


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**PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGIES
FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT**

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**PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGIES
FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT**

by

PHILIP S. YANG, MAJOR, USA



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**Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 23665-5556**

October 1988

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The mission of the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC) is to improve the Army and Air Force posture for engaging in low-intensity conflict (LIC), elevate awareness throughout the Army and Air Force of the role of the military instrument of national power in low-intensity conflict, including the capabilities needed to realize that role, and provide an infrastructure for eventual transition to a joint and, perhaps, interagency activity.

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Pending	Compilation of LIC References and Bibliography, Vol II
Pending	The Literature of Low-Intensity Conflict
Pending	US Military Civic Action in Honduras, 1982-1985

PREFACE

The process of psychological operations (PSYOP) requires a whole state of mind rather than thinking in terms of a specific action or reaction. The ultimate objective in PSYOP is to assist in the application of power by one nation acting on another nation to influence the minds of the people and enhance the achievement of national goals. The greatest need for effective PSYOP today is in the area of low-intensity conflict (LIC), an area in which the probability of US involvement is very high for the remainder of this century.

Low-intensity conflict is a spectrum of conflict where success cannot be measured in terms of battles won, hills taken, or bodies counted. Rather, success will be measured in terms of political objectives achieved without the protracted involvement of US combat forces. While it is a spectrum of conflict in which conventional warfighting strategies are not likely to work, it is an area where psychological strategies can contribute immensely to a national strategy. The author firmly believes the proper employment of PSYOP may actually preclude the necessity for the commitment of combat forces in some LIC activities.

Low-intensity conflict consists of four categories: insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping, and peacetime contingency operations. This paper examines these four categories as part of the dynamics of psychological power as an element of national strategy.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGIES FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

SECTION I -- BACKGROUND

PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER AND NATIONAL STRATEGY

National strategy is the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, psychological, and military powers of a nation, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.¹ Colonel Melvin Kriesel, a well known authority on psychological operations (PSYQP), notes that of these four instruments of national power, the psychological element is the "least understood, the hardest to quantify, and the most difficult to effectively apply to a national strategy."² Psychological power, unlike other powers, is intangible and difficult to articulate. Few scholars and military strategists have ever attempted to examine the essence of this enigmatic instrument and its role in the formulation of national strategy.

Psychological power is not an element suitable for discussion separate from the political, economic, and military elements of national power. It is neither subordinate to nor substitutable for the others. All these elements have inherent psychological effects which go beyond their physical impact; however, it is the successful application of these elements that gives rise to psychological power. In other words, psychological power is largely a resultant power, emanating from other powers, amplifying them, and making them more powerful. Without them, it exists basically as an informational activity. However, unlike other powers which only affect the physical, psychological power affects the psyche of the target audience. The ultimate objective in the application of psychological power by one nation-state upon another is to influence the opinions, attitudes, and behavior of target audiences in ways to enhance the achievement of national objectives. This process, when it is an integral part of a strategic, operational, or tactical plan, is known as psychological operations.

In reality, psychological power is what people think it is. It is what policy-makers in other nations perceive it to be. Its ability to influence lies in the minds of the beholders. In the absence of an accepted definition, psychological power may be described as a perceived power of influence. The effectiveness of this power, however, depends on the ability and willingness of a nation to convey or project this perception through communication of information or performance of an act.

Traditionally, communication and informational means have been most closely identified with this power. The recently published National Security Strategy of the United States and the newly promulgated low-intensity conflict (LIC) definition replaced "psychological power" with "informational power." Upon initial examination, the focus of the informational element appears to be an adjunct to diplomatic and political power.³ Presently, it is not clear whether this change will alter the "role" of psychological power in the traditional sense. It is certain, however, that the change will further complicate the already confusing nature of this elusive phenomenon.

Nuclear defense with its concomitant nuclear deterrence can best clarify this interdependent relationship between the psychological and military instruments of national power. Nuclear defense, a formidable capability in the US military arsenal, denotes an important form of military power. Its effectiveness as a deterrent, however, stems from other nations' perception of US willingness to employ nuclear weapons in the event of open hostilities. Nuclear deterrence, a perceived power which connotes the power of nuclear defense, is largely based on the policy of "flexible response" in which nonnuclear aggression against the US or its allies may trigger a US nuclear response, while nuclear aggression, without any doubt, will prompt a retaliatory attack on the aggressor's homeland.

This policy delineates an important psychological power and a key ingredient in the US defense strategy in mid- and high-intensity conflicts. It is this power that has significantly contributed to the preservation and the security of the US and its allies for the past four decades. In psychological terms, it is the manipulation of fear of a "first use" of nuclear response to a nonnuclear aggression and a massive nuclear retaliation to a nuclear attack that has influenced the politico-military behavior of the Soviet leadership since 1945. The recognition and comprehension of the efficacy of this abstract power is essential for an understanding of the application of psychological strategies in LIC in which persuasion is often preferable to intimidation, and battles are often fought in the realm of ideas.

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

Developments in nuclear weaponry, the rise of insurgencies and regional conflicts and, in more recent years, the growth of international terrorism and narcotics trafficking, have dramatically reshaped the international arena since World War II. Today, the United States and the Soviet Union have achieved a level of nuclear parity which, should these two powers resort to all-out war, guarantees the destruction of both nations and the world at-large. Although this parity means an ever present threat of high-intensity conflict, it also means the most destructive forms of conflict that could occur in the future,

nuclear and large-scale conventional war, are becoming less probable because both countries have developed effective deterrents. While the success of mutual deterrence has reduced the likelihood of mid- and high-intensity conflicts, it has forced the Soviets and their client states to direct much of their activity toward the low-intensity level to exploit the unstable and fragile conditions which are prevalent among many developing nations. The result has been a dramatic increase in the quantity and sophistication of terrorism, insurgencies, and other activities in the spectrum of LIC.

The 1987 National Security Strategy of the United States identified the most significant threats to US interests in the low-intensity environment as the accumulation of unfavorable outcomes from insurgency, economic instability, or acts of terrorism. Such adverse outcomes can gradually "isolate the US, its allies, and major trading partners from the Third World and from each other." The document further stated that unfavorable outcomes may lead to the interruption of Western access to vital resources; gradual loss of US military basing and access rights; increased threats to key sea lines of communication; gradual shifting of allies and trading partners away from the US; and expanded opportunities for Soviet political and military gains.⁴

EVOLUTION OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT DOCTRINE

As defined in the JCS Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, low-intensity conflict is:

Political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.⁵

This definition represents the second major effort in the last two years to define the phenomenon. The definition is broad and demonstrates the difficulty of combining many different and seemingly conflicting elements under the same label.

Low-intensity conflict, an environment at the lower end of the conflict scale, is certainly not new in the annals of warfare. However, the understanding of LIC has been made difficult by the recent popularization and the development of the term. Moreover, there are many confusing and often overlapping military lexicons relating to LIC, and people tend to use them

interchangeably. These misunderstandings have led to frequent misuses and misinterpretation of concepts and issues in the study of this phenomenon.

The US Army's efforts in studying this phenomenon in the 1970s were restricted to "internal defense and development (IDAD)," a euphemism for counterinsurgency. The first concerted effort by the Army to study LIC resulted in the publication of Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, in 1981. The focus of this effort, however, remained closely aligned with the concept of IDAD, or counterinsurgency. The definition of LIC was simply "internal defense and development assistance operations involving actions by the US combat forces (Type A)" or "US advice, combat support, and combat service support (Type B)" efforts to assist the host government in combatting insurgency or other internal problems.⁶

A two-volume study prepared by Robert Kupperman, Inc., for the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1983 amplified this concept of IDAD. The study accentuated the politico-military nature of the conflict and defined LIC as "the military recourse of nations and organizations to limited force or the threat of force to achieve political objectives without the full-scale commitment of resources and will that characterizes nation-state wars of survival or conquest"⁷ The study broadened the scope of LIC by considering many "instrumentalities" available to apply within the conflict spectrum. These included normal and coercive diplomacy, PSYOP, formal and informal sanctions, military assistance, special intelligence operations, counterterrorism operations, surgical strikes, guerrilla warfare, cross-border raids and incursions, insurgency, revolution, and activities including the limited employment of regular armed forces.⁸

The origins of the present interest in LIC in the defense community began around 1985 with the formation of the Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (A-AF CLIC) and the subsequent publication of three major LIC documents. These efforts gained much attention in the Army and Air Force communities.

Activated on January 29, 1986, the A-AF CLIC was a response to increasing Army and Air Force concerns about LIC. It was assigned the mission to improve the Army and Air Force posture for engaging in LIC and was designated as the Army and Air Force "focal point" for matters relating to military and civil-military operations in the LIC arena.⁹ Simultaneously, the Army was engaging in three separate efforts to provide doctrinal guidance for Army elements in the LIC environment. The first, US Army Operational Concept for Low Intensity Conflict, TRADOC PAM 525-44, published in February 1986, laid the foundation for later LIC doctrinal development efforts. For the first time, the Army

consciously examined LIC as an environment on the spectrum of conflict and not as a euphemism for IDAD. The document provided an operational concept for the employment of US Army forces in LIC; contributed a useful working definition, which was later adopted by the 1987 JCS Publication 1; and examined US Army missions in the context of four categories: peacekeeping operations, foreign internal defense, peacetime contingency operations, and terrorism counteraction.¹⁰ Although some criticized the definition as ambiguous, it remained effective for over two years and provided a good beginning in the understanding of this complex spectrum of conflict.

Beyond the operational concept, the Army further developed and fielded its second major doctrinal writing on LIC, Field Circular (FC) 100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict, in July 1986. The Field Circular represented a major departure from the 1981 Field Manual 100-20. It adopted the definition, the basic principles, and the four mission categories in LIC delineated in the TRADOC Operational Concept publication. In essence, FC 100-20 was the extension of TRADOC PAM 525-44. The document provided doctrinal guidance for the US Army in each mission category and became the basic document which led to the development of the draft Army-Air Force doctrinal manual on LIC, FM 100-20/AFM 2-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict.¹¹

A third major effort by the Army in the LIC arena in 1986 was the publication of the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict (JLIC) Project Final Report. The two-volume report was the product of the JLIC Project, established by the Army Chief of Staff on 1 July 1985 to study the complexity of the LIC phenomenon. The report, a culmination of joint and interagency effort, addressed the concern of how to safeguard threatened US interests in the LIC environment. It was critical of the military's inability to understand, organize, execute, and sustain military operations in conflict environments short of conventional war.¹² The report adopted the TRADOC PAM 525-44 LIC definition but renamed two of the four mission categories of LIC to make them more suitable for joint usage. The final version of the mission categories, which is reflected in the final draft of the Army-Air Force LIC manual, consists of insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping, and peacetime contingency operations.¹³

OPERATIONAL CATEGORIES OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Low-intensity conflict is complex, ambiguous, and difficult to address. Devising different mission categories germane to this environment is equally difficult. Contributing to these difficulties is the lack of understanding that military capabilities, not military forces, should play the dominant roles in this environment. Complicating matters even further are the four LIC mission categories described in the current draft for the Army and Air Force LIC doctrine, FM 100-20/AFM 2-20, because

they are not mutually exclusive. For example, the US military may execute a peacetime contingency operation in response to a terrorist incident. Nevertheless, clarity and order are essential to understanding, and it is the purpose of this paper to discuss these mission categories and their corresponding psychological strategies.

SECTION II -- INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

Insurgency and counterinsurgency is the most complex and difficult to comprehend operational category of LIC. It involves politico-military struggles in which ideas may be more important than arms. Insurgencies in the Third World often pose serious threats to US security interests. For example, the current Filipino insurgency, if unchecked, could ultimately threaten US military basing as well as access and transit rights in the Philippines, the key to US security interests and regional stability in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. Admiral Hayes, Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Command, recently commented that the US forces operating from the Clark and Subic Bases "checkmate Moscow's steady military build-up at Cam Ranh Bay," and "their departure would create a power vacuum" in the region.¹⁴

The most prevalent form of US involvement in this type of conflict has been to assist friendly governments threatened by externally supported insurgents. However, in recent years, the US has learned that although it prefers to associate itself with peaceful and legitimate change of power, supporting insurgencies is not necessarily contrary to the best interests of the US, and, sometimes, it may be the best course of action for achieving national security objectives in the LIC environment. The support for insurgent activities, however, is effective only if there is a coordinated policy to employ US national resources towards achieving a clearly defined objective.

Although many academic and military thinkers have written extensively about insurgency and counterinsurgency, few have ever attempted to articulate their strategy from a psychological perspective. This paper will examine this age-old phenomenon from the psychological standpoint and provide some psychological explanations about the successes and failures of certain insurgency and counterinsurgency efforts. In the study of insurgency, there are four generally recognized models: urban, political, traditional, and focal. Today, no insurgency follows one model exclusively. Each develops unique characteristics appropriate to its own circumstance. This paper will only address the "political" or, as some call it, "mass-oriented" or "Maoist" model of insurgency.

INSURGENCY

Insurgencies usually occur as a result of people's dissatisfaction with the existing government. The dissatisfaction may stem from religious, ethnic, political, social, or economic grievances. Under normal conditions, these grievances are insufficient to cause an insurgency. Insurgency begins only when people realize it is possible for conditions to improve and when groups coalesce around the grievances. This is the point at which insurgents leadership begins to form, develop, and promote their cause. Initially, in an attempt to win the support of the population, insurgents provide information to the targeted population that conditions can and should improve. Thus begins the contest for legitimacy. The government may react by correcting or not correcting these concerns. If the government is unable or unwilling to resolve these grievances, or if the insurgents are unwilling to accept the government's resolution, then we have the beginning of an insurgency.

Insurgency and counterinsurgency are, in essence, the opposite sides of the same coin. Insurgency aims at the overthrow of a government, whereas counterinsurgency is the government's effort to defeat such a movement. These conflicts are usually long-term, armed political struggles in which the battles are often waged in the socioeconomic and psychological arenas, and the outcome is not necessarily decided on the battlefield. The support of the people is the key ingredient in the success of these struggles. Many Third World revolutionaries have understood this fact as their successes in the past 30 years have made evident. They have understood that psychological power, guided by political objectives and supported by psychological operations, is an important and an all-encompassing element in achieving popular support, and that it should be the prime consideration in an insurgent strategy. This important principle is echoed by the JLIC Report:

Psychological operations are absolutely essential in insurgency and counterinsurgency operations where success depends upon the support of the population. Without popular support, the very existence of a government attempting to fight an insurgency is jeopardized.¹⁵

The report, however, did not go beyond the confines of psychological operations. Psychological power, the heart of the insurgency and counterinsurgency strategies, was not addressed.

Perhaps no one better understood the application of psychological power in a "Maoist" insurgency than General Vo Nguyen Giap, the commanding general of the Viet Minh Army and victor over the French at Dien Bien Phu. In his book People's War People's Army, an adaptation of Mao's "People's War"

theories, Giap clearly enunciated that "People's War" is predicated on achieving popular support of the people. He understood that an integrated strategy of economic, military, and political powers is necessary to achieve the psychological power essential to obtain popular support.¹⁶

Land reform, a popular slogan in any agrarian society, was often the propaganda focus in soliciting popular support in the Vietnamese insurgency. The insurgent leadership understood that tangible socioeconomic improvement for the peasants is necessary to gain their support. Even during the course of the conflict, the leadership attempted to distribute confiscated land equally, lower land rents, and reduce interest rates in the insurgent-controlled areas.¹⁷

In the military arena, the insurgents were ideologically indoctrinated on how to win the support of the people as well as tactically prepared to fight the enemy. The leadership recognized that a politicized soldier is much more effective in advancing the cause of the movement and winning the support of the people. In point nine of the Viet Minh soldiers' Oath of Honor, the insurgents were instructed to follow three rules: respect the people, help the people, and defend the people.¹⁸

The insurgent leadership realized, however, that a total mobilization of the people is required to win the revolution. For this, it employed psychological operations. In reference to the insurgency mobilization efforts in the 1940s, Giap wrote, "political activities were more important than military activities, and fighting less important than propaganda; armed activity was used to safeguard, consolidate and develop the political bases."¹⁹ This statement, however, must be understood in the context of its usage. The term "political activities" or "political works" in Giap's writing is often synonymous with or closely related to "propaganda" or modern-day psychological operations, and Giap used them interchangeably.²⁰

In present day usage, depending on the intent of the activities, these are all elements of "psychological operations," a term that did not evolve until the 1960s. In retrospect, if Giap's words were to undergo a new interpretation today, they would emerge more in this vein, "Psychological operations were more important than military activities, and fighting less important than propaganda; armed activity was used to safeguard, consolidate and develop the political bases." Regardless of the translation, it is clear the emphasis is on the political and psychological objectives. These guide the military campaign and not the reverse. These economic, military, and political efforts were the major underpinnings of Giap's psychological strategy.

Undoubtedly, psychological operations were the cornerstone of Giap's strategy in achieving psychological power. This strategy, which most people recognized only for its tactical and operational significance, included a strategic perspective to defeat the French at home through world and public opinion.²¹ It was an important strategy which worked equally well against the US some 20 years later. In this age of mass information, local insurgency is often portrayed on the international scene. While actual fighting may be limited to one area, support or condemnation often occur worldwide because of reporting by the news media. Giap understood this and was able to manipulate it to his advantage by employing propaganda on his adversary's home front, driving a wedge between the government and its people.²² In short, Giap's "people's war" strategy was essentially one of psychological operations.

In the "political" model of insurgency, the movement matures through a three-phase development process, from inception to the final overthrow of the government. In turn, the development of the movement is sustained by an infrastructure made up of political, armed, and front organizations. This paper will briefly examine the significance of these activities in the "political" model.

Phases of Insurgency Development

On the one hand, each insurgency is unique, since it has to fit the needs of the local situation. On the other hand, studies show that most insurgencies under the "political" model usually evolve through three phases. These phases are known by various titles. Some list them as incipient, guerrilla, and war of movement. Mao Zedong, the first post-World War II revolutionary who mastered the concept of protracted war, identified them as strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive. General Vo Nguyen Giap, who successfully adopted Mao's theories on revolutionary war, classified the phases as stage of contention, stage of equilibrium, and stage of counteroffensive. By its nature, the protracted struggle is the psychological strategy of the weak against the strong because the intention is to defeat the national will of its enemy by wearing him down over time. The following are brief descriptions of the three phases of an insurgency.

Phase I. Generally, in this phase, the aim of the insurgency is to secure support from the population to sustain its survival and to prepare the population for the following phases. In other words, this is the psychological preparation of the battlefield. The insurgents begin organizing the grass roots political and military organizations. This is the time when the insurgency is the weakest.

Phase II. In Phase II, the political organization spreads nationwide. The aim of the insurgency is to secure the support of a substantial portion of the population. This requires a psychological operations effort on two fronts, indoctrinating the population and conducting small-scale military operations. The increased military activities in this phase are merely an extension of the overall insurgent psychological strategy to win the support of the people by successfully accomplishing small scale armed actions that demonstrate the government's vulnerability and the insurgents' own strength. The government's influence in the countryside is systematically undermined by the conversion of village officials and by the formation of a parallel insurgent shadow government. In this phase, the insurgency gains strength and reaches a point of "equilibrium" with the government.

Phase III. The last phase culminates in the final insurrection or overthrow of a government. Once the insurgency has gained wide popular support, the insurgents will openly attempt to incite a total popular uprising and militarily defeat the government forces in battle. Usually, when the insurgency reaches this phase of development, government forces will not be able to reverse the situation unless the insurgents have acted prematurely. Such premature action is the result of the insurgency leadership misjudging the situation and not really having the support of the people.

Insurgent Organization

Insurgencies under this model are usually organized around three elements: political, armed, and front. The armed and front elements revolve around the political element, or the Party, which provides the ideological and political leadership.

Political Element. The most important element in an insurgency is the underground political organization. Such an organization is a prerequisite for the survival of an insurgency in the initial phase of development and expansion in the following phases. In securing a broad base of support from the people, the organization plays a critical role in alienating the masses from the existing government, and getting them to learn and support the insurgency. Psychological operations, in the form of propaganda, is the vehicle to accomplish that role. Psychological operations inform and educate the people about the ills of the government and portray the insurgency as the champion of both patriotism and social change. More importantly, it explains the nature of the insurgency, its reason for being, what it wants, and how it plans to achieve its goals.

An effective political organization is extremely important, especially when control of a specific area has been established by the insurgency. It can facilitate the establishment of new

political, social, and economic structures so that the insurgency can achieve a break with the old order. Furthermore, with an effective political organization, the movement will be able to provide recruits, intelligence, and logistical support. In the long run, the insurgency will be successful, because the political organization can sustain its struggles.

Armed Element. As Giap indicated, the purpose of the armed element is to "safeguard, consolidate, and develop the political bases." Fighters and leaders, who are the backbone of the insurgency, receive thorough indoctrination. They are taught that the struggle is being waged not only to defeat the government but to build and develop the country. Recruits receive political as well as military training during their initial indoctrination, which strives to inculcate deep-rooted revolutionary fervor that can sustain them throughout their service with the insurgency. Undoubtedly, troops with a strong ideological motivation are more willing to risk their lives than troops lacking a strong commitment.

Mass Front Organization. Traditionally, insurgent front organizations play a key role in supporting the armed struggle, particularly in the cities. They are the "underground" elements of an insurgent movement. They may be either insurgent-formed or existing organizations. Labor unions, human rights groups, student leagues, peace and religious groups, and trade associations are often linked, or at least believed to be sympathetic, to the insurgent causes. Undoubtedly, many of these groups are legitimate and are formed for political, economic, or societal reasons. However, because of the nature and objectives of these organizations, which are often compatible if not closely aligned with those of the insurgency, they become easy prey for insurgent takeover or exploitation. It is mainly for this reason that these organizations are more attracted to the insurgency and become, willingly or unwillingly, front organizations for the movement.

When conditions are right, front groups can coordinate and conduct various legal activities that can discredit the government. These may include protests, rallies, demonstrations, and strikes. Individually, these actions may represent dissatisfaction and unrest among related segments of the population. Together, they may paralyze an entire city, cripple the economy, and/or bring about mass confusion in the country.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Assisting host governments in combatting insurgencies has been, and is still, the most prevalent form of US involvement in countering insurgencies. Since the root causes of an insurgency are usually problems of a political, social, and economic nature, assisting a host country in combatting the military threat is but

one element in a comprehensive strategy that must address the conflict's multiple dimensions. Military efforts designed to suppress insurgents' activities must be executed in consonance with the host government's development program. History has shown that while strong, military measures may for a time control an insurgency, only the eradication of the root causes will permanently conquer one.

Perhaps no recent writer has provided more insight into this subject than Dr. Sam Sarkesian, a well-known author in the LIC arena. He notes the "center of gravity" of counterinsurgency is not on the "battlefield" but in the "political-social system" of the indigenous country. He further states that "main battle lines are political and psychological rather than between opposing armed units." In order to be successful in countering an insurgency, Sarkesian argues that the established government must "be flexible enough to make a serious attempt at redressing internal grievances, and develop the necessary leadership and cadre to govern effectively."²³ In essence, a successful counterinsurgency strategy requires the same elements as the insurgent psychological strategy, winning the "hearts and minds" of the people. Therefore, to defeat an insurgency means to defeat its strategy.

This conclusion is certainly not new. The Chinese strategist Sun Tzu made this same observation over 2,000 years ago. He said, "What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy, the next best is to disrupt his alliance, and the next best is to attack his army, while the worst policy is to attack his cities."²⁴ In the counterinsurgency context, to defeat the strategy of insurgents means to compete for the support of the people which is the strategy of the insurgents. The counterinsurgency strategy must include programs to redress grievances, whether they are political, economic, social, or military in nature, so as to undermine the insurgents' cause. Civil and military actions, conducted as psychological actions, should support the strategy which should be an extension of a long-term national psychological strategy.

Often, civic action programs best embrace this "hearts and minds" strategy. Through road building, school construction, and health programs, the government can improve basic services as an attempt to provide some tangible solutions to fundamental socioeconomic problems. Current US Army counterinsurgency doctrine reflects this requirement and acknowledges that all military and nonmilitary actions must be considered in terms of their psychological impact. Moreover, it may be necessary to sacrifice short-range tactical advantages to preserve long-range psychological objectives.²⁵

Unfortunately, too many authorities portray these protracted conflicts as military struggles and outline solutions in military terms. Consequently, the military often finds itself attacking the insurgent's "army" and its "cities" or strongholds, because they are the easiest quantifiable ways of measuring success. Attrition usually becomes the strategy. In the final analysis, the military wins the armed confrontation and the nation loses the psychological war. France experienced this result in Algeria and the US in Vietnam. Colonel H. G. Summers, captured this best when he wrote about a conversation he had with a North Vietnamese colonel during a 1975 negotiation in Hanoi. Summers said, "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield." The North Vietnamese colonel pondered a moment and replied, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant."²⁶

This is not intended to slight the importance of military arms in a counterinsurgency war. On the contrary, military power is one of the four essential elements of national power that is required in these struggles, and it plays an important role in the destruction of the insurgency. After all, it was Mao Zedong, the infamous Chinese revolutionary, who said, "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun."²⁷ But, the principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun is never allowed to command the Party. Simply put, political power is premier and is the dominating factor in these struggles. To win these struggles, however, it requires the integration of political, military, and economic powers, which produce psychological power, into a coherent national strategy. Only through such genuine actions are psychological efforts effective and counterinsurgency campaigns won. Otherwise, these efforts will only achieve temporary success.

In the same sense, US support of these nations does not so much help them to win battles against insurgent combat forces as it assists their militaries to gain the time necessary to initiate reforms and bring them to fruition. Unless the government succeeds in eliminating the underlying causes of insurgency, military successes will, in all probability, prove to be short-lived as well.

It is essential to understand that a successful counterinsurgency strategy is not predicated on winning military battles or campaigns. It requires the government to compete for popular support and legitimacy, not just to eliminate the insurgents and their supporters. It is a long-term effort in which political objectives guide all civil and military operations. The government must establish its legitimacy with the people and must willingly make those changes and reforms necessary to pre-empt the insurgents' cause and drive a wedge between the insurgents and their local support. To regain, preserve, and strengthen popular support for the government is the overriding aim. Moreover, the government must respond during the early phases of the insurgency, when confrontations are

basically political and psychological. The military, an important factor in any counterinsurgency effort, must be integrated with other elements of national power to carry out a coherent national strategy.

A brief examination of an ongoing insurgency and a counterinsurgency will best illustrate the criticality of psychological power in winning "hearts and minds."

Philippines' Insurgency

At present, the Philippine government is besieged with political, military, social, and economic problems. President Corazon Aquino, who is still nurturing a political base, is being challenged from both the right and the left. The right opposes her plans for reform and criticizes her for undue leniency toward the insurgencies that threaten the government, while communists challenge the administration with an armed insurgency. In addition, the regime faces armed opposition from Muslim separatists and turmoil caused both by private armies and by widespread banditry. The biggest internal security threat to the Philippines, however, is the armed communist insurgency, which is the focus of this brief examination.

One of the root causes of the insurgency lies in the nation's poverty and distorted distribution of wealth. According to Manila's National Economic and Development Authority, 59.3 percent of the population lived below the poverty line in 1985. In another set of figures released by the Manila's Center for Research and Communications in 1987, almost three-fourths of Filipinos lived below the poverty level, the equivalent of \$1,000 a year for a family of six. While the economy showed positive growth in 1986 for the first time in several years, individual purchasing power will not reach 1983 levels until sometime in the early 1990s.²⁸ The impoverished economy, coupled with high unemployment and population growth, contributed greatly to the legitimacy of the communist insurgency.

The insurgency had its humble beginning in 1969 with 60 men and 35 weapons in Tarlac Province.²⁹ Unlike the Huk rebellion, which flourished during the early 1950s and was basically confined to Luzon, the present insurgency has spread throughout the archipelago and is steadily increasing its size. The insurgency has been successful in exploiting such legitimate local grievances as growing landlessness, corruption, human rights violations, and lack of essential government services. The Filipino military admits the insurgency now influences almost all of the country's 73 provinces. According to Western analysts, much of the recent, dramatic expansion is a result of painstaking political work supported by military actions.³⁰ Judging from the number and nature of incidents recently reported in the press, the Filipino insurgency is already into Phase II of its development.

As in the classic model of the "Maoist" insurgency, the Filipino communist movement is waging a rural-based protracted "people's war." The key ingredients in the insurgency are its political, armed, and front elements. The political arm, the key element of this insurgency, is the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). It has developed mass support bases in the countryside. The armed element, the operational arm, is the New People's Army (NPA). It is now estimated at 25,000 strong and controls perhaps 20 percent of the rural villages. The front element, the leading umbrella group, is the National United Front Commission. It has more than 45 supporting organizations, including labor, clergy, and student groups, which provide the legitimacy and mass support base for the movement in the cities.³¹ Like its Chinese and Vietnamese predecessors, the Filipino insurgency is a "revolutionary,"³² which means it is necessary to overthrow the existing government and replace it with a communist government in order to advance the revolution.

The insurgent leadership is thoroughly indoctrinated with communist ideology. The leaders understand the revolution is a political war that will not succeed through armed confrontation alone. One insurgent leader has said, "We are a political army. We are not only engaged in fighting."³³ Another insurgent leader noted, "When military action is considered, we are always thinking in terms of a political gain."³⁴ It is clear the insurgent leadership understands and applies the essence of psychological power in gaining popular support. Proposals of social justice, land redistribution and economic reforms, popular issues in this agrarian society, are the centerpieces of the insurgent political platform.

The Aquino administration, facing a direct challenge to its legitimacy, committed itself to land reform in July 1987. In practice, however, the insurgents have often outperformed the government. They have succeeded in lowering farm rents, increasing wages for workers, and reducing interest on loans in areas under their control.³⁵ Although limited by resources, the insurgents are already competing with the government by providing medical care to villagers in neglected areas.³⁶ In contrast, the comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program that the Philippine legislature finally enacted in June 1988, after a year of debate, is seriously flawed and may never improve the lot of landless peasants.³⁷

Guatemalan Counterinsurgency

Modern Guatemalan history since the overthrow of General Jorge Ubico's dictatorship in 1944 has been marked by violence, disorder, and a string of military coups. Political kidnappings and assassinations, by both right and left, electoral fraud, coups, human rights abuses, and insurgency, especially during the period from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, have contributed to

the proliferation of violence in Guatemalan society. Not surprisingly, President Jimmy Carter suspended all military aid to Guatemala in 1977. Such instability has also made the study of Guatemalan counterinsurgency efforts difficult. This paper will only examine the brief but successful counterinsurgency efforts since March 1982, when a military coup by a group of junior officers installed Rios Montt in power.

As with the Filipino insurgency, the root causes of the Guatemalan insurgency lie in the socioeconomic sphere where government neglect, coupled with abject poverty and disparities in the distribution of wealth, create a vast difference in quality of life between Indian and non-Indian. Three major insurgent groups, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), combined with the outlawed communist party, the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). These were the main actors in the insurgency.³⁸

Prior to 1982, armed confrontations between the military and the insurgents dominated life in much of the rural Indian-populated Western Highlands where the expanding insurgency was based. The military counterinsurgency efforts were often characterized by indiscriminate killing of the Indians. These operations often created refugee problems and lent credibility and legitimacy to the insurgent cause. In March 1982, Rios Montt came forth with a new strategy, combining military actions with economic reforms, to win the "hearts and minds" of the people in combatting the insurgency.³⁹

The counterinsurgency strategy rested on the simultaneous pursuit of internal defense and internal development to undermine the insurgents' cause. It involved the integration of political, economic, psychological, and military powers of the nation to defeat the insurgency. On the one hand, the government took measures to protect its Indian citizens from armed insurgents. On the other hand, the government implemented development programs to redress grievances and to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the Indians, whom previous governments had neglected. The Guatemalan government has been successful in implementing this strategy to win the support of the people and has reduced the insurgency to the point where it no longer presents an immediate threat to national stability. The major ingredients of the internal defense and development activities were security, development, and mobilization. These activities, which are still ongoing, epitomize the psychological strategy of the Guatemalan government since 1982.

Security. Providing protection to the rural population and security to ensure internal development are two of the essential ingredients in any counterinsurgency strategy. Protection and

control of the population mean denying the insurgents access to their most important resource, popular support. The British experience in the Malayan Emergency and the US Marines' experiment with the Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam have proven the importance of this basic requirement in an insurgency environment. In Guatemala, the government reforms provided security at two levels, military presence and formation of civilian defense forces in the rural areas.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Letona, Chief of Guatemalan Public Affairs, the Army often conducted military operations with an emphasis on maximizing face-to-face contacts with the populace. The objective was to reassure people with a military presence and not necessarily to neutralize the insurgents. With government support, civilian defense forces took form in the rural villages in the Western Highlands to protect farmers in the fields, work sites, and rural communities and towns.⁴⁰ This was an important psychological breakthrough for the government, because it generated a sense of involvement among the people in providing a solution to this national problem. Once the people were actively engaged in the betterment of their society through government programs, they gain a stake in the system. Consequently, they were "committed" to support the government rather than to overthrow it.

Development. In the words of Lieutenant Colonel Letona, "tactically, the military has won the war against the guerrillas. Now we must intensify internal development."⁴¹ No program can better promote and maintain the legitimacy of any government than a well-conceived internal development program. In most insurgency environments, internal development programs often address some of the legitimate grievances of the people the insurgents attempt to exploit. Because of their tangibility, these activities play a major role in winning the people over to the side of the government. In the rural areas of the Western Highlands, Guatemalan development programs took the shape of civic action programs. Activities such as building roads to improve transportation to rural areas, constructing schools and health clinics to provide essential government services, and building homes to replace those destroyed in the conflict were critical in winning and maintaining popular support in the rural areas and, at the same time, undermining the insurgents' cause.

Mobilization. Popular support is critical in any counterinsurgency effort, and the mobilization of the people was an important element in the overall Guatemalan counterinsurgency strategy. The government was successful in adopting this insurgent tactic for its own purpose. It employed psychological operations to mobilize the rural population to support the government. It educated the population about the constructive goals of the government and the destructive goals of the insurgents. The formation of civil defense forces was a good

example of a mobilization effort. The Army was also politically mobilized to counter the insurgency. The Army indoctrinated soldiers on the importance of PSYOP and how to win the "hearts and minds" of the people. "Every soldier is a potential ambassador of goodwill," said Letona.⁴²

SUMMARY

It is clear the leadership of both the Filipino insurgent movement and the Guatemalan government understood that psychological power was an all encompassing element in achieving popular support, the heart and soul of these conflicts. In insurgency and counterinsurgency, PSYOP can help to gain, strengthen, and mobilize popular sympathy and support; maintain the legitimacy of the movement or government; build and maintain troop morale, loyalty, and discipline; create dissension, disorganization, and low morale within the enemy's ranks, both at home and abroad; discredit the hardcore enemy supporters; shift the loyalty of the passive enemy sympathizers; and win the support of unwilling enemy collaborators. Internal development programs are extremely important in satisfying grievances of the people. In short, insurgency and counterinsurgency are protracted political wars. These wars are won in the "hearts and minds" of the people. Whoever wins the population wins the war.

SECTION III -- COMBATTING TERRORISM

TERRORISM

Terrorism is a dimension of LIC that has received increased attention from the US government, academics, the public, and news media. This attention is largely the result of the increasing numbers of terrorist acts directed at US citizens and interests around the world in recent years, from the truck bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, in which more than 240 Americans were killed, to the murder of a US Navy diver in the skyjacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985. These terrorist acts have greatly damaged the prestige of the US. The public perception of US efforts against terrorism is mixed. Although the bombing of Libya in 1986 produced positive results in demonstrating US resolve in dealing with terrorist actions, the perception apparently is that the US is often powerless and incapable of dealing with terrorism effectively. The inability of the US thus far to recover the nine Americans still held hostage by terrorists in Lebanon underscores the impression of ineptitude. Such a viewpoint, however, ignores the nature and dynamics of terrorism.

Terrorism, often referred to as warfare without territorial boundaries, is a difficult and complex subject to understand and combat. Unlike terrorism in earlier days, when terrorist incidents were often isolated acts of dissent, terrorism is now frequently an instrument of state policy employed by such states

as Libya and Iran. There are many kinds of terrorism. They may be sponsored by individuals, political organizations, or nation-states. Some are politically or ethnically motivated and some are religiously inspired. There are no "rules of the game" like those that prevailed in traditional warfare. Its methods are terror, and its tactics are often assassinations, hijacking, indiscriminate bombings and shootings, and hostage taking. The commonality of these tactics lie in the nature of the victims, who are usually innocent civilians with no role in either causing or correcting the alleged grievances of the terrorists.

As defined in JCS Publication 1-02, terrorism is "the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives."⁴³ It is a form of psychological operation in which a violent act is committed against innocent victims to influence the emotions, motives, reasoning and, ultimately, the political behavior of nations. It is propaganda of the deed; the strategy of the weak against the strong.

Generally, terrorist objectives fall into four categories: recognition, coercion, intimidation, and insurgency support.⁴⁴ Recognition is the attempt to gain acknowledgment of a cause, and aims at attracting high-level media coverage. Hijacking an aircraft or kidnaping prominent people are examples of acts to establish credibility as a "bona fide" terrorist organization. Coercion consists of acts designed to force a desired behavior by individuals, groups, or governments. It includes threats and announcements prior to a bombing, which are intended to influence small groups or specific individuals within a government. Intimidation is different from coercion in that it is an attempt to prevent individuals or groups from acting, while coercion attempts to force action. Selective assassinations, bombings, arson, or just the threat of violence are common tactics to discourage actions of certain target audiences. Provocation consists of acts targeted against such representatives of the government as police and military personnel in order to produce an overreaction by government officials. Obviously, these objectives are not mutually exclusive, and terrorists may pursue one or more of them in their strategy, as one often sees in the case of terrorism in support of an insurgency.⁴⁵

UNITED STATES POLICY

Department of Defense efforts to combat terrorism are guided by a national policy that includes four major tenets. First, the US government opposes terrorism and is prepared to respond to such acts. Second, the government will take measures to protect its citizens, property, and national interests. Third, the US will make no concessions to terrorists. Fourth, the US will act against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles.⁴⁶

The two components of US strategy to combat terrorism are antiterrorism and counterterrorism. The US underpins these components by working in concert with other countries in identifying, tracking, apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing terrorists.⁴⁷ Antiterrorism is a program that encompasses security and law enforcement. It addresses those defensive measures taken to protect personnel and resources. Its activities include reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence for threat warnings, and education and awareness training that teaches individuals how to protect themselves and their property. In contrast, counterterrorism is a program that is more operationally focused and consists of offensive measures designed to prevent and to respond to terrorist acts and to deal with them once they are in progress. This is a highly sensitive area in which execution is likely to be controlled at the highest level of government.

The US, realizing that modern day terrorism is often transnational in nature and is an international problem requiring collective action, has been cooperating with other countries in various capacities to combat terrorism. Deputy Secretary John Whitehead, in a speech delivered at the Brookings Institution Conference on Terrorism, underscored the success of this multinational effort. He indicated that the US and its allies foiled more than 120 planned terrorist attacks against American diplomatic personnel in 1986.⁴⁸

PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO COMBATTING TERRORISM

The lack of a psychological strategy in combatting terrorism has limited the role of PSYOP in this important mission category of LIC. Since terrorism is a form of PSYOP, it is critical to integrate the psychological element of national power with the political, military, and economic elements in supporting a national strategy to combat terrorism. Conceptually, PSYOP can best support an offensive strategy whenever successful execution of a tactical operation may offer great psychological benefits against the terrorists. However, offensive actions may only serve to harden ideologies, precipitate more violence, and bring on the failure of an offensive measure, which might cause a psychological backlash. Certainly, terrorism is a long-term problem a few military actions cannot end. It requires a balanced, long-term solution that integrates all elements of national power.

One analyst noted that Kaddafi's "Achilles' heel" is the price of oil, and that the "fortuitous drop" in the world price of oil has undermined him more than the US air attacks on Libya in 1986.⁴⁹ Such an observation does not suggest that military action is unnecessary. It does, however, present the option that the US may more effectively deal with Kaddafi if other elements of power are integrated and applied with military actions. It is the synergistic value of these coordinated efforts which gives rise to psychological power, the power to influence.

Mike McEwen, a specialist in the study of international terrorism, has proposed a "nonviolent" offensive strategy in dealing with terrorism. He advances the idea that PSYOP is useful both in antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Psychological operations can be as "hard-hitting" as the ingenuity of planners allows. In antiterrorism, McEwen indicates that effective antiterrorism programs could be developed based on information gained through PSYOP propaganda analysis. In counterterrorism, PSYOP is useful in the exploitation of "internal weaknesses" of the terrorist organization and promotion of "group rivalries." Psychological operations may also play a role in shaping various possible "outcomes" of counterterrorism operations, amplifying successes, and mitigating failures.⁵⁰

Certainly, these are valid observations and worthy of consideration for incorporation into the overall strategy for combatting terrorism. More importantly, however, PSYOP may not be only a supporting instrument but supported instrument. Psychological operations may be "the cutting edge" of US efforts to combat terrorism. In many instances PSYOP may best support a national strategy to combat terrorism by conducting antiterrorism and counterterrorism operations as psychological actions. The following are examples of these psychological approaches.

Antiterrorism

Perhaps the best example of a PSYOP antiterrorism initiative was the Egyptian effort in foiling a Libyan plot in November 1984. The Libyans had plotted to kill Abdul Hamid Bakkush, a former Libyan Prime Minister living in exile, but the Egyptians set up a clever "sting" operation to embarrass the Libyan government, and, particularly, its leader, Muammar Kaddafi.

Through timely and accurate intelligence, the Egyptian authorities were able to stage an assassination and induce the Libyan agents to believe that they had succeeded in killing the prominent Libyan exile. Subsequently, the Egyptians sent pictures of the "dead" former Prime Minister to the Libyan Embassy in Malta. Official Libyan press then later claimed that Bakkush had been executed by "suicide squads" sent abroad "to liquidate enemies of the revolution."⁵¹ The premature announcement by the Libyan press, however, was quickly contradicted by Egyptian President Mubarak's news release of the "sting" operation and by a press conference held by Bakkush who exhibited the "staged" photographs in which he had posed as a bloodstained corpse.⁵²

Not only was the Egyptian government's antiterrorism effort able to prevent an assassination attempt, it also enabled the Egyptians to take the offensive and unmask Kaddafi as a perpetrator of international terrorism. Moreover, the Egyptians gained international support in condemning Libya's action. More

significantly, the Egyptian government put Kaddafi on notice and set the stage to justify possible future military action by Egypt or by other nations.

The operation had a tremendous strategic psychological effect on Libya. Kaddafi's position in the Arab world was weakened. He was personally embarrassed, portrayed as the incompetent leader of a bungled political murder attempt. He was unmasked as an admitted terrorist before the international community, and Libya became synonymous with state-sponsored and directed terrorism.⁵³ Although this antiterrorism operation may not radically alter Kaddafi's behavior, it is certain that the cumulative effect of similar successes, especially if they occur in concert with diplomatic, economic and, possibly, military actions, will further isolate Libya from the international community and erode its position in the Arab world. The result of these coordinated actions could be to push the Libyan population beyond the threshold of tolerance and lead it to stage an internal insurrection.

Counterterrorism

On April 18, 1942, 16 American B-25s led by Colonel James Doolittle, conducted a daring air raid on Tokyo, Japan. The raid, an operation conceived and conducted primarily for psychological reasons, caught the Japanese totally by surprise. Although the raid did little damage, it had great psychological consequences. It demonstrated the might of the US air power and the vulnerability of the Japanese homeland defense. More importantly, it demoralized the Japanese, both at home and abroad, while it galvanized the American people to support the war effort. The operation was one of the most successful psychological actions in the history of modern warfare. The psychological value of this type of operation is well understood in the Air Force community. Air Force aerospace doctrine states that an attack on a specific, significant target can create psychological effects to reinforce operations.⁵⁴

In the early hours of April 15, 1986, following the best tradition of the Doolittle raid, US Air Force and Navy aircraft carried out a daring air raid on Tripoli, Libya, in reprisal for a Libya-connected terrorist bombing of a West Berlin discotheque in which two US servicemen were killed. The raid, a contingency operation, was also a successful PSYOP counterterrorism operation. Although it is doubtful the raid was conceived primarily as a PSYOP campaign against Kaddafi, the post-operation analysis shows the raid was in every sense a psychological operation. Certainly, the air raid on Tripoli did have a tremendous psychological impact on certain target audiences. Like the Doolittle raid, the Libyan raid was limited in scope; however, the target audience was broad and the message was clear. The following is a analysis of three key aspects of the raid.

International terrorist organizations. The US served notice to all terrorist organizations that they cannot strike at the US and its citizens with impunity. The raid demonstrated the willingness and ability of the US to use force against terrorists at their most vulnerable spot, their home territory. The charred headquarters of Kaddafi serves as a testament of retribution and a reminder that terrorism will be fought with force, hard and direct. Walter Laqueur, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who initially thought the raid on Libya was a mistake, later said that to his surprise, the raid "has had an effect on other sponsors of terrorism."⁵⁵

Kaddafi. The attack on Libya, particularly Azziziyah barracks, Kaddafi's headquarters in Tripoli, was obviously an attempt to influence Kaddafi's behavior and send a "message" warning him that he would pay a price for his sponsorship of terrorism. It appeared, however, that the raid also shook him psychologically. Kaddafi, who boasted before the raid that he would retaliate against US targets around the world if Libya were bombed, grew suddenly silent about any retribution. There have been no apparent major Libyan terrorist attacks on Americans since the raid. The man, who is known for his daring, fearless, charming, and charismatic qualities, abandoned his headquarters and retreated into hiding for fear of further attacks. Moreover, in the few taped appearances he made after the raid, he was observed to be in a depressed and exhausted state. He faltered in his speech, and his mind seemed to wander.⁵⁶ Evidently, the raid had modified Kaddafi's behavior and kept him off balance. Even the reluctant European allies admitted that the air raid on Libya had taught Kaddafi an important lesson.⁵⁷

The World At-Large. Supported with actual film footage taken by raiding F-111s, views of the attack on the Russian-made Il-76 transports at the Tripoli airport was a psychological coup for the US. Not only did the film show that the US pilots were only engaging in attacks against military targets, but it also showed that the US had the capability to carry out air raids against distant targets. More importantly, the extensive television coverage of the aftermath of the raid and the repetitive showing of the same bombing footage by all the major television networks helped to convey the impression that the US had scored a direct hit in the heart of terrorism. The impact of the raid was greater than most had anticipated. It influenced some of the European countries, directly or indirectly, to take measures against terrorism. The British broke diplomatic relations with Syria; the French tried a major terrorist figure and sentenced him to life in prison; and the Italians reduced economic ties with Libya.⁵⁸ A Libyan-called Arab summit meeting after the raid proved to be a failure; four of the major Arab players, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, announced they would not be able to attend.⁵⁹

Regardless of the intent of the attack plan, the near-perfect execution was a total success from the psychological perspective. Certainly, no PSYOP planners could have planned it better under the circumstances. The post-raid analysis showed it had strengthened the US government's credibility in its stance against terrorism; demonstrated the vulnerability of the Libyan defense and the vulnerability of Kaddafi; influenced the European allies in their stances against terrorism; reduced terrorist activities directed at the US; helped to vent anger and frustration; and galvanized the American public to support the war against terrorism. Of course, there is no guarantee that Kaddafi will not make a comeback in his support of terrorism. However, Kaddafi may now realize that he can no longer directly challenge the US. He understands that future "overt" Libyan-connected terrorist activities may catalyze other foreign governments to take punitive actions against Libya that may lead to his overthrow or indirectly cause an internal insurrection.

SUMMARY

Conceptually, PSYOP is useful for discrediting terrorist acts, depicting the terrorists as they really are, and precluding them from establishing a heroic image. Psychological operations can help to create internal dissension by exploiting divisive issues that undermine terrorist organizations, putting pressures on terrorists, and making them suspicious and distrustful of members of their own organization. Rumors of spies inside the terrorist organization, use of amnesty programs, and employment of other PSYOP measures can yield tangible results. In other words, PSYOP is a tool to promote mutual and self destruction within and between terrorist organizations. In addition, PSYOP can facilitate the execution of a tactical operation by promoting complacency among the terrorists, conditioning them to be careless and predictable. These initiatives must be considered for incorporation into a national combatting terrorism strategy.

This examination of antiterrorism and counterterrorism efforts demonstrate the importance of psychological considerations in developing strategies for combatting terrorism. The psychological element can contribute to an offensive strategy, and deserves consideration as "the cutting edge" in all approaches to combatting terrorism. These considerations, however, are largely the synergistic result of other elements of national power. Without them, psychological power exists largely in the form of informational activities. Therefore, an effective strategy to combat terrorism must involve the coordination and integration of all elements of national power.

SECTION IV -- PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

POLITICO-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Peacetime contingency operations (PCO) are politically sensitive military operations often characterized by short-term, rapid projection of forces in conditions short of war. They become necessary "when diplomatic initiatives do not achieve time-sensitive, high-value objectives, or when unexpected threats demand a rapid response."⁶⁰

The Army-Air Force doctrine on LIC states that peacetime contingency operations include, but are not limited to, the following activities:

- Disaster relief
- Shows of force and demonstrations
- Noncombatant evacuation operations
- Rescue and recovery operations
- Strikes and raids
- Peacemaking
- Unconventional warfare
- Security assistance surges
- Support to US civil authorities⁶¹

Although most of these activities are self explanatory, two of them, peacemaking operations and support to US civil authorities, merit discussion. Peacemaking operations are different from peacekeeping operations in that the latter require the consent of belligerents to interpose an impartial third party between them, while the former may take place "at the request of appropriate national authorities in a foreign state or to protect US citizens." The United States may conduct these operations, internationally, multilaterally, or unilaterally.⁶²

Support to US civil authorities consists of those activities carried out by military forces in support of federal and state officials in accordance with the Posse Comitatus Act and other US laws and regulations. In the past, Congress and the courts have generally restricted military support to instances involving civil disorders, disaster assistance, threats to federal property, and similar incidents. In 1981, Congress defined drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and customs violations as threats to national security warranting military support and have amended the Posse Comitatus Act to include such activities under these legal provisions.⁶³ Military units involved in these types of activities, particularly those acting in support of anti-drug efforts, must provide their aid as action incidental to training and must use means that do not detract from military readiness.

The activities within PCO are not mutually exclusive of other LIC categories. For example, the US military may execute a strike or raid operation in response to a terrorist incident as in the case of the April 1986 attack on Libya and hence employ a PCO as a counterterrorism effort.

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT AND PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

It is well known that every military action, or absence of one, produces psychological effects regardless of the operators' intentions. In PCO, these effects often outweigh their physical impact. The JLIC Report states that "peacetime contingency operations are frequently psychological operations in themselves, since they are undertaken specifically to affect the attitudes and behavior of a foreign audience" in advancement of US national interests.⁶⁴ They serve as symbols of US resolve and willingness to act, and planners should consider them as psychological actions. However, the US has conducted many of these operations without due consideration or a full understanding of their psychological impact. Consequently, it has failed to harvest the full potential of such operations.

Like most other military operations, PCO produces negative as well as positive effects, and they are international in scope. Therefore, in planning contingency missions, operators must include psychological considerations. For example, if the US is involved in a peacemaking activity in the Middle East, it must be prepared to counter propaganda against the US not only in that region, but also in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. It is imperative that civilian and military leaders be cognizant of this aspect if they are contemplating PCO.

The military may execute activities in this category of LIC on the basis of operational plans, using tactical execution tailored to accomplish strategic objectives. Depending on the specific activity and situation, PSYOP can play a supporting or a leading role at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The following is a brief analysis of psychological considerations in some contingency operations.

Disaster Relief

Disaster relief involves US military personnel in both unilateral and multilateral rescue and relief efforts, and has high visibility. It is a humanitarian operation which can have a tremendous positive psychological impact, an aspect that is frequently not exploited. It wins the favor of the population and local government and helps to project a favorable image of the US to the international community.

Show of Force

A show of force to demonstrate national strength and determination is a well-recognized psychological activity. However, one must consider the negative effects when planning for a show of force operation. Depending on size, intention, and local situation, a show of force could have regional or global implications. For example, announcement of an unscheduled military maneuver by a carrier task force off the coast of Libya during a period of high regional tension may generate various adverse psychological effects that outweigh the positive influence it could have on the behavior of Kaddafi. The announcement could spur speculation in the international gold markets, trigger a rapid drop in the international stock markets, increase Arab solidarity, heighten East-West tension, or decrease international support for US policy. These secondary effects, if ignored in the planning of such an operation, may overshadow the success in the achievement of the primary objective. Consequently, psychological considerations must be organic to the planning and execution of such activities.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Noncombatant evacuation operations normally affect US citizens whose lives are in danger while they are in a foreign country. They occur when the military, political, or general conditions in the host nation deteriorate to the point at which American lives are clearly in danger. The timely execution of such operations may prevent hostile elements from taking US citizens as hostages.

By their nature and purpose, noncombatant evacuation operations have tremendous psychological impact. They demonstrate to the world community the resolve of the US to protect its citizens. In addition, they may influence the attitude and behavior of the host government, because the evacuation of US citizens from a foreign country is proof of instability in that country. Therefore, the slightest suggestion of an impending evacuation may provide leverage or psychological pressure that influences the opinion and behavior of the local government or other regional actors. Although the operation itself is most likely to affect only a single foreign country, its psychological impact is often international in nature. The Grenada rescue operation is a case in point.

On October 25, 1983, a contingent of the Caribbean security force of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, led by the US military, landed on the Caribbean island-nation of Grenada, to rescue over 600 US medical students. The operation was a noncombatant evacuation operation precipitated by the execution of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several of his ministers in a coup led by General Hudson Austin. Although the operation

received strong approval in the US, some US allies initially criticized it, including the traditionally staunch supporter of US policy, Great Britain. In a matter of a few days, however, the successful military operations turned the tide of international opinion.

On the home front, the exuberant students, rescued by the US Army Rangers, related their stories of terror and expressed their thanks for the rescue. On arrival in the US, a well covered media event, one of the rescued students immediately kneeled and kissed the ground, a gesture which symbolized the support of President Ronald Reagan's decision to rescue the students. To many, this act eliminated any further doubt that the operation was unnecessary.

In Grenada, the Austin regime was toppled by the operation, and the Grenadian people joyously celebrated what they called a "rescue mission," a term referring to the rescue of the Grenadian people from Austin's government. Graffiti of gratitude were evident everywhere in the capital city, and the pro-US sentiment on the island was so strong that a song about the rescue operation became widely popular within a week of the operation.

In Cuba, Fidel Castro suffered his first major political setback in the region. Captured documents showed that Grenada was a staging base used by Cuba to advance its aims in the region. Warehouses full of military arms and equipment, which had been secretly shipped from Cuba in containers marked as agricultural products, were captured by US forces and shown to the world in the first few days of the operation. In a humanitarian gesture and a great political maneuver, the US returned to Cuba the entire Cuban contingent of over 600 Cuban construction workers and soldiers who surrendered after unsuccessful combat with US forces. The return of the prisoners forced Castro to acknowledge the returnees in a well-publicized welcoming home ceremony. For the first time in many years, the Cuban people saw the price of Castro's overseas ventures as they watched the wounded return home.

In Suriname, a Caribbean littoral state, the rescue operation had a tremendous impact on the country. Desi Bouterse, a revolutionary socialist and an opportunist who headed the military government, perceived the operation as a political statement by the US to warn the Soviets and Cubans not to meddle in the region and to warn regional states not to support Soviet and Cuban designs there. Bouterse, who was responsible for the increasing Cuban presence in Suriname, subsequently decided it was not in his best interest to continue his strong relationship with the Cuban military. A few days after the Grenada operation, he ousted over 100 Cuban military advisors and diplomats, apparently because of his fear that the US might intervene.

Strikes and Raids

The salient point is that these military operations have tremendous psychological impact, and they deserve consideration in planning as strategic psychological actions. As discussed in the combatting terrorism section, the air raid against Libya in April 1986 was a good example of a strategic psychological action. Not only did the attack demonstrate US resolve in dealing with terrorists' actions, but it influenced the apparent attitude and behavior of Kaddafi.

SUMMARY

Peacetime contingency operations often effect the attitudes and behavior of domestic and foreign audiences. The understanding of these psychological effects and their implications will assist planning and enhance the impact of PCO for both military and psychological reasons. Regardless of the role, supporting or supported, psychological considerations must be integral to this category of LIC.

SECTION V -- PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

A NEW ENVIRONMENT

After a decade of regional conflicts, the world is arriving at a juncture where many roads are pointing toward peace or, at least, peaceful settlements. Soviet troops are pulling out of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese government has pledged to withdraw all its troops from Cambodia by 1990, Cuban and the South African governments are negotiating a time table for possible pullout of Cuban troops from Angola and South African troops out of Namibia, and Iran and Iraq are negotiating a truce to their war in the Persian Gulf. The coming together of these events raise new questions about the deployment of international peacekeeping forces to these volatile regions, while settlements are being negotiated.

PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINE

A peacekeeping operation (PKO) is largely a politico-military operation undertaken to control violence without resorting to violence. It is probably one of the most difficult missions for combatants whose primary training is to fight. The function of peacekeepers is that of a referee. Although armed for reasons of self-preservation, their real weapons are those of reasoning, persuasion, diplomacy and, perhaps, most importantly, legitimacy. These are the areas where PSYOP can contribute immensely toward a coherent peacekeeping strategy.

Over the years, the term "peacekeeping" has acquired many connotations, from responding to a friendly government seeking assistance in restoring order, to the intervening in a country which no longer has an effective government. Although in most instances, the political intentions of these operations were to keep the peace, the operations often resulted in military intervention and the protection of national interests. "Peacekeeping" by definition must be conducted by a neutral third party and with the consent of all belligerents involved. The neutrality of the peacekeepers and the consent of the belligerents are the two most important ingredients in the successful conduct of any peacekeeping operation.

United Nations Perspective

Colonel Wolf Kutter, a noted authority on PKO, has developed a peacekeeping continuum to provide a better understanding of the types of peacekeeping operations to be conducted from the United Nations' perspective.⁶⁵ The continuum is useful in demonstrating the gradual escalation of intensity of peacekeeping and the correlation in the use of force as one goes from peace observation to peace enforcement.

PEACEKEEPING CONTINUUM

<-----I-----I-----I----->

OBSERVATION

PRESENCE

ENFORCEMENT

Observation missions are those which involve the employment of military observers, usually unarmed, serving a wide range of functions, such as supervision of cease-fires and armistices, withdrawal of forces, and exchange of prisoners. The most notable example is the employment of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) in Israel. In June 1967, following the outbreak of war between Israel and the Arab states, the UN Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire which was accepted by the belligerents. Subsequently, UNTSO military observers were posted on Israel's frontiers supervising the cease-fire agreement.⁶⁶

Peacekeeping presence, most common of all peacekeeping operations, requires the employment of a peacekeeping force interposing or acting as a buffer between the belligerents. This deployment of an interpositional force generally relies on the agreement of the belligerents and could not be enforced without their consent. The United Nations Force in Cyprus is a good example of this type of mission. Following the intercommunal fighting between Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the small Mediterranean island of Cyprus in March 1964, the UN Secretary-General, under a mandate from the Security Council, organized a UN peacekeeping force to interpose between the Turkish and Greek communities, while negotiations were undertaken.⁶⁷

Peace enforcement mission, by definition, is designed to impose peace on an unwilling party.⁶⁸ These are the least common of all peacekeeping operations. These missions usually involve larger military units. In UN-sponsored PKOs, this mission may only be taken with approval of the Security Council.⁶⁹ The most notable example of this mission is the Korean conflict. On June 25, 1950, the People's Republic of Korea launched a surprise attack against the Republic of Korea (ROK). Subsequently, under US sponsorship, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for UN assistance to ROK to repel the armed attacks and to restore peace and security in the area. Later, under a UN command headed by the US, various member nations supported the ROK efforts in repelling the attack.⁷⁰ Colonel Kutter also includes the US-Organization of American States involvement in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the latter part of US operations in Lebanon from 1983-84 as examples of this mission category.⁷¹

United States Perspective

The final draft for the Army and Air Force LIC doctrine, FM 100-20/AFM 2-20, discusses peacekeeping operations as "military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict, to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate a diplomatic resolution" ⁷² By definition, future US involvement in peacekeeping, whether unilateral or multilateral, will most likely not go beyond the peacekeeping presence stage on Kutter's Peacekeeping Continuum. Peace enforcement, a term that is not defined in US peacekeeping doctrine, connotes peacemaking, a kind of peacetime contingency operation which doesn't require the consent of belligerents to interpose an impartial third party between them, as currently described in the Army and Air Force LIC doctrine. The final draft of LIC doctrine, FM 100-20/AFM 2-20 states the US may conduct peacemaking operations "to stop a violent conflict and to force a return to political and diplomatic methods." Depending on the situation, peacemaking may transition to a peacekeeping operation.⁷³

United States PKOs may range from providing a few observers to supervise a UN cease-fire and disengagement agreement, to managing a multinational-sponsored peacekeeping force interposed between two parties to a conflict. These operations normally take place following diplomatic negotiations concerning the mandate, duration of stay, size, and type of forces that each participating nation will contribute in accordance with agreements between the belligerent parties. With such a mandate, the PKO force will conduct its operations in accordance with agreements between the conflicting parties. United States participation may include military units or individuals acting as observers.⁷⁴ A good example of this type of operation is the deployment of US forces to the Sinai as part of the Multinational Force and Observers. However, not all peacekeeping mandates are

clearcut or totally supported by all belligerent parties as is the Sinai peacekeeping effort. The art of persuasion and reasoning is most critical here.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING

The successful conduct of any PKO often depends on certain factors such as continued observance and cooperation by all belligerents who are party to the cease-fire and security agreement; the impartiality and objectivity of the peacekeepers; and the support of world opinion. Effective utilization of these factors requires an integrated psychological strategy.

Psychological operations, which is often neglected in these operations, can play an important role in facilitating cooperation between the belligerents and their supporters on the one hand and the PKO forces on the other hand. Tactically, PSYOP can assist the PKO forces in keeping peace through persuasion rather than intimidation. Through such local information programs as radio and television newscasts, PSYOP can help to ensure the PKO objectives and efforts are fully understood and supported by the belligerents and their civilian populations. In any wartorn area, one can expect a large influx of displaced personnel. Psychological operations can help to amplify any US humanitarian assistance and civic action program provided to these personnel in order to win the favor of the populace and belligerents.

These assistance programs, however, must always be evaluated for both negative as well as positive political impact, and must be given in total impartiality. In addition, PSYOP can help to promote acceptance of a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, and compliance with security agreements by influencing belligerents' attitudes, emotions, opinions, and behavior. Such efforts can help to counter rumors and disinformation, and may even resolve some problems between the belligerent parties while they search for a long-term solution to their conflict.

Prior to a peacekeeping deployment, PSYOP personnel can provide training support to sensitize troops to the importance of impartiality and objectivity in their mission, and to familiarize the troops with the dynamics of the political situation in the operating area, local culture, mores, religions, and taboos. Such training programs help the troops to increase their effectiveness and gain credibility and respect for the PKO force.

More importantly, in the operational and strategic sense, PSYOP can help project to regional actors and the world community a favorable image of an impartial and capable US military force. In the world of perception where public opinion reigns, the successful conduct of a PKO by the US in a volatile situation will tremendously enhance its image as an impartial "partner of

peace" and as a viable and credible participant in future events in that region. Therefore, the creation and projection of such image should be an integral operational and strategic objective.

SUMMARY

Peacekeeping operations will continue to be difficult because of the politico-military nature of the mission. The employment of carefully integrated PSYOP can strongly enhance the success of any PKO mission, which depends to a great extent on the cooperation and goodwill of all parties involved. Ideally, PKO should be an apolitical event under UN sponsorship. However, a veto of only one of the five permanent members of the Security Council can prevent or otherwise adversely affect the formation of an effective UN peacekeeping force. Consequently, speedy deployment of UN forces is unlikely in an emergency situation. Moreover, nations always strive to protect their interests abroad, and PKO may take place as an extension of a nation's foreign policy to protect its interests, whether to safeguard the lives of citizens or to ensure stability in a region. In such situations, it is imperative that psychological operations form an integral part of PKO strategy to ensure success.

SECTION VI -- CONCLUSION

Insurgencies, terrorism, political violence, and crises will continue to be an integral part of the LIC environment and will present difficult challenges for the US military. These challenges can neither be resolved by quick fixes nor are easily deterred by firepower. Their root causes are often found in the political and socioeconomic arenas, and their resolution must be considered from the same perspective.

Psychological power, which is often neglected in the formulation of a national strategy, can play an important role in helping to deter or reduce the effectiveness of the threat in the LIC environment. This power, however, cannot stand alone, and must be an integral part of a strategy that recognizes there is no single solution in LIC and the problems must be resolved through the application of all the elements of national power.

Psychological operations, the art of persuasion, is the most appropriate response in LIC, whether to win the support of the people or to strike a blow against the heart of terrorism. The effective use of this capability needs to be studied and emphasized in service schools. As Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist, once said,

To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.⁷⁵

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GLOSSARY

Antiterrorism consists of "defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism." (JCS Pub 1-02)

Civil affairs consists of those activities a commander takes ". . . which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area where military forces are present. Civil affairs include . . . matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area usually involving performance by the military forces of certain functions or the exercise of certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government. This relationship may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military action in time of hostilities or other emergency and is normally covered by a treaty or other agreement, expressed or implied" (JCS Pub 1-02)

Combatting terrorism consists of "actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire conflict spectrum. (JCS Pub 1-02)

Counterinsurgency consists of "those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency." (JCS Pub 1-02)

Counterterrorism consists of "offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism." (JCS Pub 1-02)

Insurgency is "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." (JCS Pub 1-02)

Low-intensity conflict is a "political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. (JMTGM-44-88, JCS Pub 1-02)

Military civic action consists of "the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas." (JCS Pub 1-02)

Operational PSYOP are "PSYOP conducted to achieve mid-term objectives in support of campaigns and major operations. Operational PSYOP are normally conducted at the theater level." (FM 33-1)

Peacekeeping operations consist of "military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict." (FC 100-20)

Peacetime contingency operations are "politically sensitive military operations characterized by the short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of conventional war, e.g., strike, raid, rescue, recovery, demonstrations, show of force, unconventional warfare, and intelligence operations." (FC 100-20)

Propaganda is "any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly." (JCS Pub 1-02)

Psychological action is "the use of propaganda media and supporting activities in peace and war designed to reduce the potential or actual enemy's prestige and influence in potentially hostile or neutral countries and to increase friendly influence and attitudes in these countries." (FM 33-1)

Psychological operations consist of "planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP." (JCS Pub 1-02)

Strategic PSYOP are "PSYOP conducted to advance broad or long-term objectives and to create a psychological environment favorable to military operations." (FM 33-1)

Tactical PSYOP are "PSYOP conducted to achieve relatively immediate or short-term objectives in support of tactical commanders." (FM 33-1)