade sur terrain miné," *Le Point*, 29 June 1987, p. 73.

20. "Paris, Bonn Propose Joint Military Council," *International Herald Tribune*, 26 September 1987, p. 1.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Giovanni de Briganti, "French Leader: Others May Join Defense Council," *Defense News*, 28 September 1987, pp. 1, 48.

24. *International Herald Tribune*, 26 September 1987, p. 1.

25. On this point there seem to be no problems regarding *cohabitation*; all the parties are in agreement on the question of national sovereignty.

26. In Germany, the Social Democrats have staked out a position far to the left of the mainstream. It includes negotiating an "understanding" on foreign policy with the Communist Party of East Germany, which effectively incorporates the Soviet perspective on security in Europe. The Social Democrats also advocate a new "defensive" defense for Europe, which would rely principally upon lightly armed militias to defend against a "benign" Soviet threat. French military cooperation with any such future SPD government must be considered problematical. See Robert Keatly, "Theory of Defensive Defense Offers Europe Unrealistic Plan of Protection," *The Wall Street Journal*, 6 November 1987, p. 2.

27. The precise role of the *Force d'Action Rapide* remains unclear. It has been referred to as a tool of crisis management rather than as a warfighting instrument. This may account for some of its weaknesses in terms of sustainability and combat power. In essence, there are two such forces, one for central Europe and one for overseas contingencies, though no formal division exists as such. The French apparently intend to remain able to employ the *Force d'Action* in central Europe independently of the First Army, though this creates serious questions of logistics support. The force would be heavily dependent on German logistical support. This, in turn, raises the problem of interoperability.

28. While the 4th Division appears to constitute a potent fighting force, there is some question regarding the combat value of the 6th. Its primary source of striking power resides in the two tank regiments (battalions), each with 36 AMX10RC wheeled combat vehicles. This vehicle, originally designed as a reconnaissance vehicle, but now pressed into service as a light tank, has performed well in Chad and elsewhere, but there is considerable doubt about its effectiveness against current- and future-generation Soviet tanks. See Pierre Lellouche, "'Moineau Hardi': envol difficile," *Le Point*, 5 October 1987, p. 65.

29. Ibid.

30. The mishandling of the invitations created a very embarrassing situation, as the invitations had already been sent and the French demanded that they be recalled. Regarding French participation in NATO exercises, this appears to be on the increase, despite French government denials. See François Puaux, "'Moineau Hardi': un bilan modeste," *Le Figaro*, 8 October 1987, p. 2; Lellouche, "'Moineau Hardi': envol difficile," p. 65; and Simon O'Dwyer-Russell, "French join Nato exercise," *Sunday Telegraph*, 9 August 1987, p. 1.

31. Karl Kaiser and Pierre Lellouche, "Das Deutsche-Französische Duo und die Sicherheit Europas: Gesamtschau und Empfehlungen," *Deutsche-Französische Sicherheitspolitik*, pp. 204-305, and Yost, *Alternative Structures*, p. 41.

32. "The situation was never so serious!"

Austria and US Security

JOHN M. LUCHAK

Embattled, contested, you lie at the heart of Europe. . . ." So runs the second verse of the Austrian national anthem. Throughout history the territory occupied by present-day Austria has been crucial to the balance of power in Europe. Today the importance of Austria as a factor in Europe's military constellation has scarcely diminished. Yet, until 1945 Austria played virtually no role in American security policy. The end of World War II, however, saw the division of Europe into ideologically antagonistic camps requiring a significant American military presence on the Continent. Only then did Washington find it necessary to reexamine its hitherto languorous relationship with Austria.

In the immediate postwar period relations between Vienna and Washington were determined largely by the emerging East-West conflict and the occupation of Austria by the four wartime Allies. Faced with Soviet efforts to extend its influence into Western Europe, American planners quickly recognized Austria's importance as a bulwark against further encroachments by Moscow. In 1947 the Joint Chiefs of Staff succinctly articulated America's security interests in Austria:

We cannot afford to let this key area fall under the exclusive influence of the Soviet Union, for if this should happen, it would not only consolidate Soviet domination of the Danubian and Balkan areas but would also weaken our position in Italy, Germany, and Czechoslovakia.¹

To this end the United States pursued the objective of reestablishing Austria as an independent, Western-oriented democracy. Accordingly, American support for rebuilding war-ravaged Austria was considerable. Washington's economic assistance programs, including the Marshall Plan, amounted to some \$1.169 billion. Military aid, which was instrumental in building the new Austrian armed forces (*Bundesheer*), totaled \$96 million by the early 1960s.²


The central role played by Austria during the height of the Cold War is often forgotten in the United States today. And in view of the globalization of US interests, one easily loses sight of the fact that Austria continues to be a strategic country of vital importance for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. Indeed, the recent ratification of the INF Treaty, which surely presages an increased reliance on conventional forces, merely underscores the importance of Austria and its armed neutrality for American interests in the region.

The Geostrategic Importance of Austria

Without question, Austria's military importance derives from its geographical position in Europe. Relatively poor in natural resources and small in terms of area and population, Austria nevertheless occupies a region that has been a strategic borderland and crossroads for centuries. The area which is present-day Austria was one of the northern frontier outposts of the old Roman Empire and later the eastern frontier of the Holy Roman Empire. Austria also lies astride an oft-used invasion route. The Nibelungs are said to have marched through from west to east, as did Napoleon. For centuries the Turks and the Hungarians tried to do the reverse. In World War II Germany used Austria as a springboard into the Balkans; and in 1945 the Soviets pushed into Austria as a main axis of advance into Nazi Germany—a point we'll want to keep in mind.

The withdrawal of the Western allies from occupation zones in western Austria in 1955 adversely affected NATO's strategic position in Central Europe by disrupting the alliance's continuous defensive line from the North Sea to the Adriatic. As a consequence NATO was split into northern and southern tiers, with the flanks of each anchored on Austria. The split also lengthened NATO's line of defense, which now runs along the northern and southern borders of Austria instead of through it.³ In view of these drawbacks, the JCS consistently regarded an Allied withdrawal from their occupation zones with concern, even preferring a continuation of the occupation, lest Austria become little more than a military vacuum threatening NATO's central front.⁴ In the early 1950s this fear was so strong that some US officials urged incorporation of Austria into NATO until it became clear that the Austrians themselves opposed this step, which would have meant the permanent

Major John M. Luchak is a Foreign Area Officer specializing in Western European affairs, and is assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, on the Army Staff in the Pentagon. A previous assignment was with the US Embassy in Vienna, Austria, as the Assistant Defense Attaché/Security Assistance officer from 1983 to 1987. He is a 1969 graduate of the US Military Academy and has earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Vienna.



Map by Jim Kiefer, J. V. B. C.

division of their country.⁵ During the ratification hearings for the Austrian State Treaty, the US Senate, too, demanded assurances from the Eisenhower Administration that the United States would continue to arm the new Austrian army to minimize any weakness to the West's strategic position in Central Europe after the withdrawal of the occupation forces.⁶ Throughout the treaty negotiations the Defense Department insisted, successfully, that an Austrian army be in place before the final withdrawal of the occupation forces. It was to this end that a substantial US military assistance program was inaugurated in Austria, continuing into the early 1960s.

For the Soviets the surrender of an occupation zone in eastern Austria was but a minor price for the withdrawal of the three Western powers. Apart from splitting the NATO front, the Allied withdrawal and Vienna's neutrality ruled out, in perpetuity, any Austrian participation in the Western alliance system, a result which Moscow adamantly insisted upon throughout the State Treaty negotiations. For if Austria did not represent a wedge splitting the Warsaw Pact as it did NATO, Austria's geography nevertheless created a potentially dangerous salient into the East Bloc, a threat largely eliminated by Austria's neutrality. In the final analysis, the withdrawal of Soviet troops to bases in neighboring Czechoslovakia and Hungary did not seriously impair the Red Army's strategic position in Central Europe so long as Austria remained neutral.

Today the major axes of advance into NATO's central front are generally recognized to be the north German plain, the Fulda Gap, and the Hof Corridor, and it is in those sectors that NATO has concentrated its combat power in Central Europe.⁷ Little consideration is given to Austria as an approach into Germany. Yet a casual glance at a relief map shows that a major axis of advance runs East-West through northern Austria into southern

Germany: along the Danube River Valley from Vienna to Regensburg. Feeding across the Austrian frontier and into the Danube Valley from Czechoslovakia and Hungary are three suitable entry conduits. The Danube Valley presents favorable terrain for high-speed armored and mechanized forces and represents a serious threat to NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG) in central and southern Germany.⁸ In the event the balloon goes up in Europe, no one seriously believes that the Soviet Union would scruple over violating Austrian neutrality if such served its military purposes.

To counter a Warsaw Pact threat through Austria, NATO has deployed—aside from any reserves that might be allocated for this purpose—only one corps along the German-Czech border and astride the Danube Valley. Indeed, this corps not only has the largest sector in the German theater, it must also face east against overwhelmingly superior Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia and yet be prepared to meet a potential East Bloc thrust through the Danube Valley.⁹

Despite the vulnerability that the Danube River valley represents for CENTAG, most analysts continue to focus on the avenues of approach lying to the north. And yet, even a secondary penetration into CENTAG's southern flank would be a catastrophe for NATO. A penetration would present NATO commanders with at least three possibly insoluble problems: it would threaten a Cannae-like envelopment of the whole front along the inter-German border; it would wreak havoc with lines of communication between the frontline corps and their logistic bases to the west; and it would result in the loss of a large section of West Germany (to say nothing of Austria), with incalculable consequences for NATO's political will to continue prosecution of the war.

Austria also sits astride air corridors that are of vital importance to NATO. In peacetime the north-south corridor over the narrowest stretch of Tyrol in western Austria is a crucial line of communication between CENTAG and Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) in the Mediterranean theater. Moreover, the air corridors through Austria from the east lead into the southern flank of CENTAG and the northern flank of AFSOUTH. These avenues are particularly dangerous since they skirt the main effort of NATO's air defense system.¹⁰

In view of these circumstances, the *Bundesheer's* ability to deter or slow a Warsaw Pact advance through the Danube Valley is vital for the security of CENTAG's southern flank and can be ignored by NATO planners only at great risk.

The Austrian Factor

As a neutral country sharing a border of 945 kilometers with the Warsaw Pact and another 1214 kilometers with NATO, Austria is militarily exposed. While the potential for armed conflict with other states in the region receives consideration in defense planning, the Austrian General Staff

perceives the dominant threat in terms of hostilities between East and West. In view of this threat perception, the General Staff does not consider occupation of Austrian territory to be a primary objective for potential aggressors. Rather, it regards Austria in terms of its value as an avenue of approach to objectives in a theater of operations elsewhere (e.g. Germany). The General Staff, however, sees little prospect for a successful defense along Austria's borders; it has therefore adopted a strategy of "dissuasion" (*Abhaltestrategie*). The goal of this strategy is simply to dissuade a potential aggressor by threatening to inflict an unacceptably high price in terms of men, materiel, time, and loss of surprise. To implement this strategy, the General Staff envisions an unconventional war of small-unit actions in key zones to impede or disrupt an enemy advance. To this end Austria relies on a small, active-duty army of approximately 50,000 professional and conscript soldiers; however, the brunt of the defense effort would fall to the militia, which is expected to number some 300,000 troops by the mid-1990s. The militia soldier, organized and equipped to fight as light infantry, is trained to execute a number of missions on key terrain close to his home.¹

Austria's ability to mount a credible defense is severely circumscribed by a number of restrictions imposed by the Austrian State Treaty. These restrictions must consequently concern NATO planners to the extent that the *Bundesheer*, and hence the flanks on which NATO's CENTAG and AFSOUTH rest, are weakened.

On 15 May 1955 the United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and Austria concluded the Austrian State Treaty, ending the ten-year occupation, and on 26 October Vienna declared its permanent neutrality. While the treaty restored full sovereignty to Austria, it also included restrictions which would later impede modernization of the *Bundesheer*. Specifically, Article 13 of the treaty prohibits a number of weapon systems. Most of the prohibitions, to be sure, are irrelevant to Austrian defense needs—e.g. submarines and sea mines—but Article 13 also contains significant limitations prohibiting Austria from possessing, constructing, or experimenting with "any self-propelled or guided missile or torpedoes or apparatus connected with their discharge or control . . . [and] guns with a range of more than 30 kilometers."¹²

The intent of these limitations—as with similar (almost word for word) restrictions in the 1947 peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Finland, Bulgaria, and Rumania—was to prevent the acquisition of long-range, offensive missiles by the countries that had fought on the side of Hitler's Germany. Ironically, the restrictions imposed on Austria were first mentioned in a 1946 American draft treaty for Austria as an effort at a general reduction in the level of armaments after the war and were later included in the State Treaty as an outgrowth of the 1947 treaties. Great Britain was particularly insistent on the inclusion of those restrictions as a consequence of that

country's experience with German V1 and V2 rocket attacks during World War II. The potential for the employment of missiles as a future delivery system for the embryonic atomic bomb also lent urgency to the inclusion of those restrictions in the postwar treaties.¹³

In the intervening 41 years, however, technological advances have made possible a class of precision-guided missiles which were scarcely imaginable in 1947. Indeed, today those missiles represent the most effective defense against modern, high-performance aircraft and armored vehicles. In view of these developments, the states that were party to the 1947 peace treaties have long since acquired the defensive missiles still prohibited to Austria.

The new *Bundesheer* quickly recognized the dilemma posed by the obligation to defend neutrality on the one hand and by the limitations imposed by Article 13 on the other. In 1959, therefore, the *Bundesheer* purchased a battalion of Czechoslovakian RM-130 multiple rocket launchers, and a year later it tested the Swiss wire-guided antitank missile Mosquito. Since that time, the *Bundesheer* has acquired Bofors 7.5cm M57 air-to-air rockets, the American M72 66mm light antitank weapon (LAW), and the 7.4cm PAR 70 antitank rocket (Miniman).¹⁴ Of significance is the fact that the appearance of these weapons in Austria has not been concealed and has evoked no known protest from any of the signatories to the State Treaty. The absence of any formal protest suggests that if the weapons acquired by the *Bundesheer* were indeed questionable from the standpoint of the literal meaning of Article 13, the signatories nevertheless have found them acceptable from the standpoint of the *intent* of the treaty restrictions.

Although the parties to the 1947 peace treaties have long since acquired missiles and although the *Bundesheer* itself has acquired short-range rockets, the Austrian government has refused over the years to permit the purchase of more modern defensive missiles. The reluctance to address the *Bundesheer's* legitimate requirements for defensive missiles was particularly evident as the 1960s drew to a close and the Socialist Party, led by Bruno Kreisky (Chancellor, 1970-1983), came to power. Under Kreisky, Austria placed greater emphasis on foreign than on defense policy as a means of maintaining its neutrality, and during his long tenure as Chancellor, Kreisky brooked no discussion of missiles, let alone of a reinterpretation of the State Treaty. The Chancellor went so far as to rebuke one of his defense ministers publicly, later replacing him, for indiscreetly urging the purchase of missiles.¹⁵ And if some officials felt compelled to oppose the acquisition of missiles solely because of the State Treaty restrictions, there were nonetheless elements within the Socialist Party and the government who willingly accepted Article 13 as a tactically expedient argument to forestall the additional defense spending that the purchase of missiles would have entailed.¹⁶

Missile critics in Austria have argued that Moscow opposes missiles for the *Bundesheer*. Soviet opposition to defensive missiles per se

would, however, appear to be unlikely since Moscow's interests in the region are also served by a militarily strong, albeit neutral Austria. Any demonstrated Soviet recalcitrance seems to be rooted more in the fear of linking Austria's acquisition of missiles to a formal reinterpretation of Article 13 under the provisions of Article 34. A formal reinterpretation would represent an undesirable precedent, leading perhaps to changes in other articles of the treaty that the Soviets may regard as far more crucial to their security interests. Here I refer to those articles (i.e. 3-5, 9, 10, 14-16) which were designed to permanently separate Austria from Germany. The nonaligned Yugoslavs, too, have objected in the past to a reinterpretation of the State Treaty.¹⁷ On the surface these objections are surprising since Belgrade's interests can only benefit from a credible Austrian defense. It was, after all, the so-called "Polarka Plan" which revealed a Warsaw Pact scenario calling for an East Bloc thrust through Austria into Yugoslavia in the event of unrest after Tito's death.¹⁸ Belgrade's hesitation to countenance a formal reinterpretation can be understood in terms of the precedent it might set. For the Yugoslavs, Articles 6 and 7 of the State Treaty represent assurances that the rights of the Slovenian and Croatia minorities in Austria will be protected, and any reinterpretation of Article 13 could eventually lead to an erosion of those rights.

Since 1983 Austrian journalists, defense analysts, government officials, and politicians of the major parties have increasingly called for a reevaluation of Austria's stance toward the missile issue.¹⁹ Austrian military leaders, past and present, continue to point out that the lack of missiles, particularly air defense missiles, represents a serious deficiency in *Bundesheer* capabilities, and the decision in 1985 to purchase high-performance fighters (raising the question of suitable armament for the aircraft) merely underscores this deficiency.²⁰ Indeed, every defense minister since 1983 has openly advocated the acquisition of missiles as a long-overdue step in the overall modernization of the *Bundesheer*.²¹ In 1985, in a precedent-setting step, the defense spokesmen for the three major parties (Socialists included) agreed that the *Bundesheer* required defensive missiles.²² Clearly the Austrians today are far more willing to entertain the missile issue, and it is evident that a cautious consensus is forming that Austria cannot expect to maintain a credible armed neutrality without recourse to modern defensive missiles.

The American Interest

As long as Europe remains divided into two military blocs, it is vital for the United States and NATO that the *Bundesheer* be capable of impeding or deterring a Warsaw Pact attack through Austria. But it is difficult to see how the *Bundesheer* could possibly accomplish that without modern defensive missiles.

If the level of debate in the Austrian media is any indicator of Vienna's interest in finally breaking through the restrictions imposed on it over 30 years ago, the government there will no doubt begin to test the water for a significant purchase of missiles. One should bear in mind that the *Bundesheer* does not require a category of weapons that can in any way be considered offensive according to the intent of Article 13. The *Bundesheer* has a pressing need for anti-aircraft (e.g. Stinger), antitank (e.g. TOW), and air-to-air (e.g. Sidewinder) missiles. This category of weapons exists in the inventories of virtually every respectable army in the world and should not be denied to the Austrians on the basis of Article 13. Fortunately, there appears to be little standing in the way as far as the true intent of the State Treaty is concerned.

The United States, therefore, should quietly support, indeed continue to encourage as it has in the past, Austrian efforts to modernize the *Bundesheer* and to acquire those defensive missiles compatible with the intent of the treaty.²¹ Recourse to Article 34, requiring a formal reinterpretation, should be avoided; a reinterpretation of Article 13 is unnecessary and it would prove to be a messy revisitation of the long, drawn-out State Treaty negotiations of the Cold War years. We must also be willing to accept those steps that Vienna considers to be politically necessary in order to overtly introduce modern guided missiles into the *Bundesheer*. That may well mean the purchase of missiles from a country other than the United States in order to deflect criticism from the East Bloc of overreliance on US-produced weapons. While US defense contractors might bridle at this step, Washington should support it. We must not lose sight of the fact that the bottom line remains a more effective Austrian defense, not the source of the *Bundesheer's* weapons.

At the end of the Second World War the United States quickly recognized Austria's crucial position in the postwar military balance in Central Europe. Those circumstances have changed little in the intervening 43 years. We, along with the other signatories to the Austrian State Treaty, also assumed a moral obligation to permit the Austrians to arm themselves adequately in order to defend their neutrality, which we and the other signatories formally recognized ten years after the war. And if the NATO nations are to place a greater reliance on their conventional capabilities, as indeed it appears they must, the Austrian *Bundesheer* will become an even more important factor in maintaining Austria's neutrality and regional stability in the years to come. We may not in good conscience deny the Austrians the legitimate means to fulfill their responsibilities, which, after all, coincide with our own interests in Central Europe.

NOTES

1. "The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria (25 May 1947)," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947* (Washington: GPO, 1972), II: 1177. (Hereinafter *FRUS*, followed by the year.)

2. "Abkommen zwischen Österreich und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika vom 29. März 1961," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik* (No. 4, 1961), p. 261; and US Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction and Military Assistance Facts* (Washington: Comptroller, DSAA, 1985), p. 53.
3. For an old but still valid analysis of the effects of the State Treaty and the subsequent neutrality declaration by Austria on the strategic balance in Central Europe, see "Die militärische Lage Europas nach der Neutralisierung Österreichs," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), 23 August 1955, p. 2.
4. "Acting Secretary of State to the US Delegation at CFM (16 June 1949)," *FRUS, 1949* (Washington: GPO, 1974), III, 1243-44.
5. "Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff Concerning Western Union and Related Problems (23 March 1948)," pp. 61-64; and "NSC 9: The Position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Union and Other Related Free Countries (13 April 1948)," i. *FRUS, 1948* (Washington: GPO, 1973), III, 85-88; Bruno Kreisky, "So ruhige 30 Jahre hatten wir lange nicht," *Der Spiegel*, 17 February 1985, p. 125.
6. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The State Treaty for the Reestablishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria*, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, pp. 5-14.
7. See, for example, David Petraeus, "Light Infantry in Europe: Strategic Flexibility and Conventional Deterrence," *Military Review*, 64 (December 1984), 43.
8. Friedrich Wiener, *Die Armeen der neutralen und blockfreien Staaten Europas*, 4th ed. (Vienna: Verlag Überreuter, 1986), pp. 26, 30.
9. Petraeus, p. 43; "Stationierungskräfte und nationale Truppen im Abschnitt Europa Mitte," *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* (hereinafter *OMZ*) (No. 1, 1985), pp. 61-62.
10. The north-south Tyrolean corridor can be used in peacetime to the extent that the overflights are not incompatible with Austria's neutrality and sovereignty. In wartime this corridor, as well as the others, would be problematical for NATO (and for Switzerland) if Austria is unable to protect its airspace and deny it to the belligerents. See *Die Presse* (Vienna), 18 March 1987.
11. Wiener, pp. 25-50; *Landesverteidigungsplan* (Vienna: Bundeskanzleramt, 1985), p. 53; Charles L. Parnell, "Security Assistance and the Neutral States of Western Europe," *The DISAM Journal*, 8 (Spring 1986), 79.
12. US Congress, Senate, *Message from the President of the United States transmitting the State Treaty for the Reestablishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria*, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, p. 12.
13. See for example Heinz Vetschera, "Die Rüstungsbeschränkungen des Österreichischen Staatsvertrages aus rechtlicher und politischer Sicht," *OMZ* (No. 5, 1979), pp. 500-05; Rudolf Hecht, "Militärische Bestimmungen in den Friedensverträgen von 1947," *OMZ* (No. 5, 1979), pp. 381-82; Manfred Rauchensteiner, "Staatsvertrag und bewaffnete Macht," *OMZ* (No. 3, 1980), p. 187.
14. Hubertus Czernin, "Österreichs Raketen," *Profil* (Vienna), 23 September 1985, pp. 34-36; Heinz Magenheimer, "Das österreichische Bundesheer 1955-1975," *OMZ* (No. 3, 1975), p. 193.
15. *Die Presse*, 7 January 1977; *Wiener Zeitung* (Vienna), 12 and 13 January 1977.
16. Friedrich W. Korkisch, "Sicherheit, Verteidigung, Neutralität: das Beispiel Österreich," in *Strategie für den Frieden: Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik*, ed. Gerhard Hubatschek (Hertford: Verlag Busse & Seewald GmbH, 1986), p. 281. See also *Wiener Zeitung*, 24 June 1984; *Die Presse*, 3 August 1984, 4 July 1985, and 21-22 February 1987; *Kurier* (Vienna), 11 October 1984.
17. *Die Presse*, 8-9 January 1977.
18. "Moskaus Aufmarschpläne gegen Österreich," *Profil*, 14 February 1974, pp. 39-43. This article was part one of a three-part series on the Warsaw Pact plan "Polarka." The remaining installments appeared on 21 and 28 February 1974.
19. See for example: *Die Presse*, 17 September 1984, 7 June and 3 July 1985, and 21-22 February 1987; *Wiener Zeitung*, 16 June and 19 July 1985, and 20 June 1987; *Kurier*, 3 July 1985 and 23 July 1986; and "Raketen-Riegen," *Profil*, 29 July 1985, p. 9.
20. See *Die Presse*, 14 February 1986 and 21-22 February 1987; *Wiener Zeitung*, 7 September 1986 and 21 July 1987; *Kurier*, 12 August 1986, and 12 January and 23 February 1987.
21. *Neue Kronen Zeitung* (Vienna), 9 September 1984; *Wiener Zeitung*, 12 September 1984, *Kurier*, 23 July 1986; and *Die Presse*, 19 February 1987.
22. *Wiener Zeitung*, 24 August 1985.
23. *Die Presse*, 27 August 1982 and 23-24 June 1984. Former US Ambassador to Austria Ronald Lauder was particularly vocal in urging Vienna to modernize the *Bundesheer* with anti-air and antitank missiles. See *Die Presse*, 16 April 1986, and *Profil*, 28 July 1986, pp. 40-41.

Japan and the East Asian Balance of Power

JEROME K. HOLLOWAY

Thirteen years after the collapse of the American enterprise in Vietnam, there exists in East Asia a balance of power reasonably tolerable for the United States. Few would have predicted this when the last helicopter lifted from the roof of the American Embassy in Saigon. We would do well to recall that this balance contrasts with the situations that existed in 1946, 1953, and 1964 during which the United States, in following its 20th-century policy of opposing the hegemony of any single power in East Asia, embarked on quasi-hegemonic policies of its own. As of now, dangers to the East Asian balance of power seem remote, despite growing Soviet military power and increased political interest in the area. However, the relations of the United States and Japan are pivotal to sustaining the current balance of power in the region, and many Americans, including some of influence, do not recognize this.

In the new, non-colonial order that the United States aimed to create in Asia after World War II, there was to be a major role for a victorious China—a China, it was hoped, beholden to the United States for its political eminence as one of the Big Five in the United Nations. Such a role for China was probably beyond its power, as Churchill tried vainly to explain to Roosevelt. However, before such a role could even be tested, something had to be done to end the split between the Nationalists and the Communists in China. Hence, in December 1945, the Marshall mission. But this commitment of one of the most distinguished Americans to the Chinese problem was accompanied by military measures that seemed to be aimed at gaining a major American position on the Asian continent. The Secretaries of War and Navy recommended in 1945 that 50,000 Marines be left in China, in spite of the admitted danger of involvement in China's civil war. In the same year the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to create a 4500-man military advisory group which, the State Department noted, would have not only an extraterritorial position—not unlike the US units stationed in China from the Boxer Rebellion until Pearl Harbor—but which might be construed as a projection of US military power onto the Asiatic continent. The Navy, while reporting that no

formal written agreement on stationing US naval vessels at China ports was known to exist, did consider it had the personal concurrence of the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, in the use of Chinese ports and waters.

In 1946 the American position in China was based on a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation that seemed to many Chinese to be one-sided, appearing to benefit only the United States. In reaction, a "Buy Chinese" movement was started in late 1946 which even had some Chinese government approval. The various threads of American policy, when taken in conjunction with Lend-Lease, surplus property grants, and proposed Export-Import Bank loans to China, suggested confirmation of the "informal empire" charge so often made against US policies in Asia. True, the entire apparatus collapsed in January 1947 when the Marshall mission was terminated as hopeless, but naval commanders maintained readiness to defend ports such as Tsingtao and Shanghai until authority to do so was lifted in 1948 and 1949 as the United States waited for the dust to settle.

In 1953 the enemy seemed plain. China had allied itself firmly, or so it seemed to American officials, with the Soviet Union. It intervened in the Korean War with serious consequences for the United States, and now seemed poised for a takeover of Southeast Asia. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs considered the United States and China to be in a state of war. The United States organized an international response to the threat of Chinese hegemony that drew on many elements of the containment policy against the USSR in Europe. Security pacts were entered into with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan. Trade and financial controls were instituted. An unrelenting effort was made to isolate China politically, not only in the United Nations, but in international organizations, even including the Red Cross and the International Philatelic Union. Behind this international effort was an exclusively American agenda aiming at the political downfall of Peking. In January 1954, the following colloquy took place between a congressional inquirer and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs: "Did I understand you to say that the heart of the present policy toward China and Formosa is that there is to be kept alive the constant threat of military action vis-à-vis Red China in the hope that at some point there will be an internal breakdown?"

"Yes, sir. That is my conception."

Mr. Jerome K. Holloway served as a Naval Reserve officer in World War II on board ships engaged at Normandy, Okinawa, and the occupation of Japan. He entered the Foreign Service in 1947 and served abroad in Rangoon, Shanghai, Bremen, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Fukuoka, and Osaka-Kobe. In the State Department he was chief of intelligence and research for India, Ceylon, and Nepal; member of the Berlin Task Force; special assistant for European Affairs; and director of regional affairs for East Asia. Since 1975 he has been a lecturer at the Naval War College.

This threat was primarily naval and air, although it included raids on the mainland from Formosa, raids into Tibet, and the use of two Nationalist Chinese divisions in Burma for attack into Yunnan. Secretary of State Dulles was even more determined. He told the US NATO commander that there should be "a three-pronged attack on the Chinese mainland: through Korea, through Chekiang from Taiwan, and through Hainan Island on the south." The possibilities of such a war became real in the Formosa Straits, to the extent that in 1955 a Republican President had to ask a Democratic Senator to assure the Senate that war, if it came, would be declared by the government of the United States and not the President of China (Formosa) or some line officer off the China coast. This immense US effort to prevent Chinese hegemony petered out in the early 1960s when the Sino-Soviet split became apparent to American allies, if not to American officials.

The American commitment in Vietnam need not be rehashed here in great detail, but it is certainly relevant to recall that behind most of the explanations offered to the American public for the Vietnam involvement was the threat, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed it, of a billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons. Liberals such as Vice President Humphrey, Senator Mike Mansfield, and Professor Arthur Schlesinger all based the case for American intervention in Vietnam on the need to prevent Chinese expansion. It is ironic to contemplate the situation today on China's border with Vietnam. But it is important to note that all three post-World War II Pacific policies depended upon US ability to influence events on the Asian continent through an American military presence there. Much sport has been made of the Chairman of the JCS who, when asked what the United States would do if it won in Vietnam, replied, "The US would have to keep major forces there for several decades." The officer was just stating, albeit somewhat baldly, what was in essence the aim for American intervention in Indochina, a point d'appui on the Asian mainland for possible use against China.

It was not to be. The mocking chord was that the final chopper to leave Saigon ended a policy that had been doomed over seven years before by the US Presidential election of 1968. In what proved to be a seminal article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1967, Richard Nixon, the heir to John Foster Dulles' Sinophobic policies, called for a reassessment of American positions in the Far East.¹ His presidential campaign featured a "secret" plan to end the Vietnam War. And, in a stopover at Guam in July 1969, Mr. Nixon put forth a conception of American policy in the western Pacific that would eschew any foothold on the mainland. The concept became known as the Nixon Doctrine. It was opposed by the President's National Security Advisor as well as large elements of the foreign policy and defense establishments, all still groping unsuccessfully with the twin problems of avoiding defeat in Vietnam while making withdrawal look like victory. Failure was to attend these.

largely because they were subsumed by the President's successful ending of the two-decade American confrontation with the People's Republic of China. Yet, even after the Carter Administration completed Mr. Nixon's breakthrough, problems remained.

Taiwan remains separated from China. Korea is divided. The Vietnamese have shown a sharp appetite in Kampuchea and Laos. New Zealand and the United States have engaged in a mutually hobbling exercise over disclosure of nuclear weapons in US naval vessels calling at the former's ports. Unrest in the Philippines is serious. The Soviet Union has increased its military presence in East Asia and is trying to increase its political weight there. But in light of the predictions of disaster that followed the demise of the Saigon government in 1975, the present regional balance of power does not damage US interests.

What could damage those interests is a change in Japan's role. In an illuminating book jointly prepared by American and Japanese contributors in 1975, this statement appeared: "The only remotely plausible change in the current alignment of nations that would threaten the security of the United States is for Japan to become hostile."² The same statement would fit the 1980s and will probably fit the 1990s. Now, no one expects Japan to become hostile, but, substitute the words "indifferent," "neutral," "non-aligned," or "aloof," and the relationship is changed ominously.

What factors might change the Japanese-American relationship? First would be an attempt to revise the formal treaty status to expand the scope of Japanese military obligations in East Asia and to relate these to contingencies in the Middle East or Europe. No Japanese government or political party can risk "opening up" the present arrangements with the United States. The result would be not greater Japanese participation and responsibility: it would be a call from both intellectuals and the public for a decrease in Japan's security obligations. One may decry this, and most American politicians would, but the history of negotiations over the US-Japanese security relationship suggests that American attempts to get precise, legal language on Japanese commitments usually fail. To get an expansion of those commitments both in concept and language that will make the bureaucrats and the military comfortable is self-defeating. This is not an exercise in Oriental pop-psychology, as many attempt to portray it. It is not that the Japanese prefer a vague, all-things-to-all-men formulation; it is a fact of political life. To attempt to change the present treaty arrangements is to risk the good in hopeless pursuit of the better or best.

The second danger is clearly trade and finance. One would think that enough has been written on this, and that there is sufficient objective evidence that the average man can see for himself (Japanese cars, cameras, and appliances work better and are cheaper than their American-made

competition) to obviate ritualistic recounting of brutal truth about the decline of the American smokestack belt. But here we are in a world where emotions must be counted. No American policymaker can explain to the unemployed steelworker with a family that he is a victim of the international division of labor or even of the corporate blindness of his own business and labor leadership. His woes are a fact of life, as politically potent as Japanese distaste with commitments that could risk war. Hence, to try to suggest, as the US defense establishment must, that a trade war with Japan would endanger higher political and military interests is a difficult effort. But the effort must be made. The present American administration has done very well thus far in resisting the primitives, but in the run-up to the 1988 election it must be better prepared to explain that the US trade deficit is probably amenable to treatment only by wise domestic economic policies. Japanese sensitivity to the problem would help, but realism rules out much hope for that.

The average Japanese is an austere consumer; the Liberal Democratic Party cannot reduce substantially the agriculture subsidies that ensure the party's majority in the Diet; the Japanese bureaucracy changes no more quickly than other bureaucracies, and its ties to special interests in the business and political worlds bind it much the way many American regulatory agencies are bound; the labyrinth-like Japanese distribution system will change very slowly; and American manufacturers will still have difficulty getting their minds and efforts away from sole concentration on the huge, rich, and integrated market that is the US domestic economy. Japan has its bill of grievances against US policies, including a 1973 US embargo on the export of soybeans to Japan that was seen in Tokyo as analogous to the July 1941 US embargo.

Given the structure of US decisionmaking on trade and investment with Japan, the Pentagon's *locus standi* is weak, but the case of security considerations must be pressed.

The third lever that might move Japan is related to the first—defense expenditures. Again, the present administration, after a few false starts in 1981, has realized that the "free ride" label, like protectionism, fits headlines and stump speeches better than it fits policy and strategy. But such restraint has not crossed the Potomac. In the Pentagon we find flag officers planning ways to bring on Japanese involvement with strike group operations in the western Pacific and joint participation in carrier strike forces. Other planners devise force capabilities that Japan should purchase to meet an allegedly iron-bound commitment to 1000 miles of merchant ship protection. Meanwhile, on the wilder edges of planning, there is touted the idea that Japanese neutrality in a NATO/Warsaw Pact war could be ended by a unilateral US strike against the USSR from Misawa.

No one argues that Japan should not be able to defend itself to the extent of making a would-be aggressor at least calculate his probable losses.

But continuing attempts to co-opt a greatly augmented Japanese force into American operational plans risk alienation of the Japanese public and Japan's neighbors. Arguments that the Seventh Fleet is doing Japan's job in the Indian Ocean break down on the assumption that Japan sees a job that needs doing; it doesn't. One might also turn the problem around and ask what the United States would do differently if there were no Japanese armed forces at all.

Fourth, there is a remote danger that the United States might eventually seek a special relationship with the People's Republic of China as a substitute for the Japanese one. This is basically a variation on the 1945, 1953, and 1964 quasi-hegemonic concept. The truth of the Nixon coup is that the United States was relieved of a heavy strategic burden, the burden of a two-and-a-half-war scenario. No actual accrual of strategic strength to the American side took place. In the same fashion, China regained a great deal of strategic flexibility, but it did not gain any great strength. The low priority given the defense establishment in China's Four Modernizations underlines the limitations to US-Chinese strategic cooperation. We learned, albeit at great cost, that we are ill-served by a friendly China and an unfriendly Japan, but that we can find bearable a hostile China and a friendly Japan. If both were hostile (a 21st-century scenario) there would be little point in US participation in the Asian balance of power, except, of course, as a partner of the Soviets, a dubious prospect.

Now none of this means that we should not pursue actively with Japan the enhancement of American political, economic and strategic objectives. But we should consider the extent to which we want to pursue the four courses warned of above. Japan's role now is comfortable to Japan; it is reasonably comfortable to the other noncommunist nations of East Asia. Perhaps we should accommodate ourselves to the present arrangements, however irksome they may seem to some elements of our government and society. A cold-eyed look at the Soviet menace to the balance of power in East Asia would help. The USSR has military power; but the Soviets have no political or economic power in the area, they have unresolved territorial problems with both China and Japan, and it would be a rare Asian who would find any attraction in Soviet society. True, if the balance of power in East Asia were to begin to turn against US interests, there would be opportunities for the Soviets. But the argument here is that this balance is now at risk only if the United States mishandles its relations with Japan.

NOTES

1. Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Viet Nam," *Foreign Affairs*, 46 (October 1967), 112-25.
2. Morton H. Halperin, "U.S.-Japanese Security Relations," in *United States-Japanese Relations, the 1970s*, ed. Priscilla Clapp and Morton H. Halperin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974), p. 203.

The Army and the Great Depression

THOMAS W. COLLIER

The Great Depression shook Americans and their institutions in many ways, and shook them hard. The US Army saw itself as one of the worst shaken and as crippled in its efforts to modernize. In Caroline Bird's excellent account of the Depression, *The Invisible Scar*, she writes that the Army was cut back so far that "until 1935 we did not have enough modern rifles to arm a single regiment."¹ And yet within ten years the Army would fight and win its greatest battles. How could that be? What exactly were the effects of the Depression on the Army? What else was happening in the Army of the 1930s? A look at the Army during the interwar period and a glance at the Depression's effects on other armies may give us some answers.

The most striking fact that emerges is that the Army entered the decade of the 1930s in such terrible shape that the effects of the Depression on it do not look so critical.² The Army of 1931 was already understrength and underfunded, outdated in its doctrine and equipment, stagnant in promotions, untrained at division and higher levels, and largely without purpose, hope, or new ideas. As a peace-loving nation, America had thought hardly at all about military affairs since 1919. This was due in part to genuine revulsion against the experience of the World War, but it was far more a simple lack of interest by the public, the Congress, and the President in anything as remote as war. When Americans sought "normalcy," they defined it in part as having to pay little attention and less money to the Army. That had been the norm since the founding of the Republic. By 1922, the Army had dropped from over three million men to its prewar strength of 133,000, and it hovered around that strength until 1935, ranking roughly 17th in size among the world's armies. But that was less important than the aging of its materiel and doctrine, both of which were 1918 models.³ Even the Army Air Corps, which was the one arm that energetically developed new equipment and ideas, was using them to solve the problems of 1918. Outside of the Air Corps, Army

research and development slowed, and procurement was even slower; some of the few new items that were developed, such as the 37mm antitank gun, were obsolete by the time they were procured. Planning also had become anachronistic. In 1933, General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the Army, estimated that the Army could mobilize for war in four to six months.⁴ This was not only an overly optimistic simplification of the problems of mobilizing an outdated Army, but it actually hurt the Army. A typical "can do" response of poor-but-proud Regulars, it was of course taken by civilians as proof that the Army was ready to defend the nation. What possible threat to America could develop within six months? What need was there to spend more? The Army was thus stuck. If it had starved in the prosperous 1920s, what hope did it have to fatten in the Depression?

In personnel strength, the Army had entered the first World War with an authorized strength of 186,000, but typically it had in early 1917 money enough for only 133,000.⁵ After the war, Congress and the Army agreed on a strength of 280,000, writing that number into the National Defense Act of 1920. This strength remained on the books throughout the interwar years, but as early as 1922 it had become a pious hope rather than a planning figure. Congress consistently refused to appropriate money for more than half that strength. Twenty years were to pass and Poland and France were to fall to a new kind of warfare before the 1920 goal was reached. The Depression itself merely reinforced the shortages in personnel strength and appropriations.

And yet, because of the conservative thinking of the Chiefs of Staff, including General MacArthur, the low personnel strength disproportionately slowed research, development, and procurement. The Chiefs were still thinking of combat power as manpower, and of a mass infantry army as the key to victory. Echoing the best military thinking of earlier times, MacArthur insisted in the 1930s that personnel be cut no more and instead be built up to a minimum of 165,000. He took money from materiel to fund this buildup, and so passed the most severe economies of the Depression on to the modernization of weapons and equipment. MacArthur cut to new lows the funds for the Ordnance Corps, which researched and developed almost all equipment except trucks and airplanes, and he practically stopped procurement. He disbanded the relatively expensive experimental armored force at Fort Meade, the Army's one serious effort to develop a new doctrine and organization for ground warfare, and he refused Air Corps requests for the establishment of a unified combat force composed of the fighting units of the air

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W. Collier, USA Ret., is a graduate of the US Military Academy (Class of 1952), and a doctoral candidate in history at the University of Michigan. He has taught military history at the Military Academy, and he coauthored with John W. Shy the article "Revolutionary Warfare" in *Makers of Modern Strategy* (1986).

arm under a "General Headquarters Air Force." As soon as Congress appropriated the money in 1935 for the additional men that he wanted, however, MacArthur almost doubled the Ordnance Corps' research and development funds, bought a thousand trucks, tripled aircraft procurement, and implemented the GHQ Air Force.⁶ The point is that it was policy, not poverty, that had killed modernization. Had MacArthur and the other Chiefs wanted a modern rather than a mass army, they could have done much to develop one. They allocated to the Ordnance Corps less than 3.5 percent of the Army budget from 1922 to 1935. After 1935, they slowly upped Ordnance's share until 1939, when it suddenly jumped to almost 25 percent. The modernization debt had come due.

The story of the Ordnance Corps is worth a closer look, since its responsibilities for materiel modernization were so broad. While always short of money, the Corps also had other equally serious recurring problems. After the World War, the Army made no systematic study of the requirements for a modern force until the Protective Mobilization Plan of 1937. With little guidance on priorities, the Ordnance Corps was required to satisfy all of its customers, the arms and services of the Army; and so it did a little research and development for each one. It spread its scanty funds over 224 separate projects, ranging from medium tanks to rifles.

One of the better-organized customers of the Ordnance Corps was the Field Artillery, which had convened the Westervelt Board in 1919 to set priorities for a comprehensive artillery motorization and modernization program. Even in that forward-looking arm, however, officers were still arguing in 1938 about trucks versus horses, and only half of the artillery battalions had been motorized. The development of the 105mm howitzer was probably the key artillery/ordnance problem of that era. The Westervelt Board had recommended in 1919 that the heavier and more lethal 105mm howitzer replace the famous French 75mm gun as the standard light artillery piece. The Ordnance Corps responded by developing an excellent howitzer in six years, but it was not finally standardized for production until 1934. By then there were no procurement funds available, and in any case the Field Artillery asked the Ordnance Corps to redesign the howitzer carriage for high-speed towing by trucks. Ordnance did this, and the howitzer finally went into limited production in 1939, twenty years after the original decision. In those years, the Field Artillery had used a considerable part of its Ordnance development funds to modify the French 75s for high-speed towing. Ordnance completed that modification just in time for the new 105s to replace the now-motorized 75s.⁷ Clearly not all of the Ordnance Corps' problems were fiscal.

The botched development of the medium tank, the antitank gun, and even the M1 rifle make the howitzer episode seem like a success story. Organizational confusion was compounded by poor use of technical intelligence

on foreign developments and even more by the Army's "can do" spirit. Ordnance officers testifying before Congress regularly asserted that American equipment was the best, while the annual reports of the Chiefs of Ordnance and the Secretaries of War proudly dwelled on what had been done rather than what was still to do.⁸ Historians now characterize the 1930s as a period of low combat readiness in the Army, but Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley reported in 1930 that the Army was "more efficient today than at any time since the World War." He noted the arrival of the Depression the next year, but wrote that the Army was making "steady and healthy progress" toward fulfilling the goals of the National Defense Act of 1920—which it had been working on for 11 years and would not reach for nine more.⁹

Another characteristic of the entire interwar period, in addition to the Army's budgetary limitations and modernization problems, was the obvious neglect of and even contempt for the Army by the American society at large. Anton Myrer's carefully researched novel, *Once an Eagle*, brings to life the damaging effect this had on the morale of officers and men. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, whose morale was surely less damaged than most, wrote that the Army in 1940


... mirrored the attitudes of the American people. . . . The mass of the officers and men lacked any sense of urgency. Athletics, recreation, and entertainment took precedence in most units over serious training. Some of the officers in the long years of peace had worn themselves deep ruts of professional routine with which they were sheltered from vexing new ideas and troublesome problems. Others, bogged down in one grade for many years because seniority was the only basis for promotion, had abandoned all hope of progress. . . . Equipment of all sorts was lacking and much of that in use had originally been produced for the National Army of World War I. . . . The greatest obstacle was psychological—complacency still existed!¹⁰

There were bright spots in the gloom, and the Army Air Corps was one of them. Determined to follow the lead of Britain's Royal Air Force and get out from under the Army, such excellent leaders as General Henry H. Arnold were buoyed by their sense of mission and transmitted their élan to the rank and file. Always on its mettle, the Air Corps coaxed from the grudging Army just enough money to survive but never enough to compromise its crusading spirit. In spite of the air mail fiasco of 1934 (the Air Corps was forced to fly the nation's air mail for four months, with dismal results¹¹), General Arnold later wrote that by 1935 the Air Corps was ready for the future: "We had the airplanes, accessories, installations, the gadgets, the techniques, and the know-how to provide Air Power for the United States."¹² The Air Corps had weathered the worst of times and emerged with a cadre of energetic leaders, a new doctrine for strategic bombardment, and a handful of new aircraft developed specifically to embody that doctrine.¹³ Arnold and

the Air Corps were ready when, as he later said, "I was given \$1,500,000,000 and told to get an air force."¹⁴

The New Deal was another bright spot for the Army, although the brightness was initially dimmed by reduced appropriations and a 15-percent pay cut. Even at reduced pay, military employment was preferable to no employment, and consequently the number of officer resignations and that of enlisted desertions were both very low throughout the Depression. Meanwhile, the modernizing effects of the Public Works Administration projects proved important to the Army. In addition to building new barracks and family housing, the PWA funded the Army's purchase of trucks, which were sorely needed. Truck purchases had dropped from inadequate in the early 1930s to zero in 1933, but in each of the next two years the PWA gave the Army \$20 million to buy trucks. By 1935, the Chief of Staff boasted that motors had replaced horses except for "certain minor functions."¹⁵ This was not quite true, and it infuriated the cavalry; but the fact was that the PWA had at last gotten the Army rolling.

Many Army officers were less enthused about another New Deal agency, the Civilian Conservation Corps. It seemed to them a mass of civilians in hopeless confusion, and a distracting burden. The Chief of Staff, General MacArthur, fully accepted the mission, however, and the General Staff immediately started planning to process the recruits and send them off to camps to work for the Departments of Agriculture and Interior. Within ten days, it became clear that there were no camps, no organization, and no chance that Agriculture and Interior could create either. The Army suddenly



Horse-drawn 75mm howitzers of the 82d Field Artillery Battalion. Shown during Third Army maneuvers in Texas-Louisiana, May 1940.

received, by default, the entire responsibility for the CCC, except for recruiting and the technical supervision of forestry projects.¹⁶ The near panic that followed turned out to be an excellent rehearsal for the mobilization that would come in a few years. In the shorter run the CCC gave paying jobs to about 5000 Army Reserve officers, and even some Regulars became enthused. Colonel George C. Marshall called it "the best antidote for mental stagnation" and enjoyed working with the young men, whom he believed were the essential raw material for any future mobilization.¹⁷

Other bright spots in the Depression gloom were the Army's General Staff system and the network of professional schools for officers. Between them, they kept up the planning for military and industrial mobilization and trained the small officer corps in the staff and command duties of an expanded wartime army. Their failure was a failure of vision and imagination: from the top down, their thinking proceeded in terms of mobilizing, training, and fighting a mass infantry army in position warfare. Within these terms they worked out the details carefully and competently, but they too rarely looked up from the work at hand to question the terms. Not until the mass infantry army of Poland was shattered by blitzkrieg did they acknowledge that they were working under the wrong assumptions.

It was specifically the German army's development of blitzkrieg—the new doctrine, organization, and materiel built around the mobility provided by the internal combustion engine—that makes the US Army of the Depression look so bad. Surely the "stab in the back"—real or imagined—of 1918, the Versailles Treaty restrictions, and the chaos of postwar Germany might have induced the German military to stagnate. As the US Army would discover after its loss in Vietnam, there is no automatic "spur of defeat," nor was the building of a new model army an easy or obvious path for the Germans.¹⁸ And yet when Adolf Hitler reintroduced conscription in 1935, the new *Wehrmacht* immediately formed three panzer divisions. Similarly, the supposedly hidebound British army formed an armored division in 1937, while the infantry-oriented French army had created two mechanized divisions and built over 2000 tanks by 1939. The US Army took an additional year to form two armored divisions, and a year and a half more to equip them for combat.

Martin Blumenson writes in *The Patton Papers*, "An isolationist Congress, niggardly with funds, had deprived the Army of the means with which to develop large numbers of tanks, support artillery, trucks, close-support planes, and other new weapons and pieces of equipment, together with the units to use them."¹⁹ That of course is true in part, and is the standard explanation of the often bitter Regular survivors of the Depression years. And yet each of the specific items that Blumenson lists was not developed for other reasons besides funding, reasons internal to the Army and under Army control. Other armies, also beggared by the Depression, overcame some of

the same problems and made more progress toward modernization. Blumen-son better describes the American Army when he writes that it had become too negative, too narrow, too poor "in funds and in spirit."²⁰

The Army's poverty during the Great Depression was insufficiently different from what came before and from what befell other armies to account for its failure to modernize. The Army's imagination and morale were inadequate and its priorities were misdirected, and so it failed until well after the Depression to create the basis for the Army of World War II. Solid mobilization planning, a competent Regular cadre, and the customary American blessings of time, space, and allies allowed the Army to recover and to field modern, powerful ground and air forces that won great victories. For its earlier lack of vision, however, a lack of funds is no excuse.

NOTES

1. Caroline Bird, *The Invisible Scar* (New York: McKay, 1966), p. 301. This was important, but not in the way that it seems. The rifle had been replaced by the machine gun as the dominant weapon of the infantry during the World War. The US Army's continued concern over rifles and its delay in producing them were both symptomatic of its interwar problems.
2. The Depression years for the Army were fiscal years 1931 to 1939. Fiscal years 1932 to 1935 were the worst.
3. Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington: GPO, 1950), pp. 4, 15, and 24.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
5. Theodore Ropp, *War in the Modern World*, rev. ed. (New York: Collier, 1962), pp. 259, 309-13.
6. D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), I, 448-61. See also Constance McLaughlin Green, et al., *The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War* (Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 41; Irving B. Holley, Jr., *Buying Aircraft: Procurement for the Army Air Forces* (Washington: GPO, 1964), p. 21; and War Department, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1935* (Washington: GPO, 1936). (Hereinafter, these annual reports will be cited as *Annual Report*, followed by the year.)
7. Green, pp. 169ff, 186ff.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 204ff.
9. Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: MacMillan, 1967), p. 402; and Watson, p. 24. See also *Annual Report*, 1930, 1931.
10. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York: Doubleday, 1952), pp. 7-9.
11. During the period 9 February to 1 June 1934, when government contracts with commercial airlines were suspended, the US Army Air Corps was given responsibility for flying the mail. Serious problems with organization, infrastructure, equipment, weather forecasting, and pilot training and experience became immediately apparent. Several aircraft accidents and pilot fatalities occurred while the corps struggled to shoulder this massive burden. See Maurer Maurer, *Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-1939* (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1987), chap. 17.
12. Henry H. Arnold, *Global Mission* (New York: Harper, 1949), pp. 113ff.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
14. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), VI, 13.
15. *Annual Report*, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937.
16. *Annual Report*, 1933, 1934.
17. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939* (New York: Viking, 1963), I, 311.
18. Ropp, pp. 294-302. See also Robert J. O'Neil, "Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1919-1939," in *The Theory and Practice of War*, ed. Michael Howard (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1965), pp. 143-65.
19. Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers, 1885-1940* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 949.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 856.

View From The Fourth Estate

Behind the Arms Scandal

EDWARD LUTTWAK

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Before the consultant witch-hunt goes much further, we might pause to wonder why "waste, fraud and abuse" scandals persist year after year, in spite of the regiments of auditors, bookkeepers, and investigators added to the payroll since 1981, the dozens of laws and hundreds of regulations enacted since then, and a whole series of "procurement reforms."

Two explanations are possible: Either Pentagon officials, defense-industry executives, and the consultant tribe are naturally inclined to dishonesty. Or else there is something fundamentally wrong with the system—a defect so basic that it has remained quite untouched by all the varied reforms of the last two decades.

A comparison with the (pre-Gorbachev) Soviet economy is instructive. Alongside thieves, murderers, and rapists, one would find in Soviet jails those guilty of "economic crimes": the man who repaired cars in his spare time, the farmer who sold cucumbers from his garden, the taxi driver who worked extra hours to pick up extra fares. An economic system built on the false pretense that it provided all these necessary goods and services punished those who recognized reality and sought to fill the gaps.

Exactly in the same manner, our defense purchasing system is built on a false pretense: that military products are commodities—identical, precisely defined goods traded in open markets. A few important Pentagon purchases really are commodities—chiefly gasoline, diesel and jet fuel—and they can in fact be bought like commodities: by arm's length, open-market purchasing. Some other items—boots and blankets, uniforms and stationery, are too varied to be actual commodities, but they too resemble the idealized "goods" traded in the idealized markets of economic textbooks, simply because they can be described very precisely. Hence these items, too, should only be purchased in the free-market way, by public tenders and competitive bidding.

But most of the \$80 billion of Pentagon "procurement" and almost all the \$36 billion spent on research and development buys neither commodities nor textbook

"goods"—but aircraft, missiles, warships, armored vehicles, and military electronics of all kinds. None of those things are standard items traded everyday on open markets, and none of them can actually be described precisely in a request for competitive bids.

But under the false pretense on which the entire system is based, thousands of laws and regulations compel defense officials to act as if weapons and weapon projects were just like soy beans, boots, and blankets. The result hovers between absurdity and crime.

The problems begin with the very statement of what is wanted.

Instead of "600 tons, fuel oil No. 2," or at least a 20-page tender document for boots and blankets that an industry cost-accountant can read down to the last cent, Pentagon contracts for major weapons run to millions of pages. But that mass of detail hardly defines the product, because so many weapons include untried exotic materials, designs never attempted before, and unproven engineering methods. And during the 10 or 15 years that will pass between the start of research work and the beginning of production, thousands of changes in the specifications will be required.

Some of those "change orders" are caused by the tendency of technology-fixated military bureaucracies to add what are called "bells and whistles" in the trade, nice-to-have extras that are often technically exciting and which may or may not be tactically significant in combat. Other change orders, by contrast, are the beneficial results of the same emphasis on technology that is the hallmark of our military establishment.

Either way, those changes make nonsense of the original cost estimates on which the winning bid was supposedly based—estimates that were little more than guesses in the first place. Thus the Pentagon officials who first comply with the letter of the law by issuing mountainous contracts written out by hordes of clerks in spurious detail, must next pretend to take seriously the bids that come in—just as if actual prices could be quoted, as with fuel oil No. 2 at so many cents per gallon.

The procurement process comes down to a simple choice: New weapons can either be bought on a "cost-plus" basis, with the so-called price being in reality as open-ended as the uncertain costs of meeting current and future requirements, or on a "fixed-price" basis, in which case either the taxpayer or the developer must be the loser in what amounts to a reckless gamble.

In a futile quest for administrative solutions to what is in fact a systemic problem, successive administrations have shifted from one formula to the other over the years. When "cost plus" is in fashion, the eventual outcome is a sequence of horrifying cost overruns, because there is absolutely no incentive to control costs—neither for the purchasing service which can add all the frills it desires, nor for the producer, whose "plus" actually increases as costs go up.

Cost overruns, in turn, inevitably bring "fixed price" back into fashion, and the eventual outcome is a sequence of imminent bankruptcies, which lead either to quietly "renegotiated" payments that make nonsense of the initial solemn pricing procedure or to clamorous last-minute interventions à la Lockheed. Sometimes of course the contractor's gamble pays off—not all new materials and techniques turn out to be more costly than first expected—and then nothing much is said as the taxpayers' money silently flows into corporate coffers.

We come now to the system's most damaging pretense: that defense and aerospace amount to "industries" in the textbook sense, consisting of a great many companies, each a mere tree in the industrial forest. That false premise is basic, for it is only when there are many producers that the concept of arm's-length dealing between buyer and sellers is possible and desirable.

When I go shopping for shoes, I can select them on the basis of price and quality. I need not buy more shoes than I want simply to keep shoe-production lines open. Nor do I have to ensure that this or that shoe manufacturer has enough profit to pay for the design of new shoes. Above all, I have no reason to pay more for my shoes to ensure that there is spare capacity in the industry, to meet a sudden need I may have for a hundred pairs of shoes instead of just one. Yet those are all key concerns for defense purchasing.

The companies that develop and produce each type of weapon are like craftsmen—in their individual expertise and the small scale of their production. Only three aviation contractors would even try to bid on a strategic bomber: Boeing, Northrop, and Rockwell. Only five have the in-house expertise to attempt a fighter project: General Dynamics, Grumman, LTV, McDonnell Douglas, and Northrop again. And so it goes: There are just three companies with torpedo expertise, another three for air-to-air missiles, just two shipyards capable of producing nuclear submarines. The fate of these individual companies cannot therefore be a matter of indifference—yet that is the very basis of the free-market pretense on which the system is built.

In theory, all new aircraft projects could be awarded to just one aviation contractor, if it happens to offer the best bid each time. But that would mean putting all other aviation prime contractors out of business.

To avoid that, defense officials and service officials alike are forced to circumvent the very system they are supposed to enforce—whose ideal result (quality at lowest cost) could yield a disastrous outcome. For example, in buying the jet engine for the F15 and F16 fighters, the Air Force is supposed to choose the lowest bid when General Electric and Pratt & Whitney compete for each year's purchase. But to do that would leave only one company in production. So even the loser is awarded some part of the buy, just enough to keep his production-line open. The same type of circumvention by devoted officials is needed to ensure the profitability that pays for company research, and for the upkeep of a surge capacity for mobilization.

Pentagon officials, in these cases, have to maneuver around laws and regulations to be able to serve the national interest. And with that, we arrive at the Pentagon version of Soviet "economic crimes"—conduct that may be eminently constructive in itself but which nevertheless violates the rules of a wrong-headed system.

Whatever the facts may be in the latest procurement scandal, the normal work of consultants is a rational and essential part of the irrational Pentagon system. In essence, the consultants fill a communications gap. The armies of lawyers that negotiate contracts for the Pentagon and industry cannot serve as channels of communication on the technical substance of the purchase; and as we have seen, contractual documents are full of ambiguities and in any case are quickly overtaken by change orders. So how are buyer and seller to communicate on the myriad of technical, tactical, and production issues that constantly come up for decision?

In theory, this is the job of the "project manager," who is usually a military officer appointed by the service purchasing the weapon. In some cases that works as advertised—when, that is, the officer in question is actually competent in high-tech management. But in the vast majority of cases, the "project manager" cannot actually manage the flow of questions and answers.

That is why consultants can perform a most useful function. Whether they are retired military officers of the relevant branch, or technical experts, or civilian analysts, they can keep up a constant dialogue between the contractors' engineers and the many different offices that have a say in the acquisition of the weapon.

My own past work as a consultant before resuming full-time academic employment was in the long-range analysis of military problems, but I did witness other consultants at work. I have no doubt that many other consultants are no more than salesmen and lobbyists, perhaps ignorant or uncaring about the technical-tactical interplay that is the key to the successful development of advanced weapons; others could be outright dishonest, using their visitations to government offices for nefarious purposes.

One thing is certain. So long as the present system built on free-market pretenses endures, consultants will be necessary to overcome the contractual barriers between user and producer—just as hordes of lawyers will continue to write those very contracts, the bookkeepers and auditors will prepare and check often-meaningless cost estimates, and the investigators will seek out inevitable abuses.

If Congress can take time off from drafting yet more constricting laws and the Pentagon can get off the treadmill of futile paper reforms, perhaps both can consider a *real* reform: replacing our pretend free-market system with a professionalized "cooperative" structure—of the sort found in France, Italy, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, and Japan. In those countries, lawyers are hardly necessary because contracts are usually brief and kept very general, with most dealings conducted on a goodwill basis. Court cases between contractors and defense establishments are rare. Cost-accountants survive, but only to add up costs after the work is done.

Finally, there are no hapless "project managers," nor political appointees to play at weapon design, nor congressmen with their own ideas about what radar is best for what frigate. Instead, engineers are trained for a lifetime career as weapon buyers in each specific category. The purchase of destroyers, for example, is conducted in a running dialogue between the navy's chief officer of destroyers, the ministry's destroyer expert, and the executives of the shipyard that has the job. They do the work with perhaps one percent of the paperwork involved in a US destroyer purchase, a fraction of the bookkeeping and clerical staff, no independent consultants in between—and no need of naval investigators to uncover economic crimes.

—Edward Luttwak holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair of Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and is a consultant to the Defense and State Departments.

Commentary & Reply

THE COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR PROGRAM: A COLLOQUY

To the Editor:

In the June 1988 issue of *Parameters*, there appeared a provocative article by Brigadier General John Bahnsen, USA Retired, and Colonel James Bradin, USA Retired ("The Army's Command Sergeant Major Problem"), which was highly critical of the Army's Command Sergeants Major. Such articles perform a service in that they challenge us to read critically and to articulate our own thoughts about the subject at hand. Unfortunately, to the uninitiated you could get the impression that the authors are describing the Army of today instead of the Army as it existed when they were on active duty at brigade level.

The main theme of the article is that today's CSMs—especially those above brigade level—contribute very little to the Army. A thoroughly disturbing composite picture is presented: CSMs have supposedly lost that fine edge of concern about the personal and professional needs of soldiers. Their main focus is purportedly on "the three Ps—Perks, Privileges, and Politics." They have become tyrannical mini-field-m Marshals who intimidate subordinate commanders and their noncommissioned officers by making impromptu visits, by conducting formal inspections, and by projecting an aggressive, overbearing demeanor. To a large extent, this dysfunctional behavior is attributed to the failure of the Army to define the exact duties and responsibilities of CSMs. Woven throughout the article is the suggestion that truly deserving NCOs rarely become CSMs. Real warriors are apparently weeded out because of such trivial flaws as being overweight or undereducated.

Quite candidly, I find this image of CSMs to be disturbingly unrepresentative and misleading. There was a time in the 1970s and early 1980s when the problems featured in this article would have been more applicable than they are today. This was a period of difficult readjustment as the Army struggled to come to terms with a host of post-Vietnam issues and problems, only one of which was envisioning the proper role of the CSM. Today, however, we have a much clearer picture of what a CSM should do and how he should relate to officers and NCOs in subordinate units. Commanders at all levels much more wisely employ their CSMs now. I have observed a vast improvement alone during my three years of corps command. It is unfortunate that the authors did not serve on active duty more recently. They would undoubtedly have observed trends quite different from those portrayed in their article. I won't comment on their concern with CSM parking spaces, etc. There aren't that many perks for a hardworking CSM, only for one who has little to do.

Beyond this, the article begs several questions which lie squarely in the mainstream of leadership: What kind of commander at any level would fail to provide his CSM with a clear charter of action? What kind of commander would allow his CSM to adopt a perk-crazed approach to soldiering? What kind of commander would allow his CSM to run roughshod over his officers and their NCOs,

or allow a CSM from a superior headquarters to run roughshod over his command? What kind of commander would stand in paralyzed fear of impromptu visits from a CSM of higher headquarters? What kind of commander would allow the NCO "chain of teaching" (mistakenly termed the NCO "chain of command" in the article) to supersede his own chain of command? Is the general leadership quality of our commanders that poor? My experience is that most commanders would not tolerate such behavior. I certainly do not tolerate one who does!

In my view, there is a legitimate role for the CSM above the brigade level. I have been well-served by my division and corps CSMs. They have made valuable contributions to the force, and they have not run amok. The key is understanding the proper role of the CSM. In this regard, we, as an Army, have made great progress on a broad front. The Sergeants Major Academy has helped immeasurably, and the tradition of good CSMs has firmly taken root in units, based on demonstrated superior performance. The trends are upward and optimistic. Seldom today do we see a marginal CSM. That was not necessarily the case in the 1970s. Even then, however, we had many superb CSMs at all levels.

In their concluding paragraph, the authors suggest that we may be turning our NCO Corps "into a legion of rarified and perfumed princes, fitter to carry a tale than a rifle or a wounded comrade." I could not disagree more! This article has all the features of grand hyperbole, the primary characteristic of which is exaggeration for effect. It's a good example of hyperbole, but unfortunately it amounts to a deceptively dated and distorted view of reality. Nonetheless, we must respect the authors for their honest concerns. Such articles force us to reflect on our experiences and to express our assessment of the situation, as best we can see it. Articles like this do a service for those in positions of responsibility in that they make each of us, as a commander, vow "I won't tolerate a rarified and perfumed prince of a CSM."

Lieutenant General Crosbie E. Saint
Commander, III Corps and Fort Hood
Fort Hood, Texas

To the Editor:

Brigadier General "Doc" Bahnsen and Colonel Jim Bradin are to be commended for their continued interest in the Army, its NCO corps, and its Command Sergeants Major. I hope their article inspires much-needed debate on the duties, responsibilities, and authority of our senior enlisted soldiers.

However, the authors appear to hold some rather common misunderstandings about the role of NCO education in general and the Sergeants Major Course in particular. Significantly, their criticism of today's senior noncommissioned officers fails to recognize the rapid advances in our Army's doctrine as well as its equipment; the measurably higher quality of today's soldier, at all ranks; the multi-dimensional roles and missions of the Army as we prepare for the future; and the resultant demands for highly qualified NCOs, as well as officers, who can meet these unprecedented challenges with skilled and credible leadership.

AirLand Battle Doctrine and the rapid tempo of modern warfare have shifted the burden of decisionmaking lower in the ranks than ever before. Squads,

crews, and teams will fight on a dispersed, decentralized battlefield. In these circumstances, young leaders must act decisively on their own initiative to carry out the commander's intent. Leaders at every level must know how to fight, how to make the right decisions in the absence of orders, and how to lead unhesitatingly.

Leader training, both in the schoolhouse and in the unit, gives us tactically and technically competent sergeants. Training success starts with doctrine. Our sergeants must learn it. That gives them the tools to understand the commander's intent and to train those individual skills that support the unit's battlefield tasks.

We are not producing sergeants to be partners in command. We are producing sergeants to be partners with their officers in training and in setting and enforcing standards. Together they plan, conduct, and assess training. The sergeant has particular responsibilities at the squad, crew, and team level where individual skills are molded into unit actions.

The training and education in the Sergeants Major Course are designed to enhance the effectiveness of sergeants who will be working with commissioned officers. Based on input from the field (surveys, interviews, etc.) our instruction does in fact help our graduates in evaluating, initiating, recommending, and implementing actions that accomplish the mission and protect the soldier. We develop specific competence in leadership, communication skills, resource management, quality of life, military studies, national security affairs, training, and operations.

The NCO Education System is a progressive leadership program which prepares the NCO at each level of responsibility to discharge his or her duties and responsibilities. Most recently, the program has been assessed to determine whether we are in fact challenging NCOs to learn their skills, and whether the product is keeping pace with the demands of today's quality Army. This reinforces the authors' correct contention that NCOs must have the technical, tactical, and leadership skills appropriate to their position.

Today's Command Sergeant Major must be prepared to train, counsel, administer to, and lead soldiers who demand knowledge and skills far exceeding those of the not-too-distant past. Warfighting, as the authors are aware more than most, entails challenges for which we must prepare our NCOs—not just in rudimentary tasks, not just in taking care of basic needs, but in totally preparing the soldier to fight and survive in a most complex environment. As we scan the spectrum of conflicts which our Army might face in the future, we come to realize that NCO leadership will be far more demanding than it was ten, fifteen, or twenty years ago. The demand is broad; therefore, the training and preparation must correspondingly cover a broad range of subject matter.

A last note of caution when assessing NCOs—or, for that matter, officers. Don't form your opinion of a large group on the basis of a few individuals. I would welcome the authors on a visit to the Sergeants Major Academy so they could see for themselves that the NCO Corps is alive, well, and in keeping with the demands of today's Army.

Colonel Richard C. Edwards
Commandant, US Army Sergeants Major Academy
Fort Bliss, Texas

To the Editor:

The article on CSMs by two distinguished, recently retired officers of the US Army, with indictments of the Command Sergeants Major Program, apparently was the result of deep personal frustrations with a couple of errant CSMs in units of their past experience. While any large group can have some rotten apples, it is the *face* and not the *space* that spoils the barrel. They know that and the readership knows that!

I personally know hundreds of Command Sergeants Major in the Total Army. I can honestly say that professional soldiering is their bag. I too know some errant CSMs, and, believe me, their peers come down on them, but their peers don't write their evaluation reports. When authorities in the chain of command encounter any officer—commissioned or noncommissioned—who is overstepping professional bounds, they should take appropriate corrective measures. They must help put that soldier on the right track—it's called mentoring.

This article focused on the Command Sergeants Major Program as opposed to focusing on those few participants whom the authors chose to chastise as representative of the entire group. Their words are destined to degrade the significant contributions made by competent CSMs on a daily basis as they discharge their responsibility to care for and lead our soldiers. Why did the authors wait until they retired to state their concern?

The Sergeants Major Academy is currently undergoing an extensive review of its Sergeants Major Course curriculum, prompted primarily by comments and encouragement from serving Sergeants Major. Currency of material, doctrine, and basic soldiering issues—including the role of the CSM—are all being considered by course developers. This progressive leadership on the part of the academy is in keeping with the traditions of the senior service schools which serve the officer corps so well. The authors may be correct in stating that "the training of officers is the responsibility of the officer corps." But what they fail to recognize (and so do many senior NCOs) is that junior officers' training is not complete until their development is complemented by NCOs at the company level. In short, NCOs should develop the junior officer corps just as did the Franks, Henrys, and Dons of whom the authors so warmly comment from their own experience. Somehow, we have forgotten that inherent responsibility.

I and thousands of my colleagues in the Total Army value greatly our relationship with our commander and the staff. We would never jeopardize the integrity of that trust with behavior such as that depicted in this most unfortunate article. Look around and you will see literally thousands of soldiers who aspire to the rank and role of the Command Sergeant Major.

The Command Sergeants Major I know are articulate spokesmen on enlisted issues in assisting the chain of command. And I don't know of any senior or junior grade officers who are intimidated by that CSM professional role. All officers that I know encourage and accept proper communication on any enlisted matter.

The Army should be proud of its Command Sergeant Major Program. I am proud to be a participant of long standing.

CSM Douglas E. Murray
Command Sergeant Major, Army Reserve
Washington, D.C.

To The Editor:

After reading General Bahnsen and Colonel Bradin's article "The Army's Command Sergeant Major Problem," I had a mind to just dismiss it, but the more I thought about it the more I felt compelled to write a response. Why compelled? Well, for many reasons. Not least is the fact that a lot of officers will read that article and, while most will see it for what it really is, some might miss what I consider to be the real issue.

Let's get right to the bottom line. We need leaders at all levels to show moral courage; if those commanders felt that the CSM was running amuck and was a distractor, why didn't they do something about it? Were they too concerned about their careers and OERs to stand up and be counted? If a commander believes a CSM is a training distractor or is undermining the morale, discipline, and welfare of his or her command, that commander has a duty to speak up and deal with the situation. According to regulations, all officers outrank all NCOs. When in charge, TAKE CHARGE!

Some staff sergeant who happens to be the CG's driver, or some SFC who works in the IG's Office, or some captain who happens to be the general's aide-de-camp, can get on an ego trip and undermine the morale and discipline of a unit if the leadership allows it to happen. To be sure, I've seen CSMs who were on ego trips and tried to wear their commander's rank, but is that justification to call for revamping the entire CSM program or changing the course of instruction at the Sergeant Majors Academy? I think not.

One does not have to be a psychoanalyst to understand that some folks will take advantage of any situation if they aren't properly controlled. The CSM Program is not broken in my opinion. I think the authors of this article are guilty of stereotyping. The solution is for the officer corps to quit judging all of us by the actions of a few egomaniacs, and have the intestinal fortitude to "take charge" and hold their subordinates' feet to the fire. If you have a CSM who wants to command, tell him or her to go to OCS or apply for a commission. Remember we all took the same oath of enlistment, including the part that states, "I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, so help me God." That oath applies to Command Sergeants Major as well as to everyone else in the military.

CSM Joshua Perry, Jr.
US Disciplinary Barracks
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

To the Editor:

In response to John C. Bahnsen and James W. Bradin's article, "The Army's Command Sergeant Major Problem," I feel we should ensure that *all* non-commissioned officers spend more time with soldiers, not just Command Sergeants Major. As an example, many noncommissioned officers filling "K" coded positions in division and higher-level materiel management centers are members of the Noncommissioned Officer Logistics Program. They are among the best

NCOs the Army can muster. Rarely are "K" positions found in battalions and even less often in companies.

With the best of intentions we have thus taken the finest NCOs away from the soldiers—maybe as a reward for good work—maybe because they are "needed" at higher-level headquarters. We must reverse the trend and make it professionally rewarding for our best NCOs to be training and leading our soldiers.

I'm afraid the sergeant major problem starts when officers pull the best NCOs to work for them at "higher."

Major Michael J. Layman
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

To the Editor:

The article "The Army's Command Sergeant Major Problem" is right on target!

During the past few years, I have observed the same type of interference by Command Sergeants Major described by the authors. I suppose the continued practice by the Army's leadership of placing these soldiers on a pedestal with all the trappings and protocol of a senior commander lulled me into believing that I was "out of sync" with the rest of the Army. Too often I have seen outstanding First Sergeants become misguided meddlers when elevated to the job of CSM of a major command. There seems to be no boundaries to their self-appointed charter—Inspector General, SJA, Comptroller, etc.

It is refreshing to read an article that clearly describes an obvious problem that many of us have kept in the closet—mainly out of deep respect and affection for the overall Noncommissioned Officer Corps. As officers, we owe much to these indispensable soldiers. Consequently, we endure the troublesome CSM who frequently seems to muck up the normal chain-of-command.

The Bahnsen-Bradin article deserves the thoughtful consideration of our leaders. There is much wisdom in the proposals offered.

Colonel Dan J. Beakey
Norfolk, Virginia

To the Editor:

The Bahnsen-Bradin piece concerning CSMs was great—if a little late. I agree with everything they said, but I would go one step farther: I would do away with the rank. If I could not do away with that rank, then I would make the CSM and SGM ranks temporary, just as we do with our First Sergeants. Once an individual left a particular SGM position, then he would revert to a Master Sergeant rank and position.

I voiced similar concerns in a letter in the June 1970 issue of *Military Review*. Oh, Bahnsen! Oh, Bradin! Where were you when I needed you?

Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, USA Ret.
Editor, *Infantry*
Fort Benning, Georgia

To the Editor:

I was glad, and at the same time troubled, to read Bahnsen and Bradin's article, "The Army's Command Sergeant Major Problem." I guess it is about time the problem came out of the closet.

Although I have not served with troops for many years, I am keenly aware of the problems the authors have described. Since my command days, I have kept in touch with this issue through friends, my former unit commanders and staff, and dozens of ex-battalion commanders who are students at the Army War College. The consensus is that there is and continues to be a problem that needs to be addressed at the senior levels of the Army. Nearly all agree that the subject is too sensitive to be discussed in the presence of senior commanders. I, too, must admit cowardice in confronting this issue head-on during my battalion and brigade days. Thus, I'm pleased to see the subject brought to the Army's attention.

In 1985 two Army War College students (Lieutenant Colonels Warren P. Giddings and Claude W. Abate), seasoned combat arms officers with 16 consecutive years of battalion-level experience between them prior to their arrival at Carlisle, wrote a superb monograph titled "What Is a Sergeant Major?" which addresses Bahnsen and Bradin's concerns. Their study included a history of sergeant major, identification of contentious issues, and recommendations. An excerpt from the abstract of Giddings and Abate's study summarizes their conclusions: "Policy guidelines, specifically as they relate to the Sergeant Major Program, are dysfunctional and need to be changed. The name Command Sergeant Major should be changed to Sergeant Major of the battalion, brigade, etc."

Although Bahnsen and Bradin can be faulted for their inflammatory rhetoric and acerbic charges, they have performed a needed service by pointing out that the emperor is only partially clothed.

It's time *Parameters* began to deal with issues about "manning the force." For years you have addressed other controversial topics in the area of strategic and operational problems, but strategic and operational issues rarely "gore our favorite ox." I'm sure your in-box will overflow with heated discussion of this personnel issue, but we should not relegate discussion of such problems to the commercial trade magazines. I hope we can continue to have a professional dialogue on this topic.

Colonel David G. Hansen
Chairman, Department of National Security and Strategy
US Army War College

To the Editor:

Bravo for Bahnsen and Bradin! In the article, "The Army's Command Sergeant Major Problem," they tackle a bear that has bugged this Army for too long. Many a junior officer can rejoice that the lid has finally been lifted on a systemic failure that never lived up to its promise - and lifted in such a way that the essential character and indispensability of the noncommissioned officer is left uncompromised and unsullied.

Colonel Don Seibert, USA Ret., one of my earliest heroes, a veteran of three wars, and a man once described by General Westmoreland as "the best

brigade commander in Vietnam," recounted to me once how nonplussed he was to receive this new animal called a "Command Sergeant Major." Neither he nor the new CSM had the foggiest idea what to do with each other. I suspect we haven't advanced too far down the path of enlightenment in the intervening years.

As a second lieutenant I came to understand that august personages such as the CSM were somehow entitled to treat junior officers with indifference or even contempt. But as a captain and a company commander, I never could get used to being addressed by the installation Command Sergeant Major by my last name. The authors are right on track when they suggest that the focus of the CSM position has become power and prestige and has little to do with caring and leading. The CSMs who live up to that ethic—and they are out there—do so because they understand that, just as with commissioned officers or any other kind of leader, respect is earned, not conferred.

Officers in troop units love noncommissioned officers for the simple reason that without them life isn't worth living and nothing gets done, period. For example, we can talk all day about things that First Sergeants do that are absolutely crucial to the life of a unit.

But what do Command Sergeants Major really *do*, anyway?

Captain R. D. Hooker, Jr.
Charlottesville, Virginia

To the Editor:

My compliments to General Bahnsen and Colonel Bradin for their intellectually provocative and controversial comments. What makes this article particularly poignant to me is that I served with Command Sergeant Major "Don" in Vietnam. As a young captain commanding a troop, I could always seek him out and privately discuss matters of professional concern. I considered him one of my mentors, though I never told him that. I valued his advice and knew he would never violate a confidence. I believe I am a better officer because of him. But Don's type is a dying breed, and although I don't fully agree with the solutions proposed by the authors I do know that today's young captains rarely view the CSM as an ally, much less as a confidential advisor.

As revealed by an opinion survey among attendees of the Sergeants Major Course in March 1988, it is undeniable that there are serious conflicts between commissioned officers and NCOs in the Army today. Based upon my observations of the British regimental sergeant major system during a three-year exchange assignment with the British army, my experience on the staff of the US Army Sergeants Major Academy in 1986-87, and my investigation of the Army's NCO support channel as part of a student study project at the Army War College in 1987-88, I believe there are five principal causes for such conflict:

(1) *Formal establishment of the NCO support channel in AR 600-20.* In creating this channel, the Army may unintentionally have created a de facto second chain of command that could degrade unity of command. This possibility is strengthened by a clause in FM 22-600-20, *The Noncommissioned Officer Guide*, which declares that the NCO support channel "is used for issuing orders."

(2) *The Army's failure to define the basic duties of a Command Sergeant Major in a formal job description.* A power vacuum will always be filled—one way or

the other. The failure of the Army to define the duties of Command Sergeants Major is an open invitation for abuse by aggressive, misguided individuals, and places an unfair burden on well-meaning CSMs to contrive or negotiate their own role.

(3) *The Army's policy of permanent appointment to the rank of Command Sergeant Major.* The CSM now has career tenure, and this is a critical mistake. The average or below-average-performing CSM has no incentive to improve his performance because he cannot be reassigned to a non-CSM slot. To make room for this huge tenured group, CSM-designated billets have been greatly expanded above corps. CSM-designated billets should be restricted to those at tactical levels with a *bona fide* need. Then, like officers who give up the green tabs of command when they move to a staff position, Sergeants Major should give up the wreath when they are transferred out of the coveted and select CSM-designated positions. The policy we have now is hurting the Army.

(4) *The failure of the Sergeants Major Academy to adequately teach the concrete responsibilities of the CSM in battalions, brigades, and divisions as part of the formal program of instruction.* The POI is too general and lofty in nature, focussing on contemporary Army problems, communications skills, resource management, analytical ability, etc.

(5) *The Army's failure to clarify among the officer corps the purpose of the CSM Program.* Right now, many officers view the NCO support channel as dilutive of the chain of command. Policy should be adjusted to remove any ambiguity on this score, and the new policy should be broadly and thoroughly disseminated.

Officers and NCOs need each other. Their responsibilities must be in concert if we are to succeed in the profession of arms. But the officer-NCO bond has been weakened, and remedial action must be addressed now.

Lieutenant Colonel John J. McNulty III
Office of Legislative Liaison, Washington, D.C.

General Bahnsen Replies:

Bravo that we have some strong opinions from readers on this subject!

From initial composition to publication, producing this article took over 18 months. It was reviewed by numerous senior leaders and friends. Reader response as published above is only the tip of the iceberg of feelings on the subject. My personal mail, phone calls, and eyeball-to-eyeball contacts have been 20 to 1 in favor of the thrust of the article. Ranks of these contacts have been from 4-star to E-9.

In addition to Jim Bradin's comments that follow, let me clarify a couple of points. The Army has never in its history had better Sergeants Major. They are clearly the cream of the crop of our outstanding noncommissioned officers today. They are better trained, physically fit, and prepared for war than ever before. They as a group are one of the Army's great strengths. No one needs to defend them. However, they have never been more needed down where the rubber meets the road with our soldiers. They are *not* needed in the higher headquarters performing functions better left to LTCs and Colonels. It would be a sad indictment of our officer corps if our senior field grade staff officers (who have generally served the same length of time as many of our CSMs) could not perform all the tasks currently given to the higher-level CSMs. Most, if not all, of the duties given to higher-level CSMs overlap a staff area of responsibility.

An older, wiser 3-star boss and friend of mine told me that he put this problem on the agenda of a senior commanders' conference several years ago. He said that no one in the group wanted to discuss it. This outstanding leader was in better touch with his officers, commanders, and soldiers than anyone else I knew during my 30 years of service. He discovered problems through continuous non-threatening survey feedback from all ranks and groups. Senior leaders who haven't detected the problem yet might try this proven technique.

Brigadier General John C. "Doc" Bahnsen, USA Ret.

Colonel Bradin Replies:

First, let me say that I retired in December 1987, less than a year ago. Further, General Bahnsen and I have stayed in touch with friends on active duty. The Army's Command Sergeant Major problem remains current. But more important, there is not now nor has there ever been an officer with more respect for our Army's noncommissioned officers corps than I have. (My father was a First Sergeant at the outbreak of World War II and a damn fine one I might add.) General Bahnsen feels the same. When General Bahnsen and I wrote of the Dons, Henrys, and Franks, we spoke from long years of respect, admiration, and just plain old uncontrolled love for fellow soldiers. It must be remembered that the problems of which we speak were created and are being sustained by *officers*, not CSMs.

The purpose of our article was to induce the Army's leaders to pause for a moment and take a good objective look at the CSM program. The letters from readers would seem to indicate that our effort has borne some fruit. For any higher commander who questions the validity of the problems we point out, I would ask you to do the following: Read what your Army has written on the duties and responsibilities of Command Sergeants Major. Is it adequate? Next look at what officers are taught about the duties and responsibilities of CSMs. Is it adequate? Considering that staffs exist in our Army to serve subordinate units and assist them in closing with and destroying the enemy, and considering that CSMs are part of a staff at some level, don't they like all other staff personnel deserve to have their role spelled out so that all clearly understand? Now go forth in a non-threatening manner and take the pulse of your command and the Army at large to see if the Army's needs from its select NCOs are being met. Have your IG conduct a special inspection, concentrating on what lieutenants and captains feel in the troops, batteries, companies, and battalions across your command. Ask these same officers how they view the CSMs from brigade, division, corps, and higher. In some cases, you might not like what you hear.

To all the Sergeants Major concerned about leading and teaching young soldiers and who were offended by what we wrote, I apologize. To those concerned instead about their perks, I say "Retire!" To former unit associates of General Bahnsen and myself who might feel themselves specifically targeted in the article, I say, "Rest easy." Cases illustrative of flaws in the CSM program were based instead on composite experiences, drawn literally from scores of inputs from different sources over the years. We were concerned with portraying a broad problem within the Army *today*, not with pointing fingers at individuals from the past.

Colonel James W. Bradin, USA Ret.

Book Reviews

A Time for Giants: Politics of the American High Command in World War II. By D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells. 317 pages. Franklin Watts, New York, 1987. \$19.95. *Reviewed by Dr. Russell F. Weigley, author of The American Way of War.*

This book is must reading for the American officer aspiring to high command. Professor D. Clayton James, Biggs Professor of Military History at Virginia Military Institute and the author of our best biography of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur—the three-volume *The Years of MacArthur* (Houghton Mifflin, 1970-1985)—here builds on the extensive knowledge of American leadership in World War II that he gained in preparing that biography, to give us analyses of the careers of 18 principal American military commanders of that war. He focuses on the classic question of why with so little experience of war or of the leadership of large numbers of troops the American chieftains of 1941-1945 were able to do so well. To consider that question, he also investigates why the top commanders came to be appointed to the posts they held, and so his analyses shed light both on how the American military system has operated in choosing commanders at the highest levels and on the qualities necessary for success there.

The subjects of James's analyses are 13 generals (two of them, Lieutenant Generals Alexander Archer Vandegrift and Holland M. Smith, from the Marine Corps) and five admirals, all of whom eventually attained wartime command at least as high as that of a numbered army or fleet. The scope of their command responsibilities ranges from grand strategy, including close relationships with the Commander in Chief in the instances of General of the Army George C. Marshall and Fleet Admirals Ernest J. King and William D. Leahy; through more strictly military strategy, as for example with Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, General Carl A. Spaatz, and of course General MacArthur; through essentially operational commands, as with Generals Omar N. Bradley and Mark W. Clark, Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, and Admiral Raymond A. Spruance; to the boundary area between operations and tactics, as with General George S. Patton, Jr. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower is included, to be sure, but James's treatment of him reaffirms the extraordinary range of his responsibilities, from grand strategy almost into tactics.

The word "politics" in the subtitle is intended to convey James's belief in the importance not only of military capacities but of various kinds of political skills in the achieving and holding of high command. James does not mean politics in the political party sense, and he certainly does not mean it in any derogatory way. But when politics is considered as "the relations and competition between men involved in roles of power and leadership," then manifestly he is correct in reminding us that the top echelons of military command are political. The senior commanders are at least as much administrators of and brokers between the competitions among their juniors as they are specialists in military strategy or operations, and they themselves attained their senior positions through success in such political competition.

On the politics of rising to high command, James's section on General Marshall is particularly informative. It is titled "Pershing's Most Valuable Protégé," and it reminds us that even the austere, often apparently unpolitical Marshall—perhaps the most capable military commander in this work—was able to rise to be Chief of Staff of the Army only with the help of the political sponsorship of General of the Armies John J. Pershing. This sponsorship, furthermore, was of a highly personal kind, sometimes leaping over the constraints of hierarchy and bureaucracy, especially at the critical moment of Pershing's pushing Marshall to the very summit of the Army. In turn, similar personal sponsorship by Marshall played a critical part in elevating a number of the other Army leaders in James's book, notably Eisenhower, Bradley, Spaatz, and General Joseph W. Stilwell. Beyond his consideration of 18 individual careers, James has a final chapter, "Politics?" in which he sums up, partly in statistical fashion, the characteristics of his top commanders. While it is informative, this chapter does not add much to the book's interpretative depth because it fails to emphasize as much as it might the network of personal relationships that strikes this reviewer as central to the arrival of James's protagonists at the top.

Furthermore, the centrality of personal political sponsorship to advancement in the armed forces just before and during World War II probably has a direct relationship with the issue of success in high places. Studying Douglas MacArthur has given Professor James a healthy but perhaps somewhat excessive skepticism about the self-valuation of generals and indeed about any claims to surpassing military greatness. His reference to giants in the title notwithstanding, his evaluations of the military capacities of all of his 18 commanders are restrained. He is loath to rank any of his subjects among the great captains of all time. He may well be too chary of praise. Be that as it may, however, he does take it as a main theme that the United States was exceedingly fortunate in the quality of its senior World War II commanders, and he remains concerned especially with the question of how they came to do so well in spite of the limitations of their experience.

I believe that implicit—although never quite explicit—in James's consideration of the latter question is the conclusion that the personal nature of the political process of selecting American World War II commanders goes far toward accounting for their success. For reasons beyond the province of the book, a general of exceptional capacities had received command of the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. Particularly notable among Pershing's capacities was his ability to judge other men. Therefore he pushed his shrewdly selected protégé Marshall to the highest professional post in the Army despite bureaucratic and hierarchical obstacles. Marshall, with a similar ability to judge others, then in his turn chose and advanced his own protégés. Thus it was sound personal judgments more than any institutional factors in the Army promotion and selection systems that gave us an exceptionally capable military leadership cadre in World War II.

Advancement to the top in the Navy involved a similar process, and in both services personal political sponsorship based on shrewd personal judgments by leaders who were themselves of uncommonly high capabilities could override bureaucratic constraints because the pre-World War II armed forces were small, the selection pool for top commanders was correspondingly small, all the relevant players in the political game of military advancement knew each other, and men of unusual ability were almost certain to catch the eyes of suitable sponsors who could assist their elevation.

The disquieting aspect of this emphasis on the personal element in the process of advancement to high command in World War II, however, is that in the post-1945 armed forces such personal sponsorship of able younger officers by able senior officers, while of course anything but dead, has inevitably grown less influential. The armed forces have become too large for such a system; it is no longer true that everybody knows everybody else to the extent that was possible before 1940. Thus impersonal bureaucratic considerations have to a considerable degree displaced personal political relations in determining promotion patterns. Can the current more impersonal and more bureaucratized system yield top leaders of the quality of the generals and admirals of World War II? A more personalized politics of command worked so well in the war of 1941-1945 that the eclipse of such a system has to cause concern.

Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975. By Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson, USA Ret. 838 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, California, 1988. \$27.50. *Reviewed by Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell, USA Ret., who commanded the 9th Infantry Division and II Field Force in Vietnam and was US Military Advisor at the Paris peace talks.*

General Davidson deserves our admiration for undertaking the ambitious task of writing the history of the Vietnam War in its entirety—the almost 30 years of it. He covers each phase of the war from its beginnings in 1946 to its dramatic conclusion with the fall of Saigon in 1975. Although the author has an interesting and lively style, the book, due to its length, is more of a reference book than a “light read.” General Davidson writes with authority. The book is amply documented, and the author draws profitably on his several years of experience as MACV J-2.

The general emphasis is on the conduct of the war at the higher levels from the viewpoint of the North Vietnamese, the French, the Americans, and the South Vietnamese and their respective top commanders in the field. It seldom, with the exception of Dien Bien Phu, examines the tactics at the unit level. The only personalities covered at length are Giap—the legendary North Vietnamese general—Westmoreland, and Abrams.

The first third of the book describes the French-Viet Minh war in considerable detail from its beginnings in late 1946 to the climactic finale at Dien Bien Phu. Giap attributes the Viet Minh success to the massive increase in Chinese aid following the suspension of the Korean War, to correct strategy, and to high Viet Minh morale. General Navarre, speaking for the French, cites the basic inadequacy of French means both on the ground and in the air and the increase in Chinese aid to the Viet Minh. Davidson adds that Navarre failed to adjust his ends (objectives) to his means. By trying to hold everywhere he lost everything. He also points out that the French grossly and consistently underestimated the capabilities of the Viet Minh and Giap. Of course, the vacillation and lack of political will in Paris were also major factors.

Davidson does not speculate as to what extent the United States, military and civilian alike, profitted from the French experiences. Whether we were particularly concerned about Vietnam at the time and whether we felt the French-Viet

Minh war was worthy of note are good questions. The Geneva agreements, their subsequent abrogation by both sides, and the effect on the North Vietnamese are not mentioned.

It is of particular interest to note how three successive presidents approached the problems of Vietnam. Throughout, according to the author, American policy was "warped" by two myths. One was that the Democrats and Truman had "lost" China. While we never "had" China to lose, this rather simplistic assertion afforded a convenient club with which the Republicans belabored the Democrats, which in turn encouraged the Democrats to try to avoid another "loss" in Asia, on their watch at least. The other myth was the absolute inadvisability of fighting a large-scale ground war on the land mass of Asia under any circumstances, as expressed in recurrent warnings by respected figures. Of equal importance was the potential reaction of China and the Soviet Union to a major attack on their North Vietnamese allies. Vietnam was not worth risking an outbreak of a third world war.

In any event, President Kennedy gingerly stuck his toe in the troubled waters of Vietnam and decided to temporize. Even the authors of the Pentagon papers, hardly a collection of hawks, felt there was an arguable case for a hard commitment of ground troop support in 1961. President Johnson, on the other hand, when told in 1963 shortly after he became president that it was up to him to save South Vietnam, reportedly stated, "I am not going to lose Vietnam. I am not going to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went." Johnson supported the war fairly well, but he too demurred at striking vital targets in North Vietnam. However, he and McNamara couldn't resist playing field marshal, picking or denying bombing targets, espousing "gradualism," and such. The role of McNamara in dominating the strategy and conduct of the war is touched upon but not examined thoroughly enough to support a judgment as to his share of the blame for losing the war.

President Nixon, on the other hand, saddled with the political imperative of getting out of Vietnam with "honor" (or not too much dishonor) had an all but impossible task. He showed his willingness to bite the bullet in the invasion of Cambodia and the Christmas bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong but by then the United States was committed to the slippery slope of negotiated withdrawal and eventual defeat.

The confusing ebb and flow of the war and the parallel negotiations and the growth of the anti-war movement in the States is described at length. New, to me at least, were the events leading to President Johnson's loss of confidence in McNamara. Unfortunately he was replaced by Clark Clifford, who later recalled: "The irony is that he (Johnson) chose me to replace McNamara because he wanted a good staunch stalwart supporter of his policy in the Pentagon. Then this Judas (Clifford) appeared." A shocking example of disloyalty.

As one reads about Khe Sanh, Tet, Vietnamization, the Cambodia raids, the bombing halts, and so on he begins to feel like Alice in Wonderland. The account of the ill-fated South Vietnamese incursion into Laos—Lamson 719—gave me some insight into an operation I had never understood. By pure coincidence, I visited South Vietnam in February 1971 and received a briefing on the early stages of the operation at the US XXIV Corps CP. I remember thinking at the time that, although I didn't know enough about the situation to render a knowledgeable judgment, it looked as though they had a bear by the tail. I hoped they knew what they were doing. Davidson himself observes: "The one question which overwhelms all others, is why

General Abrams, he of the fiery histrionics and icy calculation, not only approved the operation, but pushed it on the South Vietnamese and his American superiors." Davidson also questions the ability of Admiral Moorer, the Chairman of the JCS, to grasp the pros and cons of such a risky ground operation. Lacking the background to challenge it, he had to support it. General Westmoreland, the one member of the Chiefs who was best equipped to grasp the difficulties of such an operation, has stated that he was never consulted until after it was launched. Admiral Moorer and Secretary of Defense Laird, on the other hand, claim that he was consulted. A rather contradictory situation at best.

The account of the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive of 1972 should be required reading for the serious military student. It is one of the few battles of which I am aware in which massive air support pulled victory from the jaws of defeat. What I didn't know was that President Nixon's decision to vastly augment US air and naval power in response to the North Vietnamese offensive was taken despite the near unanimous opposition of the State and Defense Departments, as was the decision to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong and to mine Haiphong.

The Christmas bombing of 1972 is also instructive. In 12 days of intensive US air operations the North Vietnamese military potential, its industry, and its economy lay in ruins, and its vaunted air defense appeared to have run out of missiles and aircraft. This crushing blow, the remining of Haiphong, and the further possibility of the bombing of the Red River dikes evidently convinced the Politburo that they had better return to serious negotiations at the conference table and quickly. Many observers of the Vietnam War question the utility of air and naval power in that type of conflict. However, the Easter Offensive and the Christmas bombings demonstrate that proper use of air and naval power could have decisive effects.

General Davidson's final chapter, "Why We Lost the War," concludes, in brief, that North Vietnam won the war through a superior strategy overall pursued with complete concentration and determination. The United States, on the other hand, fought a limited war, gratuitously assuming the strategic defensive which minimized our military advantages, and finally just lost patience. The chapter ends on a sobering note, quoting a military study group which concluded that "the United States does not understand low-intensity conflict nor does it display the capability to adequately defend against it."

My personal reaction is that the lessons of the Vietnam War tell us the contrary. If we persist in coping with this type of war by playing according to the opponent's rules, we can expect great difficulties. However, if, after Tonkin Gulf or Tet perhaps, we had declared war, swept away the shibboleths and constraints of limited or revolutionary war as defined by the enemy or ourselves, and applied national and military power directly at the heart of the enemy, the North Vietnamese would have had no recourse but to call it quits, for the foreseeable future at least. Curtis LeMay is quoted as recommending bombing the North Vietnamese back to the stone age. While his language may have been imprecise and a little indelicate for American tastes, it went to the heart of the problem. If he meant we should have decided to defeat North Vietnam rather than persuade them to mend their ways, he was right.

This book is recommended as a useful standard reference source for students of the Vietnam War. It surely isn't the last word, but perhaps such a complex war will never be sorted out to our complete satisfaction.

Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World.

By Gregory F. Treverton. 293 pages. Basic Books, Inc. New York, 1987. \$19.95. Reviewed by Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN Ret., former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The tasks of surveying past American covert actions and considering how we should look on covert action in America's future are near impossible ones. On the one hand, if the author is a veteran of CIA covert actions, he will not be permitted to write; and, because of the way information on covert action is divided into compartments within the CIA, he may not have a very complete picture anyway. On the other hand, an outsider has difficulty establishing his authenticity and in garnering the necessary facts.

Greg Treverton, though, is well-placed to play this role. On the staff of the Church Committee, he participated in its review of covert action and undoubtedly had access to even more facts than he can disclose in this book. Moving next to the staff of the National Security Council, he had an opportunity to observe the place of covert action in the broader scope of foreign policy.

Early in his book he gives us a useful typology of covert action: propaganda, political action, and paramilitary support. He further breaks political action into military coups and assassinations of political leaders, both as actions intended to achieve the immediate overthrow of governments; and he notes a number of other devices that could reshape a government over a longer time, such as control of media outlets and support for democratically inclined labor unions, political parties, student organizations, and politicians.

Having established a useful concept of the range of covert action, Treverton goes on to dissect in detail six large "major league" examples of past covert actions:

- The overthrow of the Iranian government of Mossadeq in 1953;
- The overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954;
- The Bay of Pigs venture in Cuba in 1961;
- The various efforts to prevent Allende from coming to power in Chile in 1970 and to displace him thereafter;
- The paramilitary support to two factions competing for ascendancy in Angola in 1975; and
- The support for the contras in Nicaragua since 1981.

(He also touches lightly on our support to the Afghan freedom fighters and on the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran.)

There is considerable detail available on these covert actions and it is data worth reviewing, even though these six examples are only the tip of the iceberg of the total US covert action effort since World War II. They are, obviously, important events in our foreign policy, and their effects are still being felt.

Treverton then weaves these examples in and out of the main business of his book, which is to discuss the nature of covert action and what we can and cannot expect from it. He points out that the CIA's early successes in Iran and Guatemala in 1953-54 gave covert action a momentum which still carries it forward, despite the failures in the other four principal examples. I can confirm his finding here, since as late as the Carter presidency, I found political figures urging covert actions that were

well beyond what was feasible. And I have to believe Mr. Casey's fixation with covert action was also grounded in the aura of Iran/Guatemala.

Treverton points out that when there is a prospect of covert actions remaining secret indefinitely, not just until executed, it becomes easier for decisionmakers to turn in this direction. That is especially the case when there appears to be a dearth of other foreign policy options. He then tellingly recounts how some past covert actions were easier to start than stop; that is, they gained a life of their own and sent signals to others which, while unintended, kept operations alive that should have died.

But, he adds, these large covert actions did not remain secret and he concludes that large ones never will, especially if they are also controversial. And, when covert actions are exposed, it will never be easy, he says, for the American public to understand and accept the idea of our having attempted to overthrow, or even influence, other governments. That has certainly been the case with Chile and Nicaragua where there was a reasonable semblance of electoral support for the governments we attempted to topple.

This brings Treverton to his broad conclusion: that we cannot just eschew covert action, but that we should raise the threshold for employing it. In considering this judgment, we should recall that all of the examples Treverton employs are large political actions of the type intended to have a rather immediate impact on a foreign government. There have been many smaller covert actions with less immediate objectives.

By Treverton's figures, the United States has originated a covert action on the average of once a week ever since World War II. Many were insignificant. Others were actions to promote gradual change in our favor: informing populations behind the Iron Curtain what the facts are; helping friendly politicians stay in contention with communist-financed oppositions; quiet, undramatic support and encouragement of the *Solidarities* that are the first sprouts of democracy struggling in totalitarian societies.

The weakness of this book is that it does not discuss the value of this great bulk of lesser covert actions our nation has undertaken. Of course, it cannot, for there simply is insufficient data in the public domain. Still, I would have liked to have an estimate from Treverton of the value of these lesser covert actions. After all, if we take his advice and raise the threshold for the larger covert actions, the lesser ones are principally what will be left.

Have they been worthwhile? And are they likely to be so in the future? Do we need to raise the threshold for these also, other than recognizing a Treverton caution that small ones can easily expand into large ones? There is no ready answer in unclassified materials to these questions, but they are even more relevant, I believe, than questions on whether we should try to topple more governments quickly and decisively.

In my view presidents will always be tempted into these lesser covert actions. It is often said that the reason for this is that presidents need some recourse between diplomacy and war when neither of those seems likely to produce a satisfactory solution. That is not quite the case, for it is unusual when covert action can substitute for diplomacy or war. Perhaps Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Afghanistan today are examples of when they can. More often, however, covert action

is a supplement to diplomacy, to an established policy. If we call on covert action for more, that is, to be a substitute for diplomacy or policy, we are likely to run into trouble. The key lesson in Treverton's book, in my opinion, is not to overreach and attempt too much from covert action.

Next, there is the lesson in his last chapter about proper utilization of the checks and balances that have been established for covert action. That includes ensuring that the president is fully involved, as the law requires; that he gets a full range of counsel before making his decisions; and that the Congress be dealt in as a partner. What is distressing today is that these lessons, which were obvious back in 1976 after the Church Committee concluded its reports, have to be re-learned today. Unfortunately, over the past seven and a half years, the CIA professionals, as well as the politicians in the White House, fell into the temptation of hoping that the secrecy of covert action would make careful judgments on it unnecessary; and the congressional oversight committees were not sufficiently vigilant to appreciate that was what was going on.

This is a book, then, that is worthwhile for the military professional to read, for it could be costly for the nation to have to learn these lessons a third time. It is especially appropriate for Army officers to read because of the Army's quest over the past eight years to get into the covert action business more. I happen to think that is unnecessary, and also unwise, especially for the Army. Still, covert action is a fact of life and it behooves the Army's leaders to understand this arcane art as much as the veils of secrecy will permit.

The Art of War in the Western World. By Archer Jones. 759 pages. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Ill., 1987. \$34.95. Reviewed by Colonel John R. Elting, USA Ret., author of *The Super-strategists*.

This is an unusual book, as well as a thick one. The author has concentrated on what he terms "operational history," the study of the development of tactics and strategy per se, and their application across the centuries of the West's military history. He has been successful in scraping his subject down to its raw bones; he considers leadership only when he cannot well avoid it, and almost ignores such frequently inhibiting factors as sickness and morale. Like Thucydides, he believes that war develops its own laws and methods; that most military events can be explained by military factors. And he stresses the fact—which too many "historians" fail to comprehend—that most military methods and organizations were—in their own time—the result of conscious efforts to improve and modernize the existing art of war.

The *Art of War* was written, Mr. Jones states, from "standard secondary works," in the hope of reaching an audience of both beginning students and experts in European warfare. Most of the sources that are quoted are sound, and some represent the latest scholarship. Jones *does* use Liddell Hart and Jomini, both of whom were more interested in self-advertisement than historical accuracy; especially he quotes Jomini as to Spanish guerrilla operations and the alleged fact that "all the gold in Mexico could not have procured reliable information for the French." Jomini

was in Spain eight months at most, before the Spanish guerrilla movement really hit its stride. And, had Mr. Jones consulted a few original sources on those messy operations, he probably would have discovered that some French commanders were able to exploit the rivalry between various Spanish guerrilla leaders, and even to recruit auxiliary counter guerrilla units from among them. He also might have discovered that the famous guerrilla leader, Francisco Espoz y Mina, whose operations he praises, was actually *two* men—Espoz Mina and Francisco Mina—whom he has managed to homogenize. Francisco spent most of the war in a French prison. Espoz was a gifted leader, if not quite the wrath of God presented to us. (Spanish accounts of guerrilla actions were at least as unreliable as the French after-action reports.)

The “spread” of this book is impressive, with considerable material on such lesser-known corners of military history as Alexander’s counter guerrilla techniques, Wallenstein’s system of logistics, the strategic duels between Montecuculli and Turenne, and a sympathetic explanation of the *condottieri* theory of warfare. Probably unavoidably, however, this breadth of coverage sometimes results in the book’s resembling the Powder River—“a mile wide, an inch deep.” Some battle descriptions are too sketchy. For example, wasn’t it the treachery of the Byzantine rearguard commander that converted Manzikert from an ordinary defeat into a major disaster? And *when* was Gustavus killed at Lützen? On the other hand, the coverage of some factors is thoroughly redundant, which—to me at least—became thoroughly boring, long before the final chapter.

The author’s style of writing has about it—to employ Napoleonic terminology—an intense “smell of lamp oil,” but not a whiff of gunpowder. He is unhandy at describing military actions; as in his version of Sénarmont’s artillery tactics at Friedland, he can be both incomprehensible and incorrect. He writes of “stirrup-stabilized cavalymen” and “homogeneous, bayonet-armed musketeers” and tells how “terrain [could] bifurcate warfare.” Added to this infelicity of phrase is an academic tendency toward sweeping absolutes: the introduction of the socket bayonet made a “successful frontal cavalry charge against formed infantry impossible” (Sheridan was riding over Confederate infantry in 1865) and “converted light infantry to heavy infantry, or at least gave them the capability of serving as such” (Roger’s Rangers and like units wouldn’t have agreed). He pontificates that “between similarly constituted armies the pursuing cannot overtake the retreating”—and disproves that statement repeatedly elsewhere in his text. The same is true of his insistence on the “primacy of the defense.”

In the same general way, the author really does not understand weapons. I very much doubt his opinion that the Macedonian phalanx had sarissa of varying lengths in the same formation. His instructions on how to load matchlocks and flintlocks would reduce pious musketeers—homogeneous or not—to blasphemy. And his coverage of tanks, antitank guns, and armored vehicles in general can charitably be described as “confused.”

The *Art of War in the Western World* was honestly intended and written. It will be a useful source book—and usually a safe one—for readers who seek a historical example of something or other. It has a profusion of charts and graphs, a good many of which apparently are designed for the mentally underprivileged.

I would emphatically recommend that you *read* the book before you decide whether or not to buy it.

Beyond Military Reform: American Defense Dilemmas. By Jeffrey Record. 186 pages. Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., Washington et al., 1988. \$17.95. *Reviewed by Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry, USA Ret., former Inspector General of the Army.*

Jeffrey Record has a national reputation as a critic concerning all aspects of the military. Few, in fact, challenge his assertions in print. A self-styled "military reformer," he extends his perimeter of criticism in the present book to include his fellow reformers. Record is best appreciated if one has the opportunity to read him directly. Hence, the rather extensive quotations that follow.

The intention of this book is to provide

an examination of some of the overarching problems confronting the US military today, problems to which both military reformers and all too many other participants in the national defense debate have paid far too little attention and which, if unresolved, could render the US military's reform at the operational level of warfare an exercise in futility. This book's purpose is not to challenge the validity of the military reform critique, with which the author finds himself in wide agreement, or to offer an alternative. . . . Rather, the author's aim is to supplement the reform critique by expanding its present narrow focus on the operational level of war in recognition that, for the United States, operational reform must be accompanied by strategic reform. In so doing, the author hopes to engage not only the military reformers but the minds of all citizens concerned about the nation's future security.

This is a tall order for a small book, so let us examine how the author goes about it. Record states that

Mounting dismay over the dismal performance of the US military in combat during and since the Vietnam War has sparked a military reform movement committed to the creation of armed forces that, if called upon to fight, can win. . . . Instead, they argue that ineffectiveness derives directly from the presence of intellectual, institutional, and doctrinal deficiencies and deformities pertaining to how the US military itself thinks about and wages war at the operational level of combat. Among the deficiencies and deformities identified by the reformers are:

- A hopelessly bureaucratized Pentagon;
- A bloated officer corps consumed by busy-work;
- A Joint Chiefs of Staff so organized as to be incapable of devising effective military operations or of providing the president with meaningful and timely military advice;
- Educational and promotion systems that emphasize and reward managerial-technocratic values at the expense of traditional warrior values;
- Service personnel management systems that erode small-unit cohesion in combat by constantly shuffling officers and men from unit to unit and job to job;
- Operational doctrines that emphasize firepower and costly frontal assaults at the expense of maneuver;

- Highly centralized and complex chains of command authority that stifle subordinate officer initiative and serve to divorce authority and responsibility to the point where there is often no one in charge;
- And a technology-for-its-own-sake weapons-design philosophy that all too often provides weapons too costly to be procured in desirable numbers or too fragile to endure the rigors of the battlefield.

Record continues:

The [military reform] movement . . . suffers from one major deficiency. It is a deficiency relating neither to the reformers' diagnosis of the military's ills nor to their proposed remedies. Rather, it lies in the narrow focus on the *operational* level of conventional (non-nuclear) warfare at the expense of the strategic level of war.

To the reviewer, these intellectual, institutional, and doctrinal deficiencies—whose identification Record attributes to the reformers—are not operational in nature or function, but rather matters of the organizational missions of the Army. That is, they pertain to the raising, provisioning, sustaining, maintaining, training, and resourcing of the Army. The author then states that

Strategy addresses the broader challenge of maintaining a proper relationship between the military means available to the state and the political objectives on behalf of which those means are employed. For the United States today, strategy involves such issues as

- The relationship between US military power and US military obligations overseas;
- How we can get our forces to places where they are or might be needed;
- How we can man those forces;
- Who and where to fight;
- How best to allocate resources among land, sea, and air power;
- How best to allocate resources between quality and quantity;
- The role of allies;
- And the role of nuclear weapons and their relation to non-nuclear force planning and operations.

Record is basically proposing that a proper national strategy requires a new look at the requirements for national defense. In essence, he believes we have insufficient forces to meet our treaty commitments and that our allies do not carry their fair share of the burden.

In Chapter 3, Record demonstrates that we do not have sufficient strategic lift to move even the forces we do have to meet our responsibilities. (*Parameters* published this chapter in the June 1988 issue as its "View From the Fourth Estate.") The problem is not new. The Association of the United States Army published Special Reports on this subject in 1978 and again in 1984. It will probably do so again in the near future. As paraphrased below, Record proposes four possible courses of action, either singly or in concert, to solve the lift problem, which withal probably remains insoluble:

- Cut force structure and apply the savings to lift;
- Reduce size and weight of Army forces;
- Increase sealift and reduce dependence on airlift;
- Create a fifth service to handle strategic mobility, thereby lending it a stronger constituency.

Turning to manning the force, Record proposes a return to conscription, as he does not believe that the volunteer force is representative of the population. The implication is that "the best and the brightest" do not serve. I have always found that phrase odious and condescending. If the author really believes that conscription is equitable, he didn't spend much time in the orderly rooms of line units during the years of the draft. He would have had a particularly enlightening experience during the years of "Project 100,000" and other experiments in social engineering and "doing good." One is constantly reminded of the wise aphorism advising us to be aware of people "who love humanity and hate people."

In reading this book, I had a nagging feeling that some of the material I had read before. Upon looking back at Mr. Record's book *Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Ends to Means* (Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), I found numerous instances of duplication between the 1984 book and the present book. It is not illegal or unethical for an author to dress up old material and offer it anew. Probably, if he tells himself something often enough, he begins to believe it. But to this reviewer there is a feeling of being let down. Frankly the earlier book is a better and more scholarly effort. The new book is not "The Uncertain Trumpet" of 1988.

This is an irritating book in a sense. One thing the reformers are not is humble, and this book leaves no doubt who Record believes to be ahead of the intellectual power curve. It is too bad, because there is a message. The message is lost, however, when the tone becomes all too comparable to the teutonic pronouncements of those breakfast-table Bismarcks who revel in the strategic and operational concepts found on the backs of cereal boxes, accompanied, they imagine, by the alarums and excursions of martial splendor.

The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs. By Trumbull Higgins. 224 pages. W. W. Norton, New York, 1987. \$17.95. Reviewed by Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard, USA Ret., author of *The Secretary of Defense and a forthcoming work on Maxwell Taylor*.

In 1961, the first year of the Kennedy Administration, there occurred a series of American foreign policy disasters: the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April; the acrimonious impasse between JFK and Khrushchev at the summit in Vienna in June; and the construction of the Berlin Wall in August. The first of these was a self-inflicted wound, and is the subject of this well-titled book. A prolific teacher-scholar, Higgins describes himself as a "specialist in war planning and military miscalculation."

To recall briefly the background of the event one must go back to the Eisenhower Administration. Fidel Castro took over in Havana in January 1959 with much popular support in the United States. However, as communist involvement in the new government increased, this changed, and by the end of 1959 Castro was portraying the United States as an enemy of his revolution. By March 1960, Ike was fed up with

Castro's anti-Americanism and communist involvement, and approved a CIA recommendation to form, under that agency's control, a force of Cuban exiles for possible military use against Castro. How the force would be employed was not clear, but initially the concept was for guerrilla operations. By the time of the US elections in November 1960, the concept had evolved into an invasion of Cuba employing a brigade-sized force of exiles being trained "secretly" in Guatemala.

In one of his last diplomatic initiatives, Ike severed relations with the Castro government in early 1961. Thus, Eisenhower's Cuban legacy to the new administration was, to use the words of Kennedy insider Arthur Schlesinger, "a force of Cuban exiles under American training in Guatemala, a committee of Cuban politicians under American control in Florida," and a CIA plan to use these exiles for invading Cuba and for installing the committee as the provisional government of Cuba.

President-elect Kennedy first learned of the Cuban plan in mid-November 1960. Throughout the early days of his administration, he considered various options and questions: Should the force be landed? If so, where? Would such a landing provoke an uprising against Castro? How could the force be dispersed if not used? One thing was clear: there was never any intention of employing US troops.

In a decision that he later called "stupid," the new president finally gave the go-ahead to Operation Zapata, an invasion of Cuba in the Bay of Pigs area by the exiles. It began on Monday, 17 April 1961, and ended two days later as a complete disaster, with all the invaders killed or captured.

In *The Perfect Failure* the author traces the evolution of the attempt to overthrow Castro from its inception under Ike through the actual operation and its post-mortem examination by the Maxwell Taylor committee. In particular Higgins focuses on the roles of Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

As for Eisenhower, the author points up the masterful way in which the General of the Army avoided direct military intervention both here and historically, for example, when the French unsuccessfully sought his assistance in lifting the siege of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. He does emphasize, however, that Ike's legacy to his successor was a Cuban invasion plan, described as a "hot potato," that had to be handled one way or another.

Kennedy, having dismantled Eisenhower's highly structured NSC apparatus, adopted a very informal decisionmaking process which did not serve him well in this episode. An example is the decision he made to change the invasion from a straightforward one aimed at using the port of Trinidad to a covert invasion in the Bay of Pigs near the remote Zapata peninsula. In this instance, as the author develops it, the CIA fostered Kennedy's erroneous impression that the invasion force consisted of trained guerrillas (it did not) who if unsuccessful in provoking an uprising in Cuba—the CIA predicted such an uprising—could from the Bay of Pigs area easily melt away into the nearby mountains.

The Joint Chiefs were not of great help to the president in this operation either, and he later told them so. On their behalf they came into the planning late, and as advisers to the CIA rather than as operators. Too, Chairman Lemnitzer's endorsement of the switch of invasion sites to Zapata was at best tepid. Still, the Chiefs surely owed more positive advice to the new president in this difficult decision. Their failure in this instance led to strained relations with the White House until Maxwell Taylor became Chairman 18 months later.

The chief organizational culprit was, of course, the Central Intelligence Agency. Here the author goes into matters extensively, and draws some damning conclusions. The Agency, including its Director Allen Dulles, miscalculated both the quality and quantity of the forces needed to conduct the operation. Dulles, who was dismissed about six months after the episode, and his deputy for the operation, Richard Bissell, were as Higgins shows overly optimistic, especially in predicting mass defections from Castro's militia.

The Perfect Failure is thoroughly researched, and has an excellent bibliography. Surprisingly, however, there are no new insights. Efforts on the author's part to draw from this disaster analogies pertinent to the subsequent Vietnam experience are strained and unconvincing. The author's style is lively but marred somewhat by unsupported ad hominem judgments as well as elliptical phrases. Two examples: Richard Helms is depicted as a "doubting and perhaps jealous deputy"; JFK's subsequent assassination is described as "unexpected and embarrassing"—meaning what?

In sum, however, this is an excellent work on presidential decisionmaking. For senior policymakers, actual or potential, who are not familiar with the details of this disaster, the book is highly recommended. Along with President Carter's 1980 effort to rescue the Iranian hostages, it remains a classic example of how not to do it. To end with the closing words of the author: "The Bay of Pigs should remain for all time a shining example of how not to conduct a fundamentally dishonest foreign policy or to attempt covert war by such a policy's ensuing absurd strategies and tactics."

Annual subscriptions to *Parameters* are available from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. The current one-year cost is \$7.00 for domestic or APO addresses, \$8.75 for foreign addresses. Single copies are also available at a cost of \$4.50 for domestic addresses, \$5.63 for foreign addresses. Checks should be made payable to the Superintendent of Documents. Credit card orders may be placed by calling GPO at (202) 783-3238 during business hours.

From the Commandant

The past year has been an exciting period in the field of military education. There are few issues of greater significance to the long-term readiness of our military forces than the education of our military officers to accomplish the vital roles they play in the defense of this nation. A resurgence of Congressional interest in the professional development of officers is evident in the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Among many new requirements bearing on professional development, Congress has placed particular emphasis on senior officer education and qualification. At the same time, the House Armed Services Committee Education Subcommittee Panel on Excellence in Military Education, commonly referred to as the Skelton Panel, has been conducting substantive hearings in these same areas.

Our Army Chief of Staff has had a keen interest in military education for many years. In his terms of reference to me when I arrived at Carlisle Barracks last October, General Vuono laid out his vision for the War College as the capstone institution in the formal development of Army leaders and as the cradle for innovative ideas in national strategy and security affairs. Additionally, he assigned the War College the tasks of conducting an institutional assessment and developing a plan to guide the College through the 1990s. This assessment, which spared no program, course, or activity from fresh scrutiny and reappraisal, was accomplished primarily by faculty at the Army War College itself. In that sense it was a renaissance from within. Additionally, assessment committees sought the views of former Army War College commandants, graduates of the College, senior commanders from the Army and other services, civilian educators, and senior retired officers. We shall continue to tap these rich repositories of wisdom and experience in the future.

The plan resulting from this assessment was approved by General Vuono on 25 July. The plan focuses the educational experience at the War College on strategy and the Army's role in supporting our national defense policy. The curriculum and educational methodology will sharpen critical and creative thinking skills through active learning as opposed to mere passive participation. This plan will also ensure that the College serves as a source of intellectual innovation and the Army's focal point for strategic thought.

In an article forthcoming in the December issue of *Parameters*, we shall discuss in greater detail the results of the College's comprehensive assessment and the initiatives that will guide our Army War College through the next decade.

Howard D. Graves
Major General, US Army

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