Fire Support in the Reduction of an Encircled Force. A Forgotten Mission
Abstract
Using historical analysis and survey, this study examines the sufficiency of U.S. field artillery doctrine, tactics, and techniques to support the destruction of an encircled enemy. focus is on identifying existing weaknesses by comparing applicable lessons learned from history with the practices spelled out in current manuals. The allied attempt to encircle and reduce the German forces within the Falaise-Argentan pocket in central France during August 1944 and the Soviet Belorussian Offensive and subsequent encirclement and reduction of German forces during June 1944 are examined. The results of a survey completed by the V and VII U.S. Corps artillery commanders on the subject are also included. The study concludes that the process of reducing a large encircled enemy force is sufficiently different from other operations that it should be separately addressed. Although the 'doing' of the component parts of the artillery aspect of this operation are doctrinally established, tying them together into a synergetic package requires innovative attention. Resulting field artillery doctrine, tactics, and techniques derived are equally applicable in reducing an isolated enemy force that has broken through or been inserted into our rear area as they are in the reduction of an offensively encircled enemy. Keywords: Military strategy; Theses.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 02, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA212244
Entities
People
- Joel A. Buck
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College