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**SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING CONFERENCE
AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS**

BY

BRIGADIER LOUIS M. FISHER

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SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING CONFERENCE
AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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
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The biggest challenge for this new grouping has been South Africa and its economic ties to the nine states. Various actions by South Africa towards its neighbors have clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of these nations as a result of these ties. The SADCC grouping has had to scale higher walls in the face of destabilization efforts by their giant neighbor. The success of the group's efforts holds the key to the strengthening of their political independence, improved welfare for citizens and peace within the region. It is for this purpose that SADCC member countries have increased their resolve to ensure achievement of their objectives in the face of great adversity.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING CONFERENCE
AND ITS SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The focus in this research paper is on the efforts of nine sub-Saharan countries to lessen South Africa's influence on their national economies. This grouping is known as Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). This paper identifies and develops an understanding of the critical areas within SADCC's framework of concern. Furthermore, the paper appraises security considerations and implications involved in SADCC efforts.

PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY

The word for the problem is dependency, and the challenge is the desire to do something about the status quo. Therefore, for SADCC members the watch word is disengagement. In other words, this paper starts by looking at those ties that bind SADCC members to their giant neighbor. Greater emphasis is laid on to those areas that are of greater concern to members of the region. Areas scrutinized are strategies designed to deal with the situation, South Africa's role and the relationship to SADCC's initiatives. The interplay of the various actors within the region is closely monitored and analyzed. The methodology used to research was to review as many references as possible including the following: journals, books, reports, magazines and newspapers. SADCC publications provided by the Botswana Mission in Washington were invaluable. Similarly material from the Zimbabwean Embassy in Botswana was indispensable.

TIES WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND IMPLICATION

The dependency equation between South Africa and SADCC countries is best summed up by J. Barron Boyd, Jr. in the Jonathan Swift Satire mode that:

An economic Gulliver among Lilliputians, South Africa created a network of trade dependencies, investment flows, labor migration and infra-structural ties (railways, roads, etc.), which bound the countries of the area together and which secured South Africa's pivotal position within the region.¹

The preceding quote is but one concise presentation of a very extensive network of economic relationships. Another way of getting an appreciation of what J. Barron Boyd, Jr. is trying to say is to take a look at Table 1 below which is a 1982 summary of the economic scenario in Southern Africa.

TABLE I

SUMMARY

Dependence on South Africa (all figures 1982, except + = 1981)

	Imports		Transport	Energy from RSA		Labor % of
	% from RSA	rank of RSA	Imp/Exp via RSA	Electricity	oil	formal sector workers in RSA
Customs						
Union						
Countries:						
Botswana	84%+	1	most	21%	all	30%
Lesotho	97%+	1	all	100%	all	50%
Swa.	83%	1	half	77%	all	15%
Non-customs						
Union						
Countries						
Zimbabwe	32%	1	half	1%	63%	1%
Zambia	14%	1	half	-	little	-
Malawi	3%	1	one-third	-	half	4%
Moz.	8%	2	-	28	little	5%

Source: Joseph Hanlon - Beggar Your Neighbors

According to this summary the BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland) get over 80% of their imports from South Africa. Malawi gets about 36% of its imports from South Africa. For Zimbabwe's what is not reflected on the table is the fact that 41% of Zimbabwe's manufactured goods are sold to South Africa. For Zambia, South Africa is its fourth largest trading partner. According to Dr. Simba Makoni² (the Executive Secretary for SADCC) between 1982-84 the volume of trade between South Africa and SADCC countries was worth \$ U.S. two billion. South Africa bought \$400 million worth of goods from SADCC countries. This clearly gave South Africa a \$1.6 billion trade surplus.

South African influence goes beyond trade surplus. According to Joseph Hanlon,³ South African firms dominate the economies of the majority of SADCC countries. For example in Botswana Anglo-American operates the mines; in Lesotho, South African firms virtually control the entire economy; in Swaziland, South African firms control mining, agriculture, and manufacturing; in Zambia, Anglo-American is important in copper mining, engineering, and other sectors; in Malawi, South African companies are involved in shipping, fertilizers, and insurance; in Angola, Anglo-American operates the diamond mines; and in Mozambique, South African agencies control shipping, especially Manica Freight Company and Safmarine.

These economic tentacles branch out to other areas as well such as the labor market for instance. Table 2 below gives the statistical summary of migrant workers in South Africa dating up to 1984. But even five years later, the distribution has not changed drastically in terms of ratio per country.

TABLE 2

<u>Number of Workers</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1984</u>
Angola	108	291	48
Botswana	33,357	23,200	26,433
Lesotho	134,667	140,746	138,443
Malawi	137,676	32,319	29,268


Table 2 continued:

Mozambique	139,993	56,424	60,407
Swaziland	9,984	19,853	16,823
Zambia	703	918	1,274
Zimbabwe	5,961	10,377	7,492
Total	462,449	284,128	280,188

Source: Joseph Hanlon Beggar Your Neighbor

The total figure on Table 2 is roughly 280,000 SADCC citizens employed in the South African economy. Today, this figure has risen to 350,000.⁴ About half of SADCC citizens employed in South Africa are from Lesotho. The impact of the earnings of these migrant workers on the economy of Lesotho is tremendous if not critical. These earnings make up half of Lesotho's Gross National Product (GNP). In Mozambique, earnings from migrant labor used to be paid in gold and were an important source of foreign exchange for Mozambique before the South Africans severed this arrangement. The disturbing factor about having so many of one's citizens in another country is the question of what to do if they were to be suddenly expelled from South Africa. Would SADCC economies be able to absorb them? Analysts argue that giving SADCC citizens marching orders could also be costly for the South African economy.⁵

The final area of dependency which is perhaps the most critical for SADCC countries is in the field of transport and communications. This is the area that is the main focus for this paper. The reasons why this area is the highest priority on the SADCC agenda are fully explored. SADCC's transport communications are heavily integrated with the South African (see Map 2) transport system. According to Dr. Simba Makoni, the SADCC Executive Secretary,⁶ the South African Railway System (SATS) earns \$200 million from Zimbabwe alone. From SADCC countries SATS earns a minimum of \$350 million. Basically, one-third of SADCC's international trade is carried by SATS. In



SOURCE: Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbors

terms of individual countries the situation is as follows: 90% of Botswana's exports go through South Africa, all of Lesotho's trade, about half of Swaziland, 60% of Zambian trade, half of Zimbabwe, and one third of Malawi's trade goes through South Africa. Furthermore, SATS leases over 5,000 railway wagons to SADCC countries. Questions arise: How did these countries get into such a situation and what does it mean politically? In other words what is the price?

IMPLICATIONS

The situation described above did not happen by accident. This was a result of deliberate and conscious efforts of colonial governments, their agents like Cecil Rhodes and private corporations. Self interest was the key motivation and no consideration was given whatsoever to the interests and future of the indigenous people. For some of the SADCC countries these ties were intensified by white settler regimes, especially the predecessor to some of the present governments. For example, during UDI the Rhodesian white rulers tightly bound the Zimbabwean economy to the South African economy. Special links were established such as bilateral agreements giving Zimbabwean goods preferential access to the South African markets. In the area of transport, SATS leased 3,000 railway wagons and 50 locomotives including technicians to the Rhodesian Railways. Before the independence of Mozambique the Rhodesians had a special arrangement with the Portuguese rulers, and Mozambique's Railway System carried 75% of Rhodesian goods. Dependency for SADCC members is clearly dangerous especially to a country that they do not agree with politically and to which the majority do not even have diplomatic relations with. Factors such as the position of landlocked SADCC countries do not make the situation easier or better so to say. Economic dependence

impinges upon a country's political freedom, especially its ability to pursue an independent foreign policy to fulfill some of its international obligations.

In Southern Africa the reality of the situation has been a bitter pill that SADCC members have had to swallow from time to time. South Africa's actions have clearly sent the message across. For example in January 1986 Lesotho was blockaded by South Africa for two weeks. During the two weeks, border controls cut almost all flows of fuel, foods, and medicine. South African demands included the expulsion of members of the African National Congress (ANC) from Lesotho. The border closure had catastrophic consequences for the Lesotho government headed by Chief Leabua Jonathan. The military took over power and expelled ANC members after which then South Africa reopened the borders. Other countries have also incurred South Africa's wrath. In August 1987, President Kaunda of Zambia and President Mugabe of Zimbabwe attended the Commonwealth mini-summit. At this conference sanctions against South Africa were discussed. In retaliation for the position taken by these two leaders, South Africa started slowing down the delivery of goods to Zambia and Zimbabwe. This was done for example by demanding import licences for all goods to and from these countries, something that was not required before the summit. Such actions were not only confined to Zambia nor Zimbabwe alone. Mozambique for example was threatened with repatriation of 60,000 Mozambiquan workers and payment arrangements in gold to Mozambique were stopped. Botswana, where beef exports are the countries second largest foreign exchange earner, would at times find that refrigeration wagons from South Africa failed to arrive at the abattoir for no good reason at all. In December 1987, one of the border gates between South Africa and Botswana was subjected to a tourniquet or slow down. This was done through intensive searches by South

African officials on each vehicle coming from Botswana. The objective it was explained was to find ANC members and weapons. The result was long queues that left many motorists waiting and stranded at the border gate, some up to a duration in excess of twenty-four hours. Other actions by South Africa included the withholding from BLS countries their shares from the custom revenue pool that is administered by South Africa. These events including other actions by South Africa reinforce the painful historical lesson of the interaction between political freedom and economic freedom. The stage is now set to look at the region in terms of its potential and what the countries are doing about the situation.

ENDNOTES

1. J. Barron Boyd Jr., African Review, Vol. 28, 1985, p. 46.
2. Simba Makoni, SADCC's New Strategies, African Report, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 32.
3. Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbors, p. 277.
4. Makoni, SADCC's New Strategies, African Report. Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 32.
5. Ibid., p. 32.
6. Ibid., p. 32.

CHAPTER II
DISENGAGEMENT AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

THE REGION AND ITS POTENTIAL

Table 3 outlines the economic indicators in Southern Africa by mid July 1988.

TABLE 3

COUNTRY	POP. 1988 MILLIONS	AREA 000 SQ. KM	ANNUAL GDP MILLIONS (\$) 1988	GNP PER CAPITA (\$)
Angola	8.2	1 246	4 700	600
Botswana	1.2	600	905	880
Lesotho	1.7	30	247	163
Mozambique	15.0	802	1 300	90
Swaziland	0.7	17	832	690
Tanzania	24.0	945	4 900	240
Zambia	8.0	753	2 100	300
Zimbabwe	8.0	391	4 900	540
SADCC	66.8	4 784	19 884	
SOUTH AFRICA	35.0	1 221	60 000	1 700

Source: 1988 U.S. Fact Book

SADCC countries occupy almost five million square kilometers of land with a total of 67 million people on it. Yet despite the fact that this land is five times that of South Africa and the population twice as much, the combined Gross Domestic Product of these nine states equals only one-third that of South Africa. The situation need not be as it is for the region has so much potential. It holds 60% of Africa's coal reserves. These deposits are buried in Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has 84% of the world's high grade chromium reserves. Zambia and Zaire produce more than half the world's cobalt. Botswana supplies about one third of the world's diamonds; gold can be found in Botswana and Zimbabwe, other minerals such as iron, copper, nickel, lead and zinc can be found in the region in vast

quantities. Furthermore, the SADCC region produces one-fifth of Africa's electricity. Schemes such as Kariba and Cabora Bassa are prime examples of electricity supply sources. Finally, there is also great potential for agriculture production as there is plenty of arable land. Despite all these resources there has been a lot of economic fragmentation within and between SADCC countries. As a result there is very little trade and economic activity among SADCC countries. There also exists gaps between their transport systems. The level of economic activity among these countries is clearly shown in Table 4 below.

TABLE 4

EXPORTS TO SADCC COUNTRIES

Angola	2.1%
Botswana	11.9%
Lesotho	9.7%
Malawi	3.5%
Zimbabwe	11.5%

Source: New African
September 1987

Clearly the preceding picture is not an attractive one and could be improved. These countries could supply each other with goods and services currently obtained from South Africa. However, before they could do that they need to integrate their transport system and eliminate existing gaps. The idea of boosting inter-regional trade and integrating transport system was an overriding thought when front line leaders met in Arusha, Tanzania in 1979. It was here that the foundation for the formation of SADCC was laid.

THE LUSAKA DECLARATION

After the Arusha meeting, the presidents of the nine countries met in Lusaka, April 1980. It was during this meeting that the nine presidents

issued the Lusaka Declaration. This was the inauguration of the Southern African Development Coordination Committee (SADCC). The four objectives of the organization were laid down as follows:¹

- o The reduction of economic dependence particularly but not only on the Republic of South Africa.

- o The forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration.

- o The mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies.

- o Concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of our strategy for economic liberation.

One point that has been emphasized several times is perhaps underlined in the first objective. As far as SADCC was concerned economic liberation was not aimed only at South Africa. This theme is further echoed by the President of Botswana in an interview to Africa Report that. . . . "We have established a regional plan in SADCC to integrate our economies, increase interdependence and reduce dependence on the rest of the world including South Africa."²

A question has been raised on what would happen when a black government emerged in Pretoria. Dr. Makoni the SADCC Executive Secretary is very emphatic on this point.


It would be equally unacceptable tomorrow when the ANC is in power in South Africa for the nine states of Southern Africa who constitute SADCC at the moment to be as dependent on South Africa as they are today.³

The message here is that for SADCC their goal is not one of confrontation with the present South African government, but the aim is to achieve self reliance. During the 1980 summit the nine countries identified transport and communication as their priority area and therefore their starting point.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION-SATCC


During the inauguration Summit in 1980, it was decided that transport was the keystone to SADCC objectives, and that without the establishment of an adequate regional transport and communication system other SADCC objectives would be impractical. Roads were in bad shape and railways were in no better condition. In central Mozambique, for example, only 6 out of 58 railway locomotives were operational. In 1980, the Tanzania-Zambia (Tazara) was only able to transport 60% of its 1977 traffic. The Benguela Line in Angola was out of operation due to sabotage, similarly the Limpopo Line in Mozambique. A decision was made to form the Southern African Transport and Communication Commission (SATCC) and its purpose was to coordinate SADCC transport and communications projects. Its headquarters was located in Maputo, Mozambique. In November 1980, 97 projects (see Appendix I) related to transport and communications were identified and approved. Funding was sought with international organizations and governments, and \$273 million was pledged. The 97 transport and communications projects included five major transport systems. These were very crucial to the SADCC grand plan. These are the following: (i) The Beira Corridor, (ii) The Limpopo Line, (iii) The Nacala Line, (iv) The Benguela Line, (v) The Tazara Line. These lines appear on Map 3. This map also shows other projects, however, the focus is basically on these five transport systems. Therefore it is essential to trace and determine the value of each system to SADCC, projected plans for them and later the security implications associated with each system.

Regional Surface Transport Networks and Airports



THE BEIRA CORRIDOR

RAILWAY PROJECTS IN THE BEIRA PORT TRANSPORT SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT PLAN



Estimated Costs:

Total : USD 182.0 million (1985 prices)
Foreign : USD 159.7 million
Local : USD 22.3 million

Secured Funding:

Foreign : USD 31.8 million
Local : USD 22.3 million
Funding Under Negotiation : USD 21.0 million

Financing Gap: USD 106 million

Executing Agency:

Beira Corridor Authority
(Partly Governments of Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe)

Start: 1986

Duration: 10 years

Scope : Rehabilitation and upgrading of the railways leading to the Port of Beira.

FIGURE 1

SOURCE: SADCC REPORT FEB 1987

The Beira Corridor is a 311 km stretch of road, rail line and pipeline. It was built during the first half of this century in 1897. It runs from the port of Beira to Umtare in Zimbabwe. This is perhaps the most high profile of the SADCC projects. It has been described as the survival landline for the Frontline States. Certain quarters of the media have named it "Southern Africa's Corridor of Power."⁴

It should not be difficult to understand the meaning behind this description. The Beira Corridor has the potential to carry 85% of SADCC trade and thus reduce their dependence on the South African transport system. It has also been called the "Crisis Corridor."⁵

In reference to the destructive attention the corridor was getting from South African sponsored sabotage. The Beira Corridor is indeed very critical

to the landlocked countries of Botswana. Zambia and Zimbabwe, a point which is underlined by the following distances:

DISTANCE TO PORTS (KM)

TABLE 5

	DAR	LOBITO	BEIRA	MAPUTO	DURBAN	EAST LONDON
COPPERBELT	2050	2436	2400	2395	3146	3246
LUSAKA	2025	2625	2025	2020	2751	2871
HARARE	3377	3952	698	1269	2066	2370

For Zimbabwe, Beira Port is the closest that is at 698 km, it beats all the routes north and south in the region. For Zambia and Botswana the route is a reasonable proposition. Prior to 1975, the Beira Line and the Maputo Line carried 75% of Rhodesian traffic. This changed when independent Mozambique shut off traffic to the Rhodesians in retaliation to Rhodesian cross border raids. The capacity of the Beira Line at that time was three million tons per year. When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, the line was reopened. Traffic on the line peaked in 1983 with 53% volume going through the line. Then the line became subjected to attacks by the Mozambique National Resistance, and its capacity fell to one million tons per year. One of SADCC objectives is to restore this line to its 1975 capacity. This involves making the railway and road fully operational. A second objective is to dredge and upgrade the harbor. About \$280 million were pledged for these projects.


Dutch contractors have undertaken work on the port while the National Railway of Zimbabwe will do work on the track. USAID pledged to rehabilitate 50 km of track on the Mozambian side including overhauling ten locomotives and building a railway repair shop. The eventual target is to get the corridor to handle five million tons by 1990. Progress on the corridor was considerable in that by the end of 1986, the port had been brought to its 1975 capacity of

three million tons. However, the port was only able to handle half--1.4 million tons. This figure included 600,000 tons of fuel and 300,000 tons of dry cargo for Zimbabwe. Part of the problem for this low utility was delays on the railway and road construction. Another reason was poor response from the business community. When the corridor is fully operational, it should be able to handle 40% - 60% of Zimbabwe's exports and imports. This would also save Zimbabwe \$80 million per year while at the same time earning Mozambique \$300 million in transport charges. It has been estimated that it costs Zimbabwe to send one ton of tobacco through Port Elizabeth between \$100 to \$150 whereas the same ton of tobacco if it was sent through Beira it would cost Zimbabwe \$45 and \$72 through Maputo.⁶

There is no doubt that usage of the Beira Corridor by Zimbabwe entails great savings. By mid 1987, National Railway of Zimbabwe had completed rehabilitation and road traffic had risen to 70 trucks a day. However, all these achievements would not have been possible without vigorous intervention by SADCC states especially Zimbabwe which sent in troops to Mozambique to guard the Beira Corridor. This point will be picked up later.

THE LIMPOPO RAILWAY (FIG 2)

1 REHABILITATION OF THE MAPUTO - CHICUALACUALA (LIMPOPO) RAILWAY



Estimated Costs:

Total : USD 95.0 million (1986 prices)
Foreign : USD 70.5 million
Local : USD 24.5 million

Secured Funding:

Foreign : USD 14.5 million
Local : USD 24.5 million

Financing Gap: USD 56.0 million

Executing Agency:

National Directorate of Railways, DNPCF

Start: 1986


Duration: 6 years

Scope : Rehabilitation and upgrading the line to meet the needs related to future traffic demand.

SOURCE: SADCC REPORT FEB. 1987

This railway line was opened in the fifties, and together with the Beira Line in the early seventies this line used to carry three quarters of the Rhodesian trade. This line runs from Chicualacuala near the Zimbabwean border to the Port of Maputo. For the Eastern Transvaal in South Africa, this line is the closest and as a matter of fact used to carry half Transvaal's imports and exports. In 1975, this line carried 10,918 million tons before it was closed to the Rhodesians by independent Mozambique. It was reopened in 1980 and carried 7,603 million tons. The following year in 1981, one-third of Zimbabwean goods were carried through this line. However, increased MNR attacks led to the closure of the line by mid 1984. In 1985, for those days that it remained opened it carried only one million tons which was about 33% down from the 1983 tonnage. The port of Maputo could only handle 900,000 tons compared to six-seven million tons in 1980. However, despite these set backs, new security arrangements were worked out and in 1986 SADCC began six year rehabilitation and upgrading works on the line which cost \$95 million. This line is very valuable to the landlocked countries and also for the Mozambican economy.

THE NACALA LINE (FIG 3)




SOURCE: Joseph Hanlon
Beggar Your Neighbours

The Nacala Line is the shortest route to the sea for Malawi. Earnings from foreign trade make up 75% of Malawi's GNP. In May 1982, this line was closed due to MNR attacks. As a result cargo had to be transported over 3,000 km by road and this cost Malawi an extra sixteen million Malawian kwacha. As the attacks continued the line was closed in 1984 and extra transport charges cost Malawi one hundred million kwacha. It is estimated that it cost Malawi 43% of its foreign trade earnings to use alternative routes other than the Nacala Line. In fact, it would only cost Malawi 15% of its foreign trade earnings in transport costs if Malawi were to use the Nacala Line.⁷ Clearly, the situation could not be allowed to continue like that. Therefore, in December 1986, Malawi entered a Security Agreement with Mozambique. Since then SADCC has been able to complete ten projects worth \$195 million by reconstructing the Nacala-Cuamba portion of the line. Work is still continuing on the remaining portions of the line.

THE BENGUELA LINE (FIG 4)

REHABILITATION OF THE BENGUELA RAILWAY



Estimated Cost:

Total : USD 148.4 million (1985 prices)
Foreign : USD 134.4 million
Local : USD 14.0 million

Secured Funding:

Foreign : -
Local : USD 14.0 million

Financing Gap: -

Executing Agency:

Caminho de Ferro de Benguela, CFB

Start: 1981

Duration: 10 years from 1985

Scope : Rehabilitation and upgrading of the 1,340 km railway from the port of Lobito to the Zaire border.


SOURCE: SADCC REPORT FEB 1987

This line in Angola is 1,340 km and starts from DILOLO on the Zairean border to the port of Lobito on the Atlantic seaboard. This line has been inoperative for ten years due to sabotage and attacks by Unita. However, before this line was closed it was a very important route for Zaire and Zambia. The two countries produce over half of the world's cobalt in addition to being leading copper producers. Between 1971 and 1972, the Benguela Railway carried 21% of Zambia's sea trade. This rose to 50% in 1972 and 1973 when the line carried 2.5 million tons.⁸ However, between 1976 and 1978, Unita destroyed twenty out of twenty-five diesel engines and also sabotaged the railway line. This effectively closed the line. In mid 1979 the line was reopened to traffic, and in July it started carrying Zairean Manganese. In July the following year, Zambian exports were transported through the port of Lobito. European economic commission raised \$18 million for its rehabilitation. This progress was halted in 1980 when the line was closed

once more due to sabotage. In 1981, Societe General bought Tanganyika concessions which owned 90% of the Benguela Railway. In April 1987, a meeting was held to discuss ways of opening this beleaguered line. According to SADCC a ten year program costing \$148.4 million has been proposed for the rehabilitation and upgrading of the railway. However, due to security problems actual work has not been possible. There is no doubt that this line would be a very valuable route to some of the SADCC members.

TANZANIA - ZAMBIA RAILWAY (TAZARA) - (FIG 5)

TAZARA 10-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN PROJECTS



Estimated Costs:

Total : USD 196.4 million (1986 prices)

Foreign : USD 163.2 million

Local : USD 33.2 million

Financing Gap: USD 75.6 million

Secured Funding:

Foreign : USD 48.9 million

Local : USD 33.2 million

Funding Under Negotiation :
USD 38.7 million

Executing Agency:

TAZARA and Ministry of Transport and Communications, Malawi

Start: 1985

Duration: 10 years

SOURCE: SADCC REPORT
FEB

Scope : Rehabilitation and upgrading of the TZR to provide adequate capacity for future services.

The Tanzania - Zambian Railway, otherwise widely known as Tazara, has been hailed as the UHURU Railway which means freedom railway. This label arose from the fact that at that time this was the only outlet to the sea through black independent states for landlocked countries such as Zambia, Botswana and Zaire. This 1870 km long railway was built by the Chinese at a cost of 450 million dollars.

The Chinese undertook the project after western agencies declined to fund the project. Work on the project was started in 1969 and completed in mid

1975. This was a blessing for Zambia which at that point was having problems with the Benguela Line and was able to divert its cargo to the Tazara Line. During 1977 and 1978, Tazara hauled 1.27 million tons. Two-third of Zambian copper went through the line, and the remaining one-third was sent through South Africa.⁹ For Zambia, Tazara is the cheapest route for its copper exports. For example in June 1982, the cost per ton to send copper was as follows: To DAR - \$73, to Maputo - \$106, and to East London - \$111.

However, for countries such as Zimbabwe and Botswana the Tazara route would triple their costs, but if they were to export goods to Kenya and other East African destinations, then Tazara would be an ideal option. In terms of security perhaps Tazara is the most secure line of all the SADCC transport system. In fact, its major problems are basically inadequate locomotive power, losses, delays, thefts and cancellations. As such, the line was unable to use its full capacity of 2.5 million tons per cargo per year. However, a 5.6 million dollar program was negotiated with the Chinese and the results have been encouraging.¹⁰ For example, between 1983 and 1986, Tazara recorded a profit for the first time.¹¹ In 1986 alone the line carried 1.36 million tons. In 1987 Tazara made its first loan payment to China which was clearly an indication of progress made. As a matter of fact during 1986, half of SADCC's international cargo was carried through Tazara and the Beira Corridor.

Another important reason for this tremendous progress by the Tazara Corridor is the improved capacity of the Port of Dar es Salaam. A five year, 207 million dollar project began in 1985 on the port and at the end of February 1988 several phases such as the Kurasini oil terminal rehabilitation, the container, the grain facility and the harbor entrance improvement were complete.

The security dimension of Tazara cannot simply be brushed aside. It may be relevant to recall that during the war of liberation in Zimbabwe, the Rhodesian forces attacked Tazara bridges in Northern Zambia. Recently on June 14, 1986, Zambia put its troops on the alert after uncovering a South African spy ring and exposed a large scale plan to sabotage the Tanzania - Zambia Railway.¹² It is therefore against such a background that SADCC has come up with a ten-year plan to rehabilitate and upgrade Tazara. This would cost \$196.4 million of which 64% has already been secured. This in itself signifies the value and confidence SADCC attaches to this transport system.

ENDNOTES

1. Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference Report 1987.
2. Interview with Dr. Quett K.J. Masire President of Botswana, *African Report*, Vol. 32, No. 1, January-February 1987, p. 12.
3. DeSimba Makoni, SADCC's New Strategies, African Report, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 32.
4. *The Economist*, 25-31 October 1986.
5. *New African*, May 1981, p. 20.
6. Makoni, p. 32.
7. *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 30, No. 11, 29 May 1988.
8. Christopher Hill, *Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa*, Vol. 82, No 326.
9. Hanlon, p. 246.
10. *New African*, May 1986, p. 34.
11. *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 28, No. 3, April 2, 1987.
12. *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 27, No. 17, 20 August 1986.

CHAPTER III
DESTABILIZATION

DEFINING DESTABILIZATION

Webster's New World dictionary defines destabilization as "upsetting the stability or the equilibrium of or to unbalance." In Southern Africa it carries an ominous meaning. It is synonymous with massive dislocation of SADCC economics through sanctions, sabotage, subversion and plain open aggression. The situation is adequately represented on Map 4. In Southern Africa the cost of destabilization between 1980 and 1984 is estimated to be:


- o \$1.6 billion direct war damage.
- o \$1.0 billion higher transport and energy due to disruption.
- o \$3.0 billion in direct military expenditure.
- o 2 million people displaced.¹

According to the publication Africa Confidential:

An interdepartmental committee was established in Pretoria not only to prepare for sanctions evasion but also to plan economic warfare against front line states.²

This theme has been reiterated many times by SADCC leaders. As a matter of fact President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, during an interview with Mozambican journalist Moto Lopes, had this to say about destabilization.

South Africa has tended to pursue a strategy of destabilization that varies in terms of its tactics from country to country in the Southern African region. Where they have found a ready made group of bandits, as they did in Mozambique with the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) which was a creature of the Rhodesians, they give it further training, and reinforce it with mercenaries and then depend on it to carry out their acts of destabilization. Similarly in Angola they made use and continue to make use of UNITA. But over and above that, they also have carried out their own blatant acts of aggression through the South African (Armed Forces).³



SOURCE: Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbors*

These remarks by the President of Zimbabwe are clearly a strong indictment of South Africa's role in its relationship to its neighbors. It is widely accepted by analysts that this campaign by South Africa is not without purpose. The consensus is that through destabilization South Africa hopes to achieve both economic and political gains. These include the following:

- o To continue to expand exports.
- o To maintain transport dependence. For example every time the Mozambican routes are out of commission the landlocked SADCC members have to reroute their cargo through the South African transport system.
- o To get rid of all South African refugees from neighboring countries. The blockage on Lesotho and cross border raids by South African (Armed) forces can be regarded as good examples. In the Lesotho blockade one of South African demands was the expulsion of ANC from Lesotho. This was done and borders reopened.
- o To get neighboring countries to sign non aggression pacts such as the highly publicized Nkomati Agreement between Mozambique and South Africa signed on March 16, 1984.
- o To get recognition of the homelands, especially through attempts to twist BLS countries into allowing the so called "independent" homelands into the South African Customs Union (SACU).
- o To get SADCC members to publicly oppose sanctions.

The list is not exhaustive as there are definitely other advantages to be gained from this process. South Africa has on various occasions denied any connection to the surrogate forces in the region, especially the MNR. However, subsequent events have helped lay bare the tenuity of South African denials. In as far as its relationship with Unita was concerned, there was absolutely no way South Africa could distance itself from this group in that

its involvement in Angola has been direct, open and conventional. Therefore, there is no way they could hide their armored columns or air strikes on behalf of Unita. It is appropriate now to examine these surrogate forces and the role they play in destabilizing SADCC projects.

SURROGATE FORCES-MNR - RESISTENCIA NATIONAL MOZAMBICAN (RENAMO)

The Washington based Africa Report publication of the African American Institute headed by Randolph Nugent gives a fairly informed observation of the Mozambican government's view of the MNR in their January-February issue of 1986:

The Mozambican government perceives the MNR as a terrorist organization which takes orders from the South African Defense Force whose well known goal is to destabilize Southern Africa especially Zimbabwe and Mozambique.⁴

This description of the MNR runs fairly close to the one made by the publication The Economist in its 30 March 1985 issue. It described the MNR as:

An amalgam of Portuguese expatriates and businessmen, disgruntled Frelimo turncoats, dissident tribesmen, mercenaries and arms salesmen.⁵

These observations by the two publications say a lot about the MNR. However, two important features about the MNR are clearly presented. Firstly, President Mugabe's earlier comment of South African control of the MNR is confirmed by the Mozambican view. Secondly, the composition or makeup of MNR says a lot about the credibility of this group. This can be traced to its earlier beginnings. It is this factor that has denied this group any legitimacy and consequent failure to gain recognition except, of course, by South Africa and certain right wing circles in the United States such as the Heritage Foundation. MNR was created in April 1974 by the Rhodesian Intelligence (CIO) to be their "eyes and ears" (see Appendix II). Its

original mission with the Rhodesians was one of gathering intelligence on Zimbabwe National Liberation Army Guerillas (Zanla) operating out of Mozambique. However, with the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the MNR was taken over by South African Military Intelligence. They were moved in 1980 to Phalaborwa in the Transvaal along with their clandestine radio station, Voice of Free Africa. The mission of MNR was redefined, and it was now to be used as the principal instrument for the destruction of the Mozambican government and seizure of power. Both its deceased leader Andre Matsangaisa and present incumbent Afonso Dhlakama were former Frelimo members who became involved in criminal activities and were expelled from the party. This perhaps explains partly the label of Frelimo turncoats by the publication The Economist.

In late 1980, MNR established bases in Central Mozambique, one of their bases was located in the Gorongosa Mountains. The same year they started attacking the Beira Line.

The following year in 1981, they concentrated in Manica Province on roads and railways to Zimbabwe. The Cabora Basa electrical transmission lines were also attacked frequently. With Gorongosa as their main base, they launched attacks into the provinces of Niassa, Zambezia Gaza and Inhambane in the South. During 1982-1983 period these attacks reached their peak. There was extensive systematic destruction of agricultural, industrial and transportation infrastructure. For the Mozambican government this was a trying period in that at the same time they had to deal with open attacks by the South African Defense Forces.

It was under this context that the Nkomati Accord was signed on March 16, 1984. Under the terms of the agreement Mozambique was to expel ANC members from its territory and South Africa would withdraw its support for the MNR. In addition, the South Africans closed the clandestine radio station. Events,

however, did not live up to the Accord. The Mozambicans complained of violations of the Accord. MNR attacks increased, and by mid 1987 the MNR had embarked on a campaign of atrocities. South Africa denied any complicity. However, the crucial question that kept on coming up was whether the MNR could survive without external support. The consensus was that there was no way it could survive without both technical and logistical support. Even Dr. Chester Crocker, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, in his testimony to Congress in June 1987, underlined the importance of external support to the existence of the MNR and its activities.⁶ The Nkomati Accord was the first open admission by South Africa of its support for the MNR. Independent observers point out that in anticipation of the Accord, the South Africans had airlifted six months worth of supplies to the MNR and, after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, Malawi was used for logistic support. In addition, numerous sightings of aircraft over Mozambican territory were reported by both authorities and local people. As mentioned earlier, the South Africans denied all charges.

However, two incidents were to emerge that reinforced allegations by the Mozambicans. The first was the arrest of a spy ring by the South Africans that included a Zimbabwean woman, Trish Hanekom, her husband Derek and a young white South African Defense Force Conscript, Roland Hunter. These three individuals had managed over a period of time to siphon off secret intelligence documents and send them over to the African National Congress. According to both the New African publication and Africa Confidential⁷ reports, the key person in this ring was Roland Hunter. He was Special Assistant to Colonel Van Niekerk, a Senior Officer in the Directorate of Special Tasks of the Chief of Staff Intelligence of the South African Defense

Force. According to the above sources Colonel Van Niekerk headed "Operation Mila" which was the code name for the SADF support for the MNR. According to the New African, when Trish was released and sent to Zimbabwe, she revealed in an interview that from the documents they were able to discern the following:

- o How programs for Voice of Free Africa were produced by military intelligence (SA).
- o How AK47 rifles were acquired for the MNR from certain South African military complexes.
- o How these weapons were dropped to the MNR in Mozambique by Dakota aircraft.
- o How a front company "Frama Intertrading" was used to transport MNR officials and materials around Southern Africa.
- o How senior MNR officials were paid wages by the Directorate on Special Tasks.
- o How Roland Hunter paid MNR officials in Malawi their wages.

This indicated that control of the MNR by South African Military Intelligence was extensive. In addition, there were clear indications that South African Special Forces were involved with the training and supervision of the MNR. Units such as 5 Recce Commando have been identified as the major functionary in MNR activities.⁸ In October 1981, a white man was blown apart while trying to sabotage the Beira-Umtare Line. He was later identified as of British origin but working for the South African Special Forces. Another member of the South African Special Forces, George Alerson, was captured in Maputo by Mozambican authorities.⁹ It has also been argued by many experts that some of the incidents of sabotage like the blowing of tanks in Beira went far beyond the capabilities of the MNR. In March 1987 the Mozambican authorities arrested a Mozambican citizen by the name of Jaime

Mondlane. He revealed that he was in the pay of South African Military Intelligence and that he worked as an interpreter for Major Andre Van Rooyen who was recruiting for MNR.¹⁰ The South Africans did not have any problems recruiting for the MNR because of the presence of vast numbers of Mozambican workers in South Africa and refugees who are victims of the fighting. The second and most significant event that brought to light the extent of South African violations of the Nkomati Accord occurred during the capture of Gorongosa by the Zimbabweans. This event will be picked up later in the paper.

SURROGATE FORCES - UNITA

The nature of South African involvement in Angola has been more direct, open and largely conventional. Therefore, denial of involvement under such conditions would serve no purpose. But at times the South Africans have tried to mislead the world about their involvement. What they would term follow on operations against Swapo would be in reality rescue operations for Unita. South African forces have several times intervened decisively with air strikes and armored columns when Unita bases and strong holds were under the threat of being overrun by the Angolan Forces. South African involvement with Unita goes back to 1975. That was just after the Portuguese pulled out, and there followed an ensuing struggle between the three groups (MPLA, FNLA and UNITA) to gain power. The South Africans came in on the side of Unita which then lost out to the MPLA. For some time, Unita was on the decline until the repeal of the Clark Amendment by the Reagan Administration which allowed U.S. support for Unita. This was a life blood shot for Unita which spelled dire consequences for the Angolan people, for Unita, armed with both U.S. and South African support embarked on a program of destruction. Part of this program

was aimed at economic targets of which the Benguela Railway and oil facilities became major targets. Damage by Unita has been put at \$12,000 million. Much as the Angolans had to deal with Unita, they had also to face South African onslaught.

In 1981 South Africa launched an offensive, code named Operation Protea. This was followed by another one--Operation Askari. In December 1983, South Africa occupied the southern part of Angola, a situation which then allowed Unita a free hand in its operations in the area. Smaller South African forces from time to time went into Angola and carried out acts of sabotage on ports and oil installations. The most recalled incidence being the interception of a South African Commando Unit in Cabinda in May 1985. This unit was on a mission to blow up U.S. owned oil installations in the Cabinda. Ironically these were guarded by Cuban troops. The leader of the group Captain Wynand Dutoit was captured and later released.

In 1987 fierce battles raged between Angolan government forces and Unita. South Africa joined the fighting at the battle of Mavinga. The following year in February, South African forces came again to the rescue of Unita and became involved in the now famous Siege of Cuito Cuanavale. Such incursions by South Africa imposes a tremendous burden on the Angolan government as this means more resources and attention has now to be shifted towards ensuring national survival. Therefore, security for SADCC projects must take a back seat while the country struggles for survival.

SAFE GUARDING SADCC PROJECTS

The value of the five transport systems has been recognized by SADCC members; however, much as they have allocated their preliminary attention to the transport sector, there are certain routes that have been at the top of

SADCC agenda. Clearly the Mozambican Transport Systems have drawn more attention from the media, SADCC and donors than the rest of SADCC projects. The support from SADCC has been very substantial and clearly visible in Mozambique. Zimbabwe by virtue of its geographic position and the impact of the Mozambican Transport Systems on its economy has been heavily involved in military operations in Mozambique. Zimbabwean troops have played a crucial role in clearing and securing the Beira Corridor. When the MNR stepped up its attacks on the Beira Corridor in 1982, Zimbabwe responded by sending in its troops in November. This drastically cut MNR attacks on the Corridor as instead MNR shifted to the Limpopo (Maputo) Line. This shift is clearly underlined in the table below:

Limpopo Line	No. of Disruptions	Days Closed
1982	25	75
1983	38	144
1984	30	221
1985	Closed	
Beira Line		
1982	7	24
1983	Negligible	
1984	13	32
1985	6	24

Source: Joseph Hanlon
Beggar Your Neighbors

In August 1985 a combined contingent of Zimbabwean and Mozambican troops launched an assault onto the MNR stronghold in the Gorongosa Mountains. The attack was a great success and the base was overrun. The capture of the base brought more light to the extent of South African involvement with MNR. The base contained facilities which were clearly beyond MNR expertise. First the base had a massive communications system including a well prepared landing strip. The base also contained a fully stocked weapons store. The most interesting finding was the discovery of diaries which became known as the

Gorongosa documents. These revealed meetings and dealings between South African military officials and the MNR. These encounters were in clear violation of the Nkomati Accord and this prompted the Mozambican government to raise the matter with South African Officials. South Africa admitted the violations but insisted that they were only technical. This was not enough to stem the damage to the Nkomati Accord as clearly South African credibility was compromised significantly.

Another key development in terms of security occurred in 1987. Malawi agreed to expel the MNR from its territory. The two countries had been through this process before. Malawi had previously expelled MNR from its territory in 1982 following representations from Mozambique. However, the following year MNR reopened its bases in Malawi. The irony of the situation was that MNR had cost Malawi the closure of two critical routes, the Malawi-Beira Line in 1982 and the Nacala Line in 1984. However, on this occasion Malawi agreed to provide troops to guard the Nacala Line. The Zimbabwean and Mozambican forces continued to extend their operations. During 1987 they captured the Mutarara Bridge and retook five key towns from MNR.

There has been a great deal of concern for the security of SADCC projects. Costs in defense expenditures have been high. It is estimated that Mozambique spends close to forty percent of its Gross National Product on defense, while Zimbabwe spends a fifth. It has not been possible for all SADCC members to contribute troops to guard SADCC projects in Mozambique. This has been due to various reasons, the most prominent being financial and manpower constraints. However, all member states have committed to contribute in one way or another. There has been also an awareness on the part of donors and sponsors of the critical impact security plays on SADCC projects. As a result, in November 1986, countries like Spain and the European Economic Market agreed to allow

aid funds to be used for the Civil Defense of the projects they were involved with. Italy had already preceded most donors in this view. Even a reluctant Sweden was turning around to meet such requirements. The contribution was referred to as Non Lethal Security Assistance. It included the following packages:¹¹

- o Provision of food, uniforms, fuel and medicines for units guarding projects.
- o That the Spanish Guardia would train units defending Spanish projects.
- o That Britain would provide training through security firms to secure British development projects, for example Lonrho Contracts the British Security Company, Defense Systems Limited, to train Mozambicans guarding Lonrho Projects.

The overall scheme is to bring in private security forces to guard routes as supplementary to efforts of National Forces. The system is proving to be effective, with already 600 security guards securing the Nacala Line. Other security guards are being organized and trained for the Maputo Line. The government of Mozambique continues, with the assistance of SADCC members, to train and upgrade its forces. The situation has improved significantly. The Beira Corridor has been secured, and as a result people are starting to settle along the Beira Corridor.

Other ideas to improve the security situation have been touted around. The use of Pan African forces and UN forces has been suggested. However, simple logic rules out such a possibility. The most likely contribution would be logistic support from nonaligned nations as well as other sympathetic nations.

ENDNOTES

1. New African, August 1988.
2. African Confidential, Vol. 27, No. 25, 10 December 1986.
3. African Report, January-February 1986, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 74.
4. Ibid., p. 67.
5. Economist, 30 March 1985, p. 25.
6. Africa Confidential, Vol. 28, No. 24, 21 December 1987.
7. Africa Confidential, Vol. 28, No. 24.
8. Africa Confidential, Vol. 28, No. 24, 21 December 1987.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Southern Africa is a region of paradoxes. In Angola U.S. backed Unita forces engage in the destruction of oil facilities that are run by U.S. companies and guarded by Cuban forces. The same forces have neutralized the Benguela Railway which was used to carry cobalt from Zaire and Zambia destined for the United States.

In Mozambique, South Africa needs power from the Cabora Bassa yet it has not been possible to generate power from Cabora Bassa due to sabotage by South African backed MNR. The port of Maputo is highly convenient for South African businesses in the Eastern Transvaal. The port is being under utilized due to MNR attacks and a boycott by South Africa. However, towards the end of 1988, there were several interesting developments. Foremost was the peace agreement signed between Angola, Cuba and South Africa (see Appendix III). The agreement paves the way for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, South African troops from Namibia and, most importantly, the independence of Namibia. For Angola its significance is the commitment by South Africa to stop supporting Unita. However, the South African Minister of Defense stated in New York that "the South African government would immediately return to the aid of Dr. Jonas Savimbi if the Cubans broke an agreement not to attack Unita."¹ Strangely enough what happens if Unita attacks the Cubans such as the situation that arose in Afghanistan when rebel troops attacked withdrawing Soviet troops.

Other new developments took place in Mozambique these were just as dramatic as the Peace Accord in Angola. In November the South Africans renewed interest in the Cabora Bassa Project and the Port of Maputo. First they donated military trucks to Mozambique. Then they offered Mozambique a

six million Rand loan to be used to upgrade the Port of Maputo and build a road between Komati Port and Maputo. However, despite these gestures a South African delegation from Maputo noted that "the attitude of the Mozambican delegation was positive, however, there is a perception that South Africa is still supporting Renamo."²

Clearly the lesson of Nkomati Accord are still fresh in the minds of the Mozambican authorities as well as the rest of the members of the region. It is not only the Gorongosa Diaries that have perpetuated this perception; various incidents and events have also reinforced this feeling. Latest South African actions should be seen and judged against the backdrop of the determined stand by SADCC members and donors to preserve SADCC projects. Firstly, moral ascendancy is on the side of SADCC members. Secondly, destabilization in the long run would prove counter productive to South Africa since it involves destruction of projects which involve various western countries. Therefore, it would not be realistic to expect these countries to witness their investments go up in smoke, especially when a major trading partner is implicated. Finally, the potential for economic development is very high. Other countries do not lose sight of the fact that SADCC members possess vast amounts of minerals that are increasingly becoming scarce elsewhere. Therefore, safeguarding SADCC projects should receive greater worldwide attention.

ENDNOTES

1. General Magnus Malan quoted in the South African Defense Force Magazine Paratus, January 1989 Issue.

2. Lt. General "Kat" Lienberg - Chief of the South African Army quoted in the December Issue of 1988 Paratus Magazine he had accompanied the Director of Foreign Affairs.

DIAGRAM 1 MAPUTO PORT TRANSPORT SYSTEM PROJECTS

Project No.	Project Title	Estimated Cost USD million	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95
<u>Ports and Water Transport</u>												
3.5.1	Maputo Port. MOZAMBIQUE											
(1)	Feasibility Study on Improvement of Entrance Channel	1.7										
(2)	Coal Terminal at Matola											
	Phase 1	2.0										
	Phase 2	9.0										
	Phase 3	80.0										
(3)	Container Terminal Equipment and management Assistance	29.0										
<u>Railways</u>												
2.2.1	Rehabilitation of the Main Railway Line. BOTSWANA											
(1)	Gaborone - Southern Border	19.0										
(2)	Francistown - Northern Border	15.0										
(3)	Gaborone- Francistown	80.0										
2.2.2	Rehabilitation of Railway Telecommunications Facilities. BOTSWANA	0.6										
2.2.4	Renewal of Train Working System. BOTSWANA	6.0										
2.2.5	Maintenance Depot for Botswana Railway. BOTSWANA	5.0										
2.2.6	Procurement of Railway Rolling Stock BOTSWANA	30.0										
2.3.1	Container Terminal with Customs Facilities. LESOTHO	1.4										
2.3.2	Expansion of Oil Storage Facilities. LESOTHO	5.8										
2.5.1	Rehabilitation of the Mozambique Swaziland Railway, Study.	0.9										
2.5.6	Railways in Southern Mozambique and Swaziland											
(2)	Study on Engineering for Bridges on Railways in Southern Mozambique.	(0.3)										
(3)	Rehabilitation of the Maputo - Chicualacuala Railway											
	Phase 1 Emergency Programme 140 km	20.0										
	Phase 2 Rehabilitation of Remaining 384 km	75.0										
2.5.10	Wagon Rehabilitation CPM, MOZAMBIQUE	3.3										
2.6.1	Modification of Wagons and Wagon Maintenance, Swaziland Railway,	1.2										
<u>Roads</u>												
1.3.1	Upgrading of the Road Mchales Hbek - Cuthing - Qachas Nek. LESOTHO	89.0										
1.3.2	Upgrading and Reconstruction of the Road Taung - Mokhotlong - Sani Top. LESOTHO	35.7										
1.3.3	Upgrading of the Road Thaba-Tseka-Taung - Mpti. LESOTHO	35.7										
1.3.4	Construction of a New Road Ramabanta - Semonkong - Sekake. LESOTHO	36.8										
1.3.5	Upgrading of the Road Mokhotlong - Oribow. LESOTHO	26.5										
1.5.4	Rehabilitation of the Road Connection to Swaziland. MOZAMBIQUE	21.0										
1.5.6	Study of a New Road Linking Southern Zimbabwe with the Maputo Area. MOZAMBIQUE	0.4										
1.6.1	Rehabilitation and Upgrading of the Road Section Lomahasha-Siteki-Big Bend	22.0										
1.6.2	Improvement of Mbabane-Mansini Road SWAZILAND	28.9										
Total		680.9										

Project with funding or funding under negotiation

Project No.	Project Title	Estimated Cost USD million										
			86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95
0.5.1	<u>Multimodal projects in Beira</u>											
	<u>Corridor Development Plan,</u>	(7.9)										
PR-M-1	Organization and Manpower Development Plan	1.2										
PR-M-2	Support to Workers and their families	5.0										
	Development of the Town of Beira	0.5										
	Project Co-ordination	1.2										
3.5.2	<u>Port Projects in Beira Corridor</u>	(388.8)										
P-TA-1	Technical Assistance to Port	7.5										
P-A-1	Channel Dredging to 10 metres	31.0										
P-A-2	Navigational Aids	(1.0)										
P-CE-1	Multipurpose & Container Handling Terminal (Berths 2-5)	63.5										
P-CE-2	New Oil Terminal	9.0										
P-CE-3	Port Railways	18.0										
P-CE-4	Sugar & Cereal Terminal	31.0										
P-CE-5	Cold Storage Facilities	8.0										
P-CE-6	Tobacco Terminal	3.0										
P-CE-7	Cotton Terminal	3.0										
P-CE-8	Grain Silos (combined with P-CE-4)	12.0										
P-CE-9	Coastal Protection Scheme	10.0										
P-CE-10	Service Port Facilities	3.6										
P-CE-11	Port Roads	3.7										
P-CE-12	High Capacity Coal Terminal	160.0										
P-ME-1	Equipment for Multipurpose & Container Handling Terminal	18.0										
P-ME-2	Tug Boats	7.5										
2.5.3	<u>Railway Projects in Beira Corridor</u>	(182.0)										
R-TA-1	Technical Assistance to CFM	26.5										
R-TA-2	Technical Assistance to Malawi Railways	2.0										
R-OP-1	Motive Power, Rolling Stock Operation Plan	(0.2)										
R-OP-2	Electrification Study	0.7										
R-CE-1	Track Upgrading, Rehabilitation Beira-Machipanda	36.0										
R-CE-2	Emergency Repairs Dondo-Vila Nova	15.0										
R-CE-3	Track Rehabilitation Blantyre-Border	15.5										
R-CE-4	Track Upgrading Dondo-Vila Nova	25.0										
R-CE-5	Study, Rail Link Kafue Lions Den	0.8										
R-CE-6	Line Doubling Beira to Dondo	7.0										
R-CE-7	Track Maintenance CFM(C)	4.5										
R-ST-1	Emergency Repairs to Telecommunications Beira to Machipanda & Vila Nova	2.1										
R-ST-2	Radio Telecommunication CFM (C)	2.9										
R-ST-3	Train Control System CFM (C)	3.7										
R-ST-4	Wagon Control System CFM (C)	0.7										
R-ST-5	Replacement of Railway Telephone Exchange CFM (C)	0.8										
R-ST-6	Solar Power Panels	0.1										
R-ME-1	Scrapping, Salvaging of Wagons & Locomotives, Rehabilitation of Wagons, Conversion to Roller Bearings CFM (C)	10.0										
R-ME-2	Rehabilitation of Locomotives CFM (C)	15.0										
R-ME-3	Replacement of Malawi Railway Wagons	2.0										
R-ME-4	Rehabilitation of Locomotive Workshops CFM (C)	2.0										
R-ME-5	Extension of Linbe Workshop	0.6										
R-ME-6	Facilities, Spares, Equipment for CFM(C) Workshops	6.2										
R-ME-7	Rescue Cranes and Rerolling Equipment	2.7										
1.5.1	<u>Road Projects in Beira Corridor</u>	(33.4)										
RD-CE-1	Beira - Machipanda	21.0										
RD-CE-2	Lusaka - Kafue Junction, ZAMBIA	2.9										
RD-CE-3	Chimoio - Changara	3.0										
RD-CE-4	Matundo - Chuita	6.5										
1.9.1	Rehabilitation of Harare-Chirundu Road. ZIMBABWE	1.8										
Total		613.9										

 Project with funding or funding under negotiation
 Project without financing

DIAGRAM 3 NACALA PORT TRANSPORT SYSTEM PROJECTS

Project No.	Project Title	Estimated Cost USD million	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95
3.5.3	<u>Ports & Water Transport</u> Design and Construction of Container Terminal for the Port of Nacala. MOZAMBIQUE	28.0										
3.5.5	<u>Railways</u> Rehabilitation of the Nacala-Cuamba Railway 538 km. MOZAMBIQUE	208.0										
4.1	<u>Roads</u> Study on Upgrading of Road Mangochi-Mandimba-Mitande. MALAWI/MOZAMBIQUE	0.2										
8.6	Rehabilitation of the Road Lusaka - Chipeta. ZAMBIA	28.8										
Total		265.0										

 Project with funding or funding under negotiation
 Project without financing

DIAGRAM 4 DAR ES SALAAM PORT TRANSPORT SYSTEM

Project No.	Project Title	Estimated Cost USD million										
			86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95
Ports and Water Transport												
3.7.1	Development of Navigation on Lake Niassa/Nyasa/Malawi MALAWI/TANZANIA	(8.7)										
(1)	Lake Navigation Study	0.4										
(2)	Lake Ports (Dry Cargo & Fuel)	2.8										
(3)	Vessel	2.8										
(4)	Monkey Bay Shipyard	1.7										
(5)	Lake Technical Assistance	0.7										
(6)	Engineering Design	0.3										
3.7.2	Development of the Port of Dar es Salaam, TANZANIA	(207.0)										
(1)	Kurasini Oil Terminal Rehabilitation	3.7										
(2)	Improvement of Harbour Entrance Channel	45.4										
(3)	Construction of Container Terminal	34.0										
(4)	Construction of Grain Facilities	12.8										
(5)	Ubungu Container Depot Included in (3)											
(6)	Lighterage Quay and Belgian Warf	6.2										
(7)	Construction of Tug Berth	5.2										
(8)	Purchase of Shore-based Container & General Cargo Handling Equipment	38.9										
(9)	Purchase of Floating Craft	21.1										
(10)	Technical Assistance to THA & Improve- ment of Bandari College	3.2										
(11)	Rehabilitation of Berths 1-8	32.6										
(12)	Study on New Oil Terminal	0.2										
(13)	Study on increasing Port capacity	(0.3)										
(14)	Study on container Handling in Tan- zania and on TAZARA	0.5										
(15)	Malawi Fuel Tank Farm	3.2										
Railways												
2.7.1	TAZARA 10 Year Develop. Plan Project	(196.4)										
	Project Co-ordination Unit	2.0										
CE:1	Rehabilitation of Quarries	11.3										
CE:2	Permenent Rectification of Landslides	12.0										
CE:3	Mechanized Track Maintenance	19.0										
CE:4	Rail Welding	16.4										
CE:5	Rail Burn Repairs	5.3										
CE:6	Terminal Facilities at New Kapiri Mposhi	0.3										
CE:7	Railway Link TAZARA-Mpungu Port, Zambia	0.4										
CE:8	Malawi Cargo Centre, Mbeya	1.2										
CE:9	Malawi Fuel Tank Farm, Mbeya	1.5										
CE:10	Malawi Cargo Centre, Dar Engineering Design & Technical Assist.	2.3										
ST:1	Solar Power Panels	3.2										
ST:2	Back-up HF Radio Link	0.5										
ST:3	Teleprinters	0.1										
ST:4	Feasibility Study of Future Telecommunications System	0.2										
ST:5	Automatic Train Stops	4.5										
ST:6	Track Circuiting	1.6										
ME:1	Locomotives	46.0										
ME:2	Goods Wagons	48.3										
ME:3	Trolleys and Trailers	2.1										
ME:4	Handling Equipment for Goods Depots	2.0										
ME:5	Rescue Crane and Rerailing Equipment	6.8										
ME:6	Wheel Lathes	2.5										
ME:7	Mechanical Equipment for Work Shops	2.0										
ME:8	Malawian Tank Cars	0.9										
GM:1	Technical Assistance to the Head Office	2.7										
GM:2	Manpower Development Plan & Training Facilities	1.3										
Roads												
1.4.3	Road Link Karonga-Mbeya. MALAWI/TANZANIA	28.0										
1.7.3	Rehabilitation/Strengthening of the TANZAM Highway. TANZANIA	62.0										
1.8.8	Rehabilitation of the TANZAM Highway. ZAMBIA	52.5										
Total		554.6										

 Project with funding or funding under negotiation
 Project without financing

DIAGRAM 5 LOBITO PORT TRANSPORT SYSTEM PROJECTS

Project No.	Project Title	Estimated Cost USD Million	Year									
			86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95
3.1.2	<u>Port and Water Transport</u> Development of the Port of Luanda ANGOLA	(38.0)										
(1)	Construction of a Container and a RO/RO Terminal	10.7										
(2)	Construction of a Grain Terminal and Silos	12.7										
(3)	Modernisation and Enlargement of Electrical Systems	5.5										
(4)	Earth Works	5.5										
(5)	Construction of Canteen Facilities	3.6										
2.1.1	<u>Railways</u> Rehabilitation of the Benguela Railway. ANGOLA	148.4										
1.8.1	<u>Roads</u> Angola-Zambia Road Link. ZAMBIA	0.2										
Total		186.6										

 Project with funding or funding under negotiation
 Project without financing

DIAGRAM 6 INTRA-REGIONAL SURFACE TRANSPORT SYSTEM PROJECTS

Pr	Project No	Project Title	Estimated Cost USD Million	86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93							
O.		<u>Ports & Water Transport</u>									
	1.1.3	Port School, Lobito, ANGOLA	5.0								
PR	3.5.4	Navigational Aids. MOZAMBIQUE	12.0								
PF	3.5.4(1)	Buoy Handling & Maintenance Vessel. MOZAMBIQUE	6.6								
	3.5.5	Port Staff Training Institute. MOZAMBIQUE	6.8								
J	3.7.3	Navigation Aids. TANZANIA	0.15								
P	3.8.1	Navigability of the Zambezi & Shire Rivers	0.3								
P		<u>Railways</u>									
P	2.2.7	Establishment of Dry Ports/ICDs in BOTSWANA	2.5								
P	2.4.3	Establishment of Dry Ports/ICDs in MALAWI	4.0								
F	2.5.8	Change over to Roller Bearings & Reconditioning of wagons (CPM). MOZAMBIQUE	7.0								
I	2.5.9	Facilities, Materials, Spares & Equipment for Workshops and Repair Tracks, Wagon Maintenance. MOZAMBIQUE	11.1								
I	2.5.11	Computerized Wagon Control CPM, MOZAMBIQUE	2.5								
I	2.6.2	Establishment of Dry Port/ICD, SWAZILAND	0.7								
I	2.8.1	Feasibility Study for New rail Links Connecting Zambia with Malawi and Mozambique	0.6								
I	2.8.2	Wagon Repair Tracks and Tools, Zambia Railways	0.2								
I	2.8.3	Construction of Kafue Rail Bridge	11.7								
I	2.8.4	Establishment of Dry Ports/ICDs	6.0								
I	2.9.1	Repair Tracks & Wagon Maintenance Equipment National Railway of Zimbabwe	1.1								
I	2.9.2	Equipment for Central Electrical Workshop National Railways of Zimbabwe	0.4								
		<u>Roads</u>									
	1.1.1	Study of the Road N'Zeto Soyo. ANGOLA	1.1								
	1.1.2	Studies of Six Roads. ANGOLA	2.0								
	1.2.1	Partial Reconstruction of Nata-Kazungula Road, BOTSWANA	3.7								
	1.2.2	Study on Jwaneng-Manung Road Link. BOTSWANA	0.77								
	1.4.2	Study on the Upgrading of the Road Blantyre-Milanje-Mocuba-Malawi/Mozambique	0.8								
	1.5.2	Rehabilitation of the Zimbabwe-Tete-Malawi Road. MOZAMBIQUE	18.6								
	1.5.5	Study on Unity Bridge & Access Roads. MOZAMBIQUE/TANZANIA	0.9								
	1.7.1	Rehabilitation & Upgrading of the Mwara-Songea Mbamba Bay Road. TANZANIA	44.0								
	1.8.2	Study on Kazungula Bridge & the Panda-metenga-Victoria Falls Road. BOTSWANA/ZAMBIA/ZIMBABWE	(0.2)								
	1.8.3	Rehabilitation of the Kafue-Livingstone-Kazungula Road. ZAMBIA	31.0								
	1.8.4	Rehabilitation of the Road Kafue - Chirundu. ZAMBIA	6.0								
	1.8.5	Rehabilitation for the Ndola-Lusaka Road. ZAMBIA	23.8								
	1.8.7	Improvement of the Road Lusaka-Mongu	25.6								
	Total		239.2								

 Project with funding or funding under negotiation
 Project without financing


Project No.	Project Title	Estimated Cost USD Million	Estimated Cost									
			86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95
4.0.8	Rehabilitation of Aeronautical Telecommunications in the Region	30.0										
4.2.1	Acquisition of new Aircraft for Air BOTSWANA	9.0										
4.4.1	New Airport at Mzuzu, MALAWI	17.3										
4.5.3	Civil Aviation Projects in Beira Port Transport System Development Plan	(29.5)										
C-TA:1	Technical Assistance	5.0										
C-CE:1	Development of Beira Terminal	2.0										
C-CE:2	Strengthening of Runways in Beira and Tete	4.5										
C-CE:3	Airport Building, Chimio	1.5										
C-ME:1	Acquisition of two Aircraft	7.0										
C-ME:2	Communication and Navigation Beira, Chimio and Tete	6.0										
C-ME:3	Fire Fighting Equipment (Beira, Chimio and Tete)	2.5										
C-ME:4	Maintenance Equipment	0.5										
C-ME:5	Airport Lighting, Chimio	0.5										
4.5.4	SADCC Boeing 737 Flight Training Centre	2.75										
4.5.5	Development of Maputo Airport, MOZAMBIQUE	6.5										
4.5.6	Development of Inhambane Airport, MOZAMBIQUE	6.0										
4.5.7	Development of Vilanculos Airport, MOZAMBIQUE	2.5										
4.6.1	Development of Matsapha Airport. SWAZILAND	38.0										
4.8.1	Study on Improvement of Livingstone Airport, ZAMBIA	0.2										
4.8.2	Study on Improvement of Ndola Airport, ZAMBIA	0.3										
4.8.3	Study on Improvement of Southdowns Airport, ZAMBIA	0.2										
4.8.4	Study on New Hangar at Lusaka International Airport, ZAMBIA	0.07										
4.8.5	Extension of Zambia Air Services Institute (ZASTI) ZAMBIA	1.7										
4.9.2	New Harare Airport Terminal, ZIMBABWE	0.5										
4.9.3	Modernization of AFIN - Message Switching Centre at Harare International Airport, ZIMBABWE	0.6										

Total

145.12

 Project with funding or funding under negotiation
 Project without financing

DIAGRAM 8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROJECT



Total

292.3

 Project with funding or funding under negotiation
 Project without financing

APPENDIX II

*'Flechas' and the Formation of the 'Mozambique National Resistance'**

The first Flechas ('Arrows', or pseudo-terrorists) were recruited in Angola during the 1960s by Dr São José Lopes, Head of DGS. Having been accorded the privilege of consultation with the authorities in Angola I could see the Flecha-concept being developed on the lines of the Illaloes we had recruited during the 1940s to safeguard the Ethiopian-Somali borders; although – not to put too fine a distinction on it – many of these 'Illaloes' became the 'Shifta' or bandits of Somalia's struggle for independence in later decades.

2. We put the Flecha-concept into practice in CIO during the late 1960s, trying to develop counter-terrorist groups as 'an African solution to an African problem'; but although we made some progress we failed to establish a tripartite basis with the South Africans. Subsequently, we argued that Flechas should be introduced into Mozambique but there was considerable resistance from the then Director, DGS, Mozambique – because DGS in Angola had thought of it first!

3. I saw the Portuguese Prime Minister, Dr Caetano, in September 1971 concerning the deteriorating security situation in Mozambique and to try and get his government to use its influence in developing Flechas in Mozambique. Unfortunately, my actions were misconstrued as being critical of General Kaulza de Arriaga's conduct of the anti-terrorist war and were rejected by the Portuguese High Command in favour of General de Arriaga's alternative suggestion of forming anti-guerrilla groups (GES and GERS) from black Mozambican soldiers: but in our estimation this was merely an extension of failed military strategy, unlikely to be successful in countering subversion.

4. In the meantime, Flecha operations in Angola had proved increasingly successful, at one stage accounting for 60% of all terrorist kills, and had won a fair measure of favour with the then Commander-in-Chief, Angola, General Costa Gomes.

5. I saw Dr Caetano again in August 1972 and re-introduced the desirability of trying more unconventional methods in fighting the pattern of insurgency in Mozambique. At this stage the improved Portuguese position in Angola contrasted sharply with the deteriorating situation in Mozambique, and Dr Caetano made comment to the effect that they might have done better by offering more scope to the DGS in the earlier stages of the anti-terrorist war.

6. Dr Lopes was appointed Joint Controller of DGS Operations for Angola and Mozambique, and a belated move was made towards introducing Flechas in Mozambique as a cover for the small-scale pseudo-operations CIO had already started there.

7. Further tripartite meetings (DGS-BOSS-CIO) took place, during the course of which General van den Bergh promised support – particularly finan-

* MNR, MRN, or RENAMO, according to English or Portuguese usage.

APPENDIX

cial support – provided that the Flechas to be formed within Mozambique would be based along the Zambian border; but I believed this would defeat the object of the exercise (re-introducing conscripts or mercenaries in a conventional operation that had already been tried and failed, instead of the non-conventional 'head-hunting' type operation based on personal or tribal affiliations).

8. I remained convinced that what we needed was a pseudo-terrorist operation directed from Rhodesia into Mozambique and I saw the South African Prime Minister to seek his authority for tripartite support. Mr Vorster showed every appreciation of our need and said that I could discuss the detail with General van den Bergh, but when I saw General van den Bergh the following day he claimed that he had no responsibility for participation in this type of operation. I reminded him that over a period of years he had always claimed that his organisation had the sole responsibility for external clandestine operations; and that his own Prime Minister had confirmed this with me the day before. He then said that our current proposals would only interest him under conditions which I believed to be unattainable.

9. The security situation within Mozambique continued to deteriorate, and in March 1974 I was invited to Lourenço Marques by the Director-General, D.G.S., Major Silva Pais, to find him and Dr Lopes utterly depressed but most forthcoming in that they made a new offer for Rhodesia (and South Africa if they wished to join in) to operate Flechas within Mozambique on the basis of what they called 'unconventional, clandestine operations by local Africans'. The following was then agreed between us:

- Rhodesia must continue in 'Hot Pursuit' of her own terrorists;
- there should be no international objection to Africans of the same ethnic grouping operating in adjoining territories;
- there was little prospect that the Portuguese military forces could protect the electricity power lines between the Cabora Bassa dam and South Africa, but Flechas could help eradicate terrorists on either side of the Zambezi river and give Rhodesia (and South Africa) some stake in Mozambique.*

10. I visited Lisbon yet again in April 1974 and confirmed with the D.G., D.G.S., that he had cleared our trans-border operations with Dr Caetano: he expressed deep disappointment that we were not already operating in strength in Mozambique and that there appeared little prospect of obtaining South African participation.

I also saw General Luz Cunha, Chief of Defence Staff, who gave his approval for our Flecha-type operations and I discussed with him our Prime Minister's 'First Prize' – tripartite defence of the Zambezi River Line. I had similar discussions with the Minister of Defence, Silva Cunha, and the Foreign Minister, Rui Patricio, but the military coup in Portugal on 25th April put paid to our joint plans.

* The Cabora Bassa transmission lines were to have followed the direct route through Rhodesia to South Africa so that Rhodesia could benefit from that hydro-electric scheme; but the route was changed to omit Rhodesia, allegedly to ensure protection by the Portuguese military, and it was this route that the Portuguese now claimed they could not protect!

11. Irrespective of pending political changes we were left with the same defence requirements as before. Following the convention of 'Hot Pursuit', Rhodesian Security Forces had killed more FRELIMO in the Tete District of Mozambique than had the Portuguese military; and our chances of success against ZANLA/ZIPRA had also been considerably improved.

The alternative now was to withdraw – and perhaps withdraw unnecessarily – within our borders when no change of political consequence would occur in Mozambique for more than a year after the Portuguese coup.

It seemed that all of us in Southern Africa had to face the inevitability of action similar to that to which Israel had become accustomed – pre-emptive strikes against neighbouring countries – and our chances of succeeding with such action in Mozambique would be immeasurably improved if we acted under the guise of 'Hot Pursuit' *in advance* of any political change in Mozambique.

In other words, Rhodesia's (and South Africa's) security requirements would be better maintained by protecting our borders beyond our borders: at least, this was one side of the argument. The other side had been expressed by Dr Banda, for instance, who always advised that Rhodesia's war would be won or lost within Rhodesia. And we had found from experience that military planners quickly develop an obsession to strike at the enemy as far away as possible irrespective of cause and effect or the lessons of counter-insurgency; whereas the experience of Police and Special Branch indicated it was more important to safeguard internal security when the 'enemy' originated within one's borders.

12. In the event, CIO proceeded with the recruitment of Mozambicans who were encouraged to do their own thing in Mozambique without having to rely on support from Rhodesia.

The surprising ease with which the Mozambique Resistance Movement developed indicated that we were proceeding on right lines, particularly as we kept the movement small and clandestinely manageable during the first five years whilst it could provide the eyes-and-ears of our Intelligence in Mozambique.

The undoubted success of the movement also signified that FRELIMO in Mozambique (as between MPLA and UNITA in Angola) lacked that essential measure of support that they needed from the population: or the Portuguese had acted too hastily in transferring power to a liberation movement which could not establish popular support through free elections.


Director General, CIO
April 1974

HISTORIC AGREEMENT SIGNED

FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF ANGOLA :

FOR THE REPUBLIC
OF CUBA :

FOR THE REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA :





The signatures on the English version of the tripartate agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa

The text of the agreement signed in New York between Angola, Cuba and South Africa is recorded below:

PREAMBLE

The governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa, hereinafter designated as "the Parties",

Taking into account the "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa", approved by the Parties on 20 July 1988, and the subsequent negotiations with respect to the implementation of these Principles, each of which is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement,

Considering the acceptance by the Parties of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), adopted on 29 September 1978, hereinafter designated as "UNSCR 435/78",

Considering the conclusion of the bilateral agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba providing for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola,

Recognizing the role of the United Nations Security Council in implementing UNSCR 435/78 and in supporting the implementation of the present agreement,

Affirming the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence of all states of southwestern Africa,

Affirming the principle of non-inter-

ference in the internal affairs of states,

Affirming the principle of abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states,

Reaffirming the right of the peoples of the southwestern region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights, and of the states of Southwestern Africa to peace development, and social progress,

Urging African and international cooperation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of Africa,

Expressing their appreciation for the mediating role of the Government of the United States of America,

Desiring to contribute to the establishment of peace and security in southwestern Africa,

AGREEMENT

Agree to the provisions set forth below.

(1) The Parties shall immediately request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to seek authority from the Security Council to commence implementation of UNSCR 435/78 on 1 April 1989.

(2) All military forces of the Republic of South Africa shall depart Namibia in accordance with UNSCR 435/78.

(3) Consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 435/78, the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of Angola shall cooperate with the Secretary-General to ensure the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections and shall abstain from any action that could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78. The Parties shall respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of

borders of Namibia and shall ensure that their territories are not used by any state, organization, or person in connection with acts of war, aggression, or violence against the territorial integrity or inviolability of borders of Namibia or any other action which could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78.

(4) The People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba shall implement the bilateral agreement, signed on the date of signature of this agreement, providing for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, and the arrangements made with the Security Council of the United Nations for the on-site verification of that withdrawal.

(5) Consistent with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force, and shall ensure that their respective territories are not used by any state, organization, or person in connection with any acts of war, aggression, or violence, against the territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, or independence of any state of southwestern Africa.

(6) The Parties shall respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the states of southwestern Africa.

(7) The Parties shall comply in good faith with all obligations undertaken in this agreement and shall resolve through negotiation and in a spirit of cooperation any disputes with respect to the interpretation or implementation thereof.

(8) This agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

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