A Duopoly Model of Pricing for Inventory Liquidation.

Abstract

The authors consider the problem of pricing to liquidate inventory in a duopoly. The problem is modelled as a multi-player game with complete information. The unique Nash equilibrium for the game, which is also sequential, involves mixed strategies for the sellers. The equilibrium extends in a limited fashion to multi-period and many seller situations. Keywords: Economic models.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Aug 01, 1987
Accession Number
ADA204654

Entities

People

  • John W. Mamer
  • Sushil Bikhchandani

Organizations

  • University of California, Los Angeles

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Bargaining
  • Competition
  • Consumers
  • Cooperative Games
  • Dispersions
  • Distribution Functions
  • Economic Models
  • Game Theory
  • Heterogeneity
  • Intervals
  • Inventory
  • Non-Cooperative Games
  • Probability
  • Probability Distribution Functions
  • Probability Distributions
  • Recreation
  • Social Sciences

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Operations Research