


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BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES

*Report of the
Defense
Secretary's
Commission*



December 1988

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Base Realignments and Closures



Report of the Defense Secretary's Commission

December 1988

A-4

The Defense Secretary's Commission On Base Realignment and Closure

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December 29, 1988

The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On behalf of the Commission, we are pleased to transmit to you our report as required by our Charter and Public Law 100-526. This report contains our detailed findings and recommendations. We certify that the Commission has identified the military installations to be closed or realigned by reviewing all military installations inside the United States, including all military installations under construction and all those planned for construction.

We want to assure you that we undertook this task with the utmost seriousness and dedication to purpose. The recommendations in this report may not have been the only recommendations possible, but we believe that there is a sound basis for them. They reflect information received from expert witnesses, private industry, the Military Services and other elements of the Defense Department. While this input has been considerable, the results are the independent judgment of the Commission based on its own experience and expertise.

The scope and nature of our recommendations reflect the current and future requirements as we now see them, but as the nature of the threat and force structure change, new basing realignments and closures will be required. We hope that the emphasis of our report will lead to a smoother and more flexible process for these changes in the future. There is no question that implementing our proposed realignment and closure recommendations will require some fortitude, but we believe that the hard budget choices facing our nation mandate that unneeded bases be closed and realigned.

Sincerely,


Abraham Ribicoff
Co-Chairman



Jack Edwards
Co-Chairman

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Executive Summary

The Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure was chartered on May 3, 1988 to recommend military installations within the United States, its commonwealths, territories, and possessions for realignment and closure. The Congress and the President subsequently endorsed this approach through legislation that removed some of the previous impediments to successful base-closure actions.

For over a decade, the Department of Defense has been unable to improve the effectiveness of the military base structure or to realize the significant savings that might have been gained through the realignment and closure of unnecessary or underutilized military bases. This situation is largely the result of 1977 legislation that mandated Congressional approval for any closure affecting 300 or more civilian employees of the Department. In this same legislation, the Department was expressly directed to comply with the procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act for all base-closure decisions.

Despite the absence of closure actions, there is general agreement within the government that the national defense could be improved, and its cost reduced, through a more efficient military base structure. This conclusion was endorsed in 1983 by the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (the Grace Commission), which recommended that a non-partisan, independent commission be established to study the base-closure issue. The Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure was chartered in

the spirit of that recommendation.

This Commission's recommendations for closure and realignment affect 145 installations. Of this number, 86 are to be closed fully, five are to be closed in part, and 54 will experience a change, either an increase or a decrease, as units and activities are relocated. The Commission also makes several additional recommendations that address potential problems in implementing the Commission's closure and realignment recommendations and certain other matters that the Commission has discovered during its review of the military base structure.

From the outset, the Commission sought the most appropriate criteria to govern the nomination of installations for realignment or closure. While cost reduction was an important reason for its chartering, the Commission decided that the military value of a base should be the preeminent factor in making its decisions. With a primary focus on military value and improving the overall military base structure, the Commission elected not to set savings targets. Nevertheless, the Commission estimates the realignment and closure actions recommended in this report should lead to annual savings of \$693.6 million and a 20-year savings with a net present value of \$5.6 billion.

The Commission's analysis of military installations began with a review of the military force structure and its basing requirements. Representative of the kinds of installation characteristics mandated by force structure are availability of acreage and airspace for realistic combat training

and provisions for survivability of strategic forces.

The Commission found that many bases have experienced an erosion of their military value as a result of urban development. The resulting encroachment has forced the modification of missions at many installations. The acquisition of additional land, especially in less populated areas, may be needed to satisfy military requirements.

After a review of the general condition of the military base structure, the Commission began the process of selecting bases for realignment and closure. The data supporting this process were provided by the Services and validated by the Commission and its staff. Installations with similar missions were grouped together to facilitate consistent analysis. The bases were then screened to determine whether the installations were appropriately sized to support current or future requirements and whether their physical attributes were appropriate to accomplish assigned missions.

When it was determined that an installation's mission was impaired, the Commission looked at relocation alternatives. This review focused on the ability of a receiving installation to accommodate and enhance the mission of the units or activities being relocated and whether the costs of the closure and realignment package could be paid back with savings in six years.

As realignment or closure candidates were identified, the Commission took an initial look at environmental impacts. This review was not intended to be a substitute for the environmental analysis required by the Congress during actual implementation of the approved base realignments and closures. As a result of this review, the Commission found that closures generally resulted in positive impacts on the environment rather than negative ones. As individual realignment and closure actions are taken by the Secretary of Defense, full opportunity for public hearings will, of course, be provided.

Besides environmental issues, the public will also be concerned about the economic impact of base closures. The Commission reviewed the history of base closures since 1961 and found that closures were generally less traumatic than people anticipated. In many cases, Defense Department jobs have been replaced by new civilian jobs, and the bases themselves converted to civilian uses. Notwithstanding this record of success, the Commission has recommended to the Secretary of Defense several actions that should be taken to aid local communities in their redevelopment planning.

As a final task, the Commission considered the process for realigning and closing bases in the future, which will be necessary as military strategy and force structure change.

Chapter 1

Background

On May 3, 1988 Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci chartered the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure to recommend military bases within the United States, its commonwealths, territories, and possessions for realignment and closure (see Appendix A). Legislation subsequently passed by the Congress and signed by the President on October 24, 1988 endorsed this approach and provided relief from certain statutory provisions considered impediments to the completion of base closures. The legislation ("Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act"; see Appendix B) constitutes agreement between the Legislative and the Executive Branches that improvement in the military basing structure could be a means of realizing savings in the defense budget, while not impairing the ability of the armed forces to carry out their missions.

Recommendations for military base realignments and closures normally fall within the purview of the Executive Branch, operating under general policy guidance and oversight by the Congress. Nevertheless, a ten-year stalemate over base closures has led the two branches to agree that a commission be established to develop those recommendations.

The chartering of the Commission takes into account the recent history of failed attempts to realign or close bases as well as successful closure actions taken in prior years. A brief review of the base realignment and closure issue is instructive.

In the early 1960s, under the direction of President Kennedy, Secretary of Defense McNamara developed and subsequently implemented the most extensive base realignment and closure program in the history of the United States. Hundreds of base closures and realignments took place during this period, and more than 60 major bases were closed. Criteria governing bases selected for closure were established primarily within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with minimal consultation with the Military Services or the Congress.

The Congress had not anticipated the broad extent of these actions, and their cumulative political impact was substantial. With very few exceptions, the closure actions were viewed negatively by the Congress, especially since the announcement of base closures was made immediately after the 1964 elections, while the Congress was in recess.

In its next session, the Congress passed legislation setting up reporting requirements designed to involve itself in any DoD base-closure program. The proposal was vetoed by President Johnson. The confrontation between the two branches of government continued to grow. Despite this situation, the Department of Defense was able to complete base realignments and closures routinely throughout the 1960s.

During the early 1970s, the Department found it increasingly difficult to realign or close installations due to repeated attempts

by the Congress to regulate the base-closing process and to limit or deny base-closing funding. In 1976, the Military Construction Authorization Bill contained a provision prohibiting any base closure or reduction of more than 250 civilian employees until the Department had notified Congress of the proposed actions, assessed the personnel and economic impacts, followed the study provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, and waited nine months. This bill was vetoed by President Ford and the Congressional veto override effort failed.

Subsequently, however, President Carter approved legislation requiring the Department to notify Congress that a base is a candidate for reduction or closure; prepare local economic, environmental, and strategic consequence reports; and wait 60 days for Congress' response. This legislation, which also required Congressional approval for any closure affecting 300 or more civilian employees of the Department, effectively brought base closures to a halt.

Since passage of this legislation over a decade ago, there has not been a single major base closure. All attempts at closing major installations have met with failure, and even proposed movements of small military units have been frustrated. Since then, force structure changes and the assignment of new missions to marginal installations, supported by large capital expenditures, have reduced many opportunities for future closures.

Given that situation, the incumbent administration has discussed with the Congress but not pursued the development of a comprehensive proposal recommending base closures to Congress. The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (The Grace Commission)

included in its 1983 report a finding that economies could be made in the base structure and recommended that a non-partisan, independent commission be established to study the base-closure issue in a less constrained process and submit a list of closures.

In sum, the current stalemate between the Legislative and the Executive Branches has made it virtually impossible to close any military installation and realize the resultant savings in the defense budget. In addition to straining relations between two branches of government, this stalemate has increased the cost of national defense. These increases, which are not always measurable, flow from inefficiencies such as the requirement for units to travel hundreds of miles to adequate training areas, the necessity for extensive command-and-control systems to ensure coordination of split functions, and the need for senior management to spend time dealing with administrative problems created by an inefficient base structure--time that would be more properly devoted to mission-related activities. In some cases, the Department has been obligated not only to keep certain marginal installations active, with all the attendant operating costs, but also to use severely limited military construction funds either to bring facilities up to standard or to enable the installations to be more fully utilized.

The importance of an efficient military base structure cannot be overstated. The base structure can remain efficient only if the difficult decisions to close and realign bases can be made on a timely basis. The Commission has made a number of such decisions. In addition to achieving documented savings, the Commission's recommendations will alleviate some of the problems discussed above, leading to improved mission effectiveness.

Chapter 2

The Commission

The Commission was composed of 12 individuals from varied backgrounds (see Appendix C). All have had experience in dealing with complex public-policy issues. In many cases, they brought to the task a first-hand knowledge of military matters, and all have had extensive experience in organizational settings that has provided them with a perspective on how to improve processes. The Commission functioned in a non-partisan manner, and was supported by a professional staff (see Appendix D).

In organizing to accomplish its tasks, as defined in its charter and companion legislation, the Commission established a number of parameters to govern its work. Significant to its decisions was the selection of military value as preeminent among the criteria governing nomination of bases for closure or realignment. The Commission's recommendations will not degrade military effectiveness, and in most cases will improve it.

While military value was of primary importance in its deliberations, the Commission also considered cost savings. No cost-savings targets, floors or ceilings, were established, and the Commission felt no obligation to reach any particular dollar figure cited in studies that have appeared from time to time. The Commission determined that these previous savings estimates were for the most part derived from limited investigations, and represented only order-of-magnitude estimates.

The Commission also assumed for the

purposes of its review that the force structure would retain the size and configuration outlined in currently approved plans. Unlike some previous reviews, the Commission's approach, consonant with its charter, focused on properties and their uses, not on military units, command structures, or other organizational matters. The Commission's ability to close major bases was often dependent upon the status of plans in the individual Services. For example, the Air Force, driven by severe current and projected fiscal constraints, had under way reduction and consolidation efforts that gave the Commission a number of opportunities. On the other hand, in the case of the Navy, whose base structure is tied quite closely to the current plan to create a 600-ship fleet, the Commission, adhering to the principle of not challenging Service force-structure planning, found fewer opportunities for closure actions.

Finally, the Commission's review of the Army's base structure revealed a larger number of installations needing closure due to that Service's ground-related mission and its role as executive agent for many DoD functions, but the operational savings from these closures are considerably less than those of the Air Force. Thus, the Commission found a variety of Service force-structure plans facing it, and its final recommendations and resulting savings reflect these differences. Each Service used vigorous presentations to explain its current posture and defend its individual views.

While the force structure may well change in the future, growing or shrinking in response to changing national strategy, budget considerations, political accommodations, or other factors, the Commission chose not to engage in a debate on these issues. Since there is no sure way of knowing what the strategy, force structure, and basing requirements will be in the long term, the Commission, in Chapter 8 of this report, expresses the need for a continuing base-review process.

In developing a methodology for arriving at decisions, the Commission established a process for reviewing the complete inventory of military properties, with an emphasis on larger installations.

Pursuant to the charter, and with Commission guidance, the staff developed a process for the initial evaluation of military installations. The purpose was to measure each installation against the criteria established in the charter so as to narrow the number of installations for more detailed and subjective review by the Commission. The Commission does not claim that the process outlined in Chapter 4 is the only possible alternative or that it is perfect; it is, however, an effective, methodical approach proceeding from reasonable assumptions, with military value

as its cornerstone.

The Commission's screening and evaluative processes required vast amounts of information, much of which was available only from the Department of Defense. The Commission adopted an "auditing" approach that verified information through public hearings, formal and informal consultations, visits to bases, references to other sources, and the collection of supplemental data when necessary. The Commission is satisfied that its process made use of the best information currently available.

The process adopted was one in which judgment and expert opinion played an integral part. The Commission heard expert testimony, and the Commissioners drew upon their personal experience and investigations to identify candidate installations for review and to arrive at the conclusions in this report. The Commission and its staff visited 44 installations during the course of the review. The Commissioners engaged in vigorous debate on many issues, with a full and frank discussion of opinions. While there was disagreement on many issues, the Commissioners are unanimous in their support for the recommendations in this report.

Chapter 3

Base Structure and Conditions

The Commission considered the military value of an installation in terms of how well it met the mission-related needs of the units or activities located there. As the Commission proceeded with its evaluation of the base structure, it addressed a number of factors that contribute to military value. Natural physical factors such as expanse and type of terrain, geographic location, and weather can be of utmost importance. Other factors are found in the nature of the relationship between an installation and its surrounding community. The condition of base facilities, along with their current and potential capacity, also affects military value.

Physical Factors

The size and location of military installations were significant considerations in the Commission's analysis, since they are often directly related to the ability of an installation to support current and projected missions, and are also major factors in its ability to accept additional units and missions resulting from a reorganization of the base structure. In the course of its deliberations, the Commission developed an acute concern about the requirement of the armed forces for adequate training areas. Modern tactical doctrine, taking advantage of vastly improved equipment capabilities, calls for greatly increased mobility for the operational units of all Services. The areas of operational responsibility for modern units dwarf those of yesterday's forces. For instance, today an Army mechanized

battalion needs more than 80,000 acres to practice standard maneuvers; its World War II predecessor required fewer than 4,000.

The increasing sophistication and extended ranges of modern weapons continually increase the requirements for training areas. Today, the high speed of modern tactical aircraft means that even large ground ranges are overflown in a matter of seconds, so that ranges that might have been perfectly adequate ten or more years ago are now too small. The five nautical miles required by a World War II fighter aircraft for aerial maneuver have grown to 40 miles today. With the advent of the Advanced Tactical Fighter, that requirement will expand to between 80 and 100 nautical miles. There is also an emerging need for a new kind of range, one capable of accommodating the full and free use of electronic-warfare devices without impairing normal private and commercial use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Furthermore, the increasing emphasis on joint and combined-arms operations expands the requirement for large training areas, such as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. In the past, the Services have been able to augment their training areas by using other federal lands, such as national forests, under agreements with various custodians. That option is becoming increasingly constrained because of the growing body of legislation that places greater limits on the use of federal land. The Commission notes in passing

that Soviet forces have at their disposal vast training areas in which to practice large-unit maneuvers.

The foregoing demonstrates clearly the need for the Department of Defense to pursue vigorously the acquisition of large tracts of land in sparsely populated regions for the purpose of ground and air training.

Realistic training also requires access to varied terrain. Marine Corps units practicing amphibious operations need beach landing sites with appropriate tides and supporting soil, relatively free of vegetation. Low-level helicopter flight training must be conducted over rolling, forested terrain in order to build pilot proficiency. The soil over which armored and mechanized-infantry units maneuver must be stable enough to support heavy vehicles. Light-infantry units require less space but more variety in terrain, while airborne units need parachute-landing zones and good weather conditions to maintain their proficiency.

Such considerations will loom even larger in the future. The pace of technological change is increasing, and the trend toward higher-mobility forces with ever-more-lethal weapons can be expected to accelerate. While simulation techniques are useful in meeting some training requirements, particularly for individual skill development, unit proficiency can only be attained through "real life" exercises.

Although location has an effect on the military value of any given installation, in certain instances a specific location is a prerequisite to mission accomplishment. For example, despite the higher land values associated with such locations, the Navy needs deep-water ports with access to the ocean, while the Marine Corps mission to conduct over-the-shore operations requires

access to beachfront training areas.

The ability of a military base to survive in a nuclear environment is also of clear military value. Years ago, the range and speed of strategic bombers dictated their stationing near the coasts to put overseas strategic targets within their reach. Technology has since extended effective ranges, and the survivability of U.S. strategic-bomber bases, given the presence of missile-equipped Soviet submarines off our coasts, has now become a prime consideration in locating those bases farther inland. Another consideration governing remote location of these bases is the requirement for low-level bomber routes, which has been extended to between 500 and 700 nautical miles.

Weather can be another important basing consideration, particularly in the case of flight training and operations, but also for other outdoor operational and training activities. In addition, special climatic conditions may be desirable for training specialized units or for research, development, and testing of equipment.

Encroachment

Despite the relatively large land area of the United States, there is often an intense competition for desirable areas. The encroachment of civilian activities on military installations has an effect on operations. Our nation's demographic evolution has been marked by a shift of population from the Northeast toward the South and West. This trend has accelerated in the last fifty years, so that bases that once were remote and isolated are now engulfed by urban development. This has constrained the growth potential of many established bases, reduced their ability to conduct training and other operations, and impeded, in some

instances, efforts to consolidate units or functions. In many parts of the country, a growing competition for valuable land has pitted local interests against military requirements. This has been particularly evident near deep-water ocean ports. Aside from the facilities supporting current port operations, additional land for the staging of personnel and equipment is required for mobilization. As the development of civilian communities around ports has occurred, this capability has been restricted.

The Commission has found that the encroachment problem is particularly acute for military flight operations. Air bases across the country are confronted with airspace extremely congested by commercial and private aviation, a situation exacerbated by the desire of local municipalities for noise abatement and limited night operations.

Condition of Facilities

Another factor with a direct impact on military value is the condition of base facilities. Substandard base facilities hurt military effectiveness in both operational and human terms. In their visits to military installations, the Commissioners were struck by the number of deteriorating facilities. The continued presence of large numbers of wooden buildings erected during World War II and designed to stand for ten years at most is but one example. The data on individual installations provided by the Services showed that antiquated structures are common and are not restricted to any single Service or mission area. While recognizing that military-construction projects compete for funds with other national defense requirements, the Commission encourages the Department of Defense and the Congress to consider the adverse impact

that inadequate living and working conditions have on the performance and retention of personnel.

Under ideal conditions, the Department of Defense would be able to design a base structure from the ground up, taking into consideration the mission-related requirements of its forces. Reality requires that any comprehensive basing proposal begin with the base structure that already exists, one that has developed over many years in response to a variety of circumstances.

In fact, the design of the current base structure strongly reflects the practice of adapting existing facilities to new purposes. When a new basing requirement arises, the first response ordinarily is to determine whether it can be met with an existing base. This response is partly conditioned by economic considerations, since existing bases already represent significant sunk costs. It is usually more economical to station a new unit on an existing base that may have some unused space, and pay the incremental costs, than to acquire a large tract of land at current, higher prices and build a complete infrastructure at a new location.

Given the impediments to creating a base structure on purely rational grounds, it is all the more remarkable to learn, as the Commission has, that the current base structure, while not ideal in all particulars, generally meets the mission-related needs of the Armed Services in the context of their current force structure. The shortcomings are of degree, not of kind. On that basis, the task of the Commission with regard to base realignment and closure was primarily one of adjustment, particularly in those cases where the Commission's action was based on excess capacity.

Chapter 4

The Process

The Commission charter required the development of a process to determine which bases could be realigned or closed. That directive was consistent with a widely accepted presumption that the military base structure includes some number of installations that are unneeded or not fully utilized, the closure of which could provide savings of defense expenditures without adversely affecting military capabilities. The potential for closing bases hinges on the validity of this presumption, which is a judgment about the fit between the requirements of the military forces that use the base structure and its capacity. The number of bases to be closed depends largely upon the amount of excess capacity found in the system. For the purpose of the Commission's review, excess capacity, or the ability to absorb additional units, was defined in terms of land, facilities, operational environment (including airspace), and quality of life or community support factors, as appropriate.

In order to evaluate capacity in the context of military value, a determination was first made as to whether each installation was appropriately sized to support current or future requirements. Categories of installations with similar missions were then established to provide an evaluation of aggregate capacity. In this context, the Commission reviewed the Secretary of Defense's Overseas Basing Study of October 13, 1988. While there is no need to retain domestic capacity for the immediate return of overseas units, the Commission was sensitive to this contingency in its deliberations.

Phase I

The first step in installation evaluation was to establish a complete inventory of installations and assign them to categories. In the case of large installations, or complexes of installations, where separate major mission requirements were clearly identifiable, areas dedicated to such separate missions were treated conceptually as independent installations for the purpose of analysis. This procedure was required for the review of many Navy base complexes where sea, air, depot, and other activities are carried out on contiguous or proximate sites. More than 2,300 separate installations, constituted from over 4,200 separate DoD-owned properties, were identified for review.

While installations are ordinarily under the control of the Military Service to which the tenant units belong, there are numerous instances where tenant units from one Service are located on an installation controlled by another. In addition, the Army, to a much greater extent than the other Services, acts as an executive agent in operating installations where activities of consolidated organizations such as the Defense Logistics Agency are located. For this reason, the inventory of Army installations is considerably larger than that of the other Services.

The initial measurements of military value and capacity were performed within categories of bases having similar missions in each Service. Five task forces were

used: air, ground, sea, training and administrative, and depot, along with a sixth task force, generally referred to as "all other." These staff task forces oversaw the collection of data from the Services regarding the installations within each category (see Appendix E). Analysis by category within each Service was employed as a starting point for installation evaluation because it permitted a relevant comparison of assets, environments, and attributes.

In order to establish whether the physical attributes of specific installations were appropriate for the accomplishment of currently assigned missions, an evaluation of installations was accomplished by measuring 21 mission-related physical attributes grouped into five overall factors (see Appendix F). Each of these attributes was represented by one or more physical units of measure relevant to the category of installations being evaluated. Within a category, the same units of measure were used.

The measurement of each attribute was characterized by one of three ratings: marginal for mission accomplishment, acceptable, and fully satisfactory. Each of these ratings was specifically defined for and consistently applied within each category of installations. To complete the evaluation of installations in each category, a level of significance was assigned to each of the 21 attributes and was applied consistently within the category.

The method used for this evaluation was based on a consistent set of criteria that was used to compare all installations within a category. In conjunction with the evaluation of capacity available throughout a category, the process offered a logical basis for judging possible opportunities for closure and realignment. The Commission

selected a number of installations for further detailed review based on capacity and military value.

For the "all other" task force, a tailored procedure was employed. This task force included such diverse categories of properties as research and development centers, communications and intelligence sites, special-operations bases, space-operations centers, medical facilities, laboratories, and Reserve-Component centers.

For this "all other" task force, a set of criteria was established by the Commission for each category. The criteria were consistent with the spirit of the evaluation process for the first five task forces, namely, military value and capacity. The Services developed the installation inventory for each category and applied the Commission's criteria. These analyses were checked for consistency and reasonableness by the Commission.

Phase II

The next phase was an evaluation of the potential for relocation of activities or units located on installations identified as potential closure or realignment candidates. The Commission's focus shifted from installations to the activities assigned to them. Suitable alternative locations had to be identified for each major activity or unit before proceeding with further consideration of closing an installation.

The first step was to identify all activities that needed to be relocated at each candidate installation (some activities could be eliminated as a result of a closure) and to develop options for their relocation based on specific Commission criteria. Activities with fewer than 50 civilian or 100 military personnel (the

threshold set by the Department of Defense for notification to the Congress) were identified but not analyzed for relocation. It was the Commission's view that sites for relocation of these smaller activities should be left to the discretion of the parent Services, but an estimate of the cost of relocating all activities was included in the Commission's cost-estimating model (see Appendix G).

In developing relocation options, potential receiving bases were listed in the order of their ability to enhance the mission of the activity being relocated, using designated mission-enhancement factors: consolidation of split functions; improvement in training, mobilization, and command and control; cost of operation; customer service; and improvement of quality of life.

Potential receiving bases for individual units or activities were not limited to a single category but could be chosen from any category as long as capacity to receive the activity was available or could be created by a simultaneous move.

The Commission selected the preferred relocation option for each activity based on mission enhancement. This best option was then checked for environmental or community support problems at the receiving base. The best relocation options for all activities to be relocated from a closed or realigned installation were then analyzed as a package, using the Commission's cost-estimating model. The model was used to determine the costs and savings for the package, which were then used in calculating the payback period--the time required to recoup the cost of the closure or realignment. The Commission followed the guideline in its charter in electing to use a maximum payback period of six years.

In determining the payback for a given installation, the Commission estimated costs and savings associated with the closure or realignment of the installation and the subsequent relocation of units and activities affected by the action. The cost of hazardous-waste cleanup was not included, since such cleanup is currently required by law regardless of the base-closure situation. Costs for social-impact programs such as food stamps, welfare, and unemployment compensation also were not included. The Commission believes these costs will be minimal. All calculations were adjusted to reflect a discount rate of ten percent and a three-percent inflation rate in order to account for differences in the timing of costs and savings. Military construction costs were estimated based on DoD standard construction costs for similar buildings. Consequently, the Commission's construction estimates should not be construed as a cap on these estimated costs.

The Commission valued property based on the estimated fair-market value of the land as raw or as undeveloped commercial, residential, or industrial property, as appropriate. Where it could be documented, the value of any existing improvement, such as a usable manufacturing plant, that would add significantly to the marketability of the property was included. This approach is based upon testimony and statements made in hearings during consideration of the Base Closure and Realignment Act, the practices prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget, and sound economic theory.

The Commission evaluated each potential closure or realignment in terms of environmental and socioeconomic considerations, including environmental mitigation at receiving bases and the

impact on local employment.

Throughout the process, the Commission investigated the possibilities for cross-Service realignments that would satisfy its military value, payback, environmental, and socioeconomic decision rules. The Commission also considered the impact on the Department's classified programs and warfighting capabilities.

Each step of the process was checked for completeness, reasonableness, and consistency by independent staff experts hired specifically for that purpose. The raw data were also sampled and tested for accuracy. The independent experts found the data to be reasonable, sound, and defensible.

The Military Services performed several important functions during the analysis. They collected raw data pertaining to the measures of physical attributes related to

installations. Each Service also provided the Commission with expert advice regarding current missions, development and evaluation of measures, and the levels of significance for physical attributes. With regard to those installations recommended for closure or realignment by the Commission, the Services identified activities to be relocated and nominated potential receiving bases for those activities, following Commission decision rules. They also provided cost-savings and real-estate data used in the Commission's model.

While the Commission depended heavily on the process described above, its final recommendations also reflect the individual judgments and deliberations of the Commissioners. There is no "magic formula" that will yield precise results. The process enabled the Commissioners to focus on the best opportunities; it did not replace subjective judgment.

Chapter 5

Recommendations

SECTION I

This section summarizes the Commission's recommendations, more fully discussed in Appendix H, that constitute those required by Title II of Public Law 100-526, to be accepted or rejected in their entirety by the Secretary of Defense and, if accepted by the Secretary, subsequently by the Congress.

The Commission's recommendations for closure and realignment affect 145 installations. Of this number, 86 are to be closed fully, five are to be closed in

part, and 54 will experience a change, an increase or a decrease, as units or activities are relocated. The details of these actions are found in the appendix, along with an index of affected installations.

Implementation of these recommendations will result in annual savings of \$693.6 million and a 20-year savings with a net present value of \$5.6 billion. These savings are both realistic and substantial.

SECTION II

During the course of its evaluation and deliberations, the Commission encountered a number of situations that, while not in all cases involving proposed base closures or realignments, need attention. Accordingly, the Commission has decided to make a series of recommendations in these areas, with the understanding that they are not part of the "all or none" package. These recommendations are, however, related to issues that were investigated during the Commission's review of the base structure, and in some cases are critical to the successful implementation of the Commission's closure and realignment recommendations.

The lack of comment by the Commission on other ongoing actions, studies, or proposals regarding military

installations should not be construed as implying Commission support or non-support for such actions, studies, or proposals; the Commission was constrained by its charter and by time.

Program Implementation

The Commission is extremely concerned that the implementation of its recommendations may be frustrated unless adequate funding is made available early in the process and existing rules and regulations affecting the process are streamlined. It is clear that if this process is to move forward during a time of severe budget constraints, it will be necessary to make the program self-financing to the greatest extent possible. The Commission

strongly recommends:

-- that the Base Closure Account (hereinafter, the Account) be capitalized as quickly as possible. As a minimum, the Account should receive \$300 million in appropriations in the FY 90 Defense Appropriations Bill.

-- that special reprogramming rules be developed with the Congress and the Department of Defense to permit the transfer of other Department funds into the Account as necessary. In particular, the Services should be given the authority to reprogram FY 89 funds appropriated for construction projects at installations designated for closure. This action will enable the Services to accomplish timely environmental analyses, construction design, and site preparation.

-- that there be enacted statutory relief from Section 207(a)(2)(B) of the Base Closure and Realignment Act, which prohibits the Secretary from transferring funds into the Account from other funds appropriated to the Department until approval is obtained in an appropriations act and notice is provided to the Congress. The Commission is concerned that this procedure will delay timely implementation of its recommendations.

-- that there be enacted statutory relief from the provisions of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1940 (40 U.S.C. 471 et seq.) that restrict the Secretary of Defense from disposing of real property and facilities. The current requirements entail a complex and time-consuming screening process. The Commission is concerned that delays may result in minimal proceeds being made available to the Account to fund relocations.

-- that the Administration remove regulatory impediments for the sale of excess land and reinforce the current Office of Management and Budget policy that transfers between federal agencies be accomplished at fair-market value.

-- that the Defense Department accelerate efforts to dispose of "salable" land in order to get sales proceeds into the Account as rapidly as possible. The Department is encouraged to be innovative in this effort. For example, it may not be necessary to wait for current military occupants to vacate the land before a sale is made. Further, a sale can be contingent on the buyer's building replacement facilities for the military with occupants moving when these facilities are available.

-- that the Secretary of Defense, in managing the Account, make disbursements from the Account in proportion to the Services' contributions to the Account and the Services' expected savings. This approach is fair and maintains the incentives for the Services to take actions to build the Account balance.

Expanded Training Areas

Realistic training of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force units is a difficult challenge. In many geographic regions, the Services are constrained in their ability to train because of encroachment near maneuver areas and live-fire ranges. Examples include limits on air operations due to noise, ordnance limits at various ranges, reduced availability of ranges for live fire, restrictions on the use of landing beaches, and pressures from local communities to halt night training activities such as artillery firing and air strikes. These encroachments on existing training ranges are occurring at the same

Belvoir is illustrative of various innovative real-estate agreements being pursued by all the Services. These efforts typically lead to enhanced mission capability, consolidation of Department of Defense functions, and significant cost savings.

Another example of such transactions is the Marine Corps plan to consolidate its geographically separate activities in the Kansas City area. As a result of creative real-estate agreements, three Marine Corps functions will be collocated in the same vicinity with Army, Navy, and Air Force activities.

The Commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish policies and guidelines that encourage the Services to pursue innovative real-estate transactions.

Consolidation of Reserve Component Locations

In reviewing Department of Defense reserve-unit locations, the Commission found there were many opportunities for improved efficiency through closure and realignment. The Commission was reluctant, however, to include such facilities for closure and realignment, since there is no statutory guarantee that proceeds from the sale of a specific reserve activity will be applied directly to the associated relocation costs.

Therefore, the Commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense accelerate current efforts to consolidate Reserve Component locations and sponsor special legislation allowing the sale of land and facilities to fund related relocations.

Study of Military Laboratories

The Commission recognized that the numerous laboratory activities of the Department of Defense are important to maintaining necessary technological competence, but, because of time constraints, was unable to review the entire complex subject, particularly with regard to an examination of missions versus ongoing activities and the relationship between in-house and contract work. The Commission was also provided information concerning the declining R&D budget and the resultant concern that laboratory capabilities were being diluted or subsidized by activities better performed elsewhere. The Commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense establish a task force to examine these concerns. Such a review should include the development and application of a uniform set of standards designed to improve the overall effectiveness of the Department's laboratory activities, with a view toward consolidating such activities and eliminating those functions that might better be accomplished by the private sector.

time that growing maneuver speeds and ranges of modern weapons demand the availability of greater expanses of real estate and air space for training. Chapter 3 contains a further discussion of this issue.

Large joint-training areas will help optimize the military use of restricted land, air, and water space, and allow the Services to train as they would expect to fight. In order to do this, the Services should be seeking ways in which they might expand training areas, such as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California to accommodate the need for battalion, brigade, and division-level maneuver with artillery, missile, and air support, and to recognize the diminishing ability to accomplish such training in now-inadequate areas. For example, a joining of Twentynine Palms, Fort Irwin, and Camp Roberts, California; Nellis AFB, Nevada; and range areas in Western Utah could, with the addition of several hundred thousand acres of leased land in Death Valley, provide a greatly expanded training area to better satisfy the needs set forth above.

Therefore, the Commission recommends that, in addition to current initiatives, the Secretary of Defense also consider using funds that may remain available in the Base Closure Account, after costs to implement the Commission's recommendations have been satisfied, to lease or acquire land to facilitate the creation of an expanded range complex.

Department of Defense Presence in the National Capital Region (NCR)

The Commission is aware of the Congress' concern with the DoD presence in the NCR as discussed in Senate Report 100-57, "National Defense Authorization

Act for 1988 and 1989," dated May 8, 1987. The Commission has reviewed the results of a master-development planning effort documented in "A Report to the Congress on DoD Administrative Space Planning for the National Capital Region," dated May 1988, conducted under the auspices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

The Commission notes that much of DoD-occupied administrative space in the NCR is leased, that lease costs in the NCR are among the highest in the nation, and that occupancy costs for DoD space in the NCR are expected to soar in the next ten years unless remedial action is initiated.

Consequently, the Commission endorses the broad planning goals developed in the study and urges the Secretary of Defense to consider long-range alternatives to reduce the cost of leased space in the NCR. The Commission specifically encourages the Army's public-private development plans for the Fort Belvoir Engineer Proving Ground. The development concept is to encourage the sale or exchange of the 820-acre parcel to a private developer who would, in turn, construct needed office facilities for the Department of the Army on a portion of the site, and develop the balance of the site as private office parks and residential communities. The Commission supports the passage of special legislation authorizing this public-private development and similar DoD initiatives in the National Capital Region. Certain of the Commission's recommendations with respect to Fort Meade, Maryland, are also in consonance with this concept.

Innovative Real Estate Transactions

The Army's development plan at Fort

Chapter 6

The Environment

As required by the charter, the Commission carefully considered the impact on the environment of base closures and realignments. The Commission process maximized the level of review possible in the relatively short period of time available. The process was not, however, intended to replace the environmental analysis required by the Base Closure and Realignment Act to be accomplished by the Secretary of Defense during actual implementation of the base closures and realignments. Overall, the statute and the procedures established by the Commission pursuant to the statute have been designed to prevent environmental requirements from being used inappropriately to block base closures or realignments. At the same time, they are designed to ensure that the environment will be fully protected in that process.

In a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of Defense testified that he fully intended to comply with all the applicable environmental laws in closing or realigning bases. Nevertheless, he did seek a modification of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); the Congress supported this position. Accordingly, the base-closure statute specifies that the National Environmental Policy Act does not apply to the actions of the Commission. It does apply, however, with some modifications, to the actions of the Secretary during the closing of a military installation and during the process of relocating functions from a military

installation. In this regard, the base-closure statute further provides that the Secretary will not have to consider "the need for closing or realigning a military installation which has been selected for closure or realignment by the Commission; the need for transferring functions to another military installation which has been selected as the receiving installation or alternative military installations to those selected." The statute provides a 60-day limitation on a civil action for judicial review.

Even though there is no specific requirement under the statute for the Commission to consider environmental impact, the Secretary made it one of the explicit criteria of the charter. In addition, he appointed a noted environmental expert to the Commission.

The Commission held a public hearing on July 28, 1988 to receive testimony from environmental experts both inside and outside of government on the question of how the Commission should consider environmental impacts in its deliberations. Representatives of several national organizations testified. A recurring theme in their testimony was that the decision to close or realign a base would predominately rest on mission considerations rather than environmental considerations. Nevertheless, the witnesses urged that, once a decision was reached to close or realign a base, the Secretary should fully involve the public when considering appropriate mitigation measures.

The statute does not require nor has time permitted the Commission to prepare environmental assessments for its base-closure and realignment recommendations. But the Commission adopted procedures that required evaluation of closure and realignment actions on the basis of six key attributes: threatened or endangered species, wetlands, historic or archeological sites, pollution control, hazardous materials and wastes, and land uses. The Commission limited its review to active candidates for closure and realignment consideration. A large amount of data was collected in an extremely short period of time. It was taken, for the most part, from information already on record or from environmental specialists within the Department of Defense.

The Commission found that closures generally resulted in positive impacts on the environment rather than negative ones. The Commission was particularly sensitive to the issue of hazardous waste, a major problem at many military facilities. It is clear that base closure will not in itself change any obligations (or liabilities) that the Department may have regarding hazardous-waste cleanup. In some cases,

the need for cleanup may affect the property disposal and reuse plan for excess property made available from the base closure or realignment. Likewise, in developing and implementing such plans, it is desirable that the Department adhere to a national goal of "no net loss" of wetlands. No closures or realignments were precluded solely on the basis of environmental considerations. Environmental findings regarding the Commission's specific base-closure recommendations are included in Appendix H.

The Commission highlighted relevant environmental concerns during the decision-making process, which should also prove to be valuable to the Department during actual implementation of base closures and realignments, especially in dealing with matters of mitigation. The Commission anticipates that public involvement will be an important element of that phase and expects the Department vigorously to continue pursuing its obligations under the law so that the base-closure program is carried out in a manner that ensures an environmentally sound result.

Chapter 7

Easing the Impact

Communities that lose military bases are naturally concerned about the impact on local business and employment. The Commission was sensitive to these concerns and, as part of its deliberations, explored the various means by which the adverse effects of base closings might be mitigated. It heard testimony to the effect that, in the past, any hardship has usually been temporary and that closures have been far less traumatic than people anticipated. Many communities that have dealt with closures have thrived. Former military bases are now being used as colleges, vocational-technical schools, industrial and office parks, and airports (see Appendix I).

The Commission heard from leaders who were prominently involved in their communities' redevelopment efforts. They testified that local economies need not suffer if the community works together with the federal and state governments to develop and execute a plan of action. The Commission feels it is imperative that this cooperation be continued and, wherever possible, improved.

The federal government established several programs to help communities and individuals affected by the wave of base closures in the early 1960s. With this help, many communities were able to make resourceful use of the former bases so that the land previously occupied by bases now provides more jobs, services, and business for the communities. Displaced employees who wanted to continue working found other employment within the Department of Defense, and many were helped in

relocating their households. The programs that provided this help are basically still in place.

The Homeowners Assistance Program (HAP) was authorized by the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Act of 1966 to assist employees who are forced to move as a consequence of base closures. HAP is an entitlement program that pays cash benefits to people who meet the program's criteria. In general, if a homeowner displaced by a closure cannot sell his home at a reasonable price within a reasonable time, the government will buy the home for 85 percent of its value prior to the base-closing announcement; if the owner sells the house for less than this value, the government will reimburse him the difference up to 95 percent of this value. The program also provides relief if a displaced employee faces foreclosure.

The DoD Priority Placement Program is another measure that was originally established to help employees adjust to the base closures of the 1960s. The program resulted directly from Secretary McNamara's policy that every Department of Defense employee affected by a base closure would be offered another comparable job within the Department. That explicit policy has since been discontinued, but the effectiveness of the current program is essentially the same. The computerized system established to support the original policy is still in place and, over the years, has helped 90,000 employees find new assignments.

The Priority Placement Program is highly regarded. The General Accounting Office has judged it to be the most effective placement program in government. Periodic surveys have shown that 99 percent of placements are considered successful by the supervisors with whom the employees have been placed. Two thirds of the placements have maintained or advanced the employees' grades and salaries and 60 percent of placements have been within the commuting area of the original jobs. In addition, relocation expenses are paid when the new job is beyond commuting distance.

A third initiative was the President's Economic Adjustment Committee (EAC), chaired by the Secretary of Defense and including the administrators of seventeen other executive agencies who coordinate their agencies' programs on behalf of affected communities. Between 1973 and 1980, the federal agencies that constitute EAC provided between \$80 and \$90 million a year in assistance to communities affected by base closures. Grants for planning and infrastructure were vital in securing productive reuse of former bases. More importantly, federal money was used to leverage private investment, to improve facilities, and to provide municipal services so that the former bases could become more attractive to business.

In the 1960s, economic-adjustment assistance to communities, under the direction of the Department of Defense, was an essential part of the base closure process. DoD provided invaluable services to the affected communities, not only as the focal point for contact with the federal bureaucracy, but also as an advocate for community interests. DoD was frequently successful in expediting federal help for or removing obstacles to redevelopment. It also supplied assistance in creating and

executing redevelopment plans for communities that did not know how to manage such efforts. The Commission feels strongly that such assistance needs to be an integral part of implementing its recommended base closures.

Communities can and do learn quickly and, by all accounts, the communities themselves were the heroes in the successful recoveries of the 1960s. The affected cities and towns assembled dedicated teams that not only drafted ambitious plans, but also made their cases effectively to public agencies and private companies, often travelling extensively to do so. The best of the organizers were relentless. The communities went to great lengths to make themselves and the former bases attractive to investors and business. Roads were built; sewer pipe was laid; and services were improved.

The Commission has identified five components of past successful redevelopment efforts: (1) there must be an effective local organization to provide strong leadership and overall policy direction for the recovery effort; (2) there must be a recovery action plan for redeveloping the former facility and for attracting jobs; (3) the recovery effort must focus on the entire community, taking into account the transportation network, public facilities and services, health care, housing, schools, and other attributes; (4) the community itself has to demonstrate its capacity to engage and sustain new business growth through intensive, ongoing, economic-development programs; (5) federal and state agencies must participate in and buttress this community effort by responding on a priority basis to the key actions identified in the community recovery program.

Another factor in past successful

recoveries was the ability of the Department of Defense to turn over to the communities the bases' land, facilities, and equipment. Often these assets were elaborate, substantial, and valuable. This allowed communities to make very attractive offers to would-be tenants and buyers. Roads and utilities were in place. Machines and even furniture were left behind. The attractions were therefore great, particularly for new small businesses and schools.

Circumstances have changed, however, in the years since the last major round of base closures. First, in the 1980s the federal government has made a concerted effort to realize proceeds from the disposal of assets. With regard to the recommendations of this Commission, there is a clear expectation that the Department of Defense will derive financial benefit from the sale of base-closure real estate. This expectation is evident in a reading of the legislative history of the statute that endorses the Commission's work, and the Commission believes that the Department should realize some return on its properties, especially if they are in "high-rent" districts or have some other intrinsic value. This objective can conflict with the communities' interests, however. Communities would often prefer that properties be conveyed expeditiously so that economic recovery can get off to a quick start, and the government's waiting for reasonable bids may frustrate that goal.

To help mitigate this situation, the Department of Defense should develop an efficient and time-sensitive property-disposal strategy for the transfer of land and facilities for redevelopment. In addition, the President's Economic Adjustment Committee should immediately offer to help all affected communities plan for the reuse of the land and facilities of

the closing bases. Time is a particularly precious commodity for private investors. When a community has assembled a package that includes private investment, success often depends on getting real-estate matters settled so that redevelopment can proceed.

As quickly as possible, the Department should develop schedules for phasing down activity on bases to be closed and for their ultimate closure. Communities should be informed of these schedules. In particular, contractors who provide services to bases should be told where they stand in light of these schedules.

Another change from the 1960s has been the proliferation of competing interests for the use of federal property, particularly for social ends such as sheltering the homeless, drug rehabilitation, and prisons. There are also longer-standing policies and laws regarding conveyance of property, often without reimbursement, for airports, schools, hospitals, parks, and other public uses. Finally, local interest groups or the communities themselves may prefer to dedicate properties to public uses, such as government facilities or parkland, rather than commercial development.

The community may decide to develop and implement a balanced, community-based, land-reuse plan that takes all interests into consideration. The federal government can contribute to the success of this approach in several ways. First, the Department of Defense can, when requested, provide technical assistance and funds to help develop a plan. Second, federal agencies that by statute are given an option on base facilities should exercise such options quickly, and only if funds are available for the operations to be put on the land. Also, federal agencies should

position their facilities on the base in the least intrusive manner possible to preserve the greatest flexibility for use of the remaining property. Third, the same principle of minimum intrusion should be applied with regard to federal laws and regulations that prescribe the use of federal property for functions such as drug rehabilitation and shelter for the homeless.

Within the last decade there has been a diminution of federal money available to assist affected communities. Between 1966 and 1986, the federal government, under the auspices of the President's Economic Adjustment Committee, provided \$503 million in adjustment assistance to communities impacted by base realignments and closures, but most of the federal programs that provided this money have been curtailed or eliminated during the 1980s. Between 1975 and 1980, the Economic Development Administration (EDA) gave \$57.5 million to 31 base redevelopment projects. EDA now has only \$12 million for economic adjustment grants. This trend, shared by other federal agencies such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Farmers Home Administration, poses a problem.

If sufficient federal monies are to be available to give assistance to affected communities, Congress should consider expanding these programs. In addition, under the base-closure statute, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to provide economic-adjustment and community-planning assistance if financial resources from other sources are inadequate. The Commission recommends that the Congress increase funding for this program. No specific funding levels are recommended here since the need cannot be predicted in advance and, until the communities draw up their plans, the

extent of required federal redevelopment assistance will not be clear.

A positive change since the 1960s has been the substantial growth in state development agencies. Every state now has such an agency, with budgets ranging from \$360 thousand to over \$180 million. The average is \$17.5 million with 110 employees. These agencies provide technical and managerial assistance, trade promotion, financial aid, training programs, and tax incentives. They have grown adept at attracting investments, including in some cases setting up offices in foreign countries to attract investment, and have combined to begin a collective, taxable-bond initiative to provide alternative financing for state and local projects.

The gap caused by reductions in federal development programs has been largely filled by state development agencies. The one example of concerted state action during an earlier round on base closures was a resounding success, and bodes well for future state involvement. The Governor of Massachusetts established the Massachusetts Base Closing Commission in the 1960s to deal with the closing of Boston Army Base and the Boston Shipyard. This commission assembled a professional staff and contracted for studies that addressed the redevelopment of these sites. Consequently, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was able to contribute indispensable help to affected communities. It is reasonable to expect that today's more-seasoned state development agencies will be full partners in helping communities recover from the closings.

With respect to employment, the federal government should provide whatever assistance it can to help affected communities develop or expand job placement offices. Defense Department

personnel should be fully informed of the programs that are available to help them, particularly the Homeowners Assistance Program and the Priority Placement Program. The Commission recommends that civilian employees who lose their jobs as a consequence of base realignments or closures be guaranteed other jobs within the Department. Whenever possible, those jobs should be at least at the employees' current grade and located geographically where the employees want to be. Past experience suggests that this is feasible in many cases.

Additional resources will be required to mitigate the impact of base closings on government employees. The Homeowners Assistance Program will require additional money for its revolving fund. The fund is replenished by the proceeds from the sale or rental of properties that the government purchased under the program, and also by Congressional appropriation. Since there have been no base closures for ten years, HAP has been largely inactive, receiving no appropriations from 1984 to 1986. For 1989, the program has received an appropriation of \$2 million, but an ongoing realignment is expected to use this money. The average cost of a case has been running about \$23 thousand, but administrators of the program believe that a more reasonable estimate would be \$30 thousand for cases resulting from this Commission's recommendations. Therefore, Congress must appropriate a substantial

sum for HAP if it is to meet its obligations to the people who will be eligible for the program.

Not every base closure has led to economic recovery. Some communities have done better than others. Certainly, it helps when a base is located in a metropolitan area where land values are high and the economic infrastructure is well developed. When a base is closed in a remote, rural community, however, redevelopment is more difficult. While the federal government can provide a degree of mitigation, its ability to relieve the full impact of a base closing is limited. The federal government must work closely with communities, placing special emphasis and focusing resources on the needs of those where recovery is not a foregone conclusion.

In summary, the Commission recognizes that implementation of its base-closure recommendations will create concern in communities that will be affected. The Commission urges these communities to treat these actions not as problems, but as opportunities. Communities should take advantage of the programs outlined in this chapter and expend their energy enhancing the opportunities. Experience has shown that if the affected communities, teamed with the appropriate federal officials, will work aggressively to create new opportunities, recovery will be rapid and communities will emerge even stronger.

Chapter 8

A Look Ahead

The Commission, reflecting on the circumstances that led to its formation, and having invested a great deal of thought and effort in developing both a process for reviewing military installations and a list of recommended actions, would like to believe that lessons drawn from this experience could be applied constructively in the future. The base structure should properly be derived from the force structure, which in turn should reflect national security strategy. That strategy must change over time in response to changes in the external strategic environment and may also be altered to reflect internal fiscal or political realities. The Commission believes that the nation's interests will be best served by an ongoing base-management process that is responsive to change.

The Future Strategic Environment

Some of the more dramatic trends or circumstances that could occur over the next two decades might be a significant change in the threat, a potential reassessment of priorities within the Soviet Union, the negotiation of far-reaching arms-reduction agreements, the emergence of new major powers and alliances, an increasing number of Third World contingencies, and the continued development and fielding of long-range advanced-technology weapons--nuclear and non-nuclear, both offensive and defensive.

The number of overseas bases available for use by American forces is considerably lower than it was immediately after World

War II. With fewer forward bases and increasingly limited access to overseas ports, airfields, and even airspace, U.S. forces will have to be better prepared to provide direct support of overseas operations from bases in the United States.

Additional uncertainties nagging at future U.S. basing needs include possible shifts in alliances or force-reduction agreements that could prompt a return of sizable numbers of forward-based forces to the United States. While returning forces might be inactivated under terms of an agreement, or in response to budget constraints, if the United States intends to maintain a capability to project forces into the theaters from which they have been withdrawn, these will need to be retained in the force structure. In that event, a larger home-based strategic reserve of ground, air, and naval forces might consist of new blends of active and reserve components. There already exists a clear trend toward meeting current budget realities and force requirements with greater reliance on Reserve-Component forces, with some concomitant reduction in the number of active-duty personnel and units. Of the Army's overseas deploying forces in time of emergency, 70 percent come from the Reserve Components. The Air Force, for its part, plans to reduce the number of tactical-fighter wings from the 38 it presently has to 35 in FY 1990, having set aside for the time being its ultimate goal of equipping and manning 40 wings. Possible implications for basing associated with this trend might be fewer facilities

such as housing for the active force, and perhaps more, widely dispersed, training areas accessible to reserve units, whose members live throughout the United States.

It follows that the future military base structure in the United States would need to have an elasticity to support a rapid force expansion and the wherewithal (in terms of airlift, sealift, and aerial refueling) to underwrite a global mobility capacity greater and more versatile than that of today.

Another set of base requirements could emerge from long-range new-technology weapons. Requirements for space-borne command, control, communications, and intelligence are expected to increase substantially and be critical for future wartime operations, and the U.S.-based ground facilities providing linkage with space platforms will grow in number as well.

All of this cautions against taking base-closure actions today that may adversely affect the deterrence and defense capacity of tomorrow's military forces. It also means that if popular paradigms were adopted that see U.S. bases predominantly in their peacetime roles or in terms restricted to peacetime cost-effectiveness, national defense risks would be increased. Unused capacity at military bases allows room for future force structure changes, rapid expansion in conflict, and potential dispersal for wartime operations.

Desirable Features of a Future Process

To be successful, future base management must be an integral part of our political system, an open process that builds on the trust of the American people. The process should be aboveboard and

based on sound criteria that emphasize military value. Such a process will best serve the national defense and assure the public that basing decisions are made independent of unfounded biases from any quarter.

The future base-management process should have a healing effect. It should be structured in such a way that over time greater bonds of trust and confidence between members of Congress and the Defense Department can be built. While the management of the nation's military base structure is the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense, the Congress is clearly a partner in matters of national defense. The Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff also have essential roles to play in the process. The nation's interests would not be served by a continuation of the unworkable process that led to the formation of this Commission.

A Proposed Mechanism

While an ad hoc commission similar to the present one may be useful, from time to time, in dealing with extraordinary problems of government, such an arrangement should not become a routine means for evaluating bases or addressing other subjects that are part of the day-to-day business of governing. This Commission's work can be an important step in clearing the way for creation of a sound process of base evaluation, realignment, and closure. We need to build on the cooperation and impetus achieved by this legislative-executive effort, drawing on the lessons learned during the Commission's study of basing needs, and defining consistent rules to assist in making decisions on future realignments and closures.

It is important to the success of any future process that it be straightforward, methodical and understandable. The Commission believes that the process it developed is an appropriate starting point; it can, however, be improved. Specifically:

-- The process should not be so constrained by time. The process used by this Commission was an iterative one requiring the development and testing of many options. Prevailing circumstances (the delay in passing the enabling legislation and the reality of the election timetable) forced the Commission to accomplish Phase II of the process, the heart of its task, between the elections in November and the date of this report. While some six months prior to November were spent in assembling data and receiving testimony from expert witnesses (see Appendix J), the time spent developing specific recommendations was constrained. In the future, this Phase II effort should be allotted more time--probably 90 to 180 days.

-- The six-year payback used in the Commission's evaluation is too limiting. The Commission did not discover the genesis of this requirement, but as a result of its application, many otherwise sound actions were discarded. Most actions require substantial "up-front" costs to accommodate relocating units, and even significant steady-state savings may not amortize the "up-front" costs of a desirable action in six years.

-- A ruling by the Defense Department Counsel, based on the history of the enabling legislation, prevented the Commission from recommending actions on government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities. The Commission believes that there are opportunities for closure and realignment among the GOCO

facilities and that they should be examined in any future process.

-- By virtue of the time constraint discussed above, several areas that appear to have the potential for further savings were not included to any great extent in the Commission's recommended closures and realignments. Two of these, Reserve Component facilities and military laboratories, are addressed in Chapter 5.

-- The staff of the Commission consisted of dedicated, informed, and hard-working people. The senior staff were Defense Department personnel detailed to the Commission and outside experts hired by the Commission to bring special expertise to the process, as required by the enabling legislation. The staff role in this process is extremely difficult because (1) they must have detailed knowledge of the basing structure to include the associated force structure--they must "know the Pentagon", but (2) they must be independent of the Pentagon and supply the Commission with accurate data and analyses. Quite often the staff found itself in conflict with the Department viewpoint and getting detailed data and support on such complex subjects from already burdened Department officials was often difficult. Despite these built-in difficulties, the staff performed extremely well. Should there be a future commission, this Commission hopes that appropriate legislation would be passed in a more timely manner so that rules would be adopted and independent staff hired in a more orderly fashion.

Given the need to preserve the linkages among strategy, force structure, and base structure, the Secretary of Defense is best suited to execute the nation's base-management responsibilities, including the acquiring and disposing of real estate, and

realigning and rearranging the base structure. This management function must be supported by a consistent, ongoing, base-review process within the Defense Department that looks to the long term. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified and Specified Commanders should share in the responsibility of making recommendations to the Secretary on base realignment and closure. At the same time, members of Congress must have confidence in the Department's internal process. The factors to be used in the future base-management process should be auditable and open to the Congress.

One way of satisfying this requirement would be through the creation of a standing, external advisory panel that oversees and verifies the analytical efforts within the Department of Defense. Such a panel, composed of senior experts, could be convened as necessary to render an independent judgment on proposed base realignments and closures. Appointed by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with Congressional leadership, the panel

members would be expected to examine the DoD analyses that led to identification of a base-management action, providing commentaries on their validity and maintaining a broad perspective on related national issues. The advisory panel would report its findings and observations to the Secretary for review and comment before the proposed action, along with the advisory panel's findings, was submitted to Congress.

This approach could answer the need to ensure that the Secretary of Defense leads the base-management process, while providing an effective means of Congressional participation and support. So long as the process, combining DoD's internal analytical efforts and an external advisory panel, is conducted openly and on the basis of sound and consistently applied criteria, it should provide a workable means for base realignments and closures. Such a process should strengthen our defense by allowing cost-effective use of resources and set the foundation for greater legislative-executive trust in managing the nation's military bases.

APPENDICES

Appendix A

Charter

Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure

In accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5U.S.C. App. I), a Commission on Base Realignment and Closure is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment.

There is established the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. The Commission shall be composed of twelve members appointed or designated by the Secretary of Defense. The composition of the Commission shall include persons with broad experience in government and national defense. The Secretary shall designate two Chairpersons from among the members of the Commission.

Section 2. Functions.

The Commission shall study the issues surrounding military base realignment and closure within the United States, its commonwealths, territories, and possessions. The primary objectives of the Commission shall be to:

- A. Determine, by November 15, 1988, the best process, including necessary administrative changes, for identifying bases to be closed or realigned; how to improve and best use Federal government incentive programs to overcome the negative impact of base closure or realignment; and, the criteria for realigning and closing bases to include at least:
 1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the military departments concerned.
 2. The availability and condition of land and facilities at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
 3. The potential to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future force requirements at receiving locations.
 4. The cost and manpower implications.
 5. The extent and timing of potential cost savings, including whether the total cost savings realized from the closure or realignment of the base will, by the end of the 6-year period beginning with the date of the completion of the closure or realignment of the base, exceed the amount expended to close or realign the base.
 6. The economic impact on the community in which the base to be closed or realigned is located.
 7. The community support at the receiving locations.
 8. The environmental impact.
 9. The implementation process involved.
- B. Review the current and planned military base structure in light of force structure assumptions, and the process and criteria developed pursuant to subparagraph A, and identify which bases should be closed or realigned.
- C. Report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense by December 31, 1988.

Section 3. Administration.

Members of the Commission shall serve without compensation for their work on the Commission. However, members appointed from among private citizens may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the government service (5U.S.C. 5701-5707), to the full extent funds are available. The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Commission with such administrative services, facilities, staff, and other support services as may be necessary. Any expenses of the Commission shall be paid from such funds as may be available to the Secretary of Defense.

The Commission shall be in place and operating as soon as possible. Shortly thereafter, the Commission shall brief the Secretary of Defense on the Commission's plan of action. The Commission's final report shall include recommendations to realign and close bases only upon a vote of a majority of the members of the Commission. The Commission should complete its work by December 31, 1988.


Frank Carlucci
Secretary of Defense

The Pentagon
May 3, 1988
(as revised November 8, 1988)

Appendix B

Base Closure and Realignment Act

PUBLIC LAW 100-526—OCT. 24, 1988

102 STAT. 2623

Public Law 100-526
100th Congress

An Act

To provide certain additional fiscal year 1989 defense authorization policies, to provide procedures to facilitate the closure and realignment of obsolete or unnecessary military installations, and for other purposes.

Oct. 24, 1988
[S. 2749]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

This Act may be cited as the "Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act".

Defense
Authorization
Amendments
and Base Closure
and
Realignment
Act.
10 USC 2687
note.

TITLE II—CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

SEC. 201. CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

The Secretary shall—

(1) close all military installations recommended for closure by the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure in the report transmitted to the Secretary pursuant to the charter establishing such Commission;

(2) realign all military installations recommended for realignment by such Commission in such report; and

(3) initiate all such closures and realignments no later than September 30, 1991, and complete all such closures and realignments no later than September 30, 1995, except that no such closure or realignment may be initiated before January 1, 1990.

SEC. 202. CONDITIONS

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary may not carry out any closure or realignment of a military installation under this title unless—

(1) no later than January 16, 1989, the Secretary transmits to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report containing a statement that the Secretary has approved, and the Department of Defense will implement, all of the military installation closures and realignments recommended by the Commission in the report referred to in section 201(1);

(2) the Commission has recommended, in the report referred to in section 201(1), the closure or realignment, as the case may be, of the installation, and has transmitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a copy of such report and the statement required by section 203(b)(2); and

(3) the Secretary of Defense has transmitted to the Commission the study required by section 206(b).

Reports.

(b) **JOINT RESOLUTION.**—The Secretary may not carry out any closure or realignment under this title if, within the 45-day period beginning on March 1, 1989, a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance with the provisions of section 208, disapproving the recommendations of the Commission. The days on which either House of Congress is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain shall be excluded in the computation of such 45-day period.

(c) **TERMINATION OF AUTHORITY.**—The authority of the Secretary to carry out any closure or realignment under this title shall terminate on October 1, 1995.

SEC. 203. THE COMMISSION

(a) **MEMBERSHIP.**—The Commission shall consist of 12 members appointed by the Secretary of Defense.

(b) **DUTIES.**—The Commission shall—

Reports.

(1) transmit the report referred to in section 201(1) to the Secretary no later than December 31, 1988, and shall include in such report a description of the Commission's recommendations of the military installations to which functions will be transferred as a result of the closures and realignments recommended by the Commission; and

Reports.

(2) on the same date on which the Commission transmits such report to the Secretary, transmit to Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives—

(A) a copy of such report; and

(B) a statement certifying that the Commission has identified the military installations to be closed or realigned by reviewing all military installations inside the United States, including all military installations under construction and all those planned for construction.

(c) **STAFF.**—Not more than one-half of the professional staff of the Commission shall be individuals who have been employed by the Department of Defense during calendar year 1988 in any capacity other than as an employee of the Commission.

SEC. 204. IMPLEMENTATION

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—In closing or realigning a military installation under this title, the Secretary—

(1) subject to the availability of funds authorized for and appropriated to the Department of Defense for use in planning and design, minor construction, or operation and maintenance and the availability of funds in the Account, may carry out actions necessary to implement such closure or realignment, including the acquisition of such land, the construction of such replacement facilities, the performance of such activities, and the conduct of such advance planning and design as may be required to transfer functions from such military installation to another military installation;

Community
development.

(2) subject to the availability of funds authorized for and appropriated to the Department of Defense for economic adjustment assistance or community planning assistance and the availability of funds in the Account, shall provide—

(A) economic adjustment assistance to any community located near a military installation being closed or realigned; and

(B) community planning assistance to any community located near a military installation to which functions will be transferred as a result of such closure or realignment, if the Secretary determines that the financial resources available to the community (by grant or otherwise) for such purposes are inadequate; and

Environmental
protection.
Waste disposal.
Hazardous
materials.

(3) subject to the availability of funds authorized for and appropriated to the Department of Defense for environmental restoration and the availability of funds in the Account, may carry out activities for the purpose of environmental restoration, including reducing, removing, and recycling hazardous wastes and removing unsafe buildings and debris.

(b) **MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY.**—(1) The Administrator of General Services shall delegate to the Secretary, with respect to excess and surplus real property and facilities located at a military installation closed or realigned under this title—

(A) the authority of the Administrator to utilize excess property under section 202 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483);

(B) the authority of the Administrator to dispose of surplus property under section 203 of that Act (40 U.S.C. 484); and

(C) the authority of the Administrator to grant approvals and make determinations under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)).

(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall exercise authority delegated to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) in accordance with—

(i) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this title governing utilization of excess property and disposal of surplus property under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949; and

(ii) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this title governing the conveyance and disposal of property under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)).

(B) The Secretary, after consulting with the Administrator of General Services, may issue regulations that are necessary to carry out the delegation of authority required by paragraph (1).

(C) The authority required to be delegated by paragraph (1) to the Secretary by the Administrator of General Services shall not include the authority to prescribe general policies and methods for utilizing excess property and disposing of surplus property.

(D) Before any action may be taken with respect to the disposal of any surplus real property or facility located at any military installation to be closed or realigned under this title, the Secretary shall consult with the Governor of the State and the heads of the local governments concerned for the purpose of considering any plan for the use of such property by the local community concerned.

State and local
governments.

(E) The provisions of this paragraph and paragraph (1) are subject to paragraphs (3) and (4).

(3) Before any action is taken with respect to the disposal or transfer of any real property or facility located at a military installation to be closed or realigned under this title, the Secretary shall notify all departments and other instrumentalities (including nonappropriated fund instrumentalities) within the Department of Defense of the availability of such property or facility, or portion thereof, and may transfer such property, facility, or portion, without reimbursement, to any such department or instrumentality. In carrying out this paragraph, the Secretary shall give a priority, and shall transfer, to any such department or other instrumentality that agrees to pay fair market value for the property or facility, or portion thereof. For purposes of this paragraph, fair market value shall be determined on the basis of the use of the property or facility on December 31, 1988. This paragraph shall take precedence over any other provision of this title or other provision of law with respect to the disposal or transfer of real property or facility located at a military installation to be closed or realigned under this title.

(4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), all proceeds—
(i) from any transfer under paragraph (3); and
(ii) from the transfer or disposal of any other property or facility made as a result of a closure or realignment under this title,
shall be deposited into the Account established by section 207(a)(1).

(B) In any case in which the General Services Administration is involved in the management or disposal of such property or facility, the Secretary shall reimburse the Administrator of General Services from the proceeds of such disposal, in accordance with section 1535 of title 31, United States Code, for any expenses incurred in such activities.

(c) **APPLICABILITY OF OTHER LAW.**—(1) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) shall not apply to—

(A) the actions of the Commission, including selecting the military installations which the Commission recommends for closure or realignment under this title, recommending any military installation to receive functions from an installation to be closed or realigned, and making its report to the Secretary and the committees under section 203(b); and

(B) the actions of the Secretary in establishing the Commission, in determining whether to accept the recommendations of the Commission, in selecting any military installation to receive functions from an installation to be closed or realigned, and in transmitting the report to the Committees referred to in section 202(a)(1).

(2) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 shall apply to the actions of the Secretary (A) during the process of the closing or realigning of a military installation after such military installation has been selected for closure or realignment but before the installation is closed or realigned and the functions relocated, and (B) during the process of the relocating of functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation after the receiving installation has been selected but before the functions are relocated. In applying the provisions of such Act, the Secretary shall not have to consider—

(i) the need for closing or realigning a military installation which has been selected for closure or realignment by the Commission;

(ii) the need for transferring functions to another military installation which has been selected as the receiving installation; or

(iii) alternative military installations to those selected.

Claims.

(3) A civil action for judicial review, with respect to any requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the extent such Act is applicable under paragraph (2), or with respect to any requirement of the Commission made by this title, of any action or failure to act by the Secretary during the closing, realigning, or relocating referred to in clauses (A) and (B) of paragraph (2), or of any action or failure to act by the Commission under this title, may not be brought later than the 60th day after the date of such action or failure to act.

SEC. 266. WAIVER

The Secretary may carry out this title without regard to—

(1) any provision of law restricting the use of funds for closing or realigning military installations included in any appropriation or authorization Act; and

(2) the procedures set forth in sections 2662 and 2687 of title 10, United States Code.

SEC. 206. REPORTS

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—As part of each annual budget request for the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress—

- (1) a schedule of the closure and realignment actions to be carried out under this title in the fiscal year for which the request is made and an estimate of the total expenditures required and cost savings to be achieved by each such closure and realignment and of the time period in which these savings are to be achieved in each case, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such actions; and
- (2) a description of the military installations, including those under construction and those planned for construction, to which functions are to be transferred as a result of such closures and realignments, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such transfers.

(b) **STUDY.**—(1) The Secretary shall conduct a study of the military installations of the United States outside the United States to determine if efficiencies can be realized through closure or realignment of the overseas base structure of the United States. Not later than October 15, 1988, the Secretary shall transmit a report of the findings and conclusions of such study to the Commission and to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. In developing its recommendations to the Secretary under this title, the Commission shall consider the Secretary's study.

(2) Upon request of the Commission, the Secretary shall provide the Commission with such information about overseas bases as may be helpful to the Commission in its deliberations.

(3) The Commission, based on its analysis of military installations in the United States and its review of the Secretary's study of the overseas base structure, may provide the Secretary with such comments and suggestions as it considers appropriate regarding the Secretary's study of the overseas base structure.

SEC. 207. FUNDING

(a) **ACCOUNT.**—(1) There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury an account to be known as the "Department of Defense Base Closure Account" which shall be administered by the Secretary as a single account.

(2) There shall be deposited into the Account—

(A) funds authorized for and appropriated to the Account with respect to fiscal year 1990 and fiscal years beginning thereafter;

(B) any funds that the Secretary may, subject to approval in an appropriation Act, transfer to the Account from funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for any purpose, except that such funds may be transferred only after the date on which the Secretary transmits written notice of, and justification for, such transfer to the appropriate committees of Congress; and

(C) proceeds described in section 204(b)(4)(A).

(3)(A) The Secretary may use the funds in the Account only for the purposes described in section 204(a).

(B) When a decision is made to use funds in the Account to carry out a construction project under section 204(a)(1) and the cost of the project will exceed the maximum amount authorized by law for a minor construction project, the Secretary shall notify in writing the appropriate committees of Congress of the nature of, and justifica-

tion for, the project and the amount of expenditures for such project. Any such construction project may be carried out without regard to section 2802(a) of title 10, United States Code.

Reports.

(4) No later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal year in which the Secretary carries out activities under this title, the Secretary shall transmit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress of the amount and nature of the deposits into, and the expenditures from, the Account during such fiscal year and of the amount and nature of other expenditures made pursuant to section 204(a) during such fiscal year.

(5) Unobligated funds which remain in the Account after the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this title shall be held in the Account until transferred by law after the appropriate committees of Congress receive the report transmitted under paragraph (6).

Reports.

(6) No later than 60 days after the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this title, the Secretary shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing an accounting of—

(A) all the funds deposited into and expended from the Account or otherwise expended under this title; and

(B) any amount remaining in the Account.

SEC. 206. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION REPORT

(a) **TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION.**—For purposes of section 202(b), the term “joint resolution” means only a joint resolution which is introduced before March 15, 1989, and—

(1) which does not have a preamble;

(2) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That Congress disapproves the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure established by the Secretary of Defense as submitted to the Secretary of Defense on _____”, the blank space being appropriately filled in; and

(3) the title of which is as follows: “Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure.”

(b) **REFERRAL.**—A resolution described in subsection (a), introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in subsection (a) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(c) **DISCHARGE.**—If the committee to which a resolution described in subsection (a) is referred has not reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) before March 15, 1989, such committee shall be, as of March 15, 1989, discharged from further consideration of such resolution, and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

(d) **CONSIDERATION.**—(1) On or after the third day after the date on which the committee to which such a resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of, such a resolution, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution (but only on the day after the calendar day on which such Member announces to the House concerned the Member's intention to do so). All points of order against the resolution

(and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the respective House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.

(2) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the resolution is not in order. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. A motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(3) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in subsection (a) and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate.

(e) **CONSIDERATION BY OTHER HOUSE.**—(1) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that House receives from the other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply:

(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House receiving it except in the case of final passage as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).

(B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection (a) of the House receiving the resolution—

(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the other House; but

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the other House.

(2) Upon disposition of the resolution received from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the resolution that originated in the receiving House.

(f) **RULES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE.**—This section is enacted by Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a resolution described in subsection (a), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of

that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

SEC. 209. DEFINITIONS

In this title:

(1) The term "Account" means the Department of Defense Base Closure Account established by section 207(a)(1).

(2) The term "appropriate committees of Congress" means the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

(3) The terms "Commission on Base Realignment and Closure" and "Commission" mean the Commission established by the Secretary of Defense in the charter signed by the Secretary on May 3, 1988, and as altered thereafter with respect to the membership and voting.

(4) The term "charter establishing such Commission" means the charter referred to in paragraph (3).

(5) The term "initiate" includes any action reducing functions or civilian personnel positions but does not include studies, planning, or similar activities carried out before there is a reduction of such functions or positions.

(6) The term "military installation" means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department.

(7) The term "realignment" includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions.

(8) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Defense.

(9) The term "United States" means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

Approved October 24, 1988.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 2749 (H.R. 4264):

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 100-1076 (Comm. of Conference); No. 100-563 (Comm. on Armed Services) and No. 100-753 (Comm. of Conference), both accompanying H.R. 4264.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 134 (1988):

Apr. 26-29, May 2-5, 11, H.R. 4264 considered and passed House.

May 27, considered and passed Senate, amended, in lieu of S. 2355.

July 14, House and Senate agreed to conference report.

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 24 (1988):

Aug. 3, Presidential veto message of H.R. 4264.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 134 (1988):

Aug. 11, S. 2749 considered and passed Senate.

Oct. 3, considered and passed House, amended.

Oct. 12, Senate and House agreed to conference report to S. 2749.

Appendix C

Commissioner Biographies

The Honorable Abraham A. Ribicoff, Co-Chairman, is a former Governor of Connecticut, Congressman, and Senator. He served as the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under President Kennedy. Senator Ribicoff is Special Counsel to the New York law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler.

The Honorable Jack Edwards, Co-Chairman, is a former Congressman from Alabama. While a Congressman, he was a member of the House Appropriations Committee, and was the Ranking Minority Member of the Defense Subcommittee. Congressman Edwards is a partner in the law firm of Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, in Mobile, Alabama.

Mr. Louis W. Cabot is a former Chairman of the Board of the Cabot Corporation. He was also a Member of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. Mr. Cabot is the Chairman of the Board of the Brookings Institution, located in Washington, D.C.

The Honorable W. Graham Claytor, Jr., is a former Secretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defense. Mr. Claytor is the Chairman of the Board and President of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK), located in Washington, D.C.

Mr. Donald F. Craib, Jr., is the former Chairman and CEO of Allstate Insurance, Co. He currently resides in Las Vegas, Nevada.

The Honorable Thomas F. Eagleton is a former Senator from the State of Missouri. He also served as Missouri's Lieutenant Governor and Attorney General. While a Senator, he was a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Senator Eagleton is a member of the St. Louis law firm of Thomas & Mitchell and a Professor of Public Affairs at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri.

The Honorable Martin R. Hoffmann is a former Defense General Counsel and Secretary of the Army. Mr. Hoffmann is a managing partner in the Washington, D.C. office of the Chicago, Illinois law firm of Gardner, Carton & Douglas.

General Bryce Poe, II, USAF (Ret), is a former Vice Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Force (Europe), and a former Commander of the U.S. Air Force Logistics Command. General Poe currently resides in Alexandria, Virginia.

Vice Admiral William H. Rowden, USN (Ret), is a former Commander of the Sixth Fleet, Military Sealift Command, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. Admiral Rowden resides in Alexandria, Virginia.

Dr. James C. Smith is a former staff member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. Dr. Smith is President of the Commercial Group, CRS Sirmine, Inc., an engineering and construction company located in Houston, Texas.

General Donn A. Starry, USA (Ret), is a former Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and a former Commander-in-Chief of the Readiness Command. General Starry is presently Executive Vice President of Ford Aerospace Corporation.

The Honorable Russell E. Train is a former Under Secretary of the Interior, first Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, and Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. Currently, Mr. Train is the Chairman of the Board for the World Wildlife Fund and the Conservation Foundation, located in Washington, D.C., and of Clean Sites, Inc., located in Alexandria, Virginia.

Appendix D

Commission Staff

Hayden G. Bryan, *Executive Director*
Jay Winik, *Deputy Executive Director*
Douglas B. Hansen,* *Executive Secretary and Research Director*
Russel E. Milnes,* *Counsel*

PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL STAFF

James G. Abbee
Richard B. Baldwin
Van B. Bandjunis
Charles W. Barrett
Douglas M. Brown
Robert Chandler
Karen Chase
Kathryn A. Condon*
Donald L. Conner
Charles T. P. Flachbarth*
Peter J. Groh
Anthony L. Harper*

Robert D. Hickson
LTC Frederick B. McKenzie, USAR*
CDR Charles F. Miller, USNR*
Trevor Neve
Ronald Preston
Hugh J. Quinn*
LTC Jeffrey C. Sandefur, USAF*
LTC Thomas Shadis, USA*
Ben Sternberg, Jr.
CAPT (SEL) Larry Szutenbach, USN*
Kevin J. Urban*
COL (P) Roger F. Yankoupe, USA*

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

MAJ Nancy J. Gordon, USA
SPC Lisa L. Babington, USA
SSG D. Michelle Charleville, USAFR
Manuela L. Cuen
QM1 Mark A. Gilbert, USN
SGT Claudia D. Lawrence, USAR
YN1 Wayne Liddy, USN
MAJ Walter McKnight, USAF
Margaret I. Mixan
Jacqueline L. Morales

1LT Robert S. Moyer, USAF
SSG Steven P. Peterka, USMC
SPC Michael L. Riddick, USA
CPT Christopher A. Roosa, USMCR
CPT Chris Sherry, USAF
Kristin M. Stapf
SGT Greg E. Strong, USAF
1LT Lisa Tucker, USAF
Marsha E. Weisberg

* DoD employees (reference Section 203(C), P.L. 100-526)

Appendix E

Installation Task Forces and Categories

TASK FORCE	CATEGORY
Ground	Operating Ground Operating Troops
Air	Operating Tactical Aircraft Operating Strategic Aircraft Operating Mobility Aircraft Operating Missiles Flying Training
Sea	Operating Surface Ships Operating Submarines
Training and Administration	Headquarters Training Classrooms
Depot	Maintenance Depots Supply Depots Munitions Facilities Industrial Facilities Production Facilities
All Other	Guard & Reserve Centers Communications/Intelligence Sites R&D Laboratories Special Operations Bases Space Operations Centers Medical Facilities

Appendix F

Military Value Factors and Physical Attributes

FACTORS

Mission Suitability

Availability of Facilities

Quality of Facilities

Quality of Life

Community Support

PHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES

Site-Specific Mission
Deployment Means
Relationship to Other Activities
Weather/Terrain/Land Use
Survivability
Maneuver Space

Operations
Support
Infrastructure
Administration

Condition
Technology
Configuration

Family Housing
Bachelor Housing
Recreation/Amenities
Medical

Work Force
Commercial Transport
Infrastructure
Complementary Industry

Appendix G

The Commission's Cost-Estimating Model

The Commission developed a model to capture the essential costs and savings resulting from realignments and closures. The model was used in determining whether the six-year payback guideline in the Charter had been achieved.

The model uses standard cost factors to convert into dollar values the actions required by the suggested options. Each Service was encouraged to provide the Commission with an assessment of the viability of the model as an estimating tool. Their responses indicated that planning and accounting mechanisms were sufficiently different to warrant Service-specific cost factors. The Services were required to document the source of their factors to the Commission.

In addition to the Service-specific factors, the model takes local cost factors into account. This was essential to determining the potential for reducing overhead by consolidating facilities, and to eliminate options in which activities are moved from relatively efficient facilities to less efficient sites. Calculations consider relative differences in the cost of maintaining the installation, paying off-base housing allowances, and building new facilities.

The model considers one-time transactions, costs or savings, such as construction, personnel retirements and severances, personnel relocation costs, equipment freight and transport costs, land

purchases or sales, cost avoidances, and environmental mitigation. There are also recurring costs or savings, including housing allowances, salary changes from hired or released billets, changes in base support (overhead and maintenance) costs, and mission-related costs experienced by the activity as a result of the relocation. During transition, both one-time and recurring costs or savings can occur.

In order to avoid misleading data based on differing inflation estimates, the model collects all costs in constant-dollar terms: a one-time conversion is then made at a three-percent inflation rate. A computation of net present value (at an assumed discount rate of ten percent) is made to determine the payback period and to provide a means of comparison of the different options. The net present value is computed for a twenty-year period, reflecting five transition years and fifteen steady-state years. The key decision item is the payback period, defined in the charter as the number of steady-state years required before the transition costs are recouped. The model itself is non-decisional, simply reporting the results of the computations.

The Services have reviewed this model extensively for theoretical soundness, and from the practical aspect of its assessment of the options proposed. Some are now considering it for their own future planning needs.

Appendix H

Closures and Realignments

The following recommendations constitute those required by Title II, P.L. 100-526. An index of affected installations begins on page 82.

ARMY

Fort Dix, New Jersey

The Commission recommends the realignment of Fort Dix to semi-active status and relocation of entry level training functions (Basic Training (BT) and Advanced Individual Training (AIT)) from Fort Dix to other Army training base installations. This decision will consolidate similar training accomplished at various locations and will increase the availability of training areas at Fort Dix to support active and reserve training. This category has excess capacity allowing these consolidations. The net cost of this realignment will be paid back in five years. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$84.5 million.

In reviewing Fort Dix, the Commission noted opportunities to improve overall effectiveness of the training base through the realignment of training. As BT and AIT training are relocated from Fort Dix to other training installations, related adjustments can be made to better distribute, consolidate, and manage training load requirements.

The realignment of Fort Dix to semi-active status will give the Army an improved capability to meet active and reserve component training requirements

in the Northeast. It also will permit expansion of training capability to meet mobilization requirements when needed. The size and location of Fort Dix, which is contiguous to McGuire AFB, will also provide capability to absorb future Army force structure changes resulting from possible adjustments in overseas unit stationing.

Implementation of the realignment will require careful planning. There must be adequate provisions for security and maintenance of retained facilities to meet future expansion and mobilization requirements. Infrastructure to operate residual active facilities, such as Walston Army Hospital, and support for McGuire AFB, Naval Air Engineering Center (NAEC) Lakehurst, and the Fort Dix training area may also be required. In reviewing the overall health care requirements within the Delaware Valley area, the Department of Defense should determine whether the Walston Army Hospital should be retained or downgraded to a clinic.

No negative environmental impacts are anticipated since Fort Dix will remain in semi-active status. Relocation actions

involved with this recommendation will not significantly alter the environmental situations at the gaining installations as comparable training presently exists there.

The realignments will have moderate impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends the following relocations of Basic and Advanced Individual Training:

-- Basic Training at Fort Dix, as follows: approximately 30 percent to Fort Knox, Kentucky, to include Air Base Ground Defense, 20 percent to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and 50 percent to Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

-- Basic Training at Fort Bliss, Texas, to Fort Jackson.

-- Motor Vehicle Operator (88M) Combat Service Support AIT from Fort Dix to be consolidated with other 88M AIT training at Fort Leonard Wood.

-- Light Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic (63B) Combat Service Support AIT from Forts Dix and Leonard Wood to be consolidated with other 63B AIT training at Fort Jackson.

-- Administrative and Legal Specialist (71C/D) Combat Service Support AIT from Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, to be consolidated with other 71C/D AIT training at Fort Jackson.

-- Personnel Specialist (75 D/E) Combat Service Support AIT load and cadre from Fort Jackson to be consolidated with other 75 D/E AIT training at Fort Benjamin Harrison.

-- Supply Specialist (76Y) Combat Service Support AIT from Fort Jackson to

be consolidated with other 76Y AIT training at Fort Lee, Virginia.

-- Food Service Specialist (94B) Combat Service Support AIT from Fort Dix and Fort Jackson to be consolidated with other 94B AIT training at Ft Lee.

The Commission recognizes that the relocations prescribed above may require modification. The Secretary of the Army may modify them if necessary. These modifications must be at no greater cost and payback than currently calculated and follow the stated intent of the Commission to consolidate like AIT training at single installations and to consolidate basic training at fewer installations.

Fort Douglas, Utah

The Commission recommends Fort Douglas for closure. It is positioned in the center of the University of Utah campus which severely restricts its operational flexibility. Its regional support mission can be relocated to another location. The Reserve Component facilities will be segregated and retained within the Fort. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back within six years. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$250 thousand.

The activities assigned to Fort Douglas support the regional Reserve-Component functions and pay actions, and support area recruiting efforts.

Construction potential is also limited by the historical landmark status of the central portion of the installation. The facilities have a high backlog of maintenance and repair, requiring substantial capital investments to upgrade.

Closure of Fort Douglas will result in minor environmental impacts. The closure and subsequent relocation will require the removal of an unknown quantity of PCB transformers, as well as asbestos, from the buildings. Cleanup of these sites is covered under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure. Additionally, 45 acres of the installation have been designated as a National Landmark. Several of the facilities are listed on the National Register of Historic Places and will require protection or segregation.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends the following relocations of major activities:

- The Reserve Component Pay Input Station to Fort Carson, Colorado. This realignment will enhance command and control by Headquarters, Sixth Army, its parent activity.

- Segregate and retain on a portion of Fort Douglas the Reserve Component activities.

- Other activities to leased space in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Cameron Station, Virginia

The Commission recommends Cameron Station for closure. It has a substantial administrative-space deficit; the facilities are also old and inefficient with an array of security, maintenance, electrical, health, and safety problems. The major mission and tenants of the installation can be relocated within the National Capital Region (NCR). The net cost of closure and relocation is expected to pay back

within six years, with annual savings estimated to be \$13.3 million.

The Department of Defense missions at Cameron Station include logistical and transportation support to military activities in the Washington area. The Commission also notes that the installation provides morale and welfare-support functions for a significant portion of the military community in the NCR.

Cameron Station's facilities are inadequate in size and quality to support the large administrative organizations resident on the installation. The converted warehouses used for administrative space are a maze of hallways and offices without windows or natural lighting. The quality of the work environment is significantly degraded by overcrowding and health hazards. In addition, Cameron Station is located in a heavily urbanized area of the NCR.

The closure of Cameron Station requires consideration of contaminated sites, PCB transformers, asbestos, and possible leaking underground storage tanks. Cleanup of these sites is covered under the DoD Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission's initial cost evaluation for this closure revealed an eight-year payback, resulting from the standard property value estimated for Cameron Station. The Commission reexamined this value and believes that the property would return considerably more if it were rezoned. The Commission believes there exists sufficient potential for the rezoning to permit estimation of a higher property value. Moreover, the payback period

would decrease markedly if the Army is successful in obtaining special legislation approving the Fort Belvoir Engineer Proving Ground Public-Private Development initiative for NCR leased space which could accommodate relocation of Cameron Station activities.

The Commission recommends that the major activities at Cameron Station be relocated to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, which is within commuting distance. The relocations will enhance administrative operations by providing modern facilities designed for administrative purposes. The activities to be relocated include the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the Engineer Activity Capital Area, and the Joint Personal Property Shipping Office, Washington.

For morale and welfare-support functions, the Commission recommends that some proceeds from the closure be applied to expansion of commissary and post exchange facilities in the NCR to the extent that they are required.

Presidio of San Francisco, California

The Commission recommends the Presidio of San Francisco, to include Letterman Army Medical Center (LAMC), for closure, primarily because it has no capability to expand, and LAMC is in need of major structural repairs. The Commission believes that it is unlikely that a new hospital will be constructed on the San Francisco side of the Bay Area. The Presidio and LAMC functions can be relocated. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back within two years. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$74.1 million.

The Commission notes that the installation has 1416 acres of land under Army control, of which only 36.5 acres can be sold. Public Law 100-80, Section 2331, provides for lease of the salable land to the city of San Francisco for a term of ten years beginning no later than January 1989. The full value of the 36.5 acres could be realized if the legislation on lease of Presidio lands were repealed.

Presidio is the headquarters for Sixth Army, which provides command and control of regional Reserve-Component forces. LAMC provides medical care for the Bay Area military community, serves as an Army graduate medical training facility, and houses the Letterman Army Medical Institute of Research.

The Presidio has no excess administrative-space capacity. Statutory restrictions preclude new construction. Reconstruction is allowed only if the replacement facility is the same size as the existing structure, regardless of mission. Demolition of a like amount of square footage is required for all reconstruction. The status of the Presidio as a federally registered landmark, with approximately 300 historical structures, will affect any future development plans.

The LAMC does not meet seismic standards and upgrading would be very costly. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has recently assigned regional medical responsibility in this area to the Navy. The Navy operates a similar hospital at Oak Knoll on the east side of the Bay Area.

Closure of Presidio will require action with regard to contaminated sites, PCB transformers, asbestos, and possible underground storage tank leaks. Cleanup of these sites is covered by the Defense

Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure. Maintenance of historic sites and the existing agreement with the Golden Gate Recreational Committee will affect property disposal. Adverse environmental impacts are not anticipated for those installations receiving transfers from this action, since comparable activities presently exist there.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends the following relocations of major units:

- Headquarters, Sixth Army to Fort Carson, Colorado. This will reduce the high base-operating costs currently experienced at Presidio and place the Sixth Army on a multi-mission installation.

- The medical assets of LAMC to be distributed throughout the Army medical force structure to improve health care at other bases with large active-duty populations, and to reduce costs.

- Recurring health-care requirements normally handled by Letterman to be accommodated by other Service medical facilities in the Bay Area or through CHAMPUS.

- Letterman Army Institute of Research to be relocated to Fort Detrick, Maryland. The realignment will provide new facilities and consolidate research functions.

Coosa River Annex, Alabama

The Commission recommends Coosa River Annex for closure. It has limited military value because it has been essentially inactive for several years, with

only a minimal ammunition storage mission. There are no mobilization requirements for this property. The net cost of closure will be paid back immediately upon sale of the land. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$100 thousand.

Coosa River has only limited ammunition storage capability. The ammunition can be either demilitarized or relocated. Inadequate facilities limit any additional ammunition-related functions at the site.

Coosa River has significant environmental cleanup problems. The hazardous waste problems include asbestos, PCBs in transformers, and other forms of contamination. Cleanup of these sites is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure.

The closure will have no impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends relocating the ammunition storage mission to Anniston Army Depot, Alabama.

Navajo Depot Activity, Arizona

The Commission recommends Navajo for closure and anticipates its eventual transfer to the Arizona National Guard. The military value of the installation is lower than others in the same category. The Army does not exercise operational control of the depot and the ammunition mission and tenants of the installation can be relocated. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back within four years. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$3.1 million.

Navajo stores and demilitarizes conventional ammunition. It also operates a reserve-storage depot, which provides care, preservation, minor maintenance, and limited receiving and shipping of assigned commodities. The ammunition and supply functions can be more effectively managed at less cost at another location. No significant environmental problems exist at the Depot.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends relocating the ammunition-mission stocks, equipment, and personnel to Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant, Nevada.

Fort Wingate Ammunition Storage Depot, New Mexico

The Commission recommends Fort Wingate for closure. Its military value is lower than the other installations in the same category, primarily because Fort Wingate is a small, single-mission facility. Its mission can be relocated. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back within one year. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$5.2 million.

Fort Wingate ships, receives, renovates, and stores ammunition and components and is responsible for the disposition of unserviceable ammunition.

Sufficient storage capacity is available at other depots to accept the ammunition mission from Fort Wingate. This realignment will eliminate current excess capacity and equipment problems.

Closure of Fort Wingate will require the cleanup of environmental hazards before the facility can be considered for

unrestricted land use. The major environmental problems are asbestos and contaminated sites. Cleanup of these sites is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure. Potential issues also exist with the archaeological sites at the installation.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends that the activities at Fort Wingate be relocated to Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant, Nevada.

Lexington - Bluegrass Army Depot, Kentucky

The Commission recommends closure of the Lexington portion of the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot. The military value of this installation is lower than others in the same category, primarily due to the condition of facilities and to limited storage capacity. The Bluegrass Storage facility, however, has higher military value. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back within six years. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$6.7 million.

The Lexington - Bluegrass Army Depot consists of two separate facilities, one located in Lexington, which is the headquarters for the complex, and the other an ammunition storage facility (Bluegrass) at Richmond, Kentucky. The Lexington facility also performs the overhaul of communications security equipment and assembles communications -electronics materiel.

Consolidation of the communications-electronics maintenance function from

Lexington to Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania, will enable Tobyhanna and its western region counterpart, the Sacramento Army Depot, California, to provide responsive communications-electronics support to customers in either region. Since Lexington's mission is not site specific, and Tobyhanna has excess capacity to absorb additional missions, the consolidation will improve operational efficiency, management effectiveness, and command and control over these activities. The two major tenants at Lexington, the Material Readiness Support Activity and the Central Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment Activity, can also be relocated to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, and Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania. This will combine functions, improve management effectiveness and efficiency of the entire operation, as well as improve command and control.

The cleanup requirements to qualify Lexington for unrestricted land use are minimal with minor environmental impacts. Major adverse environmental impacts are not anticipated at those facilities receiving activities from this action as comparable activities are presently performed there.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends the following relocations:

- The transfer of the supply and material-readiness missions to Letterkenny.

- The transfer of the communications-electronics mission to Tobyhanna.

- The transfer the central test management mission to Redstone Arsenal.

Pontiac Storage Facility, Michigan

The Commission recommends Pontiac Storage Facility for closure. The military value of the installation is lower than other installations in the same category, primarily because it is a small, single-mission facility, with a high backlog of military construction. The mission can be relocated. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back within six years. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$500 thousand.

Pontiac receives, stores, maintains, and ships industrial plant equipment for various types of production functions in support of mobilization requirements.

Pontiac's mission of supporting industrial plant requirements is not cost effective. Small, single-mission storage facilities such as this should be combined to achieve overhead savings.

Closure of Pontiac storage will result in minor environmental impacts, specifically in the areas of hazardous wastes and pollution control. Major adverse environmental impacts are not expected at those facilities receiving transfers resulting from the closure since comparable activities are presently performed there.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends relocating all stocks to the Seneca Army Depot, New York. Equipment presently in storage should be surveyed to determine its continued utility. No costs for new construction are required to accommodate the transferred supplies.

Alabama Ammunition Plant, Alabama

The Commission recommends Alabama Ammunition Plant for closure. The military value of the installation is lower than other installations in the same category, primarily because it has been in an inactive status since 1954, pending disposal. No capability to manufacture propellants and explosives remains at Alabama due to the fact that all production equipment has been removed. No mission or tenants need to be relocated. This closure will be paid back immediately. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$27 thousand.

The plant has significant environmental cleanup problems. The installation is on the national priority list for hazardous-waste cleanup. It has numerous contaminated sites and asbestos in several facilities.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

There are no realignments of units required for the closure.

New Orleans Military Ocean Terminal, Louisiana

The Commission recommends New Orleans Military Ocean Terminal for closure. The military value of the installation is lower than other installations in the same category, primarily because its facilities and piers cannot meet its mission to process and embark a combat force. Its peacetime mission is the temporary storage of privately owned vehicles and household goods. This mission can be eliminated.

There are no costs of closure and relocation; thus, there is an immediate

payback. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$1.0 million.

Poor wharf configuration, inadequate piers, and low accessibility of loading areas disqualify the site for continued military use. The facilities are the only property under Army control and ownership. All other property, including the land, belongs to the city of New Orleans.

The substation and transformers on the wharf need to be surveyed for asbestos, PCB's, and underground storage-tank contamination before property transfer. The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

There are no relocations of units necessary.

Fort Sheridan, Illinois

The Commission recommends Fort Sheridan for closure primarily because it is located in a heavily urbanized, high-cost area with minimal potential for future growth. Its mission and tenants can be relocated. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back within one year. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$40.8 million.

Fort Sheridan is the operations base for Headquarters, Fourth United States Army, and the United States Army Recruiting Command. Missions include command and control of reserve units in the area; recruiting functions for the Army; and area support for Reserve Component units and recruiting operations. Its relocation outside of the Chicago vicinity will reduce operating costs for the Army. Approximately 60 acres containing reserve support facilities should be retained. The Commission anticipates the cemetery will

be transferred to the Veterans Administration.

Fort Sheridan is located on high-value property. The installation can be easily relocated. The only stipulation is that the relocation of the Fourth Army Headquarters must be within its seven-state area. The Recruiting Command needs to be centrally located due to its nationwide mission. Both activities require accessibility to an adequate transportation network.

This closure will have minimal environmental impact. Concerns that need to be addressed during implementation include historical buildings, a contaminated munitions burning site, various landfills, PCB transformers, and possible leaking underground storage tanks. Cleanup of contamination on these sites is covered under the DoD Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends the following relocations of major units:

-- The Headquarters, Fourth Army, and Headquarters, United States Army Recruiting Command to Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.

-- The United States Army Recruiting Battalion Chicago, Illinois, and the United States Army Recruiting Brigade Midwest to leased space in Chicago.

Army Material Technology Laboratory (AMTL), Massachusetts

The Commission recommends Army

Material Technology Laboratory (AMTL) for closure primarily due to the condition of its facilities and infrastructure. The laboratory's mission of developing new materials to enhance the effectiveness and warfighting capability of the Army can be performed at other Army installations. Relocating that mission will take advantage of existing Army property, reduce base operations costs, and combine research groups with those working on similar technologies. The net cost of closure will be paid back within one year. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$7.1 million.

Army Material Technology Laboratory supports other laboratories in the area of material-development research. It provides advice, technical assistance, and support to other Army laboratories. It also performs failure analyses on developmental and fielded systems.

AMTL facilities need major renovation or replacement, the laboratory can be relocated and the construction avoided. The facilities are located on high-value property that can be sold to offset realignment costs.

The laboratory is currently hampered in performing its mission by the condition of the facilities and the supporting utility systems. Major renovation or complete replacement of the facilities at AMTL would be costly but necessary to overcome all the operational deficiencies. Closure avoids major renovation costs and enables the research functions to be performed more efficiently elsewhere.

Closure of AMTL will require consideration of hazardous-materials sites, asbestos, PCBs, and historically significant areas. Cleanup of these sites is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration

Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends the following relocations:

-- The ceramics and related research functions to the U.S. Tank-Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center at Detroit Arsenal, Michigan. This relocation will consolidate the ceramics and related research functions with similar activities now being performed at Detroit Arsenal.

-- The metal and metal-related research functions to the U.S. Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. This relocation will consolidate the metal and metal-related research functions with similar activities now being performed at Picatinny Arsenal.

-- The corrosion prevention and control related research to the Belvoir Research, Development, and Engineering Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This relocation will consolidate the corrosion prevention and control research functions with similar activities now being performed at Fort Belvoir.

Various Stand-Alone Housing Installations

The Commission recommends fifty-two stand-alone housing installations (see list below) for closure. Cost analyses have indicated that these installations are not economically efficient to operate. There are no construction costs associated with the closure of these installations. Closures will result in immediate paybacks, with

annual savings expected to total \$4.9 million for all sites.

Stand-alone housing installations provide family housing for military personnel and their dependents in locations separate from their place of duty. These sites are generally remote from the major installations that provide their support, and are dedicated to support service members stationed in the geographic area in which the housing is located.

These housing areas were in most cases constructed in the early 1950s and are either approaching or have gone beyond their useful economic life. Annual operating costs for these housing units are double the Army average. The cost of housing allowances for personnel now residing in the houses will be less than half of the Army's actual cost to operate and maintain them.

Other factors that affect the housing sites include their deterioration and long distance to their parent military installations. The mission requirements that led to the construction of these facilities have either changed or no longer exist. Overall analysis indicates closure of all 52 areas recommended is the most prudent option except where another service may request transfer of ownership. Also, adequate housing may exist at other nearby military installations, and stand-alone housing may represent excess capacity.

Closure of these sites will have no environmental impact.

The Commission recommends that during closure the Department of Defense allow for continued occupancy of the units by the personnel currently housed in the units, until their rotation to new duty

assignments.

Various Stand-Alone Family Housing installations recommended for closure are as follows:

1. FH Manchester CT 25
2. FH Ansonia CT 04
3. FH Orange CT 15
4. FH Milford CT 17
5. FH Fairfield CT 65
6. FH Westport CT 73
7. FH Shelton CT 74
8. FH New Britain CT 74
9. FH E Windsor CT 08
10. FH Portland CT 36
11. FH Plainville CT 67
12. FH Middletown CT 48
13. Worth Family Housing (IL)
14. USARC Addison Housing (FL)
15. NIKE Washington-Baltimore (MD)
16. FH Burlington (MA) 84
17. FH Nahant MA 17
18. FH Wakefield MA 03
19. FH Beverly MA 15
20. FH Hull MA 36
21. FH Randolph MA 55
22. FH Bedford MA 85
23. FH Swansea MA 29
24. FH Topsfield MA 05
25. ST. Louis Area Support Ctr
Wherry Housing (MO)
26. NIKE NY 54 Housing (NJ)
27. NIKE NY 60 Housing (NJ)
28. NIKE NY 79 80 (NJ)
29. NIKE NY 93 94 (NJ)
30. Dry Hill Family Housing (NY)
31. Manhattan Beach Housing (NY)
32. NIKE NY 01 Housing (NY)
33. NIKE NY 25 (NY)
34. NIKE NY 99 Housing (NY)
35. Irwin Support Detachment
Annex (PA)
36. Pitt 02 Family Housing (PA)
37. Pitt 03 Family Housing (PA)
38. Pitt 25 Family Housing (PA)
39. Pitt 37 Family Housing (PA)

40. Pitt 42 Family Housing (PA)
41. Pitt 43 Family Housing (PA)
42. Pitt 52 Family Housing (PA)
43. Coraopolis Family Housing
Site 71 (PA)
44. Coraopolis Family Housing
Site 72 (PA)
45. Family Housing Davisville
(RI)
46. FH N Smithfield RI 99
47. Manassas Family Housing (VA)
48. NIKE Norfolk 85 Housing (VA)
49. Woodbridge Housing Site (VA)
50. Youngs Lake Housing Site (WA)
51. Midway Housing Site (WA)
52. Sun Prairie Family Housing (WI)

Kapalama Military Reservation Phase III, Hawaii

The Commission recommends Kapalama Military Reservation Phase III for closure. The military value of the installation is lower than other installations in the same category primarily because Kapalama is separated from its primary customers, Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. The major mission and tenants of the installation can be relocated to Schofield Barracks. The cost of new construction, including required non-appropriated fund facilities and warehouse space, along with the relocation of functions, will be paid back immediately upon sale of the land. There are no annual savings associated with this closure.

The Kapalama Military Reservation provides warehouse and maintenance facilities, along with administrative areas, in support of Army missions located in Hawaii. Kapalama Military Reservation is located several miles from the installation it supports. This property is considered high-value real estate, and is located in an important industrially zoned

area near major highways and commercial ports.

Replacement construction required to execute the sale of Kapalama Phase III includes replacement warehousing for the Army and Air Force Exchange System.

No significant environmental impacts are anticipated for the closure. Consideration will have to be given to any PCB transformers or asbestos in the buildings. Cleanup of these sites is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure.

Personnel assigned to Kapalama Military Reservation Phase III, will be reassigned locally, and no employment impacts are anticipated.

Tacony Warehouse, Pennsylvania

The Commission recommends Tacony Warehouse for closure since it will have no current mission after additional construction at the New Cumberland Army Depot (NCAD), Pennsylvania is completed. There are no personnel assigned to Tacony and there will be no construction or relocation costs. The closure costs will be paid back immediately upon sale of the land. There are no annual savings associated with this closure.

The Tacony Warehouse complex, consisting of 11 buildings located on 14.2 acres in Philadelphia provides interim storage for the New Cumberland Army Depot. There is new construction underway at NCAD that will eliminate the requirement for the use of Tacony as a warehouse.

The closure will have minimal

environmental impact.

The closure will have no impact on local employment.

Hamilton Army Airfield, California

The Commission recommends Hamilton Army Airfield for closure. The military value of the installation is lower than other installations in the same category, primarily because of the high flood-control-system repair costs. The major mission and tenants of the installation can be relocated. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back immediately. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$150 thousand.

Hamilton Army Airfield serves as an airfield for the Presidio of San Francisco and as a training center for Reserve aviation and medical units.

Hamilton Army Airfield is located below sea level and requires a series of pumps, levees, and culverts to remain dry. No major repairs to the airfield have been made since the Air Force turned the property over to the Army in 1976, and facilities have since deteriorated.

The airfield lighting system is no longer operational, and a backlog in runway and related repairs has accumulated. The limited number of aircraft assigned, combined with the mission utilization, does not justify the expenditure of funds to make the airfield operational, especially in view of the Commission recommendation to close the Presidio. The future utility of the installation is limited to use as a Reserve training facility.

The closure of Hamilton Army Airfield will involve only a limited number of

contaminated sites. Cleanup of these sites is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure. Transfer of units from Hamilton Army Airfield is expected to relieve civilian noise pollution concerns.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends the following relocations of major activities:

-- Approximately 695 acres not required by the Army Reserve are recommended for closure and disposal. Facilities are to be constructed on the remaining acres to consolidate the Headquarters, 3/12 Special Forces Group and the 3/12 Service Company; the Headquarters, 2/91 Division Training; the 6253rd USA Hospital; and all Reserve units. This move will enhance Reserve training capabilities, since it will consolidate units and provide adequate facilities.

-- The 91st Division Aviation Detachment and the 343rd Medical Detachment, both reserve units, to leased space at a local airfield. No personnel are expected to be affected, since these moves will be local.

-- The Sixth Army Aviation Detachment, a reserve unit in support of the Sixth Army Headquarters, to be realigned as part of the Sixth Army relocation to Fort Carson, Colorado.

Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana

The Commission recommends Jefferson Proving Ground for closure. Its mission of evaluating ammunition produced for the Army can be located at another

installation. This move will increase utilization and reduce base-operating costs. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back within six years. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$6.6 million.

Jefferson Proving Ground has the mission of conducting, analyzing, and reporting on tests of ammunition and ammunition components.

The closure of Jefferson Proving Ground will result in significant environmental impacts. The closure will require consideration of 26 buildings with a range of herbicides, metals, explosives, PCBs and possible asbestos contamination. Cleanup of these sites is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure. A serious ordnance problem also exists. Adverse environmental impacts are not anticipated for the receiving installation as comparable operations are presently performed there.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends relocating Jefferson Proving Ground activities to Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona.

Nike Philadelphia 41/43, New Jersey

The Commission recommends closure of Nike Philadelphia 41/43 which is located in New Jersey near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This property consists of housing capacity excess to Army needs. The payback for this closure is immediate as there are no associated relocation or construction costs.

Nike Philadelphia is a stand-alone

housing installation that has in the past provided family housing for Army and other Service members and their dependents at locations separate from their duty stations.

This housing site was previously offered to the local community for possible housing for the homeless. Negotiations for its development were unsuccessful, however, and it was returned to the Army for disposal. The housing site represents excess capacity and is not needed to fulfill Army missions.

No significant environmental impacts are anticipated for closure of these housing units.

The closure will have no impact on local employment due to the fact that no personnel are assigned to or housed on Nike Philadelphia 41/43.

Nike Kansas City 30, Missouri

The Commission recommends closure of Nike Kansas City 30. This property represents excess capacity to the Army and is not required for any current or future Army mission. The payback for this closure is immediate as there are no associated relocation or construction costs.

Nike Kansas City 30 facilities consist of two barracks, a mess hall, and an administration building. The facility was made available to the Missouri Army National Guard, but the agreement has expired and will not be renewed.

No significant environmental impacts are anticipated for closure of this installation.

The closure will have minimal impact

on local employment due to the fact that no personnel are assigned to Nike Kansas City.

Cape St. George, Florida

The Commission recommends closure of Cape St. George. This property, is excess to the Army's needs as it is not required for any current or future Army mission. The payback for this closure is immediate since there are no associated relocation or construction costs.

The Cape St. George property consists primarily of a helipad that is in a state of disrepair and is unusable. There is no current or future anticipated Army mission for the installation.

No significant environmental impacts are anticipated for closure of this site.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment due to the fact that no personnel are assigned to Cape St. George.

Umatilla Army Depot, Oregon

The Commission recommends Umatilla Army Depot for realignment. The military value of the installation was lower than other installations in the same category, primarily because it is a small single-mission installation. The facilities at Umatilla also require upgrading. The mission and tenants of the installation can be relocated. The net cost of realignment will be paid back within six years. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$6.3 million.

Umatilla performs the mission of reserve storage and demilitarization of

conventional and chemical munitions.

Umatilla's mission can be managed more effectively in another location by consolidating functions in multi-mission operations.

The Commission was prevented from closing Umatilla because of the ongoing chemical demilitarization (CHEM DEMIL) mission. CHEM DEMIL prevented closure because the Army cannot begin on-site destruction of chemical munitions until 1994 with an expected completion date of 1996, which falls outside of the Commission's allowed timeframe for completing closures.

The installation will be realigned to the maximum extent possible in order to facilitate closure as soon as the CHEM DEMIL mission is complete.

Umatilla is on the National Priority List for hazardous wastes cleanup. Confirmed ground water contamination exists as well as other forms of pollution. Transfer of the conventional ammunition mission to Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant, Nevada, could have minor impact on existing hazardous waste management conditions there.

The realignment will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends relocating the conventional ammunition mission to Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant. Approximately 75 civilians will remain at Umatilla to perform environmental monitoring of ammunition-storage igloos, munitions handling, munitions transport quality control activities, and security escort duties. Additionally, personnel will be needed to support the increased depot workload for such activities as storage site

monitoring, laundry operations, and vehicle and road maintenance. CHEM DEMIL will be performed by contract augmentation.

Pueblo Army Depot, Colorado

The Commission recommends Pueblo Army Depot for realignment. The military value of the installation was lower than the others in the same category, primarily because of its substandard mission facilities and the elimination of the Pershing missile maintenance mission which creates unused capacity. Additionally, the reduction in maintenance function will cause a 20 percent decline in supply stocks. The major missions and tenants of the installation can be relocated. The net cost of realignment will be paid back within three years. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$15.5 million.

Pueblo Army Depot stores, demilitarizes, and renovates ammunition, as well as storing chemical munitions and performing maintenance on assigned commodities of equipment and components.

The depot's maintenance program is to be eliminated as a result of the mandated destruction of the Pershing missile system components. Pueblo also lacks modern facilities and does not have the necessary technology to automate its material handling system.

The Commission was prevented from closing Pueblo because of the ongoing chemical demilitarization (CHEM DEMIL) mission. CHEM DEMIL prevented closure because the Army is scheduled to begin on-site destruction of chemical munitions in 1995. The demilitarization operation is scheduled to be completed in 1997 which is outside of the Commission's allowed

timeframe to complete closures. Consequently, the installation should be realigned to the maximum extent possible in order to facilitate closure as soon as demilitarization is complete.

Moderate environmental problems are anticipated with the realignment of Pueblo Army Depot. Cleanup of hazardous wastes, asbestos, PCBs, underground storage tank problems, and contaminated sites will be required. Cleanup of these sites is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the realignment. Major adverse environmental impacts are not expected at those facilities receiving activities resulting from this action since comparable activities are presently performed there.

The Commission recommends relocation of the following major missions:

- The supply mission to Tooele Army Depot, Utah.

- The ammunition mission to Red River Army Depot, Texas.

- Approximately 75 civilians will remain at Pueblo to perform environmental monitoring of ammunition-storage igloos, munitions handling, munitions transport quality control activities, and security escort duties. Additionally, personnel will be needed to support the increased depot workload for such activities as storage site monitoring, laundry operations, and vehicle and road maintenance. CHEM DEMIL will be performed by contract augmentation.

Former Nike Site at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

The Commission recommends the former Nike site at the northwestern edge of Aberdeen Proving Ground for closure. This property, consisting of approximately 100 acres, represents excess capacity to the Army and is not required for any current or future Army mission. The payback for this closure is immediate since there are no associated relocation or construction costs.

The land is licensed to the State of Maryland for the use of the Army National Guard and is used for training and support of the Field Operating Activity (FOA) of the National Guard Bureau. The FOA is relocating to new facilities to be completed in 1991. After the National Guard relocates there will be no requirement for this property. Significant environmental impacts are expected as a result of this closure. Closure and disposal of the Former Nike Site Area requires consideration of contamination sites, PCB transformers, and asbestos. Cleanup of these sites is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

Fort Meade, Maryland Fort Holabird, Maryland Fort Devens, Massachusetts

The Commission recommends the partial closure and realignment of Fort Meade and

Fort Holabird, and the realignment of Fort Devens. The effect of these closures and realignments will be to consolidate a number of commands and activities whose operations are currently separated, thereby improving mission effectiveness, efficiency, and command and control. The net cost of these realignments will be paid back within one year. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$21 million.

Fort Meade: At Fort Meade, the range and training areas, including the airfield (approximately 9,000 acres generally south of Maryland Route 198, extended, and the existing power-line right of way), are recommended for closure and disposal. This action is taken in order to realign Fort Meade from an active Army post to an administrative center in the extended National Capital Region (NCR), an increasingly encroached urban area.

The activities of the Criminal Investigation Command (CIDC) currently located at Fort Meade and at Fort Holabird will be realigned to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, utilizing space vacated by the Information Systems Engineering Command (ISEC) of the Information Systems Command (ISC), which will relocate to Fort Devens, Massachusetts (see below). Realigning the CIDC to Fort Belvoir will avoid significant programmed construction at Fort Meade.

The primary tenant of this new administrative center at Fort Meade will be the National Security Agency (NSA). NSA leases a significant amount of space in the NCR. The other major tenant will be the Headquarters, First Army. The administrative center should be placed under the administrative and operational control of the Military District of Washington or other similar command.

The Commission encourages the Department of Defense to explore the opportunities for government or public-private development on the remaining portion of Fort Meade, along the lines being pursued at Fort Belvoir and the Belvoir Engineer Proving Ground.

Fort Holabird: The Commission recommends the closure of the portion of Fort Holabird occupied by the Criminal Records Center (CRC) of the Criminal Investigation Command (CIDC). As detailed above, this relocation of CRC to Fort Belvoir will consolidate split functions, thereby improving mission effectiveness and efficiency.

The current facilities are inadequate for the criminal-records mission. The Defense Investigative Service, which is adequately housed in another portion of the Fort, and the Wherry Housing Project, which has a long term, non-termination lease, will both remain.

Fort Devens: The Commission recommends realignment of Fort Devens in order to consolidate the split Intelligence School training function and the Information Systems Command (ISC). Consolidation of the school and the command will improve the mission effectiveness and efficiency of both functions.

The Intelligence School, currently located at Fort Devens, will relocate to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to consolidate with the Intelligence School training operations at Fort Huachuca. Fort Huachuca is the more suitable location for conduct of the school curriculum.

The Headquarters, ISC will relocate from Fort Huachuca to Fort Devens to consolidate the command in one location

which is well suited for a national command such as ISC. Other ISC activities from Fort Belvoir (see above) and from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and Fort McPherson, Georgia, will also relocate to Fort Devens.

The partial closures and realignments of Forts Meade, Holabird, and Devens will

result in minor environmental impacts. Fort Meade however, will require some environmental restoration, including cleanup of the impact area. The realignments will have minimal impact on local employment.

NAVY

Naval Station New York (Brooklyn), New York

The Commission recommends Naval Station New York (Brooklyn) for closure, primarily because the support functions located there can be more efficiently and effectively performed at Naval Station New York (Staten Island). The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back immediately. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$4.2 million.

The primary mission of the site at Brooklyn is to provide administrative, housing, supply, medical, and recreational support to activities at Staten Island. In addition, Brooklyn provides logistical support for Navy tenants.

The Brooklyn site is located on the east shore of the East River, north of the Brooklyn Bridge, on the site of the former Brooklyn Naval Shipyard. Since the site at Brooklyn has no waterfront facilities, its mission is predominantly administrative.

Staten Island, which is the site for the homeport of the Northeast Battleship Battlegroup, is located 20 city-driving miles across the Verrazano Narrows Bridge from the Brooklyn site. Management of these two sites is difficult and costly because of the distance separating them and traffic congestion. This affects the quality of support provided to assigned personnel, and reduces the installation's military value.

Closure of the Brooklyn site will not adversely affect the environment. There are plans to remove underground storage tanks and PCB transformers. Some buildings built before 1977 may contain

asbestos. Cleanup of the site is covered by the Defense Environment Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure. The movement of activities to Staten Island will not alter the environmental situation there, since comparable activities are currently planned for the area.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends that all units and activities located at Brooklyn be relocated to Staten Island.

Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point), Washington

The Commission recommends closing the portion of Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point) whose mission is to serve fleet units at Naval Station Puget Sound (Everett). These support functions can be performed more efficiently from a site much closer to Everett. The net cost of closure and relocation of those activities will be paid back within five years. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$5.6 million.

The primary mission of Sand Point is to provide administrative, supply, medical, recreational, and housing support to Everett. Sand Point also provides logistical support for Navy and other U.S. Government tenants.

The Naval Station at Sand Point is located on Lake Washington at the site of

the former Naval Air Station Seattle. Since Sand Point has no waterfront facilities and must lease pier space, its mission is predominantly administrative. The site for the homeport of the Pacific Northwest Carrier Battlegroup, consisting of an aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and eight destroyers and frigates, is Everett, 35 driving miles from Sand Point. This distance reduces the military value of Sand Point, makes management of the two sites difficult and costly, and decreases the quality of support provided to personnel at Everett. By relocating those activities supporting Everett, but currently located at Sand Point, the overall military value of the Naval Station Puget Sound will be enhanced. Approximately 40 acres of land are required to be purchased near Everett in order to accomplish this relocation.

Closure of a portion of Naval Station Puget Sound at Sand Point will not adversely affect the environment. The National Wetlands Inventory of the Department of the Interior indicates that Sand Point may be classified as wetlands. Plans for investigation and action include cleanup of leaking underground storage tanks, and investigation and remedial action regarding an oil-spill site. Buildings at Sand Point that were built before 1977 may contain asbestos. Cleanup of the site is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure. The movement of activities to Everett will not alter its environmental situation, since comparable activities are currently planned for the area.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends that those Naval Station activities, whose mission is to serve fleet units at Everett, and the

Navy exchange be relocated to Everett.

Naval Station San Francisco (Hunters Point), California

The Commission recommends that the proposed Strategic Homeport Program construction for Hunters Point not be executed. Instead, comparable construction should be accomplished at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and Long Beach and San Diego, California. The net cost of this realignment will be paid back immediately. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$8.0 million.

Hunters Point is located in San Francisco on the shores of San Francisco Bay. Contractor repair and overhaul of Navy ships is performed using the Navy's drydock at Hunters Point. The drydock is also used for unscheduled repairs on nuclear-powered ships, including aircraft carriers. There is also an existing ship intermediate-maintenance activity that supports frigates. Consequently, the Commission recommends retaining Hunters Point as currently configured.

Hunters Point had been designated as a homeport for one battleship, four cruisers, two destroyers, and two frigates. The maritime mission of these ships is to protect the sea lines of communication in the Pacific, support amphibious operations, and provide deterrence through visible peacetime power projection.

Relocating the battleship battlegroup to Pearl Harbor, Long Beach and San Diego will not alter the environmental situation at those bases, since comparable operations are presently under way there.

The realignment will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends relocating the battleship, and two cruisers from Hunters Point to Pearl Harbor; one cruiser, two destroyers, and two frigates to San Diego; and one cruiser to Long Beach.

Naval Hospital Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

The Commission recommends the closure of Naval Hospital Philadelphia. The hospital facilities are unsafe and inadequate to support modern health care. Because of its deteriorated condition and outmoded configuration, the existing hospital cannot be modernized.

The mission of the Naval Hospital is to provide comprehensive emergency, outpatient, and inpatient health-care services to eligible personnel. Additionally, the hospital participates as an element of the Tri-Service Regional Health Care System within the Delaware Valley area. The mission requires that the hospital maintain quality health-care standards to ensure accreditation and recognition by appropriate governmental and civilian agencies and commissions, to include the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.

The hospital configuration makes renovation to meet minimum requirements for a primary-care inpatient facility impossible. This 50-year-old facility has deteriorated to the point where the only usable components for a new facility would be the exterior masonry and the structure.

As early as 1973, the condition of the facilities was reported unsafe by the Navy. Since then, safety problems have been documented by the Navy, in engineering evaluations and fire-protection survey reports, and by the General Accounting Office, and the Joint Commission on

Accreditation of Hospitals. Among the unsafe conditions are a substandard electrical system and inadequate fire protection.

The closure of Naval Hospital Philadelphia will have no detrimental impact on the environment. Closure and demolition will require removal of asbestos from the hospital buildings. Cleanup of the site is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure.

The closure of the hospital will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Department of Defense should explore various cost-effective health-care alternatives, including the use of Walston Army Hospital at Fort Dix, New Jersey, to meet the current Naval Hospital Philadelphia workload. In light of the need for further study, the Commission recommends retention of the Naval Hospital Philadelphia land until a final decision on overall health care in the region is reached.

The Naval Ship Systems Engineering Station, a tenant on the hospital grounds, should remain in the Philadelphia area.

Naval Station Galveston, Texas

The Commission recommends that the Strategic Homeport Program construction for Naval Station Galveston not be completed and the installation be closed. Instead, comparable construction should be accomplished at Ingleside, Texas. The net cost of closure and relocation, including repayment of local contributions, will be paid back immediately. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$2.5 million.

expects annual savings to be \$2.5 million.

Galveston had been designated a homeport for two frigates and two mine-warfare ships, which are part of a battleship battlegroup planned primarily for location at Ingleside, Texas. Relocating the Galveston ships will improve battlegroup integrity, reduce costs, and improve command and control.

The relocation of the homeport from Galveston to Ingleside will not adversely affect the environment, since there are comparable operations and construction currently planned for Ingleside.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends relocating the two frigates and two mine-warfare ships from Galveston to Ingleside.

Naval Station Lake Charles, Louisiana

The Commission recommends that the Strategic Homeport Program construction for Naval Station Lake Charles not be

completed and the installation be closed. Instead, comparable construction should be accomplished at Ingleside, Texas. The net cost of closure and relocation, including repayment of local contributions, will be paid back immediately. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$1.2 million.

Lake Charles had been designated a homeport for one oiler which is part of a battleship battlegroup planned primarily for location at Ingleside, Texas. Also, Lake Charles is inland, reducing access to open waters. Relocating the Lake Charles ship will improve battlegroup integrity, reduce costs of operation and improve command and control.

The relocation of the homeport at Lake Charles to Ingleside will not adversely affect the environment, since there are comparable operations and construction currently planned for Ingleside.

The closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends relocating the oiler from Lake Charles to Ingleside.

AIR FORCE

Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois

The Commission recommends Chanute Air Force Base for closure primarily due to reduced mission effectiveness caused by lower quality and limited availability of facilities, and because of excess capacity within the category. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back within three years. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$68.7 million.

Chanute AFB is lower in military value than other technical-training centers because the facilities significantly detract from its mission effectiveness.

Chanute AFB is one of five Air Training Command Technical Training Centers providing specialized training for officers, airmen, and civilians of the Air Force, and for other Department of Defense agencies. Major training courses include fire fighting, aircraft and missile maintenance, and fuel contamination and inspection training. The base also prepares extension and career-development courses, specialty-training standards, and training manuals. In addition, Chanute provides on-the-job training advisory services and reviews field training courses.

Chanute AFB can be closed without degrading the overall capability of the Air Force to provide technical training. Shortcomings of this installation include a shortage of buildings for training and administration purposes, maintenance, and warehousing. The quality of life for assigned personnel is affected by a shortage of family housing units, bachelor housing, recreational amenities, and medical and dental facilities.

This closure will have no negative impact on the local environment. The cleanup of hazardous materials and waste contamination at Chanute AFB is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure. The movement of the units currently assigned to Chanute will not significantly alter the environmental situation at the gaining bases, since comparable training is presently conducted at those locations.

This closure will have moderate impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends the following relocations of major units and related support activities of the 3330th Technical Training Wing to existing technical training wings at Sheppard, Keesler, Lowry, and Goodfellow AFBs. Some examples of the types of training to be relocated are:

- Sheppard AFB, Texas will absorb 52 courses including aircraft engine, propulsion, maintenance, and aircrew life-support training.

- Keesler AFB, Mississippi will absorb 22 courses including avionics and weather-equipment maintenance, weather-satellite system, and photo-interpretation training.

- Lowry AFB, Colorado will absorb 45 courses including missile support-equipment maintenance, intercontinental ballistic missile maintenance-officer, and cryogenic-operations training.

- Goodfellow AFB, Texas will absorb

25 courses including fire fighting, fire truck operation and maintenance, and fuel-inspection training.

These relocations will consolidate similar courses and improve training.

George Air Force Base, California

The Commission recommends George Air Force Base for closure primarily due to degraded training effectiveness, air traffic congestion, and because of excess capacity within the category. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back immediately. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$70.2 million.

The military value of George AFB is lower than other tactical-fighter installations due to its distance to specialized training ranges and the increasing air-traffic congestion in the vicinity of the base.

Training for George's defense suppression units is hampered by a distance of over 150 nautical miles to an electronic-combat training range. This results in a considerable waste of time and money flying to and from the range. All flight operations are constrained by increasing air traffic congestion in the greater Los Angeles area.

Other shortcomings of the installation include a shortage of facilities for operation and maintenance purposes. The water supply system is presently inadequate, and is scheduled for replacement in FY 1991. There are other deficiencies at George in the area of quality of life, the most prominent being a severe shortage of bachelor housing. The installation also has difficulty hiring civilian workers due to the demand for technically qualified workers

in other industries within the civilian community.

George AFB is one of 11 Tactical Air Command tactical-fighter bases. The wings assigned there have the wartime mission of providing conventional tactical air support primarily in the defense-suppression role as well as close air support, air interdiction, and counterair. The early retirement of the F-4 fighter aircraft from George, caused by a recent Air Force budget reduction, enabled the Commission to consolidate similar units. There is sufficient capacity within the tactical-fighter category to absorb the remaining units at other locations.

This closure will have no negative impact on the local environment. Cleanup of hazardous materials and waste contamination at George is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure. The movement of units currently assigned to George should not significantly alter the environmental situation at the gaining bases. There will, however, be a requirement for increased storage of hazardous waste at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, and Cannon AFB, New Mexico. The Commission has been advised that these bases will have no difficulty providing the appropriate, conforming storage facilities required for the relocations.

This closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends the following relocations of major units and related support activities:

-- The 35th Tactical Training Wing and the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing (F-4E/G aircraft) to Mountain Home AFB. This move will enhance command and control

by consolidating functions with EF-111 air defense suppression aircraft. The recent expansion of the electronic-combat and weapons ranges in the Mountain Home area provides the capability to relocate operational and training assets, which will increase efficiency and enhance mission effectiveness. To accommodate the move of the F-4E/G into Mountain Home, it will be necessary to move part of the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing (F-111E and F-111A aircraft) from Mountain Home to Cannon AFB. This will collocate all U.S.-based F-111 aircraft with a similar mission at a single base, improving command and control while enhancing mission effectiveness at a reduced cost.

-- The 27th Tactical Air Support Squadron (OV-10 aircraft) will relocate to Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. OV-10 aircraft are already stationed at Davis-Monthan, and consolidation of OV-10 aircraft there will improve command and control, and provide increased efficiency while enhancing mission effectiveness. To accommodate the additional OV-10 aircraft at Davis-Monthan, it will be necessary to move the 41st Electronic Combat Squadron (EC-130H aircraft) from Davis-Monthan to Bergstrom AFB, Texas. This relocation will absorb excess capacity and enhance the implementation of the tactical ground-surveillance mission of the EC-130H at Bergstrom, AFB, provide increased efficiency, improve command and control, and reduce operating costs.

Mather Air Force Base, California

The Commission recommends Mather AFB for closure primarily due to its deficiencies in the quality and availability of facilities and excess capacity within the category. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back within one

year. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$78.7 million.

The military value of Mather AFB is lower than other flying-training installations. Mather has a shortage of buildings for operational and training purposes, and a shortage of maintenance and administrative facilities. Additionally, the availability of vehicle pavements is less than required. The installation has also had difficulty in hiring civilian workers in the area, due to the demand for technically qualified workers by other industries within the civilian community.

While Mather AFB has a hospital, the base requires additional medical and dental facilities. The closure of Mather will save construction costs for these facilities.

Mather AFB is one of eight Air Training Command flying-training bases. Mather conducts undergraduate navigator training for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as foreign countries. The base also conducts advanced and tactical navigation, electronic-warfare, instructor, and other training. The B-52 bombers at Mather are programmed to retire, which will leave only the navigator training mission and an Air Force Reserve KC-135 unit. These missions can be relocated within the immediate vicinity to provide improved multi-Service training capability in a more cost-effective manner.

This closure will have no negative impact on the local environment. Cleanup of hazardous materials and waste contamination at Mather is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure. The relocation of the units currently assigned to Mather will not significantly alter the environmental situation at the gaining bases because

comparable operations are presently underway at those bases.

This closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends the following relocations of major units and related support activities:

- The 323rd Flying Training Wing to Beale AFB, California. This move will take advantage of force-structure drawdown at Beale and improve multi-Service training.

- The 940th Air Refueling Group (Air Force Reserve) to McClellan AFB, California if local authorities do not elect to operate the Mather facility as an airport. McClellan is only 10 miles from Mather and has the capacity to absorb the unit. Additional savings could be realized if this reserve unit could remain at the Mather facility.

Norton Air Force Base, California

The Commission recommends Norton AFB for closure primarily because of air traffic congestion, inadequate facilities, and because of excess capacity within the category. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back within two years. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$67.9 million.

The military value of Norton AFB is lower than other strategic-airlift installations because of a combination of increasing air-traffic congestion, outdated facilities, and increasing competition for skilled personnel.

Norton AFB is currently one of six Military Airlift Command strategic-airlift

bases that provide airlift for troops and military cargo. The wing at Norton supports US Army and Marine Corps airlift requirements and participates in other airlift operations. Flight operations at Norton have become constrained because of increasing air traffic congestion in the Los Angeles area.

Norton AFB has a number of large warehouses of generally poor quality. Only the relatively temperate climate allows their use, but deterioration continues. There is also a shortage of weapons storage facilities. Utilities and most other facilities need a general upgrading to meet today's technological standards. Because of the poor quality of facilities, higher than normal expenditures are required for maintenance, repair, and periodic replacement.

There are also deficiencies at Norton AFB in the area of quality of life. The most prominent include a shortage of family housing units and inadequate medical, dental, and recreational facilities. The installation also has difficulty meeting civilian hiring requirements due to the demand for technically qualified workers by other industries within the civilian sector.

This closure will have no negative impact on the local environment. Cleanup of hazardous materials and waste contamination at Norton is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure. The movement of the units currently assigned to Norton will not adversely affect the environmental situation at gaining bases since comparable operations are already underway there.

This closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends the following relocations of major units and related support activities:

-- Three Squadrons of the 63rd Military Airlift Wing and the 445th Military Airlift Wing (AFRES) (C-141, C-21 and C-12 aircraft) to March AFB, California. The remaining squadron (C-141 aircraft) to McChord AFB, Washington. These moves will enhance command and control, and reduce the cost of operations while still providing for three strategic-airlift installations on the West Coast.

-- The Air Force Inspection and Safety Center to Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, to be consolidated with the Nuclear Safety and Inspection Center.

-- The Air Force Audit Agency to March AFB. This provides new, modern facilities for this unit within the same local region.

The Commission notes the Air Force is exploring other alternatives for accomplishing the Air Force Audio Visual Service Center mission and therefore recommends that the Air Force be given the option of moving this unit to March AFB or retaining it in its present location at Norton. The annual savings reflect the movement to March.

Because of the high cost of relocation and the functional requirement for the Ballistic Missile Office to remain in the local area, the Commission recommends it remain at Norton AFB. In order to reduce the shortage of family housing in the local area, the Commission further recommends that Norton AFB family housing be retained for use by personnel assigned to March AFB.

Pease Air Force Base, New Hampshire

The Commission recommends Pease Air Force Base for closure primarily due to quality and availability of facilities, and because of excess capacity within the category. The net cost of closure and relocation will be paid back immediately. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$95.7 million.

Pease AFB has a shortage of buildings for operational, training, and maintenance purposes. In addition, the military family housing is inadequate and requires upgrading. There are also deficiencies in the area of quality of life, the most prominent being a shortage in recreational facilities.

Pease AFB is currently one of 12 Strategic Air Command bomber bases. An Air National Guard Unit with a peacetime and wartime refueling mission is also assigned to Pease.

Pease's FB-111 bombers are programmed to be transferred to the Tactical Air Forces now that the B-1 bomber aircraft is operational. This will leave the base with only the 509th Air Refueling Squadron. There is sufficient capacity within the strategic-bomber category to absorb the remaining units at other locations at minimum cost.

The military value of Pease AFB is also lower than other strategic-bomber bases because of low pre-launch survivability from submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Pease's location provides less warning time for aircraft to launch during times of increased tension or international conflict.

This closure will have no negative impact on the environment. The cleanup of hazardous materials and waste contamination at Pease AFB is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure. The movement of units currently assigned to Pease will not significantly alter the environmental situation at gaining bases since comparable operations are presently under way at those locations.

This closure will have minimal impact on local employment.

The Commission recommends the following relocations of major units and related support activities:

-- The 509th Air Refueling Squadron (KC-135 aircraft) to Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan; Plattsburgh AFB, New York; Eaker AFB, Arkansas; Carswell AFB, Texas; and Fairchild AFB, Washington.

These relocations will improve the efficiency of strategic-bomber operations by linking tankers with bombers, thus avoiding military construction by utilizing facilities that already exist at those locations.

-- The 132nd Air Refueling Squadron, (Air National Guard (ANG) KC-135 aircraft) assigned to Pease to remain within its current cantonment area. The transfer of property ownership should include a memorandum of agreement that will permit the continued presence of the ANG and provide for the unit's future requirements. If local authorities do not elect to operate the facility as an airport, the ANG unit must be relocated. The Commission is aware that Pease is high on the Federal Aviation Administration's list of military bases with potential for civil use and believes that the ANG unit will likely be allowed to remain at Pease.

MISCELLANEOUS PROPERTIES

The Commission recommends the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) site in Herndon, Virginia for closure. Implementation of the Global Positioning System will eliminate the need for these facilities and property. There are no relocation costs associated with the closure as reassignment of personnel to the DMA Hydrographic-Topographic Center in Brookmont, MD is in the local commuting area. Payback will be immediate. The Commission expects annual savings to be \$70 thousand. There are no negative socioeconomic or environmental impacts associated with this closure.

The Commission reviewed a number of Service properties that had been recently surveyed by the General Services Administration (GSA). GSA survey report findings were compared to the Services' evaluation of the properties for consistencies and discrepancies. Four of these properties are recommended for closure by the Commission and two are recommended for partial closure:

-- The Commission recommends the Bennett Army National Guard Facility, Arapahoe County, Colorado for closure. There is no longer any military mission supported at this location and no personnel are assigned to the facility. There are no closure or relocation costs associated with this recommendation. The underground storage tanks at the Bennett facility require cleanup and are the only known environmental problem.

-- The Commission recommends the Army Reserve Center, Gaithersburg, Maryland for closure. The Army Reserve has relocated to a new site and there is no longer any military mission supported

at the location or personnel assigned to the facility. There are no closure or relocation costs associated with this recommendation. At present, there are no environmental problems known to exist at this site.

-- The Commission recommends the Salton Sea Test Base, Imperial County, California for closure. There is no longer any military mission supported at this location and no personnel are assigned to the facility. There are no closure or relocation costs associated with this recommendation. There are contaminated areas at Salton Sea Test Base that must be cleaned up. Examples of contamination are PCB, asbestos, expended small-arms ammunition, a landfill site where batteries were discarded, and 20 underground storage tanks. Cleanup is expected to require significant costs and take at least three years. Cleanup, which is independent of the closure, is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program.

-- The Commission recommends the Naval Reserve Center (Coconut Grove) Miami, Florida for closure. A new facility is currently under construction for the Reserves at another site. Once this construction is complete, there will no longer be any military mission supported at this location. Relocation costs will be minimal and there are no environmental problems anticipated.

-- The Commission recommends Fort Des Moines, Iowa for partial closure. Approximately 56 acres in the south portion of Fort Des Moines, as identified in GSA survey report of December 2, 1983 (GSA Inventory Control Number 2100-20264), are recommended for closure. Fort Des Moines is on the National Register of

20264), are recommended for closure. Fort Des Moines is on the National Register of Historic Places and the Defense Department should coordinate with the State Historic Preservation Office and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to develop appropriate preservation guidelines. There are no relocation costs associated with this recommendation. One building and some of the land are contaminated with pesticides and other contaminants, possibly asbestos and PCB. Cleanup of these sites is covered by the Defense Environmental Restoration

Program. Cleanup is independent of the closure action.

-- The Commission recommends the Indiana Army Ammunition Plant for partial closure. Approximately 900 acres on the north side of the installation that do not support any military mission are recommended for closure. There are no relocation costs associated with this recommendation since no personnel are assigned in this area. No significant environmental problems are anticipated from the closure.

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Appendix I

Redevelopment in Twenty Communities

Mobile, Alabama: The city secured 3,500 new jobs with Teledyne-Continental Motors, International Paper, and the University of South Alabama at Brookley Air Force Base and another 1,300 new, private-sector jobs at the former Theodore Army Terminal.

Benicia, California: Private developers have replaced the former arsenal with facilities for Exxon, Sperry and an automobile-importing operation, for a total of 5,510 jobs.

Colorado Springs, Colorado: Ent Air Force Base has been converted into the National Olympic Training Center.

Orlando, Florida: McCoy Air Force Base is now a municipal airport and an industrial park with a total of 3,049 new jobs.

Albany, Georgia: The former Albany Naval Station has been converted to industrial facilities for the Miller Brewery Co. and the Kroger Co., with a total of 2,000 new jobs.

Brunswick, Georgia: Glynnco Naval Air Station now provides a home for the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and a new municipal airport, for a total of 1,200 jobs.

Salina, Kansas: Schilling Air Force Base provides facilities for Beech Aircraft, a food production operation, and two vocational schools, for a total of 4,900 jobs.

Bangor, Maine: An aircraft-servicing facility and a satellite campus for the University of Maine were established at Dow Air Force Base, with a total of 2,470 jobs.

Presque Isle, Maine: Missile hangers were converted to facilities for manufacturing shoes, plywood, and potato products, creating 1,100 jobs.

Boston, Massachusetts: Charlestown Naval Shipyard has become a historic park and a commercial and residential complex. The South Boston annex has become an industrial park. Boston Army Base has become a commercial office facility.

Springfield, Massachusetts: Digital Equipment, Milton Bradley and Smith & Wesson are now located at the Springfield Arsenal, together with the new Springfield Technical College, providing 3,300 jobs.

Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan: Geographically isolated Kincheloe Air Force Base has provided 990 new manufacturing jobs and a state minimum-security prison.

Neosho, Missouri: Over 2,300 new jobs have been created at Camp Crowder and Air Force Plant No. 65 by new industrial firms and Crowder College.

Edison, New Jersey: Raritan Arsenal has been transformed into an industrial park with 13,100 employees. RCA, American Hospital Supply, Nestle, R.H. Macy,

Schwinn Bicycles, Michelin and the Middlesex County Community College are located there.

Roswell, New Mexico: Walker Air Force Base is the site for Greyhound's bus manufacturing facility and other private-sector firms, along with Eastern New Mexico University, for a total of 2,770 new jobs.

Toledo, Ohio: Rossford Arsenal is used by Hunt Foods, Owens Illinois, Ace Hardware, Michael Owens Junior College and Penta County Vocational School, for a total of 3,900 jobs.

Quonset Point, Rhode Island: A new general-aviation airport and port-authority industrial park provide 7,000 jobs.

Greenville, South Carolina: Donaldson Air Force Base has become an industrial complex that includes facilities for Union Carbide, 3-M Company, Norwich Pharmaceutical, and others, for a total of 3,500 jobs.

Amarillo, Texas: Amarillo Air Force Base is now home to Bell Helicopter and Texas State Technical Institute, with a total of 1,030 jobs.

Mineral Wells, Texas: Fort Wolters has been converted to an industrial park and the Weatherford College campus, for a total of 1,300 jobs.

Appendix J

Public Hearings and Witnesses

DEFENSE MISSIONS

JUNE 8, 1988

Hon. William Roth
VADM J. A. Baldwin, USN
GEN Carl E. Vuono, USA
Hon. William L. Ball, III
GEN Thomas R. Morgan, USMC
GEN Larry D. Welch, USAF
Gene R. La Rocque
Stephen Moore

Hon. Richard Arney
Hon. John O. Marsh, Jr.
Hon. John W. Shannon
ADM Carlisle A.H. Trost, USN
Hon. James McGovern
LTG Vincent M. Russo, USA
Fred Thompson

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT

JULY 7, 1988

Hon. Charles A. Bowsher
William C. Wright
Gordon Davis
Hon. Herman Costello
Gary Engebretson
Paul J. Dempsey
Dr. John Lynch
Frank P. Cipolla

Frank C. Conahan
Edward Lashman
William Laubernds
Robert Edgell
Orson G. Swindle, III
Dr. Robert M. Rauner
Paul W. Johnson
Dr. Alan S. Gregerman

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

JULY 28, 1978

William H. Parker III
Gary D. Vest
Dinah Bear
Brock Evans
Barry Breen

Lewis D. Walker
CAPT Richard H. Rice, Jr., USN
William D. Dickerson
Lynn A. Greenwalt

LESSONS LEARNED

SEPTEMBER 14, 1988

Hon. Robert S. McNamara

Hon. Paul R. Ignatius

FUTURE BASING NEEDS

OCTOBER 6, 1988

MG Wilson A. Shoffner, USA
VADM Stanley R. Arthur, USN
LTG William G. Carson, Jr., USMC
MG Walter E. Webb, III, USAF
Richard Brody

Marcy Agmon
Hon. R. James Woolsey
Dr. Edward N. Luttwak
Hon. Fred Ikle

ADDITIONAL VIEW

Additional View of Thomas F. Eagleton

I harbor one strong additional view which I feel compelled to state. The cooperation with the Commission's efforts varied significantly from service to service.

The Air Force ultimately gave its cooperation. The Army begrudgingly gave its reluctant cooperation. The Navy stonewalled and got away with it. Intransigence paid off. When the new Secretary of Defense looks to further base closings as a means of trimming the Pentagon budget, he should most certainly start with the Navy. The Navy "refused to play" this time; it should be obliged to next time.