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AFTER 40 YEARS, DOES NATO
HAVE TO CHANGE?
(AN EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE)

BY

COLONEL RUURD REITSMA

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NATO has underwritten an unprecedented period of peace in Europe. Many developments, however, indicate that NATO should have to change to sustain its success. This study seeks to find an answer on the need for change. It explores the kind of possible changes and concentrates on issues like: NATO after the INF-Treaty, East-West relations, Burden-sharing and political and economical developments in Europe. The role of Europe in relation to the interests and the position of the United States is studied in particular. The study also explores the more fundamental question if in the long term NATO itself will survive.

The study concludes with a long term outlook on NATO's possible structure and internal relationships.

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AFTER 40 YEARS, DOES NATO HAVE TO CHANGE? (An European Perspective)

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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AFTER 40 YEARS, DOES NATO HAVE TO CHANGE?
(An European Perspective)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The relationships between the individual members of NATO, in the almost 40 years of her existence, could be characterized as varying between intensively cooperative and sometimes completely opposing. Nevertheless, NATO is still able to hold the coalition together. In doing so, she has provided a major contribution in maintaining peace in Europe. A very important factor is the continued support of the majority of the people of the member states.

Many developments, however, indicate that internal relationships are going to change in the near future. These changes will be a result of different East-West relations, new developments in Europe, changing economic positions in the world, a general trend to decrease the defense budgets, the outcome of the debate on burden-sharing and last but not least a changing public opinion on defense matters.

These possible changes have to be related to a more fundamental question, namely if NATO itself will survive in a changing environment. To answer this question I will study the characteristics and the impact of the possible changes.

Since the end of 1986, the pace of the developments has increased remarkably under the influence of four central issues: NATO after the INF Treaty, East-West relations, the issue of burden-sharing within NATO and the political and economic developments in Europe itself.

Within the context of these issues, I will discuss the

nature of the expected changes in relationships within NATO. A description of these changing relationships cannot be complete unless all NATO members are taken into account individually. However, not all changes have the same impact on the future of NATO and I will restrict myself to the major ones. For that reason I will focus on the trans-atlantic relations and on a number of dominant multilateral and bilateral changes in relationships in Europe. Necessary changes in foreign policy and in public diplomacy will also be reviewed.

CHAPTER II

NATO AFTER THE INF-TREATY

Effects of the INF-Treaty.

The INF-Treaty, banning all United States and Soviet Union land-based medium-range and shorter-range missiles was without a doubt the major political event of 1987. This treaty removes a direct threat to the European population centers and critical military assets. For the first time the Soviet Union intermediate range missiles will no longer threaten Western Europe. However, even though the Soviet Union may have given up highly capable systems, it will not have removed from its target lists those NATO assets, which were covered by the surrendered systems.¹ Therefore, the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe is still present and has not been diminished by the INF-Treaty. The position on nuclear weapons will remain a point of divergence between official views and the consensus of public opinion. European Governments and public opinion as well have made it clear that deterrence in combination with arms control negotiations is the mixture that allows a balance between fear of nuclear weapons and support for deterrence. On this issue there is European consensus to the point of unanimity.²

Another very important factor in the INF-Treaty is that the Soviet Union must remove twice as many missiles and more than four times as many nuclear warheads as the United States. This asymmetry may be of vital significance in bringing about arms control agreements in other areas in which the Warsaw Pact also has superiority.

The stringent verification clauses, which are also part of the treaty have brought a breakthrough in the field of verification and a hopeful sign for other arms control agreements. The Treaty is also a major contribution in improving East-West relations and the West should take advantage of the improved relations to achieve a better balance of power in

Europe. The atmosphere of detente should also be used to enhance better relations in other areas. One of these areas is foreign trade with the Soviet-Union and the other East-bloc countries. Another area is a possible improvement of human rights in the Soviet Union.

The INF-Treaty certainly does not mean that the Alliance defense posture no longer relies on nuclear armaments. The Alliance strategy of flexibility in response remains basically the same. This strategy is based on NATO possessing both nuclear and conventional forces. However, without nuclear forces NATO ceases to have a credible strategy. The defense of Western Europe by American strategic arms will still remain unimpaired. In a post-INF world only strategic weapons will remain, which threaten the Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic. However, within NATO's strategy the removal of intermediate-range weapons will place greater weight on the conventional defense of Western Europe.

Conventional forces play a vital role in NATO's strategy too, but on their own they couldn't remove the threat of nuclear weapons. Both components must be strong enough and capable enough to convince the Warsaw Pact that aggression in Europe is not an option.

The present trend, after the INF-Treaty, is in favor of enhancing the West's conventional forces in Europe. Notwithstanding the recently announced unilateral withdrawal of Soviet forces, the Soviet Union continues to mass some two-thirds of its active duty forces in this theater.

Presence of United States forces in Europe.

Western Europe's lack of strategic depth, with its border directly connected to Warsaw Pact military power and without the option of going nuclear, make a permanent presence of a United States force indispensable. The American military presence in Europe is necessary not only in the negative sense as a deterrent to Soviet aggression but also in a positive sense of reassurance to the West-Europeans.³ The combination of these two

factors is basic to the creation of consensus within the Alliance. "The reassurance on which most Europeans rely, says Michael Howard, is the continued presence among them of US troops".⁴

"The role of US nuclear weapons in NATO's doctrine has come to symbolize the projection of American power to the European continent. This is far beyond whatever use might be made of these weapons".⁵ The Euro-American coupling does presuppose the existence of shared interests and basic attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic and a degree of consensus about the nature of the challenge or the threat. The main question remains: will Americans feel fundamentally threatened if something unforeseen happens in Western Europe. "Such a collective attitude has more force and value than all the doctrines and deployments of nuclear weaponry".⁶

On Europe's behalf; credibility thus depends less on nuclear logic - important as that is for reassurance - than on Western European images about American society and leadership.

Recently, a certain reawakening of latent American isolationism is recognized, first as a consequence of the American dissatisfaction with the contribution of the European allies and secondly because the emergence of new imperatives in American Foreign policy. There is obviously "a struggle within the American Foreign Policy Community between the "Atlanticists" and the "Hemispherists"-factions".⁷ The reorientation of US policy towards the Americas to counter the growing threat posed by communist infiltration in Central and South America is favored by the "Hemispherists".

In Europe, especially during the Reagan administration, one could recognize a rejection of United States' criticism and a growing disillusion with United States' leadership. This is caused by the initially disproportional anti-Soviet rhetoric, a badly promoted foreign policy, especially in the Americas and a number of incidents among the leadership in the United States (i.e. "Iran-gate").

Conflicting interests can harm the continuity and the credibility of the Alliance too. One of the conflict areas is a slightly different appreciation of NATO's strategy by the Europeans. The first priority of Europeans is to avoid a war, not to win a war.⁸ They want a conventional capability, which answers the implementation of the deterrence element in the strategy of flexibility in response. Many Europeans generally want a conventional capability sufficient to deny the Soviet Union a rapid victory. The implementation of the deterrence element in the strategy is emphasized primarily to avoid a war. The most troubling of questions should be "a trend leading to the acceptance of Europe as a battleground, a nightmare that Western Europe has always sought to avoid by relying upon the deterrent, that nuclear weapons provided".⁹ This nuclear deterrence is reinforced by the presence of United States forces in Europe.

The number of US forces in Europe has to be related not only to the military commitment, but also to the political presence of the United States in Europe. It is the super-power requirement of the United States to express its power position in Europe and in doing so to secure a voice in European political affairs. At the same time, it allows the United States a forward defense on European territory to limit the Soviet Union's expansion. The presence of United States' forces in Europe has as a consequence that "even if a president of the United States decided to sacrifice these Americans rather than begin using nuclear weapons, their fate would surely have more of an impact on his judgement, than would nuclear theory or abstruse notions about using nuclear weapons based in Western Europe before they could be overrun by advancing Warsaw Pact troops".¹⁰

"The much discussed "European alternative" a proposed regrouping of the West-European nations around the pillar of Franco-German military cooperation and under the umbrella of French (and British) nuclear deterrents has only modest value as a counterweight to Soviet military power on the continent".¹¹ That makes this alternative doubtful.

How will the described current situation have an impact on

future relationships? Mutual political acknowledgement, that the presence of US troops in Europe still remains essential for good trans-atlantic relationships, is key for future developments. This presence is a vital interest for both sides of the Atlantic. The number of forces will be subject for reconsideration and negotiations. However, a smaller number of US troops without a timely secured alternative replacement, will decrease the nuclear threshold and bring nuclear deterrence closer. It is a national decision of the United States how the presence of its forces in Europe will look. Whatever decision may be taken, Europeans will always look at the real strength and capabilities in relation to the chances of successfully avoiding a war in Europe. I think that a broad political consensus can be reached for the next decade. In the long term the presence of US troops will be more effected by the development of the other elements of power. For example, an economically stronger Europe will highly affect the willingness of the United States to maintain a substantial military presence in Europe. Crucial for any presence in Europe will be a continuous and outspoken support of the people on both sides of the Atlantic.

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CHAPTER III

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

"Glasnost" and "Perestroika".

It appears that the Soviet Union is entering a period of transformation and reform under the leadership of President Gorbachev. The signing of the INF-Treaty, the withdrawal of Soviet Forces from Afghanistan and the recently announced unilateral measures with regard to force reductions in Central Europe and the announced banning of all chemical weapons are indications of remarkable changes in Soviet foreign policy. However, these policy changes have not yet been reflected in the national or military strategy or in the size of the forces. The very well presented objectives of "Glasnost" and "Perestroika" are not aimed to transform the Soviet Union into a more western style political system, but to bring greater economic and industrial efficiency to the Soviet Union as a marxist-leninist state.

This characteristic of the Soviet Union brings me back to the roots of Marxism in trying to find an answer to "Glasnost" and "Perestroika". The philosophic theory of Marxism is based on dialectical materialism. Historic materialism, or the materialistic interpretation of history, is simply dialectical materialism applied to the particular field of human relations within the society.¹ In this theory, the principle that governs all human relations is the production of the means to support life. The productive conditions taken as a whole constitute the economic structure of a society and form the material basis on which a superstructure of laws and political institutions is based. The economic system of society, the so called substructure, always provides the real basis; and religion, ethics, laws, and institutions of society are a superstructure built upon and determined by it.² After a long period of failing 5-years plans and an absolutely centralized structure of

government, supported by a very strong military as the principal element, the gap between the economic substructure and the governmental superstructure has widened. To avoid a new "social revolution" in the long term it was absolutely necessary to change policies in the Soviet Union. I think that a policy of "Glasnost" and "Perestroika" is related directly to the above described basic elements of the Marxist Theory.

The key player in this process is President Gorbachev. He sees himself as a man of action, not one of empty words. The recently unilaterally announced withdrawal of 10,000 tanks in Eastern-Europe and the destruction of chemical agents are again proof of this attitude. Gorbachev is pursuing the national interests of the Soviet Union not those of the Alliance, however, some of these interests are mutual.³ Gorbachev's success depends on the Euro/Asian geography, Russian history, ideology and if Soviet Military power will persist. In any case "Glasnost" and "Perestroika" will constitute a rather unstable mixture.

Currently it is Mr Gorbachev's internal reform that is causing the most interest. There can be little doubt that his prime concern is not so much "revolutionizing" Soviet society as making the system work more efficiently. Central to Gorbachev's strategy is keeping the military content. If they remain on his side then he will not suffer Khrushnev's fate. He must move to reduce the great burden of arms expenditure without antagonizing the military. This can be accomplished most successfully by an arms control agreement.

The Soviet's supremacy in numbers allows a decreased pace of the production of military equipment. After all, the Wehrmacht overran the west in 1940 with about 2700 tanks while the pact now has more than 15,000 tanks in Europe.⁴ With a lower production rate, in combination with the results of the arms control negotiations, defense expenditures could be channelled more into further technological improvements. In fact, a similar policy is used in many NATO countries where quality is emphasized above quantity. This policy will solve two problems for Gorbachev, namely how to spend more on re-equipping the Soviet

industry, while simultaneously keeping the military on his side. The latter could be established if the technological improvements are used in military equipment.

It is my impression that in the discussion on the outcome of Gorbachev's initiatives European publics tend to focus more on the political intentions and possibilities of these new policies than on the still available military capabilities. The Soviet Union should, however, not be allowed to drive a wedge between the United States and its Allies or among the European Allies.

The German question.

In this context, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) plays a key role in the European theater, due to its dominant interest in good East-West relations. The success of the so called "Ostpolitik" initiated by then Chancellor Willy Brandt is directed on reducing the tensions between the FRG and the German Democratic Republic (GDR).⁵ The ultimate goal is to create an atmosphere, which offers a perspective for a solution of the "German Question" (Some kind of unification of both Germanies). The German question has in fact been transformed into many German questions such as the desired nation or state, a reunification or an integration and the consequences for stability and security in Europe. Each of these questions deserves a separate study, but the problem of stability and security in Europe raises the more problematic issues with regard to future Alliance relations. From Germany's perspective, a supra-national integration of Europe, within the context of the European Community, has not occurred. Neither are the sources of antipathy and distrust between the two Germany's diminished. This, by and large is a result of the deterrence strategy of the Alliance and the protracted arms control negotiations.

A disturbing factor is that both the FRG and the GDR have assumed positions of political and economic preeminence within their respective blocs. Also, in the opposing military blocs, both Germanies are dominant forces in Europe. All these factors dominate the relations between these countries. In the Alliance,

due to their very strong position, West Germans have begun to voice the expectations that they have earned a more active support for their efforts to end the separation of families associated with the ongoing division of Europe.

Another factor is becoming evident. The younger part of the population is no longer inclined toward an uncritical acceptance of American dominance in European affairs. This feeling, shared by many on the European continent, exists because the image of the United States has changed. Different attitudes by Americans toward Europeans and US Foreign policy, misunderstood or ill supported, have contributed to that image. Anyway there is a trend in the FRG toward a more independent diplomatic action in security affairs.

How the relationship of the Germans in the two German states will be shaped is not easy to predict. It seems that, especially among the younger generation, the FRG is accepted by her citizens as their state. A key item will always be the relations between both Germanies. The better the relations, the more the fundamental issues will vanish. However, any change in East-West relations will affect the "German Question" and as such influence the relationships in NATO.

Economic relations.

The strengthening of the economic conditions in the Soviet Union requires a different approach to the economic super powers of the world, in particular to the United States, Japan and Western Europe. For that reason the Soviet's military threat has to be masked and a climate of cooperative relationships with the countries involved has to be created.

The current situation is that in particular the FRG and the BENELUX-countries, but also some other European countries, have used the improved East-West relationships to expand in high tempo their trade relations with the East bloc countries. This, in combination with the already supplied credits to the Soviet Union by major European allies, has lead to reactions in the United States and put pressure on the internal relations.

The generous attitude of the FRG, the United-Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands in providing credits of almost 7 billion dollars was criticized in the US press. Senator Bradley's summarized statement included: "We like the consumptions and the investments to be extracted from the Soviet Union's defense budget and not from the saving accounts of Europeans". The Reagan administration has emphasized again and again to avoid all Western transfer of technology and know-how usable for defense improvement in the Soviet Union. Richard Perle, the former Under Secretary of Defense earmarked any transaction with the Soviet-Union as a Western subsidy to the Soviet forces.

On the surface, every Western aid is indeed a contribution to reinforce the opponent. However, this is too simple an approach in the European view and is based on the acknowledgement of only military relationships between East and West. The recently concluded credits and trade agreements are all related to civilian branches of industry, such as clothing, provisions, transport, wood and paper. This is obviously not a direct contribution to the defense sector and fits in the same category as the more or less annual wheat transactions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

There are other important arguments in favor of trade relations with the Soviet Union. In the first place, the amount of money is relatively small compared to the overall foreign debt of almost 40 billion dollars. That is almost 4 % of the GNP of the Soviet Union and much less than the estimated national budget deficit of about 60 billion dollars. Due to the decreased oil prices, the Soviet Union gained 65 billion dollars less in their most important source of foreign currencies.⁶ So Gorbachev has to look for other means.

Secondly, the choice of the area of investments and the priority between defense and consumers is a choice to be made in Moscow. In the past, there was no clear relationship between the economic perspectives and the amount of defense expenditures. Gorbachev's strategy aims on a restructuring of the entire economy and no longer a restructuring only based on the possible

subset of the defense expenditures. He describes in his book "Perestroika" that the scientific-technological revolution has to happen in all sectors of the industry. The "spin-off" has to go more from the civil to the defense sector than in the opposite direction.⁷

A third factor, in judging the economic traffic with the Soviet Union is how the system will make use of the credits and the trade. As long as "Perestroika" does not include a market-economic mechanism and does not allow financial-economic considerations, there are minimal chances on a remarkable economic growth. Bureaucrats have to be replaced by investors making cost and profit calculations. This requires a structural change in the price system for goods. Realistic prices with non-socialist countries have to be established and exchange rates are necessary. The current credits have only a permanent value if these major changes in the economic structure of the Soviet-Union occur.

All these reasons make Europeans evaluate trade relations with the Soviet-Union in a different manner than very often expressed in the United States. Nevertheless, it is very important to communicate on this subject, because an improved Soviet economy can have stabilizing and destabilizing tendencies. A stabilizing effect would be greater interdependency between Western and East-bloc economies, although it may be destabilizing in power relations among the super-powers. This makes clear, why the United States focuses more on the present (military) capabilities. It signals that in spite of "Glasnost" and "Perestroika" the weapon production in the Soviet Union hasn't decreased yet and the Soviet-Union continues to expand their military supremacy. Maybe it is still too early already to expect results from "Perestroika", because the ongoing 12th five-year plan (1986-1990) in the Soviet Union is under a still rigidly executed planned economy model.

Consequences.

"For the Alliance governments it will be important, with the

current developments in mind, to show that they can resist the temptation to use the improved international situation as an excuse for postponing difficult decisions. A period of detente of uncertain duration may not be the easiest moment to establish and communicate a consistent and convincing set of policies for the years ahead. But it may be the time when we need these policies most. One of these policies is to reaffirm or to readjust our present strategy".⁸ Within the framework of this strategy the highest priority has to be given to the formulation of the long term goals for a asymmetrical reduction as a basis for East-West arms control agreements. NATO has no illusions that the arms control agenda it has already set is anything more than an ambitious one. Strength and Alliance solidarity are the key to successful negotiations with the Russians. Arms control requires unity of doctrine and a permanent consultation of all NATO members. The framework for the consultations remains NATO's strategy for the years ahead.

Keeping the relationships in good shape requires a better understanding between the United States and Europe on the different ways how to use the improved East-West relations. Living between two super-powers affects foreign policies of each of the sovereign countries in Europe in a different way than the foreign policy of one of the opposing super-powers.

Europe will always show a tendency to make maximum use of improved East-West relationships to establish a stabilizing effect in the power relations in the world. The United States will measure improved relations in terms of real effects on the current balance of power and will propose or take measures to minimize the negative effects as a consequence of its point of view. A good understanding of each others characteristics is essential to understand the possible different attitudes towards East-West relations and provides the basis for future relationships in the Alliance.

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CHAPTER IV

BURDEN-SHARING

The burden-sharing debate.

Since the foundation of NATO, the contribution of the United States to the Alliance has often been considered as a substantial and direct assistance as long as the Europeans weren't able to take care of their own defense. The political and military presence in Europe also showed an involved world power defending the Western world against the Soviet threat. Politically burden-sharing is an important issue in integrated alliances. Especially if the members devote a substantial portion of their military effort to common security objectives. Currently, the term burden-sharing is more often used in the United States for the commonly viewed disproportionally large American contribution to NATO. These concerns explain why much of the burden-sharing literature has been produced by Americans and focuses on NATO.

If we want to examine burden-sharing in an alliance from a normative point of view, equality is not a fruitful concept, because nations differ in their ability to share burdens. Burden-sharing involves much more than just the burden of the budgetary contributing to a collective defense. This latter aspect, however, has attracted most attention. Especially, if a member state has to deal with this issue against the background of a deficit or a decreasing defense budget. Of course, with respect to solidarity and cohesion, an equitable contribution of the members remains a prerequisite. The comparison of defense expenditure as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) is interesting and a good instrument to exert a little pressure on one another, but is misleading in character. Based on the most recent figures on defense expenditures of the NATO countries, US and European spending patterns should not be expected to converge. This is because they are fundamentally different, even with a zero growth in US defense expenditures in Fiscal Year

1989. The reason for these differences is twofold. In the first place, the United States is a global power, while its allies are regional actors. Secondly, American decision makers cannot exact a significantly different distribution of burdens by coercion. A possible lever of the unilateral withdrawal of (parts of) United States troops from Europe has other severe implications and has to be placed in an overall concept of strategy and arms control.¹

Over time, the United States also differs from the other members in NATO by its fluctuating expenditure patterns due to policy changes. On the other hand, one finds rather consistent extractive burdens over time among smaller members of the alliance. Between 1972 and 1988 US allies chose their priorities consistently and independently. Moreover it is expected this pattern will continue.²

Differences in ranking of all the individual nations occur if the GNP-percentages are not presented in absolute terms but in terms of defense expenditures per capita. Another comparison can be presented based on the differences in income per capita after the defense bills are paid. However, how interesting a ranking may be, financial reality shows, for the majority of the member states, that an increase in defense expenditures is now unlikely. For the time being the member states have to be satisfied with a more modest growth.

A new approach.

In order to make the overall contribution of each country more comparable, a new approach in NATO on burden-sharing has been introduced. The new and broader term addresses the sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities (and not least: the benefits). This is a very complex issue because of the number of quantitative and non-quantitative elements, which have to be taken into account. The contribution in money, making people and space available, accepting limitations in personal freedom or quality of life, different degrees of exposure or vulnerability and braving internal and external tensions are all part of the burden.³ It is a good thing that the broadening of the term

burden-sharing will put less emphasis on discussions on spending and more on output comparison. This will provide additional chances for a more equitable distribution of burdens.

The most vital and fruitful approach is to improve the return of the spending. NATO countries will have to put more effect than ever before into many forms of cooperation. This has to be in the field of research and development, on production and purchase of material, cooperation in maintenance, in training, in achieving a fair contribution and implementation of the operational tasks, and also cooperation in the event of out-of-area crisis. This is the way how improvements may be achieved, but this has a serious impact on leadership and relations within NATO.

Research and development.

I will continue focusing on the costs for research and development and will also give some thought to task specialization. The costs for Research and Development (R&D) of new weapon systems are closely related to the national defense industrial complexes and influenced by the national policy on industrial participation in defense projects. Improvement of the so called "Two way street", a more or less equal participation in defense equipment projects between European and United States industries, is very important for future relationships between the NATO members. On the United States side, R&D cooperation among the allies has for the first time been institutionalized in US law; with the Nunn-amendment (Section 1103 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986).⁴

One of the lessons of the implementation of the Nunn-Amendment is that industrial teaming, for a variety of reasons, may prove to be the only way to truly develop a "two way street" for defense trade between the US and Europe. Teaming is moving away from the licensing of developed technology to a spirit of international cooperation in the early development process. Industrial teaming can be established based on the initiative of the industries involved or as a result of close cooperation of

those countries, which have a common interest in developing a new weapon system of another kind of military equipment. Although some progress has been made in NATO bodies dealing with cooperation, inter-operability and standardization of military equipment, much has to be done to achieve a more equitable participation of the national industries involved.

It is clear that the Nunn-initiative has generated more political will in the United States to achieve new levels of cooperation in armaments R&D. Finally, there may be "some meaning to the familiar words Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability" between the United States and the other NATO-members.⁵

A key item is the way national governments will be successful to subordinate the interest of the national defense industry to the necessity to get more value for the defense expenditures. I will discuss this aspect later under economic perspectives.

Task specialization.

The issue of task specialization will also be part of the burden-sharing discussions. This debate will primarily take place between the European partners. Especially the smaller countries will be forced to discuss their future defense posture. Due to the increasing costs for armament and operations and maintenance it could become impossible to equip all the service components adequately. In such a case the contribution to the alliance could be more efficient if a certain degree of task specialization between those countries would take place. This type of task specialization has to be related to the current missions of (parts of) the service components. National sovereignty and the related possibility to safeguard the national integrity will be dominant factors in the national discussions. Success in task specialization will primarily depend on the possibilities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in Europe.

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CHAPTER V

THE EUROPEAN PILLAR

European identity.

Very often the Alliance is compared with a bridge spanning the Atlantic and supported on an European and a North- American pillar. Burden-sharing addresses the quality of the pillars, which support the bridge safely and efficiently.

In recent years, European allies established a more recognizable European identity in defense matters. The political discussions on the employment of cruise missiles, the INF-Treaty, the out-of-area activities in the GULF and a not very sufficient two way street policy in trans-atlantic armaments cooperation have stimulated this tendency and intensified the European defense cooperation. Much of the cooperation takes place in bilateral and regional relationships or in groupings established for special projects. Three European organizations play a major role in the defense cooperation in Europe.

The Western European Union (WEU) founded in 1954, at the heart of which is a commitment by the signatories to afford one another all the military aid in their power, should one of them be the object of an armed attack in Europe. The WEU underwent a major reactivation in 1984 and since then the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the 7 member nations have met every six months to discuss defense and security issues of significance to Western Europe. The WEU, however, is essentially a political body and doesn't have an integrated military structure. Therefore, the WEU is not in the position to implement strictly military measures. To enhance or to facilitate the military cooperation the existing NATO structure has to be chosen. Another possibility is the use of bilateral or multilateral cooperation. Examples of political cooperation in the WEU to establish military actions are the combined operation in the GULF, the initiatives to create a Franco-German brigade in the FRG and - very recently - actions to

study a multinational division in a covering force role for NATO.¹ Notwithstanding the present structure of the WEU, it cannot be excluded that the role of this institute will change in a more competitive mode to NATO or to the North American allies. The structure of the WEU is currently a subject of discussion.

The two other European organizations, the Eurogroup and the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), are more embedded in the NATO structure than the WEU.

The Eurogroup, established in 1968, aims to ensure that the contribution, which its 12 members make to NATO's defense, is as strong and cohesive as possible. Defense Ministers meet every 6 months and discuss major defense and security issues.

The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) was established in 1976. The IEPG aims to promote European cooperation in research and development and production of defense equipment to improve trans-atlantic armament cooperation and to help maintain a healthy European defense industrial and technological base. Since 1987 the Defense Ministers of the 13 member nations met about once a year.

All these organizations seek to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance and to reinforce the work of NATO. Up until now NATO remains the central forum in which all important decisions about collective security are taken. The differences in size, power and geography between Europe and the United States can, however, produce different perspectives, which can result in another process of decision making in Europe. Such a process can take place inside and outside NATO as well.

A look at the limitations of the description of NATO's territory will illustrate this. It was the United States, that insisted on the charter's description of NATO's territory. The main reason was the colonial interests, some members still had in that time frame. The United States wanted to exclude any involvement of NATO in decolonization processes. NATO's current territory is therefore directly related to maintain the European territorial integrity. World-wide security interests as these have developed over time are not connected to the charter of

NATO. Out-of-area actions will serve another goal than territorial integrity. These are primarily related to safeguard common interests or to promote the same values. The more differences in interests or values between the member countries, the more problems arise to use NATO for out-of-area actions. The limited scope of NATO in the world order also determines a future existence of the Alliance.

Sharing the same interests in the world by a number of NATO-members does not mean, that these interests automatically are NATO-interests. In such cases other connections than NATO-bonds are preferable to safeguard the shared interests. Multilateral or bilateral relations outside NATO will very often provide a possible solution for these problems.

Multilateral relationships.

Most of the multilateral relationships in Europe are embodied in the prescribed European institutions. France, also a member of the WEU, has thereby a commitment for military support of the other WEU members in case of an attack on one of the other members. The successful establishment of a joint French-German brigade resulted initially in a different approach to a possible European defense organization. President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl invited the other European countries to join a platform for a broader European defense community. This invitation was rejected by the other European countries and in particular by the other WEU-members, because of the recognized danger of undermining NATO's cohesion.² NATO provides a solid military structure and there is no need for a European back-up structure. The WEU has to serve as an European advisory body within NATO. The function of WEU is best described by Dr Dov Zakheim on the "New" Western European Union: "WEU appears to be providing for greater intra-European cooperation to supplement the contribution of the United States to the defense of Europe. To the extent that France is further entwined into the defense of Central Europe, to the extent other Europeans are somewhat relieved of their nightmare of nuclear free Europe, and, most

importantly, to the extent that Europeans are seen to take their defense requirements seriously enough to justify continuing America's level of effort in Europe".³

The revival of the WEU was stimulated by the success of naval deployments by five of the WEU nations to the GULF, with active support of the other nations. The consultation of the European member states during the process of negotiations on the INF Treaty was another stimulating factor. The consultations among the European allies looked more like discussions between Europe and the United States, than like consultations of individual sovereign countries. The WEU assessed this process as an indication for possible changes in the procedure for deliberations in NATO. Discussions among the European members has to be followed by a discussion between "Europe" and "North America". Of course, in the final decision making the sovereign position of the individual members should be respected.

The WEU itself presents only a part of Europe, because its membership doesn't include all European allies in NATO. The first steps of WEU will be to improve the organizational structure, i.e. the rationalization of the organization and co-location of the administration. All members of WEU intend to intensify the use of WEU and improve the exchange and harmonization of views.⁴ WEU will continue with biannual joint meetings of Defense and Foreign Ministers and will select specific items to discuss. Two already selected areas are logistics and medical support.

As a consequence of its prescribed role, WEU must discuss if its membership should be extended to other European countries. A more complete European view would be achieved if all European NATO members were members of WEU too. The clause of mutual military assistance however, can cause additional problems in case of a local European conflict between some of the members. A good example is a possible conflict between Turkey and Greece.

The discussion on the membership of WEU will also be stimulated by the developments in the European Community. A WEU with more member states has the growth potential to be not only a

platform to discuss security matters but also to discuss the use of other elements of power. Along these lines a strong European pillar will become reality.

Bilateral relationships.

The Alliance also has several bilateral relationships. Some of these are dominantly politically oriented, such as the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, others are more task or mission oriented. A third category is a rich variety of other relationships. Most of these are related to the development of armaments and procurement issues.

I like to focus on a specific and most interesting bilateral relationship. This is the relation between the FRG and France, which I suspect could have a major impact on future relations in NATO.

In 1982 Helmut Schmidt and Francois Mitterrand agreed on an exchange of views on security problems.⁵ Ministers of defense and foreign affairs would have regular meetings and working groups on armaments, political-strategic affairs (threat assessment and arms control), military cooperation (exercises, logistics and training) were established. Since then, these dialogues have helped to build a greater degree of mutual confidence and consensus regarding security matters. Improved French capabilities for potential participation in the forward defense of West Germany, with the so called "Force d'action rapide", has not only an impact on the security of the FRG, but also on the defense posture of NATO. A major development has been an unprecedented French decision on consultation about the use of tactical nuclear weapons.⁶ This is especially important with respect to the planning of possible tactical targets on German soil. It also offers a perspective on some coordination between the United States and France on the use of nuclear weapons in this theater.

The other discussion items between the French and the Germans are more or less the same items as discussed in NATO and in the West-European fora. The bilateral context with France also

German delegations. In general, Germany's closer connection with France should be welcomed. It might help to draw that country, which withdrew from NATO's military integrated command structure in 1966, more strongly in NATO's military posture.

Interesting is that many Frenchmen have interpreted the INF-Treaty as a confirmation of the need to strengthen Western Europe's defense capabilities and to work more closely with the FRG in particular.⁷

The German-Franco relationship has also initiated other bilateral contacts in the military structure, such as the Dutch initiative to establish a joined Dutch-German division and similar contacts between the United-Kingdom and the FRG. All these initiatives are welcomed in NATO, especially in the Central Sector. In this theater an Army corps is the highest army level at which NATO military organizations maintain national integrity. Consequently, the contribution of the nations to NATO's army components is more or less prioritized by the requirements of the forward deployed corps. A contribution to the needs of a higher operational NATO level, for example in units of command and control systems, very often get a lower priority. The more elements of a visible integrated structure, the easier it will be to achieve a more balanced contribution to the Alliance. A second argument to welcome more bilateral relationships within NATO is that these kind of relations are easier to establish, show more involvement of the partners and do very often offer faster results. In short, a good means to improve NATO.

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CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

Europe 1992.

The allies pledge to eliminate conflicts in their international economic policies is also part of the Treaty. However, a degree of conflict is inevitable among nations in the competitive Western economic system. Economic parity between the United States and Western Europe inevitable has led to trade tensions. There is a growing concern that intensification of these tensions between North America and Western Europe would seriously affect the trans-atlantic partnership. In 1992 the European Community will open all internal borders of the member countries and bring down the existing tariff barriers. In the United States some fear has been expressed about the possible negative effects of "1992" for this country as related to its future share of the world trade.¹ New tariff barriers between Europe and the United States could be a result of the restructuring of the European internal trade.

The purpose of 1992 is, however, to remove internal borders not to erect new external ones. The perspective on 1992 and its expected effects has given a new elan to all West European countries. The confidence in their strength has increased and a more business like behavior seems in effect by the Governments. The attitude towards the United States will be much more assured. Towards the Soviet Union and the other East bloc countries a more independent foreign policy could be the result. The effect of confidence building could be reinforced if the long term estimates on world economic developments would be confirmed. If the world order of economic super powers would change at the end of this century in favor of Japan and Europe, the relationships in the Alliance will also be affected. Possible changes have to be expected in executing leadership and internal relations between individual members or geographically divided parts of the

Alliance.

Economic relations and defense spending.

According to widely available US Department of Defense figures from 1965 to 1985, NATO out spent the Warsaw Pact on defense every single year. In 1980 the gap was \$20 billion (Fiscal Year 1987 dollars) in NATO's favor. By 1985 it had opened to \$120 billion in NATO's favor, a superiority of 36%.² This amount of money is comparable with roughly six times West Germany's annual defense budget. There are of course uncertainties in such comparisons induced by the Eastern secrecy and the Western violent fluctuations in exchange rates.

Another interesting figure is, that NATO defense spending has increased by over a third in real terms since the late 1970's.³ The Western dominance in spending has, however, not resulted in a quantitative dominance over or even an equilibrium with the Warsaw Pact.

The disparity in numbers between NATO and The Warsaw Pact arises not because of what NATO spends, but how NATO spends. In the West the costs per unit between generations of major weapon systems such as aircraft, tanks and ships tends to increase 6 - 10 per cent faster than the rate of inflation.⁴ The costs depend heavily on the procurement mode a Ministry of Defense has chosen. Such a ministry can use "a spectrum of alternative procurement modes. These modes go from domestic design and production, through collaborative design, to off-the-shelf import of weapons, designed and produced abroad. Costs tend to fall as one moves along this spectrum. For a variety of reasons NATO countries prefer to be towards the expensive end of the spectrum in an effort to protect domestic industries".⁵ It is, however, much easier to set out the alternatives than to make the choice.

NATO has also opted for "the very expensive approach of having relatively few but highly paid troops, equipped with very costly non-interoperable weapons produced in very small numbers by separate national defense industries, after duplication or

triplication of development expenditure".⁶ Arms control might lead NATO to reassess the advantages associated with this pattern, the disadvantages are well known. In any case Ministers of Finance are likely to oppose increased expenditures in the absence of reform. Coming to terms with costs will be a central issue to any reconfiguration of NATO forces.

In economic terms, the NATO partners could spend a lot more if they should wish to do so. It is a matter of circumstances and priorities. An extreme example is that during the Second World war the United Kingdom devoted over half of its GNP to defense. The Soviet Union is currently estimated to spend between 10 and 20 per cent of its national income this way.⁷ There are, however, economic costs on defense spending. Money spent on defense is not used elsewhere to provide desirable outputs. Another effect is that an unbalanced defense spending reduces economic growth in the long term, as the Soviets have found.

Budgetary choices may also be influenced by Alliance pressure. Even with the same level of defense spending in NATO it must be possible to get more output of the defense expenditures. This can be achieved only by avoiding unnecessary costs. Another factor that could improve the output is using the outcome of arms control negotiations in terms of costs. The argument that removal of nuclear weapons should lead to more money being spent on defense is familiar. Nuclear weapons are seen as a cheap source of firepower.⁸ Without these the conventional imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be more threatening and would need to be remedied by increased NATO spending on conventional forces to maintain the same deterrence.

On the other hand the argument that the removal of nuclear weapons should lead to less spending is equally straightforward. An arms control agreement raises the threshold between the opposing parties. It would ratify a degree of coexistence and reduced probability of conflict and signal a lower threat.⁹ In these circumstances the European countries could maintain the same security, while spending less on defense.

The impact of arms control on the level of spending will

also be subject to influence relationships between the United States and the West-European allies. The costs for nuclear weapons for the United States and the European countries are different. The Europeans are primarily confronted with the costs of infrastructure, while the costs on the American side are more related to the costs of the weaponry itself. It is within the current budgetary constraints more probable that the Europeans will tend to the "less threat"-model and are not willing to increase substantially their defense budgets.

The economic revenues of the national defense expenditures will be one of the dominant factors in future relationships. This will carry much more weight if the economic developments of Europe and the United States should come to diverge. The success of the already discussed "Two way street policy" will also depends on these factors. Nevertheless each country decides itself how much to spend on defense in the light of its domestic calculations and the alliance interactions.

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CHAPTER VII

PUBLIC OPINION

Public support.

"Absent any measurable degree of consensus the public opinion of an alliance is little more than a patchwork of attitudes and beliefs that reflects the diversity of audiences present. There are first distinctive national audiences defined by the socio-cultural and linguistic peculiarities of their respective countries. Then there are, within each country, those characteristic groupings within the policy that are defined by their awareness of and involvement in public affairs - elite opinion makers, the attentive public and the mass (largely inattentive) public".¹ Walter Lippman (1920) said "we must further assume that the public is intermittent and inexperienced in its curiosity; that it discerns only gross distinctions, is slow to be aroused and quickly diverted; it personalizes whatever it considers, and is interested only when events have been melodramatized as a conflict".²

In his article Gregory D. Foster recognizes two divisive and unprecedented trends³:

- a transatlantic psychological gulf brought on by the deep seated mood shifts among American and European elites and mass public alike;
- an increasing intrusion of the mass public.

As Western publics become more aware and active politically, they will insert themselves ever more vigorously into the affairs of state. At the moment the cohesion of the atlantic alliance is challenged by a concerted Soviet psychological offensive. All new developments in East-West relations are tests of confidence among the allies. This confidence is also threatened by a declining image of the United States. In opinion surveys this is one of the more striking features of recent polls. "While it is difficult to tell

who is leading whom in these evaluations of American policies and politics, one would not have to search long to find official expression of doubt - and pique - about the consistency and direction of US foreign and security policy".⁴

This illustrates one of the weak points in the Alliance. Notwithstanding a general public support for NATO membership, political leaders in general are not very successful in "selling" NATO policies to the public. The influence of extra parliamentary movements like the peace movement plays an important role in communication with the public. It also poses a direct threat to the legitimacy of parliamentary politics. A specific element in the lack of communication between the governments and the public is the area of nuclear capabilities. "Nuclear weapons, after all, frighten and outrage many of our citizens for precisely the same reason that they deter generals and political leaders"⁵, but deterrence has to be explained to the public as long as nuclear deterrence remains a cornerstone of European security. A disturbing factor in the approach of the public on deterrence strategies is, that public opinion is a mix of ideas on all assets of nuclear power. This includes nuclear energy and nuclear weapons as well. The Tsjernobyl accident, for example, has dramatically influenced the general attitude in Europe towards the use of nuclear weapons. Public's greater ambivalence about the ultimate role of nuclear weapons plays an important role and can't be neglected.

The demands for increasing defense budgets in an obviously less threatening East-West atmosphere present another major impact on public opinion. For both key items in NATO's security policy, deterrence and substantial defense budgets, it is absolutely necessary that governments obtain broad public support. Otherwise the still available broad support for NATO will be affected.

An urgent redressive strategy must be a coordinated public diplomacy aimed squarely at the publics of the Alliance rather than the elites, and keyed to the criteria of cumulative consensus building.⁶ The bonds within NATO have to be based on

political consensus and this can only be accomplished based on a broad public support.

Public diplomacy.

The alliance must decide in concert on a strategy that can stand up to the public scrutiny and win broad public support.⁷ To develop a public diplomacy is one of the urgent needs of the Alliance. Such a diplomacy can be developed along the lines, which Warren Christopher, US Deputy Secretary of State has indicated.⁸

The major elements of such a public diplomacy are: propaganda, information and cultural exchange. These instruments provide the necessary means to ensure that:

- other nations more accurately understand the United States, its values, institutions and policies;
- the understanding by the United States of other nations and of interrelationships with them is informed and accurate;
- mutual understanding is bolstered by collaborative individual and institutional relationships across cultural lines;
- when international policies of US government are formed the values, interests and priorities of publics abroad are taken into account.

A public diplomacy along these lines fits every NATO ally, but also shows where improvements can be made and how the Alliance can be strengthened. One of the elements in the suggested public diplomacy will restrain Western governments in its execution. This element is the use of propaganda, based on the existing appraisal of it. A better understanding of propaganda has to be established, because most people view propaganda as an unallowed means. They make difference between the truth and propaganda. The question is how to explain the difference between our truth and the Soviet's truth. Both blocs, the East and the West, claim to have the truth. Our objective has to be to convince the people that our truth is the preferred point of view. When propaganda is used in this way, it becomes more a form of civic education. This transition is very well put

into words by Terrence H. Qualter: "The standard of education is the truth of the material in the light of available knowledge. The standard of propaganda is the purpose behind the teaching. Where the purpose is achieved by the teaching of what is believed to be the truth then the result is both propaganda and education".⁹ In any case NATO as an institution has to present more identity, which could be recognized by a broad public.

Regrettably the relationship of NATO's security policy to public opinion has not been explored in depth. "Public opinion actually may be the "fulcrum" of alliance cohesion" and one of the key factors for good relationships in NATO.¹⁰

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CHAPTER VIII

IN SUMMARY, NATO'S FUTURE

How will relationships in NATO develop and is there still a future for the Alliance? These are the two basic questions NATO will be confronted with in the next decades. Let me give some citations to start with:

Thomas Etzold: "Realism in alliance's affairs requires recognition that no alliance is permanent."¹

George Bush: "What ever consensus we arrive at, I can assure our allies that America has no intention of "de-coupling" or weakening our commitment to the European defense. NATO is the best investment in peace we have ever made".²

"A country's foreign policy should rightly aim to protect that country's interests. The interest that underpins any foreign policy must be national security".³ Security against external threat is one of the basic reasons for statehood. Security is also the primary purpose around which alliances are built. A further consequence is that as countries power and influence alter in relation to other states so will their security interests and their need for alliances.

NATO was primarily built to limit the Soviet Union's expansion and influence in Europe. After 40 years one can conclude, that NATO has been rather successful in accomplishing this goal. Another specific goal of the United States has always been to generate a prosperous and more unified Europe. This goal also seems to be accomplished. Europe is prosperous and especially economically more unified. Reasons enough for the United States to express that it has to diminish its exceeding contribution to NATO. This attitude is reinforced by the current economical circumstances, the necessity to decrease the defense expenditures and to meet the economical challenges of the future, partly caused by the determined approach of the economic

perspectives by the Europeans.

The current NATO strategy of flexibility in response has been, up until now, a viable and a credible deterrence strategy. As long as deterrence plays a dominant role in establishing peace, there will be a basis for a similar strategy and an alliance. The question is, which partner can provide the necessary nuclear component in such an alliance. A greater French involvement in the military posture of NATO will be a logical consequence of the current developments. Especially the bilateral relationships with the FRG reinforce this process. However, the French policy of national independence will block a European security policy depending on the French nuclear capabilities as a deterrent. Neither will there be that role for the United-Kingdom or any other European power.

One of the very strong characteristics of the Alliance is that it has brought together all different European sovereign countries under the same conditions and on a basis of equality. Europe's history shows that every time one of the European countries developed a dominant position, this resulted in a series of conflicts. The different contributions of the members have of course an impact on the influence in the Alliance, but not on the status of a member.

These facts and the need for deterrence require an alliance with the United States. There is no alternative for the Europeans other than to couple their security interests with those of the United States. The question remains however, if this connection will continue to be within the framework of the current strategy and if it will be characterized by the same relations. An adjusted strategy with a greater West-European self-reliance in defense would be desirable. This balanced relationship between the United States and West-Europe (i.e. diminished West European dependence on the United States) would be a more robust and enduring structure for Western Security in the long term.

An important factor in developing such a strategy is the role of the FRG in the Alliance. Until now Germany has been the

European partner, which has provided the most fruitful cooperation in both the industrial and military fields. The future will depend largely upon the choice of Germany between assuring its role in a more united Europe and succumbing to the temptation of a reunified and neutralized Germany.

The future of the United States in the Alliance will be dominated by the question if this country is prepared to continue being an "European power". This choice of the United States does depend on national answers to frequently expressed ideas like "The job is done in Europe", "There are other needs...", "Europe first does not mean Europe only, especially taking into account the obviously present ingratitude of Europe" and "How will Europe act in "out-of-area-problems". It is not simple to predict the answers to these questions. In any case, a broad public has to be convinced by these answers and by Europeans showing their willingness to take a larger part of the burden in the defense of Europe. The burden-sharing debate must, therefore, result in lower costs for the United States. For this purpose, several options are available. Both, Europe and the United States have to take measures aiming in the same direction, namely to achieve more output from their defense expenditures. The distribution of the output in NATO has to be discussed. A specific point of interest is the necessity of United States forces in Europe related to the nuclear capability. Future economic developments and the outcome of the burden-sharing debate will be the key factors in determining the overall strength of United States' troops in Europe.

The economic perspectives of Europe and the United States depend heavily on mutual cooperation and the market policy of each. The developments in Europe after 1992, leading to a more unified economic structure, together with a more balanced European pillar in the security structure, will have a major impact on partnership relations. It is necessary to assess this European pillar as a multilateral undertaking intended to enhance the security of the Alliance i.e. of Europe and North America. It will not do so if it comes to be seen as an ad hoc network of

bilateral relationships. The structure of the alliance has to accommodate mutually reinforcing United States and European interests.

The relations in the Alliance are going to change internally and externally. Internally, there are diverging security and economic relations between the United States and Europe. Externally, relations are going to change due to different reactions to East-West relations. Especially the possible changes in the Soviet-Union can lead to a different approach of the two parts of NATO on both sides of the Atlantic. It is likely that Europe is going to use the improved East-West relations to expand their political and particularly their economical contacts with the Soviet Union and the other East bloc countries. On the other hand, the United States will show a more waiting attitude, well aware of the still available military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact and a more reserved attitude towards the outcome of "Glasnost" and "Perestroika".

Nevertheless, there is still more in favor to maintain the Alliance than to give it up. For Europe and the United States and Canada as well, it is still the best means to control the Soviet Union in the European theater. United States presence in Europe guarantees political influence in Europe. The necessity for Europe to depend on American deterrence gives the United States a more powerful position in convincing the Europeans to take a larger part of the security burden in Europe and doing so to increase the nuclear threshold by reinforcing the conventional capabilities. Arms control and an improved output of the defense expenditures are necessary to achieve this goal. Maintaining the territorial integrity of Europe will remain the dominant factor in the Alliance. Conflicting interests in the world between the United States and Europe restrain NATO from playing a role in managing the world order. Common interests have to be defended or safeguarded on a multilateral or bilateral basis.

Managing the inevitable tensions between building a true European pillar in the Alliance and maintaining the Euro-American coupling is a better course to take, than having to

learn to live with the consequences of the dislocation of the allied coalition. The main policy ingredient is continuity rather than change.

The primary interest of the United States in Europe remains to be political influence in Europe and the possibility to defend the national integrity against the main threat on foreign soil. The main interest of Europe in the presence of the United States in Europe is the commitment of this super-power to the defense of Europe by means of a credible deterrence and a convincing number of troops. The relations between the United States and Europe will change because of a greater participation of Europe in its own defense and consequently a more European style in managing the tensions between East and West. The economical, political and socio-psychological instruments of power will increasingly be more important in managing the balance of power between the two super powers. The most effective use of these instruments of power will still be in an alliance of the United States and Europe.

The alliance must decide in concert on a strategy that faces the developments and the challenges of the future. Especially now that the Soviets seek to fragment NATO by exploiting the psychological vulnerabilities of the Alliance. The Soviet strategy of presenting the impression of a diminished threat has to be countered by a new consensus within NATO on effective counter measures.

Most important of all in any new structure or adjusted strategy is to win a broad public support. Gregory D. Foster expressed this need as follows:

"Focus on NATO audiences rather than on Warsaw Pact subjects and shore up the psychological defenses of the Alliance... Secondly focus on the various audiences constituting the mass public rather than the elite opinion makers or the attentive public..., thirdly focus on coordinated employment of all instruments of public diplomacy; the objective is to convince as many audiences as possible that our truth is the preferred point of view... and at last focus on reestablishing confidence among the NATO peoples

in the leadership of the Alliance; consensus is a cumulative phenomeron".⁴

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