Thinking About the Tactics of Modern War: The Salvadoran Example
Abstract
This study offers a way of thinking about counterinsurgency tactics. Five salient propositions bind the paper. 1) Tactical success in a Phase II insurgency (such is the nature of the Salvadoran insurgency) is defined as the destruction of the guerrilla infrastructure among the populace. 2) The nature of an insurgent war charges the tactical military unit with performing political, economic, psychological and military tasks along the path to success. 3) Evolvement and maintenance of tactical security is central to tactical success. 4) The local civilian populace represents an untapped, contributory force for tactical security. Therefore, mobilizing and motivating the populace is the fundamental role of the military unit. Evidence suggests a paucity of military forces available to the Salvadoran brigade commander for security. His likelihood of tactical success is limited unless an increase in force structure is forthcoming. Because this is unlikely, an alternate method of achieving tactical security, hence tactical success, is offered. The paper concludes that organizational reform combined with doctrinal innovation can be the foundation for forging a different method of obtaining security. The method suggested incorporates the untapped strength of the civil populace as auxiliaries to the tactical military unit. The end result is a tactical military unit designed to create a favorable balance of forces through persuasion of the local populace rather than through a futile war of attrition against the guerrilla.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 06, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA211007
Entities
People
- Skip Thornton
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College