Stalingrad and the Turning Point on the Soviet-Ger man Front, 1941-1943
Abstract
This thesis focuses on the years 1941-1943. It examines the relative economic and military power of the two nations to determine if there was a shift in advantage, or turning point, during that period. To quantify those elements of power, it uses criteria taken from a current strategic analysis model. This model assesses elements of national power to aid in strategic problem solving and international policy formulation. Specific criteria are applied to 4 specific military events between 1941 and 1943. The resulting data is then graphed to compare relative military and economic power. The graphs serve as the basis for conclusions. These include: the battle of Stalingrad was not the economic turning point of the war when considering the criteria of industrial labor and armaments production; Stalingrad was the military turning point, considering military forces and equipment on the Soviet German front. This study concludes that this method of assessing relative national power of nations can be applied in an historical context to evaluate past wars, and may assist historians to better understand factors that led to various turning points throughout history. Keywords: Economic analysis; World War II, Theses. (edc)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 02, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA212034
Entities
People
- Dennis W. Dingle
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College