


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**THE JOINT STAFF/J-5 AND A-AF CLIC
PLANNING AND POLICY IN
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT**

**A
CLIC
CONFERENCE REPORT**

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JUN 12 1989
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**Army - Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia**

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1. The 13-15 December 1988 Planning and Policy for Low Intensity Conflict sponsored by the Joint Staff/J-5 and the A-AF CLIC drew nearly 300 participants from government and private organizations. Conference critiques and other feedback indicate the conference was successful.					
2. The stated purpose of the conference was to provide a forum for members of the joint and interagency communities to examine mutual requirements arising from approved national LIC strategy and to exchange lessons learned. The plenary session and the Intelligence, Public Affairs, Security Assistance, Counter-drugs, and Reserve Affairs Workshops obviously fostered the desired ex- change of ideas, perceptions, and experiences.					
3. Another purpose of the conference was to discuss some "issues of conten- tion" among students of LIC and of the disciplines central to (cont'd on back)					
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4. On behalf of the Joint Staff/J-5 and the A-AF CLIC, we thank you for making your conference successful. Hopefully, the attached conference report reflects what really happened. We also hope it will be helpful. (Don't let the size of the report turn you off--it's organized by session/workshop so you can turn to your area of interest. Also, please note additional materials and spin-off CLIC Papers are available upon request.)

FOREWORD

1. The 13-15 December 1988 Planning and Policy for Low Intensity Conflict Conference sponsored by the Joint Staff/J-5 and the A-AF CLIC drew nearly 300 participants from government and private organizations. Conference critiques and other feedback indicate the conference was successful.

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3. Another purpose of the conference was to discuss some "issues of contention" among students of LIC and of the disciplines central to dealing with LIC. That happened! For example, the Public Affairs and PSYOP proponents struggled to define their respective plots of turf. We heard agency and defense representatives speak of what the military should do in the "War on Drugs" while a member of the DOD office responsible for military assistance to the law enforcement agencies told us what the armed forces wouldn't do. The editor of a distinguished defense oriented magazine raised some very valid questions about the efficacy of the military informational instrument. We set the stage for airing of these and other issues (and we weren't disappointed once).

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ALBERT M. BARNES, Colonel, USAF
Commander



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Low Intensity Conflict Conference

Sponsored by

The Joint Staff/J-5
and
The Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict

13-15 December 1988

Radisson Hotel
700 Settlers Landing Road
Hampton, Virginia

PURPOSE

To provide a forum for members of the joint and interagency community to examine mutual requirements arising from approved national LIC strategy and exchange LIC lessons learned.

AGENDA

DAY 1

0700-0800 Coffee

0800-0815 Welcome and Conference Administration

0815-0900 Keynote Address, Dr. Michael Vlahos, Director of the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State (Ballroom)

0900-0930 Question and Answer Period

0930-0945 Break

0945-1015 Role of the CJCS and the Joint Staff in Planning and Implementing National LIC Strategy and Policy, Rear Admiral P. R. Olson, USN, Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff/J-5 (Ballroom)

1015-1030 Break

1030-1130 Creating Unity of Effort to Meet the LIC Threat,
Colonel Albert M. Barnes, USAF, Commander, Army-Air Force Center
for Low Intensity Conflict (Ballroom)

1130-1300 Lunch

1300-1400 National LIC Policy, Ambassador Charles S. Whitehouse,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict (Ballroom)

1400-1415 Break

1415-1515 Joint Doctrine Development, Colonel Ken Wilson, USA,
Chief, Joint Doctrine Branch, Joint Doctrine and Education
Division, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate,
Joint Staff/J-7 (Ballroom)

1515-1530 Break

1530-1615 The USPACOM Peacetime/Multinational Strategies,
Lieutenant Colonel William Robinson, USA, US Pacific Command,
J-5, Policy Division (Ballroom)

1615-1700 The SOUTHCOM Strategy System, Major Wilfred D.
MacDonald, Jr., USA, US Southern Command/J-5, Policy and Strategy
Division (Ballroom)

1700-1900 No-host Cocktail Party (Peninsula Room)

DAY 2

0800-1200 Intelligence Workshop, Speakers - Dr. Robert M. Gates,
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Brigadier General
James D. Beans, USMC, Director of Intelligence, HQ USMC; and
Colonel Raymond Chojnacki, USAF, Director of Targets, Assistant
Chief of Intelligence, HQ USAF (Ballroom)

0930-1200 Public Affairs Workshop, Speaker - Mr. Benjamin F. Schemmer, Editor, Armed Forces Journal International (Peninsula Room)

1200-1330 Lunch

1330-1700 Public Affairs Workshop (Continued) (Peninsula Room)

1330-1700 Security Assistance Workshop, Speakers - Mr. Leif Rosenberger, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College; Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Byler, USA, US Pacific Command/J73; and Major Eric Pettersen, USAF, Air Force Logistics Command, International Logistics Center; and Lt Col Dennis Murphy, USAF, State Department (Ballroom)

DAY 3

0800-1200 Joint Staff/J-5 Executive Session (TAC Auditorium)

0800-1230 Counter-Drugs Workshop, Speakers - Mr. Charles Gutensohn, Chief, Cocaine Investigations, Drug Enforcement Agency; Mr. Brent Olson, Deputy Director, Office of Program Management, Bureau of International Matters, Department of State; Colonel David D. McCullough, Jr., USAF, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Policy and Enforcement; and Mr. Paul Mahlstedt, Aide to General Paul F. Gorman, USA (Retired) (Ballroom)

0830-1230 Reserve Affairs Workshop, Speaker - Major General William R. Berkman, USA, Military Executive to the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Peninsula Room)

1230 Closing Remarks, Colonel Albert M. Barnes, USAF, Commander, Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (Ballroom)

PLENARY SESSION

PLENARY SESSION

13 December 1988

Purpose. To provide a forum for members of the joint and interagency community to examine mutual requirements arising from approved national LIC strategy and exchange LIC lessons learned.

Summary of Speakers Remarks.

Keynote Address. Dr. Michael Vlahos, Director of the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, briefed on "The Postwar American Ethos and Low Intensity Conflict." The national security policies of all societies are reflected through their cultures. In this way, US foreign policy and politics reflect the myths which unite Americans, and which they generally hold to be true. These myths are based on the sharing of a religious based system reinforced by beliefs that America is the source of human progress, and has been blessed with exceptional endowments. As such, these myths reflect an American belief that perfection is achievable through willpower. In the postwar period the sense of US national mission has been guided by the Soviet threat and the Cold War. The strategy which supported US initiatives in these arenas were seen as protective measures by which American myths could be safeguarded. However, this was also the period of the growth of Marxism in the Third World, and the crippling of national strategy as a result of the Vietnam War. The denouement appeared in the form of Watergate, causing America to hold up the mirror to reality and question the validity of her essential myths. The path to rejuvenation has appeared in the form of an American awareness of her new role in relation to issues such as peaceful competition with Japan, and the relationship with the near Third World of Mexico, Central America, and the Andean Region. This region brings new challenges in the form of narcotics trafficking, economics, and local revolution. A difficult issue for the United States will be how to use force in this region, if need be. This will mean a new perspective by which to address the doctrine guiding low intensity conflict (LIC) which, by its very nature, is antithetical to the American version of democracy

Role of the CJCS and the Joint Staff in Planning and Implementing National LIC Strategy and Policy. Rear Admiral P. R. Olson, USN, Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Joint Staff/J-5, focused on the enduring confusion (myths) within the government (including the military) as to the nature of LIC and on the emerging trends he sees which will affect the US ability to understand the threat and take appropriate actions. Chief among his listing of myths concerning LIC were The Lesser Included Case, Equals SOF,

Primarily a Military Problem, No Useful Definition, and Bipolarity. In terms of emerging trends that RADM Olson identified as having major LIC policy impact were Soviet Policy, World Economy, Strategic Nuclear Balance, Lethality of Conventional Weapons, Availability of Weapons, Insurgent/Terrorist/Narco-Trafficker Linkages, Third World Economic/Demographic Changes. RADM Olson discussed the need for a coordinated interagency approach to the LIC problem. The beginnings of such a LIC community already exists and has done much valuable work. Future efforts must be focused on defining LIC specific requirements and developing a integration process for current LIC related initiatives. The role of the CINC's is critical in the LIC environment.

Creating Unity of Effort to Meet the LIC Threat. Colonel Albert M. Barnes, USAF, Commander, Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, discussed the Center for Low Intensity Conflict from the Command perspective; from the establishment of the Center under the 1986 Activation Plan, through the latest initiatives. Particular emphasis was placed upon the expanding role of the Center as the DOD and interagency focal point for LIC issues. The major Center initiatives were presented and their status updated. His presentation looked at the pre-eminent emerging LIC problem, that of the illicit drug traffic and its connection to international terrorism. Col Barnes finished his presentation with a statement underscoring the vital need for interagency cooperation in the LIC arena, and the utility of continued exchanges/meetings such as this CLIC/J5 conference.

National LIC Policy. Ambassador Charles S. Whitehouse, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, addressed the need for a clear US national policy on LIC. There is much confusion about what LIC is -- even the job title ASD for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict causes people to draw the erroneous conclusion that special operations and low intensity conflict are synonymous terms. The concept of LIC is compounded by the fact that most Americans think only in terms of two world conditions: peace or war. The grouping of diverse tasks such as peacekeeping, combatting terrorism, and insurgency and counterinsurgency also hamper the way the US government can effectively tailor itself to deal with LIC. What, then, should the US do to prepare for LIC? The LIC Board, established at the NSC level, was mandated by Congress. Its representation is made up at the Cabinet level. Cabinet officials are too busy to deal with the multitude of problems inherent in LIC; therefore, the LIC Board should be put at the Deputy Secretary level. Specifically, Regional Secretaries of State are, or should be, the real LIC leaders. It is the Regional Secretaries who decide the degree of US involvement in LIC. Any government agency must be appraised of a real, precise LIC problem before they are able to focus their efforts. Within the DOD the main roles will probably fall within

equipment, training, and intelligence. After all is said and done, we must remember the very survival of a nation may well rest on what the US does in LIC.

Joint Doctrine Development. Colonel Ken Wilson, USA, Chief, Joint Doctrine Branch, Joint Doctrine and Education Division, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, Joint Staff/J-7, gave an in-depth briefing designed to familiarize the audience with the history, current status, and future of the joint doctrine development process. His briefing included joint doctrine development prior to the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act, the Joint Doctrine Master Plan, current projects, and the joint doctrine development road map for the future. The Joint Doctrine Master Plan includes 26 existing JCS Pubs, 11 ongoing projects, 6 multi-service pubs, and 24 new projects. Included in the 24 new projects was a Category I project, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. The briefing outlined the Joint Doctrine Development Process specified in JCS Pub 1-01. Key future actions included a computerized management system and a joint doctrine computer network.

The USPACOM Peacetime/Multinational Strategies. Lieutenant Colonel William Robinson, USA, US Pacific Command/J-5, Policy Division, provided a brief overview of the US Pacific Command area of operations and the three interwoven parts of their Pacific strategy: warfighting, peacetime, and multinational. The peacetime strategy recognizes that military forces can serve far more than deterrence and warfighting needs. The objectives of this strategy are to enhance US military preparedness, strengthen alliances, expand US influence, and aid in nation building. The methods used include military exercises, intelligence exchange, humanitarian relief and reconstruction exercises, military construction, medical assistance, ship visits, high level military visits, conferences/seminars and exchange programs, and military sales. The multinational strategy provides for tailoring to each country. For each country, it also provides an assessment of potential and desired contribution to Pacific security and details goals.

The SOUTHCOM Strategy System. Major Wilfred D. MacDonald, Jr., USA, US Southern Command/J-5, Policy and Strategy Division, began with a brief overview of the US Southern Command area of operations and provided a detailed look at the US Southern Command Strategy System. The Strategy System includes MTR (Mission, Tasks, and Responsibilities), RSS (Regional Security Strategy), Programming Guidance, USSOUTHCOM Campaign Plan, Strategic Priorities List, and Priority Actions Agenda. The RSS examines the theater in general, each country in the region, and specific functional areas. This process will result in a six year action plan which specifies objectives, activities, requirements, time phasing, and specific responsibilities. The benefits of the plan include a coordinated plan for employment of

assets and efforts, more efficient use of assets and planning efforts, coherent identification of materiel, force structure, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and training needs, determination of funding priorities, and a structure for consolidation of countries' needs and trade-offs.

Attachments

RADM Olson's Briefing Text and Slides

Col Barnes' Briefing Slides

Col Wilson's Briefing Slides

LTC Robinson's Briefing Text and Slides

MAJ MacDonald's Support Material and Briefing Slides

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:

MYTHS AND TRENDS

RADM PHILLIP R. OLSON, USN

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, STRATEGY AND POLICY, J-5

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT WORKSHOP

13 DEC 1988

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: MYTHS AND TRENDS

GOOD MORNING, DISTINGUISHED GUESTS AND CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS. IT'S A PLEASURE TO BE HERE; IN FACT, IT'S A PLEASURE TO BE ANYWHERE OUTSIDE OF THE PENTAGON! WHEN WE AGREED TO CO-HOST THIS GET-TOGETHER, WE HAD NO IDEA IT WOULD GROW TO THESE PROPORTIONS. THE OVERWHELMING RESPONSE TO THIS CONFERENCE REFLECTS WIDESPREAD INTEREST IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND ENCOURAGES ME TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS BOTH SUPPORT AND A RESERVOIR OF EXPERTISE WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE FOUNDATION FOR THE IMPORTANT WORK WHICH LIES AHEAD. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK COL BARNES AND HIS STAFF AT THE CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT FOR THE TREMENDOUS JOB THEY'VE DONE IN CO-HOSTING THIS MEETING WITH THE JOINT STAFF, AND OF COURSE FOR THEIR SUPERLATIVE WORK IN THIS FIELD. THIS CO-HOSTING ARRANGEMENT IS ESPECIALLY NICE IN THAT IT ALLOWS THE JOINT STAFF TO TAKE ANY CREDIT FROM THIS CONFERENCE, WHILE COL BARNES AND HIS PEOPLE ARE DOING ALL THE HARD WORK.

MY TOPIC FOR TODAY DEALS WITH THE MYTHS AND TRENDS OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, AND WHAT I HOPE TO DO IS TIE THAT DISCUSSION IN WITH SOME REFLECTIONS ON WHAT IS LEFT UNDONE AND WHAT WE IN THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT COMMUNITY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE TASK OF COMING TO GRIPS WITH THIS IMPORTANT CHALLENGE TO US NATIONAL INTERESTS.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT MYTHS

ITS DIFFICULT TO THINK OF AN AREA MORE PRONE TO ENDURING

MYTHS THAN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. IN FACT, WE HAVE EVEN
MANAGED TO MAKE THESE MYTHS THE BASIS FOR POLICY ON OCCASION.

LIC MYTHS

- THE LESSER INCLUDED CASE
- EQUALS SOF
- PRIMARILY A MILITARY PROBLEM
- NO USEFUL DEFINITION
- BIPOLARITY

SR 1

ONE MYTH LONG HELD TO BE TRUE BY MILITARY POLICY MAKERS WAS THE IDEA THAT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IS THE LESSER-INCLUDED CASE, THAT IF YOU PREPARE ADEQUATELY FOR HIGH OR MID INTENSITY WARS YOU HAVE, BY DEFINITION, PREPARED FOR LOW INTENSITY THREATS. IN FOOTBALL TERMS, THIS IS THE IDEA THAT "IF YOU CAN BEAT THE VARSITY, YOU CAN BEAT THE JV!" OF COURSE, IN FOOTBALL, THIS IS GENERALLY TRUE. THE PROBLEM IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, TO STRETCH THE ANALOGY SLIGHTLY, IS THAT THE JV MAY NOT BE PLAYING FOOTBALL AT ALL. IN OTHER WORDS, THE RULES OF THE GAME MAY BE SO DIFFERENT THAT YOUR MOST EXPENSIVELY ACQUIRED CAPABILITIES MAY BE IRRELEVANT.

AS RECENTLY AS 1975, THIS IDEA HAD OFFICIAL STATUS: [PAUSE] WHILE NO LONGER AN OFFICIAL PART OF OUR POLICY, THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS PERSIST.

US PLANNING ATTEMPTS TO ENSURE THAT OVERALL FORCES
GENERATED FOR MAJOR CONFLICTS HAVE THE INHERENT
CAPABILITY TO ENGAGE IN THE FULL SPECTRUM OF
PLAUSIBLE LESSER CONFLICTS

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THE EFFECT OF THIS MYTH, OF COURSE, HAS BEEN TO RATIONALIZE
THE CONTINUED COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO
CAPABILITIES NEEDED AT THE HIGHER END OF THE CONFLICT SPECTRUM.
IN SOME CASES, THE RESULTING CAPABILITY MAY BE LESS USEFUL IN
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS THAN THE EQUIPMENT IT REPLACES, AS FOR
EXAMPLE STRATEGIC BOMBERS MAY BE REPLACED BY STEALTH AIRCRAFT
WHICH ARE FEWER IN NUMBER, MORE EXPENSIVE TO OPERATE, AND HAVE
LIMITED APPLICABILITY TO THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
ENVIRONMENT, OR IN OUR ACQUISITION OF SURFACE COMBATANTS WITH
LITTLE OR NO GUN CAPABILITY. OF COURSE, THE DANGER TO NATIONAL
SURVIVAL REFLECTED BY NUCLEAR OR GENERAL WAR MANDATES
CONCENTRATION ON OUR STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES; BUT WE OUGHT NOT
DECEIVE OURSELVES INTO THINKING THAT WE ARE ALSO BUYING
INHERENT SECURITY FROM THREATS AT THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM.

A SECOND MYTH, ONE WHICH PERSISTS EVEN AMONG KEY
DECISION-MAKERS, IS THAT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT EQUALS SOF,

THAT WE CAN LEAVE THE TASK OF PREPARING FOR AND CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT EXCLUSIVELY TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES. NO DOUBT THIS MISPERCEPTION HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE 1986 LEGISLATION WHICH CREATED BOTH AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND. IN TRUTH, OF COURSE, CINCSOC IS NOT IN CHARGE OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, AND RECENT US LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT INVOLVEMENT HAS BEEN PREDOMINANTLY CONDUCTED BY CONVENTIONAL FORCES. IN THE PERSIAN GULF, GRENADA, AND THE STRIKE ON LIBYA, CONVENTIONAL FORCES PROVIDED THE BULK OF THE DEPLOYED COMBAT POWER. AND THAT IS THE LESSON: ALTHOUGH SOF HAVE IMPORTANT CAPABILITIES ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT, THEY ARE NEITHER NECESSARILY NOR UNIQUELY THE FORCE OF CHOICE FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. THE REALITY WILL MOST OFTEN BE A COMBINATION OF SPECIAL AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND CAPABILITIES.

AND THAT LEADS TO THE NEXT MYTH, THAT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IS PRIMARILY A MILITARY PROBLEM, AMENABLE TO MOSTLY MILITARY SOLUTIONS. THIS IDEA ENDURES BECAUSE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS USUALLY GET ATTENTION IN THIS COUNTRY ONLY WHEN THEY REACH THE STAGE OF MILITARY CONFLICT. BUT THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY CLEARLY STATES THAT THERE ARE FOUR INSTRUMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, INFORMATIONAL, AND MILITARY. WHEN MILITARY POWER MUST BE APPLIED, INDIRECT APPLICATIONS OF MILITARY POWER, ESPECIALLY SECURITY ASSISTANCE, ARE PREFERRED OVER DIRECT APPLICATIONS. ONLY WHEN VITAL US INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE ARE WE TO CONSIDER THE INTRODUCTION OF US COMBAT FORCES.

SO THE ROLE OF OTHER, NON-DOD AGENCIES, IS KEY TO SUCCESS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. STATE, CIA, COMMERCE, TREASURY, JUSTICE, DEA AND OTHERS ALL MUST CONTRIBUTE TO AN INTEGRATED US GOVERNMENT EFFORT IN A COUNTRY OR REGION.

THERE ARE ALSO THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE NO USEFUL DEFINITION OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, OR THAT ANOTHER TERM WOULD BETTER DESCRIBE THE PHENOMENON. (SOME HAVE SUGGESTED THAT "NON-CAREER ENHANCING CONFLICT" WOULD BETTER DESCRIBE THE REALITY). BUT WE DO HAVE AN APPROVED DOD AND USG DEFINITION OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: [PAUSE]

LIC DEFINITION

POLITICAL-MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN CONTENDING STATES OR GROUPS BELOW CONVENTIONAL WAR AND ABOVE THE ROUTINE PEACEFUL COMPETITION AMONG STATES. IT FREQUENTLY INVOLVES PROTRACTED STRUGGLES OF COMPETING PRINCIPLES AND IDEOLOGIES. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT RANGES FROM SUBVERSION TO THE USE OF ARMED FORCE. IT IS WAGED BY A COMBINATION OF MEANS EMPLOYING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, INFORMATIONAL, AND MILITARY INSTRUMENTS. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS ARE OFTEN LOCALIZED, GENERALLY IN THE THIRD WORLD, BUT CONTAIN REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS.

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THIS DEFINITION IS USEFUL FOR THE VERY REASON THAT IT HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY ALL OF THE AGENCIES CONCERNED. ULTIMATELY, IT DOESN'T REALLY MATTER WHETHER WE TOTALLY AGREE WITH THE DEFINITION; WE MUST USE IT TO INSURE THAT WE FOCUS OUR DEBATE AND BEGIN TO ACHIEVE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING.

FINALLY, THE MYTH OF A US AND SOVIET DOMINATED BI-POLAR

WORLD RETAINS A STUBBORN ATTRACTIVENESS FOR POLICY-MAKERS IN THE CONTEXT OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. THIS MYTH HAS SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR CONCEPT OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. IT IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO SAY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SOURCES OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ARE LIMITED TO THE SUPERPOWERS. VENEZUELA AND PANAMA HAVE BEEN PRINCIPAL SUPPORTERS OF THE FMLN IN NICARAGUA. FRANCE HAS PROVIDED IMPORTANT SUPPORT TO THE FMLN IN EL SALVADOR. LIBYA HAS PROVIDED ARMS TO THE IRA IN NORTHERN IRELAND. AND CHINA HAS PROVIDED SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO INSURGENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA AND BELLIGERENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

CERTAINLY, RECENT US INVOLVEMENT IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT TENDS TO SUPPORT THE MULTI-POLAR VIEW. US ACTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, THE GULF OF SIDRA, AND GRENADA WERE OCCASIONED BY COMPLEX COMBINATIONS OF FACTORS, NOT PRIMARILY BY MOSCOW.

IT'S INTERESTING TO NOTE, BY THE WAY, THAT THE BI-POLAR VIEW OF THE WORLD RETAINS ITS CHARM AT VERY HIGH LEVELS:

"TONIGHT, ONE OUT OF EVERY FOUR COUNTRIES AROUND THE GLOBE IS AT WAR. IN VIRTUALLY EVERY CASE, THERE IS A MASK ON THE FACE OF WAR. IN VIRTUALLY EVERY CASE, BEHIND THE MASK IS THE SOVIET UNION AND THOSE WHO DO ITS BIDDING."

SECRETARY CASPER WEINBERGER, JAN 1986

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I DO NOT MEAN TO IMPLY THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT THE PRINCIPLE US ADVERSARY. THEY ARE AND WILL REMAIN SO FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE. BUT WE WILL FAIL TO CONFRONT ADEQUATELY THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT THREAT IF WE FOCUS ONLY ON PROBLEMS CLEARLY INSPIRED BY THE SOVIETS OR THEIR SURROGATES, OR IF WE ASCRIBE OUR DIFFICULTIES IN THE THIRD WORLD SOLELY TO OUR DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT TRENDS

LET ME NOW TURN TO A DISCUSSION OF TRENDS IN THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IS A PHENOMENON WHICH LENDS ITSELF POORLY TO UNDERSTANDING THROUGH SNAPSHOTS; THE ENVIRONMENT IS CONSTANTLY CHANGING. WE CAN SAFELY PREDICT THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF SOME OF THESE TRENDS; ABOUT OTHERS WE CAN ONLY SAY THAT THEY WILL HAVE IMPORTANT EFFECTS AND BEAR WATCHING.

LIC TRENDS

- SOVIET POLICY
- WORLD ECONOMY
- STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE
- LETHALITY OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
- AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS
- INSURGENT/TERRORIST/NARCO-TRAFFICKER LINKAGES
- THIRD WORLD ECONOMIC/DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES

SR 5

UNION AND IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD. I WILL NOT
DETAIL THESE CHANGES; YOU WILL HAVE READ ABOUT THEM IN THE
PRESS AND FORMED YOUR OWN OPINIONS. IT'S TOO SOON TO ATTEMPT TO
PREDICT WHETHER SECRETARY GORBACHEV WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN
TRANSFORMING SOVIET POLITICAL CULTURE, OR WHAT THE EFFECTS WILL
BE ON SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD. ONE HYPOTHESIS IS A
SCENARIO IN WHICH A RESTRUCTURED ECONOMY AND REDUCED MILITARY
OUTLAYS DUE TO ARMS AGREEMENTS COULD RESULT IN "DISCRETIONARY
FUNDS" TO SUPPORT INCREASED SOVIET ADVENTURISM ABROAD. YET
ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT SOVIET INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND
DIFFICULTIES WITH WARSAW PACT ALLIES MIGHT LEAD TO INCREASED
SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN SETTLING LONG-STANDING
REGIONAL CONFLICTS. AND OF COURSE THERE ARE MANY OTHER POSSIBLE
SCENARIOS. WE WILL HAVE TO WATCH VERY CLOSELY AS THESE FORCES
WORK THEMSELVES OUT IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS, AND BE ALERT TO THE
CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR POLICIES IN THE THIRD WORLD AND ELSEWHERE.

A SECOND TREND APPARENT TO MOST OBSERVERS IS THAT THERE ARE
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TAKING PLACE IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER.
SOME OF THE ASPECTS OF THIS TREND INCLUDE A RISING GAP BETWEEN
THE GLOBAL "HAVES" AND THE "HAVE-NOTS", INCREASED ECONOMIC
INTERDEPENDENCE, AND A DECREASING US ABILITY TO POLICE THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM, ESPECIALLY AS OUR OWN ECONOMIC
SITUATION GROWS LESS STABLE. THESE FACTORS PORTEND BOTH
ENHANCED CONDITIONS FOR THIRD WORLD INSTABILITY AND A REDUCED
CAPABILITY ON OUR PART TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THOSE
CONDITIONS. THE US CAN NO LONGER IMPOSE ITS WILL ON THE WORLD

ECONOMY AS WE COULD FOR A DECADE OR SO AFTER WORLD WAR II, BUT MUST ENCOURAGE OTHER EMERGING AND ESTABLISHED ECONOMIC POWERS TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLES.

THE CHANGE IN THE NUCLEAR BALANCE OF POWER, TO A POSITION OF ROUGH PARITY BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS, ALONG WITH NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION NOW AT THE MARGINS OF THE THIRD WORLD, HAS IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS EVEN IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. SOME ARGUE THAT THIS PARITY POSES A RESTRAINT ON THE ACTIONS OF THE SUPERPOWERS, WHILE NOT RESTRAINING THE ADVENTURISM OF SUCH REGIONAL ACTORS AS CUBA, LIBYA, OR SYRIA. THE SUPERPOWER NUCLEAR THREAT HAS LITTLE CREDIBILITY TO DETER THESE KINDS OF AGGRESSION.

A RELEVANT TECHNOLOGICAL TREND IS THE REVOLUTION IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE AND OTHERS CAN NOW DELIVER POTENT CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS OVER GREAT DISTANCES WITH EXTREME PRECISION. BUT HIGH TECH WEAPONS ARE NOT THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF THE SUPERPOWERS, AND THAT MEANS THAT THE RISKS INHERENT IN SO-CALLED "SMALL WARS" MAY BE EXTREME. REMEMBER THE IMPACT OF A SMALL NUMBER OF EXOCET MISSILES ON OUR OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, AND ON THE BRITISH IN THE FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN. OTHER EXAMPLES INCLUDE THE INTRODUCTION OF STINGERS IN AFGHANISTAN, A WEAPON CREDITED BY SOME ANALYSTS AS TIPPING THE SCALES IN FAVOR OF THE MUJAHADDIN, OR THE USE OF RECENT VINTAGE SOVIET MINES TO THREATEN THE APPROACHES TO THE SUEZ IN 1984. OF COURSE, THE PROLIFERATION AND POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, A CHEAP AND EASILY PRODUCED COMMODITY, FURTHER RESTRAINS OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION IN THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT.

SOPHISTICATED AND NOT, THROUGHOUT THE THIRD WORLD. IT IS INSTRUCTIVE TO NOTE THAT THIRD WORLD ARMS IMPORTS INCREASED AN AVERAGE OF 7 % EACH YEAR FROM 1970-1984. SHOULD US TROOPS BE INTRODUCED INTO A THIRD WORLD CONFLICT, THEY WILL NOT BE LIKELY TO FIND THEMSELVES IN "PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENTS."

ANOTHER RECENT TREND IS THE INCREASINGLY WELL-DOCUMENTED LINKAGE BETWEEN INSURGENTS, TERRORISTS, AND NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS IN SOME REGIONS. THE VERY SURVIVAL OF SOME GOVERNMENTS UNDER THREAT FROM THIS COMBINATION IS IN QUESTION. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR US ARE MORE INSTABILITY IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND GREATER DIFFICULTY IN DEALING WITH IT, AS THE NARCO-TRAFFICKERS BUY SECURITY FROM THE TERRORISTS AND INSURGENTS, WHILE PROVIDING THEM WITH WEAPONS AND FUNDS.

FINALLY, WE MUST TAKE NOTE OF ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES WITHIN THE THIRD WORLD WHICH ARE LIKELY TO EXACERBATE UNREST. SUCH FACTORS AS INCREASED URBANIZATION, UNCONTROLLED POPULATION GROWTH, AND THE SHIFT TO AN EXPORT ECONOMY MORE DEPENDENT ON WORLD MARKET TRENDS ALL COMPLICATE OUR COMPREHENSION OF THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT PHENOMENON AND MAKE OUR PLANNING TASK MORE DIFFICULT.

PROSPECTS FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

IT'S NOT POSSIBLE TO SPECIFY WITH ANY PRECISION THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF THESE TRENDS, BUT IT SEEMS SAFE TO PREDICT THAT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS WILL CONTINUE AT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF ACTIVITY OR HIGHER, THAT THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WILL BE LESS CRITICAL IN

DETERMINING OUR OWN ROLE, THAT WE WILL BE UNABLE TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT, SOMETIMES DIRECT INVOLVEMENT, AND THAT SUCH INVOLVEMENT CARRIES WITH IT GREATER RISKS THAN EVER.

NOR IS IT POSSIBLE TO PREDICT WITH ANY GREAT CONFIDENCE HOW THE "GRAND US LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT STRATEGY" WILL EVOLVE IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS. WE ARE ABOUT TO TRANSITION TO A NEW ADMINISTRATION AND A NEW CONGRESS, AND WE DON'T YET KNOW HOW LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT WILL FIGURE IN THEIR VARIOUS AGENDAS. BUT I WOULD ARGUE THAT THOSE OF US IN THE MILITARY COMMUNITY CANNOT AFFORD THE LUXURY OF IGNORING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT NEEDS. HISTORY SHOWS THAT THE BILL-PAYERS OF FAILED POLICY AND SHORT-SIGHTED NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING ARE THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE NATION.


I THINK THAT'S ESPECIALLY TRUE IN THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT. AS CLAUSEWITZ POINTED OUT, "WAR IS NOTHING MORE THAN THE CONTINUATION OF POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS." WHILE THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND INFORMATIONAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS ARE PREEMINENT IN THE EARLIEST STAGES OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT SITUATIONS, OFTEN THE ONLY REMAINING RESORT WHEN OUR POLICIES HAVE FAILED OR CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE CONSPIRED AGAINST US IS TO USE MILITARY FORCES IN A DIRECT ROLE. THE ALTERNATIVE MAY BE TO DO NOTHING, AND WHEN US INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE, AS THEY SOMETIMES ARE, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AFFORD THAT. THIS IS EXACTLY THE SITUATION WHICH HAS PLAYED ITSELF OUT IN THE PERSIAN GULF IN RECENT YEARS, IN WHICH A REGIONAL CONFLICT SPILLED OVER IN WAYS WHICH AFFECTED VITAL US INTERESTS, INCLUDING ACCESS TO RESOURCES, RELATIONS WITH ALLIES, AND OUR CREDIBILITY AS A SUPERPOWER. THE RESULT WAS A DECISION IN FAVOR

MORE CLOSELY IN TERMS OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. WERE WE READY FOR THE THREAT WHICH PRESENTED ITSELF? WERE OUR CAPABILITIES SUITED TO THE SITUATION WE FOUND OURSELVES IN? WERE THE RISKS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BEFORE THE DECISIONS WERE MADE? I'M NOT GOING TO ATTEMPT TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS IN THIS FORUM, BUT THESE ARE THE KINDS OF QUESTIONS ON WHICH WE MUST FOCUS IN OUR ANALYSIS FOR THE FUTURE.

THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT COMMUNITY

AT THE BEGINNING OF MY REMARKS, I ASKED HOW THE DOD LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT COMMUNITY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT CHALLENGE AND HELP FIND USEFUL SOLUTIONS. BEFORE I TACKLE THAT ONE, LET ME FIRST TRY TO EXPLAIN WHAT I MEAN BY THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT COMMUNITY.


LIC COMMUNITY



SL 6

THE DOD LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT COMMUNITY IS JUST A PART, THOUGH A VERY IMPORTANT AND A VERY ACTIVE PART, OF THE LARGER LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT COMMUNITY WHICH INCLUDES BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS. THESE LINKAGES, ALTHOUGH INFORMAL AND OFTEN AT THE WORKING LEVEL, ARE CRITICAL, AND WE MUST WORK TO STRENGTHEN THEM THROUGH FORA SUCH AS THIS.

DOD LIC COMMUNITY



SE 7

THE DOD COMMUNITY IS A LOOSELY CONNECTED NETWORK OF PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS INTERESTED IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT EITHER BY THE NATURE OF THEIR MISSIONS OR BY AVOCATION. MANY OF THOSE PEOPLE ARE PROBABLY IN THIS ROOM THIS MORNING. WHAT CONNECTS THEM IN MOST CASES IS THE NOTION THAT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT IS IMPORTANT TO US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS, AND THAT WE CAN DO BETTER THAN WE ARE CURRENTLY DOING.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

WHAT DOES THE DOD LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT COMMUNITY HAVE TO

IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS, AND THAT THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY WILL BE AS DESCRIBED EARLIER IN MY REMARKS, THEN YOU MUST ACCEPT A PART OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THAT WE ARE READY.

THE FIRST CONTRIBUTION WE CAN MAKE IS THAT OF PERSPECTIVE. PERSPECTIVE INCLUDES BRINGING YOUR EXPERTISE AND APPRECIATION FOR THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT THREAT TO BEAR ON OUR ORGANIZATIONAL TASKS. PERSPECTIVE INCLUDES INSURING THE LEADERSHIP IS MADE AWARE OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT REQUIREMENTS. IT MEANS ADVOCACY OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT PROGRAMS. IT INCLUDES PROVIDING FOCUS FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ISSUES TO ENSURE PROPER ATTENTION AND CONSIDERATION. PROVIDING PERSPECTIVE APPLIES BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE DOD CIRCLES; LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT MUST BE A TOTAL GOVERNMENT EFFORT.

SECONDLY, WE MUST BEGIN THE DIFFICULT TASK OF DEFINING, AND QUANTIFYING WHERE POSSIBLE, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT REQUIREMENTS. THIS INCLUDES FORMULATING DOCTRINE, STRUCTURING ORGANIZATIONS, DEFINING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, AND IDENTIFYING EQUIPMENT NEEDS. WE MUST FIND THE APPROPRIATE RESOURCE BALANCE BETWEEN OUR NUCLEAR AND GENERAL WAR NEEDS AND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MOST LIKELY FORM OF CONFLICT, LOW INTENSITY. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THIS MEANS THAT A NAVY SURFACE COMBATANT CAPABLE OF ENGAGING AND DESTROYING STATE-OF-THE-ART SOVIET AIR, SURFACE, AND SUB-SURFACE THREATS MAY ALSO BE REQUIRED TO NEUTRALIZE A 40 FOOT HIGH SPEED GUNBOAT. IT MEANS THAT AN

AWAACS AIRCRAFT DESIGNED FOR BATTLE MANAGEMENT IN A HIGH INTENSITY ENVIRONMENT MAY ALSO BE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE ON-SCENE COMMANDER DURING THE EVACUATION OF NON-COMBATANTS FROM A HOSTILE COUNTRY OR REGION. AND IT MEANS THAT A SOLDIER TRAINED TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH A T-72 TANK MUST ALSO BE ABLE TO CONTEND SUCCESSFULLY WITH A 15-YEAR OLD HURLING MOLOTOV COCKTAILS.

HOW DO WE ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES? ONE ANSWER IS THAT A LOT IS ALREADY HAPPENING. MANY LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT-RELATED INITIATIVES ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY IN THE SERVICES AND UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS. BUT MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE. IF WE ARE TO TRULY DEFINE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT REQUIREMENTS, THE WARFIGHTING CINCS MUST BE THE PRIMARY ADVOCATES, AS THEY ADDRESS THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT THREATS IN THEIR AORs AND IDENTIFY RESOURCE AND CAPABILITY SHORTFALLS. THE SERVICES AND THE JOINT STAFF CAN ONLY RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO VALIDATED CINC PRIORITIES.

ALTHOUGH MANY SEPARATE EFFORTS ARE UNDERWAY, THERE IS NO MECHANISM FOR COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION OF THOSE EFFORTS. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE SOMETHING LIKE A DOD MASTER PLAN FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, A PROCESS WHICH HAS WORKED WELL IN OTHER AREAS, SUCH AS PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS. I HAVE ASKED THE EXECUTIVE SESSION ON THURSDAY, WHICH WILL INCLUDE SERVICE AND CINC REPRESENTATIVES, TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER SUCH A FRAMEWORK WOULD BE USEFUL, AND IF SO, HOW WE MIGHT GET STARTED PRODUCING ONE.

LOSE HEART. YOU MAY FEEL FRUSTRATED AND DISCOURAGED BY A PERCEIVED LACK OF SUPPORT IN YOUR ORGANIZATIONS AND AGENCIES FOR SYSTEMATICALLY ADDRESSING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. BUT THIS IS IMPORTANT WORK, KEY TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. IF YOU AND I DON'T DO IT, WHO WILL?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION. WE HAVE A FEW MINUTES LEFT FOR YOUR QUESTIONS. IF I DON'T HAVE THE ANSWERS, I PROMISE TO GET BACK TO YOU BEFORE THE CONFERENCE ENDS.



ARMY-AIR FORCE CENTER FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (CLIC)

Center For Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC)

- FEB 85 -- AF INNOVATION TASK FORCE RECOMMENDED:
 - FIND WAYS TO USE ALL FORCES
 - AVOID LOSING VIETNAM EXPERIENCE
- JUL 85 -- CSAF PROPOSED JOINT LIC CENTER TO CSA
- SEP 85 -- CSAF/CSA AGREED TO ESTABLISH AN
ARMY-AIR FORCE CENTER -- JFDI 35

ARMY/AIR FORCE CENTER


FOR

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

(CLIC)

ACTIVATION PLAN

29 JANUARY 1986



John A. Wickham, Jr.
JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff



Charles A. Gagniel
CHARLES A. GAGNIEL
General, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff

Army-Air Force Center For Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC)

MISSION

**IMPROVE THE ARMY-AF POSTURE FOR LOW INTENSITY
CONFLICT (LIC), ELEVATE AWARENESS IN BOTH SERVICES
OF MILITARY POWER ROLE IN LIC, ELEVATE AWARENESS
OF CAPABILITIES NEEDED FOR THAT ROLE, AND
PROVIDE AN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR TRANSITION TO A
JOINT/INTERAGENCY ACTIVITY**


HQ DA DCS OPS	HQ USAF DCS P&O

HQ TAC DCS/Plans	HQ TRADOC DCSDOC	HQ MAC DCS/Plans
GENERAL OFFICER EXECUTIVE COUNCIL		

- ARMY EXECUTIVE AGENT - HQ TRADOC
- ARMY PERSONNEL - TRADOC FIELD ELEMENT
- AIR FORCE PERSONNEL - AIR FORCE COMBAT OPERATIONS STAFF

ARMY-AIR FORCE CENTER
FOR
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Organization/Authorization



CLIC Fields Of Expertise

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
INTERDICTION
AIRLIFT
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
CONVENTIONAL COMBAT ARMS/SUPPORT
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
CIVIL AFFAIRS
POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS
FOREIGN AREA SPECIALIST
INTELLIGENCE

C³

ELECTRONIC COMBAT
LOGISTICS
ENGINEER
RESERVE COMPONENT ADVISOR
MEDICAL
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
HISTORIAN

RIGHT BALANCE OF
COMBATANT/NONCOMBATANT
SKILLS

Command Relationships

DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORIZED WITH...

- USA-USAF MACOM'S/MAJCOM'S
- DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
- AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
- NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
- DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
- NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
- DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
- FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
- UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Tasks And Responsibilities

- DEVELOP AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE LIC PHENOMENON
- DEVELOP AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICO-MILITARY ENVIRONMENT
- ACCEPT AND MAINTAIN A JOINT LIC DATA BASE
- REPRESENT THE ARMY-AIR FORCE IN JOINT AND INTERAGENCY LIC FORA
- DEVELOP JOINT ARMY-AIR FORCE OPERATIONS CONCEPTS
- CONDUCT OPERATIONAL ANALYSES
- IDENTIFY CAPABILITY SHORTFALLS
- FACILITATE MACOM/MAJCOM OT&E EFFORTS FOR MATTERS RELATED TO LIC
- ADVISE ARMY-AIR FORCE DECISION MAKERS AND EDUCATE SERVICE PERSONNEL ON LIC OPERATIONS
- DEVELOP AND PROPOSE POLICY INITIATIVES
- PROPOSE INITIATIVES TO GENERAL OFFICER EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
- MONITOR PROGRESS

CONCEPTS AND MULTI-SERVICE DOCTRINE

FM 100-20/AFM 2-20, MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LIC.....	LT COL JAY CLEM
ARMY LIC MEDICAL DOCTRINE.....	LTC BILL THORNTON
SECURITY ASSISTANCE CONCEPT.....	MR. PAUL BELBUTOWSKI
TACTICAL FORCE PROTECTION CONCEPT.....	LTC FRED BERGER
REGIONAL INTEGRATION TEAM CONCEPT.....	LTC RICH WALTERS
SOCOM/SOUTHCOM JOINT MISSION ANALYSIS.....	LTC BILL THORNTON
PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN LIC CONCEPT.....	MAJ(P) ALEX ANGELLE
INTERAGENCY ACTION PLAN.....	LTC CHICK CICCOCLELLA

JOINT DOCTRINE

JCS PUB 3-07, JOINT LIC DOCTRINE.....LT COL BILL FURR
JCS PUB 3-07.1, JTTP FOR IN/COIN.....MAJ RICH CORSON
JCS PUB 3-07.2, JTTP FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM.....MAJ BRAD BUTLER
JCS PUB 3-07.3, JTTP FOR PEACEKEEPING.....MAJ(P) MONTY AYERS
JCS PUB 3-07.4, JTTP FOR PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPS.....MAJ RICH CORSON

INTELLIGENCE

INDICATORS TEMPLATING.....LTC RICH WALTERS
THREAT ASSESSMENTS.....LTC RICH WALTERS
LIC THREAT BRIEFINGS.....CAPT TED ELY
INSURGENTS-DRUGS AWARENESS BRIEFINGS.....CAPT TED ELY

AGENCY SUPPORT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.....MAJ MIKE PARSONS
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.....LTC ROD BRUNK
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.....LTC RICH WALTERS
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY.....LTC FRED BERGER

EDUCATION / AWARENESS

JLIC STUDY DATA BASE.....	DR. TOM CROUCH
LIC LESSONS LEARNED.....	MAJ JOHN TOWNSEND
CLIC LIBRARY.....	DR. TOM CROUCH
RESEARCH FELLOWS SUPPORT.....	LT COL JAY CLEM
MAJOR CONFERENCES.....	MS. SHERRY ROSCOE
UNICOM VISITS.....	OPR
FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE CRISIS RESPONSE TRAINING.....	MR. PAUL BELBUTOWSKI
CONGRESSIONAL VISITS.....	LTC CHICK CICCOCLELLA
LIC PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT SEMINARS.....	MAJ(P) MONTY AYERS
AUSTRALIAN RCUNDTABLES.....	MAJ(P) ALEX ANGELLE
ODUSD(P) (POLICY) PARTNERSHIP.....	LTC CHICK CICCOCLELLA
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY LIC ELECTIVE	LT COL JAY CLEM
LIC COURSES AUDITS.....	MAJ RON ZELMS
LIC COURSES PROGRAMS OF INSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE.....	OPR
LIC SIMULATIONS/MODELS.....	COL LEE DIXON
IN-HOUSE RESEARCH ASSISTANCE.....	MRS. JANICE PAINE
SOFTWARE TRANSFER.....	MS. CHERYL VICK
BRIEFINGS/DISTINGUISHED VISITORS SCHEDULING.....	MS. BARBARA NICHOLS

RECURRING PUBLICATIONS

CLIC PAPERS.....LT COL BILL FURR
CLIC REPORTS.....COL LEE DIXON
CLIC CONFERENCE REPORTS.....OPR
QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER.....MAJ (P) MONTY AYERS
LIC BIBLIOGRAPHIES.....DR. TOM CROUCH
LIC COURSES COMPILATIONS.....MAJ RON ZELMS
CLIC HISTORY.....DR. TOM CROUCH

RESERVE COMPONENT SUPPORT


RESERVE COMPONENT LIC TRAINING CIRCULARS.....LT COL KEN BROTHERS

RESERVE COMPONENT TASK FORCE COMMANDER INTERVIEWS.....LT COL KEN BROTHERS

OTHER PROJECTS


LIC COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES.....COL LEE DIXON
ROC/SON/SORD REVIEWS.....LT COL KEN BROTHERS

THE PRICE FOR VIOLENCE IN THE 20TH CENTURY



60M

WW I & II




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SINCE 1945




16M

PATTERNS IN GOVERNMENT SINCE 1945



POST-WORLD WAR II INSURGENCIES



**"...THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY LIES
IN THE COLONIES...SEVER THE RAW MATERIALS FLOW FROM
THE COLONIES AND YOU CUT THE SPINAL CORD OF THE EMPIRE..."**

V.I. LENIN

"OUR GOAL IS TO CONTROL THE TWO TREASURE HOUSES UPON WHICH THE WEST DEPENDS. THE ENERGY TREASURE HOUSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MINERAL TREASURE HOUSE OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA"

LEONID BREZHNEV

A-43

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THE STAKES


"... THE DEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON CERTAIN
STRATEGIC MINERALS FROM ABROAD IS THE WEAK LINK
IN AMERICAN MILITARY CAPABILITY..."

A-44

SOVIET MAJOR GENERAL
A.N. LAGOVSKIY
"STRATEGY AND ECONOMICS"


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SOVIET THIRD WORLD STRATEGY



— SEA LANES


SOVIET THIRD WORLD STRATEGY




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
XP 10452

THE ILLICIT DRUG THREAT






DIRECT COSTS TO THE U.S. ARE
\$110-\$160 BILLION ANNUALLY




SECOND LARGEST IMPORT


INTO THE U.S.




INDIRECT COSTS ARE \$100-
\$200 BILLION ANNUALLY




**37% OF THE U.S. POPULATION 12
OR OLDER HAVE USED ILLICIT DRUGS**



**OVER 23 MILLION PEOPLE IN THE
U.S. USE ILLICIT DRUGS REGULARLY**




**DRUG RELATED DEATHS HAVE
INCREASED OVER 500% SINCE
1980**




**DRUG RELATED
EMERGENCY ROOM INCIDENTS
HAVE INCREASED OVER 1000%
SINCE 1980**

WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY

BY LAND



265,000,000




94,000,000



4,400,000



WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY

BY SEA




WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY

BY AIR



COMMERCIAL

421,000




GENERAL AVIATION

250,000



30,000,000


FUTURE EXPANSION






A CANCER IN THE HEMISPHERE

U.S. COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS


● U.S. DEMAND REDUCTION/ LAW ENFORCEMENT



● INTERDICTION



● SOURCE COUNTRY OPERATIONS



A-AF CLIC ACTIVITIES

PROVIDE EXPERT ADVICE

DEPT OF STATE INM

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

OPLAN

TRAINING PROGRAM

INTELLIGENCE

OPERATIONAL SITES

AVIATION

COMMUNICATION

OPSEC


"ROLE OF DRUGS IN LIC"

JCS PUB 3-07.4, JTTP, PEACETIME

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

THE SOLUTION!

**THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE ILLICIT DRUG
PROBLEM IS THE ELIMINATION OF
DEMAND!**




**SHORT OF THAT, A CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL
EFFORT STRESSING ALL PHASES OF
COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS IS REQUIRED!**

THE DESIRABLE SITUATION IS THAT THE POINT IS NEVER REACHED WHERE THOUGHT MUST BE GIVEN TO THE DEPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF A MAJOR COMBAT FORMATION. KEEPING THE SITUATION IN CHECK SHOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMUNITY.

BG RAYMOND E. BELL JR.
COMMANDER 220TH MP BRIGADE
MILITARY REVIEW APR 88


PURPOSE

Familiarize the audience with the history, current status, and planned future of the joint doctrine development process.



OVERVIEW


- I. JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO THE 1986 DOD REORGANIZATION ACT.**
- II. THE JOINT DOCTRINE MASTER PLAN**
- III. CURRENT STATUS**
- IV. JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT ROAD MAP FOR THE FUTURE.**
- V. QUESTION / ANSWER SESSION.**



JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

JOINT DOCTRINE DEFINITION

Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Joint Chiefs Of Staff.



JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

JOINT DOCTRINE DEFINITION

OLD: Fundamental Principles That Guide The Employment Of Forces Of Two Or More Services Of The Same Nation In Coordinated Action Toward A Common Objective. It Is Ratified By All Four Services And May Be Promulgated By The Joint Chiefs Of Staff.

NEW: Fundamental Principles That Guide The Employment Of Forces Of Two Or More Services In Coordinated Action Toward A Common Objective. It Will Be Promulgated By The Joint Chiefs Of Staff.

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO 1986 DOD REORG ACT

- NO SINGLE INDIVIDUAL OR AGENCY OVERALL RESPONSIBLE.
- NO SINGLE STANDARDIZED PROCESS FOR INITIATION, DEVELOPMENT, COORDINATION, APPROVAL, DISTRIBUTION, EVALUATION, OR CHANGES.
- NO DEFINITIONS FOR JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES.
- NO CLEAR DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN JOINT DOCTRINE AND MULTI - SERVICE DOCTRINE.
- NO REQUIREMENT FOR PARTICIPATION BY THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS.
- NO REQUIREMENT FOR CONSISTENCY BETWEEN JOINT, SERVICE, AND COMBINED DOCTRINE.

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO 1986 DOD REORG ACT (CONT)

- BOTH THE SERVICES AND THE JOINT STAFF DEVELOPED JOINT DOCTRINE.
 - NORMALLY WITHOUT CINC PARTICIPATION
- MULTIPLE INDICES WERE REQUIRED TO DETERMINE WHAT JOINT DOCTRINE WAS ACTUALLY AVAILABLE.
- THAT JOINT DOCTRINE THAT WAS DEVELOPED WAS NOT ALWAYS WHAT WAS NEEDED BY THE UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS TO CONDUCT JOINT OPERATIONS.
 - NO JOINT OPERATIONS DOCTRINE
 - NO GUIDANCE ON ESTABLISHING JTFs
 - NO INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE
 - NO FOFA DOCTRINE

**JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT
PRIOR TO 1986 DOD REORG ACT
(CONTINUED)**

- NO AGREED UPON AUDIENCE.
- MUCH DOCTRINE THAT DID EXIST HAD NEVER BEEN EVALUATED.
- MANY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS WERE OUTDATED.
 - AIR DEFENSE
 - MEDICAL SUPPORT
 - AIR SPACE CONTROL
- NO ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHY OF PUBLICATIONS.
- NO WAY TO DETERMINE DISTRIBUTION.

JOINT DOCTRINE PILOT PROGRAM

- INITIATED IN 1983.
- DECENTRALIZED DEVELOPMENT WITH CENTRALIZED APPROVAL.
- KEY PROJECTS DEVELOPED BY SELECTED CINCS AND COORDINATED WITH ALL OTHER CINCS AND SERVICES.

PROJECT

-- THEATER AIR DEFENSE.

-- ATTACK OF THE SECOND ECHELON.

-- STRATEGIC AIR SUPPORT TO MARITIME OPERATIONS.

-- TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT TO MARITIME OPERATIONS.

DEVELOPING AGENCY

US EUCOM

US EUCOM

USPACOM/SAC

US LANTCOM

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

JOINT DOCTRINE PILOT PROGRAM PROJECTS

PROJECTS

DEVELOPING AGENCY

- THEATER COUNTERAIR OPERATIONS.	USEUCOM
- INTERDICTION OF FOLLOW-ON FORCES.	USEUCOM
- JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS(AIR).	USLANTCOM

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

SAMPLE DOCTRINAL ISSUES

- 1. WHO CONTROLS AIR DEFENSE ASSETS?**
- 2. WHO PLANS, COORDINATES, AND EXECUTES THE INTERDICTION EFFORT?**
- 3. SHOULD OR COULD A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL BE GIVEN THE AUTHORITY TO CONTROL AVIATION ASSETS?**
- 4. CHOULD FORCES BE ORGANIZED FUNCTIONALLY OR BY SERVICE COMPONENT?**
- 5. SHOULD A SINGLE LAND FORCE COMMANDER BE ESTABLISHED?**
- 6. SHOULD US FORCES BE PLACED UNDER THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF AN ALLIED COMMANDER?**
- 7. HOW MUCH AUTHORITY DOES THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER HAVE OVER ASSIGNED FORCES?**

JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THEATER COUNTERAIR

- MOST COMPREHENSIVE ADDRESSAL OF AIR OPERATIONS OF ANY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION DEVELOPED THUS FAR.
- IN A SINGLE DOCUMENT ADDRESSES OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE COUNTERAIR, SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES (SEAD), C3 COUNTERMEASURES, AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS.
- CLARIFIES CONTROL AND EMPLOYMENT OF ORGANIC AIR DEFENSE ASSETS BELONGING TO THE ARMY CORPS AND MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE (MAF).
- RECOGNIZES MODERN TECHNOLOGY INCLUDING SPACE BASED ASSETS AND CRUISE MISSILES.
- CLARIFIES COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AVIATION ASSETS.

AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER

"THE JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER DERIVES HIS AUTHORITY FROM THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE OPERATIONAL CONTROL, ASSIGN MISSIONS, DIRECT COORDINATION AMONG HIS SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS, REDIRECT AND ORGANIZE HIS FORCES TO ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF HIS OVERALL MISSION. THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER WILL NORMALLY DESIGNATE A JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER. THE JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES WILL BE ASSIGNED BY THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER (NORMALLY THESE WOULD INCLUDE, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PLANNING, COORDINATION, ALLOCATION AND TASKING BASED ON THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER'S APPORTIONMENT DECISION). USING THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE AND AUTHORITY, AND IN COORDINATION WITH THE OTHER SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS AND OTHER ASSIGNED SUPPORTING COMMANDERS, THE JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER WILL RECOMMEND TO THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER APPORTIONMENT OF AIR SORTIES TO VARIOUS MISSIONS OR GEOGRAPHIC AREAS."

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

1986 OMNIBUS AGREEMENT

"THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE (MAGTF) COMMANDER WILL RETAIN OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF HIS ORGANIC AIR ASSETS. THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE MAGTF AIR COMBAT ELEMENT IS THE SUPPORT OF THE MAGTF GROUND ELEMENT. DURING JOINT OPERATIONS, THE MAGTF AIR ASSETS WILL NORMALLY BE IN SUPPORT OF THE MAGTF MISSION. THE MAGTF COMMANDER WILL MAKE SORTIES AVAILABLE TO THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER, FOR TASKING THROUGH HIS AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER, FOR AIR DEFENSE, LONG-RANGE INTERDICTION, AND LONG- RANGE RECONNAISSANCE. SORTIES IN EXCESS OF THE MAGTF DIRECT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER FOR TASKING THROUGH THE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER FOR THE SUPPORT OF OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE JOINT FORCE, OR OF THE JOINT FORCE AS A WHOLE.

NOTHING HEREIN SHALL INFRINGE ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE THEATER OR JOINT FORCE COMMANDER, IN THE EXERCISE OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL, TO ASSIGN MISSIONS, REDIRECT EFFORTS (E.G., THE REAPPORTIONMENT AND/OR REALLOCATION OF ANY MAGTF TACAIR SORTIES WHEN IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED BY THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER THAT THEY ARE REQUIRED FOR HIGHER PRIORITY MISSIONS), AND DIRECT COORDINATION AMONG HIS SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO INSURE UNITY OF EFFORT IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF HIS OVERALL MISSION, OR TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF THE FORCE, AS PRESCRIBED IN JCS PUB 2."

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY DECISIONS IMPACTING JOINT DOCTRINE AND JTTP DEVELOPMENT

- **DOD REORGANIZATION ACT (SEP 86)**

- THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEVELOPING DOCTRINE FOR THE JOINT EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES

- **DOD DIRECTIVE 5100.1 (APR 87)**

- THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IS TASKED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY TO DEVELOP AND ESTABLISH DOCTRINE FOR ALL ASPECTS OF THE JOINT EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES
- THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WILL PROMULGATE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PUBLICATIONS (JCS PUBS) TO PROVIDE MILITARY GUIDANCE FOR JOINT ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES

- **JCS PUB 2 (DEC 86)**

- THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAS OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR JOINT DOCTRINE AND JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
- ALL JOINT DOCTRINE WILL BE COORDINATED WITH THE SERVICES, UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS, AND JOINT STAFF
- ALL JOINT DOCTRINE WILL BE APPROVED BY THE CJCS
- ALL JOINT DOCTRINE AND JTTP WILL BE PUBLISHED AS A DISTINCT FAMILY OF JCS PUBLICATIONS
- EACH SERVICE WILL ENSURE THAT ITS DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES ARE CONSISTENT WITH JOINT DOCTRINE ESTABLISHED BY THE CJCS

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

REORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT STAFF


- FORMED J-7 DIRECTORATE
- TRANSFERRED FUNCTIONS FROM OTHER DIRECTORATES ALONG WITH NEW FUNCTIONS
- RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANS, TRAINING, EXERCISES, EVALUATION, DOCTRINE, EDUCATION, AND INTEROPERABILITY NOW IN A SINGLE DIRECTORATE
- ESTABLISHED JOINT DOCTRINE CENTER UNDER J-7

JDC MISSION


The Joint Doctrine Center (JDC) will assist in improving the combat effectiveness of joint U.S. military forces and unified and specified commands through the analysis, development, and assessment of joint and combined doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

Support will be provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military services, unified and specified commands, and defense agencies.

IMPACT OF JOINT DOCTRINE



JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT



THE JOINT DOCTRINE MASTER PLAN

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

JOINT DOCTRINE MASTER PLAN

1. IDENTIFICATION OF KEY DOCTRINAL
VOIDS AND INITIATION OF PROJECTS
TO FILL THEM
2. DEVELOP NEW JOINT DOCTRINE
PUBLICATION HIERARCHY
3. NEW JOINT DOCTRINE
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

JDMP WORKING CONFERENCES RESULTS

AGREEMENT ON TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR JOINT DOCTRINE

11 ONGOING PROJECTS BROUGHT UNDER JDMP

108 INPUTS RECEIVED FROM CINCS, SERVICES

- FOLDED INTO 24 NEW AND 11 ONGOING PROJECTS

26 EXISTING JCS PUBS FOLDED INTO NEW SYSTEM

**6 MULTI-SERVICE PUBS (2 DIRECTLY, 4 AFTER UPDATE)
MOVED INTO THE JOINT SYSTEM)**

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

JOINT DOCTRINE PROJECTS SUMMARY

NEW PROJECTS

LA

NATIONAL DEFENSE DOCTRINE

J-7

DOCTRINE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF JOINT OPERATIONS

DIA

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

US ARMY

DOCTRINE FOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT OF JOINT OPERATIONS

J-4

DOCTRINE FOR PLANNING OF JOINT OPERATIONS

J-7

DOCTRINE FOR C3 SYSTEMS SUPPORT OF JOINT OPERATIONS

J-6

JTTP FOR JOINT CAMPAIGN PLANNING

US ARMY

DOCTRINE FOR AIRLIFT SUPPORT TO JOINT CONVENTIONAL OPS

TRANSCOM

JTTP FOR JTF PLANNING

J-7 (JDC)

JTTP FOR JOINT PORT OPERATIONS

TRANSCOM

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

SPACECOM

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

US ARMY

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

JOINT DOCTRINE PROJECTS SUMMARY (Cont)

NEW PROJECTS

LA

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS

US ARMY

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

USAF

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT FIRE SUPPORT

US ARMY

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

CINCSOC

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT REAR AREA OPERATIONS

US ARMY

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT CSAR

US NAVY

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT RECCE, SURV, TGTING & ACQ

USAF

JTTP FOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

USMC

JTTP FOR SEAD

USAF

DOCTRINE FOR TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

US ARMY

JTTP FOR BARRIERS, OBSTACLES & MINES

US ARMY

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

J-5

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

MULTI-SERVICE PUBLICATIONS TO BE INCORPORATED INTO THE JCS PUB SYSTEM

FM 31-11 / NWP 22B AFM 2-53 / LFM 01	DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS	US NAVY
FM 20-12 / NWP 22-6 AFR 75-6 / FMFM 4-2	AMPHIBIOUS EMBARKATION	USMC
FM 100-43 / NWP 30 AFM 2-54 / LFM 02	LANDING FORCE OPERATIONS	USMC
FM 100-28 / NWP 17 AFM 1-3 / LFM 04	AIRSPACE CONTROL OVER THE COMBAT ZONE	USAF
NWP 19 / FM 20-150 AFM 64-2 COMDINST M16130,2	NATIONAL SEARCH AND RESCUE MANUAL	J-7
FM 8-8 NAVMEC P-5047 AFM 160-20	MEDICAL SUPPORT IN JOINT OPERATIONS	USA

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

ONGOING PROJECTS BROUGHT UNDER THE JOINT DOCTRINE MASTER PLAN

DOCTRINE FOR JOINT LOGISTICS OVER THE SHORE	US NAVY
DOCTRINE FOR JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS (AIR) *	LANTCOM
DOCTRINE FOR JOINT C3CM**	J-3
DOCTRINE FOR JOINT FOLLOW ON FORCES ATTACK *	EUCOM
DOCTRINE FOR JOINT SPACE OPERATIONS	SPACECOM
JTTP FOR JAMMING OPERATIONS	J-3
JTTP FOR AMMO	J-4
JTTP FOR FUEL	J-4
JTTP FOR LASERS *	J-7
JTTP FOR HAVEQUICK	J-6
JTTP FOR SINGGARS	J-6

* TEST PUB

** APPROVED PUB

JOINT DOCTRINE MASTER PLAN TERMS OF REFERENCE

PURPOSE OF JOINT DOCTRINE -

**ENHANCE JOINT WARFIGHTING
CAPABILITY**

USES OF JOINT DOCTRINE -

GUIDE EMPLOYMENT OF JOINT FORCES

**PROVIDE NATIONAL POSITION FOR
COMBINED DOCTRINE**

DRIVE JOINT TRAINING

**PROVIDE INPUT FOR THE MILITARY
EDUCATION SYSTEM**

**INFORM US GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OF
JOINT FORCE EMPLOYMENT**

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

JOINT DOCTRINE MASTER PLAN TERMS OF REFERENCE (CONT)

JOINT DOCTRINE WRITTEN FOR -

**THOSE WHO PROVIDE STRATEGIC DIRECTION
TO JOINT FORCES (DOD, JCS)**

**THOSE WHO EMPLOY JOINT FORCES
(UNIFIED, SUB- UNIFIED & JTF CMDRS)**

**THOSE WHO ARE SUPPORTING OR ARE
BEING SUPPORTED (JTF, SPECIFIED,
COMPONENT CMDRS & SERVICES)**

**ORGANIZATIONS CAPABLE
OF DEVELOPING JOINT DOCTRINE**

**SERVICES, JOINT STAFF,
UNIFIED & SPECIFIED COMMANDS**

**JOINT DOCTRINE WRITTEN TO
REFLECT**

**EXTANT CAPABILITIES BUT MAY INFLUENCE
ACQUISITION AND JOINT FORCE
ORGANIZATION**

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

JOINT DOCTRINE MASTER PLAN TERMS OF REFERENCE (CONT)

JOINT TACTICS TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES ARE WRITTEN FOR THOSE WHO IMPLEMENT JOINT DOCTRINE:

- JOINT FORCE CMDRS**
 - COMPONENT CMDRS**
 - BELOW COMPONENT LEVEL WHERE JOINT FORCES INTERFACE**
- IN DEVELOPING JOINT DOCTRINE, EXISTANT SERVICE AND COMBINED DOCTRINE ARE CONSIDERED. ONCE APPROVED, JOINT DOCTRINE PROVIDES THE NATIONAL POSITION FOR COMBINED DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT. SERVICE DOCTRINE MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH APPROVED JOINT DOCTRINE AND WILL ALSO SERVE AS THE NATIONAL POSITION WHEN UNI-SERVICE ISSUES ARE INVOLVED IN COMBINED DOCTRINE.**


JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

JCS PUBLICATION 1-01


- APPROVED BY JCS
- APPROVED ALL PROJECTS
- APPROVED NEW ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHY
- APPROVED TERMS OF REFERENCE ESTABLISHING PURPOSE AND USES OF JOINT DOCTRINE
- APPROVED NEW JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS WHICH CLEARLY SEPARATES DOCTRINE FROM ADMINISTRATIVE PUBLICATIONS AND STANDARDIZES:
 - INITIATION OF PROJECTS
 - DEVELOPMENT OF PROJECTS
 - COORDINATION OF PROJECTS
 - EVALUATION OF PUBLICATIONS
 - APPROVAL OF PUBLICATIONS

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT


JOINT PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



JOINT PUBLICATION SYSTEM



JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT



JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT PLAYERS

- **LEAD AGENT (LA)**
- **PRIMARY REVIEW AUTHORITY (PRA)**
- **JOINT STAFF DOCTRINE SPONSOR (DS)**
- **COORDINATING REVIEW AUTHORITY (CRA)**
- **TECHNICAL REVIEW AUTHORITY (TRA)**

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

LEAD AGENT (LA)

- **CAN BE:
SERVICE
CINC
JOINT STAFF DIRECTORATE**
- **RESPONSIBLE FOR:
DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATION
REVIEW
MAINTENANCE**

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

PRIMARY REVIEW AUTHORITY (PRA)

ASSIGNED BY LA

**ACTUALLY DEVELOPS AND
MAINTAINS ASSIGNED PUBLICATION**

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

COORDINATING REVIEW AUTHORITY (CRA)

**EACH SERVICE, CINC, AND JOINT
STAFF ASSIGNS CRA**

**COORDINATES WITH AND ASSISTS
PRA IN DEVELOPMENT,
EVALUATION AND MAINTENANCE**

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

TECHNICAL REVIEW AUTHORITY (TRA)

**ANY COMMAND OTHER THAN
PRA OR CRA**

TECHNICAL EXPERTISE

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

JOINT STAFF DOCTRINE SPONSOR (DS)

ASSIST LA/PRA AS DIRECTED
COORDINATE DRAFT DOCUMENT WITH
JOINT STAFF

PROCESS FINAL DOCUMENT FOR
APPROVAL IAW JCS MOP 197

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT PROPOSAL

- SERVICES**
- UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS**
- JOINT STAFF DIRECTORATES**

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

JOINT DOCTRINE WORKING PARTY

**FORUM FOR SYSTEMATIC ADDRESSAL OF JOINT DOCTRINE/
JTTP ISSUES**

**CHAIRER BY THE JOINT DOCTRINE AND EDUCATION
DIVISION, J-7**

**CONSISTS OF ONE REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH SERVICE
AND UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMAND**

MEETS SEMI-ANNUALLY AT THE JOINT DOCTRINE CENTER

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM DIRECTIVE

- BACKGROUND
- SCOPE
- EXISTING RELEVANT SERVICE, JOINT,
AND COMBINED DOCTRINE
TO BE CONSIDERED
- OTHER SOURCES
- MILESTONES
- COORDINATION
- EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT DEVELOPMENT

- LEAD AGENT ASSIGNS PRIMARY REVIEW AUTHORITY
- CINCS/SERVICES SUPPLY COORDINATION
- INITIAL AND FINAL DRAFT CIRCULATED
- LEAD AGENT FORWARDS TO DIRECTOR, J-7,
WITH UNRESOLVED ISSUES


JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

TEST PUBLICATION

- SERVICES NOTIFIED**
- DIRECTOR, J-7 APPROVES**
- APPROVED FOR EVALUATION**
- USE AS INTERIM DOCTRINE ON CASE BY CASE BASIS**


JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

STEPS IN DEVELOPING A NEW JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION



JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

STEPS IN REVISING A JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION



Develop Initial Draft

The original publication may have to be revised during this stage to bring it in line with the Program Directive.

Develop Final Draft

A working conference may have to be conducted to resolve outstanding issues during this stage.

A final working conference may have to be conducted to resolve any remaining outstanding issues during this step.

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT PRIORITIZATION

INITIATE NEW PROJECTS

A. CATEGORY I

- NATIONAL DEFENSE DOCTRINE
- INTELL SUPPORT OF JOINT OPNS
- JOINT OPERATIONS
- LOGISTICS SUPPORT OF JOINT OPNS
- JOINT PLANNING
- C3 SYSTEMS SUPPORT OF JOINT OPNS
- LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
- SPECIAL OPERATIONS
- INTERDICTION
- JTF PLANNING *
- CAMPAIGN PLANNING **

* TEST PUBLICATION .. INCLUDED IN PUB 3-0
JOINT OPERATIONS

LA
J-7
DIA
USA
J-4
J-7
J-6
USA
CINCSOC
USAF
J-7
USA

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT PRIORITIZATION (CONT)

B. CATEGORY II

- JOINT BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE	CINCSpace
- JOINT CHEMICAL OPERATIONS	USA
- JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS	J-5
- AIRLIFT SUPPORT TO JOINT CONV OPNS	CINCTRANS
- JOINT FIRE SUPPORT	USA
- JOINT REAR AREA OPERATIONS	USA
- JOINT COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE	USN
- JOINT RECON, SURV, TGTING & ACQ	USAF
- TAC BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE	USA
- JTTP FOR PORT OPERATIONS	CINCTRANS
- JTTP FOR SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEF	USAF
- JTTP FOR BARR, OBST, AND MINES	USA
- JTTP FOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES	USMC
- JOINT EVASION AND RECOVERY	USAF

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

ONGOING DOCTRINE PROJECTS

DOCTRINE PROJECT

LA

NATIONAL DEFENSE DOCTRINE

J - 7

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

DIA

JOINT OPERATIONS

USA

INTERDICTION

USAF

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

SOCOM

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

USA

LOGISTICS SUPPORT

J - 4

PLANNING OF JOINT OPERATIONS

J - 7

C3 SYSTEMS SUPPORT

J - 6

SPACE OPERATIONS

SPACECOM

JOINT LOGISTICS OVER THE SHORE

USN

JTTP FOR JAMMING

J - 3

JTTP FOR FUEL

J - 4

JTTP FOR HAVEQUICK

J - 6

JTTP FOR SINGGARS

J - 6


JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

TEST PUBLICATIONS BEING EVALUATED

<u>DOCTRINE PROJECT</u>	<u>LA</u>	<u>DATE APPROVED</u> <u>AS TEST PUBLICATION</u>
INTERDICTION OF FOLLOW - ON FORCES	USEUCOM	JUN 88
JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS (AIR)	USLANTCOM	MAY 88
* JOINT RIVERINE OPERATIONS	USN	AUG 88
JTTP FOR LASERS	J - 7	JUN 88
JTF PLANNING GUIDANCE & PROCEDURES	J - 7	MAY 88

* JOINT RIVERINE OPERATIONS WAS AN EXISTING JCS PUBLICATION THAT
WAS UNDERGOING REVISION WHEN BROUGHT UNDER THE
JOINT DOCTRINE MASTER PLAN

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT



DEFINITIONS

JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

THE ACTIONS AND METHODS WHICH IMPLEMENT JOINT DOCTRINE AND DESCRIBE HOW FORCES WILL BE EMPLOYED IN JOINT OPERATIONS. THEY WILL BE PROMULGATED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

MULTI - SERVICE DOCTRINE

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDE THE EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES OF TWO OR MORE SERVICES OF THE SAME NATION IN COORDINATED ACTION TOWARD A COMMON OBJECTIVE. IT IS PROMULGATED IN MULTI - SERVICES PUBLICATIONS THAT IDENTIFY THE PARTICIPATING SERVICES, e.g., ARMY - NAVY DOCTRINE.

FUTURE

- **COMPLETE ALL CAPSTONE / KEYSTONE PROJECTS**
- **CONSOLIDATE AS MANY PUBS AND DOCUMENTS AS POSSIBLE**
- **DELETE UNNEEDED DOCTRINE PUBS AND DOCUMENTS**
- **ENSURE CONSISTENCY OF ALL JOINT PUBLICATIONS AND DOCUMENTS**
- **BRING ALL PUBLICATIONS UP TO DATE**
- **INITIATE ALL CATEGORY II PROJECTS**

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

FUTURE (Cont)

- ESTABLISH A COMPUTERIZED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
- ESTABLISH A JOINT DOCTRINE COMPUTER NETWORK
- REFINE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
- REVIEW SERVICE / COMBINED DOCTRINE FOR CONSISTENCY WITH JOINT DOCTRINE
- ASSIST SERVICE SCHOOLS AND SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES IN JOINT WARFIGHTING CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

PUBLICATION	1989												1990								
	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S
CAT I PROJECTS																					
CAPSTONE 0-1 J-7								I				F		T							
INTELLIGENCE 2-0 DIA				I					F						T						
OPERATIONS 3-0 USA				F					T												
LOGISTICS 4-0 J-4					I			F					T								
JOINT PLANNING 5-0 J-7						I				F					T						
C3 6-0 J-6					F						T										
INTERDICTION 3-03 USAF				I			F					T									
SPECIAL OPNS 3-05 SOCOM				I			F					T									
LIC 3-07 USA				I			F					T									
OTHER ONGOING																					
LAND FOR OPS* 3-02.1 USMC						T															
SPACE OP** 3-14 SPACOM					I						F					T					
AIRSPA CON* 3-52 USAF									I				F						T		
JTTP AMMO** 4-00.2 J-4			TBA																		
JTTP FUEL** 4-00.3 J-4					T																
JLOTS** 4-03 USN				T																	
MEDICAL OPNS* 4-05 USA			TBA																		
JTTP HAVEQK** 6-06.1 J-6			TBA																		
JTTP SINGGAR** 6-06.2 J-6			TBA																		
* MULTI-SERVICE PUBS BROUGHT UNDER JCS PUB SYSTEM																					
** ONGOING PROJECTS BROUGHT UNDER JCS PUB SYSTEM																					
I - INITIAL DRAFT F - FINAL DRAFT T - TEST PUB																					

A-9

PACIFIC PEACETIME STRATEGY

BRIEFING FOR

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT PLANNING POLICY WORKSHOP

HAMPTON VIRGINIA

13 DECEMBER 1988

SLIDE 1: PACOM

SLIDE 2: PACOM AOR

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN THE PACIFIC TODAY IS ONE THAT GENERATES CONSIDERABLE CHALLENGE. THE SHEER SIZE OF THE AREA, ABOUT HALF THE EARTH'S SURFACE, STRETCHING ACROSS THIRTEEN TIME ZONES FROM THE WEST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE EAST COAST OF AFRICA, CREATES ENORMOUS OPERATIONAL, PLANNING, AND COORDINATION CHALLENGES. THE PACIFIC COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY INCLUDES OVER 50 NATIONS AND TERRITORIES WITH NEARLY TWO-THIRDS OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION AND NOT INSIGNIFICANTLY, SEVEN OF THE WORLD'S TEN LARGEST ARMED FORCES.

TWO WORDS, CHANGE AND DIVERSITY, BEST CHARACTERIZE THE AREA TODAY.

WHILE CHANGE IS BY NO MEANS UNIQUE TO PACOM, THE SPEED OF THAT CHANGE IS UNIQUE -- CONSIDER THAT IN THE LAST 14 YEARS, 12 NEW NATION'S HAVE EMERGED FROM FORMER COLONIES AND TRUST TERRITORIES. ECONOMICALLY, THE GROWTH OF MANY PACIFIC NATIONS SETS THE PACE FOR THE WORLD -- SEVERAL NATIONS HAVE SUSTAINED GROWTH RATES IN EXCESS OF 7 PERCENT.

DIVERSITY IS THE OTHER CHARACTERISTIC. THE FIFTY PLUS NATIONS AND TERRITORIES INCLUDE SOME OF THE WEALTHIEST AND MOST TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED ECONOMIES OF THE WORLD AS WELL AS MANY THAT ARE POOR, UNDEVELOPED, OR SINGLE CROP AGRARIAN ECONOMIES.

THE AREA INCLUDES ONE OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST COUNTRIES, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH ITS BILLION PLUS INHABITANTS, AS WELL AS TINY TUVALU, A PACIFIC ISLAND NATION OF SOME TEN SQUARE MILES AND ABOUT 7,000 INHABITANTS. THE PACIFIC POLITICAL SPECTRUM INCLUDES SOME OF THE WORLD'S MOST PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACIES AS WELL AS SOME OF THE MOST REPRESSIVE TOTALITARIAN REGIMES.

THIS DYNAMIC AND DIVERSE ENVIRONMENT HAS IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR PACIFIC STRATEGY. LET ME BRIEFLY DISCUSS FOUR ASPECTS OF THAT ENVIRONMENT.

SLIDE 3: MISSION

FIRST IS OUR MISSION, SHOWN HERE, WHICH IS BROAD IN SCOPE AND DICTATES A SPECTRUM OF CONCERNS THAT SPANS THE ENTIRE REGION.

SECOND IS THE NATURE OF THE THREAT -- IT IS NOT SINGULAR OR MONOLITHIC AND STRETCHES ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT FROM NUCLEAR DETERRENCE TO LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. IN FACT, GIVEN RECENT SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THE REGION, THE THREAT EXTENDS BELOW LEVELS OF CONFLICT TO WHAT IS TERMED "PEACEFUL COMPETITION" AMONG STATES.

THIRD IS THE DIVERSITY IN PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT. WHILE OUR PRIMARY FOCUS IS ON THE THREAT POSED BY THE SOVIET UNION, THAT IS NOT NECESSARILY THE CASE FOR MANY OF OUR PACIFIC FRIENDS.

A FOURTH ELEMENT OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IS THE DIVERSITY IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND RESULTING POTENTIAL TO CONTRIBUTE TO PACIFIC SECURITY -- MANY NATIONS DO NOT EVEN HAVE A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN OUR SENSE OF THE TERM, BUT RELY ON LOCAL POLICE FORCES FOR THEIR DEFENSE NEEDS.

IN A PRACTICAL SENSE, THESE DIVERSITIES HAVE DICTATED A RELIANCE ON BILATERAL RATHER THAN MULTILATERAL DEFENSE RELATIONSHIPS. MILITARILY, THE PACIFIC COMMAND THUS BECOMES THE COMMON DENOMINATOR.

SLIDE 4: STRATEGY CIRCLES

TO DEAL WITH THIS ENVIRONMENT, WE HAVE DEVELOPED THREE INTERWOVEN PARTS TO OUR PACIFIC STRATEGY: WARFIGHTING, PEACETIME, AND MULTINATIONAL.

THE WARFIGHTING COMPONENT OF OUR STRATEGY IS FOCUSED ON THE HIGH END OF THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT AND DESIGNED TO ASSURE WE CAN MEET OUR PRIORITY MISSION -- DETERRENCE. THE STRATEGY IS BASED UPON MAINTAINING COMBAT READY FORCES AT FORWARD BASES. IN A CRISIS, WE PLAN TO REINFORCE THOSE FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES TO SIGNAL RESOLVE TO OUR ALLIES AND THE SOVIETS, THEREBY STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE AND AT THE SAME TIME OPTIMIZING OUR POSITIONING SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL.

BRIEFLY, OUR WARFIGHTING STRATEGY CALLS FOR FORWARD DEPLOYED AND AUGMENTING FORCES TO AID OUR ALLIES IN DEFENSE AND TO CONDUCT SWIFT AND EARLY STRIKES TO DESTROY SOVIET POWER PROJECTION FORCES WHICH COULD THREATEN STRATEGIC AIR AND SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND CRUCIAL STRAITS. WE INTEND TO CARRY THE WAR TO THE SOVIETS, IN NORTHEAST ASIA AND THE NORTHWEST PACIFIC. OF GREATER INTEREST TO OUR PURPOSES HERE IS THE PEACETIME COMPONENT OF OUR STRATEGY WHICH ADDRESSES THE BROADER SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT AND CONCERN INHERENT IN OUR MISSION. MUCH OF THE PEACETIME STRATEGY FOCUSES ON WHAT IS SOMETIMES REFERRED TO AS PEACEFUL COMPETITION AMONG STATES.

THE PEACETIME STRATEGY RECOGNIZES THAT MILITARY FORCES CAN SERVE FAR MORE THAN DETERRENCE AND WARFIGHTING NEEDS. IT PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR PEACETIME EMPLOYMENT OF USPACOM FORCES TO ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVES SHOWN HERE:

SLIDE 5: OBJECTIVES

THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE BEHIND THE STRATEGY IS THAT EACH PACIFIC NATION CAN CONTRIBUTE IN SOME WAY TO PACIFIC SECURITY AND TO THE WARFIGHTING COMPONENT OF OUR STRATEGY, AND THAT WE MUST ENCOURAGE THEM TO DO THAT. THE THRUST OF THE PEACETIME STRATEGY IS TO PROMOTE REALISTIC, INCREMENTAL CHANGE, AND TO ENCOURAGE OTHER NATIONS TO ADOPT ROLES AND MISSIONS WHICH WILL AT LEAST ^{of the spectrum of conflict} COMPLEMENT OUR WARFIGHTING STRATEGY. AT THE HIGH ^{END} ~~END~~ ^{FOR THESE} COUNTRIES THAT CAN MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION, WE SEEK TO ENCOURAGE DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN ~~THE WARFIGHTING STRATEGY~~ ^{our defensive} THROUGH COMBINED MILITARY EXERCISES DESIGNED TO IMPROVE OUR

ABILITY TO FIGHT TOGETHER IN DEFENSE OF MUTUAL INTERESTS. A LESSER BUT STILL IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION IS TO ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIABLE SELF-DEFENSE, THUS RELEASING U. S. FORCES FOR OTHER WARFIGHTING MISSIONS. AS A MINIMUM, WE HOPE TO FOSTER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNAL STABILITY TO REDUCE THE RISK OF LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT.

OUR STRATEGY ALSO IDENTIFIES THE METHODS AND RESOURCES FOR ACCOMPLISHING OUR OBJECTIVES AND REGIONAL GOALS.

SLIDE 6: METHODS

THE METHODS WHICH SUPPORT THE STRATEGY GO BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES. THE PEACETIME STRATEGY IS A GUIDE FOR USING MILITARY RESOURCES IN WAYS THAT ENHANCE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH MAJOR ALLIES, AND IN WAYS THAT EXHIBIT TO DEVELOPING NATIONS THE BENEFITS THAT ACCRUE FROM A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. BY CAREFUL EMPLOYMENT OF RESOURCES, TAILORED TO MEET THE SPECIFIC NEEDS OF EACH NATION, WE PROVIDE A POSITIVE EXAMPLE OF OUR CONCERN AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO CONTRIBUTE TO PACIFIC STABILITY AND SECURITY.

SLIDE 7: RESOURCES

THE FISCAL RESOURCES NEEDED TO EXECUTE THIS STRATEGY ARE FUNDED PRIMARILY FROM EXISTING COMPONENT SERVICE OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE ACCOUNTS. UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, FUNDING ASSISTANCE CAN BE GRANTED BY USCINCPAC CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 10 AS AMENDED BY THE 1987 DOD AUTHORIZATION ACT.

IN MAJOR DISASTER RELIEF EXERCISES, STATE DEPARTMENT AND HOST NATION FUNDS MAY BE USED IN A COORDINATED EFFORT TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EXERCISE. REIMBURSEMENT IS ALSO AVAILABLE WHEN DOD ASSETS PERFORM OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF, OR ON BEHALF OF, OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES SUCH AS THE U. S. OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE.

OTHER RESOURCES ARE:

SECURITY ASSISTANCE, TO INCLUDE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AND INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS.

SLIDE 8: CB'S SLIDE

ENGINEERING TEAMS, SUCH AS NAVY SEABEES, AIR FORCE PRIME BEEF ^{which} TEAMS, ARMY ENGINEER BATTALIONS, AND USMC ENGINEER FORCES CAN BE USED FOR RECONSTRUCTION EXERCISES FOLLOWING DISASTERS. ^

CIVIC ACTION TEAMS, SUCH AS THOSE LOCATED AT PALAU, YAP, THE ^{Republic of the} MARSHAL ISLANDS, TRUK, POHNPEI, AND KOSRAE.

SLIDE 9: MERCY

MEDICAL CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS, MEDICAL READINESS TRAINING EXERCISES, HOSPITAL SHIP DEPLOYMENTS, AND MEDICAL TRAINING SEMINARS.

SLIDE 10: ARMY

AND RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD UNIT TRAINING EXERCISES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

THE DIVERSITY OF PACIFIC NATIONS IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY CAPABILITY, THREAT PERCEPTION AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES, DICTATES THAT THE PEACETIME STRATEGY BE TAILORED TO EACH INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY.

THE MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY DOCUMENT PROVIDES THAT TAILORING AND SERVES AS A PLANNING GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACETIME STRATEGY. FOR EACH COUNTRY, IT PROVIDES AN ASSESSMENT, A STATEMENT OF POTENTIAL AND DESIRED CONTRIBUTION TO PACIFIC SECURITY AND DETAILED GOALS FOR OUR PEACETIME STRATEGY.

I'D LIKE TO SPEND JUST A FEW MINUTES DISCUSSING OUR METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING PRIORITIES AMONG THE NATIONS AND DEVELOPING THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY GOALS.

WE HAVE FOUND IT HELPFUL TO MAKE AN ESTIMATE OF A NATION'S POTENTIAL TO CONTRIBUTE TO PACIFIC SECURITY. WE SEE THIS "CONTRIBUTION POTENTIAL" AS A FUNCTION OF THE FOUR FACTORS SHOWN HERE:

SLIDE 11: FOUR FACTORS

UNDERLYING THE ANALYSIS IS ALSO AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NATION'S ECONOMY.

PLEASE NOTE THAT THE FIRST TWO FACTORS, MILITARY FORCE AND GEOGRAPHIC POSITION, ARE RELATED IN THE SENSE THAT THEY BOTH ADDRESS THE NATION'S PHYSICAL CAPACITY TO ACT; AND THAT THE SECOND TWO, IDEOLOGY AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE U. S., PERTAIN TO THE NATION'S WILL OR DESIRE TO ACT.

SLIDE 12: GRAPH

WE CAN ILLUSTRATE THE TWO FEATURES USING A CONTRIBUTION POTENTIAL GRAPH. THE VERTICAL AXIS REPRESENTS AN AGGREGATE MEASURE OF PHYSICAL CAPACITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO U. S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND THE HORIZONTAL AXIS REPRESENTS THE EXTENT OF A COUNTRY'S WILL TO CONTRIBUTE.

FOR EXAMPLE, WE WOULD PLACE A COUNTRY SUCH AS KOREA IN THE FAR UPPER RIGHT CORNER, *representing high capacity and important location as well as strong cooperation.*

THE RATING OR RANKING PROCEDURE IS ADMITTEDLY SUBJECTIVE. HOWEVER, IT IS VERY USEFUL AS A QUICK REFERENCE OF RELATIVE POSTURES AND INVARIABLY STIMULATES DISCUSSION AMONG THOSE WHO USE AND REVIEW IT.

SLIDE 13: PLOT

SHOWN HERE ARE THE SAMPLE PLOTS OF A REPRESENTATIVE ^{Assortment} ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONS IN THE THEATER. FOR CONVENIENCE WE HAVE DIVIDED THE FIELD INTO THREE SEPARATE ZONES: HIGH, MODERATE, AND LOW POTENTIAL TO CONTRIBUTE TO U. S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES. THE EXACT DIVISION IS ADMITTEDLY SUBJECTIVE, AS ARE THE ACTUAL PLOTS OF THE COUNTRIES ON BOTH THE VERTICAL (CAPACITY), AND HORIZONTAL (COOPERATION) AXES.

JAPAN AND ^{Australia} ~~KOREA~~ WOULD NATURALLY OCCUPY HIGH POSITIONS IN OVERALL POTENTIAL. THERE ARE COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE PHILIPPINES WHICH ALSO HAVE HIGH POTENTIAL, NOT BECAUSE OF PHYSICAL POWER, BUT BECAUSE OF A CONTINUING STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. ^{Yes} ~~A~~ COUNTRIES ^{would be} ~~ARE~~ SUCH AS CHINA ^{ARE} IN THE HIGH ZONE BECAUSE OF VERY SIGNIFICANT GEOGRAPHIC POSITION AND HUGE MILITARY FORCES, EVEN THOUGH IT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U. S. IS STILL EMERGING.

COUNTRIES IN THE LOWER LEFT OF THE CHART, IN THE LOW POTENTIAL ZONE, HAVE NEITHER THE PROPENSITY NOR THE CAPABILITY TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS. WHILE USPACOM HAS IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES FOR SOME OF THESE COUNTRIES, WE DON'T EXPECT MUCH OF A RESPONSE.

THE COUNTRIES SHOWN IN THE CENTRAL, OR MODERATE ZONE OCCUPY A SPECIAL POSITION IN OUR STRATEGY. MOVEMENT UPWARD OR TO THE RIGHT COULD GIVE THEM A HIGH POTENTIAL TO CONTRIBUTE TO PACIFIC SECURITY. IN THEORY, THESE COUNTRIES OFFER THE BEST RETURN FOR WHATEVER TIME, EFFORT AND RESOURCES WE INVEST.

IN ADDITION TO REFLECTING RELATIVE POTENTIAL, WE USE THE HORIZONTAL DIMENSION OF THIS CHART TO SUGGEST HOW WE CAN APPROACH COUNTRIES, IN AS MUCH AS COOPERATION WITH THE U. S. IS THE MOST RELEVANT FACTOR IN THAT DIMENSION.

- NATIONS WHICH WE SHOW ON THE EXTREME RIGHT ARE THOSE WITH WHICH WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO IMPLEMENT INTEGRATED ^{defense} PLANS TO COUNTER AGREED-UPON THREATS. HOWEVER, MANY NATIONS IN ASIA, PARTICULARLY THE NON-ALIGNED, ARE VERY SENSITIVE TO THE TERM "COALITION," SO WE EMPHASIZE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS.

- NATIONS FARTHER TO THE LEFT ARE THOSE WHICH WE CAN ~~BE~~ APPROACHED WITH COOPERATIVE OR PARALLEL COURSES OF ACTION.

- FOR THOSE COUNTRIES ON THE FAR LEFT THE MOST PRODUCTIVE APPROACH MIGHT BE UNILATERAL EFFORTS, FREQUENTLY WITHOUT DIALOGUE, TO FOSTER COMMON AIMS SO THAT AT LEAST OUR EFFORTS ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE.

- I SAID AT THE OUTSET THAT THIS PROCESS WAS SOMEWHAT SUBJECTIVE BUT NEVERTHELESS, IT HAS BEEN A USEFUL TOOL TO STIR DISCUSSION AND TO ASSIGN PRIORITIES TO OUR PEACETIME EFFORTS, AS IT GRAPHICALLY PORTRAYS WHERE THE GREATEST POTENTIAL LIES.

AFTER EXAMINING EACH COUNTRY'S INDIVIDUAL SITUATION, WE SELECT SPECIFIC SECURITY GOALS TO WHICH WE FEEL A COUNTRY CAN CONTRIBUTE. WE THEN LIST ROLES AND MISSIONS WE WOULD LIKE THEM TO PURSUE. ONCE COUNTRY ROLES ARE ASSIGNED, THE ASSESSMENT LISTS USCINCPAC MILITARY RESOURCES AND PROGRAMS AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT AND FOSTER ACHIEVING THOSE ROLES.

GIVEN THE VOLATILE ENVIRONMENT OF THE PACIFIC, COORDINATING, MONITORING AND UPDATING OUR ASSESSMENT AND INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY PROGRAMS IS A CHALLENGE. WE HAVE RECENTLY BEGUN A SERIES OF QUARTERLY MEETINGS WITH THE ACTION OFFICERS AT CINCPAC AND THE COMPONENT COMMANDS TO REVIEW EACH COUNTRY AND RECOMMEND CHANGES TO A FLAG LEVEL BOARD. AS PART OF THIS PROCESS, WE UPDATE STATUS MATRICES TO REFLECT ONGOING PROGRAMS. THIS PROCEDURE IS USEFUL TO SURFACE INITIATIVES THAT MAY OTHERWISE BE OVERLOOKED. FURTHERMORE, IT PROVIDES AN UPDATE OF ONGOING ACTIONS AND PROGRAMS WHICH, WHEN ONE CONSIDERS ALL THE STAFFS AND AGENCIES INVOLVED, CAN BE EXTENSIVE.

SLIDE 14: MATRIX

THIS MATRIX SHOWS MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES VERSUS INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES FOR A PARTICULAR REGION IN OUR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. THIS IS USEFUL NOT ONLY IN PROVIDING A GRAPHIC SNAPSHOT OF WHERE WE ARE, BUT ALSO IN SUGGESTING WHERE WE CAN APPLY FUTURE EFFORTS. I SHOW IT HERE BECAUSE IT LISTS PROGRAMS WHICH ARE RELEVANT NOT ONLY TO LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, BUT ALSO PROACTIVE TO DISCOURAGE SUCH CONFLICT FROM EMERGING.

IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT DEAL WITH LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AS A SEPARATE ISSUE, BUT RATHER AS PART OF OUR INTEGRATED STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH ONGOING AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS IN THE PACIFIC.

SLIDE 15: PEACETIME STRATEGY

In summary

THE PEACETIME/MULTINATIONAL PORTION OF OUR PACIFIC STRATEGY HAS SERVED US WELL. IT HAS BEEN A RISK REDUCTION MEASURE, HAS FURTHERED OUR DETERRENCE POSTURE, AND HAS SUPPORTED OUR WARFIGHTING PLANS. *We offer it as our roadmap for peace and stability in the Pacific*

USPACOM

PEACETIME

STRATEGY

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND


MISSION:

■ SUPPORT U.S. POLICIES AND SECURITY THROUGHOUT OUR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR). WE ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION BY:

- DETERRING THE THREAT, PRESERVING PEACE, AND PROVIDING FOR THE SECURITY OF U.S., ALLIED, AND FRIENDLY NATIONS WITHIN OUR AOR; AND,
- IF WAR COMES, DEFEATING THE ENEMY AND TERMINATING THE WAR ON TERMS FAVORABLE TO THE U.S., ITS ALLIES AND FRIENDS.

USCINCPAC STRATEGY

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

J0015(065)/J00.1485/8

OBJECTIVES

UNCLASSIFIED

A-130

- ENHANCE U.S. MILITARY PREPAREDNESS
- STRENGTHEN ALLIANCES
- EXPAND U.S. INFLUENCE
- AID IN NATION BUILDING

J5(055)/J55 0560/6

UNCLASSIFIED

METHODS

UNCLASSIFIED

- MILITARY EXERCISES
- INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE
- HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION EXERCISES
- MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
- MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
- SHIP VISITS
- HIGH LEVEL MILITARY VISITS
- CONFERENCES/SEMINARS AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
- MILITARY SALES

UNCLASSIFIED

J0019(065)/J00.1485/11

RESOURCES

(DOLLARS AND UNITS)

UNCLASSIFIED

- COMPONENT SERVICES O&M FUNDS
- TITLE 10
- STATE DEPARTMENT & HOST NATION
- SECURITY ASSISTANCE
- ENGINEERING TEAMS
- CIVIC ACTION TEAMS
- MEDICAL TEAMS
- RESERVE/NG UNITS


J001S(065)/J00.1405/12

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTRIBUTION POTENTIAL

- MILITARY CAPABILITIES
- GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION
- POLITICAL ORIENTATION
- RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S.

CONTRIBUTION POTENTIAL



CONTRIBUTION
CAPABILITY




POTENTIAL FOR DEFENSE COOPERATION IN RELATIONSHIP

NON INTERFERENCE
COURSES OF ACTION

PARALLEL
COURSES OF ACTION

COALITION
COURSES OF ACTION

CONTRIBUTION POTENTIAL



CONTRIBUTION
CAPABILITY

OCEANA																			
ELEMENTS	AUSTRALIA	COOK ISLS	FED ST MICRO	FJI	KIRIBATI	MARSHALL ISLS	NAURU	NEW ZEALAND	NEW CALEDONIA	NIUE	PALAU	PAPUA N G	POMPEI	SOLOMON ISLS	TONGA	TUVALU	VANUATU	WESTERN SAMOA	REMARKS
HUMANITARIAN ASSIST																			
DISASTER RELIEF																			
MEDICAL ASSIST																			
CIVIC ASSIST																			
CAT TEAM																			
IMET																			
TITLE 10 FUNDS																			
FMS CREDIT																			
FMS																			
SECURITY ASST																			
MOBILE TRAINING																			
CONFERENCES SEMINARS																			
CINC VISIT																			
HIGH-LEVEL VISIT																			
STAFF OFFICER EXC																			
UNIT EXCHANGES																			
BILAT TASKS																			
SHIPS VISIT																			
DATT ASSIGNED																			
CINCPACREP ASSIGNED																			
MUTUAL DEF TREATY																			
STATUS OF FORCE AGMT																			
HOST NATION SUPPORT																			
BASING AGREEMENT																			
JOINT FACILITIES																			
COMM FACILITIES																			
INTEL EXCHANGE																			
MARITIME SURV																			
STAND INTEROP AGMT																			
PUBLIC INFO AFFAIRS																			
EXERCISES																			
COMPONENT PROGRAMS																			
PACAF																			
WESTCOM																			
PACFLT																			
FMFPAC																			

FIGURE C-4

J5213/J5 1687/1

SL OF 14

PEACETIME STRATEGY

UNCLASSIFIED

- STRATEGY FOR DAY-TO-DAY ACTIVITIES
- GUIDANCE FOR EMPLOYMENT
- ALL FORCES OPERATING IN THEATER
- A ROADMAP FOR PEACE AND STABILITY

A-137

UNCLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
QUARRY HEIGHTS, PANAMA

10 AUG 1988

SCCS

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: USCINCSO Priority Actions Agenda

1. The attached agenda is an outgrowth of the Mission Analysis process. Divided into three time phases, it comprises USSOUTHCOM staff coordinated issues and areas on which USCINCSO and USSOUTHCOM are to focus energies and resources.
2. The USSOUTHCOM staff and component commanders will use the agenda as a guidepost to establish the relative priority of their respective efforts. The agenda will serve to ensure all elements of USSOUTHCOM have a common set of goals and are expending the appropriate amount of resources to achieve those goals.
3. The Priority Actions Agenda will be reviewed during Directors' meetings, as necessary, and Component Commanders' Conferences. The Office of the Chief of Staff, USSOUTHCOM will retain responsibility for changes to the agenda. SCJ5 will retain responsibility for distribution of the agenda.

RICHARD C. USTICK
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

Atch

DISTRIBUTION:

E

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Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command South, Albrook AS, Panama
Commander, Joint Task Force Bravo, Palmerola AB, Honduras

CF:

Commander, USAF Southern Air Division, Howard AFB, Panama

USCINCSO SHORT TERM PRIORITY ACTIONS AGENDA

CINC TOP PRIORITIES (6 MONTHS) - no priority order intended:

1. Identify the consequences of Sandinista non-compliance with announced agreements and their impact on Latin America and DOD resources.

2. Develop the warfighting capability of the staff using selected OPLANS/CONPLANS as vehicles for training, exercising, role definition, communications, intelligence, and logistics.

3. Fully develop and institutionalize the USSOUTHCOM Strategy System to include the Regional Security Strategy, the Missions, Tasks, and Responsibilities, the Programming Guidance, the USSOUTHCOM Campaign Plan, the Strategic Priorities List, and the Priority Actions Agenda.

4. Protect security assistance levels for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and work to increase levels elsewhere in the region.

5. Continue to develop plans and be prepared for decisive action in the current Panama crisis.

6. Develop a strategy to ensure that critical U.S. national security interests in the USSOUTHCOM AOR are conveyed to and receive appropriate consideration and resourcing by the new U.S. administration and the Washington community.

a. Update the USSOUTHCOM threat, strategy, action plans, and resources requirements.

b. Identify the key audiences and issues.

c. Deliver the message in conjunction with the ongoing war of information action plan.

12 MONTH GOALS - in priority order:

1. Develop functional strategies and action plans to assist regional governments in consolidation of their democracy with priority to El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia.

2. Continue to plan for treaty implementation.

a. Develop a framework planning architecture for future TIP actions and decision points.

b. Develop stationing criteria and begin evaluating/eliminating potential sites.

c. Develop new facility requirements.

d. Publish public affairs guidance about and continue efforts to declassify TIP.

.. 3. Develop a counterdrug strategy based on emerging responsibilities for DOD.

4. Validate the FY 89 exercises/training program vis-a-vis USCINCSO strategy, plans, and missions.

5. Develop a wide-ranging war of information action plan to inform the U.S. political and military leadership and the civilian public of USSOUTHCOM'S mission, role, and strategy in Latin America.

6. Continue emphasizing the resource requirements of the Command in the POM/Budget process.

a. Be prepared to respond to the annual Congressional Appropriations cycle through an adjusted budget submission.

b. Develop fully supported requirements for CINC initiatives to be included in the next POM cycle.

7. Improve C3 within USSOUTHCOM through the activation of the WWMCCS Information Network (WIN) and the Central American Regional Communications Network (ROC 1-84).

8. Continue to assess the impact of the DOD Reorganization Act and determine ways to fully exploit its effects for USSOUTHCOM mission accomplishment.

9. Institutionalize and continue to exercise the USSOUTHCOM Crisis Action Team.

10. Man, equip, and deploy the DJTF.

11. Develop a long-range intelligence collection management strategy to satisfy the command theater collection and analysis requirements into and through the 1990's.

12-24 MONTH GOALS - no priority order intended:

1. Improve the professional development, facilities, family support, and quality of life of the personnel assigned to USSOUTHCOM.

2. Establish a modern, integrated command and control center with necessary facilities, automated data processing (ADP)/office automation (OA), executive aids, and security to support operational activities within the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

3. Develop the FY 92-96 POM to properly resource USSOUTHCOM'S regional and country strategies.

4. Seek alternative methods to accomplish our security assistance programs in view of minimal funding and flexibility.

5. Continue to develop plans for the reestablishment of an effective bilateral military-to-military relationship with the PDF, contingent upon the restoration of the democratic process within Panama.

6. Proactively develop and initiate innovative and creative activities not dependent upon security assistance funding which focus on the building of favorable relationships with friendly nations.

USSOUTHCOM REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (RSS)
EDITORIAL GUIDE

PURPOSE: To help the USSOUTHCOM staff produce strategies which are realistic, concise, comprehensive, and consistent in content and style.

WHAT IS STRATEGY? Essentially strategy is an orderly conception of where you're trying to go and how you're planning to get there. It consists primarily of three main elements, ends, ways, and means. [for an official definition of strategy, refer to JCS Pub 1]

- **Ends:** the terms ends, objectives, goals, aims, targets, destinations, end-products, purposes, and desired outcomes are interchangeable. What is your purpose? What are you trying to get done? For clarity, the RSS will use the term objectives.

- **Ways:** the term "ways" is interchangeable with methods, policies, courses of action, concepts, and tools. How do you go about getting the job done? What is your way of proceeding to get to your objectives? The RSS will use the term methods.

- **Means:** the term "means" is interchangeable with resources and assets. What will you use to get the job done—manpower, money, systems, hardware? The RSS will use the term resources.

SUBMISSION OF STRATEGIES FOR PUBLICATION: Submit all strategies on a floppy diskette using Multimate Advantage II, to the editor, SCJ5-PS, 282-3452/4605. Country strategy diskettes will be maintained in a central file in SCJ5-PS.

GENERAL RULES:

- Minimize periods: write "US", not "U.S."
- Use active voice: "The US wants it!", not "It is wanted by the US."
- Classify at the lowest level.
- Introduce acronyms the first time you use them in a functional or country strategy.

USE THE FOLLOWING CONVENTIONS:

combating	Communist
counter-drug	counterinsurgency
counter-narcotics	counter-terrorism
Country Team	democracy
drug trafficking	Government of Honduras (GOH)
Honduran government	narcotrafficking
near-term	policymaking
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)	
the Services	the Armed Forces
the Military	the Police
western hemisphere	7 January 1988
600-man unit	

CONTENT GUIDE FOR A COUNTRY STRATEGY:

UNCLASSIFIED

AS OF: 2 August 1988

FINAL COORDINATING DRAFT

USSOUTHCOM Regional Security Strategy

for

TEXAS

I. (U) POLITICAL-MILITARY ASSESSMENT

This should be a one to two paragraph general discussion of the political and military environments in the host nation, including a brief discussion of military forces and capabilities.

II. (U) THREAT ASSESSMENT

This should be a one to two paragraph general discussion of the threat environment in the host nation. It should normally include an overview of the general situation, the host nation's view of its internal and external threat, and the bottomline estimate of the US intelligence community.

III. (U) US INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

A. (U) Significant US Interests In Texas the US

B. (U) US Objectives [These are usually mid- to long-range objectives taken from the US Ambassador's Goals and Objectives message]

1. (U) Promote democratic development.
2. (U) Help the economy grow at 3% per annum.

IV. (U) USSOUTHCOM LONG-RANGE SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR TEXAS

(1997-2008) [Objectives for the 9-20 year long-range strategy are unconstrained --they should be realistic, but do not have to be based on allocated or programmed resources. They must support US interests, US policy, US security strategy, and USSOUTHCOM regional security strategy.]

A. (U) Texas Armed Forces (FAT) subordinate to civil government.

B. (U) Defeat the insurgency.

V. (U) USSOUTHCOM MID-RANGE SECURITY STRATEGY FOR TEXAS

(1991-1996) [for this 3-8 year period, objectives should be based on programmed resources. There is still plenty of room for creatively rethinking the objectives, but the objectives must be constrained by what resources are likely to be available in the planning period.]

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTENT GUIDE FOR A COUNTRY STRATEGY (cont):

UNCLASSIFIED

A. (U) Objective FAT becomes committed to subordinating itself to civil government. (Lead: MILGP; Assist: SCJ5, SCEN, SCJ4, SC5G, USASAALA, USAFSO)

1. (U) Methods

- a. (U) Demonstrate benefits of subordination.
- b. (U) Increase FAT exposure to US and other models of military subordination.
- c. (U) Conduct seminars and personnel exchanges to carry the message of subordination.

2. (U) Resources

- a. (U) SA funds.
- b. (U) Engineer troops.
- c. (U) LATAM Coop funds.

B. (U) Objective Reduce insurgent forces to 50 percent of 1988 level. (Lead: USARSO; Assist: USSOC50, SCJ3, DJTF, MILGP)

1. (U) Methods

- a. (U) Use saturation ambush operations in both TX and OK territory to put at risk insurgent LOCs.
- b. (U) Implement a full scale PSYOP campaign to gain the support of Texans in Bexar County and to exploit insurgent fear of the unknown.

2. (U) Resources Use forces of the 19th S0F BN for ambush ops and forces of the 922 PSYOP Brig for the PSYOP campaign.

VI. (U) USSOUTHCOM ACTION PLAN FOR TEXAS (1988-1990) [Objectives for the 0-2 year period should be based on allocated resources.]

A. (U) Objective Enhance FAT recognition that it needs to be subordinate to civil government. (Lead: MILGP; Assist: SCJ5, SCEN, SCJ4, SC5G, USASAALA, USAFSO) [The following list of actions links methods and resources to achieving the stated objective, time-phases the actions, and assigns specific lead responsibility.]

1. (U) USCINCSO host visit to USSOUTHCOM by Chief of FAT (August 1988, SCJ5-SP).
2. (U) Conduct engineer training exercise in Texas (October 1988, USARSO).
3. (U) Conduct HCA training seminar in Texas (November 1988, USAFSO).
4. (U) US Army Chief of Staff visit to Texas (January 1989, USARSO).

UNCLASSIFIED

CONTENT GUIDE FOR A COUNTRY STRATEGY (cont):

UNCLASSIFIED

B. (U) Objective Restore the initiative to the FAT counterinsurgent effort and reduce the insurgents' combat effectiveness by 10 percent. (Lead: USARSO; Assist: USSOCSO, SCJ3, DJTF, MILGP)

1. (U) Send MIT to Texas to begin counterinsurgency training for FAT (July 1988, USSOCSOUTH).

2. (U) Send medical MIT to Texas to prepare FAT medical personnel to handle increased combat casualties (July 1988, USARSO).

3. (U) Invite FAT 1st Special Ops Company to San Antonio for special urban canal-warfare training (September 1988, USARSO).

4. (U) Initiate counterinsurgent PSYOP campaign (October 1988, USARSO).

VII. (U) US MILITARY INITIATIVES

A. (U) Programmed [list significant military programs, activities, or initiatives which are "on the books," but have not yet been undertaken, and which will help bring about the mid-range strategy objectives.]

B. (U) Proposed [list here significant military activities, initiatives, or programs which you think should be developed to bring about the long-range strategy objectives.]

NOTE: If ongoing initiatives have been incorporated into the short-range action plan, they should not be listed separately here.

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CONTENT GUIDE FOR FUNCTIONAL AREA STRATEGIES This guide describes the basic content and format for a functional area strategy. In place of the word "intelligence" substitute your functional area title, such as "engineering." This is a guide; you may need to deviate for some reason—if so, please contact the Regional Security Strategy editor, 80J5-PS, 282-3452/4605.

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USSOUTHCOM REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY

AS OF: 2 August 1988

I. (U) (U) USSOUTHCOM INTELLIGENCE MISSION

II. (U) USSOUTHCOM LONG-RANGE REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES (1997-2008) [Objectives for the 9-20 year, long-term strategy are unconstrained—they should be realistic, but do not have to be based on allocated or programmed resources. They must support US interests, US policy, US security strategy, and USSOUTHCOM regional security strategy.]

A. (U) Total US-LATAM intelligence interoperability.

B. (U) One hundred percent reliability in detecting and identifying drug traffickers.

III. (U) USSOUTHCOM MID-RANGE INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY (1991-1996) [for this 3-8 year period, objectives should be based on programmed resources. There is still plenty of room for creatively rethinking the objectives, but the objectives must be constrained by what resources are likely to be available in the planning period.]

A. (U) Objective Fifty percent US-LATAM intelligence interoperability. (Lead: J2; Assist: SCJ5, SCEN, SCJ4, SCSC, USASAALA, USAFSO) [Objectives should be based on allocated resources.]

1. (U) Methods

- a. (U) Demonstrate benefits of interoperability.
- b. (U) Expose regional militaries to US intelligence capabilities.
- c. (U) Conduct intelligence seminars and personnel exchanges to carry the message of interoperability.

2. (U) Resources

- a. (U) CBRN intelligence facilities.
- b. (U) USOUTHCOM and 470th MI Intelligence personnel.
- c. (U) LATAM C. up funds.

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CONTENT GUIDE FOR A FUNCTIONAL AREA STRATEGY (cont):

UNCLASSIFIED

B. (U) Objective Fifty percent reliability in detecting and identifying drug trafficking activities. (Lead: USSOUTHAF; Assist: USAFSO, USSOCSO, SCJ2, MILGPS)

1. (U) Methods

a. (U) Install air intercept radar equipment in lighter than Vodka, floating football stadiums.

b. (U) Distribute the floating stadiums to regional all star baseball teams.

2. (U) Resources Use existing surplus ABC-102X radar dishes and the technical capabilities of the 72nd AFMC Squadron.
CONTENT GUIDE FOR A FUNCTIONAL AREA STRATEGY (cont):

IV. (U) USSOUTHCOM REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACTION PLAN (Present-1990)
[Objectives should be based on allocated resources.]

A. (U) Objective Enhance regional recognition that the Latin American nations need increased intelligence interoperability with the US. (Lead: J2; Assist: SCJ5, SCEN, SCJ4, SCSG, USASAALA, USAFSO) [The following list of actions links methods and resources to achieving the stated objective, time-phases the actions, and assigns specific lead responsibility.]

1. (U) USCINCSO host visit to USSOUTHCOM by Chief of FAT (July 1988, SCJ5-SP).

2. (U) Conduct intelligence exchange seminar (August 1988, SCJ2).

3. (U) Conduct intelligence site survey in Brownsville (September 1988, USARSO).

4. (U) Director SCJ2 visit to Texas Intelligence Center (December 1988, SCJ2).

B. (U) Objective Increase by 20 percent regional facilities for detecting drug trafficking aircraft. (Lead: USSOUTHAF; Assist: USAFSO, USSOCSO, SCJ2, MILGPS)

1. (U) Conduct radar site surveys at five sites in southwest Texas (July-October 1988, USSOUTHAF).

2. (U) Present increase in radar facilities requirements to Defense Resources Board (November 1988, USCINCSO--staff lead: SCJ5-PR).

3. (U) Install first radar dish at Corpus Christi site (February 1989, USSOUTHAF).

4. (U) Complete negotiations and sign Memorandum of Understanding with US Coast Guard on radar data sharing (July 1989, SCJ5-PS).

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CONTENT GUIDE FOR A FUNCTIONAL AREA STRATEGY (cont):

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V. (U) USSOUTHCOM INTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES [What initiatives, programs, or activities will help to fulfill the objectives of the USSOUTHCOM strategy?]

A. (U) Programmed [list significant initiatives which are "on the books," but have not yet begun, which will help bring about the mid-range strategy objectives.]

B. (U) Proposed [list significant initiatives which you think should be developed to bring about the long-range strategy objectives.]

NOTE: If ongoing initiatives have been incorporated into the short-range action plan, they should not be listed separately here.

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-7-

NATURE: CONFERENCE PRESENTATION

EXPECTATION:

- (1) PROVIDE QUICK OVERVIEW OF SC (ES)
- (2) DESCRIBE SCSS
 - o SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
 - o WORKING ISSUES
- (3) PROVIDE STRATEGY PACKET TO ATTENDEES
 - o SCSS BRIEFING SLIDES
 - o STRATEGY FORMAT GUIDES
 - o CINC'S PRIORITY ACTION AGENDA
- (4) ESTABLISH POC NETWORK

AGENDA:

o INTRODUCTION	5 MIN
o SC EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (35mm SLIDES)	15 MIN
o SCSS (OVERHEAD TRANSPARENCIES)	25 MIN
o QUESTIONS / COMMENTS	5 MIN


TIME: 50 MINUTES

USSOUTHCOM STRATEGY SYSTEM (SCSS)

A-149


SCSS-1

USSOUTHCOM STRATEGY SYSTEM (SCSS)



SCSS-2

USSOUTHCOM STRATEGY FORMULATION



REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (RSS)

THEATER

- I. GENERAL REFERENCES PURPOSE SCOPE
- II. STRATEGIC APPRAISAL SPL
- III. US INTERESTS OBJECTIVES STRATEGY
- IV. US SECURITY STRATEGY
- V. SC SECURITY STRATEGY MISSION STRATEGIC CONCEPT CDR'S INTENT BASIC MILITARY OBJ ENDS WAYS MEANS
- VI. ALLIED/FRIENDLY CONTRIBUTIONS
- VII. SUMMARY


COUNTRY

- I. POL - MIL ASSESSMENT
- II. THREAT ASSESSMENT
- III. US INTERESTS & OBJECTIVES
- IV. SC LONG-RANGE OBJS (9-20 YRS) (UNCONSTRAINED)
- V. SC MID-RANGE STRATEGY (3-8YRS) (PROGRAMMED)
- VI. US MIL INITIATIVES

FUNCTIONAL AREA (FA)

- I. SC FA MISSION
- II. SC LONG-RANGE FA OBJ s (9-20 YRS)
- III. SC MID-RANGE FA STRAT (3-8 YRS)
- IV. SC FA INITIATIVES

THE PLAN DEVELOPMENT



THE PLAN

I. PHASE ONE (0 - 2 YEAR)

A. THEATER

1. OPS REQUIREMENTS

a.

b.

.....

x.

2. TNG REQUIREMENTS

3. SUPPORT REQ

4. MAJOR PLANNING CONFERENCES

B. COUNTRIES


1. ARGEN

.....

.....

II. PHASE TWO (2 - 6 YRS)

THE PLAN IMPLEMENTATION



(PROGRAMMED / ALLOCATED RESOURCES)

CATEGORIZED
- OBJECTIVES
- ACTIVITIES
- REQUIREMENTS

THEATER OAR
COUNTRY OAR
FUNCTIONAL AREA INPUTS
INTEL SOF
LOG CA
ENGR PSYOPS
MED SA
CD OPNS
C4 WAR OF INFO

COMPONENT/SAO/JTF INPUTS

BENEFIT TO COMPONENT CDRS

- o PROVIDES COORDINATED PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF ASSETS AND EFFORTS**
- o WILL MAKE MORE EFFICIENT USE OF ASSETS AND PLANNING EFFORTS**
- o SUPPORTS MORE COHERENT IDENTIFICATION OF MATERIEL, FORCE STRUCTURE, DOCTRINE, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND TRAINING NEEDS**
- o ASSISTS IN DETERMINING FUNDING PRIORITIES**
- o PROVIDES STRUCTURE FOR CONSOLIDATION OF COUNTRIES' NEEDS AND TRADE - OFFS**

MILITARY ACTIVITIES EVALUATION



SA
EXERCISES
MIL-TO-MIL
RELATIONS
HCA
INTEL SHARING
MEDRETES
NATION BLDG
WAR GAMING
CPX
DISASTER RELIEF
TNG ASSISTANCE
LOG ASSISTANCE
CD ASSISTANCE
PSYOPS

USCINCSO PRIORITY ACTIONS AGENDA

STRATEGIC PRIORITY LIST (SPL)

- **SPL: RANK ORDERED LIST OF SITUATIONS IN THE MID-TERM (3-8YRS) WITHIN THE COUNTRIES OF THE AOR WHICH REPRESENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR USCINCSO TO ADVANCE US INTERESTS**
- **REFLECTS MID-TERM STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO USSOUTHCOM / US**
- **PROVIDES GENERAL GUIDE FOR MAKING COMMAND DECISIONS**

RESPONSIBILITIES

CHIEF OF STAFF

- o SYSTEM EXECUTIVE
AGENT FOR USCINCSO
- o COMMANDERS AND STAFF
MEETINGS

DIR SCJ5

- o SYSTEM OVERSIGHT

DDIR-P

- o OPR FOR SYSTEM MANAGEMENT
- o FORMAT & PUBLICATION OF MTR, RSS &
THE PLAN
- o SPL MANAGEMENT
- o PRIORITY ACTIONS AGENDA
- o THEATER STRATEGY
- o CA FUNCTIONAL STRATEGY

DDIR-R

- o ASSIST SYST IMPLEMENTATION
- SIMULATION SUPPORT
- SPL DEVELOPMENT
- o IPL
- o MEANS (RESOURCES) INFO MGT
- o COORDINATE INTEGRATION INTO NATIONAL
PPBES

DDIR-S

- o COUNTRY STRATEGIES
- o COUNTRY INPUTS TO THE PLAN
- o SA FUNCTIONAL STRATEGY
- o CD FUNCTIONAL STRATEGY

**INTELLIGENCE
WORKSHOP**

INTELLIGENCE WORKSHOP

14 December 1988

Purpose. To stimulate interagency understanding and cross-feed of ideas among planners, operational elements, and intelligence community personnel on the role of intelligence as the lead discipline for managing an increasing array of interdependent national security issues related to low intensity conflict (LIC).

Summary of Speakers Remarks.

Low Intensity Conflict: The Role of Intelligence. The Honorable Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director, CIA, established a departure point for subsequent discussions and set the theme for the workshop. He characterized LIC as a strategy of escalating violence and enduring element of the international environment which transcends the capabilities of any single agency to manage and must therefore be confronted on an interagency basis. The foundation of this effort lies in intelligence--to understand the problem, collect information and analyze it, and provide the decision maker with a framework for combatting the challenge. To accomplish this, the intelligence community must aggressively pursue developments in the Third World and provide timely forecasts of economic, social, and political changes which foreshadow instability and opportunities for hostile exploitation. This strategic role provides policymaking agencies with a baseline to craft preventive or damage limiting measures to preempt or limit the threat. Once the decision is made to react to an evolving LIC scenario, the second role of intelligence is tactical support, both informational and operational, to stabilize the immediate situation and allow the deliberate implementation of an overarching campaign to produce favorable results without being forced into a military solution involving US combat forces.

The Role of the Marine Corps in Low Intensity Conflict. Brig Gen James D. Beans, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, reviewed past and future roles for the USMC as an expeditionary force uniquely tailored to deal with the growing number of conflicts from the lower end of the spectrum. His presentation offered an overview of a number of Marine Corps intelligence concerns and initiatives to enhance the service's organizational and resource capabilities, to include the establishment of an Intelligence Center as part of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, VA, dedicated to all-source analysis and production for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces projected against Third World contingencies.

Targeting, Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Support to Low Intensity Conflict. Col Raymond Chojnacki, Headquarters United States Air Force, focused on USAF targeting concerns in a LIC environment and the problems inherent in energizing a system optimized for the mid to high end of the scale. Among other issues, he discussed the long lead time often required to develop an adequate target profile and limited availability in many cases of larger scale map products to support operational planning.

Workshop Summary.

The Intelligence Workshop was attended by some 200 participants representing OSD, DIA, CIA, NSA, the unified and specified commands, the Joint Staff, military service intelligence and operational commands, and congressional staff organizations. An open forum, the workshop was structured to focus on the broader issues of intelligence support to LIC rather than specific enhancements and centered on three topical presentations--each from a different perspective with separate question and answer periods. Two unifying themes emerged from the presentations and question and answer sessions.

First, intelligence managers are playing a larger role in shaping the general outline of an interagency consensus on the long-term threat to US security interests posed by recurring instabilities, conflict scenarios, and narcotics trafficking in the developing nations of the Third World. This trend is reflected in the number of initiatives implemented in recent years to shift intelligence priorities and resources away from an almost exclusive concern with East-West and strategic balance issues to more predictive analysis on North-South flash points, international terrorism, and source country drug operations.

Second, despite some encouraging progress in the intelligence community's strategic capability to anticipate change and provide early warning of an approaching LIC threat, existing data bases for fine-grain resolution and in-place intelligence resources to support policy options for Third World strategies are still limited and need to be improved. In an era of declining budgets, however, new initiatives in one area will almost certainly mean tradeoffs in others. How best to effect these realignments is the concern of policymaking agencies but will require the full commitment of the intelligence community to insure the right changes are made.

Attachments

- Dr. Gates' Briefing Text
- Brig Gen Beans' Briefing Notes and Slides
- Col Chojnacki's Briefing Text and Slides

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT:
THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

by

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

I want to thank you for inviting me to address this conference on low intensity conflict policy planning. The Director of Central Intelligence and I, as you may know, coordinate the national level activities and budgets of all the elements of the US intelligence community -- including the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), CIA, and the foreign intelligence elements of the FBI, the Departments of Energy, State and Treasury and the military services. It is in the context of our overall intelligence community responsibilities that I speak today, for the critical role of intelligence in the American conduct of low intensity warfare transcends the capabilities of any single agency. Indeed, bureaucratic parochialism and turf battles -- within and among policy and intelligence agencies -- have in the past been an obstacle to US conduct of war against subversion, insurgency, terrorism and narcotics.

Nearly three years ago, in January 1986, Secretary of State Shultz said "low intensity conflict is the prime challenge we will face, at least through the remainder of this century. The future of peace and freedom may well depend on how effectively we meet it." That same month, Secretary of Defense Weinberger said, "much has been written about low intensity warfare, but it remains an open question how much is understood. Of greater certainty is the fact that little of what is understood has been applied effectively."

In my DDCI confirmation hearings in the spring of 1986 I said that "we face a very complicated international environment." Resistance movements are fighting Soviet aggression in their country. There are groups resisting the imposition of Marxist-Leninist regimes supported by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Vietnam in their countries. The Soviets have a very active covert action program aimed at political destabilization that we estimate broadly is costing them on the order of \$4 billion a year. We are confronting problems in the world of narcotics, terrorism, proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, and a host of other problems. I think that the experience of the last 10 years would suggest that in many of these cases, diplomacy alone is not an effective instrument. I think that experience also would show that in many of these instances, overt military action by the United States is either not appropriate, or would not be supported by the American people or the Congress. At that point,

the United States has two options. It can develop other instruments by which to carry out its policy and to try and protect its interests, or it can turn and walk away." This conference and others like it contribute to developing the other instruments for waging low intensity conflict. We cannot and must not walk away.

Low Intensity Conflict: What Is It?

Low intensity conflict presents us with a major national security challenge. Unfortunately, the meaning of "LIC" still lies in the eye of the beholder. Just what is it that concerns us so much? As a point of departure, NSDD 277 defines "LIC" as political-military confrontation between contending states or groups, below conventional war, and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. LIC ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. These conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.

The important thing to remember is that "LIC" is a strategy of conflict, where dilatory tactics are employed with increasing violence to wear down the opponent. As Jean-Paul Sartre put it, "(the insurgent) tires out his adversary until they are sick of him." To the insurgent, "LIC" is a process; to us, it's an event. The difference is fundamental.

I know that the military considers foreign internal defense, contingencies, peacekeeping operations, and counterterrorism as "LIC" missions. I believe that one day you will add counter-narcotics, narcoterrorism and the adversarial actions of states governed directly or indirectly by narcotic cartels as discrete LIC tasks.

We are only beginning to come to grips with defining the LIC issue coherently, attacking it analytically and countering it operationally. And, while many parts of our national security machinery are -- or soon will become -- involved in confronting the threats posed by low intensity conflict, the foundation of our efforts to meet these threats lies in intelligence -- in understanding the problem, collecting information and analyzing it, in providing the decision maker with a framework and, increasingly often, the means for combatting it.

Low intensity conflict is the "weapon of choice" in the Third World, and its many manifestations constitute the slings and arrows of availability and economy against larger, more developed powers whose defenses are designed primarily for nuclear and conventional military conflicts and whose strengths are in

economic development and democratic values. It is a classic case of the capacity to destroy arrayed against the capacity to build.

All of this brings me back to Secretary Shultz's statement that low intensity conflict is our primary challenge through the rest of this century. It also brings me to the focus of my remarks here -- the role of intelligence in support of our efforts to manage low intensity conflict.

The Role of Intelligence

The intelligence community once allocated almost all of its resources against the Soviet Union and China, but this has changed dramatically over the last decade. As the challenges of low intensity conflict have grown over the last several years, the intelligence community has responded. The community started an aggressive rebuilding program in the early '80s that has come to include, to a great degree, the intelligence ingredients of low intensity conflict support. We have added to our agencies a sizable number of operations officers, attaches and analysts in the Third World, and greatly expanded our information base on the Third World. We've established the Central America Joint Intelligence Team, a joint terrorist center, and built a community terrorist data base. We've developed better and quicker ways to deliver sigint and imagery support to the field. We're now working to strengthen the intelligence community's contribution to the war on overseas narcotics production and networks. Time and again in recent years, from Grenada to the Achille Lauro to major offensives against drug refineries and networks, we have made a major contribution to successful US actions and policies, and at the same time, used each experience to strengthen our capabilities even more.

Intelligence has two roles to play in LIC. The first is strategic -- to anticipate challenges to this country and its friends and allies and thereby provide the basis for preventive -- or damage limiting -- measures to preempt or limit those challenges. The whole idea is to deal with these challenges early, when they are more susceptible to outside influence, and in time to preclude the need for direct military intervention. To do this, we must learn more about developments in the Third World and provide early warning of economic, social, and political problems that foreshadow instability and opportunities for exploitation. It is important that we have in place resources to carry out this task.

The second role of intelligence is tactical support, both informational and operational, once our government decides to react to a specific threat. The immediate objective at this level is to stabilize the situation without the introduction of US combat forces, to provide an environment within which our broader nation building effort can be undertaken. We are usually

trying to buy time for the host country to get its act together, the premise being that it is their struggle and they must fight it.

Low intensity conflict targets are more difficult in certain respects for the intelligence community to address than the traditional Soviet intelligence target. Specific threats are all too often very difficult to forecast. They are rarely foreseen in time to have any impact on scheduled programmatic actions, and frequently they occur in areas where we have little or no intelligence infrastructure. Low intensity conflicts are often less susceptible to national technical means and demand dependence as well on traditional humint, tactical signals and reconnaissance means, and analysis. Making matters still worse, access to the local country may be denied to us and often there may be no official US presence of any kind. When we have not adequately anticipated a low intensity conflict situation, we often must quickly develop an adequate intelligence infrastructure.

One aspect of low intensity conflict that is common to many low intensity operations involves supporting friendly governments -- in most cases, Third World governments. Perhaps the single most important challenge is instilling in host governments a sense of the critical role of early and consistent use of intelligence. We are repeatedly finding that this is our number one priority and problem. What often holds us back, however, is that in many Third World areas the term "intelligence" is often synonymous with "internal security." There are significant cultural, power and resource implications of focusing the country's attention on "intelligence." Even after the value of true intelligence is accepted, there remains the task of organizing and applying timely and sustained intelligence. We in the United States may believe that intelligence is one of the key ingredients to success in low intensity conflict operations, but if we don't convince the local leadership, it can't play its crucial and beneficial role.

Common to much of low intensity conflict is the importance of being "target smart." Low intensity conflict may be mostly a conceptual issue in Washington, but in the field it can concern minutiae about exact warehouse locations and such small details as which way doors open. Failure to know these kinds of details can literally be fatal. Usually we need to work hard with the local country's targeting and analysis people and encourage support by the proper local users to instill an appreciation for this.

Another requirement is the need to build, or at least improve local intelligence organizations. This often calls upon us to provide direct sigint, imagery and human collection support and product capabilities for a sustained period. It also frequently

means tailoring our own collection systems or even devising new systems peculiar to the local requirements.

We must also help with developing and providing intelligence communications and training. Very often, intelligence is available in the capital but does not reach units in the field on a timely basis. More often than not, government forces are using communications equipment and techniques that are wide open to compromise, another factor which weakens their ability to respond forcefully and erodes morale.

Further we must focus on the critical need for many of our allies in the Third World to improve their counterintelligence capabilities. This is particularly valuable to insurgency operations where agent penetration can have a devastating effect.

Finally, I should point out that intelligence serves numerous other purposes related to LIC. We provide significant support to friendly and allied countries, support resistance movements, aid in the suppression of drugs, and work to deter and respond to terrorism. And we regularly develop intelligence in support of other national-level activities, ranging from security assistance, aid, trade, economic development, human rights, and political and social issues, such as promoting democracy. All of these activities go to the heart of low intensity conflict.

Management

Let me comment briefly on the management impact of all this. Much of the management problem relates to the issues that I mentioned just a moment ago of setting priorities and allocating resources. Here is an area where we can use your help.

I think we'd all agree that the intelligence community needs to place special focus, on a community-wide basis, on low intensity conflict intelligence support issues, at least to assure that we understand low intensity conflict and can improve intelligence support. But we must also remember that intelligence is a supporting community and not a policymaking organization. No major shifts of resources or priorities can be sustained without a policy consensus. We are seeing such a consensus develop around counterterrorism and drug enforcement.

The management of our collection assets is another issue that cuts across priorities in allocating and melding resources. There is no question but that our classic collectors do a terrific job collecting against low intensity conflict targets and that they will continue to be tasked. At the same time the old "keep it simple" rule is unquestionably essential to low intensity conflict collection. This is particularly true when one of your objectives is ultimately to turn the collection and the collector over to the host country. Here is another place

where technology -- particularly low cost, simple to operate and maintain technology -- can help.

Another challenge we, as managers, confront is the difficulty of anticipating the next hot spot and committing resources. Who could have anticipated in 1980 that Grenada or even Lebanon would become the focus of US military action. How could we allocate resources well in advance to be ready for crises in the long list of countries, many of them small and obscure, where the US has supported friends or allies in recent years?

This places a premium on surge capabilities that can depend on already existing data bases, and specialists on the general art of combating or waging insurgencies, of countering and thwarting terrorism, of tackling narcotics networks. We need a core of experts -- still thin and fragile -- in each area to ensure that new tactics, new information and old and new experience are adequately integrated. This often will require bureaucratic flexibility to create new organizations as they are needed, as well as the innovativeness to identify ways in which American strengths -- economic, political, technological -- can be brought to bear. And it puts a premium on protecting expertise even on small, currently or seemingly unimportant countries.

Finally, let me address a critically important aspect of intelligence support. For far too long, we have been content to be passive participants in low intensity conflict. We collect information, we analyze it, and we send reports to policy agencies and officials. Yet, we know -- as I said before -- that traditional diplomacy and military measures are usually not effective against low intensity conflict -- especially insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, terrorism and subversion. Often the most effective offensive weapons available are those either in intelligence or are deeply dependent upon the aggressive use of intelligence. We in intelligence must think offensively about our role. Covert action; intelligence training, collection, and targeting intelligence assistance to friendly governments threatened by communist insurgencies; action to thwart, disrupt, frustrate, and divide terrorist groups; the pinpointing of vulnerabilities of terrorist and narcotics networks; the public exposure of subversive, terrorist and narcotics activities; and the development of new strategies, tactics and technologies to wage low intensity conflict are but some of the many ways intelligence can help combat low intensity conflict effectively. But we can no longer think or behave as passive observers. We in intelligence are the shock troops of low intensity conflict. Managers must lead this change in attitude and priority.

Future Challenges

Let me close with a personal observation about low intensity conflict. It is essential to appreciate that low intensity conflict is preeminently still -- war without declaration, without mobilization, without massive armies. It is, in many respects, that long twilight war described a quarter century ago by President Kennedy.

In Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, the Persian Gulf and elsewhere we are seeing the fruits of American policies and programs. Major changes are under way inside the Soviet Union and the Bloc countries. But it is critical for us to maintain our vigilance. We cannot allow these currently favorable -- and welcome -- developments to lull us into a weakened security posture, especially regarding intelligence. Intelligence capabilities will be increasingly important, as we seek to anticipate change and provide early warning of impending threats or situations that demand attention.

Third tier countries and subnational groups will be far more sophisticated in conducting low intensity war than they are today. Technology developments in recent years seem to favor the adversary more than governments. Indeed, some elements, such as the narcotics traffickers, are often better armed and equipped than the government forces they face. Some of the most advanced armaments are now available on the legitimate and gray arms markets. Military power itself no longer serves to deter those adversaries whose strategy is one of the indirect approach. Thus more sophisticated and enduring approaches are required to deal with the underlying causes of LIC, to inhibit the growth of militant insurgencies.

You know that shrinking budgets will inevitably lead to increased friction between and among the various competing agencies of government. Accordingly we need -- perhaps more so than at any earlier time -- to rise above parochial concerns and look to the national interest. A strengthened intelligence posture in the Third World would be a strong indicator of our commitment to deal effectively with this increasingly important arena of conflict.

Let me conclude by noting that as you consider low intensity conflict and how to deal with it, it is imperative to remember that the sources, the wellsprings of such conflict often are still governments. And, I further submit to you that, as in the past forty years, these political-military wars of varying scale will demand our attention and that of our leaders as far into the future as we can see. If we deny or simply fail to recognize that most low intensity conflict is war and often is conducted or sustained by states and forces deeply hostile to us, we will underestimate its durability, its danger to us, and its scope.

I set forth these propositions and analysis because too many treat low intensity conflict as a new and narrowly viewed phenomenon, the latest fad -- the newest bandwagon bureaucracies and contractors alike are climbing aboard because it's perceived to be where the action and the dollars are. If we fail to see the larger strategic picture, if we ignore the lessons we can learn from our past experience in these conflicts, if we regard low intensity conflict as a transitory phenomenon rather than an enduring element of the international environment to be strategically managed, then we will constantly be on the defensive, we will be reacting -- dancing to the tune of subversion and aggression, of terrorists and drug dealers. We must develop realistic policies, public support for those policies and make the long term investment in resources, technology and information essential to overcoming or winning low intensity conflicts.

THE ROLE OF THE MARINE CORPS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

by

Brig Gen James D. Beans

VU-GRAPH #1

I. Introduction

VU-GRAPH #2

A. Statements by CMC

"Intelligence drives operations"

"Marines are expeditionary"

"Must prepare for most-likely scenarios - 3d World"

B. Historical precedent - well known

Philippines in early 1900's

Central America in 20's/30's

Small Wars Manual (1940)

Vietnam - Combined Action Program

Lebanon in 1980's

VU-GRAPH #3

C. Marine Corps Intelligence in LIC Today

El Salvador

Honduras

Panama

CAJIC

Philippines

VU-GRAPH #4

D. Forward-deployed MAGTF's. This vu-graph displays location, of forward-deployed Marines - capable of rapidly responding to LIC contingencies.

VU-GRAPH #5

II. LIC Operations in Context of CMC's Intelligence-Related Initiatives

VU-GRAPH #6

A. C4I2 Department at HOMC headed by AC/S, C4I2. CMC acknowledges inseparability of intelligence and command and control and the means to join them--comms and computers. Also assigned cognizance for surveillance, reconnaissance, EW, and C3CM.

VU-GRAPH #6--OFF

B. Intelligence Center, MCCDC. An all-source intelligence center which will focus on intelligence support to MAGTF'S, specifically in the Third World.

VU-GRAPH #7

C. Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence (SRI) Group. A MEF-level organization that brings together all intelligence elements and provides a true C3I flavor by including the Force Communication Battalion.

VU-GRAPH #8

D. Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU-SOC). A forward-deployed MAGTF capable of multi-missions.

VU-GRAPH #9

1. MEU (SOC) missions

VU-GRAPH #10

2. MEU (SOC) intelligence capabilities

III. Intelligence in LIC. Our distilled experiences resulted in these characteristics of LIC intelligence as we teach them to all levels of Marine intelligence specialists attending NMITC.

VU-GRAPH #11 & 11A

A. General Intelligence

More importance at a lower level

Political Factors
Economic Factors
Sociological Factors
Psychological Factors

Faster Processing and Dissemination Required
Dissemination - Lower Level
Enemy Order of Battle - Lower Level
Data Base - Greater & Lower Level
Terrain & Area Studies - Greater Detail
Clandestine Collection - More Important
Greater Exploitation of Civilian Sources
Need for Logistics/Medical Intelligence

VU-GRAPH #12

B. Organization

Larger S-2 Section

Required to keep more data
Need a greater language capability
Make greater use of indigenous personnel

VU-GRAPH #13

C. Counterintelligence

Greater Need-Deprive Guerrilla/Terrorist of Surprise/
Secrecy
More Agents Required
Greater Requirement for OPSEC at lower level
Greater Probability of Combined Force-Increases Threat
Greater Knowledge of Indigenous/Lower Level

Black List
Gray List
White List

VU-GRAPH #14

D. HUMINT

Greater Role for Agents at a Lower Level
More Agents Required

E. SIGINT

Targeted Against Lower Level-More difficult target
More Rapid Dissemination Required
Dissemination to Lower Level

F. IMINT

Dissemination to Lower Level
Coverage in More Detail
Difficult Types of Targets

VU-GRAPH #15

IV. Future Challenge Facing Marine Corps Intelligence in LIC Environment

A. Resource Competition. Strategic I & W; INF/START; Narcotics; Terrorism; S & T Intelligence; relocatable targets - critical intelligence issues.

B. Resultant Low Priorities for LIC Collection and Production

"Do it yourself" data bases
New areas of focus in LIC

Logistics Intelligence
Medical Intelligence

C. LIC Indications & Warning

Need better means to anticipate Third World crisis. Strategic I & W is excellent; don't expect another Pearl Harbor surprise. But LIC is tougher!

D. Must Develop Cadre of Third World Specialists

Linguists and area studies for Low Density languages. Long term investment in manpower - no substitute for these skills.

E. Develop HUMINT capability for Third World

Third World crises not appropriate for sophisticated technical sensors.

Premium on HUMINT

F. Intelligence Training for LIC

Integrate "nation-building" with intelligence (Vietnam experience - CAP's and CIT's)

VU-GRAPH #15--OFF

V. Summary. Intelligence is essential to the success of counterinsurgency operations because of the nature and tactics employed by the insurgent. Detailed, accurate, and timely intelligence is more vital to counterinsurgency operations than to conventional military operations; a conventional military force can be destroyed by overwhelming military power, but the insurgent force must be eliminated by continually subjecting it to exhaustive scrutiny, delicate and discriminate analysis, and aggressive and accurate countermeasures. To conduct counterinsurgency operations without a sound intelligence basis is to invite disaster. Effective intelligence operations must exploit all host country or allied intelligence assets. The basic inventory of intelligence on a specific area and situation is derived from area and country studies supplemented with recent operational intelligence collected on the scene. Of particular importance are those aspects of intelligence activities which are devoted to neutralizing or destroying the effectiveness of the insurgent infrastructure and protecting the host country against espionage, subversion, and sabotage.

CMC Direction

"Intelligence drives operations"

"Marines are expeditionary"

"Must prepare for most-likely scenarios - Third World"

Marines in LIC Environment Today

El Salvador

Honduras

Panama

CAJIT

Philippines

DEPLOYED MARINE UNITS

MAP OF THE WORLD

(CLEAN COPY OF SLIDE UNAVAILABLE)

B-18

CMC's Organizational Initiatives

C4I2 Department and AC/S, C4I2

Intelligence Center, MCCDC

Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence (SRI) Group

**Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable
(MEU-SOC)**

C4I2 ORGANIZATION

DUAL HATTED

AC/S *
C4I2

DUAL HATTED

DEP AC/S *
C4I2

DIR *
INT

DIR *
C4

SECY

SECY

SPECIAL
ASST
INT *

C4
TECH
ADV **

DEPDIR
INT

DEPDIR
C4

INT *

INT *


SIGINT & EW BR
C3 & HUSINT BR
MANPOWER & TRAINING BRANCH
PLANS & ESTIMATION BRANCH

ADMIN BRANCH
OPER'L INTEL INTEROP BR
PTSD BRANCH

PLANS INTEROP BR
TRAINING BR
INFO RESOURCE BR

2ND SRI GROUP

206\2364



MEU (SOC) MISSION

O AS A CONTINGENT OF THE U.S. PRESENCE AT A FORWARD DEPLOYED
LOCATION, IS TO CONDUCT AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OF LIMITED DURATION,
ACT AS ADVANCE FORCE FOR A FOLLOW-ON LARGER MAGTF (e.g., MEB FWD)
AND TO PROVIDE AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE CAPABILITY ACROSS A WIDE
SPECTRUM OF CRISIS/CONTINGENCIES BY CONDUCTING SPECIAL OPERATIONS
MISSIONS INCLUDING

(CLEAN COPY OF SLIDE UNAVAILABLE)

MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (MEU

(NOTIONAL TASK ORGANIZATION)

AIRCRAFT/LAUNCHERS

MAJOR GROUND COMBAT EQUIPMENT

3 CH-53D/E

5 TANKS

8 155MM HOW

12 CH-46

8 81 MM MORTARS

9 60MM MORTARS

2 UH-1

32 DRAGON TRACKERS

20 50 CAL MG

4 AH-1

8 TOW LAUNCHERS

60 M-60 MG

5 STINGER TEAMS

12 AAV

(CLEAN COPY OF SLIDE UNAVAILABLE)

MEU (SOC) MISSION

(CONT)

O AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS	O COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
	OPERATIONS
O SECURITY OPERATIONS	
O LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACK	O INITIAL TERMINAL
O MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS	O ELECTRONIC WARFARE
O NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION	O MILITARY OPERATIONS
OPERATIONS (NEO)	URBAN
O SHOW OF FORCE OPERATIONS	O CLANDESTINE RECOVER
	OPERATIONS
O REINFORCEMENT OPERATIONS	
O CIVIC ACTIONS	O SPECIAL DEMOLITION
	OPERATIONS
O DECEPTION OPERATIONS	
O FIRE SUPPORT CONTROL	O TACTICAL RECOVERY
	AND PERSONNEL

(CLEAN COPY OF SLIDE UNAVAILABLE)

MEU (SOC) Intelligence Components

S-2 Section (2/4)

Det, Radio Battalion (2/22)

Radio Reconnaissance Team (0/6)

Det, Counterintelligence Team (1/2)

Det, Interrogator Translator Team (0/4)

Det, Force Imagery Interpretation Unit (0/2)

Det, Force Reconnaissance Company (2/20)

Det, Topographic Company (0/2)

Sensor Employment Team (0/4)

General Intelligence

More importance at a lower level

Political Factors

Economic Factors

Sociological Factors

Psychological Factors

Faster Processing and Dissemination Required

Dissemination - Lower Level

General Intelligence (cont.)

Enemy Order of Battle - Lower Level

Data Base - Greater & Lower Level

Terrain & Area Studies - Greater Detail

Clandestine Collection - More Important

Greater Exploitation of Civilian Sources

Need for Logistics/Medical Intelligence

Organization

Larger S-2 Section

Required to keep more data

Need a greater language capability

Make greater use of indigenous personnel

Counterintelligence

**Greater Need-Deprive Guerrilla/Terrorist of
Surprise/Secrecy**

More Agents Required

Greater Requirement for OPSEC at lower level

Greater Probability of Combined Force-Increases Threat

Greater Knowledge of Indigenous/Lower Level

Black List

Gray List

White List

HUMINT

Greater Role for Agents at a Lower Level

More Agents Required

SIGINT

Targeted Against Lower Level-More difficult target

More Rapid Dissemination Required

Dissemination to Lower Level

IMINT

Dissemination to Lower Level

Coverage in More Detail

Difficult Types of Targets

Future Challenges

Resource Competition.

**Resultant Low Priorities for LIC Collection and
Production**

LIC Indications & Warning

Must Develop Cadre of Third World Specialist

Develop HUMINT capability for Third World

Intelligence Training for LIC

TARGETING, MAPPING, CHARTING AND GEODESY
SUPPORT TO LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

by

Col Raymond Chojnacki

(Slide 1) Good morning ladies and gentlemen. I'm most pleased to have this opportunity to speak to you. When the Air Staff was asked to present issues for low intensity conflict from the Air Force perspective, I was happy that someone thought of targeting to do it. I was also told you weren't after solutions but rather concerns that you needed to be aware of. To highlight these concerns, I must first establish an appreciation for what targeting does and what it uses.

(Slide 2) Therefore, I'll approach it in this manner. I'm not out to make you targeters - you'd first have to be a fully qualified intel officer in one of the disciplines; take a 3 month course followed by a year working in the field to be considered a qualified targeting officer. After describing targeting though, I'll zero in on the issues from our perspective.

(Slide 3) Targeting! What exactly are we talking about when we use this term? The targeting function, located at the intersection of intelligence and operations, has a unifying function which is crucial to mission success. This definition of the targeting mission on the slide sums it up. Note its ingredients: guidance, weapon system, knowledge of the target base, timing considerations, knowledge of the threat, and a means of evaluating effectiveness. Targeting is important because it is the method which applies force to effect a conflict or make a statement. The targeting process involves a sequence of steps by which target intelligence and target materials are produced and used to support operational decision-making and force employment.

(Slide 4) These steps are shown on this slide. Let me briefly describe each: (1) The objective and guidance step serves as the cornerstone of the targeting effort. The value of the target selection and analysis depends on a clear understanding of guidance and objectives laid out by the commander. (2) Based on clear statements of objectives and guidance, targeters initiate the target development step. Target development is the systematic evaluation of potential target systems and their components to determine which elements military action should or could be taken against, to achieve the given objectives. (3) Once this is accomplished, weaponizing assessment is conducted to determine the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal force required to achieve a specific level of damage. (4) In the force application planning step, recommendations are made on how to apply the available weapons and forces effectively

and economically in order to achieve the desired objectives. It seeks approval from the command authority for executing the finished, correlated target intelligence and weapon system information. (5) Execution planning translates the approved course of action into information and tasking for those who will execute the plan. (6) Combat assessment encompasses combat operations, strike effectiveness, enemy repair and reconstitution capabilities, impact on enemy intentions, and reliability of our weapon systems and munitions. Results of this step are cranked back into subsequent iterations of this process. Now that I have briefly covered what occurs in each step of the targeting process one must ask. "Does it work?"

(Slide 5) The traditional process, developed in the 1920/1930's Air Tactical School, works against countries that would be involved in conflict at the mid to high end of the conflict scale. We've planned well for that because there is an infrastructure against which to target. There is knowledge of the existing target system. At the low end of the conflict scale, this structure is usually missing. For instance, supplies required to support enemy operations are usually provided from an outside source and not manufactured centrally. Additionally, this source of supply is usually supported by legitimate commerce from a country we don't wish to become involved with or are based in the sanctuary of a third country. This makes interdicting lines of communication to stop the flow of supplies difficult. With this simple statement I've highlighted several issues that concern us in Air Force targeting. In the case of objectives, a key consideration in establishing objectives has to be an evaluation of the risk to national security that the conflict represents as well as the ability to contain the conflict at the low end of the scale. That determination helps drive the priorities for the support needed in other areas. Let's look at these other areas a little closer.

(Slide 6) Among the issues that we're concerned about is the availability/reliability of intelligence data bases and target materials. A targeteer's success is heavily dependent on the data base he/she works from and the aircrew's success and survivability depends on the target materials he's provided for his mission preparation. We all recognize that JCS priorities drive data collection which feeds into the data bases and provides the source data for target material construction. For years, and it continues to be the case, the top priority has been and remains the Soviet-Warsaw Pact - because of its capability to threaten our national existence. We would expect to face this potential enemy at the high end of the conflict scale. I've already indicated targeting works well at that end of the spectrum. But as a result of this priority and limited collection assets, the data bases and target materials for LIC operations elsewhere, in the necessary detail to support the increasingly sophisticated weapon systems, are not available.

A good example to illustrate this is Iran. Although we'd been there for years and helped the Shah construct much of its infrastructure, when we became actively involved in planning contingency operations, we had great difficulty in satisfying objectives. The data base did not support the planning process. To sustain LIC operations with the best targeting and maps charts and geodesy (MC&G) support, the requirements must be identified long before operations are due to take place. It requires lead time to redirect production assets away from the primary oplan areas and construct the necessary materials.

(Slide 7) Earlier I mentioned the growing sophistication of weapon systems. Let me describe this by emphasizing the impact on MC&G products.

(Slide 7A) First, as representative of the support requirements being placed on the MC&G community, the F-111 and the soon-to-be-fielded low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night or LANTIRN system are each capable of accuracies of 100 feet (although LANTIRN will accept 200 feet). These were selected because of the F-111's use in Eldorado Canyon - the Libyan raid at night. This then becomes an accuracy requirement against which the Defense Mapping Agency or DMA attempts to produce products. Footnote refers to the automated photo-grametric positioning system (AAPS) and the point positioning data base used for mensurating a point on the earth. Given enough lead time, requests to DMA can also satisfy the need for precise mensuration.

(Slide 7B) Over time because of changing capabilities, there have been numerous geodetic reference systems or ellipsoids from which coordinates have been derived - a standard for a given region if you will. Therefore, to overcome potential errors that could be made, the positioning reference system upon which the coordinates of the target are based, must be determined. Here I've selected 3 weapon systems and noted the ellipsoids from which coordinates are derived and the navigation system is initialized. The last line indicates most maps and charts are produced from 10 different standards. Note the F-16C/D - the newest version of the F-16. The WGS ellipsoid refers to world geographic system -- the single system now being used.

(Slide 7C) Differences between aircraft navigation references based on this world geographic system and target materials based on the older ellipsoids could produce coordinate errors as large as 1900 feet. Incidentally it was this very problem that caused our poor results when we conducted operations in Beirut a few years ago - both the air strikes and the shore bombardment from the battleship.

(Slide 7) Map availability is also an issue. DMA allocates production and maintenance of existing products in accordance with established JCS priorities. As with the target intelligence data bases, areas lacking adequate coverage are primarily in the third world nations located on the African and South American continents.

(Slide 8) This slide shows we have good map coverage at the smaller scales used primarily for planning, but lack coverage at the larger scales needed for operations. I'm sure some of you have heard the story coming out of the Grenada operation which indicated some of the forces used a gasoline company's road map to find out where they were. I can't confirm that story but based on the remarks earlier by the DA/DCSIN major, there appears to be truth to the story. I do know DMA produced a substitute map in the eleventh hour even if not an ideal one. A better product could have been made available had DMA been brought into the planning sooner.

(Slide 9) In conclusion, let me once again acknowledge the qualification that I've generalized on some very serious concerns. I recognize that exceptions do exist and that improvements are under way. However, historically third world areas - the most probable areas where LIC operations are likely to occur - have not received the priority or the amount of new information to sustain an adequate data base or to support DMA production requirements. Even with a change in the JCS priority system and the reallocation of resources to cover these areas, it is doubtful that the areas could be upgraded quickly - it takes lead time to produce a good data base and adequate target materials. The traditional targeting process, while procedurally appropriate, needs to be reviewed in light of the realities of the LIC environment. Adjustments to traditional objectives, content of the data base and weapon system selection are areas that need to be reviewed. And finally one last reminder -- in spite of these issues, execution will take place. That is, a commander, whether he be an Air Force commander directing an air strike, a naval commander directing a shore bombardment or a Marine or ground commander conducting an insertion, will execute with whatever data he has available. We all want it to be the best but he'll go with what he has at the time.

TARGETING
AND
MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY
IN
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

B-36

COL RAYMOND CHOJNACKI HQ USAF/INT

OVERVIEW

- TARGETING MISSION
- TRADITIONAL TARGETING PROCESS
- ISSUES

TARGETING MISSION

IN RESPONSE TO GUIDANCE, GET THE BEST WEAPON
ON THE RIGHT TARGET AT THE CORRECT TIME USING
THE LEAST FORCE IN THE MOST SURVIVABLE MANNER
AS TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF THE BATTLE.

B-38

LIC12

3

TRADITIONAL TARGETING PROCESS

- GUIDANCE AND OBJECTIVES
- TARGET DEVELOPMENT
- WEAPONNEERING ASSESSMENT
- FORCE APPLICATION PLANNING
- EXECUTION PLANNING
- COMBAT ASSESSMENT

IT WORKS

- WORKS AT MID TO HIGH END OF CONFLICT SCALE
- ISSUES AT LOW END
 - OBJECTIVES
 - DATA BASE
 - TARGET MATERIALS

B-40

LIC14

5

TARGETING ISSUES

- LACK OF COMPREHENSIVE INTELLIGENCE DATA BASE
- AVAILABILITY OF TARGET MATERIALS
- LEAD TIME

B-41

LIC17

6

MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY ISSUES

- ACCURACY REQUIREMENTS
- AVAILABILITY OF MAPS

B-42

LIC16

7

PRECISE COORDINATE REQUIREMENTS

F-111 100 FEET

LANTIRN 200 FEET
(100 DESIRED)

* RQMTS SATISFIED BY APPS/PPDB OR DMA

LIC09

7A

COMMONLY USED ELLIPSOIDS

SYSTEM/PRODUCT ELLIPSOID

F-4/RF-4

7 SELECTABLE

F-15

CLARKE 1866 (N. AMER)

F-16A/B

HAYFORD (EUROPE)

F-16C/D

WGS

MAPS/CHARTS

10 DIFFERENT
(DEPENDENT ON AREA)

LIC21

7B

HORIZONTAL SHIFTS BETWEEN COMMON ELLIPSOIDS AND WGS

<u>ELLIPSOID</u>	<u>SHIFT (FEET)</u>	<u>AREA</u>
CLARKE 1866	305	N. AMERICA
INTERNATIONAL	485	EUROPE
BESSEL	1,633	KOREA/JAPAN
CLARKE 1880	860	AFRICA
SOUTH AMERICAN	323	S. AMERICA
AIRY	1,900	UNITED KINGDOM
EVEREST	1,200	INDIA
AUSTRALIAN	658	AUSTRALIA

MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY ISSUES

- ACCURACY REQUIREMENTS
- AVAILABILITY OF MAPS

B-46

LIC16

7

THIRD WORLD MAP AVAILABILITY

<u>MAP TYPE</u>	<u>SCALE</u>	<u>% AVAILABLE</u>
GNC	1:5,000,000	100
JNC	1:2,000,000	100
ONC	1:1,000,000	100
TPC	1:500,000	-
JOG-A	1:250,000	-
1:50	1:50,000	-

LIC08

8

CONCLUSIONS

- INADEQUATE DATA BASE
- INADEQUATE TARGET MATERIALS
- ADJUSTMENTS TO TARGETING PROCESS REQUIRED
- EXECUTION WILL OCCUR

COMMONLY USED ELLIPSOIDS

SYSTEM/PRODUCT

ELLIPSOID

A-7
 A-10
 B-1/B-52
 F-4/RF-4
 F-15
 F-15E
 F-16 A/B
 F-16 C/D
 F-111
 GPS
 BALLISTIC MISSILES
 MAPS/CHARTS
 PPDB
 DIGITAL CARTOGRAPHIC DATA
 FUTURE SYSTEMS/PRODUCTS

HAYFORD (EUROPEAN AREA)
 11 SELECTABLE
 WGS (WORLDWIDE)
 7 SELECTABLE
 CLARKE 1866 (N. AMER)
 WGS
 HAYFORD (EUROPE)
 WGS
 HAYFORD (EUROPE)
 WGS
 WGS
 10 DIFFERENT (DEPENDENT
 ON AREA)
 WGS
 WGS
 WGS

LIC19

BACK-UP 1

PUBLIC AFFAIRS
WORKSHOP

PUBLIC AFFAIRS WORKSHOP

14 December 1988

Purpose. To raise and discuss issues relevant to US armed forces public affairs (PA) actions in low intensity conflict (LIC).

Summary of Speaker Remarks.

Mr. Benjamin F. Schemmer, Editor, Armed Forces Journal International, focused on the importance of public affairs in LIC. Calling on his own military background (USMA graduate, troop-unit duty) and 20 years of experience as editor of a major internationally read military publication, Mr. Schemmer frankly and pointedly explained why he considers PA more important in LIC than in other form of conflict.

To support this view he offered various examples of LIC situations or US LIC policy issues which he said pose particular challenges for PA representatives.

- o The exclusion of reporters from Operation Urgent Fury.
- o Unfilled requirements for equipment needed in LIC/Special Operations.
- o Relationships between military/government representatives and members of the news media in LIC.
- o Roles/actions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and LIC.

After presenting his remarks, Mr. Schemmer, answered questions and discussed his views on these and other topics regarding PA in LIC. He emphasized an active role for public affairs in "improving public understanding of public policy."

Workshop Summary.

Fifty military and civilian members, representing PA offices of the five armed services (including every service staff, five unified commands, and a number of MACOM/MAJCOM-level commands), the US Information Agency, Joint Staff, and Department of Defense, participated. This was the first joint and interagency workshop devoted specifically to PA issues in LIC. Besides the keynote address, the workshop consisted of sessions on: PA/psychological operations (PSYOP) issues/relationships in LIC; PA issues in combatting terrorism and in peacetime contingency operations; PA issues in insurgency/counterinsurgency and in peacekeeping operations; and doctrine, training, and force structure issues for PA in LIC. A number of participants expressed a desire for future workshops of this kind.

Participants were energetic in the session on PA and PSYOP in LIC. There was strong interest in defining a clear line between PA and PSYOP to help prevent any blurring or overlap. Panelists from the Joint Staff (PSYOP) and DOD (both PA and PSYOP) explained the respective roles of these functional areas in LIC. The panelists said it is difficult to create a pat delineation, but they agreed a primary difference was indicated by applying the term "inform" to PA and the term "influence" to PSYOP. The ensuing discussion evoked varying views on where informing stops and influencing starts. However, the participants agreed that, to be effective in LIC, it is important for PA and PSYOP to be part of a coordinated effort. Clearly, this issue warrants more study because of the importance of these functional areas in LIC.

There was also an active session on PA issues in combatting terrorism and in peacetime contingency operations because of familiarity with previous US military actions in these categories. Some workshop participants had served as PAOs during such missions. Most of the discussion about combatting terrorism related to minimizing terrorists' opportunities to gain publicity, while preserving operational security (OPSEC) and still informing the public about US actions. In discussing peacetime contingency operations the participants were concerned about OPSEC and about including PA early in the planning process to facilitate adequate response to media attention in operational areas. Another concern was educating commanders on the importance of their relationship with the media.

The session on PA issues in insurgency/counterinsurgency and in peacekeeping operations elicited OPSEC concerns regarding the former, and limited exchange regarding the latter, owing to little prior US involvement. Participants said a clear US policy on both of these operational categories is vital to the success of the PA mission. It was generally agreed that in peacekeeping operations, the PAO should develop a meaningful message on the operation and ensure it is consistently communicated.

There were mixed reactions on the issues of doctrine, training, and force structure. Some thought emerging Joint LIC doctrine should be finalized before anything else is done. Others said any service pursuing their own doctrine or training should continue and coordinate. Some also urged inclusion of reserve PA members in training and operational planning. This is needed since active PA authorization is not likely to increase.

Attachments

- Mr. Schemmer's Briefing Notes
- Workshop Discussion Summary
- Participants' Comments

Remarks by
Benjamin F. Schemmer
Editor,
Armed Forces Journal International
at the OJCS/CLIC Conference
on Low Intensity Conflict
14 December 1988
Hampton, VA

The Importance of Public Affairs
in Low Intensity Conflict

Colonel Barnes, Admiral Olson: *

I had thought, by sitting in on yesterday's opening session of this first JCS Conference on Low Intensity Conflict, that I would learn just what our strategy is for LIC --- and thus go home reassured that our work in this arena is not as confused as it seems in Washington. Ambassador Whitehead** shattered those two expectations yesterday when he said, "There is not a national policy that is clear on dealing with low-intensity conflict." Admiral Olson worried me when he revealed, and Ambassador Whitehead confirmed, that the Low Intensity Conflict Board, mandated by Congress, has never met! As for confusion, I think I heard both Col. Barnes and Col. Farr*** intervene later to insist that we do have a national strategy for LIC, in a National Security Decision Memorandum signed by the President. And, I found, things are even more confused in the Pentagon than I had feared.

Two months ago, for instance, Ambassador Whitehead sent this memo [Vu-Graph #1] to Dr. Robert Costello, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. With it, he forwarded a study done under contract by the Logistics Management Institute on alternatives for funding the Special Operations Command. Note Ambassador Whitehead's handwritten note:

"Bob, I don't think you will want to read this junk."

I kidded Ambassador Whitehead about that at lunch yesterday and told him I planned to share his memo with you. But he told me, "Oh, I thought it was one of the better studies. I just didn't think Costello would want to read it all, but let one of his guys do it." Confused, I checked with him later to make sure I

* Colonel Albert M. Barnes, Commander, USAF, Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict;

Rear Admiral Phillip R. Olson, Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy, OJCS J-5.

** Ambassador Charles S. Whitehead, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict).

*** Lt. Col. William F. Furr, USAF, Chief, Logistics Branch, Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict.



SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400

October 13, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ROBERT COSTELLO, UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION

SUBJECT: Logistics Management Institute Study

Per our discussion at lunch today, I have attached
a copy of the Logistics Management Institute study.
As you recommended, we are looking at the U.S. Marine
Corps Acquisition systems with all participants.

Many thanks,

Charlie

Charles S. Whitehouse

Bob,

*I don't think you will want to
read this junk but one of your lads
might. I will arrange for a quick briefing
for you and get a couple of Lindsay's guys
up to join us when I get back.*

understood what he'd said at lunch, and he verified it. Whereas I was confused, now I am worried: the "junk" being produced in this arena represents some of our "better" work?

So much for my quandry; let's talk about yours.

Low intensity conflict and counterinsurgency frustrate American military planners --- because a nation that grew up on Wild West movies can't rely on good old cavalry charges to win the most frequent form of conflict today. Public affairs plays a far more important role in low intensity conflict than in mid- or high-intensity warfare for that very reason. In the latter two arenas, there is lots of news --- hot copy, graphic sound bites, invasions, troops landing, tanks firing, F-15s taking off, ships sinking, Marines hitting the beach, smoking enemy armor stopped just short of the objective. The news makes itself; you in public affairs don't have to create it.

But in low intensity conflict, it's hard to find the objective, much less even define it. The news is generally dull, certainly too subtle for a two-minute TV clip. It's hard to tell you've won --- or when. You can't even show someone what the enemy looks like, because the enemy looks like the population or indigenous forces you're trying to defend or support. And the conflicts are long-term ones: without the drama of a tank battle or cavalry charge, the "news" becomes stale, dulling the mind of reader or viewer and journalist alike. Thus, reporters are tempted to over-dramatize, to hype events: we distort the conflict.

That, of course is outrageous. But how can a reporter sent to cover a "war" tell his editor or producer there's no "news." ("My God, man, American troops are there; something must be going on; are you lost?") And on some TV networks, as much as half of a prime-time reporter's annual take-home pay may depend on an insidious incentive program --- whereby annual bonuses depend on how often he (or she) is on the tube, whether he's in the opening or closing spots, and how much total air time he or she racked up the previous year.

Thus, public affairs officers who are unlucky enough to service a low intensity conflict face two difficult jobs that are not an issue in the conventional combat arena:

- *They have to make news out of generally dull grist, and
- *They have to temper distortions.

And, unlike conventional combat, the outcome in low intensity warfare may hinge as much on how well the public affairs officer does those two jobs, as war in Europe may hinge on the decision-making of a corps commander or the courage of a battalion fighting it out tank-to-tank.

For without public support --- whether of the American public
-more-

during prolonged exposure of American lives, or of the indigenous population weary of poverty and intimidation and thus anxious to believe in the tooth-fairy (even the outrageous promises of a bankrupt Marxist) --- without public support, the war is lost!

Lt. Col. Alex Angelle said it all in a superb CLIC paper published last May (and included in your kits for this conference), "U.S. Armed Forces Public Affairs Roles in Low Intensity Conflict." (In fact, this is the first speech I've ever been invited to give where almost everything I had to say has already been leaked by the guy who invited me to the microphone.) Angelle summed up the "importance of public affairs in low intensity conflict" with these three quotes:

1. Abraham Lincoln, 1858: "Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed."
2. Elmer Davis, 1942 (when he was Director of the Office of War Information): "This is a people's war, and to win it the people should know as much about it as they can."
3. Caspar W. Weinberger: [To win, we must demonstrate] "...the proper, unashamed and unremitting willingness to make our case at the bar of public opinion at home and abroad."

But your work to do that is made harder by other factors. At the risk of being callous, let me suggest --- in editorial shorthand --- how some Americans may view your (our) recent involvements in low intensity conflict. My point is that the moment you deploy American force or expose American troops, you will face a skeptical audience, right off the bat. For here's how a cynic might look at our track record of the past eight years:

* At Desert One in 1980, we failed because a nation that was spending \$200-billion a year on defense ended up short one helicopter.

* In Lebanon in 1983, we deployed 800 Marines on low ground like ducks in a shooting gallery and wouldn't let them load their rifles.

* In Grenada in 1983 --- seven months after President Reagan showed America on national TV a 10,000-foot, Cuban-built runway that he said might pose a potentially serious threat to hemispheric security --- the Joint Chiefs of Staff hadn't yet ordered to be printed one tactical scale map of the island. In fact, the Navy's official after-action report acknowledges, tragically, the maps weren't even ordered from the Defense Mapping Agency until after midnight on Tuesday, 25 October, just hours before the 5:20 a.m. Marine assault on Pearls and Army Rangers parachuted on Pt. Salinas airfield. [Vu-graph #2.]

* In 1986, we learned that our Central American policy was so fouled up that a major on the National Security Council staff was financing his own war, blind-siding the President of the United States.

-more-

MAPS AND CHARTS (U)

[(b)(1)]

(U) The initial shortage of maps was eventually overcome by the short-fused production of 1:25,000 scale tactical maps by the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). Unfortunately, DMA was not tasked to produce the maps until 25 October, primarily because of OPSEC considerations, and these high quality maps did not arrive on Grenada until the operation was largely over.

(U) The unsatisfactory quality and quantity of tactical maps available during the planning, landing, and initial ashore phases of URGENT FURY was the most significant intelligence-related complaint from Marine units involved in the operation.

[(b)(1)]

* In Libya in 1986, we missed the real target because we bombed from low altitude using 1970-era Paveway II laser-guided bombs designed for medium altitude delivery, while our newer Paveway III low-altitude laser-guided bombs sat in ordnance depots in the United States, instead of England --- even though our F-111 crews there had been planning that strike for weeks and even though the senior U.S. Air Force commander in Europe had urged, for months, that Paveway IIIs be shipped to England so his F-111 air crews and ordnance teams could check them out and be ready to use them.

* In the Persian Gulf in 1988, we proved that the Navy's controversial Aegis anti-air weapon system really works --- by shooting down a commercial airliner --- because no one integrated commercial overflight schedules (hundreds of airplanes a day) into the ship's automated combat information system. Thus, a petty officer had to frantically thumb through a commercial airline guide trying to see if the bogey might be an airliner; he erroneously concluded no (because the airliner was 20 minutes behind schedule when it took off). The Navy later said the Aegis computers didn't have enough storage capacity to automate all that additional information. In this day and age?

Ask yourselves, what if an Aegis ship had been part of the Grenada task force? Plot the civilian overflights near that island, ones that might have been within range of an Aegis cruiser protecting the Guam. We could have ruined Caribbean tourism. After all, an 85% on-time departure record now rates a full-page ad in The New York Times by most airlines. Is the Navy telling us that 15% of Caribbean tourist flights might have become Aegis targets?

That's how a cynic might look at the track record. And most journalists are cynics. Now, public affairs officers can fairly point out that low intensity conflict is a bitch --- and thus plead, "Cut us some slack, Jack." After all, it's near impossible to predict our next war in the Third World, whether its location or its form.

But look at the cascade of incidents I've just covered this way --- through a reporter's eyes. None of those tragedies (or close-run things) required clairvoyance; they needed better military planning. Not "more" planning; just better planning. In none of these cases did superior enemy tactics prevail; nor did enemy deception undo us; our ineptitude did. It wasn't just "bad luck"; bad luck, after all, is what usually happens when you don't plan well. If you ask yourself, in all of those instances, "What is the worst thing we could have done?" --- we just about did it, didn't we? "We have met the enemy --- and it is us."

That's why your jobs will be so difficult. And they will be more difficult because some officials suggest, as I heard Ambassador Whitehouse complain yesterday, that military people plan too much, that low intensity conflict is so unpredictable and so complex we should just "wing it."

And yet America's track record on low intensity conflict is a lot better than the public or the cynic perceives. A draft report now being circulated by the Congressional Research Service* analyzes 16 conflicts we have coped with since the Korean War. (I've added two more: Iran in 1980 and the Falklands in 1982, since America played a more direct role there, albeit a small one, than is publically known.) How did we fare?

The outcome is still uncertain in five of those conflicts --- Angola, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Cambodia, and the Philippines. In the remaining 13 conflicts, US intervention or aid was successful nine times. That's a 70% win rate --- enough for a football team to get to the Superbowl. We failed --- flat out lost --- only four times: Southeast Asia (1955-1975), Cuba (1961), Lebanon (1982-1983), and Iran (1980).

Thus, we are better at low intensity conflict than we take credit for. Conversely, our batting average had better improve fast. Nuclear weapons have been a genuine deterrent to large scale conventional conflict, but low intensity conflict is becoming a fashion. Of the 28 low intensity conflicts in which the U.S. has played a major role since the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902, two-thirds have happened since the Korean War, and two-thirds of those have been in the 1980s. A 30% loss rate may be okay on the road to the Superbowl, but in geopolitics, it can be suicidal.

Can we prepare ourselves better so that you in the public affairs arena can let us in the press report better news in the next war? Of course we can. But I agree with Ambassador Whitehouse on one thing: it won't happen if we continue to plan like a bunch of platform junkies (my terminology), if we continue our fixation with hardware.

Would you believe what the Defense Science Board recently proposed as one of the key missions for the National Aerospace Plane --- the hypersonic transport that President Reagan referred to several years ago as the "Orient Express," a space plane that takes off and lands like a conventional airplane and circles the globe at 18-25 times the speed of sound? It said one mission might be "timely response for...terrorist attack." [Vu-graph #4.] In commercial service, some enthusiasts convinced the President, the Orient Express could fly New York to Tokyo in two to two-and-a-half hours. That's about twice as long as an ICBM would take. ICBMs launch at about eight "g"s. Do you want your mother-in-law leaving JFK International pulling eight "g"s? Boeing says that its surveys show commercial airline passengers get nervous when

* "U.S. Low-Intensity Conflict Experience, 1899-1988," by Frederick Hamerman, Congressional Research Service, First Draft, October 7, 1988.

Report of the
Defense Science Board
Task Force
on the
NATIONAL AEROSPACE PLANE
(NASP)

September 1988



Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
Washington, D. C. 20301-3140

Hypersonic cruise vehicles will enable our Military to project American presence anywhere in the world within a few hours, providing timely response for crisis intervention, strategic reconnaissance and terrorist attack. Civilian hypersonic transports will further shrink the world.

an airplane pulls over one-tenth of an instantaneous "g."

So what is the Defense Science Board proposing? That we position Delta Force at Cape Kennedy, fit them out in space suits, fire them off at eight "g"s, and have them cruise to Algiers at Mach 25 and try to land covertly in a Buck Rogers version of the Concorde? As the public affairs officer, would you want to explain that strategy?

Yet there are ways that technology can improve our odds in low intensity conflict, without bogging us down in the platform junkie mentality. Some of them are spelled out in three remarkable but little-noticed recent documents* that flesh out the early 1988 report on "Discriminate Deterrence" by the Bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy (the so-called Ikle Commission).

One example is using U.S. communications skills and technologies to "exploit modern media to extend a government's informational reach to all of its people." That, the June report on "Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict" notes, "would constitute a revolutionary advance for many Third World nations." The report suggests that:

"Low-cost, single-channel radio and television, possible solar-powered, might provide that government access to and influence over rural populations. American industry --- and if not U.S. manufacturers, then Japanese, Korean, or Taiwanese --- has the capability of making such products, but little incentive to do so, in the absence of U.S. government support."

But, the report later notes, none of the 12 technologies proposed in the past two years by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to improve our posture for low intensity conflict has been funded. Why not? "There was no recognized requirement or statement of need from any of the armed Services or any of the required CinCs [Commanders-in-Chiefs]." (But reading the Defense Science Board report on the National Aerospace Plane, one might wager safely that an ejector mechanism for hypersonic leaflet drops might sell.)

As the Ikle Commission follow-on report suggests, "Security assistance for low intensity conflict will require that the U.S. armed Services develop materiel, tactics, and techniques different from those used by U.S. forces, tailored to the need of the supported forces." But you will find no such equipment in the Service POMs [program objective memorandums, or draft budgets]. Why not? Because Congressional restrictions --- ones that Ambassador Whitehead acknowledged yesterday his office is doing nothing about, and which Admiral Olson says the Joint Staff hasn't addressed either --- preclude the Defense Department from

-more-

developing equipment that is not needed or used by U.S. forces. Our Services look upon the Third World as a dumping ground for surplus Vietnam War equipment, not as a new opportunity to harness technology to avoid low intensity conflict.

Look at intelligence technology. Here, we have done better; but we could do a lot better. General Paul F. Gorman, former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Southern Command, and the principal architect of two of the three reports I've just cited, points out that between 1980 and 1985, "The major gain for Salvadoran military operations...was in tactical intelligence." Without divulging how or what, General Gorman makes clear, we provided that.

But, he also points out in his report on "Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict," we don't exploit tactical or strategic intelligence very well in the war on drugs. Yet Colombia, a staunch ally, "faces national ruin" and "the U.S. is complicit in its plight." The "narcotraffickers [have become] richer than the government." And, Gorman's report notes, drugs now cost America about as much as we invest in national defense -- \$300-billion a year.

Yet cocaine processing centers and factory-like complexes in the roadless rain forests of Colombia's remote provinces can be pinpointed with modern technological means, and such centers are dependent on air support. Better U.S. intelligence support could play a key role in assaulting drug traffic at its source.

So could U.S. intelligence perform better in stemming the flow into Colombia (or other countries) of the precursor chemicals or reagents needed to process illicit drugs. "Latin American narc czars import from the U.S. virtually all the chemicals they use in making cocaine and heroin --- such as acetone, toluene, and acetic anhydride. In 1986, for example, countries to our south imported 55,000 tons of ether, a principal agent in cocaine processing, an amount vastly in excess of legitimate needs for other industrial uses, and imports 70% above the 1983 level."

Surely we have the technology to electronically "tag" and thus locate in clandestine drug labs the barrels containing such precursor chemicals.

In short, while high technology is often irrelevant to low intensity conflict, it could be vital to what may be our most important war today and the biggest threat to our society, drugs.

* 1. "Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment," April 1988.

2. "Security Assistance as a U.S. Policy Instrument in the Third World," May 1988.

3. "Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict," June 1988.

From time to time, the press is going to ask you, the public affairs officer, "What could we be doing?" to prevail in one low intensity conflict or another. How are you going to explain the things we could be doing, but aren't? Or the things we should have done, but didn't?

Bob Gates* said yesterday that "Washington is a town where everybody mutinies, but no one deserts." Before some of you mutiny over my irreverent remarks, I'm going to desert --- and sit down.

* Dr. Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS WORKSHOP DISCUSSION

The following is a summary of discussions from the Workshop on Public Affairs in Low Intensity Conflict. It reflects the substance of the various opinions and exchanges expressed by the workshop participants. The subdivisions indicate the separate sessions within the workshop. Names of the panel members for each session are included. However, to encourage the fullest candor, and because it would not be of particular benefit, the views and discussions are not attributed directly to the panel members or workshop participants by name. Except for instances in which specific policies or procedures are cited, all of this reflects personal views and not official positions or policies of the US or any of its departments, agencies, or military organizations.

Questions/Comments Following Mr. Schemmer's Presentation.

1. What is the line between PA and PSYOP? I don't know, but it is the job of public affairs to explain why we're performing our military mission.
2. What relationship should exist between the government (PA) and the media? There is no code of ethics for journalism. We should have a constructive relationship. We should be able to tell each other "like it is." There should be mutual respect between the two.
3. How can public affairs be "proactive?" It can do so by being equipped to tell what we intend to do, why we're going to do it, and what we want to accomplish. Public affairs should improve public understanding of public (government) policy.
4. What do you see as the lessons of Grenada, such as the DOD media pool? I don't feel qualified to comment on the media pool. I have not been a part of it.
5. How do you think DOD should get the message across concerning the role of Security Assistance in LIC? Chiefly by earmarking most Security Assistance dollars for a few countries is not a good way of doing it. The DOD hasn't done enough about letting PAOs explain what we do with the rest of the money. It appears the CINCs are complaining about the allocation of Security Assistance money, but aren't getting much response.
6. (Comment) Public Affairs Officers need language training. Response from the audience: There are too many languages in which to train. Public Affairs Officers would never finish training. Reply: They just need a basic orientation course, not a total fluency. For example, the US embassy could assist, especially with PAOs located in countries in which there is a unified command.

Session on Public Affairs and PSYOP Issues/Relationships.

(Panelists were: COL Jake Jacobowitz, DUSD(P); LTC(P) Harold Youmans, JCS/J-3(J-33); MAJ John Smith, OASD(PA))

Comments from the panelists: Three unified commands recently raised this issue. The Secretary of Defense recently changed the PA/PSYOP master plan to delineate a clear difference between the two, and directed development of a coordinating mechanism to ensure both PA and PSYOP contribute to national security.

a. The panelists presented views on the concept of truth, deception, and use of the media. They discussed connotations of PA and PSYOP. In distinguishing PA and PSYOP:

(1) Psychological operations narrow the audience (receiver) to that which, if behavior changes, would positively affect the US. PSYOP puts out information, and it does so to affect attitudes and behavior. Propaganda is included in this process. Most people interpret propaganda negatively; as lies. Psychological operations believe truth is essential to it.

(2) Public affairs is conducted under the DOD Principles of Information, which stress maximum release of information with minimum delay, and preclude propaganda from the PA program. The relationship between PA and PSYOP is not at odds. Both have valid responsibilities. They should work in their own way to accomplish national security objectives. The main issue is credibility. Once it is lost, it cannot be recovered.

b. The panelists discussed definitions of PA, PSYOP, and propaganda. It was stated that PSYOP is never directed at the US population (including US forces communities overseas). The panelists agreed there is a dilemma in trying to delineate the difference between PA and PSYOP, because there is no pat answer; yet a delineation is necessary.

c. Legal strictures are an important point. Congress has forbidden using taxpayers' dollars to influence legislative affairs. As a sidelight, however, if Congress asks for information bearing on legislation, you can provide lots of it.

d. A workshop participant commented to the panel that armed forces recruiting advertisements seem designed to "influence" and therefore appear to be PSYOP. (Note: Everyone reading this report should recognize that armed forces recruiting advertising is done under contract between the DOD and professional advertising firms, and by advertising and sales promotion personnel who work for the DOD specifically for that purpose. Psychological operations' assets are not involved at all.)

e. Discussion between panelists and participants:

(1) Psychological operations are not a chaotic, random activity. Psychological operations' campaigns must be approved at the federal level. There is no reason why a tasking can't be divided to ensure maximizing resources. Psychological operations have a definite niche. Public affairs is media-dependent. Psychological operations are not. Psychological operations use means such as leaflets.

(2) Public affairs and PSYOP missions seem pretty close. Is the PA mission to change behavior? That's probably too strong an interpretation, but it should be to change perceptions.

(3) We need an interagency arena for handling defense information; i.e., from multiple sources.

(4) The main issues are: knowing the definitions of PA and PSYOP; keeping the system working; and identifying where the line is drawn between pure research and pure deception. Also, we need a clearinghouse for information on topics such as staffing, equipment, capabilities, and missions of military organizations. This would enhance the entire DOD PA program.

(5) This seems like an ethical dilemma. The PA intent should be to inform. If there's an inkling of trying to shape opinions through PA it should be stopped.

(6) What is our rationale for informing the public? A by-product of the pure information effort can be changing perceptions.

(7) Where do you draw the line between informing and influencing?

(8) This discussion seems to be oriented toward a sharp contrast in ethics between PA and PSYOP. Psychological operations have important missions. I'd like to know why so many PA people think PSYOP is unethical.

(9) My perception is that PA and PSYOP are basically the same. It appears PA has avoided talking to PSYOP.

(10) Public Affairs and PSYOP are separate but equal.

(11) The challenge is to delineate how to conduct overt PSYOP and not jeopardize the credibility of PSYOP or PA.

(12) Some unified commands are tackling this issue of trying to coordinate PA and PSYOP, such as activating an "information coordination committee."

Session on PA Issues in Combatting Terrorism and in Peacetime Contingency Operations.

(Panelists were: Maj Tom Johnston, USLANTCOM; MAJ(P) Barry Willey, USCENTCOM; CWO2 John Hollis, US Coast Guard (Atlantic Area); and MAJ Bob Heath, CLIC)

1. The panelists discussed concepts of these issues and some of their views.

a. Terrorism is a form of LIC. Terrorists limit the government's time and opportunity to respond to their acts. They know how to use the media, sometimes more than PA knows how to combat it. Media exposure is a direct goal of terrorists. The media can be a hindrance to the counterterrorism effort. When a terrorist act occurs it is difficult to get the accurate message out. There is a problem in determining who it should be, as in instances in which several agencies, including US and foreign, are involved. It is essential to know who's going to provide that message, and make sure it's correct, so the press and public understand it and believe it.

b. Knowing the operational perspective is important to PA in LIC. Media access to operations is a major issue in peacetime contingency operations. Media concerns about access are understandable. The media was miffed about being left out of the planning for Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury). In addition, PA should be included in all planning phases of such operations. The program has gotten better since Grenada. We don't have a perfect system; but none is. We have come a long way in working with the media, such as with the media pool. Many journalists feel good about the media pool opportunities. Some, however, have become frustrated. We strive to provide them an opportunity to cover the news. We try to tell the US and the public about our operations through media coverage.

2. Questions/answers, and comments involving panelists and participants:

a. In combatting terrorism, what should PA do? Public affairs educates. The PAO coordinates through the State Department (US Information Service when overseas).

b. Great Britain has recently announced a blackout of news coverage of terrorist events, which really focuses on the IRA. We might think that is good because it denies terrorists a public forum. Yet, we deplore such measures in countries such as the USSR. Are news blackouts such as this good? No, but the media should be educated about the problem of giving terrorists the publicity they desire. We also need to educate our internal (DOD/military) audience about terrorism.

c. In counterterrorism planning we should seek to damage the prestige of terrorists and demonstrate US resolve to act against terrorists. To do that, we should have media coverage of such operations.

d. Some operations must be kept secret to protect the operational mission. We have to be careful what information is given. We have to protect our (intelligence) sources as well. At the same time, a short-term operation might be concluded in less time than it takes the DOD media pool to be activated.

e. If the public is behind us we can give the press information prior to an operation. For example, in World War II Eisenhower was known to have briefed reporters on operations beforehand, and they did not reveal those plans.

f. It's not the same today. There's no self-censorship among journalists. They believe anything may be published in order to tell the public what the government (and military) is doing.

g. It isn't true that journalists wouldn't agree to self-censorship. Also, sometimes journalists are your best intelligence sources. And the (DOD) media pool, because it (usually) depends on military communications, might help ensure operational security is maintained.

h. In counterdrug operations we must be very careful in releasing information which might violate legal rights. But we still must disseminate news about our counterdrug efforts.

i. What is the commander's role and relationship with the PAO in terrorist incidents? Response: The possibilities are: Tell the media everything, tell them nothing, or admit you don't know (if you don't).

j. In terrorist situations, the PA becomes the go-between between operators (military personnel) and the media, and thus, to the public.

k. We need to emphasize a positive relationship with the press. If we treat them properly we can expect fair treatment.

l. We must be able to keep an information flow going (to the media) or the press will seek other sources of information.

m. Question to a panelist: Were you brought in at an early enough stage in the planning sequence (for a peacetime contingency operation)? Response: Yes. In our command, PA people are included. We're responsible for a portion of the OPLAN. We recommend to the CINC the best means of employing PA assets and provide possible questions/responses on the operation.

n. Often, the degree to which PA is brought in "early" in the planning sequence may depend on the anticipated degree of media attention.

o. Was PA planning for the Persian Gulf operation coordinated with PSYOP? Response: Yes.

p. Regardless of how early in the planning process the PAO is brought in, command philosophy may hinder it (PA work).

q. For example, if the commander has been "burned" by the media, he'll mistrust it and not be forthcoming in dealing with the media.

r. The issue is not whether we agree with them (the media) but whether we should trust them.

Session on PA Issues in Insurgency/Counterinsurgency and in Peacekeeping Operations.

(Panelists were: LtCol Jim Pendergast, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, LCdr Jim Kudla, OASD(PA)-DDI, and LTC Angelle, CLIC)

1. The panelists discussed aspects of these LIC operational categories which have particular implications for PA. For example, the complex nature of peacekeeping operations affects the public's perception(s) of those operations. Therefore, the PAO or PA element has a natural mission in educating the public through traditional PA methods. In addition, the Peacekeeping force commander is linked to this effort in providing an image of credibility and sincere intention to carry out the peacekeeping mission in conjunction with the equally sincere intention of the belligerents. In considering the public's perception (or misconception) of the peacekeeping mission it behooves the commander to regularly talk with the media, answering questions and explaining procedures to increase public understanding and correct inaccuracies or misinformation. At the same time, the PAO should develop and communicate a consistent message to enhance the public education process. This is especially important because the US has participated in relatively few peacekeeping operations. Thus, the public has had correspondingly little opportunity to establish a base of knowledge about such missions.

2. Questions and comments involving panelists and participants:

a. Based on the Marines' experience in Beirut, it's apparent there should be a PAO with any force going ashore. There was not one assigned to the landing force, and a Sixth Fleet PAO was obtained to do the job.

b. Public Affairs Officers aren't always assigned to commands commanded by colonels. However, an expeditionary unit needs one, especially in a LIC situation. You can expect members of the media to be on the scene when you arrive, or not long after. Therefore, you need a PAO to be on hand to deal with them. If you wouldn't go ashore without your M-16, why would you go without your PAO, regardless of the unit's size?

c. We should take some of the "excess" PAOs out of Washington and put them out there.

d. Perhaps there could be a PA "strike team."

e. When plans are being developed for a deployment, PA may not have a high priority. The PAO should make the "operators" aware that when they land they'll be faced with a lot of media personnel throwing questions and snapping cameras.

f. It's just as important in a situation such as that of the Marines in Beirut to establish a reliable and prompt information flow between the on-site command and the chain of command, leading back to the Pentagon. The ability of DOD and service officials to respond to media inquiries and the need to keep an information flow going to the media through the major news bureaus based in Washington DC depends on this flow.

g. There was much talk of a "garrison mentality" concerning the Marines' presence in Beirut. This may have resulted from the media's inaccurate coverage.

(Remainder of this portion is on insurgency/counterinsurgency)

h. How about training leaders (such as platoon leaders or company commanders) to handle their own public affairs matters?

i. The British have trained their commanders in public affairs. One reason they're winning in Northern Ireland is that they're planning their operations knowing all Britons will hear about them the same night.

j. What about US PA in insurgency/counterinsurgency?

k. It's too touchy. It's so touchy we don't even want to talk about it here. It requires a strong definition and a change in the policy of what PA is. If not, it could smack of PSYOP.

l. News sources are a contentious issue in counterinsurgency. How do you (PAOs) make choices on which reporters to give what information? Are you going to give more information to some than to others; perhaps based on their trust?

m. The PAO should be able to tell the truth and thereby maintain credibility in telling the story. If the public believes it is being given the truth, it will support US forces. If the truth isn't told (or a story isn't released) and the public gets its information another way, the military may lose credibility. We should educate our bosses that sometimes you must release a story that is uncomplimentary but cannot have a "good face" put on it. They should know our credibility depends on releasing these stories as quickly and completely as we do the "good" ones.

n. If a reporter can't accept the fact that something is classified and shouldn't be released he/she isn't worth worrying about and we shouldn't be concerned about losing credibility.

o. National objectives are a driving force. Public Affairs Officers are dealing with decisions made at the national level. We need a workable policy to be effective as PAOs.

p. How do you deal with politicians coming into a third world country and expressing total opposition to everything we're doing there?

q. You need to treat critics with openness and be just as responsive to them as you would your supporters.

r. We've discussed talking to the media or not talking to the media. Sometimes it may be prudent to talk to the media later; to wait until you've put your thoughts together.

Session on PA Issues in Doctrine, Training, and Force Structure.

(Panelists were: CW02 Eric Carlson, MAGTF Warfighting Center, SFC(P) Jonathan Pierce, Public Affairs Proponent Activity (Army), and MAJ Bob Heath, CLIC)

1. The panelists briefly discussed potential issues, such as joint doctrine for PA in LIC, development of gaming simulations for PA in LIC, role of reserve components, Army PA doctrine and force structure applicable to LIC, and civil-military enhancement. They offered these for reaction to the workshop participants.

2. Questions and comments from workshop participants:

a. What do Army Mobile Public Affairs Detachments do when not deployed?

b. They are primarily in the reserve component, and are usually only activated when needed for a deployment. They can also apply their annual training to actual PA requirements, such as those ongoing in Central America. Otherwise, if on active duty, they would perform PA duties as needed in garrison.

c. Regarding development of training, etc., don't put the cart before the horse. The document/doctrine should be published before the training is started. JCS Pub 3-07 isn't published yet. Why are we talking about this before the doctrine is done? We haven't gotten as far as force structure or fixing the training problem. We've got to get the doctrine and policy fixed first. Less than 10 per cent feel LIC will even survive.

d. What joint training is being provided for PA in LIC?

e. There are three PSYOP courses based on the DOD PSYOP Master Plan. Do we need a PA Master Plan for LIC? I think we do.

f. Where do we start?

g. The doctrine is in FM 100-20/AFM 2-20 (Final Draft) and JCS Pub 3-07 (For Comment Draft). If you want to expedite this doctrine, take it home and get it moving.

h. We should all know how the reserve component system works. Trends indicate manpower will be thinning. We must be able to use assets carefully and creatively. Responsibilities may increase. If so, training will intensify. Think more about using reserve personnel. We need coordination in joint training for reservists and a joint concept for using reserves in PA in a LIC environment. The CLIC should take the lead in these things.

i. Regarding the gaming simulation for PA in LIC, this isn't a good use of your assets. It's not what we need, considering how few officers the CLIC has.

j. Is training at DINFOS (Defense Information School, the DOD training institution for armed forces PA personnel) keeping pace with PA force structure of the various armed services?

k. Each of the services should have a PA proponent to facilitate coordination on PA matters such as these. The Department of Defense should encourage their establishment and use.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS WORKSHOP
PARTICIPANT COMMENTS

This attachment contains comments from participants in the workshop on public affairs issues in low intensity conflict. These comments supplement those contained in the workshop discussion. Participants were given a comment sheet at the outset of the workshop to ensure they could submit additional opinions or information on relevant issues even if there was insufficient time to do so during the workshop. As with the workshop discussion, names are not used. The intent is to air candid, substantive views so this report can be useful to those pursuing the most effective techniques and procedures for employing public affairs in low intensity conflict.

1. PA Education and LIC Policy.

As was mentioned during the session, PA is a tough job in a LIC environment, in most instances. We need to be better informed -- PAOs across the DOD spectrum -- on just what LIC is all about, including practical examples of the work of PSYOP. I hope this conference is just a prelude to a continuing exchange of information between CLIC, PSYOP folks, and PAOs. I am fairly shocked that there is an apparent disagreement among senior government leadership regarding the existence of LIC policy. There seems to be apathy at high levels.

2. PA Credibility.

I tried to keep stressing "credibility." It's something that cannot be over stressed. The public/press have to believe what we, the military, are saying. I would also have put "training" first (in the order of workshop sessions) and then combined PSYOP-terrorism-counterterrorism-PA into one session. That way, when the subject-discussion jumped around it would have still fit within the structure. I came to the conference to hear what the DOD view is on PA and the other subjects. It was enlightening. Thanks for the chance.

3. PA and PSYOP Contrasts.

The purpose of PA communication is to inform. The purpose of PSYOP communication is to persuade. The difference is in the intent of the communication. When a requirement exists to protect or enhance democratic institutions, such as free and vital news media, the communications instruments that PA and PSYOP may utilize must also differ. Public affairs' efforts are not intended to "develop a constituency" or to "gain public support"; however, this may be a by-product of PA's efforts to inform fully.

In PA, the opposite of public support may result when PA, as required, informs the public of bad news or failures. Public affairs may inform the public as to what the government's positions and views may be, without attempting to persuade, or with the intent of building support. Psychological operations have no requirement to report bad news which may not enhance public support. By definition psychological operations "convey selected information" with the specific intent to influence.

The (DOD) Principles of Information for PA say that PA communicates as fully as possible, not so we may gain public support, but so that the public may assess and understand, not be influenced. Psychological operations' instruments are utilized in conjunction with face-to-face, civil-military operations -- what is known in garrison as "Community Relations." In the Information Age, PA must concentrate on its internal and external Media Information programs, and allow the civil-military operators to conduct PSYOP in what amounts to expeditionary/operational community relations programs. These involve "propaganda of deeds," to quote Che Guevera. This will also result in the needed dis-association between Media Information efforts and PSYOP.

In general, public support, particularly domestic public support, grows from actions taken by those utilizing the Political Instruments of LIC. Public support comes from effective political leadership -- politicians -- utilizing informational instruments beyond those that may be used by DOD's PA practitioners.

4. PA Enhancements.

The Preparation for Overseas Replacement (POR) Qualification for PA Staff (active and reserve): PA personnel need to be ready to deploy quickly, especially for LIC contingency operations/missions. This is not true (is not done) in many instances.

5. PA and PSYOP Differences, Utilization.

The primary problem with the relationship between public affairs and PSYOP is that there is not a clear difference in our stated mission. Both communities say they deal in telling the truth and both say they are concerned with altering perception. The primary difference appears to be in methods of operation. Public affairs deals with traditional media outlets (internal and external), whereas PSYOP are permitted to use less traditional media. Until there is a clear definition of differing missions and therefore, how those missions will be performed, the conflict will remain. We also should look at manning. The PSYOP organization at my command is considerably larger than the PAO staff. The unit commander, in effect, has trained communicators

both on the PAO staff and the PSYOP staff. The problem for the commander is to fully understand the differing missions of the groups and then utilize the assets for the benefit of the US.

6. Various Thoughts on PA-in-LIC Issues.

There is no national policy on LIC. Low intensity conflict/counterinsurgency frustrates planners, government, and the press. The CLIC PAPER (on public affairs roles in LIC) is superb. Any time you use military force you face a cynical audience. Most journalists are cynics. How will you (PAOs) communicate with the populace (in a host country) if it lacks radios and you lack a language capability? The PAO should not just inform the US audience but also assist local journalists in informing the host country. There is no code of ethics for journalists. The PAO should be "proactive" versus "reactive." There are a lot of inhibiting factors to doing the job.

7. Qualification and Use of PAOs in LIC Situations.

Public Affairs Officers should receive language training before being assigned to overseas areas in LIC situations. They must be able to easily communicate with host-country media and armed forces. Tour lengths for such assignments should be long enough to allow for a depth of experience in this specialty. Commanders in these situations should be thoroughly knowledgeable about using public affairs assets.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE
WORKSHOP

SECURITY ASSISTANCE WORKSHOP

14 December 1988

Purpose. To present a variety of pertinent security assistance issues to an audience of interested professionals. It is hoped that new perspectives and insights will emerge from this workshop which will stimulate thinking at the interagency level on the important subject of security assistance.

Summary of Speakers Remarks.

Security Assistance and its Relationship to the Third World. Lt Col Dennis Murphy, USAF, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, The Department of State, stated Security Assistance to the Third World is an important part of US foreign policy which contributes to regional stability and the growth of democratic institutions. Important to this endeavor is an understanding of the budget development process, and the roles of the Country Team and the CINCs. These are also first steps in approaching such problems as Congressional earmarking. Final solutions, however, can only emerge after a recognition of the magnitude of the problem, increased creativity by program administrators, and the development of a positive constituency within the bureaucracy.

Soviet Security Assistance to the Third World. Dr. Leif Rosenberger, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, stated that as Moscow's most effective instrument in the Third World, security assistance has provided the Soviets with an effective means of furthering political influence abroad. Among the several factors supporting this position are: the need to improve security; to obtain strategic or economic benefits; and the advancement of revolutionary causes. Historically, the Soviet policy of providing arms to revolutionary movements began in the 1920s with Lenin supplying Afghanistan, China, and Communist insurgents in Mongolia. In modern times, the Soviet Union has replaced the United States as the largest supplier of security assistance to the Third World. While the focus of Soviet attention has been the Middle East and South Asia, other regions have also received assistance, to include: South and East Asia, Sub-Sahara Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Currently, under a reassessment of global strategy by Gorbachev, the Soviet Union has decided to depend increasingly on security assistance over combat forces in the Third World -- a trend which is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

The Foreign Assistance Act, Arms Export Control Act, and Other Authorities. LTC Charles A. Byler, USA, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, US Pacific Command, focused on the need for both lawyers and non-lawyers to work together in the areas of

security assistance, combined training, and LIC planning. This cooperation may enhance the overall understanding of security assistance as it applies to specific areas, such as low intensity conflict, as well as aiding in deriving maximum benefit from those activities funded by Security Assistance and the Office of Management and Budget (O&M). To fully understand the impact of legislation such as the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act within the framework of security assistance, the principles which underlie their operation must also be understood. A key principle underlying both laws is, ". . . to provide defense articles and services for the overall purpose of increasing the security of the United States and promoting world peace." Finally, security assistance is only a part of the full spectrum of foreign assistance and, as such, falls directly under the Department of State, and all its activities must be coordinated with that agency. Supporting papers for the USPACOM/J-73 briefing on "The Foreign Assistance Act, Arms Export Control Act, and Other Authorities" will be published and distributed under separate cover.

A Strategy to Logistically Support US Policy in Low Intensity Conflict. Maj Eric Pettersen, USAF, Air Force Logistics Command, International Logistics Center, Wright-Patterson AFB OH, emphasized that United States national security strategy for low intensity conflict recognizes that indirect, rather than direct, applications of military power provides the most effective means of achieving national goals. In this context, security assistance has been called ". . . the principal instrument in Low Intensity Conflict." However, US military equipment has become sophisticated to a degree that it cannot easily support the needs of those countries in the LIC environment, making this strategy difficult to implement. The solution lies, in part, in providing effective and easily maintained equipment at low cost to these countries. However, success in this endeavor is clouded by US military perceptions of LIC and the Third World, as seen through the question, "How can we fight and win this war?" A more appropriate question may be, "Whose war is it?" If the latter were adopted as imperative, then a new set of doctrinal, tactical, and logistical needs would arise. The Department of Defense has the expertise to achieve national objectives in LIC at relatively low cost, and without committing US combat forces. The path to success lies along lines of combining the skills available at the theater Unified Commands with those of the larger security assistance community, especially the Defense Security Assistance Agency, and the US Special Operations Command.

Workshop Summary.

Recent experience has shown that issues such as the United States' security assistance role in the Third World compared with that of the Soviets, the possibilities of changing security assistance legislation, and the need for a strategy for security assistance in low intensity conflict, continue to surface whenever members of the security assistance community meet.

This workshop was part of a continuing effort by the Army-Air Force Center For Low Intensity Conflict to address important issues in those disciplines important to an appreciation of low intensity Conflict. The views expressed by workshop speakers are their own, and do not necessarily reflect those of any agency of the United States Government.

Attachments

- Lt Col Murphy's Briefing Notes
- Dr. Rosenberger's Paper
- LTC Byler's Paper
- Maj Pettersen's Paper

SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FOR
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

Dennis L. Murphy, Lt. Col., USAF
Department of State
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Office of Security Assistance and Sales

Security Assistance is a major component of Foreign Policy

Used for over 40 years to support strategy of global deterrence

The key components of security assistance are:

FMS(F)

FMS(CR)

MAP

ESF

IMET

CASH SALES

These programs assist the United States in the pursuit of national security

The goals that assistance promotes include:

Promoting regional stability

Maintaining U.S. alliances and military access

Enhancing stability of U.S. security partners

Defending democratic values and institutions

Helping others to defend themselves is an efficient use of resources to achieve important national security objectives

Understanding the security assistance budgeting process is a key to providing useful information and gaining appropriate assistance

The budget development process for security assistance works through an inter-agency group known as the SAPRWG

Security Assistance Program Review Working Group

Representatives on this inter-agency group are as follows:

State PM, T, D; State regional bureaus, AF, ARA, EAP, EUR, NEA; OUSD DSAA, ISA, ISP; OJCS/J-5; AID; ACDA; State EB, H, HA, INM, L, S/P; NSC; OMB; Treasury

The schedule for information requests and actions of the SAPRWG

Apr - AIASA tasker message to SAOs', CINCs', and Agencies

Jun - AIASA due from Post/SAO

Jul - AIASA due from CINCs' and agencies

Aug - SAPRWG first budget cut and coordination

Sep - Security Assistance budget recommendation to OMB

Oct - Budget Request level passback from OMB

Nov - Final budget reclaims to OMB, then final allocations

Dec - Congressional Presentation Document final edit

Jan - Budget presentation to Congress

Feb - CPD presentation to Congress

SAPRWG process was streamlined in 1987

Eliminated long meetings and presentations

Focus effort on more meaningful planning within the realistic constraints of the budget situation

AIASA is the principle tool in the budget process

Provides the input of the country team and the CINCs'

It is the justification for any part of the program

Issues and Items to support LIC efforts must enter the process at the point of the AIASA development and the SAPRWG effort

Organizations have inputs through the SAPRWG members

Through the chain of command in DOD and JCS

Through the geographic or functional offices in State and AID

The Security Assistance System IS NOT broken

Money and flexibility in its distribution are the obstacles

Priorities are established during the SAPRWG process

Allocation of resources is fully coordinated

Congressional reductions from requested levels force hard choices

Congressional earmarks limit flexibility

Congress uses the earmark to express areas of interest

Congress emphasizes that they usually support the administrations highest priorities

Congress often says liberals support foreign assistance conservatives do not

The question is; "Where do we go from here?"

Recognizing the magnitude of the problem is the first step

In 1989, a shift of approximately 2 per cent in the earmarked funds will cover nearly all known requirements for sustainability in the worldwide program

We need an overall increase in the budget to maintain priority programs at their current levels due to inflation

Many priority programs have requirements for even more money

Given the OVERRIDING issue of the deficit there will be little or no NEW increases in money

A shift of focus and emphasis at the national level will be required to change the allocation goals for assistance

The most effective short term action available will be to focus energy on highlighting requirements

Creativity to minimize dollar requirements and active justification are the key to funding

As with funding the people involved throughout the system need to be creative in identifying the items need to meet the requirements

Look for U.S. made standard or non-standard items

Look for U.S. commercial off-the -shelf items

Look for foreign made items with high U.S. content

Push the system for information on availability of items that meet the requirements

The SAOs' working with countries having the need for support must articulate that requirement and people receiving the requests must help refine the justification

Developing champions with the bureaucracy is necessary

People in the system must understand the requirements

Understanding by members of the SAPRWG is key to improving priority and chances for increased funding

Understanding by the implementers is key to identifying items and getting them delivered

Legislation and policy can be changed with good reason

Legislative initiatives go to Congress at the start of the request cycle

Initiatives must be staffed through the process on or before the initial budget request is complete

Start early - its a long review process through all the interested parties

As the LIC process matures, an overall plan must be developed

Develop country lists to identify potential threats

Develop equipment, training and project lists

Identify priorities for all requirements

Build coalitions within the system

Develop champions within the process

Develop the knowledge and understanding to work within the system

Realize not all requirements can be filled

SOVIET SECURITY ASSISTANCE: AN OVERVIEW

by

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Security assistance is unquestionably Moscow's most important and effective instrument in its overall policy toward developing countries in the Third World. Soviet security assistance in no way guarantees that Soviet political influence will be forthcoming or durable. But security assistance does provide the Soviet Union with the potential means to exploit opportunities in hopes of establishing, maintaining or strengthening political influence.

What Is It?

Before going any further, it's important to understand what we mean by Soviet security assistance. After all, Soviet security assistance to the Third World encompasses a wide range of military and military related activities. Daniel S. Papp provides a particularly useful and comprehensive definition. He says security assistance includes "transferring weapons, spare parts, munitions, support equipment, defense production machinery, and dual-use transportation and communication equipment; advising and training regular military and paramilitary forces; constructing facilities that will be used wholly or primarily by military or paramilitary forces; and providing various support services including transportation for the military forces and paramilitary forces of developing states and those socialist states that have forces deployed in the developing world."¹

Why Do They Do It?

While the desire to establish political influence is arguably the major reason why the Soviet Union (and its surrogates) rely so heavily on security assistance, there are three other sometimes interrelated motivating factors. These are to improve Soviet security, obtain strategic or economic benefits, and to advance the revolutionary process in the Third World. Certainly the large amount of Soviet security assistance to Third World countries along or near its borders can be largely explained as an attempt to create friendly buffers to enhance security. Soviet leaders also believe that arms aid to countries distant from the Soviet Union also provides security by diverting US and Western forces from threatening the Soviet Union. Secondly, Moscow provides security assistance in the hope of acquiring a quid pro quo such as access to military facilities/bases or hard currency. And finally, while the Soviet Union sometimes seems to

send arms to clients for pragmatic or realpolitik reasons (as cited above), the Soviet Union also is driven by ideological reasons to send arms to leftist or communist leading countries.

How Have Political Openings Occurred?

By the mid-1960s, the number of potential customers for Soviet security assistance was rising. The decline of the British and French empires in the 1960s and the breakup of the Portuguese empire in the 1970s created new opportunities for Moscow. New states such as Algeria, South Yemen, Mozambique and Angola were all anxious to obtain Soviet arms.²

In addition, the Cold War consensus in America that had supported the containment of Soviet expansionism in the 1950s and 1960s was gone by the 1970s. As one analyst puts it:

The post-Vietnam disillusionment and "neo-isolationism" in the United States reinforced the growing confidence and buoyancy among Soviet officials. The uncertainty and lack of resolve in American policy in the 1970s enabled the Soviet Union to exploit new opportunities in the Third World, most notably in Angola and Ethiopia. By shipping large amounts of arms and Soviet advisers to these countries, the USSR created entirely new arms markets for itself.³

In the security assistance game, the Soviets are opportunists. They have been quick to take advantage of political vacuums left during decolonization. For instance, the Soviets were promptly offered arms to Iraq shortly after the July 1958 coup which overthrew the pro-Western regime which had ruled the country since the end of the British mandate in the 1930s. Moscow signed a military aid agreement in November of 1958, and throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets began modernizing Iraqi army, air and naval forces.

At other times, Moscow was already supporting a national liberation movement during the decolonization process, and therefore was poised and ready to exploit the opening. For instance, the Soviets began providing security assistance to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the 1950s. The Kremlin stepped up its security support to the MPLA following the April 1974 coup. By late 1975, the Soviets and their Cuban surrogate provided massive amounts of security assistance to the MPLA. This security assistance was instrumental in helping the MPLA seize power and counter South African, Zairian and other pro-Western insurgents.

Revolutions and internal conflicts in other Third World areas (such as Indochina and Ethiopia) created more political openings for Soviet security assistance. While the number of consumers of

Soviet security assistance in the mid-1970s was still small (about 40 in comparison with the number of states receiving US arms), the Soviets were successful in moving from security relations with a handful of countries to a large network of pro-Soviet allies or friends around the world.⁴

Moscow has also been alert to exploit strains in US relations with key regional clients. For instance, in the late 1960s, the Peruvian military government began a military modernization drive. Following a rebuff from Washington, Peru turned first to Western Europe and finally to the Soviet Union for security assistance. In 1973, the Soviet Union offered Peru arms and equipment at incomparable prices and terms.

Similarly, Indian leaders approached American, Britain and France with procurement requests in 1962. The US and the West Europeans responded with substantially reduced counteroffers: outdated equipment, no co-production rights and unfavorable financing. Following these Western rebuffs, Moscow offered India inexpensive modern equipment under favorable terms and often with provisions for co-production.

How Sophisticated Is It?

In the early years of the Soviet security assistance program, Moscow had a reputation of exporting antiquated materiel, some of it delivered in various states of disrepair. However, this report did not really conform to the facts. For even in the first decade of the program, approximately half the military equipment provided was still in use by Soviet and Warsaw Pact, with a significant amount still in Soviet production.⁵ As the program matured, the Soviets provided an increasing proportion of late-model equipment to their clients. From the 1970s to the present, some of Moscow's Arab clients began receiving the same types of air defense equipment as Soviet forces, again before the Warsaw Pact states in some cases.⁶

The sophisticated nature of Soviet weapons now delivered to the Third World can be seen in virtually all categories, including:

- o "fighter aircraft like the MiG-29 Fulcrum (shipped to India, Syria, and Iraq), which is the most advanced fighter now in the Soviet arsenal;
- o ground-attack aircraft like the Su-25 Frogfoot (to Iraq), the MiG-27-27M Flogger D/J (to India); and the Su-17/-20/-22 Fitter D/H (to Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Peru, and South Yemen);
- o the medium-range Tu-22 Blinder bomber (to Iraq and Libya);

- o combat helicopters like the Mi-24 Hind D gunship (to Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Peru, Syria, South Yemen, and Libya, among others);
- o naval systems like the Kilo-class attack submarine (to India);
- o surface-to-surface missiles (SS-21's to Syria, reportedly now equipped with chemical warheads) and air defense missiles (SA-5's and SA-8's to Syria and Libya, SA-8's to India, Mozambique, Jordan, and other, and portable SA-14's to Nicaragua);
- o large quantities of T-72 main battle tanks and other sophisticated armored vehicles (to many countries, with India due to receive the T-80 as well); and
- o II-76 Candid transport aircraft (to a number of countries) and Tu-126 Moss reconnaissance and early-warning aircraft (to Syria)."⁷

Origins and Growth of Program

Security assistance has always been an instrument Moscow used--to a greater or lesser extent--to further the revolutionary process. As part of this process, the Soviets have exported arms to friendly states as well as to revolutionary movements. Beginning in the 1920s, Lenin provided arms to Afghanistan, China and to communist insurgents in Mongolia.⁸ In the 1930s, during the Spanish Civil War, Moscow shipped arms to pro-communist elements in the Republican government. Overall, while Soviet arms transfers in Lenin's era and Stalin's pre-World War II era were significant signs of Soviet political support for movements or friendly states, but they were not decisive in changing the political/military status quo.

In the immediate years after World War II, the devastation to the Soviet industrial base precluded much of a security assistance program to the Third World.⁹ The main recipient of a gradually reinvigorated Soviet military industries was the Soviet armed forces itself and later the other Warsaw Pact Organization members. But while Stalin was primarily Eurocentric, he was also willing to use arms transfer to further the revolutionary process in selected cases. For instance, the Soviets had large stockpiles of enemy arms, which they distributed to communist forces in China, Jewish independence forces in 1948 and to North Korean government forces.¹⁰

The USSR signed its first military assistance agreement with a developing country (Egypt) in 1955. But Soviet arms transfers remained at relatively low levels up through the mid-1960s. A few countries (China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq and Syria)

did receive substantial quantities of Soviet arms.¹¹ But overall, Krushchev tried to woo newly independent Third World States more with economic aid and trade than with arms transfers. When these early attempts to use economic assistance failed to allure many African states, the Kremlin increasingly found security assistance to be a more useful tool to advance their goals. In contrast to the cumbersome economic assistance projects, Soviet arms could be delivered quickly and could produce almost immediate political pay-offs.¹² Soviet military assistance grew impressively under Brezhnev and his successors. In the ten year period of 1966-1975, Soviet arms transfers totaled \$9.2 billion.¹³ In just the five-year period of 1973-1977, the Soviets delivered \$13.1 billion in arms to the Third World.¹⁴ And then in the five-year period of 1978-1982, Soviet arms transfers reached \$35.4 billion.¹⁵ The share of Soviet arms transfers to the Third World grew from less than 20 percent to over 30 percent between 1966 and 1982.

Since the late 1970s, the Soviet Union has replaced the United States as the largest supplier of security assistance to the Third World. From 1981-1985, the \$49.1 billion worth of Soviet arms transfers represented 33 percent of all arms exported to the Third World, compared to only 19 percent supplied by America. In this five-year period (1981-1985), the value of Soviet security assistance was four times as high as during the entire 1955-1974 twenty year period.¹⁶

Size and Geographic Trends in Program

Since the first \$250 million arms sales agreement was signed with Egypt in 1955, Soviet military assistance to the Third World has followed a similar pattern. Only a few countries are targeted as primary recipients of Soviet security assistance, and most of them are either on or near the Soviet borders in the Middle East and South Asia. The importance Moscow attaches to the Mideast/South Asian region is reflected by both the value of arms transfers as well as by the numbers of arms transferred.¹⁷ From 1954 to 1981, about two-thirds of all Soviet arms transfers went to countries in the Middle East and South Asia. And during the ten year period from 1976 to 1985, this skewing of Soviet security assistance has become even more pronounced, with approximately three-quarters of all Soviet arms transfers going to the Middle East and South Asia.¹⁸

In the more constricted 1981-1985 time period, the Mideast/North Africa and South Asia again accounted for the largest share of Soviet arms deliveries to the Third World during this period--about 64 percent.¹⁹

Moreover, the non-Marxist Third World countries getting the most Soviet arms are all located in this Mideast/South Asian region, with Syria, Iraq and Libya actually receiving larger

dollar amounts of Soviet security assistance than even Vietnam or Cuba up through 1985. Syria was the largest single recipient of Soviet arms transfers during the 1981-1985 time period, with about \$8 billion in Soviet deliveries; Iraq was second with \$7.4 billion of Soviet arms deliveries, Libya was third with \$4.6 billion, and India was fourth with \$4.2 billion.²⁰

On balance, Soviet security assistance has been and remains largely focused on the Middle East and South Asia. While Soviet arms transfers to the region has decreased slightly as a percentage of total Soviet arms transfers to the Third World up through 1985, the absolute value of arms transferred to the region has gone up.

While the Middle East and South Asia are the clear focus of Soviet security assistance, Moscow also has robust security assistance programs throughout the world. During the 1970s the Soviets demonstrated an expanded interest in supplying military assistance to sub-Saharan Africa and Latin American governments, as well as to revolutionary movements in both areas. After setbacks in Ghana and Mali in the 1960s, sub-Saharan Africa assumed a new prominence in Soviet security assistance strategy in the late 1970s and 1980s. Soviet arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa rose from slightly less than 3 percent of Soviet arms transfers to the Third World for the 1966-1975 period to slightly more than 13 percent by 1978-82.²¹ Most of the increase can be attributed to the massive influx of Soviet arms transfers to Ethiopia and Angola. During the 1981-1985 time period, the Soviets delivered \$6 billion in arms to the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, making this region the second-leading region for Soviet arms exports, (or 12% of total Soviet arms transfers to the Third World). This figure also represented 46 percent of all arms going into the region. Angola received \$2.6 billion in arms transfers from the USSR and Ethiopia received about \$2 billion in Soviet arms transfers.²²

In addition, by the early 1980s the Soviets showed a new activism in Latin America. To be sure, the Soviet Union had been involved in a large security assistance program with Cuba since the early 1960s. But except for its arms relationship with Peru throughout the 1970s, Moscow really had not been very successful in developing security assistance programs in Latin America. In the early 1980s, however, Moscow and Havana began to work together more successfully in Latin America. And in 1981, Soviet support to the new Sandinista government became formalized, when the two governments signed a \$100 million military assistance agreement. By early 1985 Soviet military assistance to Nicaragua totaled nearly \$500 million.²³ Soviet-Cuban cooperation in security assistance also took place in Grenada. Prior to the US invasion and occupation of the island, the USSR was reportedly prepared to send \$25 million of security assistance to Grenada.²⁴

During the 1981-1985 time period, Latin America was the area of the world receiving the least amount of Soviet arms transfers, with about \$4.1 billion or 8 percent of total Soviet deliveries. Nonetheless, this figure amounted to 31 percent of the world's total arms exports to the region. In Soviet eyes, this military assistance is a cost effective way to divert US attention from Soviet security concerns closer to home. Cuba continued to get the bulk of this military assistance (\$3.5 billion), Nicaragua received \$250 million in arms transfers and Peru received \$390 million.²⁵

Meanwhile, during this same 1981-1985 time period, East Asia accounted for the third largest share of Soviet security assistance, with about \$4.9 billion or 10 percent of total Soviet military deliveries. Vietnam continued to receive the bulk of this military assistance (\$3.5 billion). Mongolia (\$470 million), North Korea (\$390 million) and Cambodia (\$350 million) each received almost equal shares of the rest. Overall, Soviet security assistance represented about 33 percent of total world arms transfers to East Asia.²⁶

The Soviet Union has also been active in extending security assistance to revolutionary movements in the Third World in recent years. Unfortunately, since this military support is covert in nature, no hard figures are available on the amount of Soviet security assistance to these groups. Such support has been a low-cost activity that has returned tangible benefits to the Soviets. Much of this covert Soviet security assistance has gone to African movements in the past, although recent Soviet activity in other areas has also proved beneficial.

Despite this generally downward movement in Soviet security assistance since 1982, the value of Soviet arms transfers to the Middle East and South Asia has remained much higher (\$11.4 billion) in the 1980-85 period than they were in the 1974-1979, when they amounted to only \$7.7 billion.²⁷ While the value and quantity of Soviet arms transfers remain at a very high level, a number of factors are keeping Soviet security assistance from going much higher. First, a number of new suppliers have come into the international arms market and seized a small but significant share of the business. Second, there is a reduced demand for weapons among indebted Third World states.²⁸ Third, financial difficulties resulting from declining oil prices are beginning to cause even oil rich Arab countries to be more circumspect with arms purchases.

Soviet Security Assistance: Pros and Cons

Soviet security assistance has a number of intrinsic qualities that Third World countries find attractive, especially in comparison to similar US or Western systems. These advantages that the Soviet Union enjoys over the United States as a weapons

supplier include flexible policymaking and political reliability, quick delivery, lower prices and easier financing, and simpler weapons and easier maintenance.

Flexible Policymaking and Political Reliability

Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union can and does deliver arms to a client whenever the need arises, without pressure from public opinion and without divisive and exhaustive interagency and legislative debates.²⁹ Indian defense planners, in particular, prefer Soviet equipment despite its frequent technical inferiority to Western equipment, partly because of the perceived reliability of the USSR as a supplier. The long-term reliability of the Soviet arms source, especially during crisis periods, has made a strong positive impression on many Indian military professionals. In fact, the perception of reliability provides a strong incentive for countries like India to sustain close security ties to the USSR.³⁰

In America, on the other hand, proposals from a Third World country for US arms must be screened by State, ACDA and DOD; and they must also go to a Congress predisposed against America being "the merchants of death." United States presidents have been known to back away from possible arms sales (e.g., those for Jordan and Saudi Arabia) because of the pervasive Jewish lobby. Knowing this, countries like Jordan generally see the Soviet Union as a more politically reliable arms supplier than America. This same perception seems to be developing in Saudi Arabia.

Quick Delivery

Many clients prefer Soviet weapons systems because of their prompt speed of delivery. The Soviet Union on the average usually takes less than 12 months from contract to delivery of major weapons systems, as compared to 24-36 months for America. This disparity is a significant factor in competition for the Third World market.³¹ The Indians, for instance, were attracted to a Soviet transport aircraft partly because of its early availability.³² The Peruvians also seem satisfied with the fast delivery time or responsiveness of Soviet weapons shipments. The Soviet comparative advantage in speed of delivery is due to a number of factors.

In the past, the Soviets were able to deliver weapons faster than America because of advanced planning, which establishes an orderly production flow in contrast to the "feast or famine" syndrome that characterizes much of the US defense production. The Soviet military production system is tailored to meet the needs of its security assistance recipients. Unlike the American system, the Soviet Union and its allies have a large and responsive military industry, more than capable of fulfilling weapons requirements for their own forces, Warsaw Pact forces and

other Communist and Third World clients. In this sense, the needs of valuable friends and allies are not considered secondary to the needs of the services in the Soviet Union. Moreover, there are no shortfalls in Soviet industrial production when it comes to turning out military equipment. That is because Soviet defense production anticipates probable requests from potential arms recipients. By planning well in advance of the actual requests, Soviet military industry is able to produce high levels of sustained output to satisfy Third World recipients on short notice.

The Soviet Union also enjoys a huge defense production base. The expansion of Soviet military production that began in the early to mid-1960s has enabled Soviet military industries to assure a steady flow of goods and services abroad.³³ This huge Soviet defense production base turns out large quantities of surplus arms that can be quickly shipped to Third World clients.³⁴ The Soviets purposefully build up large stockpiles of surplus equipment for this very reason. As one Western military official puts it, "the Soviets never throw anything away. They just upgrade and provide them to client states."³⁵

In addition, the Soviets have developed whole production lines for the export market.³⁶ For example, for clients who don't need or can't afford the latest equipment, the USSR has kept production lines going for selected arms like the MiG-21 fighter, that is no longer used by first-line Soviet military. They also keep large quantities of older, refurbished weapons."³⁷ This Soviet practice of producing for export on a dedicated line facilitates scheduling and eliminates the need for frequent changes in equipment, tooling and material supply to accommodate any differences in the design of an export variant.

Dedicated export production and large stockpiles of Soviet weapons systems also permits Moscow to deliver arms to Third World clients without having to lower readiness by drawing down Soviet armed forces operational weapons. Mark W. Kramer argues persuasively that this Soviet capability affords Moscow a significant competitive advantage over the West:

Western governments, by contrast, must draw on operational equipment if they want to transfer arms rapidly, which means that their own front-line or reserve forces may suffer in readiness. This happened with US forces in Europe in 1973 when large quantities of equipment had to be supplied to Israel during the war with the Arab neighbors. If the Western governments had to draw down their armed forces' operational equipment, they have to wait three to four years until new weapons come off the production line for delivery; by that time, much of it may have gone elsewhere.³⁸

Lower Prices and Easier Financing

Despite the rise in the price of Soviet weapons systems that began in the 1970s, Soviet prices on the whole have been substantially below Western prices for relatively comparable equipment³⁹, for example, the list price of a Soviet MIG-23 fighter originally averaged about \$6.7 million, while the price America charged Israel for the F-15 fighter was about \$12 million per aircraft. Similarly the price of a Soviet MIG-21 fighter originally listed at \$2 million, while that of an F-4 was \$5.7 million.⁴⁰ Discounts from list prices have also been part of the Soviet military assistance approach. Such discounts have reportedly averaged about 40 percent of the value of the Soviet weapons contract. Discounting seems to be based on Moscow's assessment of a recipient's ability to pay, as well as the basis of political favoritism.⁴¹ India was reportedly attracted to a Soviet transport aircraft partly because the Soviets offered it at a relatively low unit cost.⁴² Once the Soviets establish an arms relationship with a client like Peru, Moscow is able to maintain its position as chief arms supplier through its ability to undersell competing arms producers. Moreover, Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba and Vietnam are reportedly free of charge, as was all the Soviet military aid provided to Grenada before October, under a series of "top secret" agreements.⁴³

In addition, the Soviets continue to offer attractive financial terms to clients, although not as low as in the past. Back in the 1970s the Soviet Union provided arms to many Third World countries either free of charge or at subsidized prices. To some extent, this practice continues. But with most of the non-Marxist clients, it is no longer the case. Similarly, up through the 1970s, the terms of financing for Third World clients was extremely attractive. The Soviet Union often allowed for small downpayments, usually 20 percent of the contract price. Credits generally ran at 2.5 to 5 percent, with repayment terms averaging 10 years, but occasionally up to 20 years. Sometimes the arms recipient was given a grace period of one to two years. And to key clients hard-pressed for foreign exchange, Moscow sometimes has permitted repayment in local currency or commodities. In addition, the Soviets have often postponed payment when recipients have been unable to meet their scheduled payments.⁴⁴

In recent years, Moscow has driven a harder financial bargain. It is less eager to heavily subsidize arms to non-communist Third World clients. It also is pushing for more payments in hard currency. Despite this shift of emphasis, the Soviets are still willing to offer terms that are generally better than those offered by America. For example, Moscow recently closed a security assistance deal with India that calls for a large shipment of Soviet arms to be financed at 2.5 percent for 17 years, with payment permitted in rubles rather than in

Western currency. Sub-Saharan African countries enjoy financial deals comparable to New Delhi's.⁴⁵ Moreover, Moscow has recently "rolled over" or written off Egypt's large military debt to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union also offers more attractive countertrade and barter deals than America to Third World arms customers. Unlike the United States, the Soviets have many years of experience in the countertrade and barter business, especially in their trade with East European allies. So it is no wonder that it is Soviet Union that can more easily take advantage of the need of many Third World states to provide Moscow with nonmonetary compensation for military deliveries.⁴⁶ While the Soviets prefer hard currency, especially from oil rich Arab countries, they accept offsets if it allows them to penetrate a region politically. America, in contrast, generally does not do very well in the areas of offsets for arms payments.

Simpler Weapons and Easier Maintenance

Many Soviet clients like the rugged, simple-to-operate Soviet equipment. Soviet weapons tend to be more reliable than American ones. In the Vietnam War, for instance, Soviet AK-47s rifles, while heavier and less accurate than the early US made M-16s, invariably fired even when wet, while the finicky M-16 frequently did not. As the CIA notes:

Rigorous design specifications--such as mirror-like finishes and tight tolerances--are called for (in Soviet weapons) only where necessary for performance. Circuit designs are simple by US standards and materials that are costly and difficult to machine are avoided where possible Soviet designers have also developed a knack for keeping parts to a minimum What appears to be crude, however, often conceals very potent combat capabilities. The "simple, rugged design" of Soviet weapons has not interfered with their combat effectiveness in the hands of well-trained troops.⁴⁷

Third World soldiers in the field also find Soviet weapons easier to maintain than their American counterparts. Because of the simplicity of Soviet systems, the soldiers are expected to perform only the most rudimentary of maintenance tasks. This is especially important for many Soviet Third World clients, whose soldiers consist mostly of conscripts who lack technical skills. When a weapon system needs major overhaul, it is sent to a centralized depot or factory, where the small number of trained Third World technicians can best utilize their talents.

Soviet Problems and Client Complaints

While the Soviet Union enjoys a competitive advantage over America in many aspects of security assistance, the Soviet program also has its problems. Soviet clients are invariably complaining about some aspect of the security assistance program. At times, these complaints may not be totally justifiable, and may reflect the incompetence of the recipient as much as negative aspects of the Soviet program. But as with buying a new automobile, what matters most is whether the buyer likes the product. If complaints outweigh satisfaction, the buyer will try to shop around for another product. But as we will see, in the security assistance game, the Soviet client often becomes dependent on Soviet weapons systems and cannot always assert his independence, even if complaints outweigh satisfaction.

Inferior Arms

While Soviet weapons systems are simpler to operate than comparable US systems, most Third World states feel that Soviet arms lack the quality of US arms. This perception was perpetuated at the time of the 1982 Lebanon War (see Syrian case study), when Israel humiliated Syria. Most Third World observers argued that US and Israeli arms outperformed Soviet arms. To be fair to Moscow, the Israeli victory was due as much to the Israeli skills in using the weapons than to the quality of the weapons.⁴⁸ But as cited earlier, what matters most is the perception of most Third World states that Soviet weapons systems are inferior to comparable US and Israeli systems. The failure of Soviet-made air defense systems to knock down US planes during US strikes against Libya in April 1986 and the humiliation of the heralded Cessna-172 plane landing in Red Square in May 1987 also perpetuates this perception.⁴⁹

When Soviet clients discuss the poor quality of Soviet arms, they often complain that the weapons are substandard or second-hand equipment. Indian military officers, for instance, have blamed the Soviets for supplying used and poorly maintained weapons.⁵⁰ Egypt in the early 1970s and Algeria more recently seem to feel that Soviet equipment is nearly obsolescent and in no way measures up to the sophisticated arms the US provides its clients.⁵¹

Perhaps some of the problem is that Moscow often provides sanitized export versions of Soviet military equipment, which are invariably inferior to those used by Soviet forces. While Indian defense planners prefer Soviet systems, Indian service personnel who've had exposure to Western equipment invariably criticize Soviet equipment.⁵² As a result of these feelings and perceptions, the Soviet arms sales program occasionally suffers because of the allure of more sophisticated US and Western weaponry. Soviet clients also complain about the fact that Soviet systems are not suitable to all climates.

Poor Follow-on Support

Generally speaking, Soviet follow-up support is inferior to the total package America offers. Many Third World states are leery of becoming too dependent on Soviet arms because of the poor quality of servicing, training and technical support that Soviet advisers and technicians provide.⁵³ Soviet spare parts are expensive, scarce or withheld as a means of gaining Moscow political influence. Soviet maintenance practices are also criticized. Clients complain that major weapons system have to be sent back to the USSR too often for major overhaul. While Moscow is quick with its initial hardware deliver, Soviet clients complain about the slow Soviet delivery of spare parts.⁵⁴

Soviet attempts to manipulate delivery schedules and shipments of spare parts for political purposes often causes strains with clients. The Iraqis, especially feel the Soviets keep a tight rein on spare parts in order to manipulate the end user. The Soviets also use arms embargoes for political purposes. For instance, when Baghdad cracked down on the Kurdish rebels in the mid-1970s, Moscow withheld arms and Soviet-Iraqi relations soured. And in September 1980, the Soviets halted all deliveries of arms to Iraq following Iraq's invasion of Iran. Moscow resumed arms transfers to Iraq in April 1981.

Soviet clients also complain that the Soviets do not train indigenous military personnel sufficiently. Poor Soviet training has provoked bitter complaints from Syria (in 1967 and 1982), Egypt (1970-72) and Libya (1986).⁵⁵ Syrian officers say that Soviet instructors follow a rigid lesson plan and are unable (or unwilling) to answer questions which do not exactly follow the outline. Freewheeling discussions and innovative ideas are discouraged. Worse still, the Indians say the Soviets are reluctant to provide technical information and that they share such knowledge only after much persuasion.⁵⁶ Some clients say Soviet instructors deliberately do not divulge all the technical or precise performance characteristics of the MIG-23.

Poor Soviet training practices ultimately serve to significantly weaken the military capability of Third World countries. For instance, while rigid Soviet ground training has improved the Syria's Army's combat capabilities, it has not provided it with the tactical flexibility emphasized in the Israeli Army. Similarly, Soviet pilot training tends to concentrate more on aircraft safety or on ground control of the aircraft rather than on air combat maneuvers. Consequently, Israeli pilots totally outclass Syrian pilots.

Heavy-Handed Soviet Advisers

Many of the Soviet advisers have an air of superiority and a condescending attitude toward their Third World counterparts.

Some are culturally insensitive racists. Most have an overbearing manner which has repeatedly triggered resentment. Many clients complain about the espionage activity of Soviet advisers. They Libyans, in particular, are suspicious of Soviet motives and are wary of Soviet intrigues. In the late 1970s, Sudan evicted 90 Soviet military advisers after it was learned that Soviet advisers rigged Sudanese radar to enable Soviet overflights of the country to go undetected.

Meanwhile Soviet arms recipients also complain about the heavy ideological content of Soviet training programs. India, Syria and Iraq are all reportedly reluctant to have their officers trained in the Soviet Union for this reason. Iraq, in particular, has complained bitterly about Soviet training programs in the USSR. Iraq has complained bitterly about Soviet indoctrination of Iraqi personnel. Soviet client anxiety about Moscow's ideological indoctrination became more pronounced after the April 1978 coup in Afghanistan (performed by Soviet-trained Afghan operatives), as well as after the January 1988 coup in South Yemen.⁵⁷

Complaints about Higher Soviet Prices

While the price of Soviet weapons systems are still generally lower than the price of comparable US systems (as discussed earlier), the Soviet decision to raise its arms prices has not been a popular one with many Soviet clients. Some clients (like India) will concede unit prices of Soviet equipment are still relatively low. But the Indians complain loudly that the price of spare parts and auxiliaries are high, thus provoking uncertainty and misgivings in New Delhi. The Indians have been involved in prolonged bargaining in an effort to reduce these costs. Protracted Soviet-Indian negotiations over the procurement of a Soviet transport aircraft took many months before a price reduction was reached.⁵⁸

Economic Considerations Looming Larger

During the early years of the Soviet security assistance program, political and military considerations were paramount in the mind of Soviet leaders when they considered establishing a security assistance relationship with a client. In fact, for many years Moscow was willing to extend a substantial number of grants and other highly favorable terms of financing to clients (i.e., tolerate a substantial economic burden) in order to obtain political and military benefits. In the early years of the Soviet security assistance program, Moscow discounted its arms at an average of 40 percent of list price (and in the case of Afghanistan, as high as 75 percent). But by the mid 1970s, Soviet discounts (especially to oil rich Arab clients) dropped to less than 20 percent. Between 1973 and 1980, the Soviets raised the price they sold its arms by about 80 percent.

The Kremlin raised the price of its arms for three reasons. First, it needed hard currency. Soviet economic problems beginning in the early 1970s (crop failures, large grain imports and sizable trade deficits) had depleted Soviet hard currency supplies and made it difficult to import the technology it needed to fuel economic modernization. Secondly, the mid-1970s was a sellers market for arms. In particular, there was a fast growing demand for sophisticated Soviet arms (that could be delivered on short notice). And third, Arab oil wealth was readily available to underwrite the payment of hard currency for Soviet arms. Consequently, Moscow took advantage of the improved financial position of its oil rich clients, and countries like Syria which received oil revenues from OPEC. In dealings with rich clients, the prices Moscow charges for some of its military equipment are even close to the prices the West charges for comparable equipment. This is especially true with Soviet fighters and medium tanks.

Moscow's decision in the mid-1970s to increase the price of its weapons and to tighten the terms of its financing has made Soviet arms sales to the Third World an increasingly lucrative source of hard currency.⁵⁹ Whereas in the early 1970s, arms transfers amounted to only 3 percent of Soviet hard-currency revenues, by the late 1970s they accounted for 10-15 percent of Soviet earnings. And with the drop in world commodity prices in the mid-1980s--especially for key Soviet exports such as oil, natural gas and oil--arms transfers have risen to 25-30 percent of Soviet hard currency earnings.⁶⁰ Moscow needs this hard currency to purchase advanced Western technology, which in turn fuels the overall Soviet modernization program under Gorbachev.

In addition to the direct economic benefits (in the form of hard currency) that the Soviets get from their arms exports to the Third World, Moscow reaps important indirect benefits.⁶¹ A healthy arms export business is a cheap way of maintaining excess capacity in Soviet defense industries. In the event of a crisis or conflict, the Soviets can divert export production lines to Soviet war production, thus bolstering the readiness and "surge" capacity of Soviet defense industries. Similarly, large quantities of Soviet arms manufactured for Third World clients helps the Soviet defense industries maintain longer production runs, an economy of scale and thus lower unit cost of Soviet weapons. Soviet weapon deliveries to the Third World also diffuse some of the cost of the Soviet Union's own research and development (Rand D) to Third World buyers.⁶²

But despite the increasing importance of economic considerations as a motive in Soviet security assistance programs, Moscow will still absorb the economic loss of discount prices, concessionary terms and payment in hard currency or barter if it serves a key political purpose and increases Soviet

influence. On balance, therefore, Soviet arms sales are likely to remain high in the years ahead for political-military as well as economic reasons.

Internal Soviet economic pressures will serve to keep Soviet security assistance at reasonably high levels in the future. Gorbachev's economic modernization depends on obtaining hard currency (which in turn is used to purchase advanced Western technology). As discussed earlier, arms sales have now become 25-30 percent of Soviet hard currency earnings.⁶³ But while the Kremlin is determined to keep arms sales high, a number of external or macroeconomic trends will keep Soviet arms sales from going much higher than they are today. These macro or international economic realities include the drop in oil revenues, Third World debt, more arms suppliers, and increased Third World desire for more direct and indirect offsets in its arms purchases.⁶⁴

Many of these international trends translate into less purchasing power for both the previously oil rich Arab states looking for Soviet arms as well as the other Third World states with weaker economies. The drop in oil revenues for oil producers means that Middle East states (by far the largest purchasers of Soviet arms) are looking for highly concessionary terms in any large purchases of Soviet arms. As Mark N. Kramer points out:

This compounds the adverse effect that the declining price of oil has had on the Soviet economy. Soviet oil revenues, which provide more than half the USSR's total export earnings, have contracted sharply; yet the one thing that might have made up for those lost revenues--an increase in arms sales--is itself made more difficult by the drop in oil prices.⁶⁵

Many Third World countries outside the Middle East have been hit by a mounting debt burden and a sharp contraction of Western credits in the 1980s. As a result, these countries are finding it harder to buy Soviet arms.⁶⁶

Another factor limiting significantly larger Soviet arms transfers is the growth in the number of Western and Third World arms suppliers who are competing with the USSR for the same customers. It is now a buyers market for weapons. Israel, Brazil and Taiwan--just to name a few--have begun to capture an even larger share of the arms market. Some of the largest buyers of Soviet arms (such as India and Iraq) have already begun to diversify their arsenals. This new buyers market has prompted Third World purchasers to demand highly concessionary terms, such as low interest rates, long repayment terms and payment in local currency.⁶⁷ They have also pushed Moscow to offer "offsets," either indirect or direct, to lessen the costs of buying arms

from the USSR.⁶⁸ Indirect offsets usually mean barter deals, involving local commodities for Soviet arms. In recent years, Ethiopia has traded coffee for Soviet arms, Libya has swapped oil or grain for Soviet arms and Nicaragua has used sugar, fruit and coffee to defray some of the cost of Soviet arms transfers. Other Third World countries want Moscow to grant them "direct" offsets, such as technology transfers and co-production rights and technology transfers to build weapons systems. India (and earlier China and North Korea) have successfully negotiated co-production agreements with the Soviets in the past.

The macro or international economic constraints are therefore providing fewer opportunities for Soviet arms exports. Those that do come along come with requests for concessionary financing and offsets. Moscow's past experience in these areas give it a competitive advantage over the United States. But while the Soviets will accommodate these Third World requests, they do so unenthusiastically. For these Third World demands on Soviet arms exporting policies complicate Gorbachev's plans for economic modernization. Resources have to be diverted to finance large-scale exports. Less hard currency tends to flow into the Soviet Union. And in the case of direct offsets, there is always the chance that diffusion of Soviet arms manufacturing plans and technology would get into enemy hands. Even if it is diverted to friends, the practice can backfire and turn purchasers of Soviet arms into competitors (as happened with China, and to a lesser extent with North Korea and India).⁶⁹

On balance, Moscow's security assistance program will continue to be an important instrument in advancing Soviet political, military and economic objectives. But the advent of new international economic realities means that the Soviets will have to work harder to achieve these objectives in the future.

Client Dependency/Soviet Influence

What emerges from the available evidence discussed is a Soviet approach that uses security assistance as a way of deliberately establishing a dependent client/donor relationship. Such a relationship affords Moscow the opportunity to develop political influence over the client. In order to gain a foothold in the country, the Soviet Union will entice the recipient with the "bait" of an attractive security assistance package (immediate delivery, discount equipment prices and liberal repayment terms). After the initial sale, however, new weapons are often delivered slowly. The location of spare and replacement parts remain in the Soviet Union. Parts are sent to the recipient country when it pleases Moscow, rather than when the client needs them. The quality of the equipment is often inferior to Western equipment. Once a country becomes dependent upon Soviet arms, it finds its future arms sales are often at increased prices. Recipient states must continue to rely on the

Soviet Union or risk seeing their equipment become useless. In addition, the Soviets rarely provide maintenance equipment and instructions to recipient countries. Soviet technicians are required for upkeep functions, thus giving the USSR an in-country presence. Logistic requirements also remain in Soviet hands.⁷⁰

The implementation of the client dependency/Soviet influence process can be seen in Sub-Saharan Africa. Here, Soviet advisers and technicians generally play a key role in the operational capabilities of those African forces equipped with Soviet equipment. The African military assistance programs do call for the training of indigenous technicians and equipment operators. But the African personnel invariably prove incapable of maintaining and operating the sophisticated Soviet equipment in the intended manner. This situation often produces strains between the African client and the Soviets. The failure of the African clients to become self-reliant in the operation and maintenance of the sophisticated Soviet equipment is the fault of both Moscow and the client. The Soviet policy is to consciously limit foreign understanding of the overall capabilities. First, the Soviet penchant for secrecy means that even the Soviet advisers have only a limited understanding of a particular system. Secondly, the Soviet policy is to consciously limit foreign understanding of the overall capabilities and limitations of Soviet weapons systems.

On the other hand, the African clients are also to blame for their own incompetence in maintaining and operating Soviet equipment. For instance, many of these African countries have too few adequately educated personnel to train on weapons systems that are far too sophisticated for those they can assign to comprehend. Secondly, many African countries are frankly satisfied with the mere possession of a sophisticated system as a symbol of prestige, and have little concern for an operational capability.

What's interesting is how countries such as Nigeria and Tanzania sought to reduce their dependency upon Moscow in the early 1980s by seeking alternate sources of military equipment. Nevertheless, both countries signed major weapon purchase agreements with the Soviets in 1984. Despite the fact that Nigerian dissatisfaction with the poor quality of Soviet pilot training programs and aircraft maintenance goes back many years, Nigeria went ahead and purchased an additional 12 MIG-21 aircraft as a short-term response to their air defense deficiencies. Similarly, in Tanzania, the government tried to reduce its military dependence on Soviet military advisers and technicians in late 1979 and early 1980. For a while, the numbers of Soviet military personnel did decrease. But in 1984 Tanzania signed a new military agreement with Moscow that provided more Soviet equipment and increased the number of Soviet advisers in the country. Moreover, the Ethiopian military is unhappy about its

dependence on Soviet technicians for maintenance of the weapons systems and Soviet in-country training techniques that prevent true operational independence of Ethiopian military forces. Yet Ethiopia shows no sign of wanting to procure less Soviet military equipment. Even India, the most independent of Moscow's Third World clients, finds it impossible to be truly self-reliant. To be sure, India is trying to reduce its dependency on Moscow by meeting more of its military requirements from its own relatively large defense industries. But poor management and deficiencies in design capabilities and production technology within these industries make it impossible for these enterprises to meet India's military requirements for sophisticated arms, either qualitatively or quantitatively.

Moreover, Moscow is also successful in utilizing its security assistance to influence the Indian military in subtler ways. The long-standing Soviet security assistance program has created a professional bond between Soviet and Indian officers. The very familiarity of Indian officers with Soviet equipment, employment doctrine, support structure and interaction with their Soviet counterparts in updating and operating the equipment has furthered this bond. This familiarity with Soviet equipment tends to be self-perpetuating. For instance, India was attracted to a Soviet transport aircraft, in part at least, because it offered the Indian Air Force (IAF) the opportunity to standardize its maintenance procedures, since the majority of the IAF transport fleet would then be Soviet-built.

Similarly, Peru has discovered the path to real independence from Moscow is a difficult one. For instance, the Peruvian Army has attained the capability to maintain some of its own equipment. The Peruvian Air Force has also established a maintenance facility. But for depot-level maintenance/overhaul, the Peruvians must still return some aircraft and tank engines to facilities in the Soviet Union for periods of up to a year. This system has therefore perpetuated Peruvian dependence on Soviet support. Moreover, the Peruvian services are still dependent on the Soviet Union for spare parts. Admittedly, the Peruvians would like to reduce this dependence. But the Peruvians fear that a change in suppliers would jeopardize force readiness.

How does Soviet influence in the Peruvian military manifest itself? United States personnel is denied access to Peruvian military installations where Soviet-made equipment is based. Soviet influence is also demonstrated in Soviet-Peruvian negotiations. The Peruvian purchase of the HIND helicopter was reportedly a requirement for the 1981 roll-over of Peru's outstanding debt to the Soviet Union.

Of course, a Soviet client's general economic strength works to its advantage in pursuing independence from Moscow. In the

past, Iraq's oil revenues enable it to retain some distance between itself and the Soviet Union, despite its arms purchases from the Soviet Union. This in turn allowed it to minimize Soviet influence over its internal and external policies. For instance, in December 1979, the Soviets reportedly offered a speedier delivery schedule in return for an increase in Soviet advisers in Iraq. Moscow also is said to have tried to tie a proposed arms deal to Soviet access to Iraqi naval bases. In both cases, Baghdad refused to meet Soviet demands. Iraq's recent economic difficulties and its war with Iran reduced Baghdad's ability to remain independent of Moscow and has reduced its overall policy options. But Iraq should regain its independence if the Iran-Iraq war ends as expected.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev has reassessed its global and domestic strategies. Anxious to improve the Soviet domestic economy, Gorbachev has begun to make political deals at home and abroad to save money and rechannel Soviet energies in productive directions. Gorbachev is taking a number of calculated risks to bring this about. For instance, the Soviets are leaving Afghanistan and brokering ways for their Vietnamese allied forces to leave Kampuchea and for their Cuban allied forces to leave Angola. But Moscow is not leaving a vacuum of "betraying" the pro-Soviet indigenous governments in Afghanistan, Vietnam or Angola.

In anticipation of the departures, the Soviets have begun to rely more on security assistance as a cost saving alternative to costly occupation forces. Instead of running these countries themselves, the Soviets have decided to assist these countries to defend themselves, thus settling for influence rather than control. In other words, Moscow is doing what the United States tried unsuccessfully to do in later years of the Vietnam War. In a very real sense, the Soviets have adopted a version of the Nixon Doctrine. This Soviet version of the Nixon Doctrine has the added advantage of decreasing threat perceptions of "Soviet expansionism," thus providing Moscow political opportunities with countries which were previously anti-Soviet or pro-US.

The Nixon Doctrine was a prudent way for America to protect its interests. Once again, America was to follow FDR's words of 1940 and be the "arsenal of democracy." Back in the early to mid-1970s, US security assistance had a good image because it was seen as a popular alternative to the unpopular and incredibly expensive US intervention in Vietnam. Under President Carter, however, security assistance was maligned. President Carter found security assistance distasteful as a concept. His advisers argued that Americans should be the champions of human rights rather than the "merchants of death." United States security assistance as a concept lost stock in the US government during

the Carter era, and has been the target of budget cuts by a Democratically run US Congress during the Reagan administration. In the last year especially, many worthwhile US security assistance programs have been cut to the bone or zeroed out altogether. In the austere Gramm-Rudman budget environment facing the new US President in 1989, the Commander-in-Chief should seriously consider reviving the Nixon Doctrine and US security assistance as a cost saving alternative to those US military forces in being dedicated to military intervention in the Third World. Failing to do so may result in Capitol Hill making arbitrary cuts which could seriously undermine (or at least badly skew) US security interest around the world. Even now, the US military is arguably ill-equipped to sustain any Third World operations because of logistical shortfalls and other "war-stoppers." In the Third World, the US military is simply stretched too thin to be a credible force today. But in an era of increasingly sharp military budget cutting, the US military will be stretched even further and will be increasingly hard pressed to honor its global commitments. In addition, America must learn the several realities.

In the international political arena, generous security assistance is considered a sign of friendship to many Third World countries. Security assistance strengthens their military, helps them to deter threats and concentrate on economic development. When the Soviets provide lavish security assistance and America (except for Israel and Egypt) is only a marginal player, then the US loses friends and allies and the balance of power tilts to Moscow. Whereas the large Soviet assistance program in the Horn of Africa is consistently reflected in generous amounts of security assistance to its clients (first Somalia and now Ethiopia), US security assistance to its client in the Horn is modest in comparison. The same can be said of the large Soviet security assistance to India in South Asia and the relatively modest US security assistance to Pakistan. Sooner or later, these shifting power realities are going to threaten US core interests in the Third World.

Faced with a diminishing defense budget and possible force structure reductions at the aggregate level, the meager money presently earmarked in the State budget for security assistance should be shifted to the DOD budget and greatly expanded. For in a very real sense, security assistance in a TRADOC revised Nixon Doctrine is really a military concept. The idea is for the US military to assist the militaries of US allies in the Third World to protect themselves. This replaces the present overly costly and ineffective concept of spending the money almost exclusively on US Third World forces, waiting for a crisis or threat to US strategic interest to occur, and then intervene massively. The latter concept also is weak because it is based on direct threats to US interests, which seldom occur. Instead, US interests tend

to erode, as friends and allies drift away from America. Security assistance is a far better approach to prevent such erosion from occurring in the first place.

Should America decide to revive the Nixon Doctrine and once again compete with the Soviet Union in the security assistance game, it must take a good look at Soviet successes and Soviet failures in security assistance programs in the Third World. This study has already performed this exercise and has come up with "lessons learned." But besides reviving the Nixon Doctrine and US security assistance in an aggregate sense, there are a number of specific things America can do to become more competitive with Soviet security assistance programs.

Overcoming Soviet Quick Delivery

The Soviets take weapon systems out of ongoing production and even out of Soviet units in order to provide quick delivery to key Third World allies. America is not about to do this. But America must do better and overcome the painfully long FMS process, which is no match for the quick Soviet approach.

- o To better compete with the Soviets in the area of quick delivery of weapons systems, Washington must revive the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) concept of pre-ordering weapons systems for foreign buyers.
- o To decrease the US lead time for major systems (from two years to six months), the SDAF should pre-order weapons systems it anticipates foreign customers will want to buy. Increments for foreign sales should be built into domestic industry production. By the time the weapons system comes off the production line, some country will want it.
- o Prudent sales forecasting would anticipate the demand for the weapon, thus avoiding surpluses or an inventory problem.
- o This would also avoid having to meet customers demand only by taking the item out of stock (lowering readiness of US forces), taking out of production which had been programmed for one of the Services.
- o In this way, the long term interests of the US are better served, the client's immediate needs are met and US relations with the recipient country would improve markedly.

Lowering Costs

The Soviets provide much lower prices for their equipment than comparable US systems. For instance, a reconditioned American M-60 tank goes for \$1 1/2 - 2 million, while a comparable Soviet T-55 costs only about \$500,000 (or a fraction of the cost). Rightly or wrongly, US friends and allies wonder how the US Army appears to get the M-1/A-1 tank for \$2.3 million, while they have to pay \$4.5 million. If America revives the Nixon Doctrine, then US allies and friends must be treated as partners rather than what they call "second-class citizens." Otherwise, they will either drift away from America, or be threatened by a Soviet ally receiving more abundant and less expensive Soviet weapons systems.

Similarly, US friends and allies point to the \$15 million old price of an F-16 and expect large quantity production to reduce costs to say \$12 million a copy. Instead, the cost is now about \$23 million a piece. In an era of low inflation, US friends and allies find such costs unacceptable and will look elsewhere for their security needs. Similarly, why should a US friend or ally buy an American tank when it can get the best tank in the world, the FRG Leopard for \$2 million? Where's the American friendship? Are US security interests to be totally dictated by commercial considerations?

In addition, the FMS process itself must improve, because the costing procedures are not competitive with Soviet costing procedures. When the Soviets quote a client a price, that's the price. It never changes. The price for an American weapons system is constantly changing, and "FMS cases are never closed." Does this drive US friends and allies crazy? "Yes" said one ally, "but we're used to this kind of treatment from America." Similarly, the US practice of using LOAs is frustrating to clients. The range is too broad (e.g., \$70,000 to \$20,000 for a unit price). Such a broad range is not very helpful and makes it very hard for countries to plan.

The time has come for US defense planners to define US security interests in new and more innovative ways. In particular, the United States should consider discounting some weapons systems to economically weak but geopolitically key allies such as Somalia and Pakistan. The costs could be absorbed in the DOD budget. Moreover, if the US weapons industries knew they had a stable Third World market, the "feast or famine" syndrome which drives up prices would diminish and lead to lower per unit costs. Finally, America should encourage more commodity offsets to defray the costs of the expensive US weapons systems.

Transfer More Arms Technology

One of the reasons the Soviet Union has been so successful in its security assistance program with India is because of its willingness to sell licenses and weapons technology to New Delhi. This allows India to build its own T-72 tanks and MIG-29 aircraft. And by giving the Indians a sense of military self-reliance, it also improves the quality of Soviet-Indian security assistance relations.

In contrast, America has the reputation as the least cooperative country in the world in the transfer of weapons technology. Understandable fear of US weapons technology getting into the hands of US enemies must be balanced against what the present policy is doing to undermine US military and political relations with key US allies and friends in the Third World. Therefore, America should loosen its excessive restrictions on selling licenses and weapons technology to even our close allies and friends in the Third World. In addition, the US should do more to encourage (rather than actively discourage) countries like Turkey and Pakistan to co-produce weapons systems.

Improve and Expand Public Affairs Activities

While the Soviets do many things well in the security assistance game, the general Soviet approach is manipulative in the sense of using security assistance as a tool to reinforce client dependence while optimizing Soviet political influence. Unfortunately, the US devotes relatively little effort to publicizing this manipulative Soviet approach with timely and sophisticated public affairs activities. Here is a wonderful force multiplier that is being terribly neglected. The time has come to revive the concept and give USIA more money and resources to do its job. With minimum amount of resources, knowledgeable US experts on the manipulative Soviet approach (to Third World clients) could educate those clients on the pitfalls associated with entering into security assistance deals with the Soviet bloc.

Trumpet United States Successes

While US security assistance has higher per unit costs, is much less abundant and is delivered much slower than Soviet security assistance, the quality is invariably better than Soviet security assistance. America offers a total support package, with superior logistics and maintenance. And in contrast to the manipulative Soviet approach, US advisers and technicians truly teach the recipient everything there is to know about a weapons system. The idea is to teach the recipient how to understand as well as how to operate the system. The goal is technical self-reliance rather than client dependency.

Somehow, what the US does well gets lost in the process of US Congressional oversight and budget cutting. It shouldn't. America needs to trumpet the virtues of its security assistance program rather than be defensive about being "merchants of death." The US Army Public Affairs Office (and those of the other Services) needs to work closer with USIA to publicize the people and services the US security assistance program provides. Maybe in this way, FDR's idea of America being the "arsenal of democracy" will finally be realized.

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THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT,
AND OTHER AUTHORITIES: AUTHOR'S COMMENTS

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This paper was previously presented as a briefing to the CLIC-sponsored "Forum for Operational Planning and Security Assistance in Low Intensity Conflict" in August 1988. The material for use is being distributed to a broader audience because of its general application to LIC planning. The USCINCPAC uses this material as a working document. It is designed to organize the guidance contained in two important Comptroller General opinions concerning the fiscal law principles applicable to combined training activities, and to the statutory authorities for conducting military-to-military training activities.

The outline and citations contained in Tabs 1-4 of this paper are also intended to facilitate a working knowledge of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and to help put in perspective the authorities to utilize combined training, training opportunities and special Title 10 authorities overseas. This outline does not purport to be inclusive of all authorities.

Finally, the outline and reference materials are first thoughts on how combined exercises and other DOD activities may complement security assistance activities. The law concerning these matters is changing rapidly. Consequently, users are encouraged to update this working document with additional Comptroller General decisions, as they become available, changes to Title 10 US Code and changes to basic security assistance legislation (FAA/AECA). Specifically, these materials do not reflect any changes to statutory authority which may have resulted from passage of the DOD Authorization Act for FY 1989.

Distinguishing Security Assistance Funded Training Activities From DOD Funded Training Activities. Security assistance, combined training and LIC planning are areas of US Government (USG) activities in which lawyers and non-lawyers must work closely together. The following thoughts reflect this office's views on the tension between security assistance funded and DOD funded training activities. From the operational planner's perspective, our efforts are to obtain the maximum benefit from security assistance and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funded activities. In accordance with the holdings of the cited Comptroller General opinions, we must distinguish these activities in order to ensure they are properly funded.

The Comptroller General's opinions on Honduras combined training exercises must be applied to all military-to-military activities. These opinions, 63 Comp. Gen. 422 (1984) and Comp. Gen. Dec. B-213137 January 30, 1986, establish a clear legal framework for analyzing fiscal/legal issues involving military--to-military activities. These Comptroller General opinions conclude that the proper analysis of authority to fund an activity begins with an analysis of the purposes of the authorizing statute. The analysis goes as follows: A general principle of fiscal law (known as the Purpose Statute) requires that expenditures be authorized by statute (31 USC Sect. 1301(a)). Appropriations from statutory authorizations must be applied to objects for which the appropriations were made. Expenditures, therefore, must be those that are necessary for the proper execution of the object of an appropriation. The Comptroller General has identified three factors in determining whether expenditures are necessary for "proper execution": First, the expenditure must be reasonably related to the purposes for which the appropriation was made; second, the expenditure must not be prohibited by law; and third, the expenditure must not fall specifically within the scope of some other category of appropriations. If we are to analyze military-to-military training issues using this formula, the correct analysis requires a determination that a proposed expenditure for training is reasonably related to the purpose of the appropriation we intend to use to fund the training. If the training expenditure is reasonably related to the purpose of that appropriation and the expenditure is not otherwise prohibited by law, the analysis further requires that we determine that no other more specific category of appropriation governs the proposed expenditure.

Purposes of the Security Assistance Funded Training Activities. Section 502, FAA and Section 4, AECA state identical purposes for sales of defense articles and defense services to friendly countries. Defense articles and services may be sold or leased "solely" for one or more of four specified purposes: (1) "internal security," (2) "legitimate self-defense," (3) "to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security," or (4) "for the purpose of enabling foreign military forces in less developed friendly countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries." The purposes and policies of both the FAA/AECA are directed at providing defense articles and services for the overall purpose of increasing the security of the United States and promoting world peace (Sections 501 and 502, FAA; Sections 1, 3, and 4 AECA). The defense articles and services (including training) are transferred for the primary benefit of

the recipient, to increase the recipient's ability to provide for its defense or to participate in regional collective security, etc. The USG does not provide defense articles and services under the FAA/AECA in order to increase US forces' readiness, training, etc. The entire scope of foreign assistance, including the sale of defense articles and services (security assistance), must be fully coordinated with and is under the direction of the Secretary of State (Section 2, AECA). These laws contemplate long-range government-to-government efforts to obtain the advantages of collective security. From a USG standpoint, these are strategic objectives. Security assistance is part of the foreign policy of the United States. The history of security assistance as part of USG foreign policy (which the FAA/AECA implement) is traced in Chapter 1, The Management of Security Assistance, 7th Ed., Defense Institute of Security Assistance, 1986. Security assistance is a multi-billion dollar endeavor, largely concerned with the procurement and sale of military equipment, but also concerned with providing general military training to friendly and allied nations, and particularly concerned with training recipients in the maintenance and use of equipment they obtain under foreign military sales (FMS).

The linking of training and equipment obtained through security assistance (FMS) is referred to as the "total package approach" (The Management of Security Assistance, page 22-2, supra). Training foreign military personnel how to use and maintain equipment sold under FMS is one of the main objectives of training conducted with AECA appropriations (Chapter 10, Section 100003A, DOD 5105.38-M, 1 Oct 88). This AECA training includes formal and informal instruction by officers or employees of the US, contract technicians, correspondence courses, publications, etc., and "orientation, training exercise, and military advice to foreign military units and forces" (Section 47(5), AECA). The methods of providing training include mobile training teams, professional military education, flight training, technical proficiency training, on-the-job-training, observer and familiarization training and orientation tours (pages 22-4 and 22-5, The Management of Security Assistance, supra and Chapter 10, Section 1001 DOD 5105.38-M, supra). Training is a "defense service" within the meaning of the AECA when it is "used for the purposes of making military sales" (Section 47(4), AECA) (emphasis added). The AECA requires the USG to recover the "full cost" of providing defense services under FMS (with some reductions available to IMET recipients) (Section 21(a)(1)(C), AECA).

International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a USG grant training program, provided under the authority of Sections 541-545 FAA. International Military Education and Training is normally, but not exclusively, classroom training conducted in the US. Training is not a "defense service" under the FAA (Section 644(f)). Training under the FAA is defined as

"Military education and training" (Section 644(n)), however, this definition and the definition in Section 47(4), AECA are nearly identical. Congress intentionally used similar definitions of training in the FAA and AECA in order to "make clear as a matter of law that the same definitions apply to (FMS sales) as to grant assistance" (see H.R. Report 94-1144, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976), reprinted in [1976] US Code Cong. & AD. News, 1378, 1415). The "additional costs" to the USG in providing military education and training is a "value" under Section 644(m)(5), FAA and must be charged to funds appropriated for the FAA (Section 515(d) and 632(d)). The purposes of IMET are described in Section 543, FAA. In addition to helping improve general relations (Section 543 (1)) and increasing the awareness of foreign participants of issues involving "internationally recognized human rights" (Section 543 (3)), training is intended to "improve the ability of foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries" (Section 543 (2)).

Training, then, within the meaning of the FAA/AECA is training which achieves the strategic (foreign policy) goals of this legislation, any training which facilitates the use and maintenance of equipment sold under the provisions of this legislation, and any training which creates an independent military capability in the foreign military (contributes to the nation's self-reliance). This is the type and scope of training which, in accordance with the Purpose Statute, must be funded from appropriations for the FAA/AECA and which, in accordance with the Comptroller General's Honduras opinions, cannot be funded from general purpose O&M funds.

Purposes of DOD Funded Training Activities. In order to define the authority and appropriations for DOD training activities we must examine general Secretarial authority, other DOD guidance, and current guidance concerning authorized combined training activities.

Secretarial Authority. The Secretary of Defense "is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense" and "has authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense" (10 USC Section 113(b)). Under the Secretary of Defense, each Service Secretary "is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of [the Department], including . . . training . . ." (10 USC Section 3013(b)(5), 10 USC Section 5013(b)(5) and 10 USC Section 8013(b)(5)). And, each Service Secretary is charged with the responsibility to formulate "policies and programs . . . that are fully consistent with national security objectives and policies established by the President and Secretary of Defense" (10 USC Section 3013(c)(2), 10 USC Section 5013(c)(2), and 10 USC

Section 8013(c)(2)). Additionally, each Service Secretary may "assign, detail, and prescribe the duties of members of [the Department]" and "prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers and duties" (10 USC Section 3013(g)(1) and (2), 10 USC Section 5013(g)(1) and (2), and 10 USC Section 8013(g)(1) and (2)).

DOD Defense Guidance FY 1990-1994, 29 March 1988. This classified document provides a broad range of guidance for DOD. The following unclassified portions relate to collective defense issues. Part ID, concerning regional defense policies, states "Our system of alliances and cooperation with friendly nations is fundamental to US policy and affects US force requirements. Accordingly, we must continue to encourage our allies and friends to support and provide for collective defense." Part IIC, concerning alliances and regional cooperation, states "The US strategy is fundamentally a coalition strategy. United States allies and friends share the responsibility for the defense of a region and have a major role in their own defense. The US seeks not only to strengthen current bilateral and multilateral alliance relationships, but also to expand US support abroad, influencing to the extent possible the pace and direction of political change. Both deterrence and the US strategic posture are strengthened by efforts to enhance interoperability between US forces and those of its allies and friends." Part IID3e, concerning peacetime strategy, states "The US will improve the warfighting capabilities of US and allied combat forces through increased force interoperability, including the development of joint and combined doctrine, procedures, plans, and the development and fielding of compatible systems."

Combined Training Activities in Support of Coalition Warfare and Interoperability Objectives. Combined training exercises with foreign militaries have long been recognized to be a valid training vehicle which does not require FAA/AECA funding (see SECDEF 241551Z Feb 77, Subj: Training of Foreign Nationals). The contents of paragraph 6 of this message are restated and expanded in Chapter 10, Section 1002, paragraph 100201B, DOD 5105.38-M.

Bilateral, combined, or multilateral exercises conducted to test and evaluate mutual capabilities do not require authorization or funding under the AECA. Costs of foreign participation in these exercises may not be paid directly or reimbursed from DOD funds, including O&M funds. DOD funds may be used to pay just the costs of US armed forces participation which would have been incurred in the absence of foreign participation in the exercise. The costs of any US support provided to the participating countries or international organizations for training exercises must be reimbursed under an FMS case. This is because providing exercise support is providing a defense service as defined in the AECA, Section 47(4) and Section 47(5).*

*NOTE: 10 USC Section 2010 provides authority for CINC's to fund certain expenses of developing countries which participate in combined exercises.

Coalition warfare and interoperability goals are obtained through combined exercises. The Comptroller General opinions restate the proposition that combined training activities must be conducted to test and evaluate mutual capabilities; that is, to train with a foreign armed force rather than to train (equip) the foreign force. Combined activities are funded from (O&M) accounts. The Comptroller General opinions conclude that it is natural and desirable that an exchange of information and skill is obtained in combined exercises. The exchange is obtained through interoperability training. In addition, training is permissible for familiarization and safety purposes. However, this training may not be the equivalent of security assistance-provided training, nor may it be used to raise the proficiency of a foreign force so that meaningful combined exercises may be conducted (see 64 Comp. Gen. 422, 441-443). The second Comptroller General opinion recognized a limited exception to the requirement to fund foreign military proficiency training from security assistance accounts (see Comp. Gen. Dec. B-213137, at 23-26). The Special Forces exception permits the training of foreign personnel to "achieve US operational goals." The rationale of the Special Forces exception is significant. It clearly distinguishes between the legislative purposes of providing independent capabilities for foreign forces and the legislative purposes of obtaining US operational goals in training foreign forces. This rationale is applicable to the US operational goal of training to improve interoperability. Interoperability is one of foundations of coalition warfare as defined in DOD Defense Guidance.

Training must be understood and analyzed for it is part of the operation of DOD. There is no separate appropriation for training, as there is for other DOD functions, e.g., military construction, research and development, and procurement. The training of DOD personnel and units is not only reasonably related to the purposes of the DOD O&M appropriations, training the Armed Forces is one of the primary objectives of O&M appropriations. Since there is no competing appropriation available to train the Armed Forces, there is no question about the validity of expending O&M appropriations for the objective of training DOD personnel/units. Similarly, expenditures for training with foreign militaries (to achieve interoperability and coalition warfare objectives) are consistent with DOD Defense Guidance and, as articulated in the Comptroller General opinions on Honduras combined exercises, are reasonably related to the purposes of O&M appropriations. The caveat, as required in the Honduras opinions analysis, is that O&M appropriations may not be expended to train foreign personnel/units within the meaning of the FAA/AECA. The FAA/AECA provide specific categories of

appropriations for the purpose of training foreign military personnel/units, and these appropriations must be used to the exclusion of more general O&M appropriations to achieve this purpose.

In order to determine whether we should fund a given activity with O&M or security assistance funds, we first must look to the purposes of the statutory authority to train foreign forces or provide defense services to foreign forces. Training under the AECA is linked to training that is provided in conjunction with the sale of defense items. Training under the FAA (IMET) has a defined purpose of improving the ability of foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and services obtained by them from the United States. Therefore, if we are not training foreign personnel on equipment they have purchased from the United States, and we are not providing them with IMET training or its equivalent, we are not conducting training within the purpose of FAA or the AECA.

Another way to look at this is to apply the "more specific authority" analysis in the Comptroller General opinions. To preclude the use of O&M funding for a combined training activity, the activity must be more specifically cognizable under the authority and appropriations of the FAA/AECA than under the general Secretarial authority. This conclusion follows the general fiscal principle which permits an expenditure which is reasonably related to the objectives of an appropriation unless there is a more specific authority and appropriation to accomplish the objectives. If there is no language in the definitions in the FAA or the AECA which particularly characterizes a combined training activity as a defense service or training and no language in the stated purposes of these acts which includes the activity as a purpose of the acts (and, hence, an appropriate objective of the appropriations for the acts) then, the activity is fundable as an O&M activity.

Following this reasoning, the worst position that we arrive at using the Comptroller General analysis is that some combined activities, while cognizable as an O&M expenditure, may also be cognizable as a FAA/AECA expenditure. If we arrive at his conclusion, then we are still left with one additional position announced in the Comptroller General opinions. That position is, if a proposed combined activity expenditure is reasonably related to both appropriations, the combined activity may be conducted using either, but we may not use both appropriations interchangeably. This leaves us where we should be according to the Comptroller General opinions. We use O&M funds for valid combined training activities with foreign militaries when the objective is interoperability and we (and State Department) use security assistance funds to train foreign military personnel within the meaning of the FAA/AECA when the objective is to provide the foreign nation with a self-reliant armed force.

A STRATEGY TO LOGISTICALLY SUPPORT US POLICY ON LIC

by

Maj Eric Pettersen, USAF
International Logistics Center

"Much has been written about low intensity warfare, but it remains an open question how much is understood. Of greater certainty is the fact that little of what is understood has been applied effectively." Former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger succinctly stated a problem that has caused the United States government and its military establishment enormous conceptual and practical problems. The US military has expended much effort in attempts to develop the doctrine and capabilities needed to support our national strategy on low intensity conflict. In looking at our efforts to support this strategy, to include the formation of the Army and Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, light divisions, and a host of other initiatives, a common thread can be found. We are focusing our efforts on that part of the strategy which deals with direct US applications of power. This supports only one part of the stated strategy. The following has been extracted from our national strategy as it applies to low intensity conflict.

The primary role for US armed forces in Low Intensity Conflict is to support and facilitate the security assistance program. The military services must also stand ready to provide more direct forms of military assistance when called upon. Usually, this assistance will consist of technical training and logistical support.

This part of our LIC strategy places the US military in a difficult position given the fact that our systems are becoming too sophisticated for use by third world military forces. The questions concerning what systems we will provide, and how we will provide training and logistical support are not addressed by the present security assistance system. It is a prime assumption of this paper that the recipients of our aid who are engaged in counterinsurgency operations are not able to use our increasingly sophisticated weapons, support and communications systems in their environment. To overcome this problem it is postulated that the best answer is to provide third world nations with effective, simple and affordable equipment that is easily and economically operated and maintained. Such equipment and systems are referred to as Foreign Internal Defense (FID) unique equipment or systems. We have the capability to provide such systems. However, we focus on preparing for direct US involvement rather than supporting the security assistance

program with FID unique systems. Direct US intervention is a last resort as the following extract from our LIC strategy clearly states.

The services must and the Unified Commands must also be prepared for the effective execution of contingency and peacekeeping operations when such operations are required to protect national interests. US combat forces will be introduced into Low intensity Conflict situations only as a last resort and when vital national interests cannot otherwise be adequately protected.

This is the portion of our strategy where we focus virtually all of our attention, efforts, money and talent. This is necessary in order for the United States to have the ability to intervene when our vital national interests are at stake. However, if we don't intervene the most important part of our strategy is how effectively we support those who are engaged in combat operations.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has the expertise, personnel and existing procedures currently available to enable us to implement the first part of our strategy and achieve our national objectives at low cost and without the introduction of US combat forces. What is required to do is for us to combine the expertise available in the Regional Commands, the Security Assistance Community (particularly the Defense Security Assistance Agency-DSAA) and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). These organizations could provide the right tools, expertise and associated support. We have, thus far, failed to adequately coordinate their efforts. This failure leaves us unable to fully implement our strategy through the use of logistical support and training rather than direct involvement of US forces. This can leave us in the position of watching those we support lose or entering the conflict with US combat troops. Before we can effectively use our available expertise to avoid this all-or-nothing choice, we must examine how the US military thinks about LIC in the third world.

The US military is making a serious conceptual error in dealing with insurgencies in the third world. This major conceptual error is found in the core question being asked by US personnel interested in, and planning for, LIC in the third world. The core question being asked is How can we fight/win this war? This question leads to Americanized solutions that involve US conventional equipment and doctrine that have proven inappropriate for this type of war when operation of the equipment and execution of the doctrine are by third world personnel!

The proper core question is Whose war is it? The question of how we can fight and win the war is a proper subset question that must be asked when we elect to commit forces to protect

vital US interest. Prior to this decision (to commit forces) US forces capabilities are, for the most part, of little value to the government actually engaged in combat. I completely understand the importance of our having the force structures and ability to fight in the LIC environment and in no way mean to deride these efforts. However, if US forces are not committed the effectiveness of our forces is moot.

If the core question Whose war is it? is put forth, an entirely different set of doctrinal, tactical, logistical, training and associated needs become evident. The war will be won or lost by the third world forces we support, with all the unique needs their environment and culture burden them with. This different set of needs, once identified, would allow us to tailor our support to their needs and capabilities, rather than ours.

The basic truth is that what works for the US military does not always work for a third world military. Either we provide the technological expertise and resources to maintain our systems or they simply don't work in less developed countries. The bottom line is that just because we have the capability to support US forces does not mean we have a mirror image capability to support third world military forces.

Ultimately we must choose between commitment to very heavy US involvement in logistical and maintenance support of our sophisticated systems in an attempt to fight an American style war or to provide systems that the recipient can support while fighting their style of war. If we are going to provide support that meets their needs we will have to provide it via the security assistance program. The following suggests a method for providing such support.

To implement the support part of our strategy concerning LIC we need to be able to provide systems that meet the unique needs of the third world militaries we are supporting. At present we are not doing this even though US industry has suggested systems that would meet third world requirements. To provide such systems would not be difficult if someone had the charter to do so. However the problem is of a nature which does not lend itself to a one organization solution. The following suggests roles and an information flow that would enable us to meet the FID unique equipment needs of third world military forces.

What is missing is an entity within DOD that has the charter to define needs and test proposals to meet the unique equipment needs of the third world. This "entity" would have to combine expertise on dirty little wars and intimate knowledge of the country concerned with exacting knowledge of the security assistance system. Such an "entity" does not exist nor will one be developed independent of existing organizations. However, the key for using security assistance to support our national

strategy on LIC in the third world is to use the existing infrastructure within DOD to meet the third world's unique needs. Proper coordination among existing DOD infrastructure can result in our developing the ability to deliver the right systems to the right place and at the right price to meet the needs of those we support.

At present all of what is needed to develop this infrastructure is in place. We have regional commands who are familiar with the problems of third world militaries in their Area of Responsibility (AOR). Over the past forty years we have developed a viable and effective security assistance system that can deliver required equipment of any type to any country. In addition, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has the potential to develop the organizational expertise needed to support those engaged in "Dirty Little Wars." These organizations could interface and provide the US with the ability to meet the challenges of supporting third world militaries. As envisioned here each organization's role would be as follows.

The regional commands' role would be to define (in coordination with concerned countries) needs of those countries within their AOR having FID unique equipment requirements. For instance the problem might involve removing wounded. Instead of ordering an expensive, difficult to maintain helicopter to perform this function they might define requirements like this. Country X needs a simple, inexpensive aircraft requiring low pilot skills to carry at least two litter patients 50 miles in no more than 30 minutes. It should not cost more than \$50,000 a copy. A basic premise of this proposed system is that American industry can and will produce anything if there's a profit in it. For instance an autogyro could be used to meet the above requirement.

The DSAA would serve two vital functions in this system to provide Foreign Internal Defense unique systems. They would act as a broker of information and control the budget for testing these systems. The need to test is based on a belief that it would be wrong to provide FID unique systems to a country involved in combat operations without any testing. The counter to this argument is that the country buying the equipment should pay for testing. This leads to the core dilemma faced by those charged with assisting third world nations. Countries who can afford the testing generally don't need the equipment, those needing the equipment can't afford the testing. This is one case where a little money up front can greatly increase our effectiveness in supporting our national security strategy for LIC in the third world. The initial DSAA budget doesn't have to be large (several million dollars should be adequate) to meet testing costs. In the initial setting up of this system it may be necessary to forgo formal testing as funding is not currently available. Some of the difficulties could be overcome by accepting applicable international or United States civil

standards for FID unique systems. Meeting US military specifications is definitely not necessary.

The DSAA role as an information broker would consist of an office (weapon system division?) in that organization notifying industry that they will accept proposals for US manufactured FID unique military equipment. These proposals (including production capabilities) would be provided to the SAOs in booklet form which would be updated periodically. The SAOs would be authorized to inform nations involved in LIC of what was available to meet their needs.

Once a country has expressed an interest in an item, a decision would have to be made concerning whether to buy off the shelf as is or to test the item prior to sale. If testing is selected the costs associated with that testing would be paid by the funding provided DSAA for that purpose. The DSAA would not supervise the testing, that task would fall to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

The USSOCOM would also serve two functions in this infrastructure. They would supervise (under DSAA sponsorship) testing of FID unique equipment and provide training on that equipment when contractor support or internal capabilities were not available. It should be noted that it has been the authors experience that giving the USSOCOM a role in this process is greeted by most military officers with the same warmth and enthusiasm as a pig roast in Iran. The DSAA is not going to develop expertise on fighting dirty little wars and the regional commands, while interested in supporting friendly third world countries involved in LIC, are primarily interested in conventional warfare. We have to develop some corporate knowledge and depth in the US military's ability to support/fight these "Dirty Little Wars." The logical place to do so is at the USSOCOM.

Once the country has determined it wants a particular FID unique item it orders it through the FMS procurement system like any other non-standard FMS item. All of the services have legal, well managed Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procedures for purchasing non-standard items that could be used to purchase FID unique equipment. The USAF is implementing a logistical support concept (Nonstandard Item Parts and Repair Support (NIPARS) contract) that will be integrated with its standard FMS resupply system. The NIPARS ensures long term logistical support and can accommodate FID unique systems. The other services could develop similar contracts which will enable us to support outdated and nonstandard systems for the long term.

We can, using this infrastructure, provide our friends and allies in the third world the tools to win their wars at low cost without US casualties. This will fulfill both the spirit and intent of our LIC strategy.

**COUNTER-DRUG
WORKSHOP**

COUNTER-DRUGS WORKSHOP

15 December 1988

Purpose. To promote an increased level of awareness on the part of the workshop participants of the threat illegal drugs and drug trafficking pose to the security of the United States; to define current roles and missions of the primary agencies charged with countering this threat; and to discuss what actions the Department of Defense, the Services and the Unified Commands must take to support national counter-drug objectives.

Summary of Speakers Remarks.

Mr. Charles J. Gutensohn, (SES-4), Chief, Cocaine Investigations, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), as keynote speaker, began the workshop with a review of the threat posed by illegal drug traffickers to the United States. He detailed an impressive litany of problems encountered by the DEA in supporting US goals and objectives. Among the growing problems are an increase in domestic crime, confirmed ties to insurgent groups in Southeast Asia and South America and creation of "shadow" economies in several developing countries. In discussing the threat and the DEA's responses, Mr. Gutensohn detailed several shortfalls in the DEA's current programs, and discussed how the DOD and Services can support the counter-drug effort (see Attachment 1).

Mr. G. Brent Olson, (FSO-1), Deputy Director of Program Management, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Department of State, outlined the significant issues in dealing with source country governments in response to the illicit drug threat. His discussion detailed the role of the Ambassador in supporting efforts by the host nation to address what amounts to a bilateral problem. The Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) is the State Department's organization tasked with the coordination of narcotic control efforts outside the United States. The INM is primarily a support agency established to assist source country forces in their efforts to control illicit drug cultivation and production. It serves as a central focal point for money requests and disbursement to source country counter-drug forces. Mr. Olson discussed the contradictions in US legislation in regard to what source countries are expected to do to receive US foreign assistance money.

Colonel David D. McCullough, Jr., USA, Director for Interdiction and Law Enforcement Support Policy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Drug Policy and Enforcement), discussed the roles of the DOD in supporting both domestic and international drug interdiction and suppression

missions. Key points to his speech included: OASD(FM&P) serves as the focal point for drug support programs; DOD cannot shortfall its primary responsibilities of national defense in supporting the counter-drug effort; until this year (FY89) there was no money in the DOD budget specifically earmarked for drug suppression; the DOD is constrained by Posse-Commitatus Act in what Services can actually do domestically; the War Powers Act may constrain DOD in international arena; the FY 89 National Defense Authorization Act establishes new taskings for the DOD in drug suppression, and the DOD is designated as lead agency for surveillance and monitoring of aerial and maritime trafficking activities; he concluded with a review of DOD's policy in the support of the National Drug Strategy.

Mr. Paul W. Mahlstedt, Cardinal Point Incorporated, associate and representative for General (Retired) Paul F. Gorman, USA, spoke of the escalating problems in Central and South America. In his speech, Mr. Mahlstedt detailed the scope and nature of the threat to regional security and the implications to US national security. After his discussion of the threat he went on to define what some of the possible solutions to counter the threat could be. Mr. Mahlstedt recommended several technological solutions which are on the verge of operational capability.

Workshop Summary.

The workshop provided an opportunity for each speaker to present his views on the topic, discuss the roles of their organization, or define the objectives relevant to the issue of illegal or illicit drugs (primarily marijuana, heroin, and cocaine). The second portion of the workshop featured a round table discussion where members of the audience were able to solicit direct responses from the speakers.

Attachments

- Mr. Gutensohn's Briefing Notes and Slide
- Mr. Olson's Briefing Notes
- COL McCullough's Briefing Notes
- Mr. Mahlstedt's Briefing Text
- Title XI - Drug Interdiction Legislation Extract

NOTES FROM MR. GUTENSOHN'S SPEECH

The Threat

- Does not like the term "War on Drugs" as this tends to glamorize and legitimize the criminals involved.

- DEA confiscates an average of 14 weapons a day related to its drug investigations.

- IDA conference in Guatemala coordinated 30 nations in unified counter-drug effort

- Drug seizures impressive, 12 1/2 tons of refined cocaine, 70,000 gallons of precursor chemicals destroyed, 7 airstrips destroyed

- Latin America (cocaine and heroin (Mexico))

- increase in coca production (Peru, Bolivia)

- 90% of US cocaine supply comes from Bolivia and the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru.

- 25% of US heroin supply comes from Mexico

- Growing coca (base plant for cocaine) is legal in parts of Bolivia (25% of cocaine coming into US is grown there).

- Peru - Upper Huallaga Valley - 50% of all cocaine to the US comes from here, over 200 hectares are grown in the valley. (terrorist groups protect cultivation)

- Southeast Asia (heroin)

- Opium is major cash crop

- Supplies 45% of world heroin stock

- Moneys earned from sale filters through banks in Hong Kong, Thailand, and Singapore

- Enforcement (control) efforts in Burma are vigorous and the army takes considerable casualties

- Thailand has an aggressive program to stop chemicals from crossing its border

- Southwest Asia (heroin)

- War in Afghanistan

- Opium production is not controlled

- Pakistan has large areas of no governmental control

- Typical enforcement effort is to run a conventional military assault on processing center

- When heroin leaves the Northwest frontier, it goes to the dealers (which are usually tight knit family units). It is next to impossible to infiltrate these organizations

- US Domestic

- Domestic heroin use estimated to be six tons annually
 - 5.8 million cocaine users
 - 840 clandestine labs seized last year
 - 25% of marijuana use is from domestic production
 - Heroin sells for \$100,000 to 200,000 per kilogram compared to \$7,000 per kilo in Pakistan
 - Cocaine related injuries have increased dramatically (84,000 reported emergency room incidents)
- Cocaine Production

- Leaves are harvested 4 times a year
 - Coca growing legal in Bolivia (25% of cocaine to US begins in Bolivia)
 - Buyers purchase leaves and process into cocaine paste
 - Paste is shipped to el Bene where it is processed into cocaine base
 - Paste is shipped to Columbia where it is converted to cocaine HCL (approx. 1,000 kilograms a week come out of Columbia)
 - Production sites spreading to other countries
- What is US response (DEA leading agency)
- Committed to bilateral action
 - Cooperative effort with INM (Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters)
 - Operation Snow Cap

- Based on experiences learned in Operation Blast Furnace
- DEA working with source country police to attack leaves or plant growers, lab sites, and transport networks
- Program set up by DEA, INM, and source country officials
- Not DEA's job, but no one else available
- Objective: To reduce the flow of cocaine into the US and assist source country forces stabilize counter-drug efforts
- Problems

- Take agents off the street
- Not enough language qualified people
- Requires military skills not inherent in normal DEA agent

- Specialized training with SF and Marines
- US SF deploy with DEA but operate under different ROE, the Special Forces personnel cannot deploy with the DEA agents on actual operations. This can lead to confusion and frustration.

What can the military do to assist DEA?

- See the following slide.
- More than a shopping list, the DEA needs people who are experts in their field and can give suggestions on how to address the problem.

SLIDE FROM MR. GUTENSOHN'S SPEECH

Military Assistance to DEA
(Source Country Cocaine Suppression)

1. Training: Establish one formal point of contact, e.g., JFKSWC
 - a. Centralized DEA training at Fort Bragg
 - b. Assist DEA with training development
 - c. Assist DEA with special training requirements
 - d. Military training of narcotics police forces
2. Tactics, techniques, procedures, equipment: Establish single source of subject matter expertise.
 - a. How to operate in an advisory environment
 - b. Tactical intelligence procedures adopted to a counter-narcotics situation
 - c. Helicopter, light aviation operations
 - d. Operations against traffickers' aircraft
 - e. Counterintelligence and counter Corruption
3. Operations Support:
 - a. More flexible authorized activities (ROE) for SOF in support of narcotics operations
 - (1) Active intel/ops planning assistance to DEA/HN (Host Nation)
 - (2) Active medical, comms, and demolition support
 - (3) Active HN unit advisory assistance
 - b. Integrate SOF/DEA efforts where possible

NOTES FROM MR. OLSON'S SPEECH

Introduction

- Narcotics and narcotics control is a political issue within both the United States and the world community
- Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM), is Department of State focal point in drug control efforts
- During this speech each individual should consider the following points
 - What should US Drug policy be?
 - Is narcotics control a national security issue?
 - if so, what is the threat to our society?
 - Is there a role for the military?
 - what should that role be?
 - What should our aim be in international narcotics control?

Americans' view of the issue

- 26% of the population believe that drug abuse poses as serious a threat as all economic issues combined
- Of 10 critical international policy issues, the drug threat was more significant
- 55% of those polled feel the administration has not done a good job

Drug use trends

- One in ten use illicit drugs on a frequent basis (once a month)
- 37% of the population over 12 years old have used illicit drugs at least once
- conservatively, \$60 billion dollars are spent on illicit drugs annually
- 1/3 of all prison inmates have been convicted of drug use
- Promising trends
 - High School cocaine use has dropped by 33% since 1978
 - Heroin abuse has remained stable

National Drug Strategy

- Tries to do everything
- Forces difficult choices in allocating limited resources
 - Choices deal with distinct elements
 - source country problem
 - interdiction within source country
 - interdiction within international territory
 - interdict within US (destroy domestic supply system)
 - interdict the user (reduce demand)
 - Large controversy over value of supply reduction versus demand reduction
- Coordination (C2) not easy in government where issue also overlaps with individual state's jurisdiction
- Coordination with source country not a clearly defined or understood problem (how much can the US expect to influence outcome?)

Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM)

- Coordinates narcotics control efforts outside the US
- Small Bureau within the State Department
 - 45 in Washington
 - Attaches/Embassies
- Not directly involved in operational matters
- 14 major countries have teams who work closely with the embassies on issues:
 - Eradication
 - Crop substitution
 - Law enforcement support
 - Public awareness
- Bi-lateral agreements in other countries for law enforcement assistance

Country by Country Review

- Heroin comes from "Golden Crescent," "Golden Triangle," and Mexico

- Pakistan has programs involving all four of the above issues (eradication, crop substitution, law enforcement support and public awareness)

- There are no known programs in Afghanistan

- The US does not have diplomatic relations with Iran

- Southeast Asia and Thailand have successful programs dealing with drug problems

- Burma has problem in that large narcotics growers are not under control of Burma's government

- Perhaps UN can go in and help eradicate crops

- Mexico is a major producer of heroin and marijuana for the US

- INM provides moneys to purchase aircraft used in drug eradication efforts

- Support to Jamaica includes personnel and rotary wing aircraft -- good cooperation

- Bahamas' program is mostly product of law enforcement community

- South America, the major source of cocaine HCL

- Large program in Bolivia, working with DEA and Bolivian government in interdiction and eradication

- Bolivia has a history of tradition in cultivation of coca plants. INM deals with only coca plants intended for conversion to cocaine HCL

- Peru, all activities are focused in Upper Huallaga Valley where coca plants are grown and processed into paste, base and cocaine HCL

- local economy is shambles

- Colombia, US kept at arms length, although military has signed up to battle traffickers

- Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia all have significant insurgent problems which are aggravated by drug cultivation issue

- guerrillas control cultivation areas

- foreign debts go unpaid, create staggering burden

- economies are all weak or stagnant, inflation a significant problem.

Political Issues

- Ambassadors work through bi-lateral agreements
- President is required to report to Congress on status of source country efforts in countering the drug problems.
 - Negative report will result in the country losing economic, and military assistance
 - Some source country governments chafe at US presumption of their national will
- US cannot become police or military power in a foreign country without creating greater stability problems
- Dictatorships moving to democratic regimes (weak and fragile), stress of counter-drug problems, and economic issues could result in shift to authoritarian or communist regimes

Military and DOD support to International Narcotics Control

- DOD (Army) has provided helicopters
- Significant amounts of training for counter-drug forces
- DOD training facilities
- Equipment and stocks have been loaned or issued
- Problem area
 - Rules of Engagement are burdensome, constrains ability for DOD personnel to operate in advisory role in a low intensity conflict environment.
 - Best qualified people are not always selected or recognized for their contributions. "This is not a career enhancing operation"

Conclusion

- Summary of and review of questions asked in Introduction.
 - What should national strategy be? Unknown
 - Colombians face a problem which may be a foretaste of what could happen in the US.
 - Is there a role for US military? Not a combat role
- Sales pitch: We [INM] are looking to hire a few retired military to work in the field.

NOTES ON COL MCCULLOUGH'S SPEECH

Introduction

- Will cover following issues
 - Organizational structure
 - DOD's role in drug suppression
 - Policy Issues

Organizational Structure

- OASD(FM&P) is DOD organization charged with overall management of DOD support to the drug suppression effort
- Within OASD(FM&P) Lt Gen Olmstead is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Policy and Enforcement
 - Lt Gen Olmstead's office acts as single focal point for drug support resourcing within DOD
 - This includes: policy formulation and support to law enforcement officials at the federal, state, and local levels
 - Serves as DOD representative in interagency coordination process

DOD's Role in Drug Suppression

- DOD's primary responsibility is defense, not drug suppression
 - Recognize DOD responsibility in support role
 - Cannot compromise primary mission
 - Until FY 89 budget no moneys allocated to counter-drug mission
 - Military personnel constrained by Posse-Commitatus in what they can do in law enforcement
- What have the Services done to date?
 - A lot has been done and it has all come out of existing O&M funding
 - Loaned equipment
 - Flying hours for Air Force AWACS aircraft, Army helos, Navy patrol aircraft have all gone to support program
 - Steaming time for Navy ships on interdiction missions
 - Army UH-1 helos have been signed over to INM
 - Service personnel have been assigned to DOS, and DEA to help coordinate efforts
 - Services have designated focal point officers to assist

- This year [FY 89] DOD has been assigned lead agency for the monitoring and surveillance of drug trafficking aircraft and sea vessels coming into the United States

- National Defense Authorization Act set aside \$250 million to support this mission

- Up to \$60 million can be allocated to the National Guard while in "State" status.

- DOD is to "assist" with technical support in setting up a command and control network to coordinate governmental efforts

Policy Issues

- Secretary of Defense has told the Attorney General that DOD would not use military people in operations (will not put into harms way)

- Limited by War Powers Act

- Required by Congress to keep them informed of military activities

- Use of military assets (to include forces) are approved through the interagency process

- If Special Forces are used then ASD SO/LIC is also involved

- Forces are only sent with approval of host country and Ambassador

- Must be judicious in use of actual forces, do not want to escalate level of fighting in source country

- Economy Act requires DOD be reimbursed for all expenditures.

- Moving to insure reimbursement is at "actual cost" level as opposed to charges similar to foreign assistance costs

- Congressional Pressure

- 1/2 say we are not doing enough

- 1/2 say we are doing too much

- Need consistent approach

- Pressure to spend more money in Central/South America, at the same time security assistance budget is zero

- Use of National Guard in State and Federal status is subject of much debate.

- Defense Authorization Act set money aside

- States have already requested amounts totaling almost ten times what was authorized

Summary

- Drug business is low intensity conflict
- DOD subscribes to all nine of the Presidents elements to fight the "War on Drugs"
- Until we give peasants [of South America] something to grow that will bring more money than coca leaves, they will grow coca leaves.
- We can make a dent
 - Reduce corruption of local police or military [in source country]
 - Focus on demand reduction in the United States
 - Continue to support State Department, DEA and local officials

OJCS/J5-CLIC Conference on LIC
Remarks by Paul Mahlstedt
15 Dec 88

Introduction. I am a poor stand-in for General Paul Gorman, who regretfully could not be with you today. What I will say are my own words, words of a private citizen (hopefully an informed one), but words that have been forged at his side for the last several years--starting in Panama in 1983. Give him the credit; I'll take the blame.

Is the United States at war on drugs? Political rhetoric, statements of the President, Presidential candidates, Congress, etc all indicate yes. Facts say no. Only war on drugs is between the 30+ USG agencies fighting for their budget. How can we be at war when the descendant of the War Dept has refused to join the battle in any serious way?

All you have to do is pick up any US newspaper and you know that US people will not tolerate much more inaction by their government.

Supply/demand is wrong equation. Leads us to focus on the consumer and how can we wage war on ourselves? "We have met the enemy and he is us" applies all too much to the way we are organized; let's not have it apply to the targeting aspects of the counter-drug efforts as well. We have to stop the supply/demand mind-set from overemphasis on the poor user and not on the purveyors of the poison.

Leads us to a "Cuff'm and Stuff'm" strategy--address and jail. If this is a war, we need to return to some basic military strategies.

Should have a "Protect/Attack" equation. That's how you go to war--with a defensive plan and an offensive plan. What we need to protect is our youth, the future work-force that will keep this great country strong and prosperous.

Protecting that youth will be even more important as we move toward robotics, and the information-based service industry. Where today's hophead on an assembly line can screw up a few hours production of car seats; tomorrow's junkie can screw up the program that controls manufacturing plans across the world, or billions of dollars in electronic funds transfers. Yes, demand must be reduced, but we need to find a way to buy time, maybe 20 years. Another generation of youth.

Peru. We have heard a lot about Colombia. The Sawyer-Miller Group is earning their keep. Let me say a little about another South American country deeply involved in narcoproduction. I spend a week there the end of November. Talked with embassy and Peruvians.

Size of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Louisiana combined. This is not the size of El Salvador. Population of 21M, annual increase 2.5%.

Crisis. Much self-brought by Pres Alan Garcia. One poll 2.4% gave him good marks. Doesn't listen to advisors, cabinet. One article I read seriously suggested that he was the Marxist mole (as had been put out by the right wing during the election), who had been sent to destroy the Peruvian economy and social institutions in order to prepare the way for the revolution.

Destroyed already fragile economy. 2000% inflation in 1988; 1989 could be worse by a factor of ten. Oil exporter to importer. Buys kerosene from Ecuador for \$31/B; sells for

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\$5. Negative growth rate of about 10%. Only a third of the work-force adequately employed, more than 1/2 underemployed. Copper at record highs; Peru miners on strike. Sendero Luminoso and other guerrilla attacks left 1/2 of Lima w/o electricity and water.

The guerrillas are growing in strength and resources--no doubt partly as a result of the vast sums of narcodollars available. One recent Sendero attacking force was estimated at 300 guerrillas. There were 122 KIA in the ambush. Now those are significant numbers of insurgents to massing for operations.

The Sendero appears to be splitting into three groups: the traditional Maoist, return to Incan purity main group from Ayachuco and the highlands; a group tied into the drug trade, and perhaps not sharing its ill-gotten gains with the traditional Sendero; and an urban group that is infiltrating the Peruvian unions and workers' associations--enforcing the strikes that plague the country and responsible for the increasing violence of the strikes.

No significant, legal dollar income. Central Bank reps go to Iquitos on the Amazon twice/week to buy dollars with the inflating Inti. Narcodollars mean at least \$500M to the country. For the three major narco producers (Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia) drug money is more than 7% of GNP, or \$2B.

Coca can grow in 90% of country, now grown in only 10%. Largest producer, and we think we can eradicate the crop--Indians who have been growing it for centuries.

Upper Huallaga Valley. Almost the size of South Carolina--3-4 times the size of El Salvador. A hundred airstrips. Choice assignment for Guardia Civil and other Peruvian law enforcement agencies. One of the most dangerous places on this planet on people are paying to get a government job there. Wonder why?

Every day, an air fleet of planes move between Colombia and the Upper Huallaga Valley. Costs \$16K to land at a military airstrip; \$12K for a police strip; and only \$8K to land at a civilian airstrip--one pays for enhanced security. Place where peasant shacks have been found to be filled with \$100 bills.

Strategy:

One of the Commissioners of the Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy, General Andrew Goodpaster, described strategy as answering three fundamental questions--the elements of strategy--What (objectives), How (methods), and With What (resources)?

Let's take a quick look at a possible counter-drug strategy.

Objectives:

Back in April of 1986, a Presidential directive outlined US policy on illegal drugs and national security. Good document--excellent document. Go back and read it. It is as clear a directive as should have been required.

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The stated policy is not unlike what you have heard during this conference vis-a-vis low intensity conflict. Help local government forces fight the war. That counterdrug policy document of 1986 laid out three basis objectives:

Halt production on flow
reduce ability of insurgents to use trafficking for support
strengthen ability of governments to defeat threat

How do you operationalize that strategy. That's the task. One first step will be to attack the air-link between the coca paste processing centers in Peru and Bolivia, and the HCL labs in Colombia. Get control of the airspace. Go after the processing centers, the airstrips, and the aircraft and their pilots. Put a hurt on them. Now that is essentially a military operation. We should know how to do that. The trick is to do it without Americans on the ground, and few in the air.

Another way to operationalize the strategy is use countervalue targeting. What are the narcotraficantes really after. A few of them might be crazed revolutionaries, intent on the destruction of the United States. But most are in it for the money. How can we keep them from getting the money.

The international money-flow associated with narcotrafficking, with its frequent instances of money-laundering to disguise the origins and purposes of the funds, may also present an exploitable vulnerability. Attacking drug production and distribution is in effect counterforce targeting; we should pursue countervalue targeting as well by attacking the end objective of the narcotraffickers--money. As with other strategic targeting problems, the first requirement is for intelligence. Basic information about money flow in the drug trade is woefully lacking. For example, it is known that more than \$1 trillion changes hands each day via electronic fund transfers, and that the bulk of high-denomination U.S. currency is under foreign control. But U.S. law enforcement agencies have no more than an elementary idea of how much either electronic or cash transfers figure in illegal drug trafficking, or how such narcofunds are transported, laundered, or spent.

Tough strategic targeting problems have been solved before by centralized management of collection and analysis. The U.S. intelligence community should construct a dynamic model of narcofunding, in both its domestic and international environments, and train analysts to manipulate and update the model to discover avenues for further investigation and identify promising courses of action. Legal review and advice will be critical. The intelligence objectives would be fairly easy to meet within the existing legal and administrative framework of intelligence support for the Government's counterdrug program. But at some point, new administrative, legal, or international action on further controls may be indicated. Both at home and abroad, U.S. strategy should encompass countervalue targeting.

As a former SECSTATE said, "Go to the source." But let's hope we plan and implement better than he did.

Methods or "Strategic Ways" in methodology of the RCWG *Supporting US Strategy for Third World Conflict*.

Intelligence.

The Intelligence Community must take the initiative. It is essential that we undertake well coordinated, but simple steps to cause recognizable returns in the short term while

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establishing a well constructed intelligence architecture for the long term. Intelligence must drive interdiction and suppression operations. Our strategic, or national, and tactical intelligence assets must be placed on a war footing. Intelligence will also deter, and preempt the narcotraficantes. Force them to change their modus operandi. Put the fog of war on their operations--try to lift it from ours.

Intelligence strategy:

- Enhance tactical analysis and dissemination
- Addition and improved collection
- Intelligence sharing, and associated training

Keep one step ahead of the narcotraffickers. These guys can afford the very best, and they are very well coached in countermeasures. Intelligence Research & Development Council (IR&DC) must push ahead with R&D in COMINT, Surveillance/sensors, chemical and substance detectors, and analytical processing systems.

Indirect use of US forces.

Peru, Colombia and other fragile democracies will not support direct US operations in their countries--any more than we would welcome Colombian forces in Washington attacking the demand side. US needs to operate in support, training, advising, etc. Rules of Engagement can certainly be written that will maximize our national capabilities, while preserving this essential concept of the indirect use of force.

Alternatives to bases.

And with minimum of US personnel. We need to be able to operate--assist the host nation fight the war, without bringing in lots of US targets. It can be done with imaginative platforms, and communications systems.

How maintain continuous airborne radar, electronic intelligence, and Imagery over the target area--without US base or flying long hours from the United States? Without millions of dollars in flight hours for AWACS. Back to the blimp! An advanced airship, made of composite materials, with solar panels and fuel cell technology could be build with almost unlimited endurance. Think of what you could do if you had a platform that could stay aloft, out of harms way, for 30-45 days. Blanketing the target with radar and other sensors--plenty of payload. Resupply (and rotate the crew if its Air Force) by helo. Imagine a squadron of RPVs that can be launched on recovered from the airship. Manned by a combined US/Peruvian/Colombian crew. Airborne controllers calling in their nation's forces to strike. Protected by Peruvian MIGs.

How do you communicate with that very small number of US individual in-country. Interactive image communications is the answer. Essentially send pictures, visuals, of whatever you want to the other guy's monitor. And point at it, write directly on the image to correct the draft plan. A joint staff meeting with players connected by the telephone. And this can be done today. Just last week, I transmitted high resolution imagery from Chile to the United States in seconds over the international telephone--using a credit card--just as fast and efficiently as I can do in this country. And had a real-time discussion of the imagery. The beauty of these systems is that you can significantly reduce the numbers of people in country. You move the expertise, not the experts.

Security Assistance. There needs to be a parallel track to the intelligence buildup. That track, of course, is security assistance and other forms of aid--training and equipment to the select local forces that will be risking their lives to save our kids. And the security assistance track must be started now, at the same time we step up the intelligence. Otherwise we wind up with a situation like the Philippines today. Two years ago, Admiral Hays, USCINCPAC, met with us and the message he took away was the right one--beef up your intelligence programs. He did that, apparently with the hope that the security assistance program could keep up. Well it didn't; and maybe it can't. Even the Director of DSAA has described security assistance as a "disaster." The United States must find a way to provide the right kinds of equipments, to the right forces, with the right training. And be able to do it without a seven year lead time.

Resources.

Organization in Washington. Who's in charge. If we have learned one thing in the last few years, it should be that a consensus-driven policy board, and its multiple committees and subcommittees, doesn't work in a war.

Let me refer again to the Presidential policy of April 1986. Where it has failed is in the implementation.

SECSTATE, SECDEF, AG, and DCI have specific implementation responsibilities. Yet who has led the charge among them?

Ambassadors in charge for their country of responsibility. And yet the Ambassador in one producing countries of highest interest to the United States, and one where major operations are being planned by the United States, was almost completely in the dark. He had to ask me who to see in order to find out what wondrous thinking lurks in Washington's mind. Not the way to run a railroad. Is that because Ambassadors have a letter from the President stating that they report through a regional Assistance Secretary--and not through the Assistance Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters? This is a "command" versus "coordination" problem, and in a war someone needs to command.

Funding. Three pots. DCI seed money, from discretionary funds. Setting the stage for FY91 National Foreign Intelligence Program budget. Great idea but why is it happening in the fall of 1988, instead of 1981. \$300M authorized by the new drug law for DOD. Needs to be carefully fenced and controlled by the speaker before me. Otherwise it will evaporate into Navy steaming days and Air Force flying hours. And the big unknown, the totally uncontrolled and uncoordinated annual budgets of the traditional drug agencies--DEA, Customs, USCG, etc.

Drug Czar. "The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988" Creates the Director of National Drug Control Policy--the "Drug Czar". Will he have a staff--a battle staff? How will he control the resources required, and direct the activities of the numerous departments and agencies? That will be one of the toughest jobs inside the beltway. Does the law give him enough authority or will he have to fight for every inch?

And where does the regional Commander in Chief, the CINC, fit into this? What are his responsibilities as the DOD finally goes to war on drugs? There is, I submit, no guidance. The only thing a CINC can expect is to get his hands slapped when he gets out too far in front. And what about Mexico? A major battle ground in the war, and not assigned to a war-fighter.

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How does an Ambassador pull all of this together? The intelligence, the planning, the security assistance, *et al.* This is not the stuff that was taught in the Foreign Service Institute. One idea that is floating around is a sort of "Most Favored Ambassador" status. When the United States decides to make a stand, to really help a country fighting what we would term low intensity conflict--be it guerrillas or narcotraficantes--the US Ambassador in that country would be given favored status to include access to an off-line advisory panel of people who have done it before. Kind a a truth squad which can review current and planned programs, design new ones, and help with the policy decisions in Washington. I can tell you that such a group is beginning to emerge--with at least three Ambassadors all vying for its time.

Conclusion.

The fact that there is a counter-drug workshop at this conference on Low Intensity Conflict is very, very encouraging. A few years ago it would not have occurred. Drugs were not recognized as part of the LIC calculus. I missed Bob Gates' address yesterday morning, but I think that he made the same point-- to add counternarcotics as a discrete task to what the United States considers LIC missions. At least it was in his draft.

I don't want to paint a totally black picture. There are very brave men and women, working around the clock to get us on a war footing. They have, both in Washington and in the llanos of Colombia and elsewhere, been doing an tremendous job. But they are too few, and they are forced to spend inordinate amounts of precious time fighting ourselves and each other. They deserve some adult leadership.

The War on Drugs is just that, it is war. The narcotraficantes are waging war against us, in our streets and schools. It is an international problem of critical magnitude, and we must use all of our skills and resources in its defeat. I have already cited one document, *Supporting US Strategy for Third World Conflict*, that should be with you as you address these LIC, to include Counter-drug strategy. What I would charge you all with is the implementation of that strategy. Good hunting.

Thank you.

The following extract is from the House of Representatives Conference Report 100-989, dated September 28, 1988, to accompany H.R. 4481, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 1989

TITLE XI - DRUG INTERDICTION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1101) that would authorize funds for specific items related to drug interdiction. The House bill also included a provision (sec. 1103) that would authorize use of the armed forces for interdiction or aircraft and vessels involved in drug smuggling.

The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec 940) that would revise and expand the authority of the Department of Defense to assist drug interdiction efforts by civilian law enforcement authorities.

The conferees agree that the Department of Defense can and should play a major role in the national drug interdiction effort. Drug abuse has an increasingly corrosive effect on our society, and it is imperative that we substantially increase our national effort to meet this challenge. The conferees have developed a program that will significantly increase the role of the armed forces in an effective and responsible manner.

Drug enforcement intelligence information

The conferees emphasize that intelligence is the key to a successful drug interdiction program. The conference agreement requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that civilian law enforcement officials are promptly provided with intelligence information collected by the armed forces that is related to drug interdiction. The conferees direct the Secretary of Defense to work with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that the collection of drug interdiction information is established as a high priority for the intelligence community.

Detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit (secs. 1101 and 1102)

Under the conference agreement, the armed forces will concentrate on the detection and monitoring of air and sea traffic, a role that is consistent with the traditional military mission. By undertaking the major role of air and sea surveillance, the military can eliminate the unnecessary duplication of assets and efforts by civilian agencies, and enable those agencies to focus on the law enforcement activities for which they are trained and equipped.

The conference agreement establishes a requirement for the Department of Defense, on an annual basis, to plan and budget for the effective detection and monitoring of all potential aerial and maritime threats to the national security. This will include guidance from the Secretary of Defense on the specific force levels and specific supporting resources to be made available for this mission, including that aspect of the mission that supports the DOD air and sea surveillance responsibilities related to drug interdiction.

Section 1102 establishes the Department of Defense as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. The conferees expect DOD to take prompt action to provide the necessary detection and monitoring capabilities in those border areas that serve as the primary points of entry by drug smugglers. The Department of Defense should focus on the area of greatest threat, the southern border of the United States, particularly during the hours of darkness. It is the hope of the conferees that the Department of Defense can develop the capability to conduct effective nighttime surveillance and monitoring of the southern border using a combination of: (1) Land, sea, and air-based radar; (2) aircraft capable of monitoring the flight of potential drug smugglers; and (3) integrated communications with the law enforcement agencies that will make the actual searches, seizures, and arrests. The conferees, in section 1107 have directed the President to report to the Congress on the feasibility of such a program. The conferees also urge the accelerated deployment of the system of aerostat radars in order to reduce the need for expensive airborne radar platforms. In this regard, the conferees call for the attention of the Department of Defense a gap in planned aerostat coverage from Brownsville, Texas, to the northern part of Florida--a gap that hearings before the House Armed Services Committee have revealed is being increasingly exploited by aerial drug smugglers.

As lead agency, DOD will be responsible for coordinating all air and sea surveillance activities of the federal government, including the elimination of unnecessary duplication. The DOD role as lead agency will be to conduct and coordinate detection and monitoring activities, but the responsibility for establishing detection and monitoring requirements for the drug interdiction program will remain with civilian law enforcement authorities. The designation of DOD as single lead agency can be changed by the President only if he makes a different designation within 15 days of the date of enactment and reports his reasons to the Congress.

The establishment of an air and sea surveillance mission and designation of the Department as the single lead agency represent a major new military requirement, and should substantially enhance our nation's drug interdiction efforts. It is important

to put this in perspective, and to not assume that we have solved the drug problem through this major change in our interdiction program. The interdiction effort will not significantly reduce the drug abuse problem without a substantial increase in our nation's commitment to reduce the demand for illegal drugs.

Interdiction is not the most cost-effective component of a drug abuse reduction strategy. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Comptroller General reported that expenditures for federal anti-drug efforts have increased from \$129.5 million to nearly \$4 billion in the last seventeen years. In the last decade, the budgetary emphasis has been on supply reduction efforts as opposed to demand reduction programs. The Comptroller General reported that by 1987 the federal government was spending three times more on supply reduction than [sic] on demand reduction programs.

Despite substantial increases in interdiction resources, there has been little or no effect on the drug abuse problem. The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) has reported that the quantity of cocaine coming into this country has more than doubled from 1981 to 1986--from 40 to 65 tons to over 130 tons. Although the OTA acknowledges that we are catching more smugglers and seizing more drugs, still more is coming through and there is no indication that the trend is changing.

Perhaps the best and most accurate indicators of the extent of the drug problem--price and purity--also raise questions about the wisdom of focusing primarily on interdiction. The most recent data from the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee estimates that the price of cocaine is at its lowest level reported to date. At the same time, its purity is at its highest--over 50 percent. The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) reported that cocaine related hospital emergencies in 1987 are at the highest level yet recorded, increasing by more than 60 percent over the previous year's record. Since 1980 there has been a near tenfold increase in the annual number of those emergencies reported through DAWN nationwide--from 3,000 to 26,186.

In short, although we have been spending more and more federal dollars on interdiction in recent years, the drug problem has been growing by leaps and bounds. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has found no direct correlation between interdiction resources and the availability of imported drugs in the domestic market. A recently completed study by the RAND Corporation also concluded that increased expenditures for drug interdiction would have a negligible effect on drug consumption.

In sum, while interdiction must remain a necessary component of any national anti-drug strategy, the conferees believe that we should reconsider the past federal emphasis on interdiction and other supply-side efforts, and develop a more balanced approach placing greater reliance on demand-reduction programs.

The Conferees recognize that demand reduction efforts in areas such as treatment and education do not fall within the scope of the Armed Services Committees and will be more appropriately addressed in comprehensive drug legislation that the Congress is expected to consider later this year. However, based on a review of proposals for increased military involvement as well as testimony from numerous experts on the drug issue, the conferees recommend that increased federal emphasis be placed on demand reduction programs in the anti-drug effort. Although the conferees authorize and encourage an expanded military support for drug interdiction efforts, the conferees emphasize that priority should be given to reducing demand.

Communications network (sec. 1103)

The conference agreement requires the President to report to the Congress on a plan for integration by the Department of Defense of the command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the United States dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs into an effective network. The President, in a subsequent report, also must advise Congress of his plan for assignment of the responsibility for operating this command, control, communications, and intelligence network. The role for the Department of Defense in this endeavor is to provide technical advice and experience in establishing and operating a communications network that provides command, control, and intelligence information. It does not place DOD personnel in a command role, nor does it provide authority for the armed forces to engage in domestic intelligence gathering activities.
[Emphasis added]

Drug interdiction and law enforcement support (sec. 1104)

In order to enhance the ability of the Department of Defense to provide support to the drug enforcement efforts of civilian agencies, the legislation revises the current law governing such activities as set forth in chapter 18 of title 10, United States Code. This revision is intended to expand the opportunities for military assistance in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of military readiness and the historic relationship between the armed forces and civilian law enforcement activities. Chapter 18 is revised as follows:

Use of intelligence and other information collected during
military operations (10 U.S.C. 371)

Subsection (a) restates current law permitting DOD to provide Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement officials with any information collected during the normal course of military training or operations that may be relevant to a violation of any Federal or State law within the jurisdiction of such officials. The requirement that this be accomplished "in accordance with other applicable law" means that the collection, retention, and dissemination of such information must be in accord with other legal requirements, such as the Privacy Act.

Subsection (b) establishes a requirement for the Department, to the maximum extent practicable, to take into account the needs of civilian law enforcement officials when planning and executing military training or operations. Examples include scheduling training exercises using night vision devices in border areas, conducting photo-reconnaissance training missions in a manner that serves the need of a civilian law enforcement agency for aerial surveillance of potential marijuana fields, and similar activities. It does not constitute authority to acquire information that DOD is not otherwise authorized to obtain during training and operations.

Subsection (c) requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that intelligence information related to drug interdiction and other civilian law enforcement matters is provided promptly to the appropriate civilian law enforcement officials to the maximum extent consistent with national security requirements. The conferees are sensitive to past concerns about use of the military for domestic intelligence gathering, and emphasize that this section does not modify in any way existing law with respect to the military's authority (or lack thereof) to collect and disseminate intelligence information about American citizens in the United States and abroad.

Use of military equipment and facilities
(10 U.S.C. 372)

This section clarifies current law to provide that the Department of Defense may make available to civilian law enforcement officials any equipment (including associated supplies or spare parts), base facility, or research facility for law enforcement purposes. The assistance must meet the requirements of other applicable laws with respect to interagency and intergovernmental use, transfer, or disposal of equipment.

Training and advising civilian law enforcement officials
(10 U.S.C. 373)

Paragraph (1) clarifies current law to provide that the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with other applicable law, may make Department of Defense personnel available to train Federal, State, and local civilian law enforcement officials in the operation and maintenance of equipment, including equipment made available under section 372. Paragraph (2) restates current law permitting DOD to provide civilian law enforcement officials with expert advice. Such training and expert advice may extend to instruction in the operation of equipment, scientific analysis, translations, and assistance in strategic planning, but may not extend to direct, active involvement in specific law enforcement operations.

Maintenance and operation of equipment by Department of
Defense personnel (10 U.S.C. 374)

Subsection (a) clarifies current law to provide that the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with other applicable law, may make Department of Defense personnel available to maintain equipment for Federal, State, and local civilian law enforcement officials.

Subsection (b) revises current law to specify the circumstances in which DOD personnel may operate equipment to assist civilian law enforcement agencies involved in the enforcement of drug, customs, and immigration laws. DOD personnel may operate equipment (including aircraft, vessels, and vehicles) for the following purposes:

Detecting, monitoring, and communicating of the movement of air and sea traffic (regardless of the location of the aircraft or vessels being monitored).

Aerial reconnaissance. The conferees intend this authority to be used for reconnaissance of property and not for surveillance of persons.

Interception of vessels or aircraft detected outside the United States for the purposes of communicating with such vessels and aircraft to direct such vessels and aircraft to go to a location designated by appropriate civilian officials. When the contact is made outside the United States, equipment operated by DOD personnel (e.g., an aircraft) may continue into the land area of the United States to direct the vessels and aircraft to go to a location designated by appropriate civilian officials. As used in this section, the term "interception" means a contact for purposes of communications, and does not include a physical interruption of the flight or passage of the aircraft or vessel.

Operation of equipment to facilitate communications in connection with law enforcement activities.

When jointly approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of State, DOD personnel may transport (or operate a base of operations for) civilian law enforcement personnel in connection with law enforcement operations outside the land areas of the United States (or any territory, commonwealth, or possession of the United States). The requirement for joint approval and the limitation to operations outside the United States are established in this section because of the potential for involving DOD personnel in a direct law enforcement confrontation, even though their role is designed for logistical support. To the extent that transportation of law enforcement officials or use of military officials does not reasonably raise the possibility of a law enforcement confrontation, such assistance may be provided in the United States under subsection (c).

Subsection (c) provides that the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with other applicable law, may make Department of Defense personnel available to any Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement agency to operate equipment for purposes other than described in subsection (b) to the extent that such assistance does not involve direct participation in a civilian law enforcement operation, except as otherwise authorized by law.

Restriction on direct participation by military personnel
(10 U.S.C. 375)

This section clarifies current law which requires the Secretary of Defense to issue such regulations as may be necessary to insure that the provision of any support (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) to any civilian law enforcement official under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search and seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law. The conferees deleted the term "interdiction of a vessel or aircraft," which is set forth in current law, because the term "interdiction" has acquired a meaning that includes detection and monitoring as well as a physical interference with the movement of a vessel or aircraft. The conferees emphasize, however, that they do not intend by this action to authorize military personnel to interrupt the passage of a vessel or aircraft except as otherwise authorized by law.

The conferees recognize that the magnitude of the drug problem has led to calls for the military to be directly involved in search, seizures, and arrests. The conferees, however, do not believe that it is appropriate to make such a radical break with

the historic separation between military and civilian functions without clear and compelling evidence that such an action would result in a substantial reduction in the drug problem. The overwhelming weight of the evidence is that no such change would come from giving the military police powers.

As noted above, there is a serious question as to whether increased interdiction efforts--regardless of which agency actually exercises the police functions--will have a significant impact on the supply of drugs available to meet the demand. Providing law enforcement powers to naval personnel, for example, would not add to the Navy's ability to assist in maritime interdiction because current law already provides for placing Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment Teams on board naval vessels transiting drug interdiction areas.

Utilizing Navy instead of Coast Guard personnel for law enforcement purposes would do nothing to solve the most critical problems that the Coast Guard now faces in drug interdiction, whether aboard Navy or Coast Guard vessels. As Peter Reuter of the RAND Corporation noted in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee: "Even when the Coast Guard has prior information that a vessel may be carrying drugs, only one out of eight of those boarded is found to have drugs. That is about five times higher than the agency's success rate when it has no prior information. The military services can ensure that the Coast Guard will see more vessels and pursue more of them for boarding. But it cannot at the moment do much to help the maritime services distinguish the undistinguishable."

The conferees agree that interdiction, to a reasonable degree, is a necessary part of a comprehensive drug strategy. However, none of the federal law enforcement agencies have requested use of military personnel to supplement their arrest, search, and seizure functions.

Drug interdiction is a sophisticated matter, and the Coast Guard provides its members with months of schooling and extensive on-the-job training. It makes little sense to create a situation in which the military skills of members of the armed forces will atrophy while they spend months receiving law enforcement training. To the extent that we need more individuals to perform law enforcement functions, the most cost-effective way to do so is to provide the law enforcement agencies with the necessary personnel. This bill follows this cost-effective approach by providing authority for increased Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment Teams.

The demand by some for use of the military in drug-related arrests would quickly fade in the face of actual law enforcement confrontations between the uniformed military and American civilians. As former Chief Justice Burger has noted, the

American experience has been marked by "a traditional and strong resistance. . . to any military intrusion into civilian affairs. That tradition has deep roots in our history. . . ." Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S.C. 1, 15 (1972). The Posse Comitatus Act, as one court has noted, is not "an anachronistic relic of an historical period the experience of which is irrelevant to the present. It expresses the inherited antipathy of the American to the use of troops for civil purposes. . . Its relevance to this age is sadly clear." Wrynn v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 457, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Carlucci noted: "I remain absolutely opposed to the assignment of a law enforcement mission to the Department of Defense. I am even more firmly opposed to any relaxation of the posse comitatus restrictions on use of the military to search, seize and arrest. I have discussed this matter with the President, and other senior members of his Cabinet, and I can report that these views are shared throughout this Administration. The historical tradition which separates military and civilian authority in this country has served both to protect the civil liberties of our citizens and to keep our Armed Forces militarily focused and at a high state of readiness."

Support not to affect adversely military preparedness
(10 U.S.C. 376)

This section restates the requirement under current law that provides that support (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) may not be provided to any civilian law enforcement official under this chapter if the provision of such assistance will adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States. The conferees note that this provision should not be interpreted in a manner that would shield the Department from providing support merely because it is inconvenient to do so. At the same time, the conferees note that the armed forces have the ultimate responsibility for the defense of the nation, and our military capability could be seriously compromised by draining DOD assets into other agencies.

Reimbursement (10 U.S.C. 377)

This section clarifies current law governing reimbursement. Chapter 18 of Title 10 was designed to eliminate ambiguities as to the type of support that DOD can provide other agencies without violating the Posse Comitatus Act. It is not intended to establish the Department of Defense as a source of free supplies and manpower that can be tapped by other agencies without any form of accountability. When DOD makes equipment, facilities, or personnel available to other government entities, reimbursement shall be provided to the extent that would otherwise be required

by the Economy Act or other applicable law. This section also makes it clear, however, that the reimbursement provision must be applied in a reasonable fashion. Reimbursement is not required when the support is provided in the normal course of military training or operations or results in a benefit to the Department of Defense that it [sic] substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be obtained from military operations or training.

Nonpreemption of other law (10 U.S.C. 378)

This section, which is similar to the provision included when chapter 18 was first enacted in 1981, makes it clear that nothing in this revision is intended to limit the authority of the executive branch to use military personnel or equipment for civilian law enforcement purposes beyond that provided by law before the date of enactment.

Assignment of Coast Guard personnel to naval vessels for law enforcement purposes (10 U.S.C. 379)

This section clarifies current law authorizing a minimum of 500 active duty personnel of the Coast Guard to be assigned to naval vessels for performance of Coast Guard law enforcement functions, including search, seizure and arrest. The revision makes it clear that Coast Guard law enforcement personnel must be placed on each appropriate surface vessel that transits a drug interdiction area. A total of \$6 million will be transferred from the Department of Defense to the Coast Guard in fiscal year 1989 for this program. To ensure the most cost-effective use of these funds, the conferees direct the Secretary of Defense to ensure that Coast Guard personnel are properly integrated into the ship's company of naval vessels to perform shipboard duties when not actually engaged in law enforcement activities.

Enhancing cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials (10 U.S.C. 380)

This section revises current law to emphasize the conferees interest in having the Department of Defense play the leading role in advising Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials of the types of assistance that DOD can provide.

Enhanced drug interdiction and law enforcement role for the National Guard (sec. 1105)

The National Guard traditionally has performed law enforcement functions under the direction of the Governors. When not in federal service, the National Guard is not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act. Subsection (a) provides funds for drug enforcement activities of the Guard while in state status. The Secretary of Defense may obligate up to \$60 million for this purpose. To be eligible, the Governor must submit a plan to the

Secretary specifying how personnel of the National Guard of such State are to be used in drug enforcement and interdiction operations. The Secretary of Defense is required to consult with the Attorney General in reviewing such proposals. It is the intent of the conferees that priority be given to those plans which (a) involve areas of the greatest need in terms of drug interdiction and (b) are most likely to be effective. The National Guard will remain under state command and control when conducting any law enforcement activity with funds provided under this section. The provision of these funds does not place the National Guard in federal status for purposes of the Posse Comitatus Act, or for any other purpose.

When in federal status, the National Guard can assist civilian law enforcement officials to the same degree as the active forces. Subsection (b) requires the Secretary of Defense to prescribe and enforce training criteria for the National Guard to enhance the capability of the National Guard to assist in drug abuse control activities.

Because the conferees believe that the National Guard may provide significant opportunities for enhanced law enforcement assistance, subsection (c) requires the President to submit to Congress a report on the potential effectiveness of using members of the National Guard for drug interdiction efforts, consistent with applicable law, along the borders and at the ports of entry of the United States.

Funding of activities related to drug interdiction (sec. 1106)

This section provides the Department of Defense with \$300 million, which may be used only for drug interdiction activities involving the detection and monitoring of air and sea traffic under sections 1101 and 1102, the integration of a command, control, communications, and intelligence network under section 1103, or the activities of the National Guard in state status under section 1105. These funds are in addition to the funds that the Department of Defense currently is expending on drug interdiction activities. The \$300 million includes a transfer of \$90 million appropriated for procurement of P-3 aircraft in fiscal year 1987. The conferees emphasize that DOD has been given specific missions under this Act in order to take advantage of existing assets and expertise, and intend that these additional funds should be used primarily to operate existing equipment. This does not preclude appropriate expenditures for procurement or research and development when there is a critical need that cannot be met with existing equipment.

To the extent that funds currently budgeted for activities related to the detection of air and sea traffic are insufficient to meet the requirements established in this legislation, the conferees invite appropriate reprogramming requests.

Reports (sec. 1107)

The conferees recognize that the new missions established in this Act are likely to require additional resources, and may require statutory modifications. Section 1107(a) requires the President to submit a report to Congress containing legislative proposals, including budgetary requests, not later than December 1, 1988. Subsection (b) requires the President to provide a report on aerial interdiction capabilities along the Southern border. Subsection (c) requires the Secretary of Defense to submit two reports on the relationship between civilian and military resources in specified air interdiction activities.

RESERVE AFFAIRS
WORKSHOP

RESERVE AFFAIRS WORKSHOP

15 December 1988

Purpose. To review each theater's reserve component employment strategy in LIC to include strengths and shortfalls; to review current Defense Guidance LIC-related mid-term objectives; to discuss reserve component policy/legal issues surrounding peacetime operational reserve component LIC missions versus the current wartime training missions with incidental LIC benefit; and to collect and publish various papers from conferees bearing on the above objectives in the main conference report.

Summary of Speaker Remarks.

Major General William R. Berkman, USA, Military Executive of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, stated his remarks were personal and did not represent the official views of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Reserve Forces Policy Board, or the US Army Reserve. He provided the conferees with a list of references describing the national strategy for employment of the reserve components in a LIC context. They were National Security Strategy of the United States (The White House, 1987 and 1988 issues); Discriminate Deterrence (President's Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy); Supporting US Strategy for Third World Conflict (General Gorman's Regional Conflict Working Group); Reserve Component Support to US National LIC Strategy: Issues for the Future (Draft CLIC PAPER by Lt Col Brothers); and Overseas Study of Reserve Component Issues (Reserve Forces Policy Board, January 1987). He highlighted the availability of reserve component units and personnel to support a CINC's LIC strategy through unit training exercises such as the Blazing Trail exercises of US Southern Command. He also mentioned use of personnel from the Individual Ready Reserve as a key source of augmentation to the CINCs.

General Berkman discussed several surmountable impediments for employing reserve component units and personnel in LIC.

a. Reserve component dollars are fenced for training. Currently, there is no support to allow reserve component training dollars to be diverted for active component operational missions. Training exercises overseas will continue to be a primary tool available to the CINCs.

b. Derivation of mission taskings. Currently, most war game simulation and analysis fits higher intensity conflicts. When LIC is addressed it is performed off-line. If LIC is the future threat, then our analysis tools must adjust. This may result in identification of units and personnel to be specifically trained and equipped to perform LIC missions.

c. Exercise accountability. Congressional scrutiny by the GAO, Army Audit Agency, etc., place LIC-related exercises in the spotlight. On major operations of a combat nature, a certain amount of wear and tear, loss, etc., is to be expected. However for LIC, the standard of accountability demanded is higher, which is causing some perturbations in the system.

d. Governor's Control of the National Guard. The Montgomery Amendment prohibited state governors from withholding consent to federalize National Guardsmen for overseas training based solely on objections due to date, location, unit, or type of training. Several governors brought litigation, claiming unconstitutionality of the amendment. The 1st US Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the amendment as constitutional, whereas the 8th US Circuit did not. If the law is ultimately held as unconstitutional, it will have serious implications on the President's ability to use the Total Force as an instrument in meeting foreign policy strategy and objectives.

Workshop Summary.

The workshop accomplished most of its major objectives. Following General Berkman's remarks, representatives from each of the overseas combatant CINCs provided an overview of how reserve component units and personnel are employed in a LIC context (Appendix 2). A legal overview was provided, which highlighted the provisions under which reserve component units and personnel could be used overseas in a LIC environment (Appendix 3). Following these presentations, other major issues were discussed.

Need for a LIC Operations Plan (OPLAN) or equivalent. Force structure, equipment, and other DOD capabilities are driven by traditional threat analyses of force-on-force, which drive funding requirements and inputs to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, OPLAN derivation, etc. As LIC is non-traditional in nature to warfighters, LIC requirements are not well stated, and consequently, not well supported by DOD. An interagency OPLAN or equivalent is needed for LIC.

Inadequacy of Security Assistance Funding. Each briefer mentioned the lack of fund availability to pursue LIC objectives in-theater. Over recent years, each CINC has seen declining security assistance funding in their area of responsibility. Lack of an OPLAN or equivalent ties in closely with the lack of funding. Reapportionment from Egypt-Israel and base rights countries is sorely needed.

Adequacy of reserve component volunteerism to meet the CINCs' LIC requirements. One point of view stated that involuntary call-up of reserve component units and personnel was needed to augment day-to-day missions like Persian Gulf operations. Others argued that the current system of

volunteerism had been meeting all of the CINCs requirements for years. They did note that demands for reserve component participation is growing even more, which is straining volunteerism, e.g., if I wanted this much duty time, I'd have stayed full-time active duty. General Berkman stated that the two week annual training period may need to be re-examined. Perhaps another category of reservist/Guardsman is needed, e.g., semi-active duty Elite Ready Reserve. Many felt that if the legal set-up is "adjusted," then the CINCs may not be able to live with the answer Congress provides. Attachment 4 contains papers submitted related to this issue.

Determination of national LIC priorities and resources. The reserve component system can support whatever the national policy makers decide and Congress funds. The maze of congressional funding constraints, illustrated in attachment 5, examines the types of authorized engineer construction activities in LIC and potential funding sources/constraints. Until LIC policies and requirements are further developed and defined at the national level (LIC Board), the reserve component system should remain on its present course. One Air Force Reserve (AFRES) attendee noted that AFRES supports over 1200 deployments annually, many of which are to SOUTHCOM. Most of these LIC-related requirements are not tied to war plans, hence, they are really over and above requirements. Eventually, however, as we face dwindling budgets, priority tradeoffs must be made. Until LIC is given a higher priority, war plan support will remain prime. Conversely, General Berkman did indicate that if LIC is the future threat, then adjustments to the reserve component (and active component) system should be made, e.g., units and personnel should be identified, trained, and equipped to perform LIC missions.

The DOD may be too far ahead of the rest of the federal government in making preparations to deal with LIC. Due to congressional prodding, one could interpret DOD being tasked to take a much more active part in LIC. As a result of legislation, some in DOD perceive that the Department of State (DOS), Agency for International Development (AID), and other federal agencies are not dealing effectively with LIC. Therefore, some feel DOD must push into traditional DOS/AID turf to correct deficiencies in the US system of dealing with LIC. Several attendees felt that until national policy makers of the next administration determine the level of integration and funding of LIC efforts, the tail (DOD) may be trying to wag the dog.

Attachments

- Read-ahead Packet
- Theater Briefings
- Legal Overview
- Papers Related to Volunteerism
- Engineer Construction in Foreign Countries

UNCLAS

SUBJ: RESERVE AFFAIRS WORKSHOP AT JCS/CLIC LIC PLANNING POLICY WORKSHOP

REFS: A. OJCS/J-5 MSG 121912Z AUG 88 [NOTAL].

B. OJCS/J-5 MSG 211936Z SEP 88 [NOTAL].

C. OJCS/J-5 MSG 282347Z OCT 88 [NOTAL].

1. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE LIC RESERVE AFFAIRS WORKSHOP ON 15 DEC 88 (CONFERENCE DAY 3) IS TO PROVIDE AN OPEN, NON-ATTRIBUTABLE FORUM FOR DISCUSSING EMPLOYMENT OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS (RC) IN MEETING U.S. NATIONAL LIC STRATEGY OBJECTIVES THROUGH THE THEATER COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF (CINCS). REQUEST A REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH THEATER CINC PROVIDE A FIFTEEN MINUTE OR LESS OVERVIEW BRIEFING ON CURRENT RC LIC ACTIVITIES IN THEIR THEATER TO INCLUDE STRENGTHS, WEAKNESS, AND CONCERNS FOR INFORMAL INPUT TO THE JOINT STAFF.

2. RESERVE AFFAIRS WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES:

A. REVIEW EACH THEATER'S RC EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY IN LIC TO INCLUDE STRENGTHS AND SHORTFALLS.

B. REVIEW CURRENT DEFENSE GUIDANCE (DG) LIC-RELATED MID-TERM OBJECTIVES.

C. DISCUSS RC POLICY/LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING PEACETIME OPERATIONAL RC LIC MISSIONS VERSUS THE CURRENT WARTIME TRAINING MISSIONS WITH INCIDENTAL LIC BENEFIT.

D. COLLECT AND PUBLISH VARIOUS PAPERS FROM CONFEREES BEARING ON THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES IN THE MAIN CONFERENCE REPORT.

3. WORKSHOP AGENDA, DAY 3, 0830-1230 HOURS:

A. 0830-0915. KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM R. BERKMAN, USA, MILITARY EXECUTIVE TO THE RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD, TO INCLUDE A QUESTION AND ANSWER TIME.

B. 0915-1015. LEGAL OVERVIEW AND BRIEFINGS BY THEATER CINC REPRESENTATIVES.

C. 1015-1030. BREAK.

D. 1030-1100. REVIEW DG OBJECTIVES.

E. 1100-1215. DISCUSS POTENTIAL RC LIC POLICY ISSUES.

F. 1215-1230. BREAK AND REJOIN FULL CONFERENCE FOR CLOSING REMARKS.

4. TO ASSIST CONFEREES IN REVIEWING DG OBJECTIVES APPLICABLE TO RESERVE FORCES IN LIC, THE FOLLOWING UNCLASSIFIED EXTRACT FROM DEFENSE GUIDANCE, FY 90-94, DATED 29 MAR 88, IS PROVIDED:

A. HUMANITARIAN/CIVIC ASSISTANCE

[273] (U) THE SERVICES WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AND CONDUCT PROGRAMS TO SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE PROJECTS USING ACTIVE DUTY, RESERVE, AND NATIONAL GUARD FORCES IN COMPLIANCE WITH GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN DEPSECDEF'S DECISION MEMORANDUM OF 20 NOVEMBER 85 ENTITLED "UNIFIED COMMANDERS CONDUCT OF COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS WITH FRIENDLY NATIONS" AND EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORITIES.

B. SUPPORT TO LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

[280] (U) DEVELOP JOINT AND SERVICE DOCTRINE AND TRAINING PROGRAMS TO INCLUDE REVITALIZING SERVICE LANGUAGE (TO LEVEL 3) AND AREA STUDIES PROGRAMS, AND ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT ACTIVITY.

[281] (U) BY DECEMBER 31, 1989 EVALUATE EXISTING U.S. AND ALLIED AIRCRAFT FOR APPLICATION TO LIC STOL AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

[282] (U) ENHANCE RIVERINE/BROWN-WATER CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT LIC TRAINING AND OPERATIONS WITH FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

[283] (U) SUPPORT LIC OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS BY IMPROVING PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING OF AC AND RC MEDICAL, ENGINEER, AND CIVIL AFFAIRS ELEMENTS AND DEVELOPING A PROGRAM FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF BASE FACILITIES TO SUPPORT THE REGIONAL CINCS IN A LIC ENVIRONMENT.

[284] (U) IMPROVE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) PROGRAMS TO ENHANCE DETECTION, RECOVERY, AND DISPOSAL CAPABILITIES FOR EOD TEAMS, ESPECIALLY WITH UNCONVENTIONAL NON-STANDARD ORDNANCES.

[285] (U) DEVELOP AND ACQUIRE, FOR AT LEAST TWO THEATERS SIMULTANEOUSLY, A LOW COST, MANNED/UNMANNED, LOW-RISK TECHNOLOGY, AIR DEFENSE/DENIAL SYSTEM THAT PROVIDES AN EASILY DEPLOYABLE SYSTEM TO DEFEAT OR DENY ENEMY HELICOPTER INTRUSION INTO FRIENDLY LANDING ZONES.

5. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE PROVIDED TO FACILITATE DISCUSSIONS DURING THE POLICY ISSUES PORTION OF THE RESERVE AFFAIRS WORKSHOP:

LIC IS ONE OF THE MOST ACTIVE THREATS THE UNITED STATES FACES TODAY. WHILE NOT OF THE HIGHEST RISK TO THE IMMEDIATE SURVIVAL AND SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS AND PROTRACTED NATURE REQUIRE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT STRATEGY THROUGH COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORTS. TO FACILITATE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS LIC DETERRENT STRATEGY, THE FOLLOWING TWO OPTIONS ARE PROVIDED FOR CONSIDERATION:

OPTION A: AS THE HIGH RISK FORMS OF CONFLICT ARE THE LEAST LIKELY TO OCCUR, E.G., CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WAR, CONSIDER SHIFTING MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETERRING THE CONVENTIONAL WAR THREATS FROM ACTIVE TO RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN ACTIVE COMPONENT FORCES ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS TO BUILD A LIC DETERRENT CAPABILITY AND EXECUTE THEATER CINC LIC STRATEGY.

OPTION B: CONSIDER ASSIGNING TO THEATER CINCS, RC ENGINEER, MEDICAL, CIVIL AFFAIRS, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS UNITS SELECTIVELY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED TO PERFORM A PEACETIME, LIC MISSION OF NATION BUILDING IN SELECTED COUNTRIES ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS. IN COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE THEATER CINC, THESE UNITS WOULD SEEK TO BUILD INFRASTRUCTURES (PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES) TO DETER AND/OR ATTACK SEVERAL OF THE UNDERLYING CAUSES THAT FOSTER INSTABILITY AND VIOLENCE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES OF STRATEGIC INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. LIC-DESIGNATED UNITS WOULD HAVE A SECONDARY MISSION TO SUPPORT MAJOR WAR PLANS.

6. CENTER POC FOR THE RESERVE AFFAIRS WORKSHOP IS LT COL BROTHERS, AV 574-4593.



LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT PLANNING POLICY WORKSHOP

USLANTCOM OVERVIEW BRIEFING - RESERVE AFFAIRS WORKSHOP

- SLIDE 1 - COMMAND LOGO - ON
- GREETING AND INTRODUCTION
- THIS BRIEFING IS UNCLASSIFIED. IT WILL CONSIST OF THREE PARTS.
 - U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
 - USLANTCOM AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
 - RESERVE COMPONENT INITIATIVES
- SLIDE 2 - MAP OF LANTCOM AOR - ON
- ADM KELSO WEARS TWO HATS, USCINCLANT AND SACLANT. THIS BRIEFING WILL NOT INVOLVE HIS SACLANT ROLE. THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR) YOU SEE ON THE SCREEN IS THE LANTCOM AOR. IT EXTENDS FROM POLE-TO-POLE AND COAST-TO-COAST (45M SQUARE MILES OCEAN). AS YOU CAN SEE, PART OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN IS INCLUDED IN THE ATLANTIC COMMAND. THIS PROVIDES A SINGLE COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION (SLOCS) AND FOR OPERATING WITH ALL THE NAVIES OF SOUTH AMERICA. ADM KELSO HAS THE ASSISTANCE OF FOUR SUBORDINATE, UNIFIED COMMANDS:
 - CDR, ICELAND DEFENSE FORCE
 - CDR, U.S. FORCES AZORES
 - CDR, U.S. FORCES CARIBBEAN (DISESTABLISHMENT COMMENT)
 - CDR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, ATLANTIC
- FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS CONFERENCE, MY COMMENTS WILL APPLY TO THE CARIBBEAN BASIN ONLY.
- SLIDE 3 - LANTCOM FORCES - ON
- ADM KELSO IS ASSIGNED ELEMENTS FROM ALL THREE SERVICES:

1.

- ARLANT (ARMY ATLANTIC)
- AFLANT (AIR FORCE ATLANTIC)
- CINCLANTFLT
- FMFLANT (FLEET MARINE FORCE ATLANTIC)

- NEITHER THE ARMY NOR AIR FORCE ELEMENTS PROVIDE THE ATLANTIC COMMAND ASSETS ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS (PEACETIME PLANNING ONLY). THESE ASSETS WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ADM KELSO SHOULD THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY ASSIGN THE COMMAND A MISSION REQUIRING THEIR UTILIZATION.

- ONE OTHER UNIQUE ASPECT OF LANTCOM - NO ACTIVE COMPONENT ARMY UNITS STATIONED IN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.

- SLIDE 4 - LIC - ON

- LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AS DEFINED IN DOD DIRECTIVE 5138.3, 'A POLITICAL-MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN CONTENDING STATES OR GROUPS BELOW CONVENTIONAL WAR AND ABOVE THE ROUTINE, PEACEFUL COMPETITION AMONG STATES.'

- NEARLY ALL THE ARMED CONFLICTS OF THE PAST 40 YEARS HAVE OCCURED IN WHAT IS VAGUELY REFERRED TO AS THE THIRD WORLD: THE DIVERSE COUNTRIES OF ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN.

- WE REMAIN VIGILANT FOR POSSIBLE IMPORTED TERRORISM FROM COUNTRIES AND GROUPS OUTSIDE, AS WELL AS INSIDE, THE THEATER.

- IT IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST TO SUPPORT THE CONTINUATION OF THE REGION'S TRADITIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. FRIENDLY INTERACTION WITH OUR CARIBBEAN NEIGHBORS IS CONSIDERED A SIGNIFICANT ASSET. THE AREA IS EXTREMELY VOLATILE, THE ELECTORAL PROCESS CAN CHANGE OUR RELATIONS OVERNIGHT BY REPLACING

GOVERNMENTS FRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES BY HOSTILE ONES.

- U.S. DECLARATION OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE HAS GENERALLY LED TO HEIGHTENED EXPECTATIONS AND ASPIRATIONS AMONG THE REGION'S LITERATE AND POLITICALLY ASTUTE POPULATION. MORE THAN EVER THESE ISLANDERS EXPECT DELIVERY ON THE IMPLICIT PROMISE OF GREATER U.S. INVOLVEMENT, BELIEVING A BETTER LIFE WILL BE FORTHCOMING WITH U.S. ASSISTANCE. UNFORTUNATELY, CONDITIONS UNFAVORABLE TO THIS TREND, U.S. BUDGET CUTS AND GEOPOLITICAL SIGNALS HAVE REDUCED OUR RESOURCES AND METHODS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE, PROVIDING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS.

- IN GENERAL, THE ISLAND NATIONS TO THE EAST OF CUBA CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS PRO-WESTERN, POOR AND HAVING FEW RESOURCES OTHER THAN TOURISM UPON WHICH THEY DEPEND. THE REALITY FOR MOST OF THE PEOPLE OF THE CARIBBEAN IS FAR REMOVED FROM THE PLUSH BEACHSIDE RESORT LIFE DEPICTED IN TRAVEL POSTERS.

- THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN IS BECOMING A STAGING AND TRANSHIPPING AREA FOR DRUG SMUGGLERS. MOST COCAINE AND MARIJUANA TRANSITING THE CARIBBEAN BY AIR IS DESTINED FOR THE U.S., CANADA, AND EUROPE. HOWEVER, TO VARYING DEGREES, CARIBBEAN NATIONS ALSO PROVIDE A MARKET FOR BOTH DRUGS TO SATISFY DEMANDS CREATED BY THE LOCAL POPULATION AND TOURISTS. THE COMBINATION OF DRUGS, CRIME, AND CORRUPTION COUPLED WITH FRAGILE ECONOMIES GENERATES SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED INSTABILITY. WITH THAT POSITIVE NOTE, WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE, CONSIDERING THE GUIDANCE, 'AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION IS WORTH A POUND OF CURE?'

- MAXIMUM USE OF THE MANY TOOLS AT OUR DISPOSAL (SECURITY

ASSISTANCE, HUMANITARIAN/CIVIC ASSISTANCE, CIVIL AFFAIRS, RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING) TO STRENGTHEN ALLIES AND FRIENDS AGAINST INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS.

- SLIDE 5 - SECURITY ASSISTANCE - ON

- SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS HAVE UNDERWRITTEN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FOR 40 YEARS, AND ARE REGARDED WORLDWIDE AS TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT.

- CURRENT SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ARE INADEQUATELY FUNDED IN THE CARIBBEAN FOR PURSUING AN INTEGRATED, LONG-TERM STRATEGY.

- AID FOR POLITICALLY FRAGILE COUNTRIES MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO FALL BELOW THE THRESHOLD SUM THAT PERMITS PURSUING SOME MINIMALLY EFFECTIVE GLOBAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OVER THE YEARS. NEED EVERYONE TO SEND THE MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON, 'REINSTATE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AS A POWERFUL INSTRUMENT OF POLICY AND INTEGRATE IT WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF OUR NATIONAL STRATEGY.'

- SLIDE 6 - RC INITIATIVES - ON

- HUMANITARIAN/CIVIC ASSISTANCE (H/CA) PROJECTS IN FY 88:

-- \$375,000 DOLLARS

-- TWENTY-SIX PROJECTS

-- SEVEN ISLAND NATIONS

- FY 89 H/CA PROJECTS

-- \$291,000 DOLLARS

-- TWENTY-FIVE PROJECTS

-- SEVEN ISLAND NATIONS

- THE 358TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE (USAR), NORRISTOWN, PA IS THE EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE USLANTCOM H/CA PROGRAM. THEIR

OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE IN THIS ROLE HAS RESULTED IN A VERY SUCCESSFUL AND REWARDING H/CA PROGRAM IN THE CARIBBEAN. TO ASSIST IN THE PEACETIME MANAGEMENT OF THE H/CA PROGRAM AND TO PREPARE FOR THEIR WARTIME MISSION OF CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS THEY HAVE DEVELOPED SUPERB AREA STUDIES ON ALL ISLAND NATIONS.

- PUBLIC AFFAIRS UNITS FROM THE ARMY AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD WILL BE USED TO SUPPORT ALL MAJOR RESERVE COMPONENT ACTIVITIES IN OUR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.

- TWO MEDICAL READINESS TRAINING AND EXERCISE SURVEY TEAMS HAVE VISITED SEVERAL OF THE ISLANDS. WE ARE MOVING FORWARD ON DEVELOPING SOME FUTURE MEDICAL TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES.

- AN ENGINEER READINESS TRAINING AND EXERCISE SURVEY TEAM VISITED JAMAICA IN NOVEMBER. AS A RESULT - TODAY - WE HAVE AIR NATIONAL GUARD CIVIL ENGINEERING PERSONNEL FROM ALABAMA AND IOWA ON SITE IN JAMAICA REPAIRING SCHOOL HOUSES.

- IN THE FUTURE WE HOPE TO EXPAND MEDRETES AND ENRETES TO OTHER CARIBBEAN ISLAND NATIONS. IT IS NO EASY TASK, ALL PROJECTS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES MUST RECEIVE:

- HOST NATION APPROVAL

- DEPARTMENT OF STATE APPROVAL

- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROVAL

- THE BOTTOM LINE IS, ALL RESERVE COMPONENT TRAINING ACTIVITIES/OPPORTUNITIES MUST ENSURE WARTIME MISSION ORIENTED TRAINING AND READINESS ENHANCEMENT OF U.S. FORCES IS THE PARAMOUNT OBJECTIVE OF THE US-HOST NATION ARRANGEMENT. HOST NATION BENEFIT MUST BE INCIDENTAL TO THE TRAINING MISSION.

- SLIDE 7 - COMMAND LOGO - ON

5.

- WE FACE MANY CHALLENGES IN THE FUTURE. WE MUST TRY OUR HARDEST TO SECURE OUTCOMES THAT BEST SERVE NATIONAL STRATEGY, NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES, AND THOSE OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE GROWING LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT.

- THIS CONCLUDES MY PRESENTATION, ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

6.

USCINCLANT



CINCLANTFLT



FMFLANT



7th FLANT

1st FLANT

• DEFINITION

• THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

• TERRORISM

• DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

• CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE

• DRUG TRAFFICKING

• AMERICAN COMM "MEN"

• FUNDING

• AID

• MESSAGE

• HUMANITARIAN/CIVIC ASSISTANCE

• DEFENSE AFFAIRS

• MEDICAL READINESS TRAINING AND EXERCISES

• ENGINEER READINESS TRAINING AND EXERCISES

• PROJECT APPROVAL

• TRAINING/READINESS


• HOST NATION BENEFIT



USCENTCOM



RESERVE COMPONENT - LIC ACTIVITIES



UNITED STATES
CENTRAL COMMAND

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative

DIEGO GARCIA

SEYCHELLES

Victoria

F-20

RESERVE COMPONENT - LIC ACTIVITIES

USCENTCOM PROGRAM

- PRIMARILY ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS
 - MOST OF COMBAT SUPPORT/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CS/CSS) IN RESERVE
 - NORMALLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH BS OR SOF EX.
- OTHER SERVICES INTRAGRATED RESERVIST INTO ACTIVE UNITS.



RESERVE COMPONENT - LIC ACTIVITIES

USCENTCOM PROGRAM CONTINUED

- THREE BASIC CATEGORIES
 - SUPPORT OF US-HOST NATION MILITARY
 - RUNWAYS
 - RANGES
 - NATION BUILDING
 - WELLS
 - ROADS
 - HEALTH SUPPORT
 - DISASTER RELIEF
 - IMMUNIZATION

RESERVE COMPONENT - LIC ACTIVITIES


RESERVE PROJECTS

FY87

- FLOATING DOCK IN BERBERA, SOMALIA (COMPLETED BS87)
- ONE K-SPAN WAREHOUSE, CAIRO WEST AB, EGYPT
(COMPLETED BS87)

FY88

- 9KM ROAD, TRAINING AREA 1, JORDAN (COMPLETED NOV 88)
- COBRA RANGE UPGRADE TRAINING AREA 1, JORDAN
(COMPLETED NOV 88)
- H/CA PROJECT REFURBISH ORPHANAGE, MOGADISHU,
SOMALIA (COMPLETED)
- WATER WELL TO BE COMPLETED



RESERVE COMPONENT - LIC ACTIVITIES

RESERVE PROJECTS CONTINUED

FY89 (SCHEDULED)

- UPGRADE BOMBING RANGE AT WADI NATRUN, EGYPT
(MAY-JUN 89)
- TWO 2KM ROADS IN TRAINING AREA 1, JORDAN (MAY-JUN 89)

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM LEVELS


	<u>FY87</u>	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>
EGYPT	\$1,301.8	\$1,301.5	\$1,301.5
PAKISTAN	313.6	260.8	230.9
JORDAN	41.9	28.2	11.7
KENYA	11.5	6.0	16.1
SUDAN	6.0	.7	0.9
SOMALIA	8.2	6.5	4.7
OMAN	.1	.1	.1
YEMEN	2.4	2.1	1.5
DJIBOUTI	1.4	1.1	.6
TOTAL	<u>\$1,686.9</u>	<u>\$1,607.0</u>	<u>\$1,568.0</u>

(\$ IN MILLIONS)

NOTE: * INCLUDES MAP, FMFP AND IMET.

** SAUDI ARABIA, UAE, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, AND QATAR ARE
TOTALLY CASH SALES.

USCENTCOM AOR





RESERVE COMPONENT - LIC ACTIVITIES

STRENGTHS

- **SUPPLEMENTS DECREASING SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNDING**
- **DIRECT SUPPORT OF HOST NATION**
- **HELPS MAINTAIN ACCESS**
- **ENHANCES AND PREPARES FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENTS**
- **PROVIDES FACILITIES FOR US TRAINING/EXERCISES**
- **PROVIDES REALISTIC ENVIRONMENT COMBINED/JOINT TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES**

RESERVE COMPONENT - LIC ACTIVITIES

WEAKNESS

- RC UNIT LEAD TIME REQUIREMENTS
 - PLANNING CYCLE
 - PERSONNEL AVAILABILITY
- PROJECT DURATION/TIMING
 - BASIC 2 WEEK LIMIT
 - TRAVEL TIME INCLUDED
 - MUST CURTAIL PROJECT/ROTATE CREWS
 - LIMIT SCOPE OF PROJECTS

RESERVE COMPONENT - LIC ACTIVITIES

WEAKNESS CONTINUED

- EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES
 - MAINTENANCE PREPARATION
 - NOT ADAPTED TO ENVIRONMENT/AOR
 - DESERT VS TEMPERATE
 - EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION

RESERVE COMPONENT - LIC ACTIVITIES

CONCERNS

- LEAD TIME
- FUNDING
 - CONGRESSIONAL REDUCTION
 - PROGRAM GROWTH
 - LIMITED AIRLIFT
- CONGRESSIONAL/POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS
- SERVICES FORCES STRUCTURE
- LIC CONCEPT FORCE EMPLOYMENT TO USE CS/CSS

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

MISSION / RESPONSIBILITIES

**MISSION: SUPPORT U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA.**

RESPONSIBILITIES:

**DEFEND THE PANAMA CANAL
COORDINATE ACTIVITIES WITH THE SERVICES
CONDUCT DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS
COUNTER TERRORISM
INTERDICT ILLEGAL TRAFFIC OF DRUGS AND ARMS
PROMOTE MUTUAL SECURITY
ASSIST IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF ALLIED NATIONS**

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

THREATS

INSURGENCIES/COUNTER-INSURGENCIES

COUPS

ILLEGAL DRUGS/ARMS

POLITICAL KIDNAPPINGS AND ASSASSINATIONS (LEFT/RIGHT WING)

ELECTORAL FRAUD


HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

DIS-INFORMATION (WAR OF INFORMATION)

**WEAK INFRASTRUCTURES AND POOR ECONOMIES OF THE
DEVELOPING NATIONS OF THE REGION**

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

IN-THEATER ORGANIZATION



EXERCISE OBJECTIVES


- **ENHANCE US READINESS**
- **DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE**
- **IMPROVE COALITION WARFARE CAPABILITY**
- **ESTABLISH FORCE PRESENCE**
- **DEVELOP HN INFRASTRUCTURE**
- **IMPROVE US IMAGE**
- **FOSTER MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS**
- **FAMILIARIZE US FORCES WITH AOR**

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND DEPLOYMENT FOR TRAINING PROGRAM

AIR FORCE
56

SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
28

NAVY
16




ARMY
174

COMPLETED: 41

REMAINING: 222

DFTs FOR FY-89

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND DEPLOYMENT FOR TRAINING PROGRAM



U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND DEPLOYMENT FOR TRAINING PROGRAM

32


24



AC RC

ENGINEER

27



MEDICAL

4

COMPLETED: 6

REMAINING: 50

OTHER AIR FORCE

25

AIR FORCE DFTs FOR FY-89

RESERVE COMPONENT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

ARMY FORCES:

CIVIL AFFAIRS (97% OF TOTAL ARMY FORCES)

PSYOP

CHEMICAL RECON

SPECIAL FORCES (FOUR GROUPS)

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION

AIR FORCE:

EC-130 ELECTRONIC WARFARE UNIT (PENN ANG)

AC-130 GUNSHIP UNIT (FLORIDA AFRES)

AFRES SPECIAL OPERATIONS HELICOPTER UNIT

NAVY RESERVE:

SPECIAL BOAT UNITS

SEAL TEAM MEMBERS

USMC RESERVE:

CIVIL AFFAIRS GROUPS (100% OF FORCE)

SOC SOUTH

ACTIVITIES

- **MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS**
- **JCS DIRECTED/COORDINATED EXERCISES**
- **DEPLOYMENTS FOR TRAINING**
- **COUNTER TERRORIST PROGRAM**
- **ANTI-NARCOTICS SUPPORT**
- **STAFF ASSISTANCE VISITS**
- **SPECIAL OPERATIONS PREPARATIONS**

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AC.....	DE.....	IG.....	PA.....	WE.....
CMS.....	DO.....	IN.....	RF.....	XP.....
CP.....	DP.....	INOI.....	SE.....	ITFW/CC.....
CSA.....	DR.....	JA.....	SC.....	IAF/CC.....
CSP.....	HC.....	LRC.....	SG.....	TSEE.....
DA.....	HO.....	LG.....	SP.....	SVC.....

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ZNR UUUUU

R 140418Z DEC 88

FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

TO RHDIAAA/A-AF CLIC LANGLEY AFB VA//

INFO RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

RUHPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO//

RUHHMA/CDRWESTCOM FT SHAFTER HI//APOF/IM/PSO//

RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR

RUAKJLA/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA

RUHQHQA/COMSOCPAC HONOLULU HI

BT

UNCLAS//N01001//

SECTION 01 OF 02

SUBJ: RESERVE AFFAIRS WORKSHOP

A. HQ PACAF 051948Z DEC 88

B. A-AF CLIC 081400Z NOV 88 (PASEP)

1. REQUEST A-AF CLIC PROVIDE COPIES OF THIS MESSAGE TO USCINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES ATTENDING THE JCS LIC POLICY/PLANNING CONFERENCE, TO MG BERKMAN AND TO MR HORACE HUNTER OF USAWESTCOM. THE CONTENT OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROVIDED IN THE SPIRIT OF NON-ATTRIBUTION AND IN NO WAY REPRESENTS THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THIS COMMAND, ITS SERVICE COMPONENTS OR SUBUNIFIED COMMANDS. REF A WAS PROVIDED IN SIMILAR FASHION.

2. STATEMENT: THEATER RC EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY IN LIC, TO INCLUDE STRENGTHS AND SHORTFALLS (PARA 2 OF REF B).

A. COMMENTS: 1) REFERENCE IS MADE TO THE USCINCPAC PEACETIME STRATEGY, TO BE BRIEFED SEPARATELY DURING THE WORKSHOP. WHILE NOT A PURE RC LIC STRATEGY, THE PEACETIME STRATEGY EMPHASIZES UTILIZATION OF AC/RC FORCES IN READINESS DEVELOPMENT EXERCISES SUCH AS MEDCAPS, MEDRETS, DISASTER RECOVERY, ENGINEER EXERCISES, ETC. THIS IS A SOLID OPPORTUNITY FOR CS/CSS TYPE RC UNITS WHICH USAWESTCOM HAS USED QUITE SUCCESSFULLY. 2) CURRENT LEGAL AND POLICY DIRECTIVES BOTH AT THE CONGRESSIONAL, DOD, JCS AND SERVICE LEVELS IMPEDE/IMPAIR DEVELOPMENT OF RC LIC ROLES/MISSIONS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT WHEN RC FORCES NEEDED IN THE COUNTERINSURGENCY ENVIRONMENT CANNOT BE "SUCCESSFULLY ACCESSED" FOR TIMELY MISSIONS WHICH SITUATIONALLY AND POTENTIALLY APPEAR TO PUT SUCH FORCES "AT RISK". 3) THE DOD SYSTEMS PROVIDE AMPLE CAPABILITY FOR FORCES TO TRAIN/EXERCISE FOR WARTIME MISSIONS. HOWEVER, LACK OF MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR LIC POLICY/STRATEGY/OPERATIONS HAMPERS FOCUS OF RC ASSETS AS MEANINGFUL LIC PLAYERS, EXCEPT FOR U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (ARSOF) SUCH AS CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA), PSYOP AND SPECIAL FORCES (SF). IN FACT, EXISTING DOCTRINE AND SUCH SYSTEMS AS THE JOINT OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM (JOPES) MAY ACTUALLY MAKE THE LIC ENVIRONMENT "TOO HARD TO WORK" WHERE EXTENSIVE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IS REQUIRED IN BOTH CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND EXECUTION OR WHEN FORCE-ON-FORCE APPLICATIONS ARE NOT REQUIRED OR DESIRABLE. 4) FORCE EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE MAY ALSO BE A LIC IMPEDIMENT, BOTH AC/RC, BECAUSE METHODOLOGY, SUSTAINABILITY AND CAPABILITY PRECLUDE LOW-VISIBILITY, LONG TERM DEPLOYMENTS IN-COUNTRY OR THAT LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURES ARE INCAPABLE OF EFFECTIVELY SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGY UTILIZED BY U.S. FORCES. 5) LANGUAGE QUALIFICATION, WHILE STILL IMPORTANT AND DESIRABLE, SHOULD REMAIN A "NICE TO HAVE" VICE BEING OVEREMPHASIZED INTO A "MISSION-STOPPER".

3. PARA 4A OF REF B: 1) USCINCPAC AND ITS SERVICE COMPONENTS ARE VERY ACTIVE IN THIS ARENA, BOTH AS AN EXERCISE EVOLUTION AND AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF DISASTER RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS. SINCE 1985, SUCH EVOLUTIONS HAVE OCCURRED DURING EXERCISES SUCH AS

ROUTINE

UNCLASSIFIED

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BALIKITAN AND COBRA GOLD AND IN DISASTER RECOVERY OPERATIONS IN THE
SOLOMON ISLANDS (TWO EVOLUTIONS), WESTERN SAMOA, VANUATU, AMERICAN
SAMOA, COOK ISLANDS, THE PHILIPPINES (THREE EVOLUTIONS) AND IN U. S.
TERRITORIES AND THE COMPACT STATES. 2) THIS IS A VERY FERTILE
ENVIRONMENT FOR JOINT LIC STRATEGY. HOWEVER, SIGNIFICANT
IMPEDIMENTS EXIST: DOCTRINE, RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY (AND
FUNDING) AND INTERAGENCY PLANNING. RC UTILIZATION IN THIS ARENA IS
A VERY STRONG OPTION.

4. PARA 4B OF REF A: 1) AREA ASSESSMENTS ARE MORE USEFUL AND
TIMELY THAN AREA STUDIES. GIVEN THE EXTENT TO WHICH RC INTEL
ASSETS ARE UTILIZED IN USPACOM, SUCH A PROGRAM COULD BE PURSUED
EFFECTIVELY WITHOUT MAJOR PROBLEMS. 2) A LIC INTEL "ARCHITECTURE",
PRODUCING INFORMATION WITH WHICH CA AND PSYOP RC ASSETS COULD WORK
IS POTENTIALLY FEASIBLE. 3) THE PACIFIC IS AN AMPLE ENVIRONMENT
FOR EOD TRAINING THAT COULD EASILY BE DEVELOPED. HOWEVER, THERE
ARE MORE LEGAL BARRIERS THAN THERE ARE SUPPORTERS TO DO SUCH
TRAINING ON FOREIGN SOIL. USCINCPAC HAS COORDINATED SUCH
OPERATIONS IN THE PAST. 4) PERHAPS A NEW APPROACH TO "TRAINING" IS
NEEDED WHICH BALANCES THE NEED TO TRAIN FOR THE "ULTIMATE WAR" (LOW
RISK) WITH THE REALISTIC REQUIREMENTS OF USING MILITARY FORCES AS
PRODUCTIVE CONTRIBUTORS TO NATIONAL STRATEGY BELOW THE THRESHOLD OF
WAR (HIGHER RISKS). IN SHORT, PERHAPS WHAT IS NEEDED IS AN OPLAN
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT BELOW THE THRESHOLD OF WAR, WHICH DETAILS
REQUIREMENTS AGAINST WHICH FORCES ARE TO BE APPORTIONED, ALLOCATED
AND "TRAINED".

5. PARA 5 OF REF B, OPTION A: 1) THERE IS MORE TO THIS OPTION
THAN MEETS THE EYE, BECAUSE IT RAISES SEVERAL KEY ISSUES
SIMULTANEOUSLY. FIRST, WHAT UNITS WOULD SHIFT FROM THE AC TO RC,
AND HOW MANY? WHAT WOULD THE IMPACTS BE UPON END STRENGTHS?;
MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS?; WORLD POLITICS?; AND PPBS? 2) SUCH A
TRADE-OFF ONLY HAS MERIT IF THE TRADE INCLUDES RESOURCING FOR
SOLVING RAPID HEAVY LIFT DEPLOYMENT SHORTFALLS, PARTICULARLY IN
AIRLIFT PLATFORMS NEEDED TO RAPIDLY DEPLOY EQUIPMENT INTENSIVE
UNITS SUCH AS MEDICAL AND ENGINEERS. 3) AGAINST WHAT SET OF
ASSUMPTIONS WOULD THE "NEW" FORCES BE DEVELOPED? 4) WHAT WOULD BE
THE IMPACTS UPON "DETERRENCE" FORCE POSTURING. 5) WHAT FORCES
WOULD "MOVE" FROM RC TO AC STATUS TO ELIMINATE THE PERCEIVED
SHORTFALL OPTION A SUGGESTS?

6. OPTIONS B (SAME REF B): 1) THIS OPTION SUGGESTS CREATION OF AN
RC TYPE JTF "BRAVO" FOR ANY REGIONAL CINC WHO FELT COMPELLED TO
HAVE ONE. CONVERSELY, SUCH CAPABILITY ALREADY EXISTS TO DO WHAT
OPTION B SUGGESTS, AND COULD ALSO BE DONE WITH AC/RC ASSETS.
HOWEVER, THOSE RC CS/CSS ASSETS (INCLUDING PSYOP) WOULD STILL
REQUIRE A "BILL-PAYER" SOURCE OF FUNDS OVER-AND-ABOVE NORMAL ANNUAL
TRAINING, ADDITIONAL DUTY FOR TRAINING, TEMPORARY ACTIVE DUTY OR
ACTIVE DUTY FOR SPECIAL WORK (ADSW). 2) THIS SOURCING WOULD ALSO
HAVE TO OVERCOME THE "VOLUNTARY" VERSUS "INVOLUNTARY" ISSUE IN
REGARD TO CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
ASSOCIATED THERETO TO ENSURE A PRODUCTIVE FORCE PACKAGE IS APPLIED
AGAINST THE MISSION ASSIGNED. 3) THE PROTRACTED NATURE OF THESE
OPERATIONS COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY BE SUPPORTED BY CURRENT
LEGISLATION OR SERVICE POLICIES REGARDING RC FORCES. 4) CURRENT
NATIONAL MOBILIZATION LAWS REQUIRE "EMERGENCIES" TO BE DECLARED IN
ORDER TO FEDERALIZE THE GUARD OR MOBILIZE RESERVES - HOW DOES THIS
REACTIVE FOCUS RELATE TO PREVENTION STRATEGY? 5) THIS OPTION
IMPLIES A TIER OF FORCES: STRATEGIC, CONVENTIONAL AND LIC. YET,
CINCS ALREADY HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ORGANIZE ASSIGNED FORCES.
PERHAPS THE REAL PROBLEM LIES IN THE COMPOSITION, VOLUME AND NUMBER
OF ASSIGNED IN-THEATER FORCES VERSUS APPORTIONED/ALLOCATED FORCES
"HIDDEN" IN PEACETIME CONUS-BASED ORGANIZATIONS. UNDER PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH FORCES MUST BE "REQUESTED" VICE BE TASKED,
UNLOCKING AN EXTENSIVE COORDINATION PROCESS BEFORE A SUCCESSFUL
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ROUTINE

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AC.....	DE.....	IG.....	PA.....	WE.....
CMS.....	DO.....	IN.....	RF.....	XP.....
CP.....	DP.....	INOI.....	SE.....	ITFW/CC.....
CSA.....	DR.....	JA.....	SC.....	IAF/CC.....
CSP.....	HC.....	LRC.....	SG.....	TSEE.....
DA.....	HO.....	LG.....	SP.....	SVC.....

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FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

TO RHDIAAA/A-AF CLIC LANGLEY AFB VA//

INFO RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

RUHVPAC/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO//

RUHHHMA/CDRWESTCOM FT SHAFTER HI//APOP/IM/APSO//

RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR

RUAKJLA/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA

~~RUHMHMA~~/COMSOPAC HONOLULU HI

BT

UNCLAS//N01001//

FINAL SECTION OF 02

SUBJ: RESERVE AFFAIRS WORKSHOP

(AND ALBEIT UNTIMELY) SOLUTION IS ACHIEVED. 6) THE DEPTH OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION/COOPERATION MAY PRECLUDE LIC PLANNING FROM BEING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED TO A REGIONAL CINC SIMPLY BECAUSE ALL THE "RIGHT PLAYERS" ARE NOT CO-LOCATED IN-THEATER WITH THE APPROPRIATE COUNTRY TEAM. THIS RESOURCING DEMAND COULD SERVE AS AN IMPETUS TO ERRONEOUSLY REMOVE LIC PLANNING FROM THE THEATER. 7) THE CONCEPT OF A THEATER LIC TASK FORCE, JOINT OR OTHERWISE, IS AN IDEA WORTH STUDY. HOWEVER, THE TASK FORCE COMPOSITION MUST BE BASED UPON POTENTIAL MISSIONS, NOT SIMPLY THE "GENERIC" SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (SAF) DISCUSSED IN FMI00-20. 8) LIC SUCCESS REQUIRES RC INVOLVEMENT TO BECAUSE OF KEY FORCE STRUCTURE WHICH CAN BE APPLIED, AS AN ELEMENT OF COMPETITIVE STRATEGY, TO THE "NATION BUILDING" MISSION. HOWEVER, IF THIS IS TO BECOME VIABLE AS A MISSION, THE ENTIRE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF U.S. ASSISTANCE MUST BE REEVALUATED, AND RECONSTRUCTED FOR EFFECTIVENESS VICE A "BAND-AID" APPROACH OF TRYING TO WORK AROUND TOO MANY "CANNOT DO IT" BARRIERS IMPLANTED IN LEGISLATION POLICES AND REGULATIONS GERMANE TO LIC AND TO EMPLOYING U.S. FORCES. RC OR OTHERWISE. IN SUM, IT IS QUESTIONABLE THAT LIC STRATEGY CURRENTLY HAS THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO ACTIVELY AND AGGRESSIVELY SUPPORT IT.

7. POC: COL J. H. DONNELLY, J363; A: 477-3110, C: (008) 477-3110.

BT

*8052

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT
PLANNING POLICY WORKSHOP

RESERVE AFFAIRS WORKSHOP

SUBJECT: Issues Attending Deployments of Reserve Component
Personnel OCONUS

1. The International Affairs Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, has examined some of the legal issues attending the deployment of Reserve Component (RC) personnel in implementing LIC strategy. Specifically, we have focused on: the authority to order RC personnel and units to active duty; the limitations, if any, on the types of duties RC personnel may perform OCONUS; Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA); Exercise Related Construction; and Security Assistance. The following information is a synthesis of past opinions of the Office of The Judge Advocate General.

2. Ordering RC Personnel and Units to Active Duty.

a. Sections 672-674 of Title 10, United States Code, provide most of the statutory authority for ordering or calling RC personnel to active duty. There are two bases for ordering members of the RC to active duty without their consent and without a declaration of war or national emergency: 10 U.S.C. secs. 672(b) and 673b.

(1) 10 U.S.C. sec. 672(b) permits the Secretary concerned to order RC units and members not assigned to units to active duty for not more than fifteen days. (If the activation is directed at members or units of the National Guard, the consent of the state governor is required.) This authority serves as the basis for ordering USAR personnel to active duty for annual training (AT), AR 135-200, Army National Guard and Army Reserve - Active Duty for Training, Annual Training and Full-Time Training Duty of Individual Members, para. 1-6a(8), and for ordering National Guard personnel to AT outside the United States, AR 135-200, para. 1-6a(9).

(2) 10 U.S.C. sec. 673b permits the President to authorize the Secretary of Defense to order up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve (both units and members not assigned to units) to active duty for not more than ninety days. The exercise of this authority is based upon a presidential determination that it is necessary to augment the

active forces for an operational mission. This authority is not to be used for training exercises; rather, it is to be used for actual military missions where augmentation of the active force is required.

b. 10 U.S.C. sec. 672(d) permits the Secretary concerned to order a member of the RC to active duty with the member's consent. This provision is the basis on which RC soldiers are ordered to duty for active duty for training (ADT), initial active duty for training (IADT), and active duty for special work (ADSW) (formerly special active duty for training (SADT)). AR 135-200, para. 1-6a(6).

3. Limitations on Utilization of RC Units and Personnel OCONUS by Virtue of Status as RC.

Aside from the limitation that 10 U.S.C. sec. 673b cannot be used to call RC personnel to active duty for training, few other statutory limitations exist on the utilization of RC personnel because of their status as RC instead of AC. One such limitation is contained in 10 U.S.C. sec. 671(a), which provides that a "member of the armed forces may not be assigned to active duty on land outside the United States and its territories until the member has completed the basic training requirements of the armed force of which he is a member." Another example is the statutory limitation on the authorized duties of RC soldiers on full-time active duty or full-time National Guard duty in the Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Program. With some exceptions, their duties are limited to "organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components" (sec. 412, P.L. 100-180). See also AR 135-18, Army National Guard and Army Reserve - The Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Program (15 July 1985). Other limitations exist in service regulations, but are generally based upon end-strength, fiscal, or other considerations. See generally AR 135-200, para. 1-3.1.

4. Other Restrictions on Utilization of RC Units and Personnel OCONUS.

a. Restrictions on the utilization of RC personnel OCONUS, as a function of their being RC personnel, are few in number. Restrictions that will affect RC operations in a foreign country derive from other considerations such as the location or nature of the mission, funding considerations, conditions in the country to which they deploy, or statutory or

regulatory restrictions applicable to RC and AC personnel alike. These restrictions are discussed below as part of the discussions of humanitarian and civic assistance, exercise related construction, and security assistance.

b. Restrictions on RC participation in hostile actions. Soldiers in an ADT status may not be used in a manner inconsistent with their training status or to support active component operational missions, except under circumstances amounting to military exigency. ADT status, as outlined above, has as its basis 10 U.S.C. sec. 672(b), and is based upon the member's consent to be ordered to active duty. The activities undertaken during ADT must therefore be consistent with the purpose for which the soldier consented to enter active duty--training. If RC personnel or units are to be used for a purpose other than training, then a statutory basis for that deployment must be found and the appropriate authority must order the personnel or units to active duty for that purpose. Of course, should RC personnel in an ADT status OCONUS be confronted with hostile activities, they would be authorized to react in self-defense, but they may not be used to respond to a military exigency unless there are no U.S. active duty military personnel available to meet the exigency and provided that the RC personnel on ADT are used only for the duration of the exigency, until they can be placed in an active duty status under 10 U.S.C. sec. 673b, or until active component units or personnel can replace them. In view of these considerations, and the obvious political and policy implications, RC units and personnel should not be deployed to or allowed to remain in areas where hostilities are imminent.

5. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA).

a. 10 U.S.C. sec. 401(a)(1) provides:

Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department may carry out humanitarian and civic assistance activities in conjunction with authorized military operations of the armed forces in a country if the Secretary concerned determines that the activities will promote--

(A) the security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out; and

(B) the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.

b. "Authorized military operations" include exercises in which RC units and personnel participate, whether the exercises are directed and coordinated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or are single-service exercises. The Secretary of State must approve any HCA activities carried out pursuant to the authority of 10 U.S.C. sec. 401.

c. HCA activities undertaken in conjunction with military operations must be funded from appropriations specifically provided for that purpose, 10 U.S.C. sec. 401(c)(1), and cannot be used to provide assistance, directly or indirectly, to individuals, groups, or organizations engaged in military or paramilitary activity, 10 U.S.C. sec. 401(a)(3).

d. 10 U.S.C. sec. 401(e) defines HCA activities as:

(1) Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country;

(2) Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems;

(3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and

(4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

e. 10 U.S.C. sec. 401(c)(2) recognizes the authority of the armed forces to incur "minimal" expenditures for HCA activities from other funds, e.g., Operations and Maintenance funds. The Conference Report accompanying this legislation states:

On the low end of the scale, the conferees were concerned that modest activities could generate burdensome paperwork because of the requirements for prior approval, separate financing, and annual reporting. The conferees, therefore, exempted [de minimus] activities from this section. The conferees did not put a specific dollar ceiling on the definition of [de minimus] but wish to make clear

they had in mind activities that have been commonplace on foreign exercises for decades. These would include a unit doctor's examination of villagers for a few hours with the administration of several shots and the issuance of some medicines--but would not include the dispatch of a medical team for mass inoculations. [De minimus] would also include the opening of an access road through trees and underbrush for several hundred yards--but would not include the asphaltting of any roadway.

H.R. Rep. No. 99-1001, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 467-68 (1986) (conference report to accompany S. 2638).

f. To the extent that a deployment of RC units and personnel is designed and properly authorized to engage in HCA activities, and within the limits of authorized funding, RC units and personnel, as part of the armed forces OCONUS, may carry out HCA activities.

6. Exercise Related Construction (ERC).

a. 10 U.S.C. sec. 2805 provides authority for the expenditure of funds for unspecified minor military construction. As a result of General Accounting Office audits of US military exercises in Central America, this authority was amended to address the propriety of funding for such construction activities undertaken as part of exercises.

b. 10 U.S.C. sec. 2805(a)(2) establishes a limit of \$5 million per year per armed service for exercise-related minor military construction. These funds are to be taken from the services' unspecified minor military construction account. All exercise related construction carried out during JCS directed/coordinated exercises is to be funded from this account.

c. 10 U.S.C. sec. 2805(c)(1) retains the services' authority to fund unspecified minor military construction projects costing less than \$200,000 per project from Operations and Maintenance appropriations. This authority may not be used during JCS directed/coordinated exercises, but may be used during single-service deployments for training (DFT's).

d. RC units and personnel participating in either JCS exercises or single-service DFT's may engage in construction projects, subject only to the availability of proper funds and

pursuant to established cost accounting practices. Their RC status has no effect on the scope of their activities during such exercises, as the exercises are undertaken for training purposes. The above discussion concerning the threat of hostilities and the proper disposition of RC units and personnel applies to these exercises as well, however.

7. Security Assistance.

a. Security assistance is a broad term that describes those statutory programs and authorities under which the U.S. may provide and/or regulate forms of assistance and sales to foreign governments and international organizations for the purpose of enhancing U.S./mutual security.

b. Security assistance legislation consists mainly of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. The Foreign Assistance Act is comprised of such programs as the Military Assistance Program (MAP), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA), Economic Support Fund (ESF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The Arms Export Control Act serves as the basis for the Foreign Military Sales Program.

c. There are no prohibitions contained in the legislation that are applicable to RC personnel solely as a function of their status as members of the Reserve Component. Rather, prohibitions exist as a function of, for example, a prospective recipient country's human rights record, nuclear proliferation policies, or debt situation. Another significant prohibition appears at 22 U.S.C. sec. 2761(c)(1) (section 21(c)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act):

Personnel performing defense services sold under this Act may not perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any duties related to training and advising that may engage United States personnel in combat activities, outside the United States in connection with the performance of those defense services.

This prohibition applies to all U.S. personnel performing defense services, whether AC or RC.

d. RC personnel and units may participate in security assistance programs so long as they are properly ordered to

active duty and so long as the programs meet all statutory and regulatory requirements.

8. Other Considerations.

a. Use of National Guard Personnel OCONUS. Pending litigation by a number of state governors has challenged the constitutionality of the so-called Montgomery Amendment, 10 U.S.C. sec. 672(f), which provides:

The consent of a Governor described in subsections (b) and (d) [of section 672] may not be withheld (in whole or in part) with regard to active duty outside the United States, its territories, and its possessions, because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such active duty.

To date, the courts that have addressed the question have split on the question of the statute's constitutionality. Compare Dukakis v. United States Department of Defense, 686 F. Supp 30 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd, No. 88-1510 (1st Cir. Oct 25, 1988) (upholding the statute's constitutionality), with Perpich v. United States Department of Defense, 666 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Minn. 1987), rev'd, No. 87-5345 (8th Cir. Dec. 6, 1988) (holding that the statute violates Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the Constitution).

b. Exchange Programs. RC personnel are eligible to be called to active duty for the purpose of participating in personnel exchange programs and small unit exchanges. These programs are not designed to provide training to foreign military forces; rather, they allow U.S. personnel and units to be attached to and train with foreign armed forces, on a reciprocal basis. Each exchange program must be based on a memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and the foreign country, and each country must bear the costs of its own participation.

9. Conclusion.

a. 10 U.S.C. sec. 682 provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a member of a reserve component who is on active duty other than for training may, under regulations prescribed

by the Secretary concerned, be detailed or assigned to any duty authorized by law for members of the regular component of the armed force concerned.

b. As this discussion indicates, RC units and personnel may participate in a wide variety of activities in furtherance of LIC strategy. The key restrictions on their use lie in regulatory and statutory provisions applicable to both RC and AC units and personnel. So long as the RC units and personnel are properly ordered to active duty for the type of duty contemplated and so long as the duties they are to perform--construction, HCA, or others--have a proper statutory basis and are properly funded, they can serve as valuable assets in accomplishing the LIC mission.

10. Caveat. The above discussion is a general overview of some of the more significant statutory and regulatory provisions that apply to deployment of RC units and personnel. It should not be used as a legal justification for their use in particular projects or missions. Each deployment must be reviewed on its own merits, taking into account not only the laws outlined above, but political and practical considerations that do not lend themselves to such a general discussion.

HQDA*(DAJA-IA)
MAJ McAtamney/AV225-3170



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

(MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

15 NOV 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A CALL-UP OF RESERVE COMPONENT PERSONNEL OTHER THAN DURING WAR OR NATIONAL EMERGENCY

Since 1976 the President has had the authority to augment the active armed forces with a limited call-up of Selected Reserve personnel (no more than 200,000 for no more than 180 days). Since enactment of this provision (10 USC 673b) (see TAB A), no President has used this authority although there have been at least two occasions where such authority would have been useful, specifically the military operations in Grenada and in the Persian Gulf. In each instance there were Reserve component units not available in the active force inventory that were essential to accomplishment of the military mission. In both cases, the military services involved were required to work around the problem by conducting a limited voluntary recall of individual reservists involving significant delays and inefficiencies that could have been avoided through judicious use of Presidential authority.

The reluctance to use Presidential authority for such necessary augmentations is threefold. First, the authority has never been used and consequently its first use has the potential of sparking an intensity of political and press comment far out of proportion to the circumstances surrounding the call-up. Precisely because it has never been exercised, there is a legitimate concern that use of the call-up authority could be perceived as a precursor to a national emergency when in fact such is not necessarily the case and should not be perceived as such.

Secondly, the exercise of such authority may be perceived as a trigger for the War Powers Resolution. Even aside from the question of whether the War Powers Resolution is binding on the President under the Constitution, there is no basis for such recalls to have any bearing on the War Powers Resolution. Any triggering of the War Powers Resolution should involve an independent assessment based upon how and where U.S. Armed Forces may be deployed under specific circumstances, quite apart from any exercise of Presidential call-up authority.

And finally, there may be some degree of political and practical impact occasioned by involuntary recalls. Nonetheless, a reluctance to recall needed personnel, short of total mobilization, is inconsistent with the "Total Force Policy" of the Department of Defense (DOD) and jeopardizes the significant

**Subj: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A CALL-UP OF RESERVE
COMPONENT PERSONNEL OTHER THAN DURING WAR OR NATIONAL
EMERGENCY**

investment that has been committed to Reserve force manpower and equipment modernization. Judicious and limited use of the recall procedure will assure that those being paid to maintain their readiness fully realize their commitment as well as bring about a public acceptance of such involuntary recall authority.

Based on the above analysis, it would seem prudent to effect those actions necessary to assure that the Presidential call-up authority becomes, as it was intended to be, a useful statutory authority rather than remaining a useless legislative appendage. To accomplish this transformation, the authority needs to be exercised frequently enough and under circumstances that are consistent with normal military operations.

Specifically, in order to exercise the provisions of 10 USC 673b the President, through a formal directive, should task the Secretary of Defense to provide the President with periodic requests for call-up of those Selected Reserve Units and/or individuals not assigned to a unit (as defined in 10 USC 268b) necessary to augment active forces for selected special and routine operational missions. Such requests will include copies of the appropriate recall orders, and a recommended notice to Congress for the President's signature setting forth the circumstances necessitating the call-up action and describing the anticipated use of the units and/or individuals. Such notice to Congress should be brief and very general in nature. Enclosed at TAB B are a sample request for recall authority memorandum, sample recall orders and a sample Congressional notification for Presidential signature. The sample Congressional notification is intended to provide a standard format for the notification of the Congress of a recall action sufficient to meet the legal requirement for notification. Any more detailed a description of the circumstances necessitating the call-up and a description of the intended use of such Selected Reserve may serve only to limit the flexible employment of such forces to accomodate rapidly changing operational circumstances.

At the outset of this program the numbers of units and individuals involved should be very limited. Additionally, recalls under this provision can initially be effected for units and individuals already scheduled for active duty training periods to minimize the impact of such recalls on the individuals affected. In time, the scope of such recalls can be carefully expanded to test the capability of our mobilization process with unannounced recalls. And, finally, the recall scope can again be expanded as necessary to accommodate relatively brief operational missions that can not be handled by an over-committed active force.

**Subj: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT A CALL-UP OF RESERVE
COMPONENT PERSONNEL OTHER THAN DURING WAR OR NATIONAL
EMERGENCY**

The implementation of such recalls, over a period of time, should desensitize the press and the Congress to the exercise of such authority. Additionally, such a course of action will visibly reinforce the "Total Force Policy" of DOD and show both friends and potential adversaries that we have an effective force multiplier in our Ready Reserve. Finally -- and no less importantly -- such a course of action will show to the Congress and the taxpayer that resources committed to the Reserves provide a tangible benefit to the national defense.

My recommendation is that this issue be made an agenda item at some future Armed Forces Policy Council Meeting.



KENNETH P. BERGQUIST
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

Enclosures

§ 673b. Selected Reserve; order to active duty other than during war or national emergency

(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 673(a) or any other provision of law, when the President determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission, he may authorize the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, without the consent of the members concerned, to order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit of the Selected Reserve (as defined in section 268(b) of this title), under their respective jurisdictions, to active duty (other than for training) for not more than 90 days.

(b) No unit or member of a reserve component may be ordered to active duty under this section to perform any of the functions authorized by chapter 15 or section 3500 or 8500 of this title, or to provide assistance to either the Federal Government or a State in time of a serious natural or manmade disaster, accident, or catastrophe.

(c) Not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve may be on active duty under this section at any one time.

(d) Members ordered to active duty under this section shall not be counted in computing authorized strength in members on active duty or members in grade under this title or any other law.

(e) The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe such policies and procedures for the armed forces under their respective jurisdictions as they consider necessary to carry out this section.

(f) Whenever the President authorizes the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Transportation to order any unit or member of the Selected Reserve to active duty, under the authority of subsection (a), he shall, within 24 hours after exercising such authority, submit to Congress a report, in writing, setting forth the circumstances necessitating the action taken under this section and describing the anticipated use of these units or members.

(g) Whenever any unit of the Selected Reserve or any member of the Selected Reserve not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit is ordered to active duty under authority of subsection (a), the service of all units or members so ordered to active duty may be terminated by—

- (1) order of the President, or
- (2) law.

(h) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as amending or limiting the application of the provisions of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.).

(i) When a unit of the Selected Reserve, or a member of the Selected Reserve not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit of the Selected Reserve, is ordered to active duty under this section and the President determines that an extension of the service of such unit or member on active duty is necessary in the interests of national security, he may authorize the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard

when it is not operating as a service in the Navy to extend the period of such order to active duty for a period of not more than 90 additional days. Whenever the President exercises his authority under this subsection, he shall immediately notify Congress of such action and shall include in the notification a statement of reasons for the action. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as limiting the authorities to terminate the service of units or members ordered to active duty under this section under subsection (g).

Added P.L. 94-286, § 1, May 14, 1976, 90 Stat. 517, and amended P.L. 96-584, § 2, Dec. 23, 1980, 94 Stat. 3377, P.L. 97-295, § 1(9), Oct. 1982, 96 Stat. 1289; P.L. 99-661, § 521, Nov. 14, 1986, 100 Stat.

Call up authority

*Chapter 15
Insurrection
Section 3500
Call of the Navy
Guard in response
to invasion, rebellion
or insurrection
of law
Section 8500
Call of the Air
National Guard*

*Notice to Congress
of the action
within 24 hours
of its exercise
must specify by
action required and
describe anticipated
use of unit or ind.*

*Callup may be
terminated by
the President or by
law extending prior
to 90 day.*

*Additional 90 days
of service authorized;
which may be terminated
prior to the 90 days
run by the President
or by law.*

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subj: RECALL OF SELECTED RESERVE UNITS AND INDIVIDUALS

I recommend that you authorize the recall of the Selected Reserve and individuals listed in the attachment for periods of active duty under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 673b.

Such units and individuals will be used to augment the active armed forces in the accomplishment of operational commitments.

(SECDEF's signature)

Attachment

(UNIT ORDER)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

(Date)

From: Chief of Naval Operations

To: Commander
Reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Twenty-Nine
1234 Seabee Avenue
Anywhere, USA 12345

Subj: UNIT RECALL TO ACTIVE DUTY

Under the provisions of 10 USC 673b, your unit is hereby ordered to active duty for the period indicated and will proceed from home station to the duty location indicated. Unless sooner relieved or extended by proper authority, your unit will return to home station and revert to inactive status not later than the last day of active duty authorized.

Period: 014 days

Report for duty to: Commander, NAS Fallon, Fallon, NY

Activation time and date: 15 November 1988

* * *

(INDIVIDUAL ORDER)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

(Date)

From: Commander, Naval Reserve Force

To: LCDR John P. Jones
1234 Main Street
Anywhere, USA 1234

Subj: ACTIVE DUTY RECALL

Under the provisions of 10 USC 673b, you are hereby ordered to active duty for the period indicated. Upon completion of the active duty period, unless sooner relieved or extended by proper authority, you will return to the place where you entered upon active duty and relieved from such duty.

Period: 014 days

Report for duty to: Commander, NAS Fallon, Fallon, NY

Reporting time and date: 2200, 15 November 1988

* * *

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(Date)

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to title 10, United States Code, section 673b, I have ordered to active duty the units and individuals of the Selected Reserve listed below. I am exercising this authority in order to properly augment our active armed forces to meet current operational commitments.

Such units and individuals will be utilized to provide such augmentation consistent with their respective organizational missions and military specialties.

(Listing of units)

(Listing of individuals)

(President's signature)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(Date)

TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to title 10, United States Code, section 673b, I have ordered to active duty the units and individuals of the Selected Reserve listed below. I am exercising this authority in order to properly augment our active armed forces to meet current operational commitments.

Such units and individuals will be utilized to provide such augmentation consistent with their respective organizational missions and military specialties.

(Listing of units)

(Listing of individuals)

(President's signature)

NGB-JA (27-1a)

**Navy Draft Legislative Proposal To
Authorize Selected Reserve Active
Duty Acknowledgements**

DAMO-ODM
ATTN:LTC Powell

NGB-JA

7 Dec 1988
Mr. Stephens/rs/33815

1. In response to your DF, subject as above, this office has no objections to the draft legislative proposal.
2. We recommend, however, that Subsection 672 (e)(1) of Title 10, as it would be amended by the draft bill, provide for regulations issued by the respective Service Secretaries rather than by the Secretary of Defense, to allow for differing decisions as to whether to implement by regulation the new authority. Neither the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard sees a need at the present time for use of the active duty acknowledgement mechanism. A DOD-wide regulation providing authority to all services to utilize this system could have a detrimental effect on recruiting and retention.

FOR THE CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU:

JAMES C. HISE
Chief Counsel
National Guard Bureau

POINT PAPER
ON
ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION IN
FOREIGN COUNTRIES

PURPOSE: Engineers participation in low intensity conflict (LIC) is constrained by a series of legislative acts providing specific guidance on the various types of construction authorized. To assist in planning engineer construction in a LIC environment, this paper outlines the types of engineer activity authorized and funding sources for each.

DISCUSSION:

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA): Section 401, Title 10 USC

- Principal objective: To improve US military image and generate good will through assistance to the host country in
 - Development of rudimentary road networks
 - Well drilling and basic sanitation facilities
 - Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities
- Use O&M funds to cover materials, fuel, and equipment leases
- May not be provided to group/individual engaged in military or paramilitary activity
- Project scope and costs must be reviewed and approved by the Department of State through DoD
- Usually planned for JCS exercises but may be planned by a Single Service deployment for training exercise
- Units may spend minimal amount of O&M funds (limited to \$200K) for HCA activities; Example: Engineers at Clark AB provide materials to repair local schools

Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP): Section 2010, Title 10 USC

- SECDEF pays developing country's incremental expenses incurred as a result from participation in a bilateral or multilateral exercise
- Includes reasonable costs of goods and services such as rations, fuel, training ammunition, and transportation
- OSD provides policy direction and oversight

Mr. Painton/HQDA/DAEN-ZCM/AV 225-2337
Maj Matthews/AF/LEEXI/AV 225-7744/mkm/12 Dec 88

Exercise Related Construction (ERC): Section 2805, Title 10 USC

- Each service may set-aside not more than \$5M from unspecified minor construction accounts to support JCS directed or coordinated exercises outside CONUS ERC. Congress makes annual appropriations within this limitation
- Funds may be spent on all enduring improvements and structures constructed in support of JCS directed/coordinated exercises outside CONUS
- Minor or temporary structures (base camp facilities including tent platforms, field latrines, etc.) which are completely removed after the exercise may be funded through O&M accounts and are not a part of project costs
- Requests are originated by the Theater CINCs and approved/prioritized by the Joint Staff
 - Services are responsible to program and budget for projects, fund projects, notify Congress, maintain fiscal accountability, and execute the projects
 - Beginning in FY 90, JCS will program, budget, approve, and prioritize all ERC
- Funded costs include:
 - All materials, supplies, and services applicable to the project
 - Labor costs, except for US military labor
 - Overhead or support costs (costs that would not have been incurred were it not for the project)
 - DoD funded costs applicable to the operation of government-funded equipment, including fuel and direct maintenance costs
- Unfunded costs include:
 - Transportation of materials, supplies, and government-furnished equipment
 - Travel and per diem costs applicable to troop labor
 - Material, supplies, services, and fuel furnished by sources outside the DoD on non-reimbursable basis
- Funding will not exceed \$1M per project

Host Nation Contributions during JCS Coordinated/Directed Exercises

- Host country exercises are undertaken to:

- Enhance readiness of both US and host country units by exposing engineer units to bare-base and unusual training environment
- Develop a positive image in the host country
- Promote economic infrastructure development
- Foster better military-to-military relationships
- Evaluate logistical sustainment operations
- Host country exercises use the same accounting rules as ERC. In addition:
 - An MOU between the US and host country establishes the framework for JSC directed/coordinated exercises. Host country normally pays for material, fuel, and associated transportation costs consumed building roads and bridges
 - Certain costs can be apportioned between two fund sources because of the dual purpose for such exercises (training and project completion)
 - Costs resulting from project work and exercise base camps are charged to the ERC
 - Administrative equipment costs are charged to O&M

Deployments For Training (DFT)

- Project costs (materials, fuel, equipment rental and services, or other contract costs) are generally paid from the O&M account and are limited to \$200K per project
- If the host country is the project beneficiary, it pays for materials and fuel used directly in the engineer project
- Material and fuel used for base camps or administrative/logistical support are U.S. funded

Other Service Funding

- Outside the specific cases mentioned above, individual Services fund general support to accomplish JCS exercises and DFT
 - Travel and per diem applicable to troop labor
 - In-country transportation costs of materials, supplies, and U.S. government furnished/leased equipment
 - Supplies required to sustain the force in the field
 - Contracts for base camp maintenance
 - Equipment leases if equipment is within unit authorization

- Funding is through Service channels using O&M funds limited to \$200K

JCS Transportation

- JCS funds the transportation and port handling costs associated with personnel and equipment from home installation to the exercise site and return
- Applies only to JCS coordinated/directed exercises; not DFT

RECOMMENDATION: None - for information only.

JOINT STAFF/J-5
EXECUTIVE SESSION

JOINT STAFF/J-5 EXECUTIVE SESSION

15 December 1988

Purpose. To provide a forum for joint planners to hold classified discussions concerning areas of mutual interest. Attendance at this session was limited to two representatives from each Service, Unified and Specified Command, and Joint Staff Directorate.

Summary. The following areas were discussed:

1. Annex O to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
2. US Special Operations Command Joint Mission Analysis.
3. Need for a DOD Master Plan for Low Intensity Conflict.

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