Tactical Reconnaissance for the Heavy Brigade Commander: How Much is Not Enough?
Abstract
To make decisions and to synchronize all available resources, the brigade commander requires timely and accurate intelligence and combat information. This study examines the issues surrounding the absence of an organic tactical reconnaissance element at brigade level and its effect on the brigade commander's decision making and synchronization effort. The study first examines the theoretical constructs regarding intelligence and reconnaissance put forth by several military theorists. Having established a theoretical foundation, an historical survey traces the evolution of brigade reconnaissance from World War II to the present. Then the current brigade organization, operational doctrine, and reconnaissance doctrine are reviewed and assessed. To determine whether US organization adheres to internationally accepted norms regarding brigade-level reconnaissance, a comparison is made with several foreign armies. Finally, an analysis is made of contemporary studies, initiatives, and field expedients aimed at improving brigade tactical reconnaissance to determine if they are consistent with the above perspectives. The paper concludes that tactical reconnaissance is crucial to the brigade commander's decisionmaking and synchronization effort and that he needs an organic reconnaissance element responsive to his requirements. In a constrained manpower and equipment environment the proper unit for this task is a light reconnaissance company. For the future, a possible company organization is suggested that is essentially lighter in structure than most traditional cavalry troops and which emphasizes the principle of stealth and secrecy in its reconnaissance operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 14, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA210965
Entities
People
- Guy C. Swan Iii
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College