

DTIC FILE COPY

2

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF TWO JOINT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS:
LEBANON 1958 AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1965

AD-A211 904

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

CHARLES K. WELLIVER JR., MAJ, USA
B.S., Campbell College, 1976

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1989

Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.

89 8 29 0 27

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army Command and General Staff College		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) ATZL-SWD-GD		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) U.S. Army Command & General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS			
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Strategic Analysis of Two Joint Contingency Operations; Lebanon 1958 and Dominican Republic 1965					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Major Charles K. Welliver, Jr.					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Master's Thesis		13b. TIME COVERED FROM 8-1988 TO 6-1989		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1989 June 2	
15. PAGE COUNT 145					
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Joint, Contingency Operations, National Strategy		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) See reverse side.					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☐ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL

UNCLASSIFIED

19. ABSTRACT

This study compares the United States use of military power to achieve political aims in Lebanon 1958 and the Dominican Republic 1965. The study uses the Strategic Analysis Model, developed at the Command and General Staff College, to integrate historical data to determine if alternative policy options existed. The alternative options are compared and contrasted against the option chosen to reveal lessons which may be applied to future crises.

The study examines U.S. interests and the history of events in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic leading to U.S. military intervention. The development of alternative policy options explores other solutions in light of U.S. frequent use of military power to achieve national objectives since WW II. While military power seems to accomplish short-term goals it has not provided long-term peace and stability necessary to provide security of U.S. interest.

The conclusions recommend integrating elements of national power, other than military, to provide U.S. long-term goals. This is necessary since history has shown that military power does not provide for long-term solutions. However, lessons learned from the crises indicate when military power must be applied, it must be strong and flexible, maintain neutrality during employment and be followed by political negotiations with participation by all factions.

UNCLASSIFIED

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF TWO JOINT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS:
LEBANON 1958 AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1965

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

CHARLES K. WELLIVER JR., MAJ, USA
B.S., Campbell College, 1976

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1989

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	☒
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.



MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Charles K. Welliver Jr.

Title of thesis: Strategic Analysis of Two Joint
Contingency Operations: Lebanon 1958 and Dominican Republic 1965

Approved by:

George L. Hathcoat, Thesis Committee Chairman
LTC. George L. Hathcoat, B.S.

Roger S. Fountain, Member, Graduate Faculty
LT. COL. Roger S. Fountain, M.S.

Jerald E. Brown, Member, Graduate Faculty
Dr. Jerald E. Brown, Ph.D.

Accepted this 2nd day of June 1989 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Director, Graduate Degree
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF TWO JOINT CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS:
LEBANON, 1958 AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1965 by MAJ.
Charles K. Welliver, Jr., USA, 140 pages.

→ This study compares the United States use of military power to achieve political aims in Lebanon 1958 and the Dominican Republic 1965. The study uses the Strategic Analysis Model, developed at the Command and General Staff College, to integrate historical data to determine if alternative policy options existed. The alternative options are compared and contrasted against the option chosen to reveal lessons which may be applied to future crises.

The study examines U.S. interests and the history of events in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic leading to U.S. military intervention. The development of alternative policy options explores other solutions in light of U.S. frequent use of military power to achieve national objectives since WW II. While military power seems to accomplish short term goals, it has not provided long term peace and stability necessary to provide security of U.S. interests.

The conclusions recommend integrating elements of national power, other than military, to provide U.S. long term goals. This is necessary since history has shown that military power does not provide for long term solutions. However, lessons learned from the crises indicate when military power must be applied, it must be strong and flexible, maintain neutrality during employment and be followed by political negotiations with participation by all factions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Thesis	2
Purpose	3
Beginnings of U.S. Joint Operations	4
Significance of Study	13
Endnotes	15
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY	16
Introduction	16
Literature Review	16
Current	18
Methodology	19
National Elements of Power/SAM	20
Strategic Analysis Model	24
Step 1: State the Problem	26
Step 2: Identify Relevant Actors and Interests	26
Step 3: Access Each Actor's Power to Pursue its Interests	26
Step 4: Develop Policy Options	28
Step 5: Reach Conclusions and Make Recommendations	29
Endnotes	31
III. LEBANON 1958	32
Introduction	32
Historical Background	32
Strategic Analysis Model	49
Step 1	49
Step 2	50
Step 3	50
Step 4 and 5	64
Endnotes	72

IV.	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1965	75
	Introduction	75
	History	75
	Strategic Analysis Model	91
	Step 1	91
	Step 2	92
	Step 3	95
	Step 4 and 5	102
	Endnotes	111
V.	CONCLUSIONS	113
	Lebanon: Update, Analysis and Conclusions	114
	Dominican Republic: Update, Analysis and	
	Conclusions	117
	Conclusions	122
	Endnotes	128
	APPENDIX	129
	1. Definitions of Terms	129
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	135
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	140

CHAPTER I

"U.S. national security interests are derived from broadly shared values [which are] freedom, human rights, and economic prosperity, [which] serve to define specific interests and associated geographical concerns, [which are] territorial integrity of our allies, unencumbered U.S. access to world markets and sources of strategic resources."¹

Introduction

The United States National Security Strategy is designed to protect these interests, values and concerns. The U.S. seeks to insure its global interests primarily by relying on economic and political power to foster democratic principals. However, there are nations that must compete in the world by using aggression to obtain resources and further their interests. These nations threaten the statutory rights of other nations, including America and often its allies and friends. The U.S. needs a strong national defense policy which in turn integrates our military power with economic and political power to secure long term objective environments where all nations can coexist peacefully. In developing this strategy, U.S. elements of national power-- political, economic, and military-- are supposed to be integrated to insure America's preeminent national security interests: survival, freedom and security.²

Thesis

The U.S. often resorted to using national military power as the element of national power in safeguarding its values, protecting its vital interests, and fulfilling its international commitments to our allies and friends. When these values, interests and commitments are threatened, U.S. political decisionmakers, to secure and maintain national security objectives, are often forced primarily to use its military power. All too often this is done to the denigration of and without the integration of the other elements of power. The United States Armed Forces thus have become a political tool of national security strategy and its policy makers to successfully achieve U.S. national goals and objectives for the short term. The military may not, in the long term, be the most favorable element of power to have been employed. This study focuses on the strategic problems presented by two case studies. Problems and lessons learned from each are applicable to future large unit joint operations. Past deficiencies not acted upon are likely to be repeated in future operations. A key point is that strategic and operational deficiencies are not remedied simply by publishing after-action reports, but require concomitant changes to our national decision making processes, including the National Security Council, military organizations, congressional support to the decisionmakers, military doctrine, and training and material programs. All of this must

be accomplished if the U.S. is to improve its military force projections in the future. It is likely that joint contingency operations planning requirements will increase in the future and that the resulting plans will remain critical in projecting military power to protect U.S. national interests and achieve U.S. national security objectives. The U.S. must be capable of conducting successful operations to protect U.S. national security interests anywhere in the world at anytime.

Purpose

This study explores two historical examples of U.S. joint contingency operations: Lebanon, 1958 and Dominican Republic, 1965. They represent the use of military power to secure U.S. vital interests and to maintain allied security. Although each of these operations did obtain national security objectives in the short term, they demonstrated that the recurring reliance on the use of military power to achieve short term goals and objectives must be integrated with the other elements of power if the long term goals and National Security Strategy objectives are to be secured and maintained. These joint operations provide the basis for proposing strategic planning processes and solutions to be applied now and in the future.

The purpose of this study is to determine what lessons can be learned from the two strategic case studies

regarding the use of national elements of power (particularly as they relate to military power) in achieving and maintaining short, mid and long term national objectives. The study will attempt to provide answers to questions such as:

- Was the use of military power in these crisis the only strategy possible?

- Could other elements of power have better accomplished long term U.S. goals?

- Did the use of military power successfully achieve our long term interests and promote freedom, democratic institutions and stability in the region?

- Are these the institutions which America strives to promote?

- Was the crisis termed a success simply due to a peaceful and favorable end to hostilities?

- Following resolution of each crisis, was stability long term? Were allied interests achieved and maintained?

Beginnings of U.S. Joint Operations

While attempting to find the "beginnings of joint operations", the exact answer to what should be the first question in this study -- when did the concept of arriving at strategic decision points married to joint military operations really begin?--is open for debate. One can trace U.S. joint operations back to the Revolutionary War, the War

of 1812, the Mexican Wars of 1836 and 1848, the Civil War, and the Indian Wars of 1870s. These have all been documented. The key to this study occurred when Dr. Jerold Brown of the Combat Studies Institute, Command and General Staff College, suggested that "there is a difference between 'thinking' and 'acting' jointly". The above operations occurring earlier than 1898, were thought about, then acted upon, generally as separate activities at the strategic, operational and often times, tactical levels of war (defined in glossary). Forces from the army and navy were employed to perform operations that could not otherwise have been accomplished by only one service.

There are probably more "joint" operations than these, but the overall concern from the point of this research is when and why did strategic thinking and decision making become married to the mobilization and deployment actions of joint operations planning. The birth and lineage of modern joint operations, (i.e., when the National Command Authority and the military leadership began to think joint and act jointly) is best exemplified beginning in 1898 with the first major operation deploying and employing US Navy and US Army forces together to achieve national strategic goals and objectives in Cuba.

In 1898, the United States found itself supporting the Cuban guerrillas in their struggle to liberate Cuba from Spanish occupation and secure their independence. Under the leadership of President William McKinley, the nation un-

knowingly faced its first trial as a world superpower whose interests were now threatened.

The nation was outraged by the Spanish atrocities committed in Cuba and the sinking of the USS Maine. Congress and the President were under pressure from public opinion to intervene. But McKinley, war weary from the Civil War, sought a peaceful solution with Spain to end the Cuban rebels plight. He made exhaustive diplomatic efforts to coerce the Spanish to reform their harsh regime in Cuba and withdraw forces. In the end, McKinley felt forced to project U.S. military power in one of America's first joint campaigns conducted outside the continent. At this time, the 8000 man U.S. Navy was considered to be more powerful than the rather limited 25000 man U.S. Army (when compared against global military forces). Jointly, they were deployed against the Spanish fighting in both Cuba and the Philippine Islands.³

U.S. national interests and strategy lead to involvement in one of America's first global commitments. Using today's lexicon, this could be termed the first large unit deployment as part of a joint contingency operation. It set the precedent that in modern times, and as a world power, the U.S. military must be capable of conducting successful joint operations anywhere in the world.

The difficulties associated with this first large unit operation are understandable in respect to the complex-

ity of the mission and the reduced readiness posture of U.S. ground forces at the time. Lessons learned from this and subsequent joint operations have been the catalyst for several Congressional Reorganization Acts. The purpose of these legislative acts has been to improve U.S. ability to conduct worldwide deployments and achieve the requisite joint interoperability that is needed to assure battlefield and operational success.

The first indication that joint service cooperation (these were 'bureaus' since 1812 in the War Department) and coordination had already become important were the reforms in military organizations implemented by Secretary of War Elihu Root in 1903. Based on Root's recommendations and the Dodge commission findings, Congress created a Chief of Staff and a general staff under the Secretary of War on 14 Feb 1903. Root's purpose was to give the War Department a head, with a staff, who was responsible to plan, coordinate and advise the Secretary of War and President on current and future operations.⁴ Another of Root's reforms "established a joint army and navy board to promote cooperation and planning coordination between the services."⁵ This was the first time that joint service operations were addressed by the War Department. This initial organization would later lead to the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1947.

The National Security Act of 1947 (NSA) is by far the most important legislation concerning modern national security policy formulation and organization of the military. The major effects of NSA 1947 were:

- Creation of the Department of Defense (DOD) and Secretary of Defense.

- Formation of National Security Council chaired by the President with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the director of the new National Security Resources Board as its members. The Central Intelligence Agency provided intelligence information to the Council. Responsibility of the Council was to "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security..."⁶

- Permanently established the Joint Chiefs of Staff as principal military advisors to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council. Along with other duties, Congress directed them to prepare joint strategic and logistic plans for the services, assign services logistic responsibilities to support such plans, establish unified commands with respect to national security and design and implement joint training education.⁷

- Formation of Army, Navy and Air Force as separate services. Each service within the DOD had an individual service chief with cabinet rank, and a civilian

Secretary department head. In 1949, changes provided for a Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman would be selected by the President and senior to all service chiefs.

Since the creation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position, there have been only two major DOD reorganizational thrusts: the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 and the most recent, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

In the 1950s, President Eisenhower lead the effort to implement changes stating, "...separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever."⁸ The main thrust of the '58 Act was to increase the authority of the Secretary of Defense, remove the Military Department Secretaries from the operational chain of command and direct that operating forces be assigned to unified and specified commands.⁹

Major provisions of the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 were broad reaching: a mandated joint education and personnel officer development system, an increased command authority of unified and specified commanders over subordinate forces, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was made the principal advisor to the National Security Council, and increased responsibility of the Chairman to monitor and manage strategy, planning and resource constraints.¹⁰

These organizational changes were aimed at enhancing the functions and capabilities of the services regarding

joint aspects of planning for and executing strategic military options when the president and the Secretary of Defense collectively (with the National Security Council and sometimes the Congress) decide to use our national military elements of power to protect threatened national interests, objectives and goals.

Joint operations have been widely used throughout 20th Century conflicts. They were born out of necessity to project U.S. national power in response to any crises where in U.S. national security interests were actively threatened by external facts, and second, to multiply the U.S. element of power by using all available combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities of all services synergistically. Perhaps most importantly, since 1898, no large unit operation involving deployment of U.S. Armed Forces has been executed without the coordinated effort of the U.S. military services. These range from two world wars, and Korean and the Vietnamese conflicts to many smaller, less intense crisis around the world. Although joint operations were mostly successful, all were replete with recurring problems resulting from often ambiguous strategic guidance, the likes of which cannot effectively be translated into operational direction to the supported and supporting combatant commanders. Affected by such ambiguous guidance is our ability to achieve unity of command, equipment and operational interoperability; and an understanding of other services' doctrine (not unlike the problems of 1898).

More specifically, since the end of the Vietnam conflict in 1975, the use of military power has more frequently been in response to international crises and subsequent requests for U.S. military intervention from allies or friendly countries. The requirement to deploy forces rapidly throughout the world has brought with it special contingency planning and execution considerations. And more importantly, a need for clearly defined national strategy, objectives and goals, policies, programs, and commitments that provide the necessary guidance to combatant commanders. Clear national direction is required to properly plan and execute the joint contingency operations necessary to attain the desired national objectives.

Lebanon 1958 and Dominican Republic 1965 are two examples of typical joint contingency operations involving the projection of U.S. military power, to protect national interests abroad and to meet global strategic commitments to allies. While each was operationally different, they are similar in that they represent military operation conducted short of declared war and aimed at achieving national objectives. Although there are numerous examples of joint operations to study, these two represent the type of joint contingency operations that are likely to happen-- for example, Lebanon '83 and Grenada '83. The study of Lebanon and Dominican Republic should provide lessons learned, indicate pitfalls, and highlight recurring strategic problems that

remain unresolved even to the time of the two later military operations. A comparison and contrasting of the problems of all four operations will be accomplished in the conclusion chapter (Chapter V).

Operations by forces and governments which threaten U.S. national security and interests today have increased in frequency; no longer is the threat simply bipolar between the superpowers. Now, the U.S. democratic system is faced with third world nations who possess powerful military capabilities. Many of these nations lack sufficient economic and political power to legitimately protect their interest or they consist of extreme elements who would use aggression to obtain their objectives. In either case, the result is an environment where countries are forced to protect their interests through the use of military operations short of declared war. The environment of military operations short of declared war has significantly increased since the end of the Vietnam conflict and is perceived as the most likely to occur in the future. The importance of a clearly defined national military strategy that achieves US national objectives in these environments has become increasingly important. It is increasingly necessary to insure (particularly in today's nuclear environment) mutual understanding and support for U.S. actions by allies and friends. Equally important to achieving these objectives is the ability of United States military forces to conduct

fluid and synchronized joint operations across the full spectrum of military missions in peace, crisis, and war.

Significance of Study

This study will focus on, and highlight, options available to the President in each case study. Military options and the use of optional elements of national power, such as political, national will, economic, and geography will be highlighted. Operational military activities for joint contingency operations planning and execution will be considered down to the Unified Combatant Command and major service or functional component commands only.

The significance of this study to define strategic issues and recurring deficiencies captures the urgent need of the U.S. to continually reassess its military capabilities as a world super power. Recent legislation has focused on resolutions to ensure the successful accomplishment of future contingency missions. The adoption of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, indicated, through legislated joint officer training and utilization of tour requirements, the importance of joint contingency operations.

By analyzing the two historical joint contingency operations through the use of the National Elements of Power and the CGSC Strategic Analysis Model (SAM) and subsequently comparing the results of those analyses against the histori-

cal events, this study will develop some recommendations for planning and executing strategic decision on future joint operations.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER I

(1) Frank C. Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress, FY 1989: 18.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (1984): 261.

(4) James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963, Special Studies Series, (1975): 11.

(5) Frederic A. Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force: Tactics of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics, (1980): 21.

(6) C. W. Borklund, Department of Defense, (1968): 40-42.

(7) Ibid., 46.

(8) LTG Richard L. West (Ret), Association of The United States Army, Fact Sheet, "Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, A Primer," N.D.: 3.

(9) Ibid.

(10) Ibid., 7.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

A review of the bibliographic literature regarding national policy formulation and the two specific joint contingency operations has revealed information which can be divided into two categories: United States policy and strategy, and historical accounts of each operation. Included in the last category are after action reports of the two conflicts.

Literature Review

A review of information on United States policy and national security strategy has shown a historical lack of clearly defined "in writing" descriptions of both our national policy and how and when we will decide to use the military element of power to meet national objectives. Prior to 1987, the President's vision of where we were headed and the way we would use our national elements of power to reach these goals was determined through U.S. Foreign Policy implementation rather than through predetermined stated guidance. The enactment of Goldwater-Nichols

Act of 1986 into public law changed that. Until January 1987, our U.S. national security strategy, which integrated and implemented the elements of national power, had not been recorded. In January 1988, former President Reagan signed only the second National Security Strategy of the United States. Only over the past two consecutive years has the President recorded and clearly defined U.S. national interests, goals, policies and military objectives for the world to view. He has described how the nation will protect its national interests and the way in which each element of national power will be used to meet our strategic global commitments. As of this writing, President Bush's National Security Strategy of the U.S. has not been published; but, as previously stated, the fundamental U.S. interests, values, and objectives are expected not to change dramatically. It remains to be seen whether President Bush will continue to provide the first document for National Security Strategy in the future.

Receiving this strategic focus, the military, as an element of national power, must likewise focus both on strategic and operational level activities--activities that allow for mobilization, training, deployment, sustainment and employment of military forces in joint and combined environments and operations as a tool of national power supporting U. S. National Security Strategy. The way in which the Department of Defense will accomplish these stated Presidential policies is defined yearly in the Secretary of

Defense's Defense Guidance and his Annual Report to the Congress. These reports outline, "the President's plan for securing the defense of America's principles and interests".¹ These reports, together with the President's National Security Strategy, provide Congress a comprehensive blueprint of the ways to achieve the strategic ends for accomplishing our global commitments. Congress, through the budget authorization process, must then provide the means in the form of dollars to fund force requirements to meet those commitments. These two documents are critical to the strategists, the JCS, Commanders in Chief, and the services in they formulate plans and budget proposals to meet the stated U.S. National Strategy.

Current

The basis for developing joint and combined strategies and concomitant operations is currently contained in the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS), the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), JCS Pub 1 (dictionary of associated military terms), JCS Pub 2 (Unified Action Armed Forces [UNAAF]), the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Defense Guide (DG), and the initial drafts of doctrine being developed by the JCS under the Joint Doctrine Master Plan (JDMP). These JDMP publications define U.S. joint military terms and prescribe principles and doctrines to provide guidance to

Unified and Specified Commanders, the JCS and their services, and their planning staffs in dealing with joint and combined activities at the strategic and operational levels. Complete combat, combat support, and combat service support doctrinal manuals for joint and combined operations are being developed under the JDMP. Emphasis on these doctrinal developments is a result of Congressional legislation found in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Historical literature of the actual operations contain vast and in-depth perspectives on the social, economic, political, geographic, and national factors surrounding each operation. Factors leading to the Presidential decisions to employ the U.S. element of military power are available; however, much of this will come from the strategic analysis of each situation.

Methodology

This study will be the result of historical research of operations in Lebanon, 1958 (Chapter III) and Dominican Republic, 1965 (Chapter IV). The study will primarily use historical research as the method to gather data from military doctrinal manuals and primary and secondary historical documents. An analysis and evaluation of the operational data for each will be conducted using the national elements of military power and the CGSC Strategic Analysis Model (SAM). These analyses will eventuate in an assessment

yielding the identification of strategic and some operational deficiencies, corrective programs applied at the time, and the risks, or unresolved issues, inherit in the operation from which proposals for the future will evolve. Chapter V will contain conclusions from the analysis of these two operations compared and contrasted with operations in Grenada and Lebanon 83.

National Elements of Power/Strategic Analysis Model

The research begins by examining the historical perspectives and the regional backgrounds for each of the major actors that existed before and during each military operation. The national elements of power including geographic, national will, economic, political and military (see Figure II-1) will be evaluated for each significant player that could have affected the development of a particular strategy or impacted the subsequent application of the elements of power. This will provide data on the relationships between each players' interests and that player's ability to employ the different elements of power.




Figure II-1: Elements of National Power²

The following are brief definitions of the major elements of power.

National power. The total capability of a state to pursue its interests. A nation's ability to use its national power to achieve interests will be assessed through the analysis of the five elements of power. There are three elements of power, political, military and economic which are "considered to be usable elements of power around which strategy is focused."³ Geographic power is a force multi-

plier of military power as national power is a multiplier of political power. Since strategy is the coordinated application of national power, assessing each actor's elements of power will aid in determining the ability of the actor to pursue their interests.⁴

Geographic power. Simply the physical characteristics of a nation on the globe. It is interrelated to all other elements of power. Rarely does geographic power stand alone as the most important element; however, when power projection involves major oceans, mountain systems, or deserts, it can quickly become a key factor in planning strategy.⁵

Economic power. Both the root cause and the remedy to many crises. Although it is widely used to cultivate international relations, it normally must be applied over the long term and therefore is usually more effectively used as "a carrot rather than a stick."⁶ Economic power also forms an interrelationship between nations which can increase or decrease the ability of nations to maneuver in the international system. Because of the widely accepted economic free trade system it is hard to regulate economic power. The most important consideration when planning strategy in relation to economic power is determining the state's strengths and weaknesses.⁷

Political power. The most widely used element; generally presenting the lowest risk and greatest chance for

success. Simply stated, it is "the manner in which the state organizes its resources."⁸ The capability to use political power is enhanced through the knowledge of cultural, ethnic, religious, and social aspects of the target nation.⁹

Military power. Will usually obtain the fastest result, but also incurs the greatest risk. It is difficult to transpose actual military execution to obtain the exact desired result. Its use, has the highest political and national will costs and often escalates above planned limits. Military power in the 20th century is almost always constrained by political limits which sometimes causes difficulty in transforming political aims into a military mission.¹⁰

National will. The "sum of the state's human resources."¹¹ It is normally a multiplier of political power which can greatly determine the length of time a state will continue a crisis.¹²

After analyzing each states' capability to use its power, the information is used in Step 3 of the Strategic Analysis Model. (FIGURE II-2: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS MODEL DIAGRAM (SAM)). There may be states who have power but based on risk and or potential gains, decide not to use that power in a particular crisis.

Strategic Analysis Model (SAM)

The Strategic Analysis Model is a systematic integrated procedure to analyze information to arrive at a strategy which will meet a nation's objectives. It is a process by which data is analyzed and strategy developed during a crisis. The purpose of the SAM is to: "...develop and analyze alternative national objectives, develop and or determine the feasible policy options a state could pursue to obtain a given national objective, and analyze the capability of other states to accomplish stated, implied, or suspected national objectives. (FIGURE II-2: SAM)"¹³

STEP 1

STATE THE PROBLEM(S) & STATE
ASSUMPTIONS

STEP 2

IDENTIFY RELEVANT ACTORS AND
INTERESTS

- > IDENTIFY ACTORS AND INTERESTS
- > DETERMINE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERESTS
- > IDENTIFY CONFLICTING AND COMPLEMENTARY INTERESTS

STEP 3

ASSESS EACH ACTOR'S POWER
TO PURSUE INTERESTS

- > ASSESS ELEMENTS OF POWER FOR EACH ACTOR
- > IDENTIFY STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND VULNERABILITIES
- > RELATE STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES OR VULNERABILITIES TO NATIONAL INTERESTS
- > DETERMINE LIKELY OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES OF EACH ACTOR.

STEP 4

DEVELOP POLICY OPTIONS

- > IDENTIFY POSSIBLE OPTIONS BASED ON POWER AND INTERESTS
- > ESTIMATE RESPONSES TO EACH OPTION
- > EVALUATE OPTIONS BASED ON RESPONSES
- > MODIFY AND OR COMBINE OPTIONS

STEP 5

REACH CONCLUSIONS AND MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS

FIGURE II-2: NATIONAL STRATEGIC APPRAISAL FLOW CHART¹⁴

Step 1: State the Problem.

The problem is stated from the perspective of U.S. threats; U.S. interests must be included to properly define the scope of the problem. Valid assumptions are developed to scope the crisis based on current situations and probable events. Assumptions chosen must be vital and essential to solving the problem. 15

Step 2: Identify Relevant Actors and Interests.

Key actors are those who have an interest or objective in the outcome of the crisis. Identification of conflicting and complementary interests among actors will assist (in Step 4) in determining the likely response of another state to a certain U.S. policy. Understanding complimentary interests can also greatly assist in the peaceful resolution of the conflict. It is also possible to have actors with interests and power who will not need to be considered further; this situation can be defined from public policy statements, treaties, and military agreements. 16

Step 3: Assess Each Actor's Power to Pursue its Interests

The elements of power are analyzed for each actor to determine the actor's ability to pursue its interests. Doing this will greatly assist the U.S. in establishing a

policy to accomplish its objectives in the crisis. Economic, political, and military power will be assessed with geographic and military power as multipliers of the other elements of power. There are cases where the latter two elements of power could be employed alone. An example of this was Britain's attempt to expand its empire by placing small military detachments at each colony's location. National will could also be significant enough in a case where religious, ethnic or other factors causes the populous to exert unusually great pressure during a crisis.

In this study, a chart containing the elements of power and actors will be used in the analysis of power. The chart and values in Fig. II-3 below are an example. Values will change depending on events, so they represent only a relatively small amount of time in this study. The degree of each actor's power is based solely on its current capability compared to all other actors capabilities of affecting the problem. The capability of one actor affecting the other is considered but the potential outcome of that influence is not calculated in assigning a value. This is true only relative to their interest, capability and likely use of this power pertaining to this problem. The United States is segregated to focus its power versus all others since its goal is to determine effective policy options which will secure U.S. national interests.

	ACTORS				
	1	2	3	4	5
POLITICAL	<+>	<+>	+	+	<+>
NATIONAL	+	<->	<0>	<+>	0
ECONOMIC	0	0	+	0	0
MILITARY	<->	+	<+>	+	+
GEOGRAPH	+	0	+	<->	<->

<+> MOST + USABLE 0 Neutral - Vulnerable <-> MOST VULNERABLE
 USABLE

FIGURE 11-3: MAJOR ACTORS VERSUS ELEMENTS OF POWER

Step 4: Develop Policy Options.

Following the identification of major actors and the assessment of each nation's power, likely U.S. courses of action are determined. These courses of action must be based on the actor's interest in the outcome, power to influence the end, and likely intent on using power to influence the outcome. Consideration to the response of other actors, the costs, the benefits, and the associated risks must be given in designing all policy options. This step should result in a wide range of options which will satisfy the U.S. objectives and interests. The choices should cover the entire spectrum of crisis situations possible with critical attention given to development of gradual alternatives in the use of any particular element of power.¹⁷

Once these policy options are developed each must be tested for feasibility, acceptability, and suitability. The basis in part for this analysis is U.S. basic interests, constraints, and restraints guidance given by the National Command Authority. The strategy option is now ready to move to Step 5.¹⁸

Step 5: Reach Conclusions and Make Recommendations.

The alternatives are identified as being acceptable or unacceptable and are listed in order of probable implementation. Discriminating factors which affected the selection or rejection of options are highlighted for reference as the situation changes.¹⁹

In this study several policy options other than the one chosen will be developed and discussed in relation to the U.S. interests during the crisis. The purpose of this discussion will be to determine if there were alternative policy options which would have met U.S. goals.

Following the analysis of the possible options, the policy chosen will be tested for suitability, acceptability, and feasibility and a comparison of the interests and objectives presented in the historical data will be discussed. Sufficient information will be presented to formulate alternative strategies if the results of the study indicate that a military projection was not the only or the best approach to meet the stated U.S. national objectives. Some of the

elements of power and portions of the SAM will have to be interpreted rather than come from historical data since this methodology was not used during the formulation and execution of the actual operations being studied.

The most important part of this strategic analysis is the identification of policy options and associated problems. This will provide future strategists and joint military planners an awareness of these critical items and will help minimize the risk of failure through objective planning and coordination. Chapter V will then compare the results identified using the SAM.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER II

(1) Frank C. Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress, (FY 1989): 3.

(2) U.S. Army CGSC, Joint and Combined Environments, Aug 1988: i.

(3) Ibid., 31.

(4) Ibid., 31.

(5) Ibid., 31.

(6) Ibid., 33.

(7) Ibid.

(8) Ibid., 34.

(9) Ibid.

(10) Ibid., 35.

(11) Ibid.

(12) Ibid., 37.

(13) Ibid., 27

(14) Ibid., i.

(15) Ibid., 27.

(16) Ibid., 28.

(17) Ibid., 29.

(18) Ibid., 30.

(19) Ibid.

CHAPTER III

LEBANON 1958

Introduction

This chapter examines the history of Lebanon from 1956 until after the landing of the last American forces in Aug 1958. The historical data is then analyzed by using the Strategic Analysis Model (SAM) developed at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. Finally, an analysis of the policy options available and the policy chosen by the National Command Authority are discussed. This will provide the basis from which some conclusions can be drawn and compared to other operations.

Historical Background

Western involvement in the Middle East after World War II was fraught with contradictions with respect to agreements and western power interests in the region. Britain and France had colonial ties to the region. After colonial independence, it was difficult to deal with these nations whose populous had resented foreign occupation and were in the midst of nationalist movements. Recognizing the importance of the region and difficulty in directing the

governments according to approved western policy, Britain, France, and the United States signed a Tripartite agreement in 1950. This proclaimed "their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in the Middle East."¹ This pact was subsequently broken by Britain and France when they invaded Egypt to retake the Suez Canal from Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser in 1956. The agreement was used in part, as legal grounds, for the U.S. to enter Lebanon in support of Camille Chamoun in 1958 against external subversion. The U.S. and their allies had three main interests associated with the region with the exception of France's involvement with Algeria: the flow of oil to Europe, the Suez Canal in Egypt (for strategic and economic interests), and the belief that the region was important to contain world-wide communism.² These interests were in direct conflict with Arab Nationalists who sought freedom from foreign power domination and Arab self-determination.

Although Egypt had gained independence from Britain in 1922, British troops remained until Arab Socialist guerrillas negotiated a treaty in 1954 for the withdrawal of troops by 1956. This was the beginning of Colonel Nasser's role as Premier of Egypt and as a dominant Arab leader. France's interests in the region revolved around economic ties to the Canal Company and successful termination of the

Algerian Revolution which was being fueled both from a material and spiritual standpoint by Colonel Nasser.³

The U.S., also involved in the region, had similar interests but focused on the vital interest of containing the further spread of communism. The U.S. had been involved assisting Egypt build the Aswan Dam until July 1956 when Nasser's uncontrollability caused the U.S. to withdraw its commitment to the project. A Soviet arms agreement with Nasser, coupled with a general distrust as to the direction of the Arab Nationalists movement, created further uneasiness in the region. Britain following the U.S.'s suit also withdrew their support and Nasser immediately declared the Suez Canal nationalized.⁴

After failed economic and diplomatic efforts, Britain and France conducted a military operation aimed at seizing the Canal and maintaining their strategic position in the region. The military mission was completely successful. This small accomplishment was overshadowed by tremendous world opinion (international will) backlash. The military attack contravened several political agreements and treaties, involved destruction to populated areas, and in conjunction with an Israeli incursion into the Sinai, strengthened Nasser's grip and fueled Arab nationalism while reducing western influence in the region to an all time low. The U.S. had remained outwardly neutral, but as far as the Arabs were concerned was guilty by association.⁵

Following the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, pro western views within many governments were threatened by rising nationalism among Arabs lead by Egypt's President Nasser. This growing sentiment along with the military defeat enabled Nasser to emerge a stronger and more inspirational leader. It also created a larger opening for the Soviet Union to champion factionalism against Western "imperialism and aggression".⁶ Bolstered by these events, the Soviets seized economic and political opportunities as the U.S. and British withdrew from the region. Immediate changes, visible both in the government rhetoric and shipments of arms and material from the Soviets, appeared in Syria and Egypt in August 1957. Both countries were receiving large quantities of Soviet military equipment and participated in radio and newspaper barrages calling for the assassination of Jordan's King Hussein. U.S. embassy officials were expelled from Syria amid charges they were part of a plot to overthrow the Syrian government. The pro-western governments of Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia reacted by informing the U.S. they were taking measures to secure their own borders in view of the Syrian developments. The U.S. reacted to the buildup by increasing the delivery rate of programmed military and economic aid and by warning European and Mediterranean commanders of adjacent countries concerns.

Following an economic agreement signed in early 1958 with Moscow, "Nasser announced his intention to merge Syria

and Egypt into a single state titled the United Arab Republic".⁷ A popular vote approved this and made Nasser president over both countries. Concerns among western nations over his growing influence and gains in the region continued to rise.⁸ The Crown Prince of Yemen, in early, March attached his kingdom to the United Arab Republic (UAR) in a Federated Status.⁹ These developments caused Saudi Arabia to withdraw from Arab politics in an attempt to seclude themselves from Nasser's influence. Jordan's King Hussein, feeling even more vulnerable, joined with Iraq in a loose federation known as the Arab Union. This defense alliance, built mainly along dynastic ties through the association of the Baghdad Pact, was aligned with the west.¹⁰

Lebanon, unlike many other Arab Nations, has been composed since the middle ages of almost half Christian and half Muslim population. By the spring of 1958, this percentage had slipped in favor of the Muslim population but the portion of representation within the government had not been adjusted according to the terms of the "National Covenant".¹¹ Rather than equal representation from each religious sect, the government was greatly dominated by Christian leadership, including President Camille Chamoun. President Chamoun, now in the late portion of his term, was "personally widely disliked by Muslims and also a number of prominent Christian political figures who condemned rumors of his intention to push a constitutional amendment that

would allow him to seek reelection."¹² These political and religious differences had fueled domestic violence in the past but the Arab nationalist movement made relations with the Chamoun's pro-west regime worse. Violence between rival factions and general domestic unrest increased throughout Lebanon in 1958. Chamoun charged that Syria and Egypt were fomenting extremist Arab nationalist activities with "encouragement and material support".¹³

General Fuad Chehab commanded the 6000 man Lebanese Army and police force to "provide internal security, repress any destructive attempts or armed activity and to pursue and arrest offenders."¹⁴ He was a Maronite Christian aristocrat, widely known and respected by both friendly and opposition parties. He had assured Chamoun of support through the end of his term. The Army was composed of both Muslim and Christian soldiers however 80% of the officers were Christian, while the enlisted ranks were made up of religious percentages closer to those found throughout Lebanon. By doctrine the military was taught to remain outside politics - soldiers could not belong to a political party nor participate in elections. Chehab strove to keep his soldiers above the political fray as he had done in 1952. The army was well equipped with American and British equipment and had proven capable of the internal security mission in both 1956 and 1957. However, Chehab was forced by the composition of his force and powerful factions within Lebanon to ensure his enforcement of security did not unjustly

single out any party or religion. The army reacted to numerous outbreaks of violence which became more frequent and involved rebels from Syria in 1958.¹⁵

The United States became alarmed with the events in the Middle East following the 1952 Suez crisis. It was evident that although the U.S. supported the cessation of hostilities and early withdrawal of French and British forces from Egypt, its association with these allies and Israel overshadowed the facts of history. American reaction to the Soviet build up of economic and military aid to Syria and Egypt and increased destabilization created by the Arab nationalist movement caused Eisenhower to adopt a competitive plan. In January 1957, he introduced the Eisenhower Doctrine "which was in the main a geographical and diplomatic extension of the older Truman Doctrine."¹⁶ The U.S. promised assistance to any Middle Eastern country against external Communist threat to the states independence and integrity. To hasten subscribers from the Middle East, Special Envoy James P. Richards was sent to the region in June 1957 to explain its purpose before the measure actually was passed by the Congress. Concurrently he concluded a military aid agreement which "provided Lebanon with political support and with military assistance to meet internal security problems."¹⁷ The intent of this measure was to assure pro-western nations that the U. S. was willing to

assist any country against foreign intervention, thus, sending a clear signal to the Soviets and Nasser.

The Tripartite declaration of May 1950 was still viewed by the U.S. as basis for intervention against external aggression. Lebanon immediately endorsed the measure in reaction to revolutionary threats to its constitutional government. Events in Syria led U.S. Secretary of State Dulles to announce, for the President, the "apparent growing Soviet communist domination of Syria and the large buildup there of Soviet block arms, a buildup which could not be justified purely by any defensive needs".¹⁸ The British Foreign Secretary and Sec Dulles met in October 1957 and as a result the JCS was told to consider current capabilities in case of a coup d'etat in Jordan or Lebanon. The objective of the intervention would be to "reestablish the authority of the friendly local government and to help maintain order."¹⁹ JCS was told to assume no possibility of armed intervention by hostile forces from outside the country. The following month, November 1957, the Secretary of State requested preparation of an operation plan using British and U.S. forces to reestablish local governments of Jordan or Lebanon in the event of actual or imminent coup. Major General Verdib Barnes, Chairman of the Joint Middle East Planning Committee (JMEPC), used a previously prepared unilateral plan in his discussion with the British one week later.

The organization of the military command structure for employment into Lebanon came under Commander in Chief European Forces (CINCEUR). The Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM) was the naval component commander of the US European Command and was "dual hatted" as the head of a specified command under JCS. He was responsible for planning and conducting operations in the Middle East and was called Commander in Chief U.S. Specified Command Middle East (CINCSPECOMME).²⁰ On 15 November 1957, JCS informed CINCEUR, CINCNELM and Commander in Chief Strategic Command of the possibility of a coup in Jordan and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon. All were informed that military action might be used to "reestablish authority of governments friendly to the U.S. and maintain order."²¹ CINCEUR and CINCNELM were told to coordinate for such actions based on the CINCSPECOMME OPLAN PLAN 215-56 and the Joint Middle East Planning Committee (JMEPC) outline plan which had been completed. After JCS review, the OPLAN was approved on 27 Nov for "emergency use".²²

On 3 December, JCS approved CINCSPECOMME OPLAN 215-58, which had been initiated in September, and was now the contingency plan for the intervention into Lebanon or Jordan. This contingency plan involved the employment of both British and U. S. forces in case of a coup in either Lebanon or Jordan. Concern was voiced by the Chief of Naval Operations about the political implications of conducting a military operation like the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt

in 1956. He stressed the need for political support and military cooperation from Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Nations before such a plan was implemented, lest history repeat the story of the fall of pro-west influence among Arabs and the rise of Soviet influence as a result. Additionally, overflight rights for several European countries, requested in late summer, still had not been approved and was of concern to the military planners. Soon, the sensitivity of the issue caused the U.S., despite British objections, to stop detailed planning which left critical issues and further long term preparations undone.

The assassination, 8 May 1958, of a Beirut newspaper editor, an outspoken critic of Chamoun's, touched off widespread rioting and street violence. The burning of two U. S. information libraries, the cutting of an Iraqi owned pipeline, and over 150 casualties resulted. The unrest was due to the opposition's belief that the assassination was politically motivated. This caused severe pressure on the slim control Chamoun held over the government. When Druze members attacked the president's palace on 13 May, Chamoun indicated to U.S., British and French ambassadors that he might be forced to request foreign intervention.²³

Reaction to these violent events provided the impetus for the U.S. government to take several actions. JCS again authorized CINCNELM, Admiral James L. Holloway Jr., to continue planning and sail his amphibious forces toward the

eastern Mediterranean. Days later, the U.S. government indicated that Marine forces in the Mediterranean would be doubled. The 6th Fleet sailed east with its original amphibious squadron and marine battalion, plus an additional marine battalion which had just come to replace the first fleet's battalion. CINCEUR was directed by JCS to be able to bring one army battle group to Lebanon within 24 hours of an execution order. Deployment of 26 C-124 aircraft from the U.S. to Germany was accomplished to ensure the capability to do this. The British also prepared for deployment by placing troops on alert in Cyprus and deploying the aircraft carrier Archroyal toward the Mediterranean. This crisis period ended after about 10 days when the Lebanese government gained more control. JCS then reduced the alert posture of the airborne battle group to 48 hours, released the C-124 aircraft, and allowed that portion of the 6th Fleet due to rotate to sail toward the U.S.

The situation in May enabled U.S. officials to more clearly define the conditions under which a request for outside help from the Chamoun government would be honored. U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Robert McClintock, was directed by the Secretary of State to make clear to President Chamoun that "a request for western military assistance should be made only under the most compelling necessity when the integrity of Lebanon was genuinely threatened and when the maximum efforts of its own forces were insufficient for protection."²⁴ Additionally, the Secretary of State through

McClintock clarified that the request for forces must come from "the President under authority of the Lebanese government."²⁵ The appeal from Chamoun would need to request assistance in protecting U.S. nationals and property and provide aid to the Lebanese military program. A request under these terms would meet U.S. constitutional requirements for intervention; a request under the Eisenhower Doctrine would be acted upon only if there was armed aggression from a country controlled by international communism. Secretary of State Dulles listed three additional conditions that should be met prior to requesting U.S. assistance. First, Lebanon should lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council regarding interference from external governments in its internal affairs. Second, Chamoun needed to lobby support from some Arab states which would support a request for western assistance. Finally, Chamoun's continued quest for an additional term as president would be terminated if it endangered the integrity and western orientation of Lebanon.²⁶

Chamoun lodged a formal complaint of interference in Lebanon's internal affairs from outside governments on both 22 May and 6 June detailing specific examples and naming the United Arab Republic as the major perpetrator. The United Nations wasted little time in voting to send an observer group to Lebanon to verify Lebanon's charges. The second condition was met on 16 June when the Lebanese cabinet

passed a resolution authorizing the president to request friendly power intervention when, in his judgment, it became necessary. This was followed quickly by public support from both Iraq and Jordan. This left only one unmet prerequisite to U.S. force intervention: Chamoun not seeking reelection. This fact made even more ominous to the JCS the potential disaster facing soldiers who might be confronted by insurrectionists and rebels from Syria and possibly a populous unfriendly to foreign intervention. The overriding concern of the JCS was a prolonged conflict involving terrorists activities by the populous, rebel factions and insurrectionists while the main military mission would be blocking logistical supplies from Syria to the rebels. However, amidst all the doubts concerning successful completion and worldwide political opinion, it was agreed during a 15 June meeting at the White House that if the U.S. failed to respond to Chamoun's request, all other pro-western governments in the region would disappear.²⁷

The United Nation observer group was largely hamstrung in its efforts to ascertain the level of influence Syria maintained in Lebanon. Their attempts to seek out information from amidst the battle areas met with denied access by rebels to certain areas. Destroyed bridges, mined roads, and fighting in their proximity hindered movement. The first report, delivered 4 July, was unable to conclude the extent of Syrian intervention and verify the first condition. However, the last condition necessary for

American intervention was met on 9 July when Chamoun in a statement to the international press stated that he would not seek reelection and would leave office at the end of his term.²⁸

The event which triggered the request for American involvement in Lebanon occurred on 14 July in Iraq. Army officers lead a coup which erased all former presence of the pro-western regime. King Faisal, Crown Prince Abdul Illah, and Premier Nuri Said were deposed and murdered. Baghdad radio announced, "the formation of a Republican Government of Iraq under the leadership of Brigadier General Abdul Karim Kassem in conjunction with a cabinet of generals and leftist civilians."²⁹ President Chamoun, shaken and uncertain of the overall depth of influence of Nasser into these events, but suspecting an immediate threat, requested American intervention through Ambassador McClintock. He demanded military intervention within 48 hours without any inquiries or conditions. He also indicated he had already asked for British assistance and was immediately requesting French assistance. It was later learned by the Ambassador that Chamoun had made these requests without any consultation with General Chehab.

The request arrived at the White House 0835L EDST (local Eastern Daylight Savings Time) 14 July during the meeting the President and his advisors were having regarding the incident in Iraq. The consensus of the group was that,

in view of these recent events and in order to assure stability of the Lebanese government, U.S. forces would be required in Lebanon. Following a meeting between congressional leaders and the President, the order was given for the JCS to execute a unilateral plan of operation, "BLUEBAT".³⁰

Admiral Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) directed CINCNELM and the commander of the 6th Fleet to land Marines at 1500 hours Beirut time (0900 EDST) the following day, 15 July. The message from the CNO was sent at 1823 EDST on the 14 July, allowing less than 15 hours between initiation of the message and execution of the landing by the Marines. The significant lapse of time between the President's decision to conduct BLUEBAT and the transmission of the message to Admiral Holloway was necessary to draft messages directing various commands' operations and coordination. This delay exacerbated military execution difficulties inherent in the already short time available to meet the President's deadline.³¹

A short time later, 2031 EDST JCS sent the same information to CINCEUR, CINCNELM, CINCUSAFE, and COMTAC. The message also directed that only following the time of the landing in Beirut was CINCEUR to assemble one army battle group and the airlift for a landing in Beirut within 24 hours of the execution order or within 36 hours if by airborne operation. Absolutely no operations were to be conducted by any of the notified CINCS until after the

actual Marine landings had begun in Beirut. The effort for absolute operational security caused information copies to reach several other CINCS between 0900-1240 EDST 15 July. Some of these commands had coordination and other support responsibilities once the execute order was given.³² Eisenhower wanted to insure that preparations for deployment by follow on units did not mislead other countries as to our actual intent. He purposefully chose 0900 EDST to make a public announcement describing the intervention of U.S. forces in order to coincide with the Marine forces landing on the beach at 1500 hours Beirut time. Britain decided to hold its forces in reserve for possible operations in Iraq or Jordan and did not participate in BLUEBAT. The French, who Chamoun had also summoned on the 14th for help despite being advised of the U.S. objection to their involvement well prior, chose not to participate in the operation except for their public support of the U.S. intervention.³³

Admiral Holloway, the Commander in Chief Specified Command Middle East (CINCSPECOMME), and his ships were not in a position to react easily to such an unexpected short notice requirement to land in Lebanon. The reduced readiness posture directed by the JCS in May, enabling the 6th Fleet to begin more normal sea operations, had carried some of the ships farther away from Lebanon. Although given 48 hours by President Chamoun to respond, President Eisenhower directed the landing take place 15 July at 1500 hours Beirut

time or 0900 local time Washington. The first elements of the Marines 2nd Battalion 2nd Regiment, composed of 1771 soldiers, landed on Red Beach just south of Beruit Airport at 1500 hours local time 15 July. Within hours the airfield was secure and by 18 July three marine battalions totaling more than 4955 soldiers were on the ground surrounding portions of Beruit. Meanwhile, the 187th Airborne Battle Group, 24th Infantry Division was given the execute order on 16 July. They were flown by the 322nd Air Division to Adana Air Base, Turkey on 16 and 17 July and then onto Beruit where they were air landed on 19 July. On the same day the 2nd Battalion 8th Marine Regiment from the U.S. had arrived in Beruit, embarked on amphibious units, and was held in reserve.

Five days after the initiation of BLUEBAT, U.S. ground forces numbered 5870; with 840 afloat offshore, and numerous Air Force elements located at both Beruit and Adana Air Base, Turkey. By 27 July, Force Charlie, composed of a majority of the logistical elements needed to provide services varying from fuel to baths, arrived from Germany. The last combat elements, Force Echo and Force Delta, completed movement to Beruit on 8 August. Force Echo was an army tank battalion with 717 personnel and Force Delta had 4411 personnel consisting of transport, artillery, engineer, communication and hospital units.³⁴

LEBANON 1958

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS MODEL

Step One:

The first step in SAM is to state the problem. From the literature the best statement of the problem the United States faced was: the need to develop strategy in response to a request for military assistance made by President Chamoun of Lebanon. On 14 July 58, Chamoun made an urgent plea to the U.S. and other governments that military forces be stationed in Lebanon....to maintain the security and guarantee the independence of the country.³⁵ This request was somewhat different from the way that Chamoun had been instructed by the State Department (through Ambassador McClintock) to request U.S. forces intervention in Lebanon. President Chamoun was told to request assistance with a dual mission of protecting U.S. nationals and property and enhancing the military assistance program.

In the analysis of the problem several other major unanswered questions arose. Who was threatening the government? Was it forces from an external country such as Syria, as had been suggested, or was it a civil war involving populous religious factions struggling for power with each other and against the government? Finally, what was the Lebanese Army's reaction to intervention of U.S. Forces

going to be? Assumptions described by Secretary of State Dulles to the JCS to be used in planning the operation indicated the current assessment and planned guidelines under which U.S. forces would be employed. These were that JCS would not take into account the possibility of armed intervention by hostile forces outside the country and that the Lebanese army under General Chehab would not oppose U.S. forces entering Lebanon. Analyzing these separate problems provides a restated problem facing the planners. Given the ambiguous requests and unclear threat facing the government, an assumption could be that the leadership of the U.S. could not determine national objectives in pursuit of U.S. interests in the region.

Step Two:

Step Two requires identifying relevant actors and their interests. The relevant actors were composed of five nations and two main factions within Lebanon. The five nations were the U.S., Britain, USSR, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon (opposition and government). France had national power and the capability to use it but was not likely to do so, because France deferred to British interests in the region. Therefore they were not considered by U.S. planners in the crisis. The two factions in Lebanon were the Chamoun government and the opposition.

The U.S. and Britain had many complementary interests in the region. The foundation of these interests was the containment of communism, free access of the west to Middle East oil, and economic and social developments which would lead to political goals and promote long term stability and friendly western relations. These interests and goals as described by the National Security Planning Board in 1958 were vital to U.S. security and attainable through objectives of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Baghdad Pact and other U.S. security assistance programs. Since Lebanon was the first nation to openly accept the concept of the Eisenhower Doctrine it became imperative for President Eisenhower to react when help was requested.

The Soviet Union's interests were to further their influence over the region and gain strategic access to the oil and ports through economic and military aid to nations willing to accept. The failure of the west to sustain economic and political initiatives, especially while Nasser was building consensus among Arabs, created voids the Soviets were willing to fill. Through Nasser and the United Arab Republic they were able to export communism into Syria and Iraq and fuel violence in troubled nations such as Lebanon.

Egyptian and Syrian interests emerge as a result of Nasser's rise to importance in negotiating withdrawal of British troops from Egypt following 34 years of occupation. Nasser simply wanted to ignite the Arab nationalists move-

ment and unite the Arab governments economically and politically to provide a super power free, self-determined Arab World. This conflicted with Lebanon's continued diplomatic Anglo-French relations following the Suez crisis and acceptance of the principles of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Lebanon's course of action did not demonstrate Arab solidarity called for by Nasser but was indicative of feelings among other moderated Arab nations and religious sects within Lebanon.³⁶

The major players in Lebanon were the government and its supporters versus the opposition. President Chamoun was a Christian and was supported by the Christian Lebanese Phalanges, Syrian Nationalists Party, and the Lebanese Army. Irrespective of the army, the government's (and its supporters') interest was to maintain closer to the status quo in many respects. They wanted no part of the U.A.R. or Nasser's rule because of the treatment the Copts received in Egypt.³⁷ Chamoun, in particular, believed Nasser to be without the deep historical roots and understanding necessary to govern and properly represent the Arab Nation.³⁸ The government and supporters desired continued Lebanese individuality, cooperation among Arab nations, and welcomed pro-western relations. President Chamoun's relationship with General Chehab was aimed toward maintaining the General's loyalty in protecting the nation while allowing him to maintain the army above the factionalized fighting. Chehab

had verbalized his loyalty to Chamoun when asked, but indicated that he could not be sure of the Muslim soldiers' loyalty in all circumstances, especially against external forces.³⁹

The opposition was composed of political and revolutionary elements. The political opposition, comprised of Christian and Muslim leaders, disliked the internal policies of the Chamoun government and the Cabinet. Their interests centered around change through closer ties with Nasser and the U.A.R. The majority would readily accept Nasser's leadership, but generally, without communism. They were vehemently opposed to any move by Chamoun to seek a change in the constitution enabling him to seek reelection and serve another term as President. The revolutionaries were Christian and Muslim rebels armed by the U.A.R. and trained by Syrian advisors. They proposed change in the political structure in Lebanon and sought unity under the U.A.R. Communism was useful for those wishing to promulgate it but was largely used only as a source for material and training.⁴⁰

Step Three:

This step involves accessing each actors' power to pursue its interests. The following paragraphs discuss the elements of power each country had and was likely to use.

USSR

POLITICAL	NATIONAL	ECONOMIC	MILITARY	GEOGRAPH
<+>	0	+	+	<->
<+> MOST USABLE	+ USABLE	0 NEUTRAL	- VULNERABLE	<->MOST VULNERABLE

The Soviets political power was manifested in their support for the Arab Nationalist movement. This was an attractive way to covertly extend Soviet interests in the Middle East region. They condemned American interference in Lebanon's internal problems and termed the intervention "an act of aggression and expansionism" and demanded an immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces.⁴¹ The Soviets actively sought to force the U.S. to withdraw by gathering global support for such a measure in France and through the United Nations. Failing in these attempts they continued to frequently publicly criticize the intervention and, in written communications to President Eisenhower, compared it to a near act of war.⁴²

Economically, the Soviets had agreements in existence with Egypt and actively sought to provide economic aid and develop further trade relations within the region. The major source of aid was in the form of continued military equipment sales to Egypt and Syria. Additionally, advisors, training programs, and military assistance programs were in progress to sustain the equipment and improve military

facilities. They were building military power in the region with the objective of greater access to ports, base facilities, petroleum supplies, and expanding influence in the rear of their unfriendly southern border nations.

EGYPT/SYRIA

POLITICAL	NATIONAL	ECONOMIC	MILITARY	GEOGRAPH
$\langle + \rangle$ +		$\langle - \rangle$	+ +	
$\langle + \rangle$ MOST USABLE	+ USABLE	0 NEUTRAL	- VULNERABLE	$\langle - \rangle$ MOST VULNERABLE

Egypt and Syria enjoyed tremendous political and national power in the region resulting from the swell of Arab nationalism. President Nasser amplified the effectiveness of this political power through his relations with the Soviet Union. Additionally, in the eyes of nationalists, formation of the United Arab Republic reduced western influence and increased Arab self determination in world politics. Arabs in Lebanon relied on their association with this movement in hope of achieving their goals. Both Egypt and Syria had been involved in actively calling for Chamoun's removal through populous anarchy against the government in Beirut. A Cairo radio commentator, from the "Voice of the Arabs", condemned Lebanese acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine in a radio broadcast as "...an alliance with

aggressors against Egypt and the Arabs."⁴³ The stated inference was that cooperation with the U.S., an ally of Britain, France, and Israel, was obviously anti-Arab.⁴⁴

The military power of Egypt and Syria was of greater significance due to geography. Egypt had sufficient resources, obtained from the Soviets, to intervene in Lebanon. However, geographically direct intervention would threaten Israel and Jordan. Syria shared most of Lebanon's northern and eastern border and used this to threaten direct intervention. This would also directly threaten Israel and Jordan, therefore Syria limited support to rebels and nationalists to include military arms and advisors. Key logistic support was provided in the form of access to Syrian terrain which provided the rebels a secure rear area.

BRITAIN

POLITICAL	NATIONAL	ECONOMIC	MILITARY	GEOGRAPH
+	0	+	<+>	<->
<+> MOST USABLE	+ USABLE	0 NEUTRAL	- VULNERABLE	<-> MOST VULNERABLE

Britain's political power was strong in the region—especially in Jordan and Lebanon. Britain's power enjoyed the coalition with the United States with respect to the region and support of many other democratic nations.

Economic power was used extensively throughout the region. Jordan, and, to a lesser extent Lebanon, were receiving aid and Britain was willing and able to provide aid in all forms to protect her interest in the region. Britain had economic agreements with Israel and Saudi Arabia as well.

Britain's military power was strong and sufficiently mobile to conduct operations within the Middle East. Jordan provided bases and facilities from which an operation could begin or be sustained from. Additionally, Britain could probably rely on Israel and the U.S. for assistance in a military operation. Anglo-American planning had already outlined a combined plan for intervention within the region.

UNITED STATES

POLITICAL	NATIONAL	ECONOMIC	MILITARY	GEOGRAPH
<+>	0	+	+	<->
<+> MOST USABLE	+ USABLE	0 NEUTRAL	- VULNERABLE	<-> MOST VULNERABLE

The U.S. was the leading free democracy in the world and as a superpower through its alliances, agreements and defense treaties drew from a large global base of political support for the protection of basic democratic principles. The U.S. had emerged from WW II and the Korean conflict as a global protector of sovereign rights of nations. U.S.

association with Middle East regional treaties and North Atlantic Treaty Organization were the political forums that were used to further democratic principles throughout the certain regions. The U.S. was a signatory of the Tripartite declaration and also agreed to the principles of the Baghdad Pact. These defense agreements were aimed at protecting the neutrality and freedom of the Middle Eastern nations; which, simultaneously protect U.S. strategic interests in the region. The Eisenhower Doctrine was politically the most recent step to secure U.S. interests in the region by specifically preventing Soviet expansion into the region. The U.S. had the political support of Britain and France who also had significant economic and strategic interests in the region.

National will was a neutral element of power for the U.S. in this crisis. The nation was recovering from WW II and most recently the Korean Conflict and was not concerned largely with events in the Middle East. National thought revolved around communism as a threat of a nuclear third world war.

Economically the U.S. was a major world leader and had provided significant assistance throughout the globe to help nations rebuild from the damage of WW II. The U.S. had major economic programs with Israel and Lebanon especially, along with other Middle East nations to a lesser degree. The major aim of this aid was to improve human services and

living conditions and strengthen their organic internal defense capability.

Militarily, the U.S. was capable of deploying and employing forces in the Middle East. Geographically, the U.S. was vulnerable due to its global position; though, its forces possessed limited strategic naval and air deployment capability enabling reaction to a world crisis. The major capability to react to contingencies came from forward deployed forces in Germany and Korea along with basing rights and negotiated overflight rights which many contingency relied on for strategic deployment of U.S. forces. Additionally, in this crisis the U.S. had coordinated combined force operations with Britain in case of a crisis in Jordan or Lebanon.

LEBANON

POLITICAL	NATIONAL	ECONOMIC	MILITARY	GEOGRAPH
+	<->	0	<+>	0
<+> MOST USABLE	+ USABLE	0 NEUTRAL	- VULNERABLE	<->MOST VULNERABLE

Lebanon's political power came mainly from Chamoun's middle and upper class supporters, the Phalanges Party, and the Syrian Nationalist Party within the country. Additionally, both Chamoun and General Chehab believed in the fundamental process of their democracy to bring about change.

They were not eager to join the history of past coups and dictatorships prevalent in the past and present in numerous border governments. The predominately Christian Phalanges and Syrian Nationalist Parties (P.P.S.) feared assimilation under Nasser. The Phalanges were wary of the treatment of the native Christian Egyptians. The Syrian Nationalists desired a more moderate direction than offered by the Arab Nationalists. Chamoun also garnered great political power from the west whose interests were in regional stability through the continuation of democratic governments.⁴⁵

The military power in Lebanon totaled 6000 men under the command of General Fuad Chehab, himself a Christian. They were well equipped with American material and had demonstrated a limited capability to control damage to public buildings and keep Lebanon's International airport open in Beirut. Deliberately, they were not aggressively employed by Chehab against the rebels due principally to their Christian officer corps and Muslim enlisted soldier demography. In principal, and by specific training, soldiers were forbidden to belong to any political party or participate in internal politics of any kind. However, Chehab realized the difficult and sensitive religious issue and insured the Army was effective, but not overly aggressive against any particular sect or faction.⁴⁶

LEBANESE OPPOSITION

POLITICAL	NATIONAL	ECONOMIC	MILITARY	GEOGRAPH
<+>	+	<->	+	0
<+> MOST USABLE	+ USABLE	0 NEUTRAL	- VULNERABLE	<->MOST VULNERABLE

The political opposition consisted of several main elements. The first consisted of the Christian leaders and Muslim leaders, who disagreed with the internal activities of the Chamoun government. The second faction was the armed Muslim revolutionaries seeking to change the political structure of Lebanon and largely favored the U.A.R. and Nasser. They had political strength within the current ruling government, in active political parties, and in nationalist activists operating out of Syria from throughout the Arab community. Communism was a partner to this element-its material support was welcome but political direction was not. In addition to these elements Nasser was an avid supporter of the Lebanese Opposition and hoped to see it become the fourth member of the U.A.R.

Militarily, the opposition had the best of all worlds. For the most part, they lived, worked and planned within their homes without fear of harm from the military. Weapons were obtained from two sources: stolen from the government and obtained from Syria. They had more people than materiel but received substantial support in the form

of safe training locations, advisors, and logistical supplies from Syrian pro-Arab Nationalists. The greatest detriment to their gaining overwhelming strength was the constant fighting between neighborhoods of urban areas. Additionally, there was a significant segment of the opposition that was not engaging in violence against the government and even limited the violent occasions to prevent the destruction of their own society.

Chart III-1 below is a compilation of all actors and their power. Assessing the complimentary and conflicting power of both sides in the crisis will aid in determining possible strategy options, reaction to those options by the opposition and its allies and possible advantages to using the elements of power in some priority.

	USSR	EGYPT	SYRIA	BRITAIN	USA	LEB	OPPOSN
POLITICAL	<+>	<+>	<+>	+	<+>	+	<+>
NATIONAL	0	+	+	0	0	<->	+
ECONOMIC	+	<->	<->	+	+	0	<->
MILITARY	+	+	+	<+>	+	<+>	+
GEOGRAPH.	<->	+	+	<->	<->	0	0

<+> MOST USABLE + USABLE 0 Neutral - Vulnerable <-> MOST VULNERABLE

CHART III-1: MAJOR ACTORS VERSUS ELEMENTS OF POWER

Before drawing conclusions from the information illustrated in the chart, an understanding of the parameters used for analysis must be understood. The chart illustrates conditions that existed in Lebanon between May 1958 until the time of Presidential elections. In considering strengths, vulnerabilities and weaknesses between Lebanon and the opposition, greater weight is given for these internal actors and their power to influence the problem relative to those external to the issue. Grouping them together provides this focus. For example, the opposition political power value is greater than the Lebanese government's until Chamoun clarifies his intent on seeking reelection.

The previous discussion in Step Three highlights a situation dominated by the overwhelming power and conflicting interests between the USSR and U.S. Therefore, when determining likely objectives and policies which would assist in problem resolution, consideration must be given to USSR reactions and its impact on the Lebanon problem. President Eisenhower demonstrated this level of concern when he proposed the Eisenhower Plan, coordinated closely with our allies in planning BLUEBAT, and carefully conveyed in detail to President Chamoun the set of guidelines under which U.S. forces would become involved. The U.S. strengths, economic, political and military power can be applied through policy to enhance the Lebanese government and degrade opposition strengths. Chart III-1, identifies

geographic and national power weakness in both the U.S. and Lebanon. These weaknesses would be areas where policy and objectives are formulated to reduce the deficit in power. In this case the U.S. failed to strengthen these areas sufficiently by not mobilizing national support during the build up of aggression, failed to build a large logistic sustainment base for future use, and failed to secure early in planning the necessary overflight rights.

The identification of major actors and the assessment of each nation's power enables likely U.S. courses of action to be determined. These courses of action must be based on the actors' strategic interest in the problem and its outcome, power to influence the end, and likely intent on using national power to influence the outcome.⁴⁷

Step Four and Five:

SAM Steps Four and Five involve developing the United States courses of action or policy options and recommending a policy to deal with the crisis. The two steps will be combined in this section. Following a discussion of two alternative policy options developed as a result of this study, the policy implemented will be compared to U.S. objectives, values, and whether U.S. interests were achieved.

Once these policy options are developed each must pass completely the test for feasibility, acceptability, and

suitability. The basis in part of this analysis is U.S. interests, the constraints and the restraints guidance given by the National Command Authority. This guidance is also the basis for the development of the two alternative U.S. policy options presented. There were an infinite number of alternative options available, the two presented represent best possible alternatives based on historical information surveyed. The following paragraphs discuss the two alternative United States policy options which existed in 1958 and analyze the option chosen versus national objectives.

Policy options available to the United States must be viewed in the realm of both the length of time to employ them and long versus short term effects. The facts facing Eisenhower of past civil violence and proclaimed desire of U.A.R. members to remove Chamoun, necessitated the coup in Iraq be construed as possible preliminary action against Lebanon. This event certainly convinced Chamoun that rhetoric would be supported with action. Once this happened, lack of time and accurate information on the extent of external subversion made it difficult for the U.S. to properly assess the actual danger to the Lebanese government. Policy centered on using economic or political solutions demanded time and negotiations with nations increasingly hostile toward any western gestures. The military solution was not the consensus among all JCS or congressional leaders. Some were extremely concerned about the possibility of military failure, since hard facts were unknown concerning

the extent of external Syrian/Egyptian support. Additional concerns surfaced among policy planners regarding Lebanese Army and populous reaction to U.S. forces entering Lebanon. Chamoun's frantic request, specifying U.S. military forces and simultaneous request to Britain and France, placed the Eisenhower Doctrine ahead of other peaceful policy options. President Eisenhower could either deny military intervention and risk losing credibility with Chamoun or provide the forces and attempt to politically control the situation.⁴⁸

Based on the assessment of the actors and their power and interests, two alternative policy options have been developed irrespective of the one actually employed. These options coordinate the employment of the various elements of power, prioritize their integration and attempt to anticipate contingencies or variations in the crisis.

The first policy option was to avoid direct intervention (thus allowing the civil war in Lebanon to continue) while using political means to end the fighting. While not preparing military options to establish an active force in Lebanon, the U.S. would prepare for, and conduct, evacuation of Americans if necessary. The U.S. would also continue economic and military aid in the form of materiel and advisors. In addition the U.S. would continue to work within the United Nations and Arab League for a reduction of external subversion from Syria and attempt to utilize political

pressure to soften Nasser's frequent and vocal attacks urging the Lebanese to overthrow their government.

In the second option, the United States would immediately call for a cease fire and would request greater United Nations involvement in patrolling the Syrian border. The U.S. would submit a resolution condemning outside subversion by Syria, and together with support of pro-west Arab nations the U.S. would request a United Nations peace-keeping force be stationed in Lebanon. The United States, by stepping up pressure on the Soviets, would gain time that would allow Lebanon the freedom to exercise their political processes. The U.S. would increase economic aid and material assistance specifically for the police force and humanitarian supplies. Additionally, the U.S. would negotiate a summit conference between key government officials and all Lebanese party leaders to halt violence and hold free elections. During this proposed conference, it would be recommended that a meeting be held inviting all Arab countries to discuss Lebanese independence. Also it would be suggested that all countries cease supporting cross border subversion against the Lebanese government. Finally, the U.S. would plan for and conduct a non-combatant evacuation operation only when necessary and introduce U.S. forces only upon an invasion of Lebanon by an external force.

The first option was feasible but not acceptable nor suitable when viewed against agreements previously promised

by the U.S. to Chamoun. Furthermore, it did not meet the objective of protecting our interests in the region. Allowing the civil war to continue would severely threaten stability in the region and would not convey to the Soviets the seriousness with which we viewed our interests in the region. Since sustainment of the democratic Lebanese government was viewed as an important economic, social and political development which would embrace the west, the U.S. would lose credibility by ignoring Chamoun's urgent requests. The act of evacuating U.S. nationals would be admission of a severe crisis incapable of being controlled by the government. At this point, U.S. economic and military aid had enabled General Chehab to maintain the Army's capability to protect, but he had already indicated to President Chamoun that he could not guarantee their reaction in all circumstances. The Eisenhower Doctrine, along with other defense agreements, provided for U.S. intervention and Chamoun had, by July 10, 1958, met all the prerequisites established by President Eisenhower. By 4 July, the United Nations Observer Group had only been moderately successful in determining the extent of external subversion. Meanwhile, four radio stations, both inside and outside Lebanon, broadcasted provocative nationalists' messages, adding to the tension and violent atmosphere. Chamoun's announcement prior to the coup in Iraq had reduced the magnitude of violence, but following the coup, there was a renewed violent mood which swept the nation that this policy option would not meet.

The second option was suitable but not acceptable or feasible. It was suitable because it met the requirements of our interests and objectives based on the current situation. It would have largely been a political solution with continued economic support. The greatest risk was that the call for a cease-fire might not be acceptable to the nationalists in that they would gain little outwardly. The goal in achieving a temporary cessation of violence would be to defuse the coup in Iraq and prevent a renewed outbreak of violence and open war. So long as no further attempt from external sources were made in Lebanon, it would allow for communication between the government and the political party leaders and could lead to restrained violence. Additionally, it would involve Arabs in settling Arab matters which would be inviting to the nationalists but unnerving to the Christians. Greater U.N. involvement would pressure Syria to reduce their involvement on the surface and definitely reduce the tensions being felt by the Army after months of unrest. The Army was still in control, as much as they had ever been, and Chamoun had greatly diffused the internal situation by declaring publicly that he would not seek another term. The greatest single detractor to this policy was the element of time and the U.S. promise for assistance. Since Chamoun had been assured in May that, being unable to contain the situation, U.S. forces would be introduced upon his request, there was literally no more time to employ

these diplomatic efforts. A further multiplier of the critical time element was the lack of understanding how the coup in Iraq was associated with future events in Lebanon. The answers as to how that piece of the puzzle fit into the crisis in Lebanon could have been the element able to defuse the tenuous position Chamoun felt, and assist the U.S. in developing an alternative crisis policy.

In the end, the U.S. intervened with force to protect American nationals and help Chamoun's government restore order. Although militarily successful, this option was acceptable but not feasible or suitable. It was acceptable because the Lebanese government had requested the assistance and there was no further U.S. military action against border nations or even rebel positions close to Beirut. It was not feasible to protect a friendly government when there was outright civil war on going. The JCS had stated earlier in 1958 that forces probably would face a violent populous, communists insurgents and armed rebel factions, each with a different strategic aim. The force employed initially to conduct the operation was woefully inadequate to cope with any one of the threats if they had chosen to strongly oppose the landing. However, the presence of U.S. forces stabilized the operation, and by maintaining their neutrality, there was little hostility aimed toward them.

It was not acceptable to use military force in a situation where there were other options which could have

been employed. There was no external force attacking Lebanon, only Syrian advisors providing aid to Lebanese rebels, wanting a change in their government. Intervention was unacceptable because it did not follow our basic values and beliefs which encompassed using military power only as a last resort.

The fact that it was successful, was largely due to the way the operation was conducted by the commanders on the ground. "There had been no violence...no subversion of Lebanese constitutional processes...no counterrevolutionary invasion of Iraq; and, instead of remaining, American forces had withdrawn with dispatch and without conditions."⁴⁹

William B. Quandt in Force Without War, indicates that the major political effort was not employed in this crisis until after the intervention of forces by U.S. troops. Additionally he identifies a theme that the global and U.S.-Soviet conflict were of far more importance than the regional conflict in Lebanon. The fact was that there were no external units in Lebanon until the U.S. arrived and that the first report, although general, from the UN Observer group, indicated they could find no basis to substantiate Lebanon's claim of external subversives crossing from Syria into Lebanon.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER III

(1)U.S. DOD Historical Office Of The JCS Draft Manuscript, "Lebanon Crisis and After", N.D.: 422.

(2)W. K. Clark, "Military Contingency Operations: The Lessons of Political-Military Coordination," (MMAS Thesis, USA CGSC, 1975): 62

(3)Ibid., 62-63.

(4)Ibid., 63-64.

(5)Ibid., 67-68

(6)Ibid., 418.

(7)Ibid., 419.

(8)Ibid.

(9)Ibid.

(10)U.S. JCS, "Lebanon Crisis and After", N.D.: 460.

(11)Roger J. Spillar, "Not War But Like War:," The American Intervention in Lebanon, Jan 81: 4.

(12)Ibid., 421.

(13)Message from Sec of State to Beirut #3629, 18 March 58.

(14)Nassib S. Eid, "Lebanon in the Middle East Subordinate System," (MMAS Thesis, USA CGSC, 1983): 111.

(15)Ibid., 111.

(16)Spillar, Not War But Like War, Leavenworth Papers No. 3 (Jan 1981): 2.

(17)U.S. JCS, "Lebanon Crisis and After", N.D.: 422.

(18)Ibid., 423.

(19)Ibid., 424.

(20)Ibid., 427. This title CINCSPECOMME was assigned to designate the specified command responsibilities of the

office. The title was dropped in 1960, so CINCNELM, now designated the specified command duties of the office. I have used the original title throughout because it pertains specifically to actions of the Commander at this time.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Ibid., 430.

(23) Ibid., 330-337

(24) Ibid., 438.

(25) Ibid.

(26) Ibid., 435.

(27) Ibid., 339-441.

(28) Ibid., 441.

(29) Ibid.

(30) Ibid., 442.

(31) Ibid.

(32) Memorandum, J-3 to JCS, 31 Oct. 1958, Subject: A review of actions related to U. S. Military intervention in Lebanon. Washington, D.C.: 3.

(33) Ibid., 445.

(34) Memorandum, Deputy Director of Plans J-3 United States European Command to Director J-2 JCS, 17 Nov. 58, Subject: Chronology of Operation Bluebat, JCS, Washington D.C.: 4-10.

(35) Ibid., 4.

(36) Eid, "Middle East Subordinate System," :107-125

(37) Ibid., 108 & 134. Copt ("Gyptos" from the Greek "Aigyptos" which means Egyptian). They remained Christian within the Islamic empires which ruled Egypt.

(38) Ibid., 112.

(39) Message, CINCSPECOMME to JCS, 26 June 58.

(40) Eid, "Lebanon Subordinate System", 1983: 118-135.

- (41) U.S. DOD JCS, "Lebanon and After": 459.
- (42) Ibid., 464.
- (43) Eid, "Lebanon Subordinate System", 1983: 110.
- (44) Ibid., 110.
- (45) Ibid.
- (46) Ibid., 119.
- (47) CGSC SAM, Exact Title Unknown (P-511 Lesson 5),
Several Pages of Notes: 6.
- (48) U.S. DOD JCS, "Lebanon and After": 440.
- (49) DeNovo, American Foreign Policy: The Eisenhower
Doctrine, N.D.: 300-301.

CHAPTER IV

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1965

"The Dominican stabilization operation, like the Lebanon intervention of 1958, illustrated the use of rapidly reacting joint military forces to achieve limited political objectives."¹

Introduction

This chapter will cover the history of the United States' intervention in the Dominican Republic during April and May 1965. This period covers the overthrow of the Dominican government by a rebel faction of Dominican armed forces and the final arrival of U.S. forces. The historical data will be analyzed through the use of the SAM model as done in the previous chapter. Finally, the policy options available compared to the actual policy chosen, will be discussed.

Conclusions drawn from a comparison between U.S. involvement in Lebanon and Dominican Republic will be presented in Chapter V. Those interested in obtaining additional information regarding the military, political and social conditions surrounding this crisis should read: The Dominican Intervention by Abraham F. Lowenthal, Power Pack:

U. S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966, by Lawrence A. Yates, and finally, United States Military Forces in the Dominican Crisis of 1965, by Herbert K. Schoonmaker.²

History

The Dominican Republic was of vital interest to the United States for one major reason: location. The island, situated 700 miles southeast of Miami, with Cuba to its west and Puerto Rico to its east is strategically located near approaches to the Caribbean Sea and, more importantly, the Panama Canal Zone. U.S. concern over any foreign intervention in the region increased significantly after Castro's communist regime came to power in Cuba. Therefore, it wasn't surprising that President Kennedy took the opportunity to "press for political and democratic reforms"³ after the 1965 Dominican Republic leadership change.

In March 1961, President Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress -- an economic, social, and political development plan for Latin America (including the Republic). Two months later, Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican Republic dictator for 30 years, was assassinated by a group of army officers. Kennedy feared the establishment of another Castro regime; he desired to promote the establishment of a democratic government. Using the complete spectrum of U.S. national power, short of direct military intervention,

Kennedy successfully obtained elections and a constitutional government under Juan Bosch in February 1963. However, Trujillo's 30 years of dictatorship, noted for harsh rule and void of public opposition, had deposited little in the way of political structure in the nation. Bosch, after 24 years in exile, was able to publish a constitution but unable to address the severe social, political, and economic problems of his constituency despite overwhelming aid from the U.S.⁴

Conservatives, lead by Colonel Elias Wessin y Wessin, overthrew Bosch in September 1963. Backed by the military, coups leaders formed a civilian triumvirate. They promised free elections in 1965, banned Communist activities, and declared the constitution nonexistent.⁵ Disappointed with the failure of the democratic government, the U.S., itself in the midst of a Presidential assassination crisis, recognized the new triumvirate and appointed W. Tapley Bennett as Ambassador. Donald Reid Cabral (called Reid by sources), a moderate and previous foreign minister, emerged as the leader from what was now a two man triumvirate.⁶ The third member of the triumvirate resigned during this time.

Reid faced several potentially unsolvable problems given the time and the lineage of ills before him. His major problems were a high foreign debt, high unemployment, and low agricultural prices-- agriculture being the backbone

of the Republic's exports. Programs he implemented to solve these largely economic ills exacerbated the highly volatile factionalized populous who were more likely to remove the government than force it to solve the problems. A major budgetary cutback was implemented in the military budget, causing reduced promotions among the junior officers some of whom favored the more progressive policies of Bosch. In order to reduce the trade deficit he raised interest rates to reduce imports. This not only made money more expensive to borrow but placed a further strain on the majority who were agricultural dependent and suffering from a severe drought.

These reforms were received by most with contempt; especially disconcerting was his acceptance of economic aid from the U.S. The opposition, and some moderates, saw this as reducing Dominican's sovereignty and drawing them closer to dependence on the U.S. Throughout 1964 and 1965 Reid was able to remove some of the more outspoken and militant leaders in the police and military. He removed the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police chiefs who were remnants of the Trujillo regime, however, this further weakened his power base. Rumors of an attempted coup surfaced and Reid moved quickly. He dismissed seven junior officers who were plotting to reinstall Bosch to power.

Under the Bosch regime, the Dominican Popular Socialist Party (PSPD), the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), and the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) had

flourished. Together they totaled nearly 4500 well indoctrinated members along with 20,000 sympathizers. During the anti-communist period of the Reid government many of these communist leaders were either exiled from the country or went underground. While exiled, many received training in Cuba. By late 1964 and early 1965 some 45 had clandestinely reentered the Republic. The constitutionalists and the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), who had been attempting to reinstate Bosch, had contacted the communist APCJ and PSPD to assist in their attempt by a coup to reinstate Bosch. The communist had fared well during the Bosch regime and could see tremendous opportunity in reinstating Bosch.⁷

The coup began on 24 April when Reid sent Army General Marcos A. Rivera Cuesta to dismiss four junior officers that Cuesta had reported were plotting against the government. Instead, Cuesta unarmed, was arrested, and the conspirators quickly notified other anti-Reid leaders that the takeover had begun. Four members of the PRD quickly gained brief control of Radio Santo Domingo and broadcasted that the coup was under way. They urged to action all who were sympathetic to the constitutional cause. Supporters of Juan Bosch called for his return from exile and reinstatement. Rebel army soldiers, mainly junior officers and NCO's, quickly took charge of two military camps and issued weapons and ammunition to civilians, PRD members, and communists. Approximately two-thirds of the Army was in one form or

another joining the rebel officers. General Wessin hesitated to commit his forces against rebels when it appeared they would enter the town that night. He was waiting to see reaction from the Navy, Air Force, and determine which way the coup was heading.⁸

The police dispersed crowds at the Palace and police headquarters and reinforced their headquarters. Reid declared the coup had failed in a televised broadcast early Saturday evening. He urged the rebels to surrender the Army Chief and turn over the two captured installations they were holding by 5 A.M. Sunday. As a final demonstration of his perceived control, he cautioned civilians in the proximity of the rebel held installations that he would use force to retake the installations.⁹

Late Saturday night and into the early morning hours of Sunday the 25th, it became clear to Reid and the Assistant U.S. Ambassador Connett that the military loyalists were going to let the government fall. (Ambassador Bennett, eleven of the thirteen member U.S. military mission, the naval attache, AID mission director, and the public safety adviser, all who were part of the Embassy staff, were out of the country that weekend.)¹⁰ The rebel forces were set on bringing Bosch back and apparently the rebel military leaders were going to attempt to form a military junta until elections could be held. Connett's first messages to the State Department earlier Saturday had generally indicated that the attempted coup would probably fail. Neither he nor

the State Department had any real idea of the complexity of the events, the forming of factions, and the communists' frantic preparations that were taking place Saturday and early Sunday. Messages received early Sunday morning from Connett revealed the dire straits the Reid government was in, indicated that the rebels were prepared to fight and Reid was unable to control the situation.¹¹

Communist leaders, caught off guard by the coup starting earlier than planned, frantically worked to organize the people. Immediately, they set up headquarters within the city of Santo Domingo and gladly accepted the weapons released by the rebellious army officers. While the rebel army leaders and the loyalist army leaders were deciding what their moves would be, the communists quickly took the initiative to organize and legitimize their position through force and propaganda. To do this they utilized, leaflets, broadcasting, and political meetings to rally the people and organize their efforts.¹²

Early Sunday morning, rebel leaders in Santo Domingo took over the fire station and proclaimed their arrival through the wail of the siren. Throughout the early morning hours, pro-Bosch PRD members and rebel army soldiers emplaced positions around the city to prevent General Wessin or other loyal military elements from crossing the Duarte Bridge into the heart of Santo Domingo. Reid and his supporters were temporarily arrested by the PRD and detained in

the palace. Colonel Caamano Deno, one of the original rebellious army officers, along with other current and ex-high ranking military officers, established a military junta headed by Dr. Molina Urena. Urena, previously a member of the Bosch regime, was selected to lead the country until Bosch could be returned from Puerto Rico. Radio Santo Domingo announced this before noon on the 25th. Minutes later, a Santiago radio announced a statement by the Army, Air Force, and National Police commanders in the north region indicating they would support the Bosch constitutional government.¹³

Bosch's return to power was the next to last choice of the U.S. The last choice being total communist rule. Based on the communist elements gaining momentum in the coup, Connett and the State Department had both agreed the best choice, if Reid could not maintain power, was to support the move for a military junta around General Wessin and the loyalists. General Wessin just recently had been named Secretary of State for the Armed Forces. Wessin was an extreme anti-communist who played a key role in removing Bosch because of his refusal to actively halt communist activities.¹⁴

The formation of a Urena headed provisional government alienated the head of the Dominican Air Force, General de los Santos. He and General Wessin joined forces and told the Ambassador they would aggressively oppose the communists and the government of Bosch. Wessin established the anti-

rebel headquarters at San Isidro Air Force Base, located 25 miles east of Santo Domingo. His location was separated from the city by the Ozama River which was spanned by the Duarte River Bridge. The Republic's P-51 aircraft, along with Wessin's tanks and army, began to move against the rebel positions west of the Duarte Bridge. The city erupted into civil war, featuring P-51 attacks on the national palace and armor vehicles moving against the rebels in Santo Domingo. Rebels rounded up loyalists and summarily executed them. Anything representing past anti-Bosch sentiment was destroyed. Radio broadcasts announced the street addresses of loyalist officers. Aircraft pilots were now engaged in open attacks against rebel strongholds in the southeast portion of the city. The rebels and 3000 armed civilians controlled most of the city with the main areas of their stronghold being the center and southeast portions.¹⁵

As a result of the open warfare on Sunday, the U.S. Director of Caribbean Affairs, Kennedy Crockett, requested the Department of Defense send a naval force to the vicinity in case the situation called for the evacuation of 1200 Americans. JCS directed Commander in Chief Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) to prepare for the evacuation of U.S. nationals from Santo Domingo, based on a previous OPLAN. The Caribbean Ready Group, known as Task Group 44.9 commanded by Commodore James A. Dare, sailed immediately from vicinity of Puerto Rico and positioned themselves 30 miles off the

Dominican coast early Monday morning the 26th. Communications between the embassy and the ship were via an amateur radio operator. Even after the Marine radio equipment arrived at the embassy by helicopter, it was not powerful enough to transmit back to the ship.¹⁶

American and other foreign nationals had already begun to occupy the Hotel Embajador located in the west part of the city. On the 26th the embassy officially announced that all Americans should prepare for possible evacuation due mainly to the indiscriminate violence.

General Wessin had already made two requests for American assistance by the 27th. Both times he was told that there was little the U.S. could do until a cease fire was put in effect. Several times leadership from both the rebel military and the loyalists communicated with the embassy a desire to meet and establish a cease fire. These were really attempts to maneuver themselves into a better position either militarily or in hopes that the U.S. would join support for their side. At this point, the State Department's instructions to Connett were: obtain a cease-fire, urge both sides to form a military junta, and have elections in September. The embassy sought a cease-fire by informing all sides that the U.S. held all elements responsible for the safety and well being of the American nationals. A cease-fire would be necessary to evacuate the civilians, during which it was hoped a more permanent halt to the civil war could be attained. Intervention by U.S. forces

still was considered unwarranted and unwise in what was considered by all U.S. officials as a democratic revolution. The communist threat was acknowledged, but was not considered so prevalent to warrant the possible damage to Latin-American relations which direct U.S. intervention might cause.

The evacuation of 1000 foreign nationals to Puerto Rico via the Navy was executed without problem beginning at 1200 on Tuesday the 27th. Ambassador Bennett arrived at the Santo Domingo airport and was flown to the Admiral Dare's command ship Boxer. That afternoon the rebels were being attacked from the west and east by armored and infantry forces on the ground, strafed and bombed by the Air Force and bombarded by the Navy. Loyalist forces had joined forces to completely destroy the will of the pro-Bosch rebel soldiers and PRD members. The offensive broke the will of the rebel soldiers and later that day Urena, unable to stop the lawlessness or bring about a cease-fire, "announced he was unable to maintain order". He took refuge in the Colombian Embassy.¹⁷

The communist element of the PSPD were now largely in control of the remaining rebel officers and army personnel who had initially initiated the coup. They pursued a well organized campaign, arming those willing to abet the leftist aims. Col Francisco Caamano, one of the few main officers involved from the onset, remained with the rebels.

The Secretary General of the PRD, realizing the communist element was in control, publicly broadcasted over radio requesting the rebels to cease the destruction of the country. House to house fighting continued; Castro slogans and guerrilla warfare tactics were prevalent. The main problem now was that the communist organized rebels and civilians were well armed and supplied with tanks, bazookas and remained largely in control of the downtown area after the offensive by loyalists on the 27. On the Wednesday 28 April, the rebels under Caamano's leadership launched a major counterattack against General Wessin's loyalist forces using additional weapons they had taken from two police stations captured that morning. For the most part the rebels heavy armament and strong defense established from building to building stalled the loyalists in their efforts to regain control of the city. Despite the strafing by Dominican Air Force and broadcasts over the San Isidro radio that the mop up operation of the loyalists was about to begin, the police chief and Colonel Benoit knew better.¹⁸

Loyalists forces established a military junta on the 28 April with three military officers from each service. This was headed by Colonel Benoit. They immediately contacted the embassy and requested 1200 U.S. forces to help restore order to the country. Benoit told Bennett that the rebels had captured additional weapons and held the upper hand in the center of Santo Domingo. He was unable to control the situation or guarantee the safety of Americans

or other foreign nationals. At 1600 hours while the Ambassador was waiting for a reply from the State Department to his latest message regarding Benoit's request, Benoit presented a formal written request. The military junta was characterizing the revolution as being directed by communists as evidenced by the assassinations, destruction of private property, excess violence, and provoking statements over radio Havana urging the rebels to continue the fight. Benoit indicated that if the rebels were successful the Republic would surely be a second Cuba. Bennett's next message to Washington described the situation as deteriorating with the loyalist junta officers' morale broken and able to defend only a few key installations. Without assistance of the marines, neither safety of Americans nor prevention of a communist government could be promised. He suggested the marines be used to ensure the safe evacuation of foreign nationals from the Hotel Embajador and to augment the guard force at the embassy. Bennett's request for the additional Marines to protect Americans and other foreign nationals and to assist the loyalists in restoring order ended with his statement, "I recommend immediate landing."¹⁹

President Johnson authorized the landing of 500 marines almost immediately after receiving the message at 1730 hours. The mission was to protect the lives of Americans and other foreign nationals and to preserve the Dominicans' right to choose their own government. Their rules of

engagement were to return fire only when fired upon. These marines were used to provide additional protection for the American Embassy and the Hotel Embajador. Bennett had already landed a Marine platoon to assist with the evacuation prior to receiving the reply to his latest message. Additionally two Brigades of the 82nd Airborne Division were placed on alert.²⁰

As the communists continued to organize the fighting, the loyalists were further stifled in their attempts to rout the rebels again on Thursday. Low morale, poor communication, and desertion persisted. Now the loyalists had an estimated 2000 men. Rebel forces continued to attack several police stations throughout the city. Information on the actual situation within the city was harder to obtain since many of the original constitutionalist leaders had withdrawn from the coup frustrated by the communist domination and inability to control the events. Leadership in Washington took little time to act upon the latest information from Bennett and his assessment that the outcome was unsure and communist domination likely at this point. President Johnson decided to land the remaining 1400 Marines and within a short time approved the deployment of the already alerted 82nd Airborne Division. The first C-130s, containing the two battalion combat teams, landed at San Isidro Air Force Base outside Santo Domingo in the first hours of 30 April. During the period between 29 April and 14 May a total of 21,000 U.S. soldiers were involved in the operation.

Their mission, one of the first "stability operations" - a term coined by then Army Chief of Staff Johnson - was to reestablish peace and stability. The initial mission for the Marines was to establish a secure barrier between the rebel held portion of Santo Domingo, the Embassy, the foreign residence area, and the evacuation site. The 82nd was sent to reinforce the Marines and to protect Americans. However, it soon became evident through the geographic position of all elements, that the link up of the 82nd and Marines would take them through rebel held locations. The link up operation began with elements of the 82nd moving to cross the Duarte Bridge on the morning of 30 April. A cease fire was finally arranged between the rebels, lead by Caamaño, and Col Benoit on May 1, but there was continuing violence and casualties to both sides.

Based on a plan approved by the Organization of American States (OAS), which had been called on to mediate the situation by President Johnson on the 29th, U.S. forces would establish an International Security Zone. This would be a safe sector between rebels and general Embassy locations in Santo Domingo. The geographic problem this presented was due to the Marines being separated from the 82nd elements by rebel forces in the city. Additional forces were necessary in order to clear a corridor through the rebel held positions and then secure and hold this position. Despite the involvement of the OAS and notification of

Latin-American ambassadors of the initial troop landings, there was sufficient sentiment in the form of demonstrations and verbal reproachment of the American intervention. This delayed President Johnson from allowing the link up operation to proceed until 2 May. That night he publicly acknowledged that the U.S. was committing more forces to ensure that the Dominican Republic did not fall to the communists. The link up began on 3 May and was completed within a few hours.²¹

Before the withdrawal of U.S. forces began on 25 May, forty seven Americans had died (twenty seven in combat) and 172 were wounded. Arrival of the first OAS interim peace keeping force allowed the peace process to continue culminating in the establishment of a constitutional government with Garcia Godoy President on 3 September. More than 3000 Dominicans died in the fighting. In view of twenty years of peace and prosperity in a region known for turbulence, perhaps some good came of the event.²²

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1965
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS MODEL

Step One:

The statement that would best described the United States' problem in the Dominican Crisis was: how could the United States stabilize the political situation in the Dominican Republic, protect Americans and foreign nationals, and insure a non-communist government in response to the coup against the Reid government? The U.S. interests were multiple: preventing the formation of a communist regime, maintaining a stable government, and establishing a democratic government. The assumptions were as follows: if the Reid government failed and the rebel military did not have sufficient strength to sustain a prolonged fight, an interim or provincial government acceptable to both sides could be formed until elections could be held; and, the communist were not sufficiently organized nor strong enough to control the political outcome.

These were the initial assumptions under which both the Embassy (to include country team, MAAG, etc.) and the State Department planned. The assumptions regarding the power, determination, and capability to successfully achieve an interim settlement changed throughout time.

Step Two

The relevant actors in the Dominican crisis included the Organization of American States (OAS), the United States, the loyalists (Reid, loyal Armed Forces/Police), the constitutionalists (rebel soldiers, pro-Bosch, PRD), and the communists (APCJ, PSPD, MPD). While Cuba was certainly an actor and did possess power and interests, they were not a direct factor in the crisis.

The Organization of American States became involved in the crisis as a result of a meeting between representatives from Uruguay, Dominican Republic, and the U.S. on 27 April. As a result, an Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC) meeting was held the following day. At that time, information was presented indicating that General Wessin's loyalist forces would probably defeat the rebels by military force. The Dominican Ambassador made no specific request of the council. The following day, at a regularly scheduled meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States (COAS), the Dominican Ambassador reported loyalists had retaken Santo Domingo and that although communists were involved, a creation of a second Cuba had been averted. That night, 28 April, the U.S. advised the OAS Ambassadors of Marines landing in the Republic and requested a special meeting in the morning. Following a briefing on the situation, the Council dispatched a message to the Apostolic Nuncio (senior diplomat in the Republic) and requested that

he arrange a cease-fire. A U.S. proposal was adopted again calling for a cease-fire and establishment of an international safe-haven in Santo Domingo. A meeting of the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MFM) was opened 1 May. Two proposals were passed: one, a special committee of five nations would be flown immediately by the U.S. to survey the situation, and, two, an Inter-American Peace Force would be established. On 5 May, the Special Committee established an agreement entitled "The Act of Santo Domingo". This provided for a cease fire and established an International Safety Zone. The Special Committee, on 8 May, reported communist infiltration and the complete breakdown of law and order with ensuing significant danger to diplomatic missions and foreigners. Later, the OAS supported a proposal to form a Unified Command. This would assist the peace effort through the organization and emplacement of the Peace Force which enabled Americans to be withdrawn.²³

The main interests of the OAS evolved around a peaceful settlement, a cease fire, and self determination by Dominicans to choose their own government without communist domination.

The interests of the United States consisted of mainly preventing participation by communists in the governments of Latin American nations. This policy was viewed as the only way to protect the continental United States and preventing the communist threat from endangering the nation-

al security of the United States and its allies in the region. Additionally, the U.S. was determined to continue a policy of non-intervention and allow the region to develop governments friendly to the U.S.

Loyalists' interests consisted of preventing Bosch's return to power, establishment of a military junta followed by elections, and prevention of the spread of communist control in their government. They were not against Reid but moved indecisively at the onset of the coup in an attempt to understand how strong the anti-Reid sentiment was within the rebel military forces.

The fundamental interests of the Constitutionals entailed returning Bosch to power, improving economic health to economy, reducing corruption in the government, and providing previous status and promotion in the military.

The communists, although actually divided along three separate party lines, were drawn together by the desire to regain their ability to openly participate in the political process under Bosch's rule. Their interest chiefly enjoined with the PRD and other pro-Bosch activists to oust Reid. This gained them an opportunity to actively participate in the political process.²⁴

Step Three:

This step involved assessing each actors' power to pursue its interest. The five elements of national power

will be compared to each major actor identified in step two. Those elements of power which were usable and employed by the actor will be discussed as will the major element of power employed by the actor in the crisis.

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

POLITICAL	NATIONAL	ECONOMIC	MILITARY	GEOGRAPH
<+>	+	0	<->	+
<+> MOST USABLE	+ USABLE	0 NEUTRAL	- VULNERABLE	<-> MOST VULNERABLE

The OAS had considerable political power in the crisis mainly due to member nations. All were from Latin America and the Caribbean basin region which geographically, economically, and strategically placed them near the top of U.S. foreign interests. This was evidenced by President Johnson's immediate contact with the OAS and timely announcement to Latin American Ambassadors of Marines being sent into the Dominican. U.S. intervention with Latin America, being a volatile issue, had started soon after colonial America was established. As recently as 1964 there had been violence over flying flags in Panama, therefore throughout the crisis, LBJ's administration was constantly concerned with acceptance of the U.S. involvement. Beginning with the evacuation of Americans, attempts toward a peaceful settlement of the coup were sought through the OAS. Information concerning the employment of U.S. forces directly in the Republic was weighed heavily against the reaction

of Latin American governments and national populous. Conversely, the OAS assisted, through the geographic closeness of its members, in confirming direct communist involvement therefore elevating the crisis to a civil war. Communist involvement had been a key factor in determining U.S. policy strategy. The U.S. lacked concrete evidence which could be communicated to mold American public opinion. In addition, the Latin American countries made up a large bloc of members of the United Nations. This represented a potential international coalition with consensus with respect to U.S. actions.

Latin American nations' geographic power was related directly to their strategic location to the U.S. and position along major sea lines of communication. The U.S. needed these nations alliance to provide for security.

UNITED STATES

POLITICAL	NATIONAL	ECONOMIC	MILITARY	GEOGRAPH
<+>	<0>	+	+	+
<+> MOST USABLE	+ USABLE	0 NEUTRAL	- VULNERABLE	<->MOST VULNERABLE

Much like Lebanon in 1958, the U.S. in 1965 was the leader throughout the free world of all democratic nations in the attempt to stop the global expansion of communism. Regionally the Organization of American States which was

made up of nations throughout Latin America and the Caribbean were aligned in this political forum which the U.S. was also a part. The national will was still not a tremendous positive factor due to our initial involvement in Vietnam, however there was much greater concern among the American populous regarding communists expansion like that which had taken place recently in Cuba. Politically this was at the forefront of U.S. anti-communist policy in the Latin America and Caribbean basin. The U.S. considered any political communist gain in the region to be a direct threat to the security of the North American continent. This political attitude was shared in a majority of OAS member states but certainly not all considered Soviet aid via Cuba to be out of the question

Economically the U.S. was heavily involved in the Dominican economy and had been for over 50 years. The U.S. had attempted through a regional development policy developed and implemented under President Kennedy to greatly improve the standard of living and bolster the economy of the underdeveloped Latin American regions. The Peace Corps as well as large amounts of humanitarian aid were dedicated to this end beginning in the 1960's. The Dominicans relied on the U.S. for economic trade support and were heavily indebted to the U.S. The U.S. was largely responsible for the improvement of Dominican armed forces and many improvements throughout the urban areas.

Militarily and geographically the U.S. considered defense of any Latin American nation and the build up of organic military capability in the region as the first line of defense to communist expansion. The U.S. was capable of employing forces throughout the region and was determined to do whatever necessary including direct force intervention to insure the communist gains in Cuba were not repeated in the U.S. geographical back yard.

LOYALISTS

POLITICAL	NATIONAL	ECONOMIC	MILITARY	GEOGRAPH
<+>	<->	0	+	0
<+> MOST USABLE	+ USABLE	0 NEUTRAL	- VULNERABLE	<->MOST VULNERABLE

The loyalists' political power emanated from the commanders of the Air Force, Army, later Navy, and U.S. All whose political interest was establishment of a non-communist (anti-Bosch) government. The military leaders were chiefly anti-communists which provided them overwhelming U.S. support. Available information indicated there did not appear to exist a strong anti-communist sentiment among the populous except for those loyal to these military leaders. The strongest sentiment among the populous was anti-Reid. Therefore, the loyalists' political power was directly proportional to the military force they could bring to bear on the rebels and pro-Bosch supporters. Loyalists' power,

military and political, except for the U.S. support, degenerated throughout the crisis due to the extreme violence, armament, and organized resistance provided by the communists lead rebels.

Their greatest chance for a political junta solution was during the first few days of the coup. After that point, only a military defeat would bring them to negotiate, in view of the strength of communist organized groups. Since their objective centered mainly on insuring Bosch, and therefore communism, did not flourish again, they would have accepted most peaceful interim government solutions.

CONSTITUTIONALISTS

POLITICAL	NATIONAL	ECONOMIC	MILITARY	GEOGRAPH
+ <+>		0	+ <->	
<+> MOST USABLE	+ USABLE	0 NEUTRAL	- VULNERABLE	<-> MOST VULNERABLE

Due to the dislike for Reid and his policies, political and national power dominated in this crisis. The constitutionalists had an important focal point: return Bosch to power. Most felt he had been removed unlawfully by the military during his "constitutional" reign. Their political objective was restoration of previous economic and political freedoms.

Constitutionalists' military power gave them the

ability to sustain their fight. As the information regarding several attempts to obtain a cease-fire indicates, Americans failed to realize their ability to succeed in reinstating Bosch by maintaining the upper hand militarily. However, once the coup had escalated to open civil warfare, many of the PRD leaders, pro-Bosch supporters, and rebel Army officers withdrew; their objectives did not involve destruction of the city and the total lawlessness that existed.

COMMUNISTS

POLITICAL	NATIONAL	ECONOMIC	MILITARY	GEOGRAPH
<+>	0	0	+	<->
<+> MOST USABLE	+ USABLE	0 NEUTRAL	- VULNERABLE	<-> MOST VULNERABLE

Communist Party leaders and members used the coup to move to bring Bosch back as conduit for their political efforts and aims to establish a pro-communist government. Their objective was to further their ideals through Bosch, whom they had prospered under in earlier time. The Communists knew Bosch was also a pro-communist acceptable to the U.S.

Since the majority of the people were in favor of a coup, communist military power grew quickly following the capture of weapons and ammunition. The willingness to fight

loyal military and police forces was easily exploited. The organized groups, training, and propaganda operations conducted by the communist groups were chiefly responsible for their ability to sustain the fight; specifically, the use of Radio Santo Domingo, publication of newspapers, flyers, and local neighborhood meetings. Many of the people, whether directly fighting or not, were within the center of rebel held territory. The only news they heard was what the leftists wanted them to hear. Since the rebels controlled the phone service and power station as well, they represented the local governing body.

Chart IV-1 is a compilation of the data derived from the previous charts and discussion. The power values represent conditions that existed between 24 and 30 April. This is necessary to remember because crisis situations cause dynamic shifts in power and the actors will and likelihood to employ such power changes.

	OAS	LOYALIST	U.S.	CONSTITUTIONALIST	COMMUNIST
POLITICAL	<+>	<+>	<+>	+	<+>
NATIONAL	+	<->	<0>	<+>	0
ECONOMIC	0	0	+	0	0
MILITARY	<->	+	+	+	+
GEOGRAPH	+	0	+	<->	<->

<+> MOST USABLE + USABLE 0 Neutral - Vulnerable <-> MOST VULNERABLE

CHART IV-1: MAJOR ACTORS VERSUS ELEMENTS OF POWER

Step Four and Five

As in the earlier example, SAM Steps Four and Five have been combined in the following paragraphs of this section. The development of alternative policy options will be based on information that was known to policy makers at the time of the crisis. Alternative strategy options developed as a result of this study, will cover the entire spectrum of time beginning at the onset of the coup 24 April until the link-up operations conducted by the Marines and 82nd Airborne Division. Finally, only two alternative policy options will be presented, as there are an infinite number possible. These plus the one actually employed will be evaluated against the acceptability, feasibility, and suitability criteria.

The two alternative policy options developed plus the option chosen, were formulated to enable the U.S. to obtain national objectives. The objectives as stated by the State Department were more than one: protection of American lives, creation of a cease fire between all belligerents to allow negotiations, and allowing Dominican people to decide their form of government. A government nearest in form to democracy was preferred, without any communist leadership or influence. In keeping with administration policy, "...no second Cuba."²⁵

The first alternative policy option would have been

to state clearly at the onset of the coup that the U.S. would not intervene or become directly involved, either diplomatically or militarily, unless both loyal military and rebel pro-Bosch leaders requested U.S. assistance. The intervention would only come after a cease-fire had been agreed to by both sides. When it appeared the situation might lead to conditions that would endanger Americans and other foreign nationals, the U.S. would immediately evacuate them prior to the escalation of fighting if possible. The U.S. would aggressively seek a cease fire settlement through the OAS. Upon learning of concrete evidence of communist involvement, the U.S. would submit the information to the OAS and request they immediately send an Inter-American Peace-Keeping Force (IAPF). The objective of the peace-keeping force would be to maintain the cease-fire in effect if necessary by establishing a security zone separating combatants. They would have sufficient strength to maintain the post cease-fire conditions; upon the outbreak of anything greater than sporadic violence, the IAPF would be evacuated. The U.S. would clearly outline to the U.N. the extent of communist subversion and seek passage of a resolution condemning the external involvement of Cuba in the Republic's internal affairs. The U.S. would provide increased surveillance of airspace and coastal waters surrounding the island and quarantine shipments of war material going into the country. Failing the establishment of a

cease-fire, the U.S. would cease shipment of military equipment and withdraw diplomatic and military personnel until one could be established.

This policy was suitable and feasible but not acceptable because it did not meet the U.S. objective of stability in government and ensuring the establishment of a non-communist government. It was suitable in that it clearly sets the U.S. as non-aligned with either party, thus allowing the Dominican people to choose their own government. Although not known at the time, the rebels, who were in control of the phone service, monitored the conversation between warring leadership of both sides and the embassy personnel. Even though embassy personnel declared U.S.'s neutrality, the rebels monitored conversations which indicated otherwise. Whether or not the U.S. was pro-loyalist was unclear; what was certain from these monitored conversations was that the U.S. was anti-Bosch. This probably made chances of an early cease-fire less likely since this incriminated any pro-negotiation as communist inspired; as well as making it more difficult for moderate PRD leaders to gain consensus from more radical elements to negotiate. Clearly, they understood that the U.S. wanted a military junta and not a Bosch government. U.S. diplomatic efforts were certainly feasible as the embassy had become the focus of all communication between rebel and loyalist leaders. If the U.S. had dealt with Urena from increased neutral perspective in the beginning it is likely that the minimum

result would have been a negotiated cease-fire. But the U.S. favoritism handed communist leaders and extremist PRD elements additional reason to escalate and not negotiate. During the negotiation process, anti-communist pressure could be enhanced from the Dominican military leaders and within the Republic itself as well as through the OAS to prevent any major communist participation in the new Dominican government. This would have hastened a peaceful negotiated settlement preventing escalation and the retribution that followed the cease-fire (due to the massive indiscriminate violence). The quarantine was certainly feasible when combined with increased intelligence gathering efforts which would help provide proof of external subversion by communist elements and support by Cuba. This would assist the U.S. by proving communist involvement and mobilize U.S. and other democratic countries national will as well as build a consensus in the U.N. and OAS.

The second option would be to strongly condemn the coup once it began and support Reid -- informing the rebel leaders that the U.S. would directly intervene both militarily and diplomatically to assist loyal officers to Reid, or, to assist in the orderly transfer of the government without violence. The U.S. would set in motion their recommended actions: a demonstration of a carrier battle group off of the Republic; the evacuation of foreign civilians before hostilities erupted; urging Reid and the loyal offi-

cers, together with the rebels, to set a date for elections and offering assistance in achieving that end; a continued build up of economic aid and military equipment for the loyalists; and, preparation for direct military operations if necessary to prevent hostilities until the elections.

This option is feasible but not suitable or acceptable. This would promote a more controlled environment from which to begin negotiations. Clear U.S. support would cause those moderates to decide which way they were going to go: with the rebels or stay with the loyalists. Intervention with or without Reid's request, unless, unquestionable proof of a communist dominated coup, would draw serious international anti-American public opinion, violate U.S. non-intervention agreements with the OAS, and generally alienate nations towards the U.S. throughout the region.

The policy option chosen was to allow the coup to take its course, without U.S. supporting Reid. The U.S. urged the loyal military to form a junta and provide for elections with the hope that this would be acceptable to those desiring a Bosch government. Elections would allow Bosch plus other candidates to run and possibly provide more acceptable candidates to the U.S. as well. Soon after the coup started, it became clear that the rebels were willing to fight to ensure the return of Bosch. In contemplating the aggressive actions of the rebels, the State Department went as far as to consider urging the return of Bosch; but held short when they realized that there was increased

evidence of communist involvement with the PRD. They remembered the unalterable hatred the loyalist military commanders had for communist freedoms during the previous Bosch regime. The U.S. position quickly moved from a crisis with two favorable U.S. choices (military junta versus Bosch), with only the rebels threatening violence, to one of all out confrontation, as there was no viable solution to satisfy either side. Both Lowenthal and Yates refer to several meetings on the 27th in the embassy between Bennett and rebel leaders who were seeking assistance in obtaining an end to the successful ground and air attack by the loyalists. Bennett, believing that a loyalist victory was near and unaware of rebel knowledge of U.S. anti-PRD policies thus far, used this meeting to attempt to further illustrate the futility of continued fighting. The increased loyalist's gains together with increased communist involvement would surely force the rebels to stop fighting. In these authors' opinions, this possibly could have represented a missed opportunity for a negotiated cease-fire between the two sides. Instead, following the meeting, Urena and other key rebel leaders withdrew from the coup, allowing communist organizers to gain greater control of the armed Dominican populous and to escalate the fighting. However, according to both authors, the communists, irrespective of the involvement of the rebel leaders, had sufficient armament and manpower to sustain themselves whether or not a cease-fire

had been agreed to by both sides. Certainly it is unquestionably short sighted to dash the hopes for the agreement of a cease-fire even if it doesn't work. However, it doesn't seem likely that the cease-fire agreement would have significantly altered the violence or U.S. force involvement. By this time, the leftists were directing the battle.²⁶

The option chosen appears to meet the entire spectrum of tests: acceptability, feasibility, and suitability. However, force intervention likely resulted more from having no other choice except to ignore U.S. interests and deny the Republic request for assistance at that point. U.S. intention was to remain neutral; however, this was probably the one area violated by embassy officials. "Neutral" somehow included "guaranteeing" that the communist would not be a part of any negotiated solution. The guidance from the State Department was to first, support a military junta, then, when things got out of hand, to consider Bosch. Finally when it was impossible to end the war and there was considerable question to whether it was about to become an overall leftist victory, the U.S. would use force to separate the combatants. The option appeared sound, though the execution somewhat flawed in relationship to remaining neutral, conducting an evacuation, and avoiding direct contact between U.S. soldiers and Dominicans. The U.S. forces would enable the safe evacuation of civilians, protect embassy, and later establish at the request of the OAS,

an International Security Zone. In the process of establishing an international security zone there by separating the two combatants, U.S. forces directly confronted rebel forces.

U.S. forces were introduced when requested by the military junta. The junta believed they would be used to assist in final destruction of the rebels. But the reasons given to the U.S. public, were that they would be used to assist in the evacuation of civilians and to support the marines already on the island protecting the embassy. At this point, the use of military force was consistent with U.S. stated aim of not directly confronting rebel forces.

However, following the signing of the cease-fire agreement 30 May, which included boundaries for all elements and prohibited U.S. forces from operating in rebel territory, the military commanders realized establishment of the ISZ under the current boundaries would leave rebel held territory dividing the marine and army forces. Information does not reveal if there was an attempt to negotiate reset boundaries with the rebels based on the OAS ISZ requirement. Instead, a combat operation to enable the U.S. army and marine forces to establish a corridor which would link them was executed. Although tactically sound this brought U.S. forces in direct contact with rebel forces, which violated U.S. initial intentions and was not in keeping with lessons learned on using military force to achieve political end as

in Lebanon. Again this cast U.S. forces as a threat to the PRD not as a peace-keeping force and the execution of a combat operation further displayed the use of force as a method of achieving an end to U.S. interests not in the light of a force sent to restore order.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER IV

(1) Herbert G. Schoonmaker, United States Military Forces in the Dominican Crisis of 1965, (Dissertation, University of Georgia, 1977): IV.

(2) Abraham F. Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 1972. Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966, 1966. Herbert K. Schoonmaker, "United States Military Forces in the Dominican Crisis of 1965", 1977.

(3) Ibid., 1-4.

(4) Ibid., 7-11

(5) Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966, 1988: 17.

(6) Ibid., 14-18.

(7) Kesaris, Crisis in the Dominican: NSC, The communist Role in the Dominican Revolt, (Director of Intelligence, Memorandum, 7 May 1965): 3-15.

(8) Kesaris, Crisis in the Dominican NSC, 1982: 7.

(9) Lowenthal, Dominican Intervention, 66-68.

(10) Ibid., 22-24.

(11) Kesaris, Crisis in the Dominican, NSC, 1982: reel 6.

(12) Kesaris, Paul, ed. Crisis in Panama and the Dominican Republic: National Security Files and NSC Histories, (reel 5) 1982. (Hereafter, Crisis, NSC.)

(13) Lowenthal, Dominican Intervention, 70-74.

(14) Kesaris, Crisis in the Dominican, NSC, 1982: reel 6.

(15) Ibid.

(16) Yates, Power Pack, 38-42.

(17) Kesaris, Crisis in the Dominican, NSC, 1982: reel 6.

(18) Kesaris, Crisis in the Dominican, NSC, 1982:
reel 6.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Lowenthal, Dominican Intervention, 1972:95-102.

(21) Yates, Power Pack, 85-99.

(22) Ibid.

(23) Kesaris, Crisis in the Dominican, NSC, "Action
of the Organization of American States in the Dominican
Republic", 1982: p. 1-14, reel 6.

(24) Kesaris, Crisis in the Dominican, NSC, "Memoran-
dum, Communist Role in the Dominican Revolt", May 1965: 1-
21, reel 6.

(25) Yates, Power Pack, 1988: 18.

(26) Ibid.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions will be the result of an individual analysis of each case study addressing the questions set forth in Chapter 1. Comparing the conclusions from the use of U.S. military power to attain political objectives in both Lebanon and Dominican Republic will yield some answers for determining if there were other strategies possible using alternative elements of national power. A key question which will be answered is did the use of military power in each crisis achieve long term U.S. goals of promoting freedom, ensuring democratic institutions, providing stability, and assuring the security of U.S. interests in the region? If the answer to this question is negative, then one should ask how long term goals could be better accomplished.

This study has highlighted the events which shaped the formulation of national strategy during the two crises. Comparing the two crises illustrates some ideas useful in purposing ideas to enhance future strategy selection. This study, in the historical summaries of each operation, has revealed many lessons; some which should not be repeated.

A major lesson learned after comparing these two crises is that the formulation of long term U.S. national strategies is lacking at best--lacking a reasoned, methodical approach to crisis resolution at the strategic level. To work to resolve future crises, through this type approach, would enable the U.S., through the integration of all elements of national power, to achieve national objectives while attempting to avoid the use of military power as the favored or sole option in future crises.

It is much simpler to evaluate the facts today and determine what should have been done or what might have been done differently in the crises in this study. The work of many historians, each having investigated a specific area of these crises, has revealed an exacting microcosm of events which were ongoing simultaneously. At the time, these events yielded unclear information to the player participants. The result of acting on unclear information has been highlighted--it goes without saying that it only exacerbates the problem and can end in failure to achieve national objectives.

Lebanon: Update, Analysis and Conclusions.

When comparing long term versus short term affects, the U.S. intervention in Lebanon had two very different results. In the short term, the introduction of U.S. forces achieved the political aims of protecting American

nationals and preventing (if there ever was going to be a coup) the overthrow of a government friendly to the U.S. The good news is that this was done with the cost of few human lives. The effect achieved was what President Eisenhower intended all along--the entire globe, but specifically the Soviet Union and the U.A.R. (the targets of his policy), was visibly shown that the U.S. would protect its vital interests. Since there was no invading force threatening Chamoun's government, the overwhelming number of U.S. forces deployed surely had a sobering effect on the opposition, as well as supporters of Lebanon's government. Immediately following this use of force, U.S. special envoy, Robert Murphy, held meetings with each rebel leader to convey the purpose of U.S. intervention and lay the foundation for free and democratic elections involving all parties.¹ During this time, the military displayed exceptional restraint in avoiding activities which would favor either side.

These factors led to a passive acceptance of U.S. soldiers on Lebanese soil and presented credibly that the U.S. was not simply interested in a Lebanon with Chamoun, but a Lebanese democratic government chosen by the Lebanese people. Finally, the last significant event surrounding the use of force in Lebanon was the U.S.'s early withdrawal once elections were held and the initial crisis situation stabilized. This greatly assisted in diffusing Soviet and U.A.R. supporters' anti-American verbal assaults. They had labeled the U.S. use of force as nearly an act of war and

viewed the intervention as an attempt by the U.S. to gain control of the situation in Lebanon by legitimizing a puppet government favorable to western views. However, the early withdrawal of U.S. troops demonstrated the belief that the Chehab government could handle the difficult task of uniting the many factions and assuring at least basic human rights for all Lebanese.

The bad news is that in the long term, the use of force did not pave the way for a pro-west regime in Lebanon. Shortly after Chehab's election as president, the Prime Minister of Lebanon denounced the Eisenhower Doctrine.² There was still not peace among the many Lebanese factions--a real peace does not exist today. Some of the same problems causing near civil war in a country where U.S. forces have now been deployed to twice, remain today. In Lebanon there exists an ongoing civil war; Arab Christians fighting Arab Moslems and religious factions fighting among themselves. Further complicating the situation in Lebanon is the involvement of Syria, Iran, Israel, and the Palestinians each with their own interests, some complimentary, others conflicting--evidence supreme that further introduction of U.S. military forces with additional competing interests would probably not create conditions for lasting peace.

There were alternative policy options available in July 1958 such as those outlined in Chapter III. These were

more in keeping with U.S. principles of relying on other elements of power to secure interests. Unless historical facts can judge that the use of U.S. forces in a crises was the only alternative available, then the U.S. has not achieved its goal of using military force as a last resort to protecting its interests.

What was achieved by the redeployment of U.S. marines in 1983? Was the outcome significantly different in 1958 versus 1983? History will only tell, but on the surface, it appears not much has changed nor is it likely to. The U.S. cannot expect to achieve long term solutions to complex regional problems through the use of force. Although the use of military power may achieve short term objectives, the result of U.S. military involvement in Lebanon 1958 as well as in 1983 indicates military power may not produce long term effects which protect U.S. interests. The U.S. then must learn how to establish, and maintain, long lasting strategies that maximize the use of all elements of national power to achieve strategic ends for the long term.

Dominican Republic: Update, Analysis and Conclusions.

The Dominican Republic crisis in April 1965, shares with Lebanon (1958 and 1983) as well as Grenada (1983) some of the same affects of the use of military force. The containment of communism in 1965 was of even greater concern

for the U.S. in its decision cycle because of recent events in Cuba. Like Lebanon, the crisis in the Dominican Republic highlighted dissatisfaction of the populous with the government. Admittedly, in the Dominican crisis, time and strong aggressive leadership by Cuban trained Communists, created an uncontrollable civil war. Unlike Lebanon, a key factor which enabled the crisis in the Dominican Republic to go beyond the capability of the loyalist Army forces to triumph, was the split of the Armed Forces. The Reid government relied on the Dominican Armed Forces to remain in political control. The lack of their immediate support for the government, due to their indecisiveness, caused the crisis to escalate. This is the point when the U.S. political decision not to support Reid or Bosch gave the communist time to gain control of rebel elements. This led to an escalating situation where the only choices were to allow the civil war to continue, and risk a communist government, or introduce U.S. forces to take control of the situation.

Regardless of which decision was chosen, the lack of U.S. neutrality prevented a negotiated early settlement. The overwhelming concern among U.S. policy makers at the time was that the Dominican Republic did not become a second Cuba. This concern clouded facts surrounding events and prevented any clear, cohesive and coordinated use of all elements of power to bring an early peaceful settlement to the crisis.

Information indicated that American embassy officials decisions were being guided by the perception that the rebels, including the PRD, were almost totally communist controlled. Officials believed the only way to achieve a peaceful, noncommunist settlement was through a victory by the loyalists. The overriding factor remains that the U.S. approached this crisis with the preconceived notion that a Bosch regime represented communist rule and was therefore unsatisfactory. Although there existed CIA information which indicated coordination between the rebel coup and the communist trained leadership, there was no strong evidence suggesting that a return of Bosch would have increased the level of communist activity beyond that which had previously existed during his regime.³ This left formation of a military junta, followed by elections, the only acceptable alternative to the U.S. Unknown to the ambassador at the time, the U.S. embassy position was compromised by rebel tapped phone lines. Since the rebels knew the U.S. supported the loyalists and were anti-PRD, the effectiveness of embassy personnel and the ambassador in negotiating an early peaceful solution was further reduced.⁴

When the loyal military forces finally decided to move against the Bosch supporters, they requested communication equipment from the U.S. This equipment was initially refused by the State Department in a desire to remain neutral. This delay gave the communists critical time to continue to organize violent support. A civil war incapable

of being controlled by initial coup leaders followed. It is not clear that any individual had the capability to stop the snowballing events once initial coup leaders withdrew. However, information reviewed clearly indicated that the lack of neutrality by the U.S. embassy personnel during the crisis, coupled with the preconceived notions of Bosch's communist association, caused the U.S. to attempt to achieve a political solution which was not favorable to the majority of either side. Simply attempting to successfully end the crisis peacefully should have been the goal of the U.S.

The short term effect of U.S. force intervention in the Dominican Republic was not as successful as in Lebanon when measured in terms of continued violence. This was due to the lack of coordination and planning in establishing the political end the military was supposed to achieve. When the cease-fire was signed on the 1st of May, the military was not a part of the decision to make the boundaries for the international safe zone between the rebels and the loyalists. This agreement separated the Marines and the 82nd Airborne Division by rebel held territory. Another part of the agreement excluded movement of U.S. forces into rebel territory. The link up operation initiated by U.S. forces cut the rebel territory in half, causing a violation of this agreement and clearly demonstrating U.S. anti-rebel sentiment. Admittedly, this did split and encircle the rebels, making any further attempts to escalate the fighting nearly

impossible, thus forcing them into a position where negotiation was the only choice. It also resulted in American forces fighting against the Dominican rebels which did not demonstrate U.S. professed high priority for a peacefully negotiated settlement without further violence. Possibly a negotiated boundary change could have resulted in the need for less direct confrontation of U.S. and rebel forces with fewer casualties on both sides.

The diplomatic measures employed by the U.S. in hopes of legitimizing its use of military force had some positive effects. However, this was done mainly to soften the global and Latin American public criticism of another case of American involvement in the region, rather than a genuine interest in peacefully solving the situation early. To this end, the U.S. presented its case to the OAS during the early stages of the coup. The greatest benefit of this diplomatic move was the OAS commission verifying communist involvement during its visits to the area. This impartial and regional commission finding added tremendously to the legitimacy of U.S. involvement. This could now be used as a basis for deploying greater numbers of soldiers and as the reason for U.S. involvement (as publicly released by the President). The establishment of the International Security Zone and the rapid deployment of Inter-American Peace Keeping force greatly assisted in the negotiation process and helped reduced the amount of bloodshed during the post cease-fire period.

Including representatives of all parties in negotiating the cease-fire and involving the OAS Peace Committee in forming the eventual democratic government were events largely responsible for enabling the process to culminate on 3 September with a provisional government headed by President Garcia-Godoy. Although the U.S. continued to play an important political role in this process, it was largely done through the Inter-American Peace Force and the OAS Peace Committee. Throughout this turbulent period, until June 1966 when Godoy held elections, the IAPF and OAS Peace Committee worked through strenuous negotiations between the two opposing sides. Both sides were angered over the cruel violence which had marked the initial fighting. The end result of negotiations was a democratic government inaugurated on 1 July with a twelve member cabinet, largely representative of the Dominican peoples' choice.

Conclusions

Comparing the results of these two crises provides lessons which can be applied to future crises. The first lesson is that the U.S. should not use military force as its sole measure to achieve long term goals. The use of force should be exercised as a last resort after all efforts involving the use of all other elements of power have failed to achieve national objectives designed to protect U.S. interests. The objective for policy makers is to refrain

from using military force by developing a long term strategy which protects U.S. interests through the integrated coordination of U.S. national power. The second lesson is that when the crisis demands the application of military power to achieve political ends, then the size of the force must be far superior to any known conventional threat. The employment must not favor one side over the other and immediate negotiations must involve participation by all parties. This will ensure the best possible formula for a continued peaceful resolution to the crisis.

To avoid the need to use military power to solve a crisis, the U.S. must formulate long term coordinated policies integrating U.S. interests and power with those of the host nation(s). This should focus decisionmakers on the development, deployment, and employment of U.S. power elements as the means to achieve long term objectives by way of a national strategy consistent with the requesting nation(s) values, economy, and social and political structure. The focus must not only be on U.S. solutions to enhance U.S. interests, rather the objectives must be planned to support the host's interests. Since the use of military power to achieve strategic ends has demonstrated relatively short term effects, the U.S. must not focus on dictating solutions, but rather implementing other elements of power to protect its interests.

The U.S. use of force in Lebanon, 1958 while successful in the short term, created no better environment to protect U.S. interests in the region. In 1983, the U.S. returned there once again with an unclear mission to achieve unclear political objectives--we lost 241 USMC soldiers. Today the civil war continues involving the same actors and situations which were evident then. Since the U.S. involvement in Korea in 1950, in Lebanon 1958, in Vietnam 1963-1975, in Dominican Republic 1965, in Grenada and in Lebanon 1983, there has largely existed uninterrupted low intensity conflict in many of these regions. This has caused the U.S. to execute military operations short of war, involving many of the same actors and situations which were evident in the operations this paper concentrated on. No amount of military involvement by either superpower in today's fracture zones created by global political environments, will force an end to the strife in these regions. Revisiting the SAM, we ask ourselves "what is the problem for the U.S. in the region (Step 1)?". The answer is the same as in 1958. It's when we get to SAM Steps 4 and 5 that we ask "what do we do about it and how?". The problem is, does the U.S. again rely on the quick military solution without focusing on a long term integrated use of national power?

The long period of relative peace following the Dominican crisis is not the result of the use of force but rather the result of U.S. political and economic support.

U.S. military operations had an immediate short term effect of overwhelming both sides through the large force deployment. This created conditions favorable for negotiating a cease-fire. But the stabilizing force in the form of the IAPF and OAS Peace Committee continued to combat with and without the use of force the regressions to violence which continued throughout the period until free elections. The long term effect did not halt communist activities locally or throughout the region. The communist party is legally recognized by the Dominican's democratic government and is prevalent today in governments throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. However, the U.S. employed a large unit joint and combined force in Grenada against Cuban forces stationed on the island following a coup by leftists in 1983. The use of military power to reinstate a government favorable to the U.S. in this same fracture zone further illustrates the inability to effectively coordinate the elements of power to protect U.S. interests. This recurring use of military power, although historically proven to be insufficient to provide long term stability, creates expectations that its use again, will be forthcoming.

Maintaining the neutrality of the forces, especially in Lebanon and to some degree in the Dominican crisis, demonstrated a positive effect on the acceptance of U.S. intervention by opposing parties locally and, just as important, throughout the world. In Lebanon, this greatly en-

hanced the capability of special envoy Robert Murphy to conduct diplomatic negotiations; and in the Dominican Republic, the IAPF enabled both sides to negotiate and enabled the outlook for compromise. Force employment developed conditions that allowed political negotiations to begin with participation of leadership from all factions in an attempt to reach a lasting settlement. While this was done in both cases, with obvious different lasting effects between Lebanon and the Dominican Republic, it remained critical in the short term to maintaining peace.

Finally, the U.S. must realize that following the use of military force, a diplomatic solution will always eventuate, regardless of the circumstance. Therefore, as was evident in its success in Lebanon and in its failure in the Dominican Republic, was the necessity to coordinate closely between the Department of State and the Unified Commander the planning and execution of military operations to achieve the political solutions. Admiral Holloway and Major General Adams close courtship between the Ambassador and the military chief of Lebanon, General Chehab proved vital to the true understanding of the nature of the problem and the formulation of military strategy.

Comparison of these two crises has presented many useful examples of the difficulties in clearly defining strategic problems revolving around particular crisis and synthesizing large volumes of raw data by which our policy and strategy evolve. Clearly, it has demonstrated the

overarching desire to protect all democratic principles and insure they remain as standards for future generations to enjoy. But when we get to the point where we consider what we do about the problems, we must not get caught in a trap which simply says "send in the military". If we do, we may lose the focus on the desired objectives quoted at the beginning of Chapter I. Strategic policy and decisionmakers must be provided the very best information available and should follow a reasoned approach to develop policy options and make recommendations to the President. Perhaps the Strategic Analysis Model, as presented herein, is as good a way of doing that as any.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER V

(1) Nassib S. Eid, "Lebanon in the Middle East Subordinate System", MMAS Thesis, CGSC, 1983: 126.

(2) U.S. DOD Historical Office of the JCS, Draft Manuscript, "Lebanon Crisis and After", ND: Washington, D.C., 4468.

(3) Kesaris, Crisis in the Dominican: NSC, "The Communist Role in the Dominican Revolt", (Director of Intelligence, Memorandum, 7 May 1965): 3-15.

(4) Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1865-1966, (1988): 44.

APPENDIX A

Definition of Terms

It is critical in the description and investigation of any subject to have an exact understanding of the definition of the terms used in the subject. Military terms are numerous, and in many cases close in spelling, sound or meaning. Joint terminology, because it is used to transmit exact ideas between or within several services or even nations, must be carefully standardized to ensure clarity and attempt to reduce communication errors. At least I thought so. However, when I began to conduct my research and select the terms that would have to be defined to ensure the reader would understand how I was using the definition throughout this study, I quickly realized there was a problem. Some of the terms were found in joint manuals, some that were not in joint manuals had been coined and defined in separate service manuals such as the case of FM 100-5. Finally, the definition I give for "large unit operation", although being studied throughout the length of an entire draft manual (FM 100-6), is taken from the sum of the text, but it is not defined in any joint or other separate service manual reviewed thus far. This may already point to some areas that could lead to confusion or misunderstanding since some terms are actually part of separate

services only and not published in joint doctrine. Therefore, I have included all definitions of terms that I could find in more than one source or noted where the definition was found if it was located solely in other than a joint publication to highlight this finding. Additionally, there were some terms which I found in outdated manuals with slightly different meanings; where this was the case I included them to describe some of the evolutionary path of joint terms.

1. Campaign: A campaign is a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war...theater commanders and their chief subordinates usually plan and direct campaigns. (FM 100-1, 1986)

2. Campaign: A campaign is a series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war. Simultaneous campaigns may take place when the theater of war contains more than one theater of operations. Sequential campaigns in a single theater occur when a large force changes or secures its original goal or when the conditions of the conflict change. An offensive campaign may follow a successful defensive campaign, for example, as it did in Korea in 1950. Or a new offensive campaign may have to be undertaken if strategic goals change or are not secured in the initial campaign. (FM 100-5, 1986)

3. Campaign: A campaign is a connected series of military operations forming a distinct phase of war to

accomplish a long range major strategic objective. (FM 101-5-1, 1985)

4. Campaign Plan: A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space. (JCS Pub 1, 1987)

5. Campaign Plan: A broad plan to accomplish a long-range major strategic objective. Usually divided into a series of related military operations. (JCS Pub 2, 1974)

6. Campaign Plan: A campaign plan is a device used by major commands to express the commander's decision in terms of specific operations projected as far into the future as practicable....Its purpose is to express an orderly schedule of the strategic decisions made by the commander to allow sufficient time to procure and provide the means to secure desired or assigned objectives. (JCS Pub 2, 1974)

7. Combined Operation: An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. (JCS Pub 1, 1987)

8. Contingency Operations: Military actions requiring rapid deployment to perform military tasks in support of national policy. (FM 100-5, May 1986)

9. Contingency Plan: A plan for major contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility. (JCS Pub. 1, 1987)

10. Major Operation: Comprises the coordinated actions of large forces in a single phase of a campaign or

in a critical battle. Major operations decide the course of campaigns. (FM 100-5, May 1986)

11. Operation: A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JCS Pub. 1, 1987)

12. Large Unit Operation: Operations that require commitment of large Army formations which will usually be joint in nature and probably combined with other national forces. (Coordinating Draft FM 100-6, September 1987)

13. Joint: Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate. (JCS Pub. 1, 1987)

14. Joint Doctrine: Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services of the same nation in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is ratified by all four Services and may be promulgated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (JCS Pub. 1, 1987)

15. Joint Operation: An operation carried on by two or more of the armed forces of the United States. (FM 101-5-1, October 1985)

16. Joint Task Force (JTF): A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, which is constituted and so designated by the

Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified command, a specified command, or an existing joint task force. (JCS Pub. 1, 1987)

17. Unified Command: A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, when so authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by a commander of an existing unified command established by the President. (JCS Pub. 1, 1987)

18. Component Commander: Single U.S. force commander serving under a joint commander. (FM 100-5)

19. Strategy: The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary, during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. (Dictionary of United States Military Terms of Joint Usage)

20. Strategic Level of War: The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives., Activities at this level establish national and alliance military objec-

tives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of power; develop global or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and, provide armed forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plan. (JCS approved Definition Effective 5 May 1988)

21. Operational Level of War: The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. (JCS approved definition effective 5 May 1988)

22. Tactical Level of War: The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. (JCS approved definition effective 5 May 1988)

National Command Authorities: (DOD) The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. (JCS Pub. 1, 1 June 87)

Crisis: A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develop rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (JOPS Vol IV, 8 July 88)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Adams, James. Secret Armies The Full Story of S.A.S., Delta Force and Spetsnaz. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1985.
- Atkins, G. Pope, and Larman C. Wilson. The United States and the Trujillo Regime. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1972.
- Baraun, Jacques, and Henry F. Graff. The Modern Researcher. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1985.
- Bergerson, Frederic A. The Army Gets an Air Force. Tactics of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.
- Berke, Jacqueline. Twenty Questions for the Writer. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972.
- Blechman, Barry, et al. Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument. Washington, D.C.: The Institution.
- Bolger, Daniel P. Americans at War, 1975-1986, An Era of Violent Peace. Novato: Presidio Press, 1988.
- Borklund, C. W. The Department of Defense. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.
- Dominguez, Jorge, I. U.S. Interests and Policies in the Caribbean and Central America. Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982.
- Dujmovic, Nicholas. The Grenada Documents: Window of Totalitarianism. Washington, D. C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988.
- Greenberg, Lawrence M., Major. United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 1987.
- Gleijeses, Piero. The Dominican Crisis. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

- Hewes, James E., Jr. From Foot to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975.
- Heller, Charles E., and William A. Stofft, editors. American's First Battles 1776-1965. Kansas: University Printing Press, 1986.
- Kesaris, Paul, ed. Crisis in Panama and the Dominican Republic: National Security Files and NSC Histories. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1982, Microfilm.
- Korb, Lawrence J. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The First Twenty-Five Years. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976.
- Lowenthal, Abraham F. The Dominican Intervention. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972.
- Millett, Allan R., and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense. New York: The Free Press, 1984.
- Schoenhals, Kai P., and Richard A. Melanson. Revolution and Intervention in Grenada, The New Jewel Movement, the United States, and the Caribbean. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.
- Yates, Lawrence A. Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965-1966.

ARTICLES

- Beck, Melinda. "Americas Secret Military Forces", News-week, (April 1985): 22-29.
- "Britains Grenada Shutout", Economist, Vol 290, no. 7332, (March 1984): 31-34.
- Cauan, James W. "Blue Christmas Coming Up," Air Force Magazine, (January 1984): 78-81.
- DeVoro, John A. "The Eisenhower Doctrine." Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy. Vol I. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 292-301.

Gabriel, Richard. "Scenes From an Invasion: How the U.S. Military Stumbled to Victory in Grenada". Adapted from Military Incompetence: Why American Military Doesn't Win. Hill and Wang, a division of Farrar, Straux and Girouz, 1985.

Naipaul, V.S. "An Island Betrayed." Harpers, (March 1984): 61-72.

Sidle, Winant, Major General, U.S.A. Ret. "The Military and the Press: Is the Breach Worth Mending." Army, (February 1985): 22-32.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Armed Forces Staff College. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.

Cushman, John H., Lieutenant General U.S. Army Ret. Organization and Operational Employment of Air/Land Forces. Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College, 1984.

Department of the Army. FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Symbols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986.

Department of the Army. The United States Army Posture Statement FY89. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1989.

Department of Defense. Annual Report to the Congress. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989.

Doughty, Robert A., Major. The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.

Gray, David W., Major General U.S. Ret. The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958: A Commanders Reminiscence. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August 1984.

House, Jonathan M., Captain. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Action Armed Forces. JCS Pub. 2. Washington, D.C.: December 1986.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Action Armed Forces. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Chronology of Operation "Blue Bat". Washington, D.C., 1958. (Declassified 5 July 79)

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Decision On J.C.S. 1887/479. Report by Chairman, Joint Middle East Planning Group. Washington, D.C., 1958. (Declassified 5 July 79)

Joint Staff. Military Posture FY 1989. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.

Mendel, William W., Colonel and Banks, Floyd T., Lieutenant Colonel. Campaign Planning. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1984.

Spillar, Roger J. "Not War But Like War". The American Intervention in Lebanon. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, January 1981.

U.S. Army. FC 100-20. Low Intensity Conflict. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Master of Military Art and Science Research and Thesis. Kansas: CGSC, 1988.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. FM 100-6. Large Unit Operations, Coordinating Draft. Ft. Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1987.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Joint and Combined Environments. Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1988.

U.S. Army Military History Institute. "The Paul D. Adams Papers." Carlisle Barracks. Photocopy: 1982.

U.S. Department of the Army. FM 100-5. Operations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987.

- Wade, Gary H., Lieutenant Colonel. Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon, 1958. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984.
- Ward, William F., Major General. Posture of the U.S. Army Reserve FY89. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.
- Yates, Lawrence A. Powerpack U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987.

MANUSCRIPTS

- Clark, W. K., CPT. "Military Contingency Operations: The Lessons of Political-Military Coordination." Masters of Military Arts and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975.
- Eid, Nassib S., LTC. "Lebanon In the Middle East Subordinate System." Masters of Military Arts and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1983.
- Galati, Frank E., Jr., CPT. "Military Intervention in Latin American: Analysis of the 1965 Crisis in the Dominican Republic." Masters of Military Arts and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1983.
- Howard, Stephen Brooks, MAJ. "Middle Eastern Strategic Deployment--Oasis or Mirage?" Masters of Military Arts and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1986.
- Judkins, James C., Jr., MAJ. "The Expanding Role of the Shi's In Lebanon." Masters of Military Arts and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1983.
- Khan, Shahid A., MAJ. "The Persian Gulf and the Balance of Power System." Masters of Military Arts and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981.
- Schoonmaker, Herbert Garrettson. "United States Military Forces in the Dominican Crisis of 1965." University of Georgia Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation, 1977.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
2. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
3. LTC George L. Hethcoat
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Directorate of Joint and Combined Operations
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
4. LT. COL. Roger S. Fountain
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
DJCO, Professional Joint Education
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
5. DR. Jerold E. Brown
Command and General Staff College
Combat Studies Institute
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027