THE MORAL DOMAIN OF
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

A Monograph

by

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The moral domain of war concerns the human dimension of conflict. People compose military forces so all military operations include human considerations. Leaders must use and protect their soldiers who are their most precious resource. Leaders must understand how military operations stress soldiers to ensure this stress does not prevent success.

Psychological studies have identified many characteristics of military operations that affect soldiers. This monograph uses the following list of factors to describe the impact of military operations on soldiers: fear of death and injury; fatigue; physical discomfort; isolation; uncertainty; value conflicts; boredom; separation from family; climate, terrain, and culture; training and tactics; and lack of privacy.

The spectrum of conflict may be divided many ways. Army doctrine generally discusses three types of conflicts: low, mid, and high-intensity. This monograph divides conflict into low and mid/high-intensity categories for discussion of the differences in stress soldiers experience. The missions and threats in low-intensity conflict result in soldiers

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U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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ABSTRACT

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low and mid/high-intensity categories for discussion of the
differences in stress soldiers experience. The missions and
threats in low-intensity conflict result in soldiers
experiencing different kinds of stress in low-intensity
conflict than in mid/high-intensity conflict. This monograph
discusses these differences and the implications for doctrine,
training, and organization.

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I. Introduction.

The Moral Domain.

Warfare is a human act. Military leaders must understand the relationship between people and warfare to ensure success. The leader who can best use and protect this indispensable resource, people, has an advantage over his enemy.

Today the US Army divides the spectrum of conflict into three levels: low-intensity, mid-intensity, and high-intensity.[1] Doctrine, training, and organization requirements may differ for these types of conflicts depending on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and time available -- basically the situation and factors affecting it.

This paper will address the human side of one part of the spectrum of conflict. Professor James Schneider calls this human side of conflict the "moral domain." This includes the role of people in military operations and the effect of such operations on people.[2] The purpose of this paper is to answer two questions: Is the moral domain of low-intensity conflict different from that of mid/high-intensity conflict? If so, what are the implications for Army doctrine, training, and organization?

People affect military operations because people compose the military forces. Soldiers operate the weapons and equipment. Commanders set goals and priorities. Clausewitz stated that moral factors "constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole." He described the principal moral elements as

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"the skill of the commanders, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit."[3] People affect all military operations.

Military operations stress soldiers. Anthony Kellett includes fatigue, sustained operations, climate and terrain, food and recreation shortages, tactics employed, a sense of purpose felt or not felt, enemy firepower, battle outcomes (victory or defeat), and casualties as characteristics of combat that stress soldiers.[4] Samuel Stouffer's detailed study of World War II soldiers identifies the following combat stresses: fear of death and injury, physical discomfort, lack of sexual and social satisfaction, isolation from affectional assurance, loss of friends, the sight of dead and dying soldiers, restriction of personal movement, uncertainty, the lack of value as an individual, lack of privacy, boredom mixed with anxiety, and a lack of terminal individual goals.[5]

Another source of stress factors is Field Manual (FM) 26-2: Management of Stress in Army Operations. The list of factors includes fatigue, the requirement to be alert and make decisions, poor visibility at night and in bad weather, isolation, continuous operations, separation from family, loss of leisure time, difficult training, unfamiliar cultures, integration of males and females, climate, terrain, and poor living conditions.[6]

In order to provide a reference point, this paper will use the factors below to describe how military operations affect

soldiers:

> fear of death and injury to self and
>   comrades
> fatigue
> physical discomfort
> isolation
> uncertainty
> value conflicts
> boredom
> separation from family
> climate, terrain, and culture
> training and tactics
> lack of privacy

The Spectrum of Conflict.

Differentiating between low and mid/high-intensity conflict
is no simple task. Army doctrinal manuals explain the spectrum
of conflict in various ways. The 1981 FM 100-20: Low-
Intensity Conflict describes high-intensity conflict as "war
between two or more nations and their respective allies" using
all resources available including nuclear and chemical weapons.
Mid-intensity conflict excludes nuclear and chemical weapons
and includes limited objectives as well as limits on
destructive force used and the geographic area concerned. Low-
intensity conflict contains "internal defense and development
assistance operations" including advice and actions by combat,
combat support, and combat service support units.[7]

The 1986 Field Circular (FC) 100-20: Low-Intensity
Conflict modifies the low-intensity conflict definition. It
defines low-intensity conflict as "a limited politico-military
struggle to achieve political, military, social, economic, or
psychological objectives."[8] The 1988 FM 100-20: Low-Intensity
Conflict (Final Draft) refines this definition to "a politico-

military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine peaceful competition among states."[?] This manual also discusses "three environments" for conflict: routine peaceful competition, low-intensity conflict, and war.

FM 100-1: The Army discusses three types of conflict involving military operations: general war, limited war, and low-intensity conflict. General war involves major powers using all available resources with national survival an issue. Limited war involves two or more nations where the "means and/or ends are constrained." FM 100-1 defines low-intensity conflict the same as the 1986 FC 100-20.[10] FM 100-5: Operations discusses the Army's need to respond to operational requirements in low, mid, and high-intensity conflicts but does not define each type.[11]

Other divisions of the spectrum of conflict exist. Authors have divided conflict among various categories including noncombat operations, special operations, low-intensity conflict, conventional war, and nuclear war;[12] war and operations short of war;[13] or peacekeeping, peacetime contingencies, conventional war, chemical/tactical nuclear war, and strategic nuclear war.[14]

Clearly the conflict spectrum is viewed many ways. In order to preclude a debate over spectrum resolution from clouding the thrust of this paper, I will use the low-intensity conflict definition in the 1988 FM 100-20 (Final Draft)

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discussed earlier.   Mid/high-intensity conflict then is all

conflict involving military operations not considered part of

low-intensity conflict.

II.   The Moral Domain of Mid/High-Intensity Conflict.

Mid/high intensity conflict is the focus of much of the Army's experience and preparation for war. World Wars I and II are in this category. The discussion below concerns the moral domain of such conflicts.

Fear of Death and Injury to Self and Comrades.

Mid/high-intensity conflict involves combat between military forces. Stress results. Combat means bloodshed. Death and injury surround soldiers in combat. Richard Holmes points out "the smell of death is almost as disturbing as the sight of it."[13] Soldiers do not want to be killed or injured but know all will not avoid that fate. Medical support to care for the injured reduces the fear of death due to injury but cannot eliminate it. Training can enhance a soldier's ability and confidence in his ability to avoid death or injury. Any protection from enemy weapons reduces this stress.

Soldiers also fear the death or injury of comrades. The sight of dead and wounded soldiers reminds soldiers of their own vulnerability. Battle tempo may result in the dead remaining unburied for long periods of time.[14] Loss of comrades reduces social contacts and the social support they provide. Medical support, training, and protection are important factors to reduce the likelihood of death and injury to comrades.

Fatigue.

Combat is physically demanding. The pace of operations

often precludes adequate rest. Fatigue can incapacitate
soldiers. Even assault troops may fall asleep due to the
physical demands of war.[17] Units need more than one soldier
with any particular skill to provide a continuous operations
capability. Cross-training ensures that soldiers with critical
skills have the time to rest without a unit being penalized for
their absence.

Physical Discomfort.

Soldiers experience physical discomfort. They must fight
in all types of weather on all types of terrain. Rest periods
may occur infrequently. Protective measures to save soldiers
from the effects of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
increase soldier discomfort. If available, proper clothing and
equipment reduce discomfort. Combat service support units
providing clothing exchange, bath facilities, laundry, bakery,
and other personal services also reduce soldier discomfort.
Training soldiers to live in field conditions helps them reduce
their discomfort.

Isolation.

S.L.A. Marshall describes the battlefield as "the
lonesomest place which men may share together."[18] Weapon
lethality forces dispersion to avoid losses. The threat of
nuclear weapons forces units to disperse to avoid presenting a
worthwhile target. Dispersion reduces soldier to soldier and
unit to unit contact. This lack of contact, visual and
physical, makes the battlefield a lonely place.[19]

Uncertainty.

Soldiers cannot avoid uncertainty. The threat of death and injury makes survival uncertain. Poor communications foster uncertainty due to a lack of correct information. Soldiers do not have control over their destinies. Commanders make decisions without their input. A thinking enemy opposes them and tries to ensure their uncertainty to enhance his opportunities for success. Eliminating all uncertainty is impossible as long as people are involved.

Value Conflicts.

Value conflicts stress soldiers. Society does not sanction taking someone's life. However, soldiers must kill their enemies even though society prohibits aggression.[20] Society's condemnation of murder conflicts with a soldier's duty. Soldiers also must deal with the conflict between the duty to function in a threatening environment and the desire to stay alive and unhurt. Leaders must weigh the requirement to accomplish missions that will result in the death or injury of his soldiers.

Boredom.

Lord Moran noted in World War I that the desire for change resulting from boredom could lead to rebellion and discontent.[21] Boredom broken by periods of great anxiety characterizes mid/high-intensity conflict. Rapid, continuous operations result in fear and anxiety. But logistics or the limits of soldier endurance eventually will force a pause in

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operations.   These pauses provide time for rest and
reconstitution but can result in boredom.

Separation from Family.

Modern armies do not intentionally deploy soldiers'
families into combat.   Soldiers do not need to be concerned for
their families' safety while fighting.   However, this
separation deprives soldiers of their usual social support.
This can make soldiers feel isolated from home and safety.

Climate, Terrain, and Culture.

The climate, terrain, and local culture of the battlefield
affect the soldier.   Climate and terrain may add to a soldier's
physical discomfort if different from that where the soldier
was stationed.   Soldiers may have to adjust to an unfamiliar
culture characterized by different customs and language.

Training and Tactics.

Training attempts to prepare soldiers for combat.   Proper
training supports the tactics used in combat.   If expectations
match reality, soldiers will experience less stress due to
uncertainty and the effects of climate, terrain, and culture.
Experience in combat provides the basis for modifying tactics
when training fails to adequately prepare soldiers.   The
battlefield is very different from soldiers' civilian
experiences.[22]   Training attempts to reduce the surprise that
results from such differences.

Lack of Privacy.

Soldiers lose privacy due to the requirements of communal

living in military forces. This is true in peace and war.
Since units are composed of numbers of soldiers, this stress is
unavoidable.

Mid/high-intensity conflict stresses soldiers. The factors
discussed above point out why. Low-intensity conflict also
results in soldier stress. In some ways the stress is the
same. In other ways the stress is different.

III. <u>The Moral Domain of Low-Intensity Conflict</u>.

Low-intensity conflict involves a multitude of threats and missions. Threats include urban guerrillas, vigilante groups, professional revolutionaries and terrorists, and drug traffickers. Major powers may use surrogates for violent confrontation. FM 100-20 includes four categories of military operations in low-intensity conflict: insurgency and counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, and peacetime contingency operations. A wide range of operations falls under the peacetime contingency heading: disaster relief, shows of force and demonstrations, noncombatant evacuation operations, rescue and recovery operations, strikes and raids, peacemaking, unconventional warfare, security assistance, and support to civil authorities.[23] This multitude of threats and missions places unique stresses on the soldiers involved.

<u>Fear of Death and Injury to Self and Comrades</u>.

Any combat that occurs in low-intensity conflict will result in the same fear of death and injury that exists in mid/high-intensity conflict. However, operations in low-intensity conflict often differ from those in mid/high-intensity conflict. Different stress results.

Fighting guerrillas results in a different stress relating to the fear of death and injury. Guerrillas attempt to blend in with the population. Soldiers have difficulty separating enemy and friends. Rules of engagement limit soldiers'

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application of force to destroy the enemy. This limits the
soldiers' ability to protect themselves.

Failure to restrict the use of force can result in the
death or injury of innocent civilians. One of the reasons for
post-traumatic stress in Vietnam veterans is guilt due to the
killing of women and children.[24] Civilian casualties to
government and guerrilla land mines hurt current government and
insurgent attempts to secure popular support in El Salvador.[25]

Other low-intensity conflict missions can result in unique
death and injury stress. Who can forget the situation faced by
US naval commanders in the Persian Gulf while escorting oil
tankers? Concern over the possible loss of his ship influenced
the decision of the captain of the USS Vincennes who mistakenly
downed an Iranian civilian airliner in July 1988.[26] This
mixture of friend and foe with restraint and action
characterizes low-intensity conflict.

Low-intensity conflict may not involve a threat to the
United States' survival as a nation. The government may not
feel compelled to continue the war to achieve a successful
conclusion. Success may be difficult to define. Combat and
the subsequent losses may seem to have no purpose. Some
Vietnam veterans experienced significant post-traumatic stress
due to the government not prosecuting the war toward an
ultimate goal of victory. Sacrifices by the veterans and their
comrades appeared meaningless.[27]

Even though the United States may not view survival as a

nation at risk, the host nation may consider the conflict a threat to its existence. Insurgencies involve an attempt by a group not in power to seize power. Therefore, the political survival of the host government is at stake. This can pose a unique stress for US soldiers and the host nation forces. The host nation may use all its power to try to survive. However, US interests may limit its assets committed to support that effort.

Fatigue.

All military operations can result in fatigue if the soldiers have inadequate rest. Therefore, this aspect of the moral domain is not inherently different in low versus mid/high-intensity conflict. However, if political considerations limit the number of troops committed, fatigue could result due to requirements exceeding capabilities. Since a lack of trained and equipped troops could lead to the same problem in mid/high-intensity conflict, fatigue as a component of the moral domain is a constant throughout the spectrum of conflict.

Physical Discomfort.

Physical discomfort may or may not differ for low-intensity conflict. Living in the field will result in some physical discomfort regardless of the type operations concerned. However, low-intensity conflict may provide soldiers a better chance to reduce their physical discomfort between periods of combat. Some soldiers in Vietnam occupied bases that had

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bunkers and buildings equipped with televisions, stereos, air conditioners, refrigerators and soft-drink machines.[28]

Relatively short-term operations like strikes and raids provide soldiers the chance to return rapidly to peacetime conditions. Operations such as peacekeeping, shows of force, and demonstrations try to avoid combat which provides military units the time to work to reduce physical discomfort.

Isolation.

Soldiers in low-intensity conflict experience a different type of isolation. Weapon lethality forcing dispersion on the battlefield will be the same. But isolation involves more than soldier and unit dispersion. Peacekeeping operations provide an example.

Peacekeeping forces must maintain neutrality between warring elements. Mutual consent from the belligerents is essential. Should the peacekeeping force lose its neutral status, the belligerents may demand that the peacekeeping force leave.

Neutrality protects the peacekeepers. Loss of neutrality may force them to fight.[29] Peacekeeping is more like police work than it is like combat.[30] Consequently, peacekeepers must isolate themselves from the dispute that required their presence if they are to maintain their neutrality. Soldiers in mid/high-intensity conflict do not have to remain neutral. US peacekeeping forces in the Sinai must maintain their neutrality between Egypt and Israel to retain their usefulness.

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Soldiers performing security assistance missions must also
isolate themselves from any conflict in the host country.
Their purpose is to assist a friendly nation facing a threat
such as when US forces provided logistical support to Israel in
its 1973 Yom Kippur War.[31] Military personnel performing
security assistance missions want to avoid, not seek, combat.

Political support may isolate soldiers in other ways.
Since low-intensity conflict may not involve the survival of a
nation, segments of domestic and international society may not
support military operations. Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon
was the first time Israel experienced significant domestic
opposition to a war. The purpose of the war was unclear.
Domestic opposition led to open protests of the war. The
refusal of 143 reserve soldiers to fight was indicative of the
discontent.[32] Domestic resistance to using military force
isolates soldiers from those that oppose such action.

International relations also affect low-intensity conflict
operations. British soldiers continue to patrol Northern
Ireland to enforce peace. The United States and Great Britain
are allies yet American citizens continue to send money and
weapons to the Irish Republican Army.[33] Support by an ally to
an enemy isolates soldiers from an expected agent of support.
The expected support helps the enemy instead of the ally.

Media coverage also impacts on the feelings of isolation a
soldier may have. Regardless of the spectrum of conflict
level, media coverage may bring soldiers' actions into

homefront living rooms. This can reduce the isolation of the domestic front from the soldiers. Terrorists have become particularly adept at using the media to further a cause. They use terror to influence a large group and attract world attention. Media coverage subjects soldier actions to scrutiny by all those watching. Media disclosures of anti-terrorist actions can jeopardize operations and hostages. Media reporting of a hijacked Lufthansa aircraft captain's contact with authorities in October 1977 resulted in the terrorists murdering the captain.[34] Military personnel cannot avoid the media. They must learn to work with its presence.

Uncertainty.

Uncertainty takes on a new dimension in low-intensity conflict. The difficulty of separating friends and enemy in a guerrilla war was discussed previously. Terrorists bring even more uncertainty to military operations. Distinguishing violent criminal acts from terrorist actions may be difficult.[35] Security forces cannot respond to a political issue when one does not exist.

Terrorist actions may be designed to produce an overreaction by government forces.[36] Overreaction may alienate the government from the population, the focus of the power struggle. Guerrilla warfare in World War II Russia and Yugoslavia was characterized by brutality and atrocities on both sides. German atrocities in response to partisan brutality alienated the local population.[37] These examples

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also show that low-intensity conflict operations may occur in a mid/high-intensity conflict. Foreign support to terrorist groups can bring further uncertainty in trying to determine who the enemy is and how to eliminate the threat. Libya's continued support of terrorists in the Philippines, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East is an example of such foreign aid.[30]

Peacekeeping, shows of force, and demonstrations involve their own special kind of uncertainty. Uncertainty exists due to the threat of combat always being present. Military forces with such missions try to avoid combat but must always be prepared to defend themselves. Failure to do so can result in disaster. The consequences of such a self-defense failure were demonstrated by the 1983 bombing of the United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, where over 240 US military personnel died.

Value Conflicts.

Low-intensity operations include different value conflicts from those in mid/high-intensity environment. Soldiers train to use their weapons in mid/high-intensity conflict. However, many missions in low-intensity conflict require restraint when using lethal force. Fighting guerrillas, peacekeeping, shows of force, and demonstrations may require soldiers to shoot only to protect themselves or to use their weapons carefully to avoid injuring innocent people. This results in conflict within the soldier to determine when to fire or not. The

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soldier knows that failing to fire can result in his or his comrades' death or injury. Firing at the wrong time may hurt the wrong target and work against his mission. The dilemma of the captain of the USS Vincennes again comes to mind.

Special legal concerns also arise in low-intensity conflict. Governments may want to treat captured insurgents as criminals. Treating them as prisoners of war may confer upon them a legitimate opposition status which could enhance the insurgents' popular standing. However, interpretation of the 1977 Geneva Protocol recognizing armed forces as all organized forces with an internal disciplinary system to enforce compliance with international law may confer such a status on an insurgent group.[39] As COL L. D. Holder, Director of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has pointed out, treating an insurgency as a civil operation may make soldiers subject to civil authority in addition to the normal military chain of command.

Using military forces to defeat terrorists may make them appear stronger than if non-military security forces are used. If terrorists want political legitimacy by being viewed as an army, a government using its army against them may confer this status on the terrorists. Great Britain faces this problem in Northern Ireland.[40]

Military personnel must be prepared to conduct operations viewed as legal by their government that another may consider illegal. Egyptian commandos discovered the danger with such a

mission when they attempted to liberate hostages aboard a
hijacked DC-8 at Lanarca, Cyprus, in 1978. When the Egyptians
attacked the plane, Cypriot soldiers returned their fire and
stopped them. The Cypriots arrested the Egyptians. The
hijackers later surrendered.[41]

Boredom.

Low-intensity conflict will include periods of boredom
broken by periods of anxiety, just like mid/high-intensity
conflict. But missions that seek to avoid combat may result in
longer periods of boredom.

Boredom is a major problem for peacekeeping forces. Small
units occupy observation posts and checkpoints for extended
periods of time. As long as diplomacy maintains peace between
the belligerents and the peacekeeping force maintains its
neutrality, no combat occurs. US peacekeeping elements in the
Sinai today experience boredom because the lack of combat
results in little activity for the soldiers. The troops feel
isolated due to cultural differences which further limits
available activities to reduce boredom.[42] Shows of force and
demonstrations also seek to avoid combat so must involve
periods of boredom.

There is a similarity between the cycle of boredom
interrupted by anxiety in low-intensity conflict and the life
of a combat pilot. Lord Moran noted how World War II pilots in
Great Britain experienced stress due to the sharp contrast
between combat and life at the air base. Pilots lived in

general safety in a civilian environment in Great Britain.
However, they flew missions over Europe in g eat danger. These
swings between safety and great danger were a significant
strain for the pilots.[43]

Soldiers in a low-intensity conflict environment may face
similar stress. Anytime military personnel establish a secure
base from which to operate against an enemy, they will
experience this contrast in safe versus hostile environments.
Firebases and air bases in Vietnam are recent examples. The
strain comes from the thought expressed by Moran as "keeping
alive the idea of another way of life -- the chronic danger of
an alternative in war."[44]

Separation from Family.

As with mid/high-intensity conflict, no government should
intentionally subject families to physical danger. Families
are not prepared to defend themselves. Soldiers will not give
full attention to their duties if they are concerned about
their families. Unfortunately, low-intensity conflict may
occur in places expected to be safe. Consequently, the lack of
separation from family can be a stress of low-intensity
conflict rather than the actual separation.

Terrorism is a threat everywhere. Certain places are
obviously more dangerous than others. Traveling in the Middle
East and Mediterranean areas involves a certain risk. US
personnel stationed in Europe continue to be concerned about
terrorist action.

US personnel are by no means the only soldiers faced with the dilemma of not being separated from their families in low-intensity conflict. The early stage of the revolution in Algeria against French rule included the murder, wounding, or rape of over 200 Europeans resulting from Muslim demonstrations in May 1945. French security forces responded by killing thousands of Algerians.[45] Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorists killed two Irish soldiers at home on leave in August 1971.[46] IRA gunmen killed a prison officer as he walked away from a wedding while holding hands with his wife and six-year-old daughter in April 1979.[47] US soldiers with their families in Panama face that stress due to concern for their safety given the current relations with the Panamanian government.[48]

As long as soldiers are separated from their families, the stress will be the same as that normally associated with mid/high-intensity conflict. The danger is that the low-intensity conflict situation may not appear to be a real threat. This can result in military families being in danger.

Climate, Terrain, and Culture.

These factors pose virtually no inherent difference in the moral domain regardless of the type conflict. Soldiers should train and be equipped for the climate and terrain where they will operate. Soldiers should be acquainted with the culture where they will be stationed or fighting. However, since low-intensity conflict so often involves restraint of force and legitimacy in the eyes of the host population, consideration of

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the local culture is more important. The Soviet Union's anti-religious program in Afghanistan failed to appreciate the population's feelings. This program provided the Afghan resistance the solidifying force of an Islamic holy war.[47]

Training and Tactics.

The wide variety of missions in low-intensity conflict may require special skills not needed in mid/high-intensity conflict. Failure to prepare soldiers to use the skills necessary in low-intensity conflict will have the same type of effect such a failure would have in mid/high-intensity conflict. Soldiers will lose confidence in their ability to defeat the enemy because they will lack the ability to do so. They will not be able to employ tactics that will win. Morale will suffer. The force will fail.

French forces responding to the 1954 revolution in Algeria were trained and equipped for combat in Europe. They were capable of controlling roads, not chasing guerrillas over rough terrain. Ambushes took a toll on the French mechanized forces without them being able to respond decisively. Civil authorities wanted a pacification program but had difficulty providing clear guidance. Security forces were unsure if they were to "regain the confidence of the inhabitants" or crush the rebellion with force.[50]

Due to the necessity for restraint, tactics can have a marked impact on the success or failure of the operation. The use of force versus restraint is key as discussed earlier.

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Tactics allowed in combat may be illegal in low-intensity conflict. British Special Air Service (SAS) soldiers killed three IRA terrorists in Gibraltar in March 1988. The terrorists were unarmed. Witnesses claimed the soldiers murdered the terrorists. An inquiry deemed the shootings lawful.[91] The interesting point for the moral domain is that some people expect soldiers trained to kill enemies to also act like policemen. Soldiers in such a situation face a real problem. Do they have authority to make an arrest? What constitutes provocation for use of deadly force? Were they sent to kill terrorists? If so, how can they be accused of criminal action? Training and clear instructions are crucial.

Governments may require their military forces to perform missions not related to wartime roles. Civil action programs are an example and are not new. Examples of previous civil action programs supported by military forces include Chinese Communist soldiers harvesting crops and British engineer efforts to build railways, docks, and roads in the Sudan.[92]

Lack of Privacy.

Lack of privacy will be a problem in peace and war. The spectrum of conflict is immaterial. Soldiers will function in close proximity to other soldiers in all conflicts. Military life means a sacrifice of absolute personal privacy.

IV.   Conclusions.

General.

The moral domain of low-intensity conflict is similar to
the moral domain of mid/high-intensity conflict. Combat means
bloodshed. The fear of death and injury will be the same when
soldiers fight. All military operations involve fatigue if
soldiers do not get adequate rest. Physical discomfort will
characterize field conditions. Soldiers will experience
battlefield isolation when facing modern weapons. The value
conflicts of murder versus duty, mission versus people, and
self-preservation versus duty will stress soldiers in all forms
of combat. Boredom will continue to be broken by periods of
anxiety. Soldiers may be separated from their families.
Climate, terrain, and culture will affect operations and
soldiers. All military operations involve a lack of privacy.

However, the moral domain of low-intensity conflict is also
different from that of mid/high-intensity conflict. The fear
of death and injury is different in low-intensity conflict due
to the difficulty in identifying the enemy and the restraint
required in the use of force.[93] Physical discomfort may have a
different impact if soldiers have the opportunity to build
comfortable facilities. Isolation may affect soldiers
differently due to the heavy impact of domestic and
international politics, media coverage, and the need to
consider the local culture. Uncertainty is different due to
the difficulty of identifying threats. Value conflicts are

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heightened by the added requirement to use force with restraint and special legal considerations. Boredom is a special problem due to the lack of combat action in several low-intensity conflict missions. Family separations pose a unique problem because of the possibility of soldiers and families not being separated in certain dangerous situations. Training and tactics differ but the impact of having the wrong training and tactics is generally the same.

Simply knowing moral domain differences exist is not enough. The important issues are the implications for doctrine, training, and organization.

Doctrine.

Doctrine provides the foundation for the Army's training and organization. Training must provide the capability to perform the tactics, techniques, and procedures that are contained in doctrine. The Army's organization must provide the units and skills necessary to operate in accordance with the doctrine.

Doctrine must address the moral domain of low-intensity conflict if there are any training and organization requirements specific to low-intensity conflict. If doctrine does not do so, no conceptual basis for solutions to these requirements will exist.

Doctrine must point out differences in the moral domain of conflict so that differences in training and organization requirements are clear. A particular problem given the

evidence cited earlier is the need for restraint.

Soldiers must use their weapons to succeed on the mid/high-intensity conflict battlefield. However, restraint is extremely important in low-intensity conflict to avoid innocent casualties. The dilemma is that these two requirements work against each other. If Marshall's observation that few soldiers fire their weapons[84] is true today, training for restraint may exacerbate the problem. If Marshall's contention is not true, teaching restraint will be difficult. Should doctrine fail to highlight this issue, leaders may not appreciate the dichotomy and fail to deal with the contrasting requirements.

Doctrine must identify the tactics and techniques necessary for success. This will guide unit training programs. Doctrine must also identify individual skills required in order to guide individual training programs.

Tactics for low-intensity conflict vary widely due to the multitude of missions possible. Individuals and units must be prepared to perform the same combat tasks as required in mid/high-intensity conflict. However, they also must be able to function in roles more police-oriented than combat-oriented. In underdeveloped countries, combat support and combat service support operations may be more important than combat operations.

Underdeveloped countries may need roads, schools, and medical support more than weapons to cure the social ills that

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form the basis for discontent and revolution. Disaster relief does not involve combat but will require combat support and combat service support. Combat units may support combat support and combat service support units rather than the other way around. Combat units are a source of disciplined manpower available to supplement the manpower in support units.

Doctrine must provide for tactics to defeat the many types of threats in low-intensity conflict. Fighting drug traffickers poses unique problems for all military services. Doctrine must provide the conceptual basis for the integration of civilian law enforcement and military services. Operations may be joint and combined. They may also include jurisdictional considerations between the multitude of federal and local law enforcement agencies. Deciding who is in charge will be difficult and is crucial as in all military operations.

Doctrine must focus force design and structure initiatives to ensure proper organizations exist to meet the required low-intensity conflict capabilities. The mix of combat, combat support and combat service support elements is important and may differ from that needed for mid/high-intensity conflict. Doctrine must identify any special skills required for inclusion in Army force designs. Doctrine must identify the mix of the various force design types. This mix combined with requirements based on national policy allows the Army to produce the appropriate force structure.

The first step Army doctrine must make to aid understanding

the moral domain of military operations is to define the divisions of the conflict spectrum. FM 100-1: The Army, FM 100-5: Operations, and FM 100-20: Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict must agree on what the spectrum of conflict is. Since they do not discuss the conflict spectrum in the same terms, relating requirements for training and organization to different types of conflict is difficult at best. The Army must decide how to divide the spectrum of conflict, define these divisions, and produce manuals that complement one another.

Army doctrine must also address the human side of war. The 1988 FM 100-20 discusses the moral considerations in low-intensity conflict. But no doctrinal manual addresses the conflict spectrum moral domain differences. The Army should provide this discussion to ensure leaders prepare for the battlefield environment they will face.

Training.

Soldiers must prepare themselves to confront moral domain issues. Mental toughness is necessary for soldiers to withstand the stress of low-intensity conflict. Mental agility is necessary to confront the wide range of missions and threats. Soldiers in low-intensity conflict must be prepared for a multitude of combat and non-combat roles regardless of the type unit to which they belong.

Soldiers must maintain the initiative in setting the tempo of operations (or social reforms in underdeveloped nations) as

in all military operations. Physical fitness is important so
that soldiers have the stamina to endure the harsh climate and
difficult terrain in many underdeveloped nations where low-
intensity conflict operations occur. Individuals must study
the culture of the areas where they will operate to reduce
stress from a strange environment. Soldiers must always strive
to master the skills associated with their rank and duty
position. Failure to do so reduces their value in any
situation.

Army schools must prepare soldiers to deal with the moral
domain of low-intensity conflict. Schools must point out the
differences in the moral domain in the various levels of the
spectrum of conflict so that leaders recognize specific
training needs. Unit training programs must reinforce school
training through refresher classes and training for tasks not
covered by schools.

Units must train soldiers to expect family separations.
They must also train soldiers in methods to protect their
families if a threat to them exists. The Army has a moral
obligation to protect military families.

Training must prepare soldiers to show restraint in using
force. They must understand the need for rules of engagement
to protect innocent parties and limit conflict escalation.
Soldiers must understand the need to be neutral when the
situation requires it. Soldiers may have to suppress the
desire to favor one side over another when one belligerent's

actions appear to warrant support or retaliation. Training
must identify threats expected and ways to recognize them.
Leaders must expect high visibility due to media and political
interest. Soldiers must expect close scrutiny of their actions
by individuals and groups at home and abroad.

Training must be joint and combined because low-intensity
conflict operations will be. Exercises must include the same
types of forces expected to be in the theater. Only repeated
training exercises can ensure that the different services and
allies develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures
necessary for success.

Units must focus on wartime missions and be theater-
oriented. In addition to individual training, unit training
must prepare soldiers for the physical demands of the theater
where they will deploy. Unit training must also focus on
cultural concerns because of the battle for the minds of the
host population. Respect for the local culture is a key
ingredient if the military force is to earn the respect and
support of the people. Focusing training on the theater where
soldiers will operate reduces the negative impact of changes in
climate, terrain, and culture. Soldiers must understand the
people living in the area so that methods used will not
unnecessarily alienate the population.

Units must ensure soldiers understand the consequences of
their actions. They must know the limits of legal force. The
SAS soldiers who killed the IRA terrorists in Gibraltar provide

an example of the potential consequences of illegal action. Obviously, close scrutiny by agencies and individuals not conducting operations means soldiers must understand exactly what they can and cannot do. Failure to understand such limits could result in the soldiers facing criminal charges for using the weapons they are trained to use. British Private Ian Thain discovered what can happen when such limits are overstepped. In December 1984, he was convicted of murder for killing a civilian in Northern Ireland. Private Thain is serving a life sentence.[55]

Units must develop training programs to build small unit cohesion. Counterinsurgency patrolling and peacekeeping operations rely on small unit actions. Cohesion will help the soldiers cope with the stresses of isolation due to physical location or cultural differences. Cohesion will keep the units intact when uncertainty threatens to destroy morale. It provides social contact when families are not around to do so. Cohesion also reduces the invasion of privacy soldiers experience in military life. Small unit cohesion provides the social support structure soldiers need when they grapple with value conflicts.

Cross-training of unit personnel can reduce the problems of fatigue and boredom. Cross-training provides more soldiers with the skills required to perform a task. Taking the time to cross-train soldiers during rest periods reduces the problem of rest periods leading to boredom. Cross-training also decreases

the problems in a unit when death or injury incapacitates key individuals.

Training exercises must include scenarios matching the wide range of low-intensity conflict operations if soldiers are to learn to cope with the human side of such use of military force. However, a problem with such exercises is the time required. Deployments help units prepare to move. Units can conduct practice strikes and raids. Units can conduct small unit combat training exercises. But the time required to conduct a successful counterinsurgency program is excessive for units to devote all the resources necessary in training. Soldiers in peacetime know exercises will end. Making soldiers feel the isolation, uncertainty, value conflicts, boredom, and separation of family stresses to the degree found in low-intensity conflict is almost impossible.

To better simulate the moral domain of low-intensity conflict, exercises should be at installations other than where a unit is based. The exercise location should have a different climate and terrain than the unit's home station. People to play host nation civilians with a different language and culture should be in the training area. Soldiers should not know when the exercise will end in order to stress them with regard to feelings of isolation, uncertainty, boredom, and separation from family.

Scenarios must provide situations where soldiers experience value conflicts and uncertainty such as ambiguous target

sightings and enemy soldiers mixed with civilians. Exercises should include casualty play to force units to rely on personnel redundancy and cross-training to continue to function.

Organization.

Army organizations with low-intensity conflict missions must contain the trained personnel and elements to perform those missions. In many ways this is no different from the requirements of mid/high-intensity conflict. Personnel redundancy reduces fatigue problems. Combat service support units reduce physical discomfort through the services provided. Medical support reduces the fear of death and injury. Morale support activities can help reduce boredom. However, differences exist and require organizational considerations.

Specialists concerning the threat and host nation take on increased importance in low-intensity conflict. This is due to the greater difficulty in separating enemy forces from civilians. Such specialists can aid in determining who is friendly by gathering human intelligence through the local population. These specialists can also help soldiers respect the local culture which is important to avoid alienating the population. This same cultural respect is necessary for medical, civil affairs, and other combat support and combat service support teams to improve living conditions in the host nation without turning the supported country into a miniature America overnight. Progress takes time.

The mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support units required for low-intensity conflict is different from that in mid/high-intensity conflict. Support to host nation governments often involves non-combat actions. Roads, schools, water treatment plants, and bridges are a few of the facilities a government may need to reduce the population's discontent. Making the host nation strong enough to survive without outside help reduces the need for US troops to be deployed. This strength is in part military. But the population will view its government more favorably if the government can provide a decent life.

Using combat support and combat service support units instead of combat units has domestic and international political benefits as well. American casualties should be lower since the forces in-country will not be trying to fight. The United States will be helping a country better itself and support its people. US military units will not be killing those opposed to its policies.

The value conflicts discussed earlier that distinguish the moral domain of low-intensity conflict from that of mid/high-intensity conflict will also increase the importance of legal counselling activities in organizations. Legal guidance will be particularly important to help leaders deal with the use of force in operations not part of a declared war. Legal advisors who are experts in local law must be available to ensure soldiers do not run afoul of local restrictions.

The lack of clear guidelines for defining success and the isolation from home soldiers may feel will make counselors more valuable for low-intensity conflict. If the military action is an unpopular one, counselors (chaplains, psychologists, etc.) to help soldiers deal with the added stress will be important. Organizations with counselors to help families cope with the stress they feel are also valuable.

Teams of mental health experts to treat stress problems are useful in low-intensity conflict. The pace of operations will often allow time for these teams to reduce the effects of stress. The military services deployed such teams to help the crew of the frigate Stark after the Iraqi aircraft attack in May 1987 and to help hostage victims five times in the Middle East from 1985 to 1986.[94]

Army force structure must address the specific demands of low-intensity conflict. Teams of the specialists discussed above should be components of the structure. These teams should be theater-oriented to provide the focus and skills necessary. Force developers must give special consideration to the combat support and combat service support skills needed. This mix will depend on the economic, transportation, communication, legal, religious, and political infrastructures that exist in the theater.[97]

Having sufficient troops on hand to provide for personnel redundancy and rest periods is not unique to low-intensity conflict. However, the deployability of the forces necessary

is an issue. This does not refer to the capability of a certain number of aircraft to deploy a certain size unit. The problem is the availability of the right number and type units to accomplish the required tasks.

The most unpredictable deployability constraint is domestic politics. The Army relies heavily on the Reserve and National Guard for roundout units to bring divisions up to full strength and combat service support units to support major force deployments. Will these forces be available when the Army needs them if the nation's survival is not at stake? The answer depends on the beliefs of the country's political leadership which potentially shifts every two, four, and six years based on the terms of office of various positions. Since a low-intensity conflict operation may involve less than total political and popular support, the Army must be prepared to deploy without mobilized reserve component forces. The Army should have self-sufficient active component units to accomplish all low-intensity conflict missions expected. Reliance on reserve component units that may not be available due to domestic political considerations may put mission success and the soldiers deployed at risk.

Concluding Remarks.

The moral domain of low-intensity conflict is different from that of mid/high-intensity conflict in several ways. These differences require consideration in Army doctrine, training, and organization to maximize the Army's ability to

conduct low-intensity conflict operations. Failure to recognize these differences will degrade the Army's ability to accomplish missions assigned. There is no need for that to happen. The differences are apparent. The Army must address them. My recommendation based on this paper's conclusions is that Army doctrine, training, and organization address the moral domain of low-intensity conflict as discussed here.

The problem does not stop there, however. Soldiers and units conducting low-intensity conflict operations require a different mental outlook than those in a mid/high-intensity conflict. I do not believe general purpose forces will maximize their capabilities by trying to train for operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. Military personnel and units must focus their efforts if they are to perform at their best.

This leads to a strategic or policy dilemma. The Army and the nation's political leadership must decide how to use military forces. Do we want to conduct operations throughout the spectrum of conflict (a balanced approach)? Do we concentrate on one level or another? Do we focus active component forces at certain types of operations and reserve component forces at another?

The answers to these questions will ultimately determine unit tactical capabilities to cope with the moral domain of military operations regardless of the type of conflict. Failure to consider the moral domain differences in the

spectrum of conflict will lead to the fielding of an Army that
will at least not perform as well as it could and may fail.
That would be a tragedy for the soldiers sent to fight in a
manner for which they are not prepared. It would be a
disservice to the country.

Human beings conduct military operations. We must consider
them in every action. They are our most precious and
responsive resource. The moral domain can never receive too
much emphasis.

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