


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WHY THE COMBINED FIELD ARMY?

BY

COLONEL JEFFERY H. WHITE

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) WHY THE COMBINED FIELD ARMY?		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Individual Study Project
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Colonel Jeffrey H. White		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS SAME		12. REPORT DATE 31 March 1989
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 34
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Rapid changes are sweeping the Korean peninsula. In the South the economic miracle of recent years is the primary force in a dynamic society. The North continues to build a military capability at the expense of all other considerations. Other dynamics of change include radical democratization, educated citizens that demand a voice in the country and world, and a realization of a new strength that permits a change from the previous policy of isolation of the North to reconciliation. All of these changes effect the soldiers of both South Korea and the United States as they adapt to the change.		

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

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Unclassified

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

WHY THE COMBINED FIELD ARMY?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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31 March 1989

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Jeffery H. White, COL, IN
TITLE: Why the Combined Field Army?
FORMAT: Individual Study Project
DATE: 31 March 1989 PAGES:31 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Rapid changes are sweeping the Korean peninsula. In the South the economic miracle of recent years is the primary force in a dynamic society. The North continues to build a military capability at the expense of all other considerations. Other dynamics of change include radical democratization, educated citizens that demand a voice in the country and world, and a realization of a new strength that permits a change from the previous policy of isolation of the North to reconciliation. All of these changes effect the soldiers of South Korea and the United States as they adapt to the change. Demands on U.S. defense spending require constant reexamination of our spending on the forward deployed forces in Korea. In the near future we can expect many changes in the manner we plan and organize for combined operations. We will change headquarters and organizations as well as procedures. I will examine the changes in Korean society and the effects on our long term friendship. In the paper I will discuss the unique strengths and capabilities of the Combined Field Army. This organization offers some solutions to problems that arise from changes in Korean/American relations.

Why the Combined Field Army?

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United States has been involved in the destiny of the Korean people since Westerners forced the orient open to trade. The United States Army has represented the United States in Korea since the end of the Second World War. The country and the Army maintained a passing interest in the affairs of the Korean peninsula until the North Koreans misjudged American and global concern for self determination of the South Koreans and invaded. Since that invasion Korean affairs are of paramount concern in America.

In June of 1950 the U.S. Army and the United States, the Republic of Korea Army and the Republic of Korea became wedded in the struggle for freedom for the Republic. Then as now the mission of our forces in Korea has been to be prepared to defend the Republic. We were not prepared to execute that mission in 1950. Since 1950 our level of preparation has varied. In spite of periods of little concern on our part since the armistice was signed South Korea remains free.

The costs of the Korean War were enormous. In the forward of his book Korean War, Max Hastings offers a quick and brutal summary of the war.....

-United Nations casualties were 142,000.

-at least one million Koreans lost.

-US losses in three years slightly less than Viet Nam in 10 years.

-three times the British deaths than the Falklands War.

-Chinese casualties unknown, a least hundreds of thousands.

-Cuban missile crisis only equal danger of nuclear war since 1950.

-the only conflict of great powers since 1945. 1

The Korean war shaped the events of the following decades of our relationship with the Koreans. Many facets of the relationship are unique to our friendship with the Koreans. Progress in that relationship has been remarkable, the Koreans have moved into the First World rapidly. The Korean Army has kept pace with social development. That Army is prepared for a greater role-perhaps as a member or a regional defense force.

BACKGROUND

In recent years economic prosperity has wrought changes in United States-Republic of Korea relations that equal the changes that resulted from the war. Both countries have prospered. The relationship that was gradually evolving toward equality in all areas has been propelled by the Korean Economic Miracle to near equality and promoted some discord among these staunch allies.

Forty years of staunch association between the two allies has resulted in the development of countless personal relationships, untold professional and civic organizations shared by the peoples of the countries, and many actions and activities

undertaken by the armed forces of the two countries. The people simply like each other and a feeling of friendship exists.

Korea in the late eighties has successfully completed the Olympics, engineered an economic miracle, and held national elections that were open to some extent to the opposition parties.

The President of the Republic of Korea commented on his nation's progress in an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 18 October 1988 as follows.

"Only three decades ago, we were a poor, agrarian society dependent on other nations' help for survival. We were able to transform ourselves into a newly industrializing nation only through our people's great desire to achieve, together with a passion for education.

We also took advantage of an open and competitive political and economic system which allows individuals to achieve their highest potential. Mankind's inviolate rights and inborn creativity are essential elements for making social progress."2

In this paper I will examine today's Korea and the Korean-American relationship. I will look at senior level headquarters that have been used since our early involvement in the country. I will point out the unique capabilities of the Combined Field Army (CFA) as it evolved from the American I Corps. I will

discuss the utility of the headquarters in this time of change and the importance of maintaining CFA as an Army Headquarters.

ENDNOTES

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2. Roh, Tae Woo ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY MR. ROH TAE WOO, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AT THE 43RD SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 18 October 1988. p.5.

Why the Combined Field Army?

CHAPTER II

KOREAN-AMERICAN SENIOR HEADQUARTERS

In the pre-1950 War period the Korean Army was deployed across the peninsula from East to West, in depth, defending the country against attack from the North. The front line divisions worked for one Army headquarters in Seoul. This was a very straight forward defense based on successful American tactics from World War II. The mission was unchanged from today; defend the Republic. Missions for both Korean and United Nations forces always include defense of the Republic. The detailed missions of today's combined forces also require planning for contingencies, recommendations for equipping force, and development of strategic and tactical concepts.³ In 1950 the threat was thought to be relatively straight forward; the Army was prepared for little else.

At that time no American combat units were deployed in Korea. Americans occupied the Japanese homeland. In Korea, American soldiers advised Korean units on tactics and the use of equipment provided to the Korean Army by America.

Those advisors enjoyed varying degrees of influence on the Korean units. Of course, much of the advisor's influence was based on his personal relationship with the Korean soldiers. These advisors are important. They were the first contact with

Americans for large numbers of Koreans. Many of these Koreans would be in powerful positions following the war.

Each senior headquarters had a few American advisors. The headquarters for the advisors to the Korean Army was located in Seoul with the senior headquarters for that Army. The advisors and all other Americans in the Pacific worked for the Commander-in-Chief, far East.

SENIOR HEADQUARTERS, JUNE 1950 TO PUSAN BREAK OUT

When, in typical Mac Arthur style, he flew from his headquarters in Japan to Korea just after the invasion he held three positions. He was the Supreme Commander Allied Powers in Japan; the Commander-in-Chief, far East; and Commanding General, U.S. Army in the far East. At that time four infantry divisions (the First Cavalry, 24ID, 25ID, and 7thID) formed the U.S. Eighth Army.⁴

In this period command of the Korean Army changed several times. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say, command of the remains of that army. The Korean Commander was not subordinate to Mac Arthur. His advisor was and was committed to carrying out his instructions.

This relationship of the two Armies was parallel to the political and economic relationships of the countries. American "advice" in lesser important areas could be justifiably considered and ignored. In return for equipment used in World

War II, stored for ten or more years and issued in questionable condition ROKA accepted American advice and made an attempt to assimilate that advice in terms that were culturally palatable to Koreans.

The relationship of advisor and not "subordinate-but-obligated to obey" underwent many changes. Early in the war the first Korean president, Syngman Rhee placed the entire Korean armed forces under control of the United Nations.⁵ Army units were reorganized or organized as light infantry divisions. These divisions generally operated under the direction of a United States Corps Headquarters. Westerners need to try to understand the changes involved. Korean soldiers that were able to stay with their units from the start of the war to the Pusan perimeter and operations under United Nations control had been exposed to a great many experiences-generally bad. The original American advisors had left them under fire. Or the Korean soldiers had left the advisors. Many of these soldiers had fought tanks with grenades-successfully! New advisors and a now official United Nations (read United States of America to the Koreans) chain of command was mandated by the Korean President. To compound the situation the combat showing of the initially deployed American units was less than satisfactory. On 13 July 1950, the Eighth United States Army established headquarters in Korea. At that point the Eighth Army was in control of all United Nations ground elements in the country.⁶ There were few forces other than the South Korean and American infantry. Now the Koreans could work

for and observe the actions of a senior headquarters firsthand. Korean soldiers who served in the Pusan perimeter were treated to a masterfully executed mobile defense. That they understood General Walker's courage and is evidenced by their respect for him. Soldiers serving with the Korean divisions saw the effect of naval gunfire, artillery, and air support. They understood that fire support and the support of the other services was essential to successful combat. These Korean soldiers acquired the desire to operate with modern equipment.

ORGANIZATIONS, CHINESE ENTRY TO ARMISTICE

In the Pusan perimeter the Korean Army began to operate in the manner of a traditional western army. From a modest beginning through a brutal initiation by fire to organized divisions that were prepared to fight defense and delay missions in line with western armies in a five or six year period is quite an accomplishment for any army and people. Defeat and disorganization are part of the development process. The Koreans suffered defeats and were driven from the field. These defeats were much the same as the ones suffered by our developing Army. Some of the Korean divisions fought very well in the Pusan area and one Korean Marine division was prepared to participate in the most important operation of the war. The Inchon landings. This operation brought a major change in organization on the peninsula.

General Mac Arthur elected to put control of the Inchon landings in the hands of a Corps not subordinate to Eighth Army. I find no reference that states why Mac Arthur elected to split command and control on the peninsula. General Almond certainly enjoyed the confidence of General Mac Arthur. General Walker might have broken the stalemate at Pusan earlier. General Mac Arthur may have felt the arrangement would give him more flexibility. Almost every senior officer that was briefed on the operation felt that the landings would fail. Walker was one of those. Almond was not. He supported Mac Arthur and expressed confidence in the landings.

The success of the Inchon landing is not lost on Koreans. This operation, one of the most successful operations of history was run by a Corps Headquarters, Korean and American students of History can see that a Corps can execute the most important operations.

Following the landings Mac Arthur elected to operate with one Corps and Eighth Army controlled by his headquarters in Japan. That Corps was in effect a field army. The X Corps fought to the Yalu with Eighth Army.

Korean divisions were organized as Corps under control of Eighth Army. These Corps fought with varying degrees of success. The Korean I Corps was the most successful.

At the end of the open conflict the Republic of Korea Army numbered sixteen division with some 600,000 soldiers under arms.7

Barely ten years old the Army was organized along American lines and included Corps, Army and special purpose headquarters.

KEY POST WAR CHANGES

Today's Korean Army is organized in three Armies, a special command to protect the Capital area, and logistic and special purpose forces. Five Korean Army Corps are subordinate to the Armies. Generally, these Corps are in control of three to five light infantry divisions and a Corps slice of cavalry, rotary wing aircraft, anti-tank forces, and logistic units. Modernization of the Korean Army was given a jolt in 1976 when then president Carter proposed the withdrawal of American forces.⁸

Modernization follows economic progress. Presently the Korean Army is undergoing a modernization program that is superior to most western armies. The Korean industrial base permits local manufacture of complex tanks and tracked vehicles. The K-1 or 1988 tank shares much of the technology of the most recent U.S. produced M-1. On the other end of the scale, the Koreans produce a sub machine gun and squad assault weapon in 5.56 caliber. From shoulder weapons to tanks, the Korean Army is being fitted with excellent equipment made in Korea.

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7. Bunge, Fredica M. South Korea, A Country Study.
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
Why the Combined Field Army?

CHAPTER III


Organization of the Combined Field Army

As the war wound down to the armistice Korean units assumed the responsibilities for the defense of the rugged Eastern sector of the line. The same line would later be the general trace of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The Eastern mountainous area offers limited avenues for North Korean advance. In the West the key approaches were in the sector for which the United States Army I Corps was responsible. U.S. infantry units were the front line troops in most of the area. Republic of Korea Army and Marine units held the remainder of the sector. The map on the next page shows the positions along the DMZ in the early 70s. The positions at the end of the war were much the same except that the Korean I Corps was to the left of the U.S. sector and the U.S. sector stretched to the Chorwon valley.

In the late 1960s one of the two front line U.S. divisions was withdrawn from Korea. At that time units of the ROKA I Corps took responsibility for the defense. U.S. units retained the responsibility for the two most important guardposts and the key patrol sector.⁹ This area lies astride the key approach to Seoul. It is difficult to devise a scenario that enables the North to achieve quick success without engaging the Americans. The units patrolling and guarding the Western DMZ continued to be under the operational control of I Corps(U.S.).



**KOREA
DEMILITARIZED ZONE AREA**



In the early 1970s the U.S. I Corps became the ROK/US Corps Group. Or I Corps Group as it was commonly called. This organization was a first step toward effective combined forces. The title represented recognition of the ROK elements of the group. The Group had three ROKA Corps and a Republic of Korea Marine Brigade as fighting forces. This army size group was commanded by a U.S. three star general with a ROKA two star as his deputy. The group was responsible for the Eastern sector of the DMZ.

The group continued to exercise command and control of the American Infantry Division on the DMZ. OPCON of the division for the DMZ mission was a Corps Group responsibility while the administration and logistic support for the division was provided by Eighth U.S. Army.

I Corps Group had limited support organizations. Korean units were supported by the Third Republic of Korea Army (TROKA). A U.S. signal battalion and a Military Intelligence unit, were the backbone of group support. Other support was provided by the American or Korean Army with the capability. It is important to note that the required support is provided by the force with the capability. This is a significant area of allied cooperation.

I Corps Group became the Combined Field Army (CFA) in the mid 1970s. This title was more descriptive of the size and capability of the force. In 1978 ROKA Third Army (TROKA) began to assume responsibility for the eastern sector of the DMZ. With

TROKA assumption of part of the DMZ mission CFA was able to turn some of it's attention elsewhere.

The Combined Field Army

As the American I Corps was evolving to the Combined Field Army the headquarters(s) that controlled CFA underwent many changes. Recounting the changes and explaining the reasons is a study of considerable undertaking. For purposes of this study we need to briefly examine the higher headquarters relationships for CFA.

All ROKA forces may be United Nations forces. The same can be said of American forces in the Republic. Each nation can designate any of it's forces as non-UN force. Over time the forces have worked this confusion out and know who fights for whom and when. In the past as the United Nations has become an arena for private agendas of first to third world nations, use of United Nations forces has been a political football. For this reason the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) was created. If the North Koreans invaded the South and the United Nations ordered UN forces not to participate the allies would simply proceed as CFC forces. Another possibility, however unlikely, is that if the United States were in agreement the CFC forces could (preemptively) attack the North. This possibility is not lost on the North Koreans.

As a CFC force and a United Nations force the Combined Field Army is linked in the most flexible means possible to the higher headquarters. The Army Commander is said to wear more than one hat. Many of us are confused by the multiple position technique of accommodating political reality. The role of multi-hatted commander in the hands of an operational commander with a clear mission is just another tool to accomplish the mission. Keep in mind that the purpose of the Combined Forces Command is to permit the United States and Korea to act on a bilateral basis.¹⁰ Currently, the intention is to limit CFC force responsibilities to the peninsula.

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9. Cushman, John H. Command and Control of Theater Forces: The Korean Command and Other Cases . Cambridge. Program on Information and Resources Policy. 1986. p7-13.

10. Rhee, p30.

Why the Combined Field Army?

Chapter IV

The Economic Miracle and Republic of Korea Armed Forces Modernization

No discussion of any element of the Korean society is complete without examining the rapid development of the Korean economy. It is difficult to grasp the improvements the Korean economy has enjoyed. The term "economic miracle" is not unwarranted. From 1962 to 1985 the Korean Gross National Product (GNP) grew from 300 Billion Won to One Trillion, 400 Billion Won.¹¹ To reduce the figures to terms that are understandable. The growth of the GNP examined on a per person basis from 1962 to 1985 went from \$87.00 (U.S. dollars) to over \$2,000.¹²

For this study it is most important to note that 7-8 percent annual growth in the South Korean GNP is likely. At that rate the individual GNP at the opening of the 21st Century will be at the \$5,000 mark (per person). The impact on Korean armed forces will be considerable.

In the 1970s one reaction to the projected American troop withdrawal was the start of a program to modernize Korean armed forces. The great success of the Korean economy put teeth in that program. Active duty Korean Army units now carry one of two Korean made personal/crew served weapons. One, a submachine gun, the other; a heavy duty assault rifle. Both weapons are 5.56 caliber. The features of these weapons make them arguably better than the weapons issued to U.S. soldiers. Korean heavy infantry,

armor, and artillery soldiers are rapidly converting to a new series of Korean manufactured/re-manufactured tracked and wheeled vehicles that are superior to like vehicles from many other countries. Certainly, the smaller size of the Korean vehicles and agility make them the first choice for fighting in that terrain. The Air Force and Navy are modernizing just as rapidly and effectively. Past experience in the assembly of fighters will enable the Koreans to assemble state of the art equipment.

Korean armed forces will continue to share in the prosperity of the economy. That modernization will be a factor in the changes the Army will undergo. In infantry units, anti-tank weapons for the medium range can be expected. That system will be an important asset in an environment that offers mostly medium range engagements. The strength of the Korean economy offers the capability of buying a system from outside Korea, buying the ability to manufacture a system from another country, or the complete development and manufacture of a system in Korea.

The ability to buy or produce a modern anti-tank system is complimented by the ability to produce a very capable carrier. That system plus the modern main battle tank being produced in Korea will contribute to a change in the balance of power on the peninsula. Changes of this order are underway throughout the Korean defense establishment. This infusion of modern equipment will cause organizations to change, necessitate changes in tactics and operational plans, and force major changes in Korean and American policy.

Improvements in South Korean economic strength can be projected to rapidly outstrip the North. The South will be able to reduce military percentages of GNP expenditures and outspend the North. If spending alone were not enough the North will not be able to match the advances in technology. The Russians cannot give the North Koreans the technology available to the South on the world economy. Much of the same technology would be available to the North if they could afford it and had not gained the reputation of non payment of debt.

The perception is that Southern strength will erode the advantages in numbers of tanks and planes enjoyed by the North. The result will be the single greatest change to the South Korean armed forces. The loss of conscription. A bright future lies ahead for the modernizing Korean armed forces. Pitfalls in changes of doctrine and a loss of manpower also lurk in the future. As the strength of the economy enables the South to modernize the threat from the North is diminished.

As that threat from the North diminishes and the exports grow (over \$30 Billion U.S. dollars in 1985) Koreans will turn to face possible threats from outside the penisular.¹⁴

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WHY THE COMBINED FIELD ARMY?

CHAPTER V

THE FUTURE OF THE COMBINED FIELD ARMY

A September 1988 article in the Wall Street Journal points out the arenas of change underway on the Korean peninsula.¹⁶ Many important changes are underway, how will the United States and the Koreans continue to look at our relationship and our strategy? I have isolated a few of the most important arenas of change. The Journal article provides a good basis for examining the importance of CFA in each area of change.

- Change in Korean soldiers/individuals.
- Shift in peninsula balance of military power.
- Continued economic progress.
- Further democratization.
- Shift from isolation of North to reconciliation.

CHANGES IN KOREANS

Education has long been a most important facet of the Korean culture. In the hills around Pusan in 1950 young Korean men with great desire to free the country joined American and Korean units in the fight. Those young men brought little skill. They were determined. We Americans must understand the differences

between Koreans of 1950 and 1989. The young men of 1950 had little or no education and possessed little beyond a hunger for freedom acquired during the Japanese occupation (since 1910). The Japanese colonial system had severely reduced the previously important educational experience for Koreans. Only 30% of elementary schools were open and only one in 30 students attended high school.¹⁷ The young man of today is highly educated. He would ride to the top of those hills around Pusan in a Korean manufactured cross country vehicle that might have been produced in one of the world's most advance robotics plants. The young man will speak some English, the skill will vary with the individual. The people have changed in many regards. We must all understand that we are working with Koreans of traditional values that enjoy one of the best education systems in the world.

The Combined Field Army Headquarters is an excellent showcase of Korean education. Korean and American staff members routinely conduct the planning and execution of Army level operations that are as sophisticated as any in the world. The subordinate Corps, with Korean and American units, operate in concert according to doctrine, tactics, and techniques that are published in manuals and Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) in Hangul and English. This existing capability for combined Army operations is important. Building a comparable organization in peace or war would be costly in time and resources.

SHIFT IN MILITARY BALANCE

Recent reports cite North Korea as having one million citizens under arms.¹⁸ This increased estimate at a time of world wide troop reductions is officially explained by American intelligence experts as improvements in estimation procedures. The nature of North Korean society is such that the most basic information is difficult to obtain. Regardless of the reasons, one million people under arms in a country of 21 million is the strongest evidence of the military strength of the North.

With Russian help and internal emphasis on military strength the balance of military power on the peninsula has favored the North. That balance is shifting. South Korean economic strength is the force behind the shift. The increases in South Korean GNP raise the levels of defense spending over that managed by the poorer Northern relatives. The technological base in the South has outstripped the North. Production of General Dynamics inspired main battle tanks gives the South the premier tank on the peninsula even if the North is producing reverse engineered T-72s. This technological advantage across the range of military equipment will be a major factor in changing the balance.

Modernization of equipment and the accompanying changes in doctrine will bring great changes to ROKA. As the force modernizes the requirements for providing command and control for the force in combined operations will change rapidly. CFA is uniquely equipped to assist with these changes. Past operations

with Korean forces that were largely light infantry posed no great logistical problems. As the Army has modernized CFA has fielded the most modern Korean units and undertaken the adjustment processes. CFA units are fully supported.

CONTINUED ECONOMIC PROGRESS

In 1971 the South Korean government began the Saemaul Undong or New Community Movement.¹⁹ The program had several purposes, one of the goals was to reverse the trend of movement to urban areas that was not supported by the economy. That movement to the cities was a change brought on by economic progress as rural citizens sought to share in the new prosperity. The Saemaul movement reversed the trend and improved the rural population's standard of living. As the economy continues to grow and change the demands on the labor pool will cause other changes in the society. These increased demands on the labor pool and the accompanying modernization of the armed forces will result in structure changes for the services. These dynamics of labor requirements and changes in the economy may well mark the end of universal conscription for South Koreans.

Exposure to Americans through the combined headquarters will provide some assistance in modeling, training, and fielding and all volunteer ROKA. This and other movement toward standardization of the forces improves the effectiveness of the combined force. The soldiers of CFA have long been exposed to an

all volunteer force. That exposure will facilitate adaption to the changes that come from loss of conscription.

FUTHER DEMOCRATIZATION

Social changes in the South are as important as the other dynamics of change that will alter the military establishment. The present rulers of Korea are largely military. Hopefully, the country will make the transition to a more representative civilian rule as a gradual and peaceful change.

Salvation of the country in 1950 was a military problem. As President Roh describes in his address to the United Nations he joined the fighting in his high school uniform.²⁰ The lack of a peaceful solution to the conflict has kept many of the most capable Koreans in uniform. Successful defense of the country would have been difficult if not impossible with a total democracy. Granted, many will argue against the 30 years of military rule and point out that many very capable Koreans are in opposition to the government. Government control is moving to the civilian sector.

The leadership of the services will adjust to these changes in quantity and quality of leadership available and the ability to apply all efforts to military problems leaving civilians to muddle in politics. Such emphasis will fuel the rate of change in the Korean services in terms of force design, modern equipment integration, and doctrinal development. CFA will provide common

ground for exchanging information and moving toward standardization.

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

In 1986 the governments of Korea conducted a family exchange. Each side permitted 150 people to visit relatives on the other side. For the period of the visit South Koreans were completely focused on the people involved. The visits were all that mattered. The level of concern and painfulness of separation from ancestral homes and burial grounds is not readily understood by Westerners. The level of nationalism in Korea defied explanation until a retired Korean government official explained it as "biological nationalism".²¹ A desire that is "in the blood", and deeply ingrained in Korean culture. That desire for peace and reunification has an important effect of every element of Korean society.

Add the movement toward reunification to the dynamics of the shifting power on the peninsula and the threat from the North is further diminished. The trade and business interest that contributed to this shift may demand the stability of a regional capable military force. From 1965 to 1972 some 300,000 Korean servicemen assisted in the Vietnam conflict.²² Service on a regional basis is not unknown to modern Korea. Large numbers of Korean workers are found throughout the world. They live quietly

under paramilitary conditions and complete projects with superior results.

ENDNOTES

16. Susan Moffat, "Koreans Demanding Equality on Defense", The Wall Street Journal., 28 September 1988,p20.
17. This is Korea, p65.
18. Don Oberdorfer, "North Korean Armed Forces now put at 1 Million", The Washington Post, 26 January 1989, pA20.
19. This is Korea, p46.
20. Roh Address, p6.
21. Susan Moffat, " In Korea, Reunification is a Family Matter", The Wall Street Journal, 23 January 1989, pA10.
22. Bunge, p214.

THE COMBINED FIELD ARMY, A REGIONAL FORCE

CHAPTER VI

CAPABILITY

The Combined Field Army is the perfect vehicle for regional combined joint force responsibilities. The staff is fully capable of responding to any requirement for contingency planning or execution. The existing structure will permit tailoring to allow for any mission. CFA commonly operates with all the services of both countries. The ability to draw from and operate with the joint services of both countries cannot be equaled, the possibilities are limitless. Should the partners need to operate with forces of a third country CFA could make the transition with little difficulty.

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

The Combined Field Army is capable of the expansion necessary to accept forces from another country. Use of CFA as a headquarters provides an existing organization to serve as a regional force immediately. The staff procedures, operations manuals, and logistics could be readily adapted for other countries. A heavy, light, or mixed Corps from a third country

could be accepted as a subordinate element of CFA almost instantly. Elements smaller than a Corps could be accepted as subordinates of a Korean Corps. Third country forces must come with logistic a slice or make arrangements with the Koreans or Americans to provide the support.

The existing guidelines for CFA training programs are suitable for other nations to use as training plans. The CFA programs used to prepare units for major exercises would be readily adaptable to this purpose. These plans and procedures could be translated and put into use immediately. A well trained and properly equipped force from a third country could function with CFA in a very short period of time.

PLANS

The CFA staff maintains a number of complex plans. The staff is experienced in operations with Korean and American Navy and Marines, the control of airborne operations mounted from other countries, and the coordination of movement of units by air and sea. It would be a small step to undertake the development of regional plans and coordination.

The present staff is experienced and ready to undertake contingency planning for the region. With the proper personnel augmentation plans for a number of regional missions could be maintained.

DEPLOYMENT

CFA experience in combined joint movements to Korea for exercises can be applied to the movement of forces from Korea and third country locations to any area in the region. This headquarters routinely moves Corps in Korea and accepts Corps Headquarters and elements of Corps from the U.S. deploying to Korea for exercises.

EMPLOYMENT

Exercise experience has placed subordinates of CFA in every form of modern maneuver. The headquarters has controlled Marine assaults, Airborne assaults, airmobile assaults, heavy and light Corps movement and maneuver, and coordinated the support for all these actions. The responsibility for providing command and control for a regional force is well within the capability of the Combined Field Army.

WHY THE COMBINED FIELD ARMY?

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

Clearly the changes in Korea are remarkable. We enjoy an unusual relationship with the Korean people. Both countries must remember the bitter late summer months in 1950 when the struggle for freedom appeared hopeless. We must try to understand the changes that both countries and services are undergoing.

Our military organizations in Korea will be changed. In this study we have seen that the CFA is uniquely capable of providing a combined force to meet future needs. Both countries must strive to preserve the headquarters and capability. American forces on the peninsula may be required to assume regional responsibilities in response to changes in strategy and constraints of new fiscal policy. The formation of a regional force would likely include forces of a third or more nations. CFA is the key headquarters to make such forces a viable element in combined operations.

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