A Proposal to Change the Federal Acquisition Regulation: Recognizing the Award Fee Incentive in Fixed-Price Contracts

Abstract

The award fee is a unique incentive structure that prov ides the Government with a method of subjective, after-the-fact, evaluation of contractor performance and affords the Government additional flexibility to reward a contractor for above average performance. Additionally, the award fee incentive is not subject to the Disputes clause of a contract. Use of the award fee has proven to enhance Government to contractor communication and improve contractor performance in areas of quality, production management, ingenuity, timeliness, and cost-effectiveness. The award fee incentive is recognized in the Federal Acquisition Regulation only under cost-reimbursement contacts. Limiting the use of the award fee to cost-reimbursement contracts restricts the Government's ability to derive the full benefits of the award fee incentive. In order to obtain the full benefit of the award fee, its use in fixed-price contracts should be sanctioned by recognizing it as specific contracts forms in both Fixed-price and Cost-reimbursement contracting. Keywords: Theses.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 01, 1989
Accession Number
ADA212112

Entities

People

  • Gerald L. Francom

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Bibliographies
  • Business Administration
  • Contract Administration
  • Contractors
  • Contracts
  • Cost Reimbursement Contracts
  • Fixed Price Contracts
  • Government Procurement
  • Governments
  • Incentive Contracts
  • Management Personnel
  • Motivation
  • National Governments
  • Organizational Structure
  • Procurement
  • Public Administration
  • United States Government

Fields of Study

  • Political science

Readers

  • Government Contracting/Procurement.