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THESIS

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THIRD WORLD
NATIONS: WHAT DRIVES CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT?

by

Gregory James Hlubek

September 1988

Thesis Advisor:

E. Laurance

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U.S. Security Assistance to Third World Nations:
What Drives Congressional Support?

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Since the Vietnam War, Congress has increasingly asserted itself in U.S. foreign policy, including security assistance relationships with Third World nations. This has led to significant conflict between the executive and legislative branches, and the need to explain Congressional voting behavior on security assistance. Using 15 cases including aid to the Contras and El Salvador during the Reagan presidency, this thesis investigates the relative impact of various factors on Congressional support for security assistance, including public opinion and the level of Soviet bloc assistance. The research concludes that the most powerful determinant is the Third World government whose behavior Congress is trying to change.



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I. INTRODUCTION

Who determines how security assistance is used by the United States to promote its national interest in the Third World? Is it the executive branch, or is it Congress? Certainly, the answer is both. The President formulates U.S. foreign policy concerning a Third World nation and then submits to Congress any requests he may have for arms transfers to that nation in support of his policy objectives. Congress will then approve or disapprove all or part of the request, and it may place conditions on the aid. Not all arms sales proposals require congressional approval, and the President can bypass Congress by using the presidential emergency powers to grant aid. However, for grants or credits or loans, the President has to attain congressional budget approval, except in declared emergencies. For those Third World nations considered important to U.S. national security, military aid is usually given in the form of grants, credits, or loans. [Ref. 1:p. 45]

The bitterness of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal brought about the situation that exists today in which Congress mistrusts the presidency. After Vietnam, Congress took steps to regain its constitutional powers to control the budget and declare war. The War Powers

Resolution of 1974 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 are two examples.

The changes made in Congress signaled a desire for greater control and oversight of foreign policy by Congress. The impact of the "new" Congress was felt most sharply in U.S. foreign policy toward the Third World. Some of the manifestations of Congress' effort to gain more control of foreign policy include the following: the 1975 cut-off by Congress of covert operations in Angola and the Church Committee's investigation of CIA involvement in the undermining of the Allende government in Chile. [Ref. 2:p. 37]

Arms transfers, historically a tool used by the President to support foreign policy, have recently come under closer scrutiny by Congress. For example, the Foreign Assistance Act (passed originally in 1961), now requires the President to suspend U.S. assistance to any drug producing country that fails to take adequate measures to prevent drugs from being smuggled into the U.S. Also, no security assistance may be given to any country that consistently violates internationally accepted standards of human rights. And, no assistance can be given to any country that delivers or receives nuclear enrichment equipment, material, or technology, unless it is placed under international supervision. [Ref. 3:pp. 65-75]

Also,, the Arms Export Control Act was passed in 1976. It prohibits FMS sales, credits, and guarantees for one year

to any country that aids or abets international terrorism. It also requires the President to report annually to Congress in detail on current military transfer programs.

It is this new congressional interest in arms transfers to the Third World that will be scrutinized in this research.

A. HYPOTHESES

This research investigates the relationship between congressional support (the outcome or dependent variable) for security assistance and the following independent variables:

- Soviet bloc military assistance to the opposition;
- reductions in the U.S. foreign aid budget;
- the military success of the U.S. clients;
- U.S. public opinion;
- changes in the administration's policy;
- Third World government behavior as perceived by Congress.

The hypothesis believed to be the most powerful is that Congress uses security assistance to influence the behavior of some government, the last hypothesis listed above. The government in question does not necessarily have to be the potential recipient of the proposed security assistance package (i.e., the Sandinista government in the Nicaragua case study).

The hypotheses represented by the variables listed above were chosen to be tested in this research, because it seemed logical to the researcher that each of the listed independent variables had a relatively high probability of being correlated to the outcome variable. For more information concerning hypotheses about security assistance transfers from the U.S. to the Third World nations, refer to Noel Koch's work. [Ref. 1]

Influence, for the purpose of this study, does not necessarily refer to the situation in which Congress might tell a prospective Third World client that it will approve an aid package for that nation if it agrees to vote with the U.S. in the United Nations. It could mean that, of course, but the term could also be used to describe the situation where arms transfers are used as either "carrots" or "sticks." In such a case Congress would reject a proposal for security assistance to a client government that acted in some manner to anger the wrong people in Congress. Certainly, emotional responses by Congress are not excluded from this definition of influence.

B. METHODOLOGY

Four Third World nations were chosen as the cases for this study: Nicaragua; El Salvador; Chile; and Pakistan. All four countries have been recipients or prospective recipients of U.S. security assistance during the Reagan presidency. For Nicaragua and El Salvador, a rigorous

methodology is used to test the main hypothesis. The discussions on Chile and Pakistan are intended to support the findings of the Nicaragua and El Salvador cases. By moving the study outside of Central America, more credibility is given to the ability to generalize from this research.

The period of President Reagan's term in office (1981-1989) was chosen for two reasons. First, Reagan is the current President which makes the results of this research more applicable and familiar to the reader. The second reason is that Reagan's arms transfer policy with respect to each country has remained constant throughout his term in office. This controls for any shifts in his foreign policy.

Although the application may differ slightly for each case, the same basic methodology was applied in all cases. A content analysis in which the broad issues were surveyed formed the backbone of this research. By reading through the pertinent congressional hearings and other congressional sources for each case, the orientation and attitude of Congress on several key dimensions was determined. The methodology used did not require a strict count of certain key words or phrases used during each hearing; a content analysis by issue was employed to determine what behavior pleased or upset Congress.

In general, this research will employ the controlled comparison strategy outlined by Alexander L. George [Ref. 4] The focus will be on aid to two specific countries,

Nicaragua and El Salvador, using 15 specific votes as cases. A more intensive analysis of the variables is possible since the paper is not trying to examine a large number of diverse countries. In each of the cases, the phenomenon to be observed is congressional support for security assistance to Third World nations considered important to U.S. national interests. In addition, this research develops a methodology that can be applied to any current or future case, irrespective of geographic area.

II. NICARAGUA

A. BACKGROUND

In 1979, the Nicaraguan government of President Anastasio Somoza was overthrown. The Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN), a group of leftist guerrillas, moved into Managua and formed a new coalition government. That same Sandinista government is currently in power with Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega now as President.

Since 1981, the United States has been involved in a covert military assistance relationship with anti-Sandinista guerrillas known as "Contras." The covert assistance was started by President Reagan as a response to allegations that linked the Sandinistas to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador and evidence that implicated them in human rights violations. The presence of Cuban and Soviet military advisors in Nicaragua led the Reagan administration to believe that Nicaragua was moving in the direction of becoming another Soviet proxy, much like Cuba.

During Reagan's term as president, Congress has voted over 20 times on issues concerning U.S. foreign policy toward Nicaragua. A recent vote on February 3, 1988 resulted in a congressional rejection of a \$36.25 million request for Contra military aid. More recently, as a result of the Sandinistas violation of the provisions of the Arias

peace plan, the issue of renewing military aid to the Contras surfaced again in Congress. On August 10, humanitarian aid was approved with the possibility of a follow-on vote in late September or early October on a military aid package for the Contras. This will be discussed in more detail later in the "forecasting" section of this paper.

During the span of his presidency, President Reagan has experienced both support and opposition from Congress in regard to his foreign policy stance toward Nicaragua. What factors seem to be most critical in determining whether or not Congress supports Reagan's Contra military aid?

B. HYPOTHESES

The hypothesis believed to be the most powerful in this case study is that Congress supports military aid to the Contras as a reaction to some behavior of the Sandinista government perceived as unacceptable by Congress. This research will also test for a relationship between support for military assistance and five other independent variables: President Reagan's Policy; Soviet bloc military assistance to the Sandinista government; U.S. budget cuts; the military success of the Contras; and U.S. public opinion. The relationships between the six independent variables and the outcome variable will all be considered as alternate hypotheses.

C. METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in the Nicaragua case is very straightforward. Nine cases were selected where Congress voted on the issue of Military aid to the Contra rebels. Along with the nine cases in which Congress voted, one "non-case" was selected in which a vote never took place, making a total of ten cases. The "noncase" will be explained later. A list of the cases, all between the 1981-1988 period, appears below in Table 1.

TABLE 1

CONGRESSIONAL VOTES ON CONTRA MILITARY AID
(PLUS NONCASE)

1.	18 December 1982:	Dodd Amendment
2.	18 November 1983:	\$24 Million Covert Aid
3.	April-June 1984:	Additional \$21 Million for 1984
4.	2 August 1984:	Ban on 1985 Aid to Contras
5.	23 April 1985:	Request to Resume Aid to Contras
6.	12 June 1985:	Aid Resumed
7.	25 June 1986:	\$100 Million Aid Approved
8.	18 March 1987:	Moratorium on Remaining \$40 Million Voted Down
9.	September 1987:	"Noncase"
10.	3 February 1988:	\$36.25 Million Voted Down

For some of the cases above, there is a boundary problem. When does the period for each case start for the purpose of assigning values to the independent variables? For this case study, the researcher argues that the problem only exists for the Soviet military assistance variable. The dates of all the public opinion polls are known, and the dates of all fiscal year appropriations legislation are known. What are not known, for most of the cases, are the dates that the Soviets delivered shipments of military aid to Nicaragua. Jane's Defense Weekly listed the month of delivery for some of the shipments, but not most of them. There is no problem assigning values for the cases that occurred in the beginning months of a new year or the last couple of months of a year, since the data for the entire calendar year can be applied to any such case. For the cases that occur in the middle of the year (i.e., June-August), some interpolation is required.

D. OUTCOME VARIABLE

Support for Contra military aid is the dependent variable selected for this study. Support is very easily measured by looking at congressional records to see what legislation passed and what legislation did not. Congress either said "yes" or "no" to Contra aid requests, which means that the reliability of the measurement is unquestionably very high. It should also be pointed out that it would be impossible to find a more valid gauge of support for

Contra military aid than actual congressional votes on the issue.

E. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Six independent variables were chosen for this analysis: President Reagan's Policy; Soviet bloc military assistance to the Sandinistas; budget constraints; military success of the Contras; U.S. public opinion; and perception of Sandinista behavior. The six independent variables were chosen because they represent the variables most likely to have a significant relationship with the dependent variable, congressional support.

The data that represent Soviet bloc military assistance were obtained from various sources including USACDA figures, SIPRI data, and tables in Defense and Foreign Affairs. Figure 1 is a graph prepared by the CIA to support President Reagan's military aid requests. It was presented to the U.S. Senate on February 27, 1986.

The values for 1986 and 1987 are estimates based on figures quoted in the 1986 and 1987 issues of "Soviet Military Power," which is published by the Department of Defense. The value for 1986 seems high, but it includes 1,200 vehicles delivered to Nicaragua in 1986 for military use. [Ref. 5:p. 143] The dollar value estimates shown on the graph are nearly identical to the corresponding yearly estimates found in World Military Expenditures and Arms




Figure 1. Soviet and Cuban Aid to Nicaragua

Transfers, a product of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA).

This research uses dollar values, the same measurement reference used by Reagan's administration to lobby support from Congress, to describe levels of Soviet military assistance. Included in the test of the individual cases, though, will be a description of the weapons types delivered to Nicaragua. The reason for this is to assess the military capability of the transfers, in addition to their dollar

value. The delivery dates in most arms transfer data sources are given only by the year of delivery. Defense and Foreign Affairs has estimates down to the month of delivery in some cases.

The perception of Sandinista behavior, the second independent variable, is somewhat more difficult to operationalize. There is no convenient way to set up a grading system that will distinguish between small variations in the behavior of a government. Any such grading system would be too arbitrary, making it subject to greater bias. Therefore, this research will treat behavior in a general context. By studying the related hearings, a reader can quickly determine Congress' reaction to some action taken by the Sandinista government. This research can accurately classify Sandinista behavior as "acceptable" or "unacceptable" for each case.

"Acceptable" behavior, in general, will include such actions that would indicate to Congress a move toward a real democracy, a better human rights record, or regional peace with other Central American neighbors. "Unacceptable" behavior will include acts of internal suppression, aggression against neighboring countries, and moves toward communism.

In testing for a relationship between congressional support and budget constraints, the third independent variable, a broad-brush approach was employed. The congressional

hearings on Contra aid and fiscal year appropriations were surveyed for any data or rhetoric that would tie cutbacks in the defense and intelligence budgets to support for military aid requests.

The fourth independent variable, military success of the Contras, has to do with how well the Contras performed in pressuring the Sandinistas into adopting democratic ideas and institutions. Statements made during congressional hearings concerning Contra performance were used to support any conclusions made in the study.

The fifth independent variable is U.S. public opinion concerning the administration's handling of the Nicaragua situation. Public opinion has already been measured by Gallup Polls. These polls will form the basis of any conclusions made about public opinion's relationship to congressional support.

The final independent variable is President Reagan's policy toward Nicaragua. By observing any shifts in the administration's policy and goals toward Nicaragua, this research will determine whether or not shifts in Reagan's policy, if there were any, caused corresponding shifts in congressional support of security assistance for the Contras.

F. CONTROL VARIABLES

During the process of researching the independent variables, the following ones were recognized as control variables. A control variable remains constant during the period being researched.

1. Reagan's Policy

President Reagan's commitment to military aid for the Contras is the control variable in this case study. Reagan's hardline policy toward Nicaragua has been extremely constant over the course of his presidency. This is very easy to see by doing a content analysis of different speeches made by Reagan concerning Nicaragua throughout his term. On March 8, 1986, for example, Reagan called the Sandinistas a "cruel clique of deeply committed communists at war with God and man from their very first days." [Ref. 6:p. 602] This kind of rhetoric has flavored statements made by Reagan concerning the Nicaragua issue ever since he took office. For instance, right after he took office in 1981, President Reagan charged the Sandinistas with seeking to establish a Marxist state under the influence of Cuba and the Soviet Union. [Ref. 7:p. 111] He then suspended President Carter's economic aid program directed toward Nicaragua. In an April 1983 speech to a joint session of Congress, Reagan defended his policy toward Nicaragua by saying "it has treated us like an enemy." [Ref. 7:p. 126] Shifts in Reagan's policy toward Nicaragua cannot be the

cause of fluctuations in congressional support for Contra military aid during his presidency, since there were no shifts. The administration's policy never changed.

2. Military Success of Contras

While the Contras stated their objective to be the overthrow of the repressive Sandinista government, the Reagan administration said that its objective in giving aid to the Contras was to pressure the Sandinistas into moving toward a democratic Nicaragua. [Ref. 2:p. 47] Congress would have no part of supporting any covert operation of which the goal was to overthrow another government.

Senator Cranston, D-California, best summed up the military success of the Contras with the following statement made in February 1986:

The United States has been supporting the Contra effort for more than 4 years now. Our government has nurtured it, we have orchestrated, we have manipulated it.

What do we have to show for these efforts? Have the Contras seized and held one square foot of Nicaraguan soil? Have the Contras spurred an increase in press and religious freedoms inside Nicaragua? Have they weakened the popular base of support for the Marxist Sandinista regime or reduced its reliance on Moscow?

No. [Ref. 8:p. 4]

The hearings do not address the issue of Contra military success very much. The strength of the Sandinistas made a military overthrow of the government by the Contras nearly impossible. Even with no available data, Contra military success was obviously at a constant low. Military success therefore becomes a control variable.

3. Budget Constraints

There are no data available at the level of this research that gives the figures for the yearly Intelligence budget for the U.S. Since Contra aid came primarily from the Intelligence budget, the yearly fluctuations of the Intelligence budget cannot be observed and compared to support of Contra aid.

A way to justify calling "budget constraints" a control variable is to compare fluctuations of Contra aid to fluctuations of a parallel military aid program that was similar to the U.S. support of the Contras. In this case, U.S. support of the Afghan rebels would be a good parallel program to observe.

If "budget constraints" was the most powerful factor in influencing congressional support of security assistance, then it follows that Afghan rebels would have also been severed from U.S. aid in 1984 when the Contras were dropped as clients by Congress. Of course, the Afghan rebels still received their full share of aid, which means that Congress was not equally cutting off aid to rebel groups supported by the U.S.

Now that the competing hypotheses and variables have been explained, this paper will proceed with the discussion of the overall debate regarding military aid to the Contras and the selected cases for Nicaragua.

G. THE DEBATE IN CONGRESS

Human rights, political oppression, and the threat of communism dominating Nicaragua were the themes most frequently addressed in Congress, but the main issue with respect to Contra military aid was the means used to attain U.S. foreign policy goals.

Congress was very uneasy about supplying arms to guerrillas who were seeking to overthrow the leftist government of Nicaragua. Supporting a government in a war against rebels was much different than supplying rebel forces in an attempt to oust an established government. The Boland amendment of December 1982 made it illegal for the U.S. to use CIA funds "for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua." [Ref. 2:p. 25]

The Reagan administration claimed that the goal of Contra military aid was the interdiction of arms traffic from Nicaragua to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. [Ref. 2:p. 25] Considering the administration's acknowledgement that the Contras' goal may be to overthrow the Sandinista government, the lack of progress in the arms interdiction campaign caused many in Congress during 1983 and 1984 to seek an end to U.S. covert assistance to the Contras. [Ref. 2:p. 25]

In April 1984 there was an outcry in Congress over reports of CIA participation in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. [Ref. 2:p. 46] This enabled the opponents of

Contra aid to swing the argument in their favor. In August 1984, both the House and the Senate voted decisively to cut off aid to the Contras during fiscal year 1985.

In June 1985, Congress voted to resume aid to the Contras. The debate became more focused on the domestic and foreign policies of the Sandinistas. President Reagan pushed Congress hard for support in light of the behavior of the Sandinistas at the time. He also agreed with Congress that the goal of providing arms to the Contras was to pressure the Sandinista government into adopting different attitudes toward diplomatic negotiations with the opposition. [Ref. 2:p. 48]

H. CASES

As explained earlier, the competing hypotheses will now be tested by looking at how each of the independent variables affected the outcome variable (congressional support) in each of ten separate cases involving congressional votes on Contra aid.

1. Case #1, 18 December 1982: Dodd Amendment Tabled

a. Summary

On 18 December 1982, the Senate rejected an attempt to put Congress on record in opposition to aid given to paramilitary groups in Nicaragua that sought to overthrow the Sandinista government. Christopher J. Dodd, D-Connecticut, stating that funds should not be used directly or indirectly after 20 January 1983 to support the Contras,

tried to add the amendment to HJ Res 631. Dodd said the administration's support for anti-Sandinista forces threatened "a far more expanded conflict than already exists." [Ref. 9:p. 3114] Despite the fact that the House had already passed a similar amendment on 8 December 1982, the Dodd amendment was tabled (killed) by a 56-38 Senate vote.

b. Soviet Military Assistance

Soviet military aid to Nicaragua actually started in 1980. From 1980 to 1982 the value of aid went from \$10 million to \$40 million to \$110 million, which was about the average value of yearly Soviet aid to Nicaragua from 1980 to 1987.

During 1981 and 1982, Nicaragua received the following major military equipment items from the Soviets: 4 Mi-8 Hip helicopters; and 50 T-54/55 tanks. Also, by 1982 there were about 1500 Cuban military and security advisors in Nicaragua, and Cubans were helping Nicaragua lengthen existing landing strips to accommodate jet aircraft (i.e., the Mig-21). Although there was no evidence that Migs were in Nicaragua at the time, the Reagan administration argued that the Sandinistas were building an offensive capability that would be far above the capabilities of Nicaragua's neighbors. [Ref. 10:p. 43]

Overall Soviet military aid was average.

c. Sandinista Behavior

Before they assumed power in 1979, the Sandinistas issued a communique dedicated to human rights, civil justice, and free elections in Nicaragua. The transparency of those promises was soon to be realized.

Soon after it took power, the new government announced that elections would be postponed until 1985. In September 1981, the Sandinistas eliminated the right to strike, and in January 1982 they forced all opposition off the radio airwaves.

The above acts of repression are not nearly the worst acts committed by the Sandinistas during that period. There have been eyewitness accounts from reliable sources that claim the Sandinistas attacked nearly 20 Indian settlements along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border, viciously killing many Indians. The Sandinistas used the excuse that the Indians were being uprooted for development purposes. [Ref. 11:p. 6]

Congress reacted to the above behavior of the Sandinistas with strong disapproval. In a discussion with Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams during a February 1982 hearing on Nicaragua, Senator Dodd had this to say about the opposition being forced off the airwaves, the elimination of the right to strike, and other actions by the Sandinistas:

I was in Nicaragua last month and expressed, along with several other members of Congress who were there,

deep disappointment at the turn of events with regard to the press and the private sector and the church and other groups. [Ref. 11:p. 18]

Senator Helms had the following to say about the treatment of the Indians by the Sandinista government:

These events seem to transcend all normal bounds of civilized behavior. The Sandinistas are now consolidating their power in Nicaragua and they have found the Miskito Indians to be too independent and too stubborn to suit the Sandinistas' plans for their subjection. It is a sad pattern, a pattern all too familiar in lands which have seen the wholesale eradication of races and classes of indigenous people who have stood in the way of revolutionary, so-called progress. [Ref. 11:p. 2]

The perception of Sandinista behavior was that it was unacceptable.

d. Public Opinion

No public opinion data exist regarding Reagan's Central America or Nicaragua policy prior to June 1983. The Gallup Poll and Editorials on File contain no data for this period.

Public support? No data.

2. Case #2, 18 November 1983: \$24 Million Covert Aid

a. Summary

On 18 November 1983 Congress voted yes to Contra aid, but no more than \$24 million was to be spent from any combination of intelligence and defense budgets during fiscal year 1984.

b. Soviet Military Assistance

During 1983, the value of Soviet bloc military assistance went up to about \$140 million for that year as

opposed to \$105 million for 1982. The major defense items delivered to Nicaragua during 1983 include the following: 1 AN-12 Cub-A transport; 10 Mi-8 Hip helicopters; 10 T-55 tankss; and 10 ZSU-57-2 AAVs.

Overall Soviet military aid was above average.

c. Sandinista Behavior

In early June 1983, Nicaragua accused three U.S. diplomats of being spies and ordered them out of the country.

During a September 1983 hearing on human rights in Nicaragua, many eyewitness testimonies were given to Congress that related horrible acts of repression committed against internal groups, especially the Miskito Indians, by the Sandinista government. In a prepared statement for Congress, Felice Gaer of the International League for Human Rights provided a long list of documented violations of human rights by the Sandinistas: 39 Indian villages were destroyed in 1982; 14,000 Indians were forcibly relocated in 1982; travel from the camps was severely limited by the government; and many Indians were beaten and injured. [Ref. 12:p. 34]

Congress denounced the actions of the Nicaraguan government just prior to the November 1983 vote on Contra aid. Congressman Gus Yatron, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, had this to say in regard to the repressive Sandinista government:

However, the Sandinistas defeated Somoza in the name of human rights and democracy. Unfortunately, it seems that the policies of the Nicaraguan Government have not held up to the promises made to the Nicaraguan people.

Elections have never been held. Restrictions on press, political, and religious freedoms reflect the nature of the Nicaraguan Government. [Ref. 12:p. 1]

The perception of Sandinista behavior was that it was unacceptable.

d. Public Opinion

Table 2 shows that there was no public support for Reagan's Central America Policy.

TABLE 2

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 24-27 JUNE, 1983

Reagan's handling of situation in Central America:

<u>Approved</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
25%	46%	29%

Public support: No.

3. Case #3, April-June 1984: Additional \$21 Million for Fiscal 1984

a. Summary

The \$24 million previously approved by Congress for fiscal year 1984 was due to run out in June. In April 1984, Reagan asked Congress for an additional \$21 million for fiscal 1984. The Senate approved the request in April, but when the bill went to a joint conference, the House

disapproved. The administration lobbied hard but finally gave up the hope for another House vote in June.

b. Soviet Military Assistance

1984 was looking to be a big year for Soviet military aid to Nicaragua. Eventually \$250 million in military aid was delivered to Nicaragua as opposed to \$140 million in 1983. Soviet military items delivered include the following: 6 An-2 transports; 5 Mi-24 Hind-C helicopters; 6 Mi-8 Hip helicopters; 20 BTR-60 PB APCs; 20 PT-76 tanks; and 100 SA-7 Grail portable SAMs. The Mi-24s were not delivered until November 1984, so they could have no effect on the outcome of this case.

Overall Soviet aid was above average.

c. Sandinista Behavior

On 21 February, 1984, Nicaragua announced plans for elections in November. While the plans for an election in Nicaragua were received optimistically in Congress, the real reaction on Capitol Hill was to the February mining of Nicaragua's harbors by the CIA.

Congress was outraged by the mining which caused damage to several Nicaraguan ships and ships from five other nations. Congress was so upset because no one in Congress had been consulted prior to the mining effort. They also claimed that the administration's mining effort was escalatory. [Ref. 2:p. 45]

The perception of Sandinista behavior was that it was acceptable.

d. Public Opinion

Tables 3, 4 and 5 show that there was no public support of Reagan's Central America Policy.

TABLE 3

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 10-13 FEBRUARY, 1984

<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
29%	48%	23%

TABLE 4

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 11-15, 1984

Military Aid to Central America

<u>Don't Get Involved</u>	<u>Give Aid</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
49%	39%	12%

TABLE 5

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 18-21 MAY, 1984

<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
28%	49%	23%

Public support? No.

4. Case #4, 2 August 1984: Ban on 1985 Aid to Contras

a. Summary

While Reagan's request for an additional \$21 million for fiscal 1984 was being refused, work was being done on fiscal 1985 legislation. Reagan asked for \$28 million Contra military aid for 1985. Despite President Reagan's nationally televised news conference on 24 July in which he lobbied for continued support for the Contras, the House approved a ban on any aid to the Contras in fiscal 1985 by a vote of 294-118 on HR 5399.

b. Soviet Military Assistance

Again, this case occurred in the late summer of 1984 which turned out to be a big year for Soviet aid. Also, the CIA estimated that Cuban military advisors in Nicaragua had increased at this time to between 3000 and 3500.

Overall Soviet aid was above average.

c. Sandinista Behavior

Nicaraguan leaders met with Secretary of State George Schultz in June. Part of the reason Schultz went to Managua was to silence critics who said the administration was reluctant to negotiate with the leftists. He also hoped to drum up support for the administration's Contra aid request.

The strategy backfired because, on 4 June, House Majority Leader Jim Wright, D-Texas, said that Congress

should not vote for Contra funds while Nicaraguan leaders and Secretary Schultz were negotiating. [Ref. 13:p. 90]

The perception of Sandinista behavior was that it was acceptable.

d. Public Opinion

Refer to case #3 for data. Same data are used for case #4.

Public support? No.

5. Case #5, 23 April 1985: HJ Res 239--Aid to Rebels

a. Summary

President Reagan requested to resume military aid to the Contras, but the joint resolution was rejected by the House. Passage of the resolution would have given \$14 million of military aid to the Contra for the remainder of fiscal 1985.

b. Soviet Military Assistance

By early 1985, Nicaragua had just come off its biggest year yet for deliveries of Soviet military equipment. In October/November 1984, Nicaragua saw the first shipment of 6 Mi-24 Hind helicopters. Based on terrain considerations, this was the most significant offensive capability given to Nicaragua to date. [Ref. 14:p. 211]

Overall Soviet aid was above average.

c. Sandinista Behavior

On 4 November, 1984, elections were held for president, vice-president and Constituent Assembly. The

Sandinistas won a majority, and Daniel Ortega became president.

Despite claims by administration officials that the Nicaraguan elections were for show only, Congress adopted a "wait and see" attitude. If Nicaragua was truly moving to implement democratic reform, it would be best, Congress felt, to give Ortega the benefit of the doubt.

The perception of Sandinista behavior was that it was acceptable.

d. Public Opinion

Table 6 shows that there was no public support of Reagan's handling of Nicaragua.

TABLE 6

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 8-11 MARCH, 1985

<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
26%	43%	31%

Public support? No.

6. Case #6, 12 June 1985: House Reversed Itself

a. Summary

On 12 June, the House reversed its 23 April legislation that rejected Reagan's request to resume aid to the Contras. By passing HR 2577, the House provided \$27 million for aid to the Contras until 31 March 1986. The money was to be used for nonlethal aid only. Only boots,

clothing, medical supplies, radios, radars, intelligence, and other nonlethal aid could be provided.

b. Soviet Military Assistance

Soviet military assistance to Nicaragua was at the same level as it was in April when Reagan's request was voted down. No major deliveries of military equipment were reported to have arrived in Nicaragua since November 1984.

Overall Soviet aid was below average.

c. Sandinista Behavior

Less than a week after Congress voted against Contra aid in April, Nicaraguan President Ortega went on an aid-seeking trip to Moscow. This action received a lot of attention in Congress.

Congress was very upset over Ortega's trip to Moscow. Several Democrats who voted against aid in April tried to revive proposals for aid. Jim Wright, D-Texas, said Ortega's "maladroit behavior" caused embarrassment for some Democrats, because it appeared to confirm Reagan's contention that the Sandinistas were Soviet pawns. [Ref. 15:p. 75] Dave McCurdy, D-Oklahoma, said, "We should not be tying our own hands while Daniel Ortega is shaking those in the Kremlin." [Ref. 15:p. 75] There was also much rhetoric condemning Ortega's trip during the May hearing on President Reagan's embargo against Nicaragua.

The perception of Sandinista behavior was that it was unacceptable.

d. Public Opinion

Refer to case #5 for data. Same data are used for case #6.

Public support? No.

7. Case #7, 25 June 1986: \$100 Million Aid Approved

a. Summary

On 25 June, the House voted 221-209 (HJ Res 738) to renew full military aid to the Contras. The \$100 million included funds for weapons, ammunition, as well as other military supplies for the Contras. This legislation marked the first time since mid-1984 that lethal military supplies were allowed to be given to the Contras by the U.S. government.

b. Soviet Military Assistance

There was a decrease in Soviet bloc military aid during 1985. The value of military aid in 1985 was about \$100 million.

Overall Soviet aid was average.

c. Sandinista Behavior

On 22 March 1986, Nicaragua invaded Honduras in pursuit of Contras in their camps. Just two days prior to the incursion, the House had voted against another Reagan request for Contra aid.

Congress had mixed emotions in regard to the incident. During April 1986 hearings on the incursion, most of the questions asked of administration officials hinted at

a congressional mistrust of the facts as given by the administration. Still, Congress did acknowledge that the border violation by armed Nicaraguan forces did occur, and the incursion angered many in Congress. House Leader Thomas O'Neill, a liberal against Contra aid, called Ortega a "bumbling, incompetent, Marxist-Leninist communist." [Ref. 16:p. 402] This action seemed to have much the same impact on Congress as Ortega's trip to Moscow. [Ref. 16:p. 402]

The perception of Sandinista behavior was that it was unacceptable.

d. Public Opinion

Tables 7 and 8 show that there was no public support of Reagan's handling of Nicaragua.

TABLE 7

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 7-10 MARCH, 1986

Aid to Nicaraguan Rebels:

<u>Congress Should</u> <u>Authorize</u>	<u>Should Not</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
35%	52%	11%

TABLE 8

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 11-14 jULY, 1986

Reagan's handling of situation in Nicaragua:

<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
34%	46%	20%

Public support? No.

8. Case #8, 18 March 1987: Vote Against Moratorium

a. Summary

The Senate, on 18 March, rejected a resolution (HJ Res 81), 48-52, that would have barred the use of \$40 million for Contra aid. The \$40 million was money that was still unused from the \$100 million approved in 1986. In light of the Iran-Contra affair, the resolution was supposed to put pressure on the Reagan administration to account for all previous official and unofficial military aid to the Contras. [Ref. 17:p. 511]

b. Soviet Military Assistance

1986 was by far the biggest year for deliveries of Soviet military items to Nicaragua. Although the \$600 million included about 1200 vehicles, other significant items were also delivered: 10 Mi-8 Hip helicopters; 15 Mi-17 Hip-H helicopters; 6 Mi-24 Hind-D helicopters; 20 T-55 tanks; 10 ZSU-57-2 AAVs; and 50 SA-14 Gremlin portable SAMs.

Overall Soviet aid was above average.

c. Sandinista Behavior

In February 1987, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias set up conditions for peace negotiations between the five Central American countries. The main provision was for a ceasefire between guerrillas and governments in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Also, amnesty for the guerrillas would be granted within 60 days.

Congress was getting frustrated by the actions of the Sandinistas. Some members of Congress were using the Arias proposal as a reason to oppose further aid to the Contras. What angered and frustrated Congress was that four of the five countries were in agreement, except Nicaragua which refused to negotiate with the democratic opposition, the Contras. [Ref. 18:p. 462]

The perception of Sandinista behavior was that it was unacceptable.

d. Public Opinion

Tables 9 and 10 show that there was no public support of Reagan's Nicaragua policy.

TABLE 9

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 4-5 DECEMBER, 1986

Aid for Contras:

<u>Should Be Given</u>	<u>Should Not</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
29%	58%	13%

TABLE 10

GALLUP POLL: TAKEN 24 AUGUST-2 SEPTEMBER, 1987

Reagan's handling of situation in Nicaragua:

<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
27%	58%	15%

Public support? No.

9. Case #9, September 1987: Noncase

This event could be discussed in the final analysis of results (conclusions), but it seems more appropriate to include it as one of the cases. While this case may bend the rules of good methodology slightly, it would be negligent of this study to exclude it.

a. Summary

The previous \$100 million appropriation of Contra aid was due to expire on 30 September. President Reagan was planning to ask Congress for up to \$150 million for another 18 months of continued aid to the Contras. [Ref. 19:p. 1892] He ended up not asking for the aid.

b. Soviet Military Assistance

At \$50 million, military assistance to Nicaragua was well below the 1986 value.

Overall Soviet aid was below average.

c. Sandinista Behavior

On 7 August, 1987, the five Central American countries signed a peace agreement, and Nicaraguan President Ortega was the first to ask civilian opponents in his country to nominate candidates for a commission to monitor compliance with the agreement. Also, in August, the government of Nicaragua allowed La Prensa, the anti-Sandinista newspaper, to reopen, and anti-Sandinista church leaders were allowed to return to Nicaragua.

Congress gave much support to the Arias Peace Agreement, so the steps taken by Nicaragua toward regional peace and socio-political reform were applauded on Capital Hill. President Reagan had been calling on the Sandinistas to negotiate with their opponents for years, and now that they moved in that direction, his arguments for continued aid were weakened considerably. After all, the stated purpose of aid to the Contras was to force the Sandinistas to negotiate and reform.

In light of congressional support for the Arias Peace Agreement and warnings to Reagan not to ask for Contra aid, Reagan did not ask for more aid. This marked the first time Reagan did not try to push a request through Congress when funds were dried up.

The perception of Sandinista behavior was that it was acceptable.

d. Public Opinion

Table 11 shows that there was no public support of Reagan's policy in Nicaragua.

TABLE 11

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 24 AUGUST-2 SEPTEMBER, 1987

Reagan's handling of situation in Nicaragua:

<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
27%	58%	15%

Public support? No.

10. Case #10, 3 February 1988: \$46.25 Million Request Disapproved

a. Summary

The House voted against Reagan's request (HJ Res 444), 211-219, to continue U.S. military aid to the Contras. The \$36.25 million was to last through the summer of 1988.

b. Soviet Military Assistance

The estimate for 1987 Soviet bloc military assistance dropped to \$50 million. Possibly, the Soviets decided to back off a little in Central America, or Nicaragua did not need much aid after the 1986 Soviet military aid.

Overall Soviet aid was below average.

c. Sandinista Behavior

On 16 January, 1988, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega issued a statement that ended the state of emergency in Nicaragua, and he promised to participate in cease-fire talks directly with the U.S.-backed Contras. The statement also promised free elections within an established time period.

On 20 January, Ortega sent a letter to President Reagan asking that the U.S. abide by the Central American Peace Plan and stop the flow of aid to the Contras. In addition to all this, the Sandinistas released a group of political prisoners a few days prior to the 3 February vote on Contra aid.

To Congress, it looked as though Nicaragua was committed to regional peace and political reform. Everything appeared to be developing in Nicaragua and Central America just as Congress had hoped it would. Nicaragua gave Congress no choice but to oppose further Contra military aid.

The perception of Sandinista behavior was that it was acceptable.

d. Public Opinion

Table 12 shows that there was no public support of Reagan's policy toward Nicaragua.

TABLE 12

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 23-26 OCTOBER, 1987

Continue to aid Contras or see if peace plan succeeds:

<u>Continue Aid</u>	<u>See Whether Plan Succeeds</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
20%	70%	10%

Public support? No.

Table 13 is a summary of the findings of the Nicaragua case study.

I. CONCLUSIONS

Based on Table 13, it appears that "public opinion" also becomes a control variable along with budget constraints, President Reagan's policy, and the military success of the

TABLE 13
MATRIX SUMMARY OF NICARAGUA CASE STUDY

Cases	Soviet Bloc Assistance	(Control) Budget Constraints	(Control) Military Success of Contras	Public Support	(Control) Reagan's Policy	Behavior of Sandinistas	Outcome (Support)
1	Average	Constant	Constant	No data	Constant	Unacceptable	Yes
2	Above average	-	-	No	-	Unacceptable	Yes
3	Above average	-	-	No	-	Acceptable	No
4	Above average	-	-	No	-	Acceptable	No
5	Above average	-	-	No	-	Acceptable	No
6	Below average	-	-	No	-	Unacceptable	Yes
7	Average	-	-	No	-	Unacceptable	Yes
8	Above average	-	-	No	-	Unacceptable	Yes
9	Below average	-	-	No	-	Acceptable	No
10	Below average	-	-	No	-	Acceptable	No

Contras, since the public never agreed with Reagan's handling of the situation in Nicaragua during the research period.

Of the two remaining independent variables, "perceived behavior of the Sandinistas" is perfectly correlated to the congressional support variable on the matrix. All five of the "yes" votes supporting Contra aid occurred during periods of unacceptable Sandinista behavior. Likewise, all five of the "no" votes occurred during periods of acceptable behavior.

There appears to be no correlation between "Soviet Bloc assistance" and "congressional support." In three cases when Soviet assistance was above average, Congress voted against Contra aid.

Based on the findings, the conclusion of the Nicaragua case study is that the behavior of the Sandinista government as perceived by Congress is the most powerful determinant as to whether or not Congress supports a security assistance (military aid) package for the Contras. Although many factors are certainly involved in the process of getting a security assistance package through Congress, for congressional support of Contra aid, the most important is congressional perception of Sandinista behavior.

III. EL SALVADOR

El Salvador provides another important example of how Congress is involved in the process of transferring arms to Third World countries. Like Nicaragua, it is located in close proximity to the United States. That is where the similarities end between the two countries from the standpoint of an analysis of congressional support for military aid.

El Salvador differs from the Nicaragua case in one very important aspect. In the case of El Salvador, the U.S. aid was given to an established government in order to support that government's fight against leftist guerrillas trying to undermine its attempts to form a truly democratic society. In Nicaragua recall that it was the guerrillas who were supported by the U.S.

A. BACKGROUND

Starting with the October 1979 coup against General Carlos Humberto Romero, then President of El Salvador, by progressive elements in the armed forces, there have been a series of power shifts in the government of El Salvador. In March 1984 Christian Democrat Jose' Napoleon Duarte, a strong U.S. supporter, won the presidential election in El Salvador. Since then, there have been no leadership changes in the Salvadoran government other than during the March

1985 elections in which the Christian Democrats also gained control of the assembly and municipalities.

Since guerrilla organizations joined forces to form the Farabundo Marti-Front for National Liberation (FMLN) in 1980, they have been active against Salvadoran government forces. These leftist guerrillas have received military aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba via Nicaragua.

Other strong opposition to Duarte's government has come from the extreme right-wing parties led by Roberto D'Aubuisson, reputed death squad leader. Human rights would probably suffer greatly under his brand of leadership.

Both Congress and President Reagan have favored a moderate democratic Salvadoran government led by the Christian Democrats. However, during Reagan's presidency, he and Congress have not been in agreement on how to deal with El Salvador. Looking at arms transfers from the U.S. to El Salvador and the associated issues, one can again see Congress trying to assert itself in foreign policy matters.

B. THE DEBATE IN CONGRESS

During the 1982-1986 period, the discussion in Congress concerning military aid to El Salvador centered around different issues than those emphasized by the Reagan administration. By reading through the El Salvador-related congressional hearings, it is easy to see where the attention of Congress was focused. A crude content analysis was

conducted, in which the type and frequency of questions asked of administration officials were monitored.

In the case of El Salvador during 1982 and 1983, the major focus of Congress was on the biannual presidential certifications. These certifications were required by the Solarz-Bingham amendment passed by Congress in 1981. The legislation required President Reagan to certify every six months that:

(1) the government of El Salvador is making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights:

(2) the government of El Salvador is achieving substantial control over all elements of the Salvadoran forces in order to bring to an end the murder and torture of Salvadoran citizens:

(3) the government of El Salvador is making progress in implementing economic and political reforms, including the land reform program:

(4) the government of El Salvador is committed to the holding of free elections at an early date and has made efforts to begin discussions with all major factions which have declared a willingness to search for an equitable political solution to the conflict:

(5) the government of El Salvador has made good faith efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the murders of six U.S. citizens in El Salvador in December 1980 and January 1981. [Ref. 23:p. 2]

Before President Reagan could give military aid to El Salvador, he had to certify that the above conditions were being met.

The requirement for a presidential certification was an issue in itself. Administration officials, of course, argued that Congress was hampering the President's ability

to conduct effective foreign policy. Reagan also had some support from Congress on the issue of certification: Representative Philip Crane from Illinois gave the following statement during the February 1983 hearing on the third presidential certification on progress in El Salvador:

...I think certification is a bad business. The truth of the matter is that while I have jealously attempted to guard prerogatives of the legislative branch of government, I think this is one area where one must place confidence in the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, in negotiating foreign policy, and there is a certification process that must go through the minds of those policy makers within the executive branch before making recommendations to Congress....And I think the certification process really potentially at least restricts the capability of the Chief Executive to make decisions in that one paramount area of responsibility he has, and that is to look to the broader interests of these United States in international affairs. [Ref. 24:p. 5]

The administration had additional gripes about the certification process. As stated by Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliot Abrams in a January 1984 hearing, the administration believed that the certification requirement had a built-in incentive for the violent right and left to increase their activities at certification time in an effort to get the U.S. to cut its support for the democratic center. Also, certification failed to ask some key questions about El Salvador such as whether or not a total aid cutoff would improve the human rights situation or risk a guerrilla victory. [Ref. 25:p. 18]

Prior to 1984, Congress typically responded to criticisms of the certification requirement by saying that

it was needed to apply some internal domestic pressure on El Salvador to become politically and socially more democratic. [Ref. 24:p. 2]

After 1984, Congress reduced the certification requirements. The reason fewer restrictions were placed on aid to El Salvador was a desire on the part of Congress to show support for President Duarte who won the presidential election held in May 1984. [Ref. 13:p. 85]

Some groups sought to have Congress declare Reagan's 1982 and 1983 certifications null and void. For instance, there were 54 members of Congress who signed a letter to Reagan asking him to retract his first certification of February 1982. They asked him to do so because of the great disparity between what the certification reported as the facts on progress in El Salvador and what other human rights organizations reported as the true facts. [Ref. 23:p. 20] And in February 1983, Representative Studds submitted a statement co-sponsored by over 80 Members of the House calling for the Third certification to be declared null and void.

The reason for the above actions was that groups such as the Civil Liberties Union, the Americas Watch Committee, and the Catholic Church were citing much less favorable human rights statistics than was the Reagan administration. Also, there were many eyewitness accounts by Salvadoran refugees

of brutal acts committed by Salvadoran troops against innocent civilians.

Administration officials were quick to respond to accusations that President Reagan was following the letter of the certification requirement but not the intent. The administration argued that the requirement was not that the goals had to be achieved before military aid could be given; the requirement was that El Salvador had to be making progress toward the goals. [Ref. 26:p. 15]

The most important issues to Congress, based on how often they surfaced in the hearings and debates, were human rights, elections, and land reforms. From 1982 to 1986 any talk in Congress about El Salvador was dominated by these issues.

Much less attention was paid to the issues of Soviet military assistance to the leftist guerrillas, cuts in the foreign aid budget, and the military success of the Salvadoran forces. Congress placed no requirement on Reagan to certify Soviet support of or Salvadoran victory against the leftists. And, restrictions on the U.S. foreign aid budget weren't mentioned until after 1984.

In terms of certification requirements, human rights held center stage in Congress. The interesting fact is that human rights died down as an issue after 1984. No requirement was levied on President Reagan to certify human rights in El Salvador after 1984. Assistant Secretary of State for

Inter-American Affairs Langhorne Motley had the following to say during the March 1985 hearings on foreign assistance legislation for fiscal years 1986-1987:

Actually, the interesting part is that the focus is not that much on it any more, because it's been a dramatic, dramatic decline since 1981, and nobody's really arguing that issue any more. It's rare to get a question on human rights violations in El Salvador these days, as opposed to a year ago in this forum and in other places, it would focus totally on it. [Ref. 27:p. 110]

Usually included in the discussion on human rights, the Salvadoran government's control over its own forces made for much controversy. Right-wing elements in the Salvadoran security forces, which included the notorious "death squads," were responsible for acts of internal terror that claimed the lives of many innocent civilians. Four nuns who were U.S. citizens were murdered by the Salvadoran National Guard in December 1980, and two U.S. AFL-CIO land reform representatives were killed in January 1981. The acts of terror so touched Congress that the Solarz-Bingham amendment required President Reagan to certify that significant efforts were being made to bring those responsible for the deaths of the U.S. citizens to justice. [Ref. 2:p. 40]

An interesting discussion on the issue of control over Salvadoran security forces took place during the February 1982 certification hearings. After Congressman Bingham asked Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders about the state of government controls over internal violence in El Salvador, Congressman Dornan interceded. He asked his

colleagues if they would cut off aid to Canada, Ireland, and Great Britain because of the acts of terror committed by groups internal to those countries but uncontrolled by them. [Ref. 23:p. 60] Progress in the area of government control over its security forces remained an important issue to Congress when it considered aid proposals to El Salvador throughout the case period.

Free elections and democratic institutions lost momentum as major issues after Duarte was elected in 1984. Congress did, however, continue to push El Salvador to improve its judicial system. They stressed the importance of the improvement in their deliberations on military aid for El Salvador.

Land reform held congressional interest over the entire 1982-1986 period, and it remained as a condition on military aid to El Salvador. Congress believed that the parceling of land to peasant families would have a major impact on reducing the poverty level and boosting the economy of El Salvador.

Finally, Congress sought originally to bring about a quick political solution to the civil strife in El Salvador by requiring the Salvadoran government to make good-faith efforts to enter into discussions with the leftist guerrillas. By allowing the rebels to present their own candidates and participate in the upcoming solutions, they would be given a voice in the governing of El Salvador. As pointed

out in the first certification hearings of February 1982, the guerrillas responded by burning down town halls and threatening to kill anybody with voting ink on his fingers. [Ref. 23:p. 28]

Even with the resistance to any dialogue between the guerrillas and the government of El Salvador, Congress continued to push for a dialogue through 1986. Prior to 1984, the reason Congress required the government of El Salvador to pursue negotiations was to bring about leftist participation in the elections. [Ref. 23:p. 28] After 1984, the military stalemate that existed in El Salvador forced the realization that a political solution was the only way to keep the war from dragging out.

C. HYPOTHESES

As in the Nicaragua case study, the idea proposed is that Congress uses military aid to influence the behavior of some government. The dependent variable is the level of approval of security assistance for El Salvador.

The independent variables are: Soviet bloc assistance to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador; foreign aid budget constraints; the military success of the Salvadoran armed forces; U.S. public opinion regarding Reagan's foreign policy toward El Salvador; behavior of client's enemy (rebels); and perceived behavior of the Salvadoran government. It is hypothesized, as in the Nicaraguan cases, that the latter variable is the most important.

D. METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in the El Salvador case study will differ slightly from that used for Nicaragua. A content analysis of congressional sources will still be the backbone of the analysis used to determine the overall attitude in Congress. However, instead of using specific congressional votes as the case to be studied, though, five fiscal years (1982-1986) will be used. Since Congress never totally rejected any of Reagan's requests, there is no clear-cut delineation between approval and disapproval of military aid in the case of El Salvador.

As in the Nicaragua case study, all of the selected cases, the five fiscal years (1982-1986), occurred during the Reagan presidency between 1981 and 1988. This allowed the researcher to control for the political environment within the U.S.

E. OUTCOME VARIABLE

Congressional support for military aid requested for El Salvador is the dependent variable. It will be measured differently than it was in the Nicaragua study.

Instead of the crystal clear method of counting congressional votes, a grading system has to be employed in which support for a given fiscal year is measured based on how it compares to the other years in the group of cases. Total dollar amount approved, percentage of total request approved, and any restrictions will have to be taken into

account in ranking the five years according to the level of support in each.

There are certainly many ways to operationalize congressional support, but this research will do it by ranking the five fiscal years that make up the cases from 1 to 5. The year that gets ranked number 1 had the lowest level of support for military aid, and the year that gets ranked number 5 had the highest.

The amounts of requested and approved military aid were determined from congressional sources including the Congressional Quarterly Almanac and selected fiscal year appropriations hearings.

F. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

1. President Reagan's Policy

As in the Nicaragua case study, this research will take a close look at the changes in Reagan's policy toward El Salvador to see if any correlation exists between his policy and congressional support.

2. Behavior of Salvadoran Government

As in the case of Nicaragua, it is no easy task to operationalize the behavior of the Salvadoran government. Determining degrees of good or bad behavior is so arbitrary that it would be extremely difficult for the researcher to keep any biases out of the grading system. To avoid such a pitfall this study will categorize Salvadoran behavior as either "acceptable" or "unacceptable" to Congress. The same

criteria used for categorizing behavior in the Nicaragua case study will also apply here. Again, by becoming more general, this analysis should improve the reliability and validity of the measurement of behavior.

3. Soviet Bloc Assistance to the Leftist Guerrillas

Since no published data exist that give the yearly dollar amount of aid received by the leftist guerrillas, it will not be possible to handle this variable the same way it was handled for Nicaragua. It will be discussed as an alternate hypothesis later in the paper.

4. Budget Constraints

The idea here is to determine if foreign aid budget constraints had any effect on the level of aid approved for El Salvador. By researching the foreign assistance legislation for each fiscal year, any relationship between constraints and support can be determined. This hypothesis will also be covered later.

5. Military Success of the Salvadoran Government

There is virtually no hard data in this case by which military success can be measured. The best that can be done is to read through the pertinent hearings to see what was said by DOD personnel, or anyone else, concerning the military success of the Salvadoran forces against the rebels.

6. U.S. Public Opinion

Public opinion data were easily obtained from Gallup Poll surveys on U.S. policy toward El Salvador and Central America. The public either approved or disapproved or had no opinion of Reagan's policy.

7. Behavior/Activity of Rebel Forces

What effect did the activity of the leftist rebels have on the level of congressional support of military aid for El Salvador? This study will test this alternate hypothesis, so that the El Salvador case study can be compared to the Nicaragua case study, in which the primary determinant of congressional support was believed to be the behavior or activity of the U.S. client's enemy, the Sandinista government.

G. CONTROL VARIABLES

As the research was being done, the following independent variables were determined to be constant for all cases and became control variables.

1. President Reagan's Policy

Just as President Reagan has been constant and hard-line in his foreign policy stance toward Nicaragua, so has he been toward El Salvador. From the time President Reagan took office, his administration's stated intention has been to "draw the line" against communism in El Salvador. [Ref. 2:p. 175] In March of 1983, Reagan warned that the domino

effect would claim Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama if El Salvador fell to the communists. [Ref. 7:p. 157]

2. Soviet Bloc Assistance to Leftist Guerrillas

This research would be incomplete if the relationship between Soviet bloc assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas and U.S. aid to the Salvadoran government was not researched and discussed. Unlike the Nicaragua case study, there is no substantial published data by which the independent variable, Soviet bloc assistance, can be quantified. In fact, as will be brought up later in this discussion, there is a good possibility that no definitive evidence exists within the U.S. intelligence community.

When Congress first started pressing Reagan on the issue of military aid to the Contras of Nicaragua in 1981 and 1982, the administration said that the primary reason for the aid was to help the Contras stop the flow of arms to Salvadoran guerrillas from the Sandinistas. During the February 1982 hearing on the first certification concerning military aid to El Salvador, Congress confronted administration officials with a January 1982 editorial from The New York Times. The article had the following to say in response to Secretary Haig's assertion that the flow of Soviet arms through Cuba and Nicaragua had significantly increased:

...No Cuban "advisors" or sizable caches of Soviet weapons have been seen by American correspondents in El Salvador. Nor does the State Department add much weight when its obviously pained spokesman says: "I don't have

anything specific for you at the moment other than to indicate that the statements represent a clear consensus by those accumulating and assessing data." [Ref. 21:p. 7]

When Congress kept pressing in 1982 to see real evidence of arms shipments, the administration revised the justification for Contra military aid to include pressuring the Sandinistas to keep their promises of democracy as a primary goal. [Ref. 20:Section II, p. 6]

In June 1984, shortly after defecting from the CIA, David MacMichael who worked as a CIA analyst from 1981-1983 gave Congress cause to have further doubts concerning Soviet military aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas. He claimed that no evidence existed that could link the Soviets or Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador other than the sightings of small aircraft flying at night from Nicaragua to El Salvador. Later, an intelligence official confirmed that it was true that no shipments had been interdicted. MacMichael said he quite the CIA because of pressure to bend information to fit policy. [Ref. 20:Section II, p. 6]

Indications are that Congress was very suspicious of efforts to make the situation in El Salvador out to be an East-West issue. Certainly, the rise in congressional support for military aid to El Salvador after 1983 could not be attributed to increased Soviet aid to the leftist rebels, since little evidence existed to show that there was any Soviet assistance at all. The rebels were apparently

getting what additional arms they needed from the Salvadoran army. [Ref. 30:p. 53]

3. Military Success of the Salvadoran Government

Debate concerning the possibility of a decisive military victory by either the Salvadoran forces against the leftist rebels or vice versa appeared in two varied phases. The assumptions of the debate prior to 1984 differed significantly from those after 1984.

Prior to 1984, the question that Congress put to Reagan's administration was how much money was going to have to be given to El Salvador in military aid before the Salvadoran forces could totally defeat the guerrillas. When Secretary of State Haig suggested that outnumbered guerrillas were beating an American-equipped army, there was an element of shock. It was hard to believe that a better equipped army of 18,000 was possibly losing to a force of about 6000 rebels. [Ref. 21:p. 7]

During the February 1982 hearings on the first presidential certification concerning military aid to El Salvador, Senator Zorinsky of Nebraska asked Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders the following question about how much money would be needed to defeat the guerrillas: "In order to get it over with, in order to tell the American people this is not a leech that has attached itself to our country and that will economically drain us for many years to come, what is the bottom

line?" [Ref. 21:p. 30] Mr. Enders answered by saying that military victory was not the goal. Rather, the goal was to help the Salvadoran government to prevent the guerrillas from disrupting the political and social progress. [Ref. 21:p. 30]

As was brought out in the hearing on the third presidential certification in February 1983, another incident took place that probably relieved some stress on Congress concerning the possibility of a leftist victory. On 9 January, Fidel Castro said in an interview in La Prensa that the leftist guerrillas could not win militarily in El Salvador; they would have to win it through negotiation. [Ref. 22:p. 10]

Beginning in 1984, the Salvadoran army showed significant improvements in size, firepower, and proficiency. The leftist guerrillas responded by reducing the size of its units, spreading them throughout the countryside, and rendezvousing the scattered units for large concentrated operations. The stalemate that resulted ended any talk or hope of a quick victory by the Salvadoran forces. [Ref. 2:p. 195]

Based on the above evidence, it can be argued that the possibility of a military victory by either side was not a factor in determining the level of congressional support for military aid for El Salvador. Prior to 1984, when statements were made suggesting the possibility of a rebel

victory, congressional support for military aid was at its lowest levels. On the other hand, congressional support was at its highest levels after 1983 when all concerned accepted the likelihood of a prolonged civil war. During the period of this case study, the military situation as perceived by Congress was constant for both sides.

4. Behavior/Activity of Rebel Forces

The behavior of the rebel forces, during the period of this case study, was always perceived to be unacceptable by Congress. Here was a group of Marxist-Leninist guerrillas who opposed democracy in El Salvador. In early 1982, the leftist guerrillas even stated that they would kill anyone who participated in upcoming elections in El Salvador. [Ref. 23:p. 237] The threat of a communist victory in El Salvador is certainly what kept military aid going to El Salvador, but that threat was constant.

In January 1982, leftist guerrillas attacked Ilopango Air Force Base in El Salvador, destroying five U.S. Huey helicopters that had been loaned to El Salvador. This action prompted President Reagan to send \$55.0 million in emergency military aid to El Salvador. In June 1985, when four U.S. marines were killed at a restaurant by the guerrillas, President Reagan did not send emergency aid. He did not have to; Congress was giving him almost all the aid he asked for.

Had Congress truly been following the activity of the rebel forces, it would have placed an additional requirement on President Reagan to report to Congress on the behavior of the rebels. Instead, Congress seemed to be worried more about the activity of the far right factions in El Salvador. The certification process dealt with human rights, control of government forces and death squads, and free elections. Never did Congress tell the rebels that aid would be increased unless they stopped trying to overthrow the government.

H. CASES

1. Case #1, Fiscal Year 1982

a. Summary of Military Aid

Total military aid to El Salvador for fiscal year 1982 was \$82.0 million. A \$27.0 million request was approved by Congress and included in a foreign aid appropriations bill (PL97-121), cleared in December 1981. Reagan used his emergency "Defense drawdown" power to send an additional \$55.0 million to El Salvador in January 1982 in response to a guerrilla attack on a military airfield outside of San Salvador. [Ref. 13:p. 76]

Reagan later requested an additional \$35.0 million for El Salvador in the fiscal 1982 supplemental (HR6863-PL97-257). The full amount was rejected.

For fiscal years 1982 and 1983, Congress saddled the Reagan administration with major certification

requirements before military aid could be given to El Salvador. S1196 required the following:

- Certification by President Reagan that the junta in El Salvador be "achieving substantial control" over its armed forces;
- An effort by the Salvadoran government to demonstrate good faith efforts to begin talks with all major political factions to find a nonviolent solution to political problems;
- Certification by President Reagan that the government of El Salvador was making a significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights; and
- Free elections to be conducted as soon as possible along with the ending of extremist violence on all sides.
[Ref. 23:p. 2]

Congressional support ranking for 1982 is 1.

b. Budget Constraints

In order to determine what effect fluctuations in the foreign aid budget had on the amount of military aid given to El Salvador each year, this research will simply observe the increases or decreases in the foreign aid budget from year to year and look to see if the level of aid to El Salvador responds likewise. The Defense Department "draw-down" money used by President Reagan to give emergency military aid to El Salvador in 1982 and 1984 will not be included in these calculations, since the money represents no reflection of budget constraints. Table 14 shows the change from 1981 to 1982 in the El Salvador military aid budget relative to the change in the total foreign aid budget.

TABLE 14

CHANGE IN EL SALVADOR MILITARY AID BUDGET RELATIVE TO THE
CHANGE IN THE TOTAL FOREIGN AID BUDGET: 1981 TO 1982

<u>Foreign Aid Budget</u>	<u>Percentage (%) Increase/decrease from Previous Year</u>
Total: \$11,469,221,970	195% increase
El Salvador (Military Aid): \$27,000,000	257% increase

Was there an increase in military aid for El
Salvador to correspond with the increase in foreign aid?
Yes.

Congressional support? Yes.

c. Public Opinion (FY 1982)

Tables 15 and 16 show that there was no public
support for Reagan's El Salvador policy.

TABLE 15

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 2-5 OCTOBER, 1981

Reagan's handling of El Salvador:

<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
22%	32%	46%

TABLE 16

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 12-15 MARCH, 1982

Reagan's handling of situation in El Salvador

<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
22%	50%	28%

Public support? No.

d. Government Behavior

There was not very much for Congress to applaud in the way of developments in El Salvador since the 1979 coup. A review of the February 1982 certification on El Salvador provides the necessary insight as to Congressional perceptions in FY 1982.

There were a few key issues that easily dominated the course of the hearing: the murder of four American nuns by national guardsmen in December 1981; human rights violations in El Salvador; and government control of Salvadoran forces.

The 1980 murder of the American churchwomen caused a great deal of anger in Congress. Congress was upset enough that a requirement that the Salvadoran national guardsmen involved in the killings were being brought to justice was added to the Solarz-Bingham amendment passed in 1981. During the first hearing on the presidential certification, Congresswoman Oaker of Ohio had this to say about the lack of progress in the investigation: "But I don't

think we have any real knowledge of whether we are going to see a trial take place and the actual individuals responsible for the orders, and so forth, in the near future, to say the least." [Ref. 23:p. 68]

Related to the issue of the murdered nuns was the question of Duarte's control over Salvadoran security forces. Based on the fact that the level of government-related violence increased from 1980 to 1981, Congress was upset by Reagan's certification in which he avoided the issue of control of Salvadoran security forces. Amnesty International, the Catholic Church, and other groups attributed most of the 1981 civilian deaths to the right wing factions in the security forces. Congressman Bingham had this to say concerning Duarte's control over his own forces:

One of the key points as far as military assistance is concerned is whether Duarte is in control of the security forces. In this very room when he was here I asked him whether he was in control of the security forces, and he turned and relayed the question to Colonel Garcia. I did not think that was a very promising way of handling the matter. [Ref. 12:p. 57]

As far as human rights were concerned, every group imaginable, except for administration officials, cited figures that showed an increase in civilian deaths due to human rights violations. Many in Congress were upset by what seemed to be an attempt by the Reagan administration to gloss over El Salvador's human rights record. In fact, 54

members of Congress signed a letter asking Reagan to withdraw his certification.

The perception of government behavior was that it was unacceptable.

2. Case 2, Fiscal Year 1983

a. Summary of Military Aid

Reagan requested a total of \$136.3 million in military aid for El Salvador in fiscal year 1983: \$76.5 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) loans; \$58.5 million in Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants; and \$1.3 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET) aid. Much of the request, \$110 million, was presented to Congress on March 10 as part of an emergency package of military and economic aid for various Central American nations.

Congress ultimately approved \$81.3 million in military aid for El Salvador in fiscal 1983. The \$81.3 million included the following: \$26.3 million in loans and grants under a continuing resolution (PL97-377); \$30 million in "reprogrammed" loans which were transferred from other countries in April 1983 with the approval of both Appropriations Committees and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and \$25 million in grants approved in an omnibus fiscal 1983 supplemental appropriations bill (PL98-63). The amount of aid approved was about 60 percent of the total requested.

On 12 May Congress voted to continue the PL97-113 requirement that Reagan present a statement to Congress concerning the conditions in El Salvador twice a year. On top of the restrictions mentioned in PL97-113, Congress voted to prohibit the president from using his emergency powers to provide any further aid to El Salvador without congressional approval.

Congressional support ranking for 1983 is 2.

b. Budget Constraints

Table 17 relates the change in the El Salvador budget to the change in total foreign aid.

TABLE 17

CHANGE IN EL SALVADOR BUDGET COMPARED TO CHANGE
IN TOTAL FOREIGN AID, FY 1983

<u>Foreign Aid Budget</u>	<u>Percentage (%) Increase/decrease from Previous Year</u>
Total: \$11,231,729,565	2% decrease
El Salvador (Military Aid): \$81,000,000	301% increase

Military aid for El Salvador increased while the foreign aid budget decreased.

Congressional support? Yes.

c. Public Opinion

Tales 18 and 19 show no public support of military aid for El Salvador.

TABLE 18

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 11-14 MARCH, 1983

Should Congress approve Reagan's request for an additional \$60 million in military aid for El Salvador?

<u>Should</u>	<u>Should Not</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
22%	68%	10%

TABLE 19

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 29 JULY-1 AUGUST, 1983

Should the U.S. give military aid to governments in Central America that are friendly to us?

<u>Give Military Aid</u>	<u>Don't Get Involved</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
35%	55%	10%

Public support? No.

d. Government Behavior

It is apparent to anyone who reads through the second and third presidential certifications of August 1982 and March 1983, respectively, how frustrated Congress was with El Salvador. As in the first certification hearing, Congress focussed on the issues that required certification by President Reagan.

Since the first presidential certification in January 1982, there was no improvement in the human rights record of El Salvador. During the hearing on Reagan's second certification, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on

Inter-American Affairs, Congressman Barnes, had this to say about the human rights situation: "It may be that the Government of El Salvador is making a concerted and significant effort to comply with international human rights. If that is so, it is not apparent from the result." [Ref. 28:p. 13] Congressman Studds, in a prepared statement regarding the third certification, brought up the fact that civilian deaths reported by the State Department amounted to half the amount reported by the Catholic Church. He also noted that even the administration admitted that "disappearances remained steady during the past six months, and that the rate of decline in civilian deaths slowed during the same period." [Ref. 26:p. 6]

At the time of the third certification, it appeared to Congress as though the Salvadoran government still had no control over its own forces. Based on verifiable evidence from numerous sources that implicated the Salvadoran Army and National Police in recent massacres, kidnappings, and cases of torture, Congressman Studds said the following: "I do not understand how the Secretary of State or the President could conclude from this evidence that the armed forces of El Salvador are putting an end to the torture and killing of the Salvadoran people." [Ref. 26:p. 9]

The program for land reform, initiated and supported by Congress, was showing no progress. While

reviewing Reagan's second certification in the summer of 1982, Chairman Barnes said, "Contrary to what the report would have us believe, all the information that I get from the people closest to the land reform program, for example, is that the program is dead." [Ref. 28:p. 13]

In March 1983, there was still no justice done in the case of the American nuns who were murdered in 1980. This upset many in Congress; Congressman Yatron, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, said, "I also want to express my disappointment over the latest ruling by the Salvadoran Appeals Court declaring that there is presently insufficient evidence to bring the five national guardsmen accused of murdering the American churchwomen to trial." [Ref. 26:p. 328]

The only bright spot in the certifications of progress in El Salvador was the fact that many voters turned out for the March 1982 Constituent Assembly elections. This may have been overshadowed by the fact that Roberto D'Aubuisson, reputed death squad leader, became President of the Assembly. In May 1982, he called a halt to the land reform program.

The perception of government behavior was that it was unacceptable.

3. Case #3, Fiscal Year 1984

a. Summary of Military Aid

President Reagan originally requested, in February 1983, \$86.3 million in military aid for El Salvador in fiscal year 1984. Later, in February 1984, Reagan submitted a supplemental request for \$176.7 million on top of the \$64.8 million that had already been approved by Congress. This supplemental request was part of an aid package for Central America.

Congress approved a total of \$196.55 million in military aid for El Salvador: \$64.8 million in a continuing appropriations resolution (PL98-151) approved in November 1983; \$61.76 million in a supplemental spending bill (PL98-332) approved in June 1984; and \$70 million included in the final supplemental (PL98-396) approved in August 1984. Approved aid was about 74 percent of requested aid.

During action on fiscal year 1984 foreign aid legislation, Congress added two more conditions to those already placed on military aid for El Salvador. First, Congress adopted a proposal by Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Pennsylvania, to withhold 30 percent of the total aid approved in the continuing resolution (PL98-151) until Salvadoran authorities substantially concluded the investigation of the murder of four American nuns in December 1980. The accused had to be brought to trial and a verdict reached. Second, 10 percent was to be withheld until Reagan certified that no

alterations had been made to the land reform program in El Salvador that would not be in the interest of the intended beneficiaries of the program.

Congressional support ranking for 1984 is 5.

b. Budget Constraints

Table 20 compares the two budgets, El Salvador military aid and foreign aid.

TABLE 20

EL SALVADOR MILITARY AID AND FOREIGN AID BUDGETS, FY 1984

<u>Foreign Aid Budget</u>	<u>Percentage (%) Increase/decrease from Previous Year</u>
Total: \$11,468,401,636	2% increase
El Salvador (Military Air): \$164,500,000	202% increase

The percentage increase of security assistance (military aid) was much greater than the percentage increase of the foreign aid budget.

Congressional support? Yes.

c. Public Opinion

Tables 21 and 22 show no public support of Reagan's El Salvador policy.

TABLE 21

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 11-15 APRIL, 1984

Should the U.S. give military aid to governments in
Central America that are friendly to us?

<u>Give Military Aid</u>	<u>Don't Get Involved</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
39%	49%	12%

TABLE 22

GALLUP POLL: POLL TAKEN 18-21, 1984

Reagan's handling of situation in El Salvador:

<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
28%	49%	23%

Public support? No.

d. Government Behavior

Based on the content analysis of congressional sources, there are two phases of Salvadoran government behavior as perceived by Congress. Key players on the Foreign Affairs Committees spoke differently on the El Salvador issue prior to the March 1984 presidential elections than they did after.

Prior to the presidential elections in El Salvador, Congress exhibited the same degree of frustration as in the cases for FY 1982 and FY 1983. During a January 1984 hearing on El Salvador, the same Congressmen who dominated the certification hearings of 1982 and 1983 seemed

to be saying pretty much the same things they said earlier in regard to human rights, death squad activities, land reform, etc.

During a February 1984 hearing on Henry Kissinger's National Bipartisan Report on Central America, Congress expressed concern over the upcoming March election in El Salvador. The concern was that it might be a victory of the extreme right if D'Aubuisson won. Already in 1982, El Salvador was moved further to the right because of the elections held in March 1982 in which rightwing parties gained control of the Constituent Assembly. [Ref. 29:p. 40]

On 6 May, Duarte won the presidency in a runoff election between Duarte and the rightwing leader Roberto D'Aubuisson. After he was elected, Duarte met with congressional leaders in Washington in May and July to ask Congress to give his democracy a chance by giving him the aid he needed. Duarte also promised Congress that he would respect human rights, control the military, and begin to implement the changes Congress had been demanding since 1981. [Ref. 2:p. 42]

Although he was the appointed head of the Junta government prior to his election as president, Duarte claimed that during those years he was unable to enforce any changes, because he was not an elected president. He had remained the head of the junta so long as he kept the military happy. Now, as the elected president, he argued, he

would be able to force changes in El Salvador. [Ref. 30:p. 2]

Congress was so taken with the moderate Duarte that it immediately resolved to support his efforts. Congressman Michael Barnes, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs and a previous critic of U.S. foreign policy in El Salvador, had this to say after Duarte's election: "We'll be a lot more receptive to requests from Napoleon Duarte than from a military dictatorship." [Ref. 13:p. 73] House Majority Leader Jim Wright said Congress should give Duarte all the aid he said he needed. [Ref. 13:p. 73]

Also, shortly after Duarte was elected, five former Salvadoran national guardsmen were convicted for the murders of the four American nuns in 1980.

The perception of government behavior was that it was acceptable.

Before case 4 (FY 1985) is discussed, the Kissinger Commission's influence on subsequent congressional support should receive more attention. In 1983, President Reagan created the bipartisan commission to stifle critics of his Central America policies. He wanted the commission to make recommendations to him concerning Central America. [Ref. 13:p. 70]

The Kissinger Commission concluded in January 1984 that the U.S. needed to act boldly to stem the crisis

in Central America. Substantial military aid for El Salvador was one of the commission's recommendations. Congress adopted only a portion of the recommendations for increased aid to Central America in a continuing appropriations resolution for fiscal year 1985. Although the commission's report was a favorable factor in terms of increased military aid for El Salvador, some footnoted dissents by Democratic commissioners against some of the recommendations caused Democrats in Congress to view the report as "cosmetics for the Reagan policies they opposed." Optimism generated was due more to Duarte's election as president than White House efforts. [Ref. 13:p. 70]

4. Case #4, Fiscal Year 1985

a. Summary of Military Aid

President Reagan requested \$132.5 million in military aid for El Salvador in fiscal year 1985. The request was submitted for approval in the fiscal year 1985 continuing appropriations resolution (PL98-473).

Of the total request, \$128.25 million was approved by Congress: \$11.75 million in grants; \$15 million in loans; and \$1.5 million for military training. This was the largest single amount of military aid that the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations had approved in one package.

All of the previous restrictions levied on military aid to El Salvador had been lifted. Congress

placed only three relatively minor restrictions on military aid in fiscal year 1985:

- Only half of the Military Assistance Program money could be spent before 1 March, 1985 unless both the House and Senate Appropriations committees approved otherwise. President Reagan had to report to Congress about the progress made by the Salvadoran government in curbing "death squad" killings and in conducting discussions with the leftist opposition before the second half of the money could be spent.
- \$5 million was held in escrow until the Salvadoran government held a trial and obtained a verdict in the case of the two U.S. land reform workers who were killed in January 1981.
- All aid to El Salvador would be suspended if President Duarte was deposed by a military coup. [Ref. 13:p. 77]

Congressional support ranking for 1985 is 4.

b. Budget Constraints

Table 23 compares the El Salvador military aid budget to the total foreign aid budget.

TABLE 23

EL SALVADOR MILITARY AID BUDGET COMPARED TO THE
TOTAL FOREIGN AID BUDGET, FY 1985

<u>Foreign Aid Budget</u>	<u>Percentage (%) Increase/decrease from Previous Year</u>
Total: \$18,190,366,636	58% increase
El Salvador (Military Aid): \$128,250,000	22% increase

Military aid for El Salvador decreased while the foreign aid budget increased.

Congressional support? No.

c. Public Opinion

No polls concerning Reagan's handling of El Salvador, Central America, or military aid to Central America were taken during 1985. Also, research through Editorials on File came up negative for any editorials that might be indicative of public opinion concerning El Salvador.

Public support? No data.

d. Government Behavior

After Duarte won the presidential run-off election in May 1984, the situation looked promising to Congress. Duarte's behavior as President of El Salvador during the FY 1985 case was no letdown in the eyes of Congress.

In a dramatic speech delivered to the United Nations, Duarte called for a meeting with the FMLN-FDR guerrillas in October. [Ref. 2:p. 184] On 15 October, 1984, the first meeting took place between the Duarte government and the leftist rebels. A second meeting followed on 30 November at Ayagualo.

Although no differences were resolved at the meetings, Duarte did show to Congress that he could act independently of the pressure put on him by the extreme right. [Ref. 2:p. 184] Congress had been urging the two sides to talk since 1981 when the presidential

certifications included a requirement for the Salvadoran government to pursue negotiations.

As for human rights, the Americas Watch Committee had this to say during a January 1985 hearing on El Salvador:

In the period from 1979 to 1983, in particular, the security forces were responsible for an enormous number of disappearances, an enormous number of death squad killings, and a tremendous amount of torture...

The practices of the security forces have improved dramatically. [Ref. 30:p. 2]

In wrapping up the 31 January hearing on El Salvador, Congressman Solarz of New York had the following to say:

I have the sense, I think, that previous certifications were as phoney as a \$3 bill. I think it would not be all that difficult to justify some of those certifications on the basis of the contemporary situation of Salvador as distinguished from the previous reality. [Ref. 30:p. 93]

Also, on 31 March, Christian Democrats were victorious in assembly and municipal elections which gave them control of 200 of 262 municipalities. The assembly had previously been controlled by the extreme right.

The perception of government behavior was that it was acceptable.

5. Case #5, Fiscal Year 1986

a. Summary of Military Aid

For fiscal year 1986, President Reagan requested \$132.6 million in regular military aid for El Salvador.

\$113 million of the requested \$132.6 million was approved by Congress.

On 27 September, 1985, Reagan formally requested \$54 million, which include \$12 million for the Salvadoran police and \$10 million for the Salvadoran military, for Central America. Congress rejected all of the military aid for Central America but accepted \$22 million of the \$26 million requested for police aid. The request was intended to bolster certain police units against internal terrorism. This was the first time since Congress barred further aid to foreign police forces in 1974 that such aid had been given. The surprise of it was the El Salvador received much of the aid, even with its history of repression by the Salvadoran police. [Ref. 15:p. 80]

Congressional support ranking for 1986 is 3.

b. Budget Constraints

Table 24 compares the El Salvador military aid budget with total foreign aid.

TABLE 24

EL SALVADOR MILITARY AID BUDGET COMPARED WITH
TOTAL FOREIGN AID, FISCAL YEAR 1986

<u>Foreign Aid Budget</u>	<u>Percentage (%) Increase/decrease from Previous Year</u>
Total: \$15,025,319,945	17% decrease
El Salvador (Military Aid): \$113,000,000	12% decrease

Military aid for El Salvador decreased less than total foreign aid.

Congressional support? Yes.

c. Public Opinion

Again, no data exist for this case. Nicaragua was the hot foreign policy topic of the polls at the time, just as in the 1985 case.

Public support? No data.

d. Government Behavior

In February 1986, a new labor confederation, Unidad Nacional de los Trabajadores Salvadorenos (UNTS), was formed by peasant organizations, labor confederations, and unions, including representatives from the Christian Democratic party and the opposition. The forming of such a democratic institution sent a signal to Congress that democracy was making steady progress in El Salvador.

In June, President Duarte proposed a third round of peace talks with the FDR-FMLN. Also in June, United to Reconstruct, a program for repopulation of key communities, was inaugurated. Duarte was obviously trying to negotiate with his opposition and implement much needed reform in El Salvador.

Not much was said in Congress about El Salvador during this period. Congress was happy with the developments in El Salvador based on the level of aid approved.

Nicaragua had moved into the spotlight in Congress after 1984.

The perception of government behavior was that it was acceptable.

Table 25 is a summary of the findings of the El Salvador case study.

I. CONCLUSIONS

It appears that public opinion could become a control variable as it did in the Nicaragua case study. Still, there is not enough data to support such a conclusion, and it is certainly possible that public opinion shifted in favor of El Salvador after democracy appeared to take hold in mid-1984.

Of the two remaining independent variables that did not fall out as control variables, only the behavior of the Salvadoran government seems to be correlated to the outcome variable, congressional support. The behavior of the Salvadoran government was perceived by Congress to be unacceptable in only two of the five cases that make up this case study. During fiscal years 1982 and 1983 the behavior was unacceptable, and congressional support of military aid was at its lowest during those two years.

Except for fiscal year 1985, security assistance for El Salvador always increased at a higher rate or decreased at a lower rate than the overall foreign aid budget. "Budget constraints" should probably be included as a control

TABLE 25
MATRIX SUMMARY OF EL SALVADOR CASE STUDY

Cases	(Control) Reagan's Policy	(Control) Soviet Assistance	Budget Constraints				(Control) Activity of Rebels	Behavior of Salvadoran Government	Outcome (Congres. Support)
			Does it reflect Congressional Support?	(Control) Military Success	Public Opinion				
1	Constant	-	Yes	Constant	No	-	Unacceptable	1 (lowest)	
2	-	-	Yes	-	No	-	Unacceptable	2	
3	-	-	Yes	-	No	-	Acceptable	5 (highest)	
4	-	-	No	-	No data	-	Acceptable	4	
5	-	-	Yes	-	No data	-	Acceptable	3	

variable. The reason fiscal year 1985 is an outlier is due to the fact that Congress approved a disproportionately high amount of security assistance for El Salvador, after the elections in El Salvador. Compared to FY 1984, FY 1985 looks relatively low in terms of dollar amount of aid given.

Like the Nicaragua case study, it appears that the behavior of the government that Congress seeks to influence is the most powerful determinant of congressional support. Therefore, in the El Salvador case study, this research shows the behavior of the Salvadoran government to be the most influential factor in determining Capital Hill support of military aid for El Salvador.

IV. SUMMARY OF NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR CASES

Congress uses arms transfers to influence the behavior of Third World governments. This study does not assert that other factors do not influence congressional support for proposed arms packages. If behavior was the only consideration, then Congress would have voted against all military aid for El Salvador during the years in which the government's behavior was labeled as "unacceptable." Even during 1982, the year in which El Salvador's behavior was at its worst, Congress gave President Reagan 41 percent of what he asked for. The reason for this is that Congress saw in Duarte and the Christian Democrats El Salvador's best hopes for becoming a democracy. Giving no aid could have meant a future victory by the communist left or a coup by the oppressive right.

What this research does assert is that the level of Congressional support for military assistance to Third World nations depends on the behavior of the government involved. The level of support can be defined by the amount of aid approved or the conditions attached to the aid by Congress. Both the Nicaragua and El Salvador case studies substantiate this assertion. A brief discussion of Chile and Pakistan will follow in support of these conclusions.

V. A LOOK AT CASES OUTSIDE OF CENTRAL AMERICA

A. CHILE

A quick look at Chile complements the more in-depth studies of Nicaragua and El Salvador in a couple of important ways. First, it adds another case study to the overall body of research. More important, though, Chile is outside of Central America, which lends more credibility to the research and makes the thesis more valid for a varied sample of Third World countries.

1. Hypothesis

The hypothesis in the discussion of Chile is in keeping with the main hypothesis of the paper. Specifically, in the case of Chile, Congress uses arms transfers as a way of trying to influence the behavior of the Chilean government.

2. Methodology

No rigorous methodology is going to be used in the discussion of Chile. Chile is being used, in this case, as an addendum to support the conclusions reached in the case studies of Nicaragua and El Salvador.

3. Discussion

In 1976, Congress banned arms transfers to Chile headed by General Augusto Pinochet. The ban was imposed due

to the Pinochet regime's poor human rights record. [Ref. 31:p. 175]

In 1981, at the beginning of Reagan's presidency, the debate concerning arms sales to Chile opened up again. Reagan pushed for military aid because he said that such positive action would encourage political reform in Chile.

Many in Congress were opposed to the aid to Chile, because they viewed the U.S. ban on military aid as a symbol of U.S. determination to protect human rights abroad. Senator Kennedy opposed repealing the ban, because Chile refused to cooperate in the U.S. investigation of the September 1976 assassination of former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. [Ref. 31:p. 176]

In the fiscal year 1982 and 1983 foreign aid authorization bill (S1196) cleared in December 1981, Congress decided to allow U.S. aid or arms sales to Chile if President Reagan could certify to Congress the following: that Chile had made significant progress in adopting internationally recognized principles of human rights; that such aid was in the U.S. national interest; that the Chilean government was not involved in international terrorism; and that the Chilean government was taking steps to cooperate in the U.S. investigation of the Letelier assassination.

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs acted in May 1984 to toughen the requirements placed on military aid to Chile in 1981. Two conditions were added to the 1981

conditions: military aid was banned unless an elected civilian government was in power in Chile; and the Chilean government had to agree to extradite alleged Nazi war criminal Walter Rauff to Israel. Congress had been calling on Pinochet to hold elections for some time. In light of his resistance to elections, Congress was acting to pressure Pinochet. [Ref. 13:p. 108]

The U.S. situation with Chile looks similar to the case of El Salvador. The difference is that El Salvador received more aid with each passing year of Reagan's presidency. The ban on military aid to Chile was lifted in 1981, but as each year passed, the conditions on any aid to Chile grew until it was impossible for Chile to get U.S. military aid. This was due to the Chilean government's refusal to be pressured by the U.S. Congress. For El Salvador, military aid became a "carrot"; for Chile, it became a "stick."

B. PAKISTAN

The reasons for including a discussion of Pakistan in this research are the same as those for including Chile. By moving the study out of Latin America and over to the Asian subcontinent, the sample becomes more varied, which lends more credibility to this research.

1. Hypothesis

Congress uses arms transfers as a tool for influencing the behavior of the Pakistani Government. Again, this

specific hypothesis adheres to the main hypothesis throughout the research.

2. Methodology

The methodology is very relaxed in the discussion of Pakistan, just as it was for Chile. A general discussion is employed to support the conclusions of the Nicaragua and El Salvador case studies.

3. Discussion

In 1979, Congress passed the Symington amendment which barred aid to Pakistan as a result of its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the potential for further aggression in the Persian Gulf, President Reagan wanted to have Pakistani assistance in resisting Soviet moves into the Persian Gulf. He, therefore, proposed a six-year \$3.2 billion aid package for Pakistan and a waiver of the Symington amendment. [Ref. 31:p. 172]

Congress accepted Reagan's proposal, but only after Senators Glenn and Helms got an amendment passed that would ban U.S. aid to any non-nuclear country that exploded a nuclear device. The amendment was designed to back-up the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy. [Ref. 31:p. 175]

In 1982, Congress passed a Senate-originated provision that would end military sales and aid to Pakistan if it transferred sensitive U.S. military equipment to a communist nation. This provision was sponsored by Senator Glenn in

response to the administration's decision to install advanced radar warning equipment on the F-16s that Pakistan was buying from the U.S. [Ref. 32:p. 246]

In October 1983, Congress passed an amendment by Paula Hawkins, R-Florida, that would suspend all aid to countries that failed to crack down on narcotics production and export. Pakistan was the world's second-largest producer of opium after Iran. President Reagan was required to submit an annual report to Congress stating that projected reductions in production and trafficking of drugs were met for the previous year and would be met for the following year.

In March 1985, an amendment was adopted that would bar aid to any country that attempted to illegally obtain U.S. material or technology to build a nuclear weapon. The amendment also required President Reagan to suspend all aid if Pakistan obtained a nuclear weapon.

The case of Pakistan provides another good example of how Congress uses arms transfers to influence the behavior of its Third World clients. In this case, Congress used arms to influence attempts by Pakistan to obtain a nuclear weapon and government policies concerning drug production and trafficking. Military aid was given originally to boost the West's strategic position in the Persian Gulf, but Congress used it more as a tool to influence the government of Pakistan as time passed.

VI. FORECASTING

As mentioned earlier in this paper, there has been renewed talk on Capital Hill about the possibility of giving military aid to the Contras again as a result of activities in Nicaragua starting in June 1988. On 10 August, the Senate approved, 49-47, a Democratic-sponsored plan that would give humanitarian aid to the Contras starting 1 October, with the possibility of a military aid vote later in the fall. By applying the general methodology developed in this research, this research will now look at the key indicators in this current case and make a prediction.

A. SANDINISTA BEHAVIOR

In March 1988, the Contras and the Sandinistas signed a ceasefire agreement and started negotiating on political reforms in Nicaragua per the Central American Peace Agreement signed last 7 August. On 9 June, the Sandinistas became unwilling to make any more concessions, so the peace talks broke down. [Ref. 33:p. 2036]

On 10 July, the Sandinistas broke up a political demonstration, jailed dozens of opposition leaders, and closed the anti-Sandinista newspaper, La Prensa. On top of that, the Sandinistas expelled U.S. Ambassador Richard Melton and seven others, alleging that Washington was encouraging opposition activity. [Ref. 33:p. 2036]

Congress reacted on 13-14 July, when both houses overwhelmingly passed resolutions condemning the Sandinista oppression against internal political opponents and the expulsion of eight U.S. diplomats. This was the strongest congressional reaction ever to be the behavior of the Sandinista government. [Ref. 33:p. 2036]

B. OTHER FACTORS

There is a U.S. presidential election coming up in November, and the politics involved are affecting the Contra-aid issue. Presidential nominee Michael Dukakis opposes Contra-aid, but his running mate, Senator Lloyd Bentsen, supports it. The Democrats united on 10 August in getting Senate approval, 49-47, for their plan largely because of the Dukakis-Bentsen split. [Ref. 34:p. 2285] The Democrats had hoped that Contra aid would not be a partisan issue in the November elections, but the Republican's unanimous vote against the humanitarian aid package destroyed that hope. The Republicans are hoping that the Contra aid issue will give them a lot of leverage in the South, where fears exist that a communist takeover in Central America will mean many more immigrants. [Ref. 34:p. 2285]

Another factor to take into consideration is that the Contra leadership has undergone some changes. During the last week in July, Col. Enrique Bermudez was elected to the seven-member directorate, the leadership of the Contras.

Bermudez is a former member of Somoza's National Guard, known for its atrocities. The concern in Congress is that the Contras might be another version of Somoza's fascist regime. [Ref. 35:p. 31]

C. PREDICTION

Although the election year politics put a different slant on this case, this paper predicts that, barring a change in the current situation, Congress will approve military aid for the Contras later in the fall. Congressional reaction in this case was stronger than it has ever been in regard to the behavior of the Sandinistas. Assuming that Sandinista behavior is the most powerful determinant as to whether or not Congress supports military aid, it is unlikely that military aid will be voted down. The Democrats who voted against military aid in February in support of the Central American Peace Plan have undoubtedly been embarrassed by the recent Sandinista oppression. They will vote for military aid as a hedge against future Sandinista misbehavior.

VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND POLICY PLANNING

The controlled comparison strategy as applied to the case studies included in this research is not new, and there is certainly the possibility that the operationalization of the variables is not optimum. So what is the value of this research?

Hopefully, by providing the analyst or planner with a structured way of looking at a prospective Third World client or security assistance package, this research will enable a planner or analyst to make a logical prediction as to how Congress will react. Such knowledge would better enable a planner to put together and present a security assistance proposal to Congress with a higher confidence of getting congressional approval.

It is always possible to think of alternate hypotheses that might better explain a phenomenon, congressional support for security assistance in this case, than the researcher originally did. The importance and utility of this work is that new variables can easily be introduced into the methodological process developed in this paper. By introducing any new variable that might explain congressional support of security assistance for a particular case, nothing is taken from the ability of a planner or analyst to generalize using the same approach.

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