Allocation of the Army's Monetary and Non-Monetary Incentives: Sensitivity to Goals, Estimation Technique, Delinkage Policy and ACF (Army College Fund) Actuarial Cost Assumptions
Abstract
In this study the sensitivity and robustness of the Enriched Enlistment Incentive Cost Allocation Model is examined in several respects. The model is used to investigate the effects of delinkage of Army College Fund (AFC) and enlistment bonuses (EB) options and the effect of guidance counselor reform. Results based on CY86 data confirm earlier cost-saving findings based on FY81- FY86 data. The model is exercised using active duty man-years rather than contracts as the manpower measure. The model suggests a somewhat different optimal mix of the ACF and EB options. The model is exercised using lower actuarial prices for the ACF option than those previously used. Results are as expected; the ACF option becomes more cost-effective. The model is re-estimated for each MOS separately rather than for 21 MOS's simultaneously. Loss in accuracy is very small, making use of the model on a personal computer feasible, thereby expanding the number of MOS's that can be examined. A program was installed at USAREC for this purpose. Recruiting, Manpower, Enlistment incentives, Army college fund, Bonuses, Military occupational specialties, (MOS) , Translog models, Seemingly unrelated regression.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 18, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA203207
Entities
People
- C. A. Lowell
- Richard C. Morey
Organizations
- Battelle Memorial Institute