A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Special Operations During the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953

Abstract

This study analyzes the strategic effectiveness of special operations conducted by the Far East Command (FECOM) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Korea during the Korean Conflict from 1950 to 1953. Each organization's effectiveness is determined by examining the areas of strategy, organization and operations. FECOM special operations were limited to partisan operations and psychological operations. The partisans consisted of anti-communist North Koreans organized and led by U.S. cadre beginning in January, 1951. Psychological operations were conducted continuously from July, 1950 by a separate staff element whose capabilities expanded dramatically during the course of the conflict. CIA operations within Korea consisted of intelligence gathering and special (or covert) activities controlled from headquarters in Japan. Keywords: Korean War, Korean conflict, Partisan warfare, Unconventional warfare, Special operations.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1988
Accession Number
ADA199061

Entities

People

  • Steve A. Fondacaro

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • C4I
  • Human Systems
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Department Of State
  • Employment
  • Foreign Relations
  • International Law
  • International Relations
  • Military History
  • Military Organizations
  • National Security
  • Organizational Structure
  • Personnel Management
  • Psychological Operations
  • Psychological Warfare
  • Second World War
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

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  • Library and Information Science/ Studies, Southeast Asia Studies, Bibliography of Vietnam and Lao Studies.
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies