Command and Control Mechanisms in the Chickamauga Campaign: The Union Experience
Abstract
This thesis analyzes how Major General William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, used the command and control mechanisms available to him as he maneuvered his army from Tullahoma, Tenn toward Chattanooga, in Aug-Sept, 1863; and how these mechanisms were employed during the battle of Chickamauga itself, on 19-20 Sept. Gen. Rosecrans possessed 3 mechanisms for commanding and controlling his army: 1). The military telegraph provided by the quasi-military U.S. Military Telegraph Service; 2). The assets of the fledgling Signal Corps which consisted of signal flags and torches, and a portable version of the telegraph; and 3). Couriers who were usually mounted and were provided by subordinate unit details, or by units specifically formed for courier duty. The author concludes that Gen. Rosecrans did not use his command and control mechanisms effectively. He relied too heavily on couriers to carry messages over densely wooded, cross-compartmented terrain to send orders to his widely dispersed subordinates and receive information from them. While Rosecrans made wide use of the military telegraph, to include using it during the battle itself, he used his Signal Corps assets essentially as static observation posts, and to only a limited degree as a means for effecting command and control. While the general's reliance upon courier assets added significantly to the time required to obtain information and send orders, it was not the reason for the union defeat at Chickamauga.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 02, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA212246
Entities
People
- Philip J. Baker Jr.
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College