

STUDY PROJECT

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COMMAND PHILOSOPHY:
THE SECRET OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

BY

COLONEL LARRY J. SMITH

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COMMAND PHILOSOPHY: THE SECRET OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U. S. Army War College
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ABSTRACT

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Recent studies confirm that the Army officer corps holds widely varying views of the quality of leadership and composition of command climates. Every commander today seeks a healthy, positive command climate and a cohesive unit. Command climate is a state or resulting condition existing from shared feelings and perceptions among soldiers about their unit, about their leaders, and about their unit's programs and policies. This condition is created by the commander's vision and leadership style. The key to a positive command climate is the credibility of the commander, established through trust, communications, loyalty, and confidence. Tools to build a consistently supportive climate are available to the Army--from history and from social sciences. Besides modifications in leader selection, the long-term development and formulation of a systematic approach to climate building provides another means for improving dramatically combat readiness. The cost is really not high. A philosophy of command (or leadership) widely articulated and for addressing key organizational issues offers an effective management tool creating the positive aspects of a command climate. This study will provide a review of the concept of command climate and its linkage to command philosophy; discuss the relationship of command climate and "organizational leadership;" outline a model based on what can be learned from practice, and finally, draw some conclusions extracted from the research. The study will also provide some recommendations. Lastly, the study will provide future leaders with some insights on how to shape their organizational climates. Positive, healthy command climates help make combat-ready units. (SDCW)

PREFACE

This Military Study Project was produced under the sponsorship of the U.S. Army War College's Department of Command, Leadership, and Management (DCLM). The objectives and methodology were determined by the author with the cooperation and guidance of DCLM. This project is not intended to be a research paper of significant magnitude. Projects of this nature are willingly left up to the U. S. Army Research Institute (ARI). Command or organizational climates are extremely complex. This project will review current literature on command philosophy and its probable impact on command (organizational) climate. It provides an overview, covering the development, scope, complexity, problems, and value of having a philosophy which can establish a positive command climate. It draws upon current research, doctrine, and theories of leadership. It views command climate from the perspectives of the soldier, the commander, and the unit itself. The author of this project elected to pursue this study based upon his experience as an infantry commander from company through battalion and his assignments as an Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer (OESO), first in the 5th Infantry Division (Mech) and second, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

I am grateful to my faculty advisor, COL Mike Sierra; COL Mike Plummer, ADC-S 10th Mountain Division (Light); the Infantry Training Center, Ft Benning; the 197th Infantry Brigade (Mech)(Sep), Ft Benning; the 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger), Ft Benning; MGs William Carpenter and Kenneth C. Leuer (Ret); the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks; and lastly, the outstanding soldiers of the 2th Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment (Golden Dragons), 10th Mountain Division (Light), who made my command experience so positive and rewarding.

Masculine pronouns are used throughout, but they refer to both men and women. The following pairs of terms are used interchangeable: commander and leader, philosophies of command and of leadership, unit and organization.

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COMMAND PHILOSOPHY: THE SECRET TO ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The only prize much cared for by the powerful is power.
The prize of the general is not a bigger tent, but command.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

Building effective units and/or organizations requires more leadership than management, but smart management is also essential. Even though senior leaders have responsibilities for both immediate readiness and the future vitality of our Army, leaders at all levels must build motivation, confidence, and mutual trust within organizations --even in the face of horrendous personnel turbulence. Furthermore, the essence of the commander's job is not simply to solve individual problems in specific areas; rather, he must achieve some measure of integration between the many subsystems which form his command. This is the distinguishing characteristic of the command leadership role.

Nevertheless, commanders can provide the proper setting for innovative learning and consistently high productivity and performance of mission by designing open organizations in which participation and anticipation work together to extend the time horizons of decision-makers, broaden their prospectives, allow for the sharing of assumptions and values, and facilitate the development and use of new approaches. By learning as much as possible about its changing environment and where it seems to be

going, the organization can develop a sense of purpose, direction and desired future state. When this sense of direction and development is widely shared in the organization, the energies of all the members of the organization are aligned in a common direction. Each individual then knows how his or her own efforts contribute to the overall thrust.

Numerous studies have provided a variety of methods and techniques by which a commander can fine-tune an organization or unit to greatness. Every commander looks for an organization which is effective and successful in its mission. There is considerable consensus on the need for professional knowledge, good management of resources, and oral and written communications skills. Likewise, there is strong agreement about the attributes of a good leader to make his unit organizationally effective: through cooperation, force, morality, ethics, courage, responsibility, and looking after the welfare of subordinates. However, there has been little research on how to align the "boss-subordinate" relationship. In other words, what does the commander do after he or she says, "I intend to establish a positive command environment." How does he know when he has done it? How are leaders and followers bonded? Is there a method or strategy which helps to build trust and loyalty? And is there one which can "open an organization up" in terms of communications flow? And how are trust and confidence developed between leaders and followers? Finally, how does everyone get in step with the "beat of the drummer?" Broadly speaking, is there a management technique available to capture the energies of an organization?

Two important documents recently published by the Army, FM 22-103 and DA Pamphlet 600-80, focus on leadership in organizations. Both documents highlight the special skills and insights required for leaders at

brigade and higher levels. The documents address command climate sparingly; they indicate that climate is relevant because senior leaders shape it through both direct and indirect application of their leadership. Secondly, only a sentence or two provide guidance for command philosophy and its development. Therefore, the publications fall short of their intended purpose in the preparation of senior leaders to assume these demanding positions. The Army has not yet attacked the issue of establishing healthy, positive command climates, even though unit evaluations indicate that it leads to combat readiness. Finally, the Army's senior leaders are not provided skills for diagnosing, creating, and maintaining the necessary climate for sustained excellence.

Consequently, the Army accepts an enormous range of command and control styles, even as it attempts to lend some consistency to the new concepts of AirLand Battle doctrine. Unfortunately, many of these styles impact negatively on units. By neglecting a means for establishing command climate, the Army fails to capitalize on its critical combat multiplier: its people. We have sufficient information to indicate that Army units are not productive at the standards of AirLand Battle doctrine (e. g., information from the national training centers).¹ The Army needs improved leadership doctrine for command climates which encourage initiative, creativity, and innovation. In fact, the Army even has difficulty in this area with other nonunits, such as installation staffs and command and control headquarters.

What are the critical tenets of an effective command philosophy? How will such a philosophy establish a healthy, positive command climate? How will such a climate promote growth, productivity, and cohesion in a unit? Matured teams within organizations leads to combat readiness. An articulated command philosophy based on critical elements of essential

information establishes a healthy, positive command climate which, in turn, impacts significantly on team development (organizational leadership). The purpose of the study, therefore, is to examine the management tool commonly known as "command or leadership philosophy." It will discuss its purpose, its application, and its linkage to command climate. It will review the concept and content of command philosophy. Then it will develop a model applicable to organizational or team leadership. Finally, it will recommend a format which captures the significant aspects of a philosophy based on current leadership concepts and/or theories. The study includes a literature search, a random analysis of existing command philosophies, and an analysis of survey data from a competent experienced leadership base.

¹U. S. Army Center for Leadership; Proceedings, Third Annual Leadership Research Conference, pp. 1-36.

CHAPTER II

COMMAND PHILOSOPHY: HOW MEANINGFUL?

To do our fellow men the most good in our power,
we must lead where we can, follow where we cannot and still
go with them, watching the favorable moment for helping them
to another step.

Thomas Jefferson
1803

Command demands an intermeshing of personalities and circumstances--many of them unforeseen. So attempting to find specific characteristics or rules which can apply to all commanders in all situations is difficult. To command is to do more than carry out orders and apply rules and regulations to the ebb and flow of military administration. Rather command calls for innovation, spawned by a mission coupled with a clear set of professional values. Command ties organizational performance to both mission accomplishment and long-range vision. A philosophy of command is, therefore, an articulated set of guidelines or policies by which the leader sets forth "how" a unit will accomplish its mission in order to complete that vision.

In The Challenge of Command (1986) Roger Nye describes commanding a peculiarly military act, rarely undertaken in civilian pursuits where power is customarily more diffused. He also says;

To command is to direct with authority; to command a military organization is to think and make judgements, employing specialized knowledge and deciding what those

commanded will and will not do. To command in wartime is to assume responsibility for taking and saving human lives. To command in peace and war is to direct how human beings will conduct themselves towards each other. As such, the commander sets moral standards and sees that they are obeyed. To command, therefore, is to think and decide, to feel and moralize, to act and wield power.¹

FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels (1987), identifies command as one of four processes: control, leadership and management being the three others.² Further, the FM states that command is the primary means whereby vision is imparted to the organization. From a command perspective, the element of analysis is the organization. In other words, command is the world of perspective and timely action. Its characteristics include:

1. Well-formed vision and clearly communicated intent;
2. Clearly understood goals and objectives;
3. Quality, low-volume communications throughout the command;
4. Concept expression of tasks;
5. Emphasis on success and rewards;
6. Focus on the future; and
7. Timely involvement to insure results.³

For commanders to be successful and lead organizations to excellence, they must have a vision of where they plan to take the unit. LTG Walter Ulmer (Ret) first outlined the concept of vision in 1979 when he commanded III Corps, Ft Hood:

Vision comes first. The essence of a general's job is to assist in developing a clear sense of purpose...To keep the junk from

getting in the way of important things.⁴

Robert Nye similarly observes in The Challenge of Command (1986) that:

The vision of one's self as a military commander makes sense only for those who yearn to attain and exercise power. Military command requires a concentration of power in one --power begotten by unusual legal ordination and energized by the will of a person to wield that power.⁵

In Taking Charge (1985) Perry Smith indicates the significance of a statement personal philosophy, stressing the importance of the mission and the leader's personal commitment to keeping the mission as the top priority for the organization. He also believes a leader should not only write and speak about the importance of the mission; he must also become personally involved in the unit's quest. If a leader is a president or dean of a college or university, that leader also should teach--not only to demonstrate a personal commitment to the goals of the institution, but to have direct interface with the students, staff, and faculty. Teaching, as Smith sees it, is a good way "to maintain an awareness of the bureauractic and administration problems that the faculty is facing relating to course development, syllabus development, etc."⁶ He also states that great senior leaders of this time have been not only effective operators and decisionmakers, but also people of vision who have had "a marvelous sense of what was possible, how to set and articulate goals, and how to motivate their people to strive."⁷

In Love'em and Lead'em (1987) Paul Malone discusses leadership philosophy and its significance to an organization. He sees each leader as a complex person... distinct and different from every other person. As Malone indicates, "Unless a leader has no power at all his/her uniqueness will influence the working environment and, thus, the subordinates' lives."⁸ When

subordinates have no idea of the leader's preferences, priorities, methods or goals, they could work in the dark. As Malone notes, "Working in the dark is obviously both unproductive and dangerous."⁹

After studying the command philosophies of over fifty senior Army officers, COL Duane Lempke's study on Command Climate: The Rise and the Decline of a Military Concept (1988) concludes that the most frequent means used to implement the commander's vision was a "command philosophy" letter.¹⁰ Most commanders, as Lempke points out, also include specific goals and objectives in their annual and/or quarterly training guidance. Several other means may achieve this purpose of articulating those qualities a commander feels are most important to him: goals and objectives lists, priority and directive lists, and particular creeds.¹¹

Futhermore, Lempke's review of twenty-seven 1987 command philosophy memorandums and letters from four divisional size units in the United States provides some thoughtprovoking data. Over sixty percent of these commanders, all graduates of the Army's Pre-Command Course (PCC) within the preceding three years (1985-1988), associated a positive climate to that of a published command philosophy. Typical comments ranged from, "The enclosed command philosophy is a formal statement of how I view the world in terms of the command climate" to "It is my intent to cultivate a command climate which is consistent and predictable and allows subordinate leaders to focus energy on the things which are important. Once established this climate will do much for the ability of leaders to think, decide, and act independently."¹² For all that, Lempke did not analyze the command philosophies in much detail. He was merely interested in whether or not command climate was used in a commander's command philosophy letter or memo. Nevertheless, his research did indicate the significance and

relationship of command philosophy to command climate, noting the role of the commander in the process.

Excel Net Concept Papers, Volume II (1986) on command philosophy indicate that the best way to go about organizational leadership is "to develop and communicate a command philosophy."¹³ MAJ Jim Robinson declares that a command philosophy is "a place one can go when one is psychologically lost, afraid, or confused. It is a place where one can stand and say these are the things I believe and stand for. And these things I will not stand for."¹⁴

An Army War College study by Dr. June Moss, Can The Climate of an Organization Be Modified and Managed to Ensure Organizational Excellence? (1988), concludes by indicating that the commander must initiate the change [in an organization] by having "a vision concerning his command, the interaction among his subordinates, and the kind of perception he wants his subordinates to have of his leadership. He can do this because he has the power to lead his organization toward excellence,"¹⁵ Moss' conclusions closely parallel those of Malone , Smith, and Lempke.

COL Mike Plummer's article "Winning in Command" (1987), emphasizes the importance of a written command philosophy. Plummer indicates "ten years" worth of research, studies, interviews, discussions, and analysis of command climate surveys convinces him the answer is not in our selection process (for successful commanders). Very simply, for Plummer, successful commanders are those with "a well-developed command philosophy and a vision of what they want their units to be."¹⁶ Plummer strongly endorses the concept of a mandatory written command philosophy in the Army's Officer Efficiency Report (OER) support form. Plummer concludes his article by asserting that a commander must provide

a strong sense of direction (vision) Otherwise, he may never impact positively on his unit:

Command to me was like being in a mail sack hanging on a RR pick-up post. The train came by, snatched me up and threw me into the mail car. Two years later, I found myself hanging from another post. I don't know where the train went in the meantime, only that I was on it.¹⁷

At the Army's Pre-Command Course (PCC), Ft. Leavenworth, a four hour block of instruction provides the students with an overview of senior-level leadership doctrine. They also examine how to create the proper unit climate for leadership and ethical development of their subordinates. Introductory remarks by the Director, Center for Army Leadership, are followed by small group work sessions of one and one-half hours each: the first focuses on leader and unit development and the second on professional Army ethics.¹⁸ The small groups are comprised of PCC students designated for similar commands and/or units: combat arms, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Forces Command (FORSCOM), combat and combat service support. These groups are facilitated by the Center for Army Leadership instructors, but the thrust of the work group sessions is to encourage students to share their experiences and ideas. For this reason, LTCs and COLs are mixed together in the groups. Two of the six learning objectives focus on the role of unit climate in leader and unit development and the function and content of a command philosophy. Questions discussed in the sessions include: Do you intend to issue a command philosophy? Written or Verbal? What issues would you cover in your philosophy if you publish one? Students carry away from the work group session what they

believe will be useful. There is no pressure. Further, when they assume their respective commands, they have no obligation to publish a philosophy.

On the other hand, the Leadership Branch at the Army Infantry School, Ft Benning, provides a written handout on team-building to its Infantry Pre-command Course attendees. The document indicates that goals, objectives, standards must be communicated to every soldier; it advocates the use of the chain of command, bulletin boards, unit formations, written command philosophy, periodic meetings to get the word out to each and every soldier.¹⁹ Yet, no format is mentioned, nor are officers informed about what other critical information needs to be articulated by the leader. Other branch pre-command courses follow a similar methods of operation.

Finally, Tom Peters and Nancy Austin in the best-selling A Passion for Excellence (1985) conclude that successful visions are realistic and within grasp. The most effective leaders from all walks of life --the classroom, the battlefield, the corporation -- have set down challenging but achievable visions. For example, Bernard Montgomery and George Patton, two distinguished military leaders, inherited dispirited armies in North Africa. Both began their campaign by focusing on internal discipline - housekeeping, uniform maintenance, physical fitness. Their avowed objective was to teach their soldiers that they were winners and could accomplish many difficult things. Nothing is more demoralizing and ultimately useless than an unachievable vision, according to Peters and Austin. The visions of Montgomery and Patton, as the authors demonstrate, were articulated to their soldiers by way of a leadership or command philosophy.²⁰ But as the authors emphasize, realism must prevail as a leader builds his unit's expectations.

The most productive expenditure of a commander's time is that devoted to explaining the mission, defining subordinate responsibilities, clarifying standards, and formulating a vision. Leaders who exercise such a perspective, nesting their day-to-day activities within it, are men of vision; excellent organizations are always led by such visionaries. In an article from Organizational Dynamics, "The Purpose of High Performing Systems," Peter Vail identifies four elements of change that particularly demand a clear sense of vision:

1. Environmental demands and opportunities;
2. Organizational member needs, expectations, abilities, and values;
3. Technology; and
4. The impact of reorganization itself.²¹

Today's Army leaders must deal with all four of these elements of change. The requirements of AirLand Battle doctrine and its follow-up concepts results are responses to from changing environmental demands. To prepare tomorrow's leaders for such a battle, with its focus on creativity and initiative, leaders must reorient themselves from conventional or safe behavior to one which embraces the four tenets of AirLand Battle: initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization.

So review of current literature clearly reveals that the major contribution of leaders toward building a healthy and productive command climate at unit level is to provide a coherent, predictable, nonhectic

environment within which the unit commander has the time and energy to be a leader. Effective training and maintaining are mostly the products of individual motivation and are not substained through rigid managerial techniques. However, the leader who understands what a command philosophy is and how it should be used in an organizational setting will establish the tone in the unit and promote productivity.

In sum, the Army community generally acknowledges a close relationship of command philosophy and command climate. Further, the literature indicates that a command philosophy has the effect of creating a negative or positive command climate. Just because a leader publishes a command philosophy does not necessarily mean that the climate will be positive. Certainly, the leader's behavior to and his philosophy must be congruent. There are no clear-cut philosophical definitions; however, there is significant agreement that command philosophy reveals is how one views the organization from his perspective and where he wants the organization to be in "X" number of months or years. As the following chapters will illustrate, there is substantial evidence that this philosophy must be articulated to the members of the organization to make a unit effective in terms of mission accomplishment. This technique is, indeed, meaningful; an organization needs a compass heading. Subordinates need to know what is expected of them. And finally, part of leading a large, complex organization is motivating people to accomplish mission-oriented tasks with verve, imagination, initiative, and purpose.

¹Roger Nye, The Challenge of Command, p. 19.

²U S Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-103, p. 19.

³Ibid., p. 43.

⁴LTG Walter Ulmer Jr (Ret), "The Army's New Leadership Doctrine," Parameters, December 1987, p. 10.

- ⁵Nye, p. 31.
- ⁶Perry M. Smith, Taking Charge, p. 164.
- ⁷Ibid., p. 33.
- ⁸Paul Malone, Love'em and Lead'em, p. 149.
- ⁹Ibid., p. 155.
- ¹⁰COL Duane Lempke, Command Climate: The Rise and the Decline of a Military Concept, pp. 45-57.
- ¹¹Ibid., p. 55.
- ¹²Ibid., p. 56.
- ¹³LTC Mike Mgee, Excel Net Concept Papers, Volume II, p. 12.
- ¹⁴Ibid., p. 15.
- ¹⁵June Moss, Can the Climate of an Organization Be Modified and Managed to Ensure Organizational Excellence, p. 15.
- ¹⁶COL Mike Plummer, "Winning in Command," Military Review, March 1987, p. 80.
- ¹⁷Ibid., p. 81.
- ¹⁸U S Army Command and Staff College, "Leader and Unit Development," Pre-Command Course Advance Sheet, April 1988, pp. 1-3.
- ¹⁹U S Army Infantry School, Pre-Command Course Advance Sheets, Leadership Division POI, October 1987, p. 3.
- ²⁰Tom Peters and Nancy Austin, A Passion For Excellence, p. 286.
- ²¹Peter Vail, "The Purpose of High Performing Systems," Organizational Dynamics, Autumn 1982, p. 24.

CHAPTER III

COMMAND (ORGANIZATIONAL) CLIMATE: WHAT IS IT? HOW IMPORTANT IS IT?

Caring means fostering a command climate where people are challenged, where they feel their contributions make a difference, and where they feel good about themselves and the Army they serve.

General John Wickham
Former CSA
March 1985

The introductory letter in Reference Book (RB) 22-5 declares, "Command climate sets the tone in an organization and either enhances or impedes its ability to perform at its maximum potential. A healthy, positive command climate is characterized by the visible commitment of all organizational members to established standards."¹ In fact, the essence of this commitment lies in the fostering of an atmosphere of mutual respect and human dignity which is observable throughout the organizational leadership. For a commander to be successful as well as effective, he must understand what an organizational climate is and how best to manage the dimensions. Our first task is to appreciate the relationship between a leader's philosophy and his unit's "climate." In this discussion, organizational leadership means the same thing as team leadership.

LTG Walter Ulmer (Ret), now the president of the Center of Creative Leadership in Greensboro, North Carolina, is credited with having developed the first dimensions of an organizational climate. Early in 1982, the Army Chief of Staff, General E. C. Meyer, gave the newly promoted LTG Ulmer the

task of emphasizing the human and leadership goals (HLG) for III Corps and Ft Hood. LTG Ulmer put together a staff which analyses command climates at various posts and installations. Efforts were made to create the appropriate leadership and organizational climate at all levels for the implementation of the AirLand Battle doctrine. This group discovered that to build a positive command climate it was necessary that the unit environment contain trust, consistency, simplicity, and productive stress. The heart of the process was discipline which was defined as "the ability to take responsibility for one's self in adherence to the organizational rules and guidelines."²

FIGURE 1
DIMENSIONS OF COMMAND CLIMATE³

1. Command trust- allowing individuals to make common sense decisions and learn from their mistakes.
2. Organization's consistency-not to let behavior, communications, and measurements conflict with announced priorities.
3. Organization's simplicity-efforts to reduce the efforts of the bureaucratic structure in simplifying or eliminating regulations, meetings, records, and feedback mechanisms.
4. Command stress-reducing inconsistent and overstated priorities and practices that produce dysfunction, uncertainty, and anxiety.

Command climate also became a focal point at TRADOC when the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Ft Leavenworth, published FM 22-100, Military Leadership. For the first time, the climate concept appeared in an Army field manual of any type. FM 22-100 explains to leaders that their job is "to create a climate in which the soldier feels secure."⁴ Soldiers complaining outside their chains of command, for example, are a strong

indicator of a negative command climate, as the FM suggests. Leaders, therefore, must develop climates in which soldiers rely on their chains of command for valid complaints, perceived injustice, or threats.⁵ In this manner, as the FM maintains, leaders can "get soldier assistance on developing a healthy leadership climate that is conducive to feedback."⁶ As the FM concludes, leadership and climate are inseparable. They are linked by communications, horizontal and vertical, within an organization. "Leadership and communications," as the manual proposes, "bring soldiers, doctrine, organizations, equipment, and weapons together, resulting in a perceived identity and purpose by all members of the organization which obviously manifests itself in command climate."⁷ In short, properly implemented by a leader, a healthy climate can prevail, conducive to morale, cohesion, and teamwork--all of which impact of combat readiness.

Further, a command climate case study in the Reference Book (RB) 22-5, Command Climate, outlines specific programs falling under the umbrella of command climate. It offers a broader more long range, effective method of dealing with contemporary leadership issues. It confronts complex social problems, such as sexual harassment, drug and alcohol abuse, and racial disharmony. Specifically, the case study proposes "command climate as the atmosphere or environment created within an organization by a commander and his chain of command through their exercise of leadership."⁸ The definition is obviously targeted at the unit's senior leaders; it also encompasses virtually every aspect of leadership in the unit's daily functions: training, maintaining, and caring for soldiers. If anything over the last few years has made "command" climate controversial and suspect, it is this publication. Most senior Army leaders believe the concept of command climate as outlined is too broad in nature.

Perhaps one of the better written documents on military organizations over the last 20 years, MAJ Jerry Simonsen and CPTs Frandsen and Hoopengardner's Excellence in the Combat Arms (1984), identifies "eight pillars" of excellence in combat units. Heavily influenced by the Peters and Waterman's best seller, In Search of Excellence (1982), these military officers, through well-documented search, have tied command climate to units of excellence. The writers observed particularly outstanding command climates in the units they visited, wherein daily operations were decentralized through a "power down" concept.⁹ In the authors' eyes, the implementation of "power down" concepts in a unit is conducive to a healthy, positive command climate. What is interesting, however, is the commander's influence on the climate. Effective climate control, therefore, leads to successful units.

A 1985 Army War College study Brigade Pillars of Excellence, written by COLs Nicholas Turchiano and James Cass with LTCs Lawson McGruder and Huey Scott, applied the methodology of the Excellence in Combat Arms at the brigade level: power down, in other words, meant "an excellent command climate all the way up and down the chain; and it meant that subordinates were trusted and allowed to grow professionally."¹⁰ The study also highlights the importance climate plays on readiness, asserting that the commander can regulate the climate by articulating his philosophy of leadership to the unit's membership.

In September 1985, Field Circular 25-100 provided Army commanders with a standardized system for training soldiers, units, and their leaders. It described the structure for training a force or a unit to execute its mission effectively to win the AirLand Battle. Strongly endorsing the command climate concept, the circular discusses a winning training philosophy, one

of six discrete distinguishable training systems. For the first time training was linked with command climate, but the FC fell short of prescribing to commanders how the climate could be regulated:

A critical component of a winning philosophy is the establishment of a healthy command climate based on fixing responsibility while underwriting honest mistakes of commission. Accentuating the positive and learning from mistakes must be the spirit inculcated throughout the organization. This organizational attribute will foster the latitude required for a total team effort from sergeant to general. A positive command environment is established when there is a climate of trust and confidence shared by competent leaders.¹¹

Further, LTG Robert M. Elton (Ret.), the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in 1985, highlighted the significance of command climate in an assessment which appeared in the Army's Green Book, "Catalyst for Improvement of Unit Command Climate." LTG Elton identifies three unique aspects of leadership in an organization: vision, communication, and climate.¹² These unique aspects represent a commander, as Elton explains. He concludes, "By assessing climate, the commander charts his progress on the map or vision,"¹³

In July 1986, LTG Walter Ulmer (Ret) published "Leaders, Managers, and Command Climate," in the Armed Forces Journal International. In the article LTG Ulmer emphasizes the importance of the Army creating "credible standard methods for measuring and improving the command climate. We are not uniformly as good as we can and must be because we have imprecise studies and randomly supervised concepts for building and sustaining a climate."¹⁴ LTG Ulmer went on to list eight contributing elements which in practice would lead to a healthy command climate. Furthermore, he states "it

is time to decide that one type of climate is conceptually better than another, and then take steps to teach, coach, test, measure, and construct that type, and demand that commanders deliver the goods."¹⁵ LTG Ulmer also strongly implies that a commander controls the healthy aspects of a climate by what he shares about how he will lead the organization.

LTC Cecil B. Calloway at the Center of Creative Leadership, Ft Leavenworth, in a Military Review article, "Leadership Imperatives (1987)," outlines seven "key leadership imperatives and ten enabling tasks" for success in command.¹⁶ He asks as a critical task the importance of developing a climate of trust and confidence. LTC Calloway also supports LTG Ulmer's belief that trust is built and sustained by combining effective direct leadership with a sense of the totality of operating values and systems. Calloway also indicates that a positive command climate is orchestrated by the commander's articulated philosophy.¹⁷

After five years of articles and numerous research efforts focused on command climate and leadership, the Army published FM 22-103. Leadership and Command at Senior Levels in June 1987. It acknowledges direct leadership skills, indirect leadership concepts, and fundamentals critical to building organizational teams--not to mention the command climate concept. The manual finds command climate as a "shared feeling, perception among the members of a unit about what life is like."¹⁸ The FM further maintains that perception is based on the soldier's understanding of how they will be treated, whether the leadership cares about them personally and professionally, and what professional opportunities they see within command. Furthermore, the manual states "senior leaders and commanders have a responsibility to establish a command climate that is fair and challenges the organization to do its best."¹⁹ The FM holds the commander

directly responsible for command climate; however, it fails to amplify the dimensions of a climate or indicate the key issues which should be addressed in a command philosophy. And it does not establish a relationship between climate and an articulated philosophy. LTG Ulmer sums it up best in his Parameters review of FM 22-103:

If there is one thing in need of repair within the crucial human domain of the Army, it is that decisive but mucky element known as "organizational climate." Climate, like leadership, is more easily felt than defined. Climate represents the collective impact of policies, expectations, priorities, operating values, management techniques, and leadership styles on motivation to get the job done right.²⁰

Ulmer sees the significant problem with the command climate concept as lack of awareness and acceptance of it by commanders and senior level officers. Since FC 25-100 acknowledges a healthy command climate as a critical component of a winning philosophy and FM 22-103 states a healthy ethical climate has a direct bearing on readiness, then what remains is to recognize the potential of a positive command climate: A command philosophy sets the tone for a command climate. How the philosophy is articulated and to what depth it is understood within the organization determines whether or not the climate will be positive or negative. As Ulmer argues, the FM is flawed because it fails to attack the issue of command climate head on.

N. L. Grunstad's, "The Total Army Leadership Goal: Where We Are," in James Hunt and John Blair's, Leadership on the Future Battlefield (1985) provides a similar viewpoint. It outlines three categories of long range objectives for commanders: systems, doctrine and training, and climate. The

important determinant of climate, he argues, is the commander. He concludes by indicating that "research on the impact of climate has shown that, regardless of how it is operationally defined, it does influence performance. Communication is central to much of this research on the impact of climate."²¹ Grunstad sheds some more light on the study of climates: "Leaders at all levels truly believe in and act upon the Army ethic and the philosophy of empowering."²² In short, leaders must understand that the change is in their own best interests and for the good of the organization.

In Volume II, Excel Net Concept Papers (Nov 85-Apr 86), "Lessons-learned from the 1985 Year of Leadership", LTC Michael McGee's research suggests that command climate is "a responsibility of the systems leader; however, all leaders play a part in setting the climate."²³ He further states that the reason is because climate is values-based and behaviorally manifested by leaders at all levels. McGee outlines a command climate model as well as the organizational and interpersonal dimensions which incorporate the current research on organizational climates. He notes significantly that "organizational climates can be effectively regulated by working the variables or dimensions, and the commander has the power to do it."²⁴ In Figure Two McGee identifies what he believes are the dimensions of command climate. Finally, he indicates that systems leadership includes not only creating climate but setting the vision, designing interdependencies, and establishing information systems.

FIGURE 2
COMMAND CLIMATE DIMENSIONS²⁵

Organization
Dimensions

Interpersonal
Dimensions

- | | |
|---------------------------|---|
| 1. Leadership focus | 11. Leader's style |
| 2. Focus of operations | 12. Your needs |
| 3. Unit goals | 13. Leader's motivation |
| 4. Leader's priorities | 14. Leader's behavior |
| 5. Purpose of work | 15. Feedback |
| 6. Method of change | 16. Your attitude toward others |
| 7. In-unit competition | 17. Your self concern |
| 8. Personnel turnover | 18. Leader's attitude toward initiative |
| 9. Focus of planning | 19. Leader's attitude toward conflict |
| 10. Demands on leadership | 20. Leader's focus on development |

Recently, the Army Research Institute (ARI) and the Center for Army Leadership analyzed the performance of units at the National Training Center (NTC), Ft Irwin, California, through the observations of the Observer-Controllers (OCs). They are in an excellent position to see what determines successful performance of combat units. Findings developed by MAJs Jim Endicott and Earl Pierce in NTC Leadership Lessons Learned, indicate that "leaders with characteristics required for the AirLand Battlefield must develop in a annual climate which allows leaders to take the initiative and to act creatively within the constraints of the commanders' intent. The inevitable mistakes that occur in training are seen as opportunities to learn lessons which can then be applied to to the battlefield."²⁶ The OCs declare

that such a positive command climate does not exist in many units which rotate through the twenty- one day cycle. In short, positive command climates create effective units and vice-versa.

Endicott and Pierce findings in NTC Leadership Lessons Learned are also supported by the Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS), which in 1983 suggested that the Army still had a major challenge in developing a command climate supportive of innovation and initiative by leaders. The PDOS survey notes:

Command climate needs continuing attention by leaders at all levels to achieve a cultural change of the officer corps...More time should be spent thinking about how to better establish a development oriented climate ...officers must ...practice more frequently a teaching and caring style of leadership ... In units, commanders control the climate.²⁷

Consequently, the NTC and PDOS studies only confirm several previous studies, analyses, and speculations. The 1979 Army War College study on "Officer Professionalism" also concludes that an organizational climate of the unit is clearly established by "the boss." A follow-on study done by COL Tilden Reid, a student at the AWC in 1984, asked 110 former battalion commanders to evaluate their brigade commanders. A summary of some of the key findings below isolates a problem which has not improved much since the survey:

- 33 percent of the respondents believed their commanders were overly ambitious at the expense of subordinates and the unit;
- 36 percent believed their commanders' desire for personal success detracted from readiness; and

-- 53 percent believed their commanders oversupervised (micro-managed) in areas they deemed important.²⁸

COL Reid's survey results obviously seriously indict command climate and many commanders' inability to establish a healthy, positive environment through the effective use of articulated command philosophies. Whether changes have occurred in the Army since 1984 to sensitize commanders to their impact on organizational dynamics is subject to an endless debate. This author's search of the literature, however, does not indicate any major shifts.

Finally, COL Duane Lempke's Army War College study on command climates also has attempted to isolate the numerous definitions available in the literature on climates. His research surfaced eleven different definitions:

FIGURE 3 COMMAND CLIMATE DEFINITIONS²⁹

1. A set of attributes which can be perceived about a particular organization and/or its subsystems, and that may be induced from the way the organization and/or its subsystems deal with the members and environments (Hellriegel and Slocum, 1984).
2. Organizational climate is the combined perceptions of the individuals that are useful in differentiating organizations according to their procedures and practices (Muchinsky, 1983).
3. Command climate is defined as the atmosphere or environment created within an organization by a commander or his chain of command through their exercise of leadership

(RB 22-5, 1983)

4. Climate is the sum total of what an experienced soldier feels or senses when he goes into a new unit, listens and looks around awhile, and then judges whether the unit is worth a damn, can do its job, and will take care of its people (Malone, 1985).

5. Command climate is the atmosphere or the environment of a unit in which things go on (TC 22-9-2, 1986).

6. Command climate is the atmosphere of leadership in the organization (TC 22-9-3, 1986).

7. Forces Command defines command climate as command trust, organizational consistency, organizational simplicity, stress management, and discipline (Hoopengardner, 1986).

8. A command climate is defined by the shared perceptions of unit members about the quality of leadership within their units. Such quality includes both affective or expressive and effective instrumental components (Viatkus, 1987).

9. Command climate is a shared feeling, a perception among the members of a unit about what life is like (FM 22-103, 1987).

10. Command climate is considered to be the corporate culture set by an Army leader in charge of a unit at any level (Siebold and Kelly, 1987).

11. Climate represents the collective impact of policies, expectations, priorities, operating values, management techniques, and leadership styles on motivation to get the job done right (Ulmer, 1987).

What is particularly noteworthy about these definitions is the focus on the commander. He is the one singled out as responsible for a negative or positive climate. Most importantly, the definitions also reflect the effort to achieve a "singleness" of purpose in the units.

In conclusion, from the material examined in this chapter, setting command climates requires conscious, rational action. Leaders develop leaders, and staffs reinforce or destroy a command climate. A command climate can be created by the leader; he is the one who has the power, authority, and responsibility to create a climate where subordinates develop and the organization grows and produces.

Furthermore, only ten years ago the term "command climate" did not appear in the Army's manuals or publications. The new AirLand Battle doctrine has caused the Army to fine tune its leadership development system. A positive command climate is needed in order to enhance cohesion, combat effectiveness, and insure decentralization requisite for success on the battlefield. The Army's doctrine will simply not operate any other way. Positive command climates allow for subordinate development. A healthy command climate provides a catalyst for things to get done right. It is more than some combination of morale, cohesion, trust, confidence, and performance. It is rather a "synergistic" condition, one which is very powerful and extremely important to combat readiness. As we shall see, people working together for the same purposes produces optimal results.

¹U.S. Department of the Army, Reference Bulletin 22-5, December 1983, p. ii.

²LTG Walter F. Ulmer Jr., "Leaders, Managers, and Command Climate," Armed Forces Journal International, July 1986, p. 54.

³LTC Michael McGee, "Command Climate," Excel Net Concept Papers, Volume II, April 1986, p., 15.

⁴U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-100, p. 70.

⁵Ibid., p. 73.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., p.78.

⁸RB 22-5, p.6.

- ⁹Jerry A. Simonson, MAJ; Herbert L. Frandsen, CPT; David A. Hoopengardner, CPT; Excellence in the Combat Arms, p. 29.
- ¹⁰Nicholas J. Turchiano, COL; James M. Gass, LTC; Lawson W. Macgruder, III, LTC; Huey B. Scott, LTC; Excellence In Brigades, p. 8.
- ¹¹U.S. Department of the Army, Field Circular 22-100, pp. 1-5.
- ¹²LTG Robert M. Elton, "Catalyst for Improvement of Unit Command Climate," Army, p. 216.
- ¹³Ibid., p. 215.
- ¹⁴Ulmer, "Leaders, Managers, and Command Climate," p. 56.
- ¹⁵Ibid., p. 57.
- ¹⁶Cecil B. Calloway, LTC, "Leadership Imperatives," Military Review, November 1986, pp. 55-63.
- ¹⁷Ibid.
- ¹⁸U. S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-103, p. 10.
- ¹⁹Ibid., p. 12.
- ²⁰LTG Walter Ulmer Jr., "The Army's New Senior Leadership Doctrine," Parameters, December 1987, p. 11.
- ²¹James Hunt and John Blair, Leadership on the Future Battlefield, p. 233.
- ²²Ibid. p. 235.
- ²³Mike McGee, LTC, "Lessons Learned From the 1985 Year Of Leadership," Excel Net Concept Papers, Volume II, p. 15.
- ²⁴Ibid., p19.
- ²⁵Ibid., pp. 21-22.
- ²⁶Sam Endicott, MAJ and Earl Pierce, MAJ, "NTC Leadership Lessons Learned," NTC Observations, Ft Irwin, p. 25.
- ²⁷U. S. Department of the Army, Professional Development of Officers, Volume II-Survey, pp. 6-10.
- ²⁸U. S. Army War College, Study on Officer Professionalism (1982), pp. 1-23.
- ²⁹Lempke, pp. 46-49.

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP: FACT OR MYTH?

The number one managerial productivity problem in America is, quite simply, managers who are out of touch with their people and out of touch with their customers.

Tom Peters and Nancy Austin
A Passion For Excellence (1982)

Leadership is the process by which leaders provide "purpose, direction, and motivation to influence others to accomplish the mission of the organization."¹ Effective leaders use both direct and indirect influence to accomplish their mission. Leadership skills, may vary according to size and type of organization, but they are nonetheless requisite to the organization.

Furthermore, there is widespread agreement that leaders lead in different ways at different organizational levels, although the Army's principles of leadership are theoretically applicable. Leadership at lower levels is predominantly a personal process; at higher levels it becomes predominantly an indirect influence process, dependent on creating the conditions which allow lower level leaders to succeed. Junior level leaders accomplish missions and build teams primarily through face-to-face contact. As the scope and complexity of operations and missions increase at higher organizational levels, senior level leaders become increasingly concerned with building organizations. Leaders at every level, nevertheless, clarify standards and set the example.

Nonetheless, they are important to understand some of the major processess of organizational leadership and how it is influenced by effective leaders. Equally important is the role of climate, for teams do not develop unless the organizational climate is positive and healthy. Thus, this chapter will highlight current literature on team development and to examine the commander's part in making units effective. This chapter will as well explore the relationship between leadership and command climate.

DA Pamphlet 600-80, Executive Leadership, (June 1987) was written for senior flag officers commanding at corps, major commands (MACOMs) and above. This pamphlet approaches leadership through "The Leadership System" model. The model discusses the three different levels of leadership:

1. Indirect Executive Leadership: for Headquarters of the Army/ Field/Corps/MACOM commands;
2. Indirect Organizational Leadership: for Division/ Seperate Brigades/ Bdes / Schools/ Staff Directorates; and
3. Direct Leadership: for Battalions / Companies / School Divisions/Staff Sections.²

According to this pamphlet, the optimal "mix" of command and leadership skills varies in accord with the organizational level of the command. "Organizational leadership", for example, "involves a mixture of direct, staff-aided, delegated 'output' but indirect leadership replaces direct leadership with subordinate units, even though there is a direct leadership relationship between the organizational commander and his subordinate leaders."³ Figure Four highlights these critical skills:

FIGURE 4
LEADERSHIP SKILLS AT THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL⁴

1. Integrating and coordinating staff functions.
2. Building teamwork among subordinate elements (As opposed to subordinate individuals).
3. Creating combat power (combat arms units) or productivity by integrating:
 - Tangibles (i. e., men, material, and expendables).
 - Intangibles (i. e., intelligence, intent, and command climate of the organization).
4. Mentoring, coaching, and teaching subordinate leaders, to provide a frame of reference both for learning direct skills and for upward growth...focusing forward ten years.

According to DA Pamphlet 600-80, executive leadership skills are built on a foundation of eight direct and indirect organizational skills. The fifth indirect skill significant by all for creation of "policies and principles of operation so positive command climate and cohesion can be created at lower levels."⁵ It is culture and values that share a relationship and impact on subordinate organizations. The pamphlet also defines any culture as "the body of beliefs members have about the organization and what it stands for, and their expectations of one another as members."⁶ If one replaces the "body of beliefs" with shared feelings and perceptions, this definition comes very close to ideas associated with command climate and a commander's philosophy.

Two additional points in DA Pamphlet 600-80 which contribute an understanding of organizational leadership are the first and second order effects on an organizational structure. The pamphlet states "first order

effects are direct effects on effectiveness and efficiency. It impacts on accountability even when it has been properly implanted by structure. Indirect second order effect, on the other hand, occurs primarily in the area of climate and socialization processes (acceptance of organizational values and norms) which collectively impact on organizational stability."⁷ Referring to organizational stability in relation to personal stability, the pamphlet concludes "over time, the climate of the organization will not only strongly influence the composition of its membership, but also its potential capabilities."⁸ In short, the pamphlet suggests that climate determines the behaviors of an organization's membership and that it can be regulated by the actions of senior leadership. Nevertheless, the pamphlet fails to prescribe techniques or methods to influence team development. Finally, there it posits no relationship between a healthy, positive command climate and team development.

FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, also explains organizational leadership but does not acknowledge direct leadership skills, indirect leadership concepts, and fundamentals critical to building organizational teams. Further, organizational teams are not even defined.⁹ It is also offers a different definition of leadership from that of DA PAM 66-80. The latter states leadership means "to achieve understanding and commitment of subordinates for the accomplishment of purposes, goals, and objectives envisioned by the leader, beyond that which is possible through the use of authority alone."¹⁰ FM 22-103, however, provides a somewhat different slant when it states "Leadership is the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the condition for sustained organizational success to achieve the desired result."¹¹ FM22-103 and DA PAM 600-80 do match up: they agree that direct leadership skills and

indirect leadership concepts are fundamental to building organizational teams.

FM 22-103 provides an important definition of command climate in the context of organizational leadership when it describes climate as "a shared feeling, a perception among the members of a unit about what life is like."¹² FM 22-103 also discloses that this perception is based on the soldiers' understanding of how they will be treated, whether the leadership cares about them personally and professionally, and what professional opportunities they see within the command. Furthermore, the manual concludes, "A senior leader and/or commander has a responsibility to establish a command climate that is fair and challenges the organization to do its best."¹³ Consequently, the leader's role is critical in establishing a healthy, positive command climate within the organizational leadership framework. Nonetheless, the manual is flawed because it fails to relate the importance of climate and its effect on the membership of the unit. There is also no mention of an articulated command philosophy. In sum, the manual offers no approaches for dealing with the development of teams in a unit or for sustaining growth.

Even so, LTG Walter Ulmer's (Ret) Parameters review of PA PAM 600-80 and FM 22-103 "The Army's New Senior Leadership Doctrine," asserts that he says "the publications hit a lot of nails on the head--from recognizing the tendency to overestimate the ability of senior headquarters to influence the echelons, to showing how the leader's discretionary limits of action vary consciously at each organizational level."¹⁴ Ulmer's comments again sheds light on the subject of organizational processess, for he indicates more effort is needed: "first, in the concept of understanding of cause and effect relationships within large and complex organizations when outcomes

are not reasonably discernible, as they are at the platoon or company level; and second, the concept of the cascading translation process, wherein organizational values, policies, and directives are routinely distorted or otherwise modified as they get communicated down through the successive rings of the hierarchy."¹⁵

Ulmer also expands upon the difficulties of securing a firm fix on what an organizational or command climate is and its impact on team development. As Ulmer argues, "Climate represents the collective impact of policies, management techniques, and leadership styles or motivation to get the job done right."¹⁶ Climate, as Ulmer senses it, relates closely to trust and confidence in the ultimate fairness and rationality of the larger organization. That is, command climate (or even culture) is relevant to organizational effectiveness because senior leaders shape the climate through both direct and indirect application of their leadership; organizational processes and/or behaviors are shaped by the type of climate.

Further, Army Regulation 600-100 (May 1987) recognizes multiple dimensions of leadership asserting various leadership qualities are appropriate at given levels of leadership.¹⁷ As leaders advance within the military profession they are confronted with greater organizational complexity, more interdependence, and increasing responsibility and authority. Commanders of units thus influence values by establishing and maintaining the climate of their units and by establishing sound organizational policies and practices. The organizational climate is "the sum of its philosophy and procedures for developing and using its human resources and its dominant leadership practices. The organization's climate has a profound effect on how it functions."¹⁸

In another article from Excel Net Concept Papers , LTC Michael McGee indicates leadership applies at multiple levels and these levels are nested within each other. He indicates that all leaders, especially those with short-term time horizons like sergeants, lieutenants, and captains, must be competent at the individual or direct level of leadership. This is "the reality of traits, attributes, competencies, values, and behaviors," says McGee, "and this is where we have traditionally concentrated our efforts to enhance leadership."¹⁹ McGee argues, however, that brigadier generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, and some captains generally operate at the organizational level of leadership. According to McGee, at the organization level the frame of reference is concerned with "forging interdependencies and teamwork and metabolizing information."²⁰ These leaders understand that organizations are matter and energy organized by information, concludes McGee. Information, therefore, moves organizations. How a leader gathers, processes, and shares information determines his metabolism. Leaders at this level, McGee proposes, add these "organizational leadership tasks to leadership tasks they held at the individual level of leadership."²¹

The most senior leaders of the Army are concerned with the leadership of complex systems and subsystems. These executive level leaders add two very significant task areas to responsibilities they held as junior leaders. The first is to give purpose to the organization, that is, give the organization direction and priorities.²² "This usually manifests itself in the specification of desired organization end-states....a vision of what the organization should look like in its steady state," concludes McGee.²³ The second additional task for systems (executive) level leaders, according to McGee, is setting the command climate. They do this by behaviorally "manifesting stated organizational values and providing a sense of

rationality that allows leaders to develop and the organization to grow in productivity."²⁴ McGee closes out his assessment of level leadership by indicating command climate is a responsibility of the organizational (team) systems leader; however, all leaders play a part in setting the climate, because according to McGee, climate is "values-based and behaviorally manifested by leaders at all levels."²⁵

Chapter V, "Senior Command" from the Army War College's Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice (1988-1989), points out a common distinction that leadership is more an organizational than rather a personal quality. "The idea of leadership as an organizational function stresses the requirements of organizations and of leadership situations. It leads one to look at the kinds of actions which fill these requirements. On the other hand, leadership as a personal quality refers to a special combination of personal characteristics.

It leads one to look at qualities and abilities of individuals."²⁶ Further, "A systems view of organization recognizes the mutual interdependencies of various structure effects and is effected by the objectives of the command. It is the interrelation of these elements that constitutes the total pattern of organization, which is what the commander is attempting to influence."²⁷ This chapter concludes with comments on organizations: First, synthesis and integration, rather than analysis and differentiation, are paramount at higher organization levels. Second, maintaining a future orientation is central to setting an appropriate vision for an organization, and creating the future depends in large part upon one's corresponding day-to day orientation around a future vision.²⁸

In a Military Review article , "Eliminate the Filters and Win," LTC Allan Futernick provides more understanding of what organizational leadership is

when he explains that cohesion is based on shared values. As he defines it, "A shared value system provides the foundation for linking members of an organization. Cohesion is more likely to exist within a unit if it's functional rather than dysfunctional to the Army's mission. If each soldier had the same value system and if this value system is the same as the Army's then the attitudes within the any military unit would tend to be homogeneous, therefore contributing to greater unit cohesion and increasing the effectiveness of the unit to win the AirLand Battle."²⁹ The problem as Futernick argues, however, is that filtering processes are at work at each organizational level, eroding the potential of the Army's value system for creating cohesion and bonding within and among units. Futernick thinks the solution to this problem is "establishing the proper command climate; leaders must articulate their values which are in concert with their policies and procedures."³⁰ So Futernick's article strongly suggests that there is a significant cause and effect relationship among climate, organizational leadership, and leader philosophy: all must be congruent. However, it is when these facets are not aligned in thought and deed, units fail to achieve productivity. Finally, Futernick implies that military organizational leadership is heavily influenced by the quality of climate and the leader's style of doing business.

In a Military Review article "Organizations Values," MAJ Alan Wilgus also provides further evidence on the issue of organizational and individual leadership: entire organizations have values which are shaped by the environment. These may not always be explicit, but they exist nonetheless. "Values can be consciously determined," insists Wilgus, and "they can act as a powerful influence on organizational behavior. A common set of values is the starting point from which we calibrate our units in terms of purpose,

mission, goals, and performances objectives," Wilgus concludes.³¹ His point is that leaders must communicate values to the members of units and further that values must be commonly accepted by a unit's membership for the unit's tasks to get accomplished.

Edgar H. Schein wrote a fascinating book entitled Culture and Leadership (1985) which focuses on organizational culture and its unique relationship to the leadership process. He shows how cultural values become embedded and the dynamics needed for this to happen. Schein outlines a set of primary and secondary mechanisms for cultural embedding and reinforcement:

FIGURE 5
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MECHANISMS³²

Primary

1. What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control.
2. Leader reactions to critical incidents and organizational crises.
3. Deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching by leaders.
4. Criteria for allocation of rewards and status.
5. Criteria for recruitment, selection, promotion, retirement, and excommunication.

Secondary

6. The organization's design and structure.
7. Organizational system and procedures.

8. Design of physical space, facades, and buildings.
9. Stories, legends, myths, and parables about important events and people.
10. Formal statements of organizational philosophy, creeds, and charters.

Analyzing these mechanisms provides insights into the skills of organizational leadership. The degree of sophistication needed by leaders to achieve effectiveness is difficult to determine. Certainly, organizations are different; however, as Schein points out, by understanding the mechanisms one can control his organization or "leaders are able to embed their own assumptions in the on-going daily life of their organizations."³³ Through what they pay attention to and reward, through the role modeling they do, through the manner in which they deal with critical incidents, and through the criteria they use for recruitments, selection, promotion, and excommunication, leaders communicate both explicitly the assumptions they really hold."³⁴ If they are conflicted, concludes Schein, the conflicts and inconsistencies also become part of culture.

In "Often Forgotten Leadership Fundamentals," William Farrell brings into focus other aspects of organizational leadership worth mentioning. "Through experience plus development, the effective leader acquires the necessary skills to fashion a unit into a cohesive organization intent on fulfilling its stated goals(s)."³⁵ This task, he concludes, becomes significantly more difficult when the organization is large and complex, perhaps encompassing a membership of differing social strata, economic levels, and professional qualifications.³⁶ The successful leader must keep in mind the importance of socialization of a complex organization-- the

process whereby a new member learns the value system and norms of an organization. "If the leader's instructions and policy letters, for example, are read and understood in the organization but his behavior implies otherwise, then the example implicit in his behavior will be the prevailing socialization factor," argues Farrell.³⁷

Farrell insists that the perceptual process, the means by which people gather data and form ideas about the world around them, can be used to harmonize one's inner thought with the working environment. Recognition of the dissimilar perceptions throughout the organization is an essential component for achieving sound communication between the various echelons of an organization. This recognition also assures proper motivation for reaching the goals that organizational members view as a combination of their own and those of the larger social unit. "Intrinsic to the attainment of organizational goals," declares Farrell, "is the motivation and willingness of members to work toward accomplishment of the objectives."³⁸ This desire to achieve depends on the workers' beliefs that their personal fulfillment is somehow tied to the success of the organization as a whole, explains Farrell.³⁹

Finally, Farrell suggests socialization and perceptual processes are part and parcel of any organization--so fundamental that their impact is often taken for granted or overlooked. Farrell adds, "The development of an integrative personal strategy for leading complex organizations demands consideration of these concepts of harmony. Successful completion of the mission can therefore be realized."⁴⁰

Probably one of the better theories on organizations comes from Peter Vail's commentary on high-performing systems in 1978. An excellent human

system--a high-performing system (HPS) is an organization or group that meets one or more of the eight criteria developed by Vail (see Figure Six).

FIGURE 6
HIGH PERFORMING SYSTEM CRITERIA⁴¹

1. They are performing excellently against a known external standard.
2. They are performing excellently against what is assumed to be their potential level of performance.
3. They are performing excellently in relation to where they were at some earlier point in time.
4. They are judged by informed observers to be doing substantially better qualitatively than other comparable systems.
5. They are doing whatever they do with significantly less resources than it is assumed are needed to do what they do.
6. They are perceived as exemplars of the way to do whatever they do, and thus they become a source of ideas and inspiration for others.
7. They are perceived to fulfill at a high level the ideas for the culture within which they exist--that is, they have "nobility."
8. They are the only organizations that have been able to do what they do at all, even though it might seem that what they do is not that difficult or mysterious.

Teamwork in HPS is focuses on the task. Members will have discovered those aspects of system operations that require integrated actions and will

have developed behaviors and attitudes that fulfill these requirements. Leadership in HPSs is strong and clear. It is not ambivalent. There is no question of the need for initiative or of its appropriate source. Leadership style varies widely from HPS to HPS, but is remarkably consistent within a given HPS. Leadership style is never conflicted: It does not swing between cool and warm, close and distant, or demanding and laissez faire. Leaders are reliable and predictable. Motivation, as usually conceived, is always high. More important than energy level, however, is energy focus. In most HPSs, there is some sense of its operation analogous to a feeling of rhythm. Finally, HPSs are clear on their broad purposes and on near term objectives for fulfilling these purposes. They know why they exist and what they are trying to do. Members have pictures in their heads of their roles, tasks, and mission that are strikingly congruent.

Vail concludes the article with precise advice for a would-be leader: "Seek constantly to do what is right and what is needed in the system (focus). Do it in terms of your energy (time). Put your whole psyche into it (feeling)."⁴² This is the nominative lesson Vail derives from studying HPS leaders. It also says a great deal about organizational leadership and the impact of a leader's style. It also strongly endorses organizational leadership as, indeed, a process of synchronizing teams in order to achieve effectiveness.

COL Mike Malone (Ret) published an article in a series of TRADOC command letters in 1981 entitled "High Performing Units." He indicates HPS may provide for commanders and others with a better appreciation of "outstandingness" and a standard to shoot at; this makes it easier to measure and improve climate and unit performance.⁴³ Malone's indicators are classified into six categories:

1. The unit;
2. The soldiers;
3. The interaction between the soldier and their HPS;
4. The leadership;
5. The "US" attitude; and
6. The interface between soldier and his gear.⁴⁴

Unfortunately with COL Malone's retirement in 1982 coupled with the Army's phase out of the Organizational Effectiveness program in 1985, the importance of HPS as a concept for Army units had faded. Nonetheless, he offers a clear appreciation of the dynamics of organizational leadership and the leader's capability to control the processes. Also what is clear are the critical dimensions which interact to create effectiveness. Further, the interface of the leader with those of the various "groups" within a particular unit is readily apparent. HPS is really a refinement of team development or leadership teams at a very high level.

Hersey and Blanchard's work on situational leadership has provided an "official model" for leadership development, more or less accepted throughout the Army since the late 1970s. In their current book, Management of Organizational Behavior (1982), Hersey and Blanchard recognize that organizations are social systems comprised of many interrelated subsystems, only one of which is a human/social system. The others include an administrative/structural subsystem, informational/decision-making subsystem, and an economic /technological subsystem (see Figure Seven).⁴⁵ Although the focus of the human/social subsystem is on motivation and needs of the members of the organization and on the desirable leadership

within a systems approach there is a very clear understanding that changes in one subsystem impact other parts of the total system. Hersey and Blanchard indicate that systems and teams are very similar in concept and operations.⁴⁶ Organizational leadership, therefore, is a fluid process which is "influenced by the tone or climate within the system."⁴⁷ Figure Eight depicts the three organizational levels and the degree of organizational skills needed by leaders to be successful.

FIGURE 7
THE INTERRELATED SUBSYSTEMS OF AN ORGANIZATION⁴⁸




FIGURE 8
SKILLS AT THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEVELS⁴⁹

<u>ARMY LEVEL</u>	<u>SKILLS</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
corps & up	conceptual	systems ldship
division, bde	human/social	org'l ldship
battalions, co	technical	individual

In "Systems Leadership," from James Hunt and John Blair's Leadership on the Future Battlefield (1985), LTC Steve Clement restates in military terms the eight attributes of excellent organizations identified by Peters and Waterman's In Search of Excellence.

FIGURE 9
MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES⁵⁰

1. Active participation: Do it yourself until it works.
2. Responsiveness to the commander: Do whatever the commander needs done.
3. Power down: Cultivate initiative and the freedom to try.
4. Achievement through the efforts of others: The rank and file are the source of quality; reward it.
5. Excellence Performance: Be the best that you can be.
6. Adherence to the mission: Define the individual's mission in relation to the organization's mission.
7. Simple form, learn staff: Communicate to solve the problem without layers of staff or organizational charts which confuse communication.
8. Centralized planning, decentralized execution: Solve problems at the lowest possible level; planning originates at the top, but permeates at all levels.

Clement's study focuses on effective military organizations. He concludes that knowing the characteristics of successful organizations enables

leaders to develop leadership and/or managerial strategies to stimulate these attributes.

In summary, the ability to develop leadership teams as outlined in this chapter by such experts as Vail, Malone, Hersey, and Blanchard is critical to organizational success. Organizational leadership unifies teams; this serves to develop a single purpose or direction. While the Army has traditionally viewed leadership as an individual effort, AirLand Battle doctrine demands that it be viewed in terms of leadership teams. Leadership teams consist of the leader and those subordinates necessary for the organization to conduct unified planning and execution of operations. Leaders must develop leadership teams that exercise initiative and anticipate requirements of future operations. Units may fail because of the ineffectiveness of a single leader ineptness, but units succeed in combat because of the collective efforts of leadership teams. An effective leadership team will provide continuity in combat that is not tied to a specific leader or person, but to a commander's intent. Responsive teams will be able to react quickly because of their common understanding of mission requirements. Integrating the concepts of command climate and organizational leadership shows how they impact on people, roles, and responsibilities. Figure Ten summarizes the relationship among people, groups, leaders, and climate as discussed in this and previous chapters:

FIGURE 10
ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIP MODEL

- ⁴ibid.
- ⁵ibid.
- ⁶ibid., p. 15.
- ⁷ibid., p. 17.
- ⁸ibid.
- ⁹FM 22-103, p. 26.
- ¹⁰ibid., p. 31.
- ¹¹ibid., p. 46.
- ¹²ibid., p. 37.
- ¹³ibid., p. 58.
- ¹⁴LTG Walter Ulmer, "The New Senior Leadership Doctrine," Parameters, March 1987, p. 18.
- ¹⁵ibid., p. 20.
- ¹⁶ibid.
- ¹⁷Army Regulation 600-100, May 1987, pp. 1-7.
- ¹⁸ibid., p. 39.
- ¹⁹LTC Michael McGee, "Leadership Levels," Excel Net Concept Papers, Volume II, April 1986, p. 5.
- ²⁰ibid., p. 6.
- ²¹ibid., p. 7.
- ²²ibid., p. 8.
- ²³ibid.
- ²⁴ibid., p. 21.
- ²⁵ibid.
- ²⁶COL Ben Johnson, "Senior Command," Chapter 5, Theory of Management, November 1988, p. 5-1.
- ²⁷ibid., p. 5-2.
- ²⁸ibid., p. 5-3.
- ²⁹LTC Allan Futernick, "Eliminate the Filters," Military Review, November 1986, p. 23.
- ³⁰ibid., p. 23.
- ³¹LTC Alan Wilgus, "Organizations," Military Review, June 1987, p. 22.
- ³²Edgar H. Schein, Culture and Leadership, p. 29.
- ³³ibid.
- ³⁴ibid., p. 35.
- ³⁵Farrell, p. 31.
- ³⁶Farrell, p. 31.
- ³⁷ibid., p. 33.

³⁸Ibid., p. 35.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 32.

⁴¹Peter Vail, "The Purposing of High Performing Systems," Organizational Dynamics, Autumn 1982, p. 26.

⁴²Peter Vail, "The Purposing of High Performing Systems," Organizational Dynamics, Autumn 1982, p. 27.

⁴³COL Mike Malone (Ret), "High Performing Units," TRADOC Command Letters, 30 June 1980, pp. 1-7.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 1.

⁴⁵Hersey and Blanchard, p. 11.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 13.

⁴⁸Hersey and Blanchard, p. 11.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 6.

⁵⁰Steve Clement, "Systems Leadership," p. 26.

CHAPTER V

COMMAND PHILOSOPHY: THE INGREDIENTS

If a soldier would command an army he must be prepared to withstand those who would criticize the manner in which he leads that army.

General Omar N. Bradley
1946

The preceeding chapters have asserted a significant relationship between command climate and organizational leadership based on a literature search. It follows then that a supportive climate should be created in order to generate the dynamics or "chemistry" to pervade a unit and drive it toward excellence. This right "chemistry" comes from the leader. He is the one in the position to provide direction; he determines progress; he rewards and punishes. His espoused philosophy of "how" the organization will operate and where it is headed should be conveyed in a written command or leadership philosophy focusing on key organizational areas. Team development and/or maturity can grow only in a climate which is healthy and positive. Successful leaders instinctively know what areas they need to articulate and manage.

In order to examine what comprises a "good" command philosophy, let's analyze those expressed by leaders who are considered "successful" by the Army. Success in this case is based on promotion. This approach allows us to isolate those items or essential dimensions expressed by commanders in their efforts to maximize the processess of organizational leadership. Furthermore, by combining and integrating what has been presented, we can

then identify essential areas of concentration based on acceptable concepts. This chapter therefore will select the dimensions within large units (battalion and above) that previous commanders have identified as critical and key to the success of their units.

COL Duane Lempke's Command Climate reviews 27 1987-1988 command philosophy documents from the 5th Infantry Division, Fort Polk, Louisiana, so it provides a good departure point. He believes this survey is a good representation of an installation. In fact, it probably does exemplify the attitudes and visions that were prevalent in most commands in the States, Germany, Panama, and Korea at that time. The commanders prior to their commands were graduated from the Army's Pre-Command Course (PCC) as well as their respective branch command orientation courses.

The results indicate that fifty-two percent (14 out of 27) of the commanders used the term command climate or an associated term in their command philosophy letters.¹ These commanders used such alternate terms as leadership climate, climate, environment, unit climate, atmosphere, and organizational climate. Moreover, "power-down" concepts and closely associated ideas are used by six of the twenty-seven commanders.² For example, several memorandums and letters articulate and emphasize the climate concept as follows:

1. The enclosed command philosophy is a formal statement of how I view the world in terms of command climate (Division Commander).
2. Readiness.....level of attainment is dependent upon the unit climate and leadership provided (Battalion Commander).
3. Our command climate must be one which fosters professional integrity (Povost Marshall).

4. The command climate I wish to foster is one that allows individuals to fail as they learn but eventually holds them to meeting the standards of competence dictated by their position, experience, and training (Brigade commander).

5. I expect us to foster and maintain a climate of wellness, enthusiasm, and pride in our unit, community, and families (Brigade Commander).

6. To perform our recon and security missions to the highest standards, within the safe, healthy command climate; people first, mission always (Battalion Commander).

7. My job as your commander is to provide you an environment where you feel comfortable in practicing your chosen profession. I will provide an atmosphere for your to grow --use it wisely (Battalion Commander).

8. The major contribution of a senior headquarters toward building a healthy and productive leadership climate at unit level is to provide a coherent, productive and non-hectic environment within which the unit commander has time and energy to be a leader (Division Commander).³

These quotations show indisputably how commanders envision the creation and use of command climates. They also reveal the commander's belief that positive and/or healthy climates just do not happen; the commander articulates how the climate will be set. He then pledges to enforce this vision through his own behavior. So he acknowledges that his actions should support what he has articulated.

The average length of a document analyzed in Lempke's study is approximately three pages, the longest being ten pages while the shortest

was just over one page. All twenty-seven commanders cite organizational values (twenty-four used the terms candor, commitment, courage, and competency) of some type.⁴ Figure Eleven itemizes values cited and shows how frequently they were cited.

FIGURE 11
PHILOSOPHY CONTENTS (FT POLK)⁵ n=27

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1. Goals and objectives	27	100
2. Values	27	100
3. Priorities	27	100
4. Length	approx. 3 pages	-----
5. Commander's Role	21	78
6. Communications (info flow)	26	96
7. Rewards/Punishment (Discipline)	25	93
8. Chain of Command	19	70
9. Nature of Challenge	15	56
10. Leadership style	26	96
11. Vision	27	100
12. Standards	23	85
13. Ethics	21	78
14. Cdr's strengths	16	59
15. Cdr's weaknesses	14	52
16. Cdr's qualification	17	63
17. Purpose/Mission	27	100
18. Teamwork	27	100

19. Powerdown (decentralization)	23	85
20. Administration procedures	11	41
21. How things are measured and inspected	10	37
22. Freedom to Try (or fail)	9	26
23. Climate	14	54
24. others	8	22

To validate the Ft. Polk review by Lempke, a second examination of command philosophy was conducted through a survey of twenty 1985-1988 battalion, brigade, and staff documents from Ft. Benning, Georgia. These documents represent units from FORSCOM and TRADOC, including combat, combat support, combat service support, and training units. The breakout is similar to Ft Polk:

FIGURE 12
PHILOSOPHY CONTENTS (FT BENNING)⁶ n=20

<u>Item</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1. Goals and objectives	20	100
2. Values	20	100
3. Priorities	20	100
4. Lengths	approx. 3 pages	-----
5. Cdr's Role	16	80
6. Communications (info flow)	17	63
7. Rewards/Punishment (discipline)	18	90
8. Chain of Command	19	95

9. Nature of Challenge	15	75
10. Leadership style	20	100
11. Vision	20	100
12. Standards	21	100
13. Ethics	16	80
14. Cdr's strengths	11	55
15. Cdr's weaknesses	12	60
16. Cdr's qualification	17	63
17. Purpose/Mission	20	100
18. Teamwork	19	95
19. Powerdown (decentralization)	17	63
20. Administration	7	35
21. How things are measured and inspected	6	30
22. Freedom to Try	5	25
23. Climate	18	90
24. other	6	30

The similarities and focus for each set of installation commanders is very much apparent. Although more judgemental than scientific perhaps, one would have to assume that at least in, 1987-1988, the philosophies of Army commanders had singled out significant items which they felt critical and crucial for their subordinates to understand. Hence, the analysis indicates that these items or dimensions are the key bits of information needed by the teams within the organizations to function effectively.

Furthermore, a third source of interesting data comes from the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Experiences in Division Command Program.

The document examines fourteen major areas of command. Of the sixty-four comments on leadership by fifteen division commanders over the past two years, only one commander made an observation about command climate and/or philosophy:

I think a division commander only does two things that really count. One is to provide the division a sense of direction that has everybody pulling together. And then, secondly, provide the climate that promotes the gaining of those goals. You must provide the motivation and the command climate that encourage and motivate everyone to pull together. If you do that, if you tell the division where it's supposed to go, and you create the atmosphere that makes everyone want to go there, you cannot fail. I don't know what else a division commander really does that counts.⁷

Nevertheless, seventy-one comments were cited about ethics, values, leadership, goals/objectives, standards, discipline, mission/purpose, team development (team work), organization, professional development, cohesion, and doctrinal lessons learned.⁸ There was no reference, however, to what a healthy, positive command climate did for their subordinates. Nonetheless, there were strong implications that commanders must articulate how they intended to run their divisions, paying particular attention to the needs of the members within the various units and/or teams. If they did not, they would be faced with numerous difficulties, as many of the division commanders warned.

Two critical studies completed within the last five years shed more light on the subject. While conducting their 1984 study on battalion leadership, MAJ Jerry Simonsen, CPTs Herbert Frandsen and David Hoopengardner interviewed 45 senior leaders who occupied key positions at

the corps, division, and brigade level--including 15 general officers. The generals were asked how they identified their best battalions.⁹ After the interviews, the researchers then observed seven battalions in their day-to-day operations. The results of their survey was a document which outlined "eight pillars of excellence."

In 1986, three USAWC students replicated this Excellence in the Combat Arms study. The AWC study used similar methodology. The results of both studies are depicted at Figure Thirteen:

FIGURE 13
UNIT STUDY COMPARISONS¹⁰

<u>Excellence in Combat Arms</u> (1984)	<u>Brigade Pillars of Excellence</u> (1986)
1. The Cdr's influence	1. Focus on Combat
2. Focus on Combat	2. Power Down
3. Power Down	3. Teamwork
4. Strong unit identity	4. High standards and discipline
5. Caring	5. Caring
6. High standards	6. Positive command climate
7. Teamwork	7. Consistent Excellence Performance
8. Consistent Excellence performance	8. The winning spirit

Contrasting these studies leads to some fairly concise conclusions. The characteristics listed in Figure Thirteen are closely aligned with the elements extracted from the command philosophies at Forts Polk and Benning. In the brigade list, the authors "debated" long and hard whether to include this characteristic (positive command climate) as a separate pillar of excellence since "so much of what we discovered about command climate is discussed in our other chapters. However, based on input from our classmates and many of the members of the brigades we visited, so much of that intangible called 'command climate' results directly from the influence of the brigade commander. So we elected to devote a separate chapter discussing his impact on the environment of the brigades."¹¹ What the authors contribute is a formula recommended for achieving a positive command climate. The studies isolate areas where team development is enhanced. It also highlights some key aspects of the command philosophy content.

Finally, in December 1988, the Army War College Class of 1989 was surveyed about their command philosophies. Over seventy percent of the class returned the questionnaire. They were asked to comment on various statements concerning the relationship of climate to philosophy and climate to team development. The survey was designed on the basis of data extracted from the Ft Polk and Ft Benning command philosophy documents. In this survey the class confirmed the importance of command climate and its relationship to an articulated command philosophy. What's more, the class overwhelmingly supported the concept of team development and the leader's role in its creation. The class, however, was cautious about endorsing mandatory written command philosophies. Advocating values or procedures the commanders could not exemplify or deliver, then the unit could perceive

the "disconnect" or inconsistency, thereby leaving the commander discredited and the unit perhaps dysfunctional. In short, the class confirmed what had been analyzed in this study already. Figure Fourteen provides an abbreviated analysis of the survey (see appendix A for the questionnaire).

FIGURE 14

DIMENSIONS: COMMAND PHILOSOPHY DEVELOPMENT SURVEY(%)

n=119

1. GOALS/OBJECTIVES: 88%
2. VALUES: 87%
3. ETHICS: 88%
4. STANDARDS: 84%
5. VISION(FUTURE): 82%
6. PURPOSE/MISSION: 80%
7. TEAMWORK: 80%
8. POWER DOWN: 75%
9. COMMANDER'S ROLE: 67%
10. FREEDOM TO FAIL (TRY): 60%
11. COMMUNICATION (INFO FLOW): 57%
12. PRIORITIES: 74%

Questions n=119

HIGH (TOP FIVE--% agree):

1. A + command climate creates a healthy organization=96%.
2. The better the command climate the more effective the unit is in getting its mission accomplished=90%.
3. A + command climate enhances cohesion among the members of a unit=98%.

4. Command philosophy is an effective management tool for creating teamwork in an organization=77%.

5. Knowing the command philosophy of my supervisor helps me do my job better=93%.

LOW (TOP FOUR--% disagree):

1. Commanders of units should be required by the Army regulation to have written command philosophies published within their units=66%.

2. A written command philosophy should have a specific format published in service regulations outlining minimum essential information needed by an organization=71%.

3. A command philosophy should be linked to the leader's individual rating system to insure compliance by his boss=67%.

4. Command philosophies are meaningful only to the leaders in an organization=83%.

So these surveys and the literature on organizational leadership reveals some very interesting facts. First, the data does isolate critical dimensions of a philosophy for commanding which impacts on climate. Second, there is considerable agreement on the dimensions, at least the first ten or so. Further, the dimensions can be identified as vital information applicable to team development and cohesion. Finally, the dimensions support the concept and theories of organizational leadership and command climate as described in preceeding chapters. Thus, this analysis identifies eleven significant dimensions through which a leader can build effectiveness in team organizations. They are as follows:

1. Vision/Future Direction

2. Value

3. Goals and objectives
4. Priorities
5. Discipline
6. Standards
7. Mission/Purpose
8. Teamwork
9. Leadership style
10. Ethics
11. Communications (info flow)

¹Lempke, p. 46.

²Ibid., p. 49.

³Ibid., pp. 46-49.

⁴Ibid., p. 50.

⁵Ibid.

⁶U. S. Army Infantry School and Center, "Command Philosophies of Ft Benning," Leadership Training to Command, pp. 1-72.

⁷U. S. Army Military History Institute, Command Lessons Learned Program, September 1986-July 1987.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Jerry Simonsen, MAJ; Herbert Frandsen, LTC; David Hoopengardner, CPT; Excellence in the Combat Arms, p. 5.

¹⁰James Gass, COL; Lawson Magruder, LTC; Huey Scott, LTC; Excellence in the Combat Arms, p. 10.

¹¹Ibid., p. 27.

CHAPTER VI

A MODEL: ONE WAY TO VIEW COMMAND PHILOSOPHY

Duty...honor...country. Those three hallowed words reverently dictate what you ought to be, what you can be, what will be. They are your rallying points: to build courage when courage seems to fail; to regain faith when there seems to be little cause for faith; to create hope when hope becomes forlorn.

General Douglas MacArthur
U. S. Military Academy
1962

No single leadership/command philosophy can serve the needs of all who are in positions of command. Many factors come together in the development of individual outlooks on organizations. In Leadership (1978), James MacGregor Burns writing on the various kinds of leadership, states, "It is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth. In fact, the more it is studied the more complex it becomes."¹ Just as complex, one may add, is the study of the causes and effects of climate.

Nevertheless, as we have seen, the dimensions of organizational leadership can actually be identified. Figure Fifteen incorporates the results of this study, in fact, into a model which draws on the theories and concepts outlined from the previous chapters. It also uses only the theories and concepts outlined in current Army doctrine and literature.

FIGURE 15
THE LEADERSHIP POWER PYRAMID

"degree;" both still are concerned with teams and their development. The leadership levels then are divided into the three professional skills outlined in FM 22-103: competency, communications, and conceptual. Then, in accordance with the manual, these skills are themselves broken down into characteristic components:

FIGURE 16
PROFESSIONAL AND KNOWLEDGE SKILLS²

<u>Competency</u>	<u>Communications</u>	<u>Conceptual</u>
assessment	interpersonal	decision-making
coordination	listening	forecasting
risk-taking	language	creativity
endurance	teaching	intuition
perspective	persuasion	innovation

FM 22-103 offers precise definitions of these major professional skills:³

1. Competency: Ability to use knowledge, methods, techniques, and equipment necessary for the performance of specific tasks acquired from experience, education, and training.

2. Communication: Ability and judgement in working with and through people including an understanding of motivation of effective leadership.

3. Conceptual: Ability to understand the complexities

of the overall organization and where one's own operation fits into the organization. This knowledge permits one to act according to the objectives of the total organization rather than only on the basis of the goals and needs of one's own immediate group.

Referring to the model in detail for clarification, the explanation of the concepts begins with Hersey and Blanchard. The two lines to the left of the pyramid are the maturity lines: one for technical skills--high being at the individual (direct) leadership level while the low end of the scale is at the systems level. As a point, "average" levels of technical skills therefore would be required for organizational leaders. Obviously, the scaling for the maturity lines is very subjective: average, as Hersey and Blanchard see it, would represent the vast majority of leaders (e. g., the Bell curve). The second maturity line, psycho-social, is in reverse relationship of the technical. For example, senior leaders need not be technically skilled or qualified as a leader(who operates at the direct leadership level). According to Hersey and Blanchard, at the direct leadership level, such skills are critical. Maturity is "the ability and willingness of people to take responsibility for directing their own behavior."⁴ Variables of maturity as well are considered only in relation to a specific task to be performed. In other words, an individual or group is not mature or immature in any total sense. Consequently, leaders at the systems level are expected to possess a high degree of psycho-social maturity because of the complexity of their jobs. Hersey and Blanchard define technical maturity and psycho-social maturity as two distinct skills:⁵

1. Technical (job): Related to the ability to do something. It has to do with knowledge and skill. Individuals who have high job maturity in a particular area have the

knowledge, ability, and experience to perform certain tasks without direction from others.

2. Psycho-social (willingness): Related to the willingness or motivation to do something. It has to do with confidence and commitment. Individuals who have high psychological maturity in a particular area or responsibility think that responsibility is important and have self-confidence and good feeling about themselves in that aspect of their job.

To the right of the pyramid are two scales derived from the discussion in Chapter II. Vail's High Performing System (HPS) espoused by COL Mike Malone in the early 1980s, is also added to the model. The theory of developing organizations has a great deal of merit and has been a focal point of many leadership studies over the last decade. Integrated into the model, it provides clarity and meaning to the knowledge skills. Individual leadership, for example, is categorized in the non-unit and unit level. However, with a progression based on the effective mix of the knowledge skills, units can obviously move or pass through the unit level, then into the competent unit level, and finally into what is considered the ideal level: high performance, where "teams" consistently perform at the level of excellence. High performing units emerge at the organizational and systems levels of leadership.

The other scale is based on Hersey and Blanchard's scheme of situational leadership, discussed earlier. Hersey and Blanchard isolate four types of leadership behavior, derived from their maturity studies on organizations: telling, selling, participating, and delegating.⁶ If a leader can successfully diagnose the maturity of his group, then he can modify his behavior to motivate and lead the group to organizational effectiveness. Also implied in the situational leadership concept is organizational growth. Organizations

grow through developmental stages. Leaders who fail to recognize this concept could impact negatively on an organization by being totally dysfunctional, as the theory implies. Furthermore, Hersey and Blanchard assert time and time again that an organization is an open social system-- that is, all aspects of an organization are interrelated; a change in any part of an organization may have an impact on other parts or on the total organization itself.⁷ Thus, a proposed change in one part of an organization must be carefully assessed in terms of its likely impact on the rest of the organization. This theory largely supports the concept of command climate and suggests why it has to be consistent throughout an organization. What's more, it stresses the importance of a consistent leadership philosophy which is articulated throughout the unit.

Furthermore, subordinates start to realize, from the perspective of situational leadership, that it is not the leader but their own behavior that determines the leadership style to be used with them. In other words, subordinates adjust their behaviors to meet the requirements of the unit leader. Thus, this theory accounts for how people understand and share expectations in their environment so that they can gradually learn to supervise their own behavior and become responsible, self-motivated individuals. To illustrate, a telling style is closely associated with individual (direct) leadership, whereas the organizational (senior) leadership may seek a style which is selling or participating. The systems (executive) leadership would probably select a delegating style. Evenso, the leader's style would be determined considerably by the maturity level of the subordinates: low maturity among subordinates indicates a telling style as the most effective style of leadership. If subordinates do not know how

to do a task, then they must be told how till they learn to do it by themselves.

Examining the pyramid model further, starting with the systems level at the bottom of the triangle, one can see that a systems leader should have "refined" professional skills in the areas of competency and conceptual knowledge, be about "average" (the majority of leaders or when compared to the other leadership levels within the model) in communications, and finally exercise a delegating leadership style (from the first scale on the right). This, in turn,--according to the concepts--would lead to a high performing system provided the command climate remains positive and healthy. To be healthy and positive in the first place, the leader must articulate direction to the unit. Most important, the use of the leader's professional skills may regulate the climate in order to foster cohesion and teamwork.

In short, command climate can be shaped by a leader through the effective use of communicative skills. The eleven organizational dimensions for a command philosophy fit neatly into the professional skill of communications which includes five knowledge skills: interpersonal, listening, language, teaching, and persuasion. These knowledge skills are potent, for they are the skills necessary for information to be articulated to subordinates. Work is done to standards based on how effectively the information is transferred. Further, expectations are clarified through mutual understanding among individuals, groups, and leader. As the leadership power pyramid indicates, communications "crosswalks" throughout the three leadership levels, but it continues to be extremely significant at the organizational and systems levels. Leaders who are skilled in the communicative process of organizational leadership are the

ones who normally will experience the most success and develop their units at a high level of performance.

In Figure Seventeen, the eleven organizational dimensions with appropriate definitions and/or comments are consolidated from this study. At a minimum, a leader's position with regard to these dimensions will determine whether tasks are carried out to a prescribed standard. Task(s) meeting prescribed standards generally indicate successful organizations.

FIGURE 17

COMMAND PHILOSOPHY ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSIONS

1. VISION/DIRECTION: description of what the future looks like in the outyears from the perspective of the leader.
2. VALUES: a leader's espousal of peacetime principles of leadership and management must inculcate values, practice techniques, and create habits which are applicable to the military.
3. MISSION/PURPOSE: explanation of mission and purpose of existence. Subordinates need to know where they fit.
4. GOALS/OBJECTIVES: these must be clear, concise, and measurable, not to mention obtainable.
5. PRIORITIES: what really is important to the organization and the leader. Where do subordinates focus their time and energy. Leaders must establish a coherent, predictable and nonhectic environment.
6. TEAMWORK: competition within an organization is done to standards. Groups share resources; outcomes or results of the unit are more important than individual concerns.

7. LEADERSHIP: empower leaders through decentralization; develop sense of responsibility.

8. ETHICS: do not have to cut corners to get ahead. Professional integrity is the basis for both trust and efficiency.

9. DISCIPLINE: it must be aggressively enforced within chain of command. Awards and punishment must be fairly executed. Policies must be clearly stated. True discipline is self-discipline

10. STANDARDS: they must be clear and achievable. They separate the good units from the bad.

11. INFORMATION FLOW: mutual trust and respect develops where information is shared openly and candidly.

To conclude, the pyramid model of leadership developed in this chapter is based on the concepts and theories generally accepted as valid in the Army and discussed earlier in this study. The model does not assert new values or insights; instead, the model simply integrates and combines characteristics where applicable. It also attempts to explain how the command philosophy dimensions fit into the organizational context and why a leader's articulated philosophy is significant for organizational effectiveness. Although the dimensions appear innocuous and unpretentious, they come to life when applied skillfully by a commander concerned about his command climate. Further, the model integrates the relationship among the dimensions with professional/knowledge skills. Finally, the model highlights the critical role of command climate. Moreover, the model indicates that command philosophy organizational dimensions transcribed through the knowledge skills of communication breed success. This skill has

be¹ effectively used by all leaders at each level, but more importantly at the organizational (team) level. The most effective "leadership" style is one which is oriented toward "selling" or "participating;" hence, the maturity of the subordinates increases in both the psycho-social and technical skills. Finally, effective organizational leadership is characterized by groups or teams which demonstrate cohesion and are bonded together based on a "singleness" of purpose/mission/task. The model focuses on this outcome and provides leaders with a perspective based on the Army's current leadership doctrine.

¹Burns, p. 2.

²FM 22-103, p. 42.

³Ibid.

⁴Hersey and Blanchard, p. 207.

⁵Ibid., p. 261.

⁶Ibid., p. 26 .

⁷Ibid., p. 298.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

To create great Armies is one thing: to lead
them and to handle them is another.

Sir Winston Churchill
1946

Leadership is a magnificently complex process. How and why one person exercises it, or another person submits to its influence is a question that is not easily answered. By definition, the exercise of leadership includes all manner of influence that one person can exercise over another within the organization. This implies leadership by example, by direction, and by manipulation. It also implies various forms of legation.

Historically, theoretical orientations of leadership have demonstrated a constantly changing emphasis from the individual to the group and to the interaction of the two. The trait theories of early leadership research emphasized the leader. The situationalist theory (e.g., Hersey and Blanchard) focused on the situation as the determining factor of leadership. Recently, the follower has been considered a main detriment of leadership behavior, with the emphasis on the follower's personal needs. The follower-oriented approach assumes that the best leader is the one who can most nearly fulfill the needs of the followers. It is also the concept of leadership teams. The interactional theory suggests that leadership is the result of interpersonal interaction, rather than limiting leadership to the traits of the individual leader.¹

As previously discussed, the two primary characteristics of organizational leadership are that (1) it is oriented toward organizational

goals and (2) it is imposed on the individual and/or group by the organization. Reality of organizations demands that objectives have to be accomplished, otherwise the organization would have no reason for existing; the organizational leader is therefore the control agent. He is expected to influence the members of his group to behave in such a way that organizational goals are accomplished. Acceptance of his influence, which is conditional upon the consent of followers, produces what is called "emergent" leadership.

Furthermore, the appointed leader with his orientation directed on the organization's rather than the group's goals is often referred to as "the man in the middle". Indeed, such leaders must reckon with structure of the emergent group. Even with a mandate or legitimacy, imposed leadership must also rest on the responsiveness of the followers and their willingness to comply. Integration of the group's needs with the organization's need becomes a paramount responsibility of "the man in the middle," if he is to survive.

As this study has attempted to demonstrate, interrelatedness of organizational (team) leadership and command climate is considerably more complex than previously imagined. Nevertheless, increasing attention to command climate over the past decade is in cadence with leadership doctrine; however, the de-emphasis of climate concept in FM 22-103, the most recent Army leadership publication, raises some concerns. Senior Army leaders encourage the use of command philosophies without really understanding how it impacts within climate. Army doctrine has not fully explained the utility of climate nor what philosophies should be prescribed or dictated by a leader. Unfortunately, Army publications also provide very little guidance on the subject of command philosophy. Yet this is probably

the single most important action a commander will do in his entire command tour. If it is not done well, he will face constant problems with team integration. For a healthy, positive command climate to become a reality, a leader must explain how he intends to lead his subordinates toward productivity. He must as well describe the leadership style he intends to use in leading the unit. Finally, he must be candid, sincere, and committed.

The relationship among the commander, his soldiers, and command climate is not revocable. These elements are, in fact, inseparable. Command climate is a glass ball--it must not be juggled. When it is healthy, it causes things^{to} get done right throughout the organization. In the military, proper command climate means that combat readiness is higher, missions are executed, commanders succeed, leaders supervise effectively, programs are meaningful, and soldiers feel good about themselves and what they are doing. This is more than an accumulation of morale, cohesion, trust, confidence, and performance; it indicates a "syneristic" condition necessary for combat effectiveness on the future battlefield.

Furthermore, a positive command climate can not be achieved unless it is created by the commander, who uses a well-developed command philosophy and a vision of what he wants his unit to be. It has to be communicated. As a result he focuses his energy and his unit's energy to make it happen. This may sound too easy, but consider what happens when a new commander fails to articulate a command philosophy, or fails to establish a future vision, or fails to think through a system to measure progress toward that vision:

1. Subordinates attempt to second guess the commander or seek opinions from others who may have various

perceptions of what they see of the leader.

2. The commander's intent is subject to piecemeal revision and policy changes.
3. Subordinates mimic the commander's changing direction of march by redirecting energy and focus.
4. Subordinates use resources inappropriately based on priority changes.
5. Subordinates fail to build trust and confidence in a commander as quickly as they should.

Consequently, the energy that could be bonding a better unit is wasted in a guessing game about what the boss wants. No commander intentionally programs this. Still it happens, often more times than one realizes. The time needed to correct it at mid-level is usually proportional to the success of the commander and the Army's overall readiness. It can be avoided. Before one assumes command, he needs to develop a command philosophy so it can be communicated to subordinates.

Moreover, subordinates can serve a leader best only when they know who a leader is and what he wants. This means that the information has to be transmitted immediately. However, there are some practical considerations which must be addressed first. If a leader knows the organization and the soldiers fairly well, then a leader is in a position to reveal himself quickly with some confidence. However, if a leader enters an unknown situation or is new to the leadership business, he might be somewhat cautious. The command climate may have a profound effect on the urgency of identifying oneself. If there is a severe crisis and immediate action is mandatory, the leader's influence is required without delay. People who are insecure seek a "rock or blanket" upon which to attach their

fortunes. That rock or blanket can be the leader who stands for something definite - even if that stand is not exactly what they want.

Equally important, a command philosophy with any utility should be unique combination of candidness, ideology and reality. The leader should demonstrate that he has done his homework; his philosophy should reflect an understanding of the mission of the organization and the contract as viewed by the subordinates. While a leader shares some long-term aspirations with subordinates, he should not stimulate unrealistic expectations. Finally, the leader lets the subordinates know what he expects of them and how and why these expectations will be achieved. In the process, the leader shares those idiosyncrasies that will influence interpersonal relationships in the work place. He can then finally exhibit his individuality--but only after he has bonded himself within the organization.

How to transmit one's philosophy? There is no single answer to this issue. One should consider the following questions, however, when drafting a command philosophy:

1. Who needs your philosophy (immediate subordinates only, the entire organization, others - boss)?
2. What communication opportunities are available (meetings, visits, memorandums, organizational newspaper, etc)?
3. What are your communication skills (good speaker, articulate, good writer, etc.)?
4. Do you want to transmit your philosophy personally or to allow it to be retransmitted by subordinate leaders who are likely to distort your message?

A whole organization is synergetic, consisting of a variety of teams with different functions and roles. A unit, for example, consists of soldiers, leaders, equipment, structure, and doctrine; each of these influences all the others. Knowing this, one of the things a leader can do to release and channel energy in the unit is to buffer the organization from outside sponges which sap away vital energy. Further, good leaders know that leadership in a complex system is dispersed throughout the unit. Information distribution controls work. The key, therefore, is to wire together vertical and horizontal communications. This is not easy. In fact, it is especially difficult in the larger and more complex units. Also as pointed out, when authority is decentralized, one's overall philosophy, concept, intent, priorities, and standards must be absolutely clear to all.

Further, decentralization as required by AirLand Battle doctrine demands high discipline. Perhaps one of the key organizational dynamics is discipline. Three rules are worthy of repetition: (1) Do not accept unsatisfactory performance. Coach, teach, train. If necessary, dismiss; (2) Accept satisfactory performance because it is acceptable; (3) Reward outstanding performance constantly. This acknowledgement of work discipline will reinforce the behaviors important to an organization and will simultaneously create role-models.

Moreover, initiative and creativity are the cornerstones of the Army's tactical doctrine. Teach subordinates to ask forgiveness, not permission; do not hold them back. Hand-in-hand with this, is competition. It is better to have a dozen good units rather than two best ones and ten sorry ones. Ensure this by engineering competition against standards instead of pitting unit against unit; never compare one unit to another.

Finally, how can one measure whether or not a command philosophy is working? There are some tools available in the system: Peter Vail's tenets of a high performing organizations provide a good start. The set of variables called "a Unit of Excellence" developed by McGee (using Vail's work) specifies what a high performing organization looks like in terms of the soldiers, their gear, the unit itself, relationships between the unit and the soldiers, and an "us" attitude that is so readily evident in cohesive units.² The chain of command can be consulted using the set of variables (see Figure Eighteen for examples of the variables).

FIGURE 18
A UNIT OF EXCELLENCE³ (PARTIAL LIST)

The Soldiers of the unit

1. A new soldier of whatever rank is not just automatically accepted.
2. The value of the task is in doing of it.

Relationship Between the Soldiers and Their Gear

3. Maintenance of their gear will be co-mingled with performance.
4. They will often ascribe human characteristics to their gear.

Things About the Unit Itself

5. There will be a great deal of experimentation and rehearsal.
6. The unit will have a clear "on/off" character not readily discernable to an outside observer.

Relationships Between the Soldiers and the Unit

7. Soldiers "live, eat, sleep, breathe, and fight" about the unit.

8. The passage of time will be measured by unit activities and performance.

"US"Attitude

9. A private language and set of symbols will arise: jargon--jive.

10. A set of explicit values about what the unit does and why will arise.

A second evaluative tool, discussed in Chapters Two and Four, is derived from the Naval Postgraduate School thesis of MAJ Jerry Simonsen, CPTs Herbert Frandsen and David Hoopergardner. Excellence in the Combat Arms provides the "eight pillars of Excellence," which are very descriptive of an ideal unit. The chain of command, once again, can then easily score each pillar on an agreed upon scale (1--10, for example), collect in a group, and discuss the weaknesses and strengths of each pillar as they apply it to the organization. The leader/ commander then has some feedback to use in aligning his command philosophy to make it useful, meaningful, and effective. The key, however, is feedback among the chain of command. Leaders who allow their subordinates to be open and honest about the unit in a constructive manner will be all that more successful leaders.

¹Hersey and Blanchard, p. 12.

²McGee, p. 15.

³Ibid., pp. 16-17.

CHAPTER VIII

RECOMMENDATIONS

Managers are people who do things right and
leaders are people who do the right thing.

Warren Bennis
Leaders: The Strategies
for Taking Charge 1985

After an extensive literature search from a variety of sources several recommendations are in order. First, FM 22-103 needs further revision. It makes a good start. But it offers very little attention to command climate, the role of command, and leadership philosophy. Indeed, the issue is complex. Nevertheless, there is enough data available from this study and others ~~about~~ which indicates how significant a positive command climate is in influencing behavior. This needs to be dealt with in greater detail. A commander who understands how to orchestrate the dimensions of climate setting can be successful and his organization productive. Communications is central to much of this research on the impact of climate. A command philosophy which effectively captures the eleven organizational dimensions travels a long way in creating a healthy, positive command climate.

Second, it is time to tell our senior commanders that they have no option when it comes to a published command philosophy. Why not? Research reveals that leaders who use written command philosophies have better units in terms of organizational health. So why the hesitation? Certainly, it is personal: even the AWC 1989 survey indicated apprehension. Nonetheless, people simply are not expendable. Furthermore, a command philosophy should be part of the new commander's checklist. In ninety days

he should have a written document published according to a prescribed format as outlined in this study. However, it should not serve to depersonalize or standardize command. The issue is just too important to neglect. The evidence is overwhelming: subordinates need to know where the "boss" stands on critical issues. It is a leader's responsibility to tell his subordinates where the unit is going. There should be no second guessing.

Moreover, as an organic system every organization is dynamic. Therefore, interaction among its member leads to internal change. The commander has the responsibility to create a climate that is conducive to change without creating fear and stress. A climate should stimulate creativity, imagination, and innovation to motivate the subordinates. In order to motivate, a commander must enlist their participation and desire to work. A healthy, positive command climate can be created only when the commander takes the time to prepare a command philosophy which outlines how he sees work being accomplished in the organization. This philosophy should incorporate the dimensions discussed so far to draw out true leadership throughout the unit. Command philosophy is the fulcrum on which the demands of the individual and the demands of the organization are balanced.

Third, research should be continued to determine the value of the Unit Climate Profile (DA PAM 600-69), currently in limited use, which is designed to obtain feedback on how a unit is functioning. The command philosophy format from this study should be tied into the research. The dimensions and the applicability of the survey to a variety of organizations should be ascertained. There are no standard methods for measuring and improving the command climate. If, for example, there are weak links in leader selection and development, they should be exposed and strengthened.

If there are valid methods for reliably identifying leaders without considering the views of those they lead, the Army should quickly move to exploit such methods.

Fourth, it is time to incorporate subordinate ratings into the officer evaluation system. Subordinate input to evaluations of commanders will provide the perspective from inside the command to those who are selecting officers for advancement and promotion. Subordinate input's sole purpose should be to insure that commanders are concerned about their subordinates and improving the command climate. As long as the behaviors that subordinates evaluate are those that the Army wants a commander to exhibit, the fact that subordinates are evaluating commanders should not decrease trust or loyalty or lead to commanders doing things that are counter to the Army's goals. If used as additional input by selection boards, subordinate input ensures that the Army's best officers, viewed by subordinates as well as superiors will advance. Further, it will modify command climate in units where it needs to be changed by causing commanders in their own self-interest to concern themselves with their unit's climate.

Finally, the Army's Pre-Command Course (PCC) at Ft Leavenworth should be provided with the Leadership Power Pyramid (developed in this study) for their leadership seminars. In this way, future leaders will have an opportunity to formulate their thoughts on command philosophy based on some limited research. As well, a larger study should be undertaken by the Army Research Institute (ARI) on the relationship of an organization's climate and the leader's ability to control or regulate it. This study merely asserts the possibility. Closely aligned to this, an evaluation tool should be formulated from the work MAJ Simonsen, CPTs Frandsen and Hoopengardner

in Excellence in the Combat Arms. Better ways are needed to measure the impact of an articulated command philosophy on command climate. The subject is too important not to understand better or assess with some accuracy. The Army has made tremendous progress in leadership. But it should not stop now when it is on a roll.

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22. Zinzer, Roy LTC., Memorandum, dated 10 June 1986, Subject: Command Philosophy, pp. 1-8.

Command Philosophy Development Survey

1. Data collected from this survey will be used to develop a model and format for a "command philosophy" which may assist leaders/commanders in creating effective and successful organizations. The survey is part of an AWC Military Studies Project (MSP).
2. Your responses to the statements will be confidential. The intent is to capture your experiences as a commander and/or supervisor in the use of a command philosophy in your last assignment and to identify those areas of concern which you feel are significant in the aspect of developing a positive command climate. In summary, I need your personal opinions.
3. Two definitions used in this survey which are extracted from current Army publications:
 - a. Command climate: A shared feeling, a perception among the members of a unit about what life is like (FM 22-103, 1987). Command climate is also called organizational climate.
 - b. Command Philosophy: A management technique whereby a leader or supervisor transmits...orally or in writing, formally or informally, to groups or through key subordinates...his/her views on philosophy of leadership. (FC 22-1, 1984). Command philosophy is also called leadership philosophy.
4. Please read the attached instructions and complete the survey as soon as possible (NLT 14 December 1988). Completion time is approximately 10 minutes.
5. Please answer questions 1-45 using a No. 2 pencil on the enclosed answer (scan-tron response) sheet. If you need to erase, do so completely. Mark your answers to each statement opposite the statement number on the answer sheet. Part IV of the survey is a comment sheet on which you can provide additional information on the statements or share any concerns you have about command climate or command philosophy.
6. Your assistance and support are essential. The development of useful management techniques which can be effective in building better organizations as well as leaders is paramount. The results of this project may become the basis for improved leadership throughout the Army. I appreciate your time and attention.

Larry J. Smith

RETURN TO..... Box 244

NOTE

Public Law 93-573, called the Privacy Act of 1974, requires that you be informed of the purpose and uses to be made of the information that is collected.

The Department of the Army may collect the information requested in this survey under the authority of 10 United States Code 139.

Providing information in this questionnaire is voluntary. Failure to respond to any particular questions will not result in any penalty.

The information collected in this survey will be used for research and analysis purposes only.

A. Part 1 of the survey request data concerning yourself.

EXAMPLE

Answer sheet

Sex

0 1 2 3 4

0. Male

0 ☒ 0 0 0

1. Female

1. Service

0. Army (Active, Reserve, National Guard)

1. Navy

2. USCG

3. USMC

4. USAF

5. Civilian

6. Other

2. Branch

0. Combat arms

1. Combat support

2. Combat service support

3. not applicable

3. Total Years Active Service

0. 10-15

1. 15-20

2. 21-22

3. 23-26

4. 26 +

4. Age

0. 29-35

1. 36-41

2. 42-45

3. 46-50

4. 50 +

5. Sex

0. Male

1. Female

6. Command time (Total time in Battalion and/or Brigade or Service
Equivalent)

- 0. 6 mos. - 1 yr.
- 1. 13 mos. - 18 mos.
- 2. 19 mos. - 24 mos.
- 3. 25 mos. - 30 mos.
- 4. 31 mos. - 36 mos.
- 5. 37 mos. - 42 mos.
- 6. 43 mos. - 48 mos.
- 7. 49 mos. +
- 8. no command time
- 9. not applicable

B. Part II of the survey consists of a series of statements which describe a command climate. Use the Key below to make your response.

<u>results (Dec 89)</u>	<u>(KEY for Part II)</u>
key: DA= disagree %	0. Strongly disagree
N =neutral %	1. disagree
D =agree %	2. neutral
<i>n=149 ALL</i>	3. agree
<i>n=119 ARMY</i>	4. strongly agree

7. The Army (or appropriate service) in FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, does a good job explaining what command climate is about. da=9; n=31; a=60

8. A positive command climate creates a healthy orgainzation. da=2; n=1; a=97

9. I know "how to" establish a positive command climate. da=0; n=6; a=94

10. A positive command climate is important to me. da=0; n=0; a=100

11. I know "how to" evaluate a positive command climate. da=3; n=10; a=87

12. The better the command climate the more effective the unit is in getting its mission accomplished. da=5; n=7; a=88

13. The Army (or appropriate service) has published what I need to create a positive command climate in my next organization. da=20; n=37; a=43

14. A positive command climate enhances a team's efforts in completing its assigned tasks. da=0; n=3; a=97

15. Individuals in organizations with positive command climates have better task skills. da=12; n=33; a=55

16. A positive command climate enhances cohesion among the members of a unit. da=2; n=2; a=96

C. Part III of the survey consists of a series of statements which describe a "command philosophy". Like Part II, use the key below to select your response for each statement.

Key for Part III

- 0. strongly disagree
- 1. disagree
- 2. neutral
- 3. agree
- 4. strongly agree

17. A command philosophy in any organization (e.g., battalion/squadron upward) should be articulated in writing to all soldiers/employees. da=24; n=27; a=49

18. Commanders of organizations/units should be required by the Army(or appropriate service) regulation/directive to have written command philosophies published in their units. da=65; n=14; a=21

19. A written command philosophy should have a specific format published in service regulations outlining minimum essential information needed by an organization. da=71; n=15; a=14

20. A command philosophy should be linked to the leader's individual rating(performance/efficiency) system to insure comppliance by his/her boss. da=67; n=16; a=17

21. Command philosophies should be articulated orally by the commander to every member of an organization. da=22; n=12; a=66

22. Command philosophies are meaningful only to the leaders in an organization. da=83; n=11; a=6

23. A command philosophy is an effective management tool for creating teamwork in an organization. da=13; n=58; a=29

24. Knowing the philosophy of my supervisor helps me do my job better. da=6; n=51; a=43

D. Part IV consists of those items which may be applicable in a command philosophy. Please select an appropriate response for each statement or item.

25. The "ideal" length of a written command philosophy.

- 0. one page=27%
- 1. two pages=16%
- 2. three pages=3%
- 3. four pages=4%
- 4. six pages=1%
- 5. seven pages=0%
- 6. eight or more pages=0%
- 7. does not have to be written=29%
- 8. length is not important=19%

Of the items listed below select either (0) yes or (1) no for which item(s) you think should be part of a command philosophy. If your item(s) is not included in the listing, please indicate on the attached comment sheet.

note : $y = \text{yes} + \%$
 $n = \text{no} + \%$

- 26. Values=y=86%
- 27. Goals/Objectives=y=87%
- 28. Priorities=y=74%
- 29. Cdr's role=y=66%
- 30. Communications (info flow) =y=56%
- 31. Discipline (awards and punishment) =y=48%
- 32. Chain of Command=y=46%
- 33. Vision (future)=y=81%
- 34. Standards=y=83%
- 35. Ethics=y=83%
- 36. Cdr's strengths=no=90%
- 37. Cdr's weaknesses=no=91%
- 38. Cdr's qualifications=no=92%
- 39. Purpose/Mission=y=79%
- 40. Team work=y=79%
- 41. "Power down" (decentralization)=y=66%
- 42. Administration (paper flow)=no=78%
- 43. Freedom to Fail=y=59%
- 44. Inspections=no=74%
- 45. Efficiency (performance) reports=no=72%

Smith, Larry J.

COL IN [REDACTED]

DOR: 01 Nov 87 (65 Yr Gp)



EDUCATION:

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Name, Place</u>	<u>Study</u>	<u>Degree</u>
1961-1965	Clemson Univ, Clemson, SC	History	BA
1974-1976	Univ of Missouri, Kansas City, MO	History	MA
1978-1979	Pepperdine Univ, Los Angeles, CA	Human Res Mgt	MA

CAREER HIGHLIGHTS:

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Position, Organization, Location</u>
Jan 66-Jan 67	PLT LDR & XO, 1ST BN, 503D INF (ABN), VIETNAM
Jul 67-Sep 67	CH, PROTOCOL SEC, OFC USCOB, BERLIN, GERMANY
Sep 67-Nov 68	CDR, C CO, 2D BN, 6TH INF, BERLIN, GERMANY
Nov 68-Nov 69	VN RECON BN ADVISOR (ABN), II CORPS, MACV, VIETNAM
Dec 69-Feb 71	ASST SGS, A CO, 2D STU BN, TSB, USAIS, FT BENNING, GA
Sep 71-Jun 72	CH, COUNTY BR, RGR DEPT, USAIS, FT BENNING, GA
Jun 72-Jul 73	RGR COMMITTEE (S3), RGR DEPT, USAIS, FT BENNING, GA
Jul 73-Jul 74	ADC TO CG, TEST & EVAL CMD, AMC, APG, MD
May 76-Oct 77	ASST G1, ACOFS, 5TH INF DIV (MECH), FT POLK, LA
Nov 77-Nov 79	AO (OE), OCSA, HQ DA, ALEXANDRIA, VA
Nov 79-Dec 80	S3 & XO, 1ST BN, 23D INF, 2D INF DIV, CP HOVEY, KOREA
Jan 81-Aug 81	DEPUTY DIR, PERS COM ACT (DPCA), USAG, FT LEWIS, WA
Aug 81-Dec 81	DEPUTY G1, ACOFS G1/DPCA, I CORPS, FT LEWIS, WA
Dec 81-Jul 83	XO, 1ST BDE, 9TH INF DIV (MTZ), FT LEWIS, WA
Jul 83-Jul 85	PMS, UNIV OF WASHINGTON, IV ROTC REGION, SEATTLE, WA
Jul 85-Jan 88	CDR, 2D BN, 14TH INF, 10TH MTN DIV (L), FT BENNING, GA
Jan 88-Jun 88	STUDY DIR, CLOSE CBT (L), MAA, CBT DEV, USAIS, FT BENNING, GA

SERVICE SCHOOLS: USACGSC, 75

INSTRUCTOR EXPERIENCE: Small Unit Tactics & Ptrlng, USAIS, Sep 71-Jul 73; Ldrshp, Tactics, US Def Pol, Univ of Washington, ROTC, Jul 83-Jul 85

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS: Inf (11A); Pers Mgt Stf (41A); Instr; Prcht; Strategy

BATTLE CAMPAIGNS: Vietnam, 7

AWARDS: SS; BSM-2; MSM-6; AM; ARCOM-2; AOM; NDSM; VSM-6; ASR; OSR; VNPU; VNCM; CIB; MSTPRCHT; PFDRBAD; RGRT; G/SIDBAD

FOREIGN LANGUAGES:

<u>Language</u>	<u>Read</u>	<u>Speak</u>
Spanish	Fair	Fair

FIELDS OR AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: Ldrshp in Cohort Units; Activation of Organizations

PUBLICATIONS: "Leadership Transition Models", OE Center and School Journal, 78; "Goals and Objectives", OE Center and School Journal, 78

ORGANIZATIONS & SOCIETIES: Clemson Univ Alumni Assn; Clemson Univ Athletics Assn; Phi Alpha Theta; 10th Mountain Div Assn