Emerging Soviet Doctrine: Implications for the U.S. Task Force Defense
Abstract
This monograph discusses selected aspects of Soviet offensive doctrine with emphasis on trends discussed in unclassified literature. Relevant U.S. heavy task force doctrine is then reviewed in light of what the Soviets are doing and the implications for defense are highlighted. Subjects addressed in this paper include Soviet use of surprise, tempo, mobile groups, fire support and helicopters, and sophisticated combined arms tactics to deal with U.S. defenses. Soviet concerns over nuclear-like weapons are discussed along with relative views of a future high intensity battlefield. Possible areas of concern for U.S. doctrine developers are identified and discussed along with some ideas for adapting our training to reflect current Soviet doctrine. The paper concludes that tactical surprise is likely to be achieved by the Soviets, and that training and doctrine should reflect this situation. The paper also questions the validity of the assertion that a task force can defeat a regiment, not because of deficiencies in U.S. doctrine or equipment, but as a function of high intensity mobile warfare. In addition, the monograph suggests changing the composition of the OPFOR at the NTC from a rifle regiment to a tank regiment, in order to more closely model emerging Soviet doctrine.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 10, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA208043
Entities
People
- Michael D. Burke
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College