

DTIC FILE COPY

1

AD-A212 443

MEDIATED MILITARY LEADERSHIP: A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP TRAINING MATERIAL

DTIC
ELECTE
SEP 19 1989
S D D

by

Phillip J. Hutchison

A thesis submitted to the faculty of
The University of Utah
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Sciences

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

Department of Communication

The University of Utah

December 1988

89 9 19 047

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS NONE		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) AFIT/CI/CIA-88-239		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION AFIT STUDENT AT UNIVERSITY OF UTAH		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION AFIT/CIA		
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-6583		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER		
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) (UNCLASSIFIED) MEDIATED MILITARY LEADERSHIP: A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP TRAINING MATERIAL					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) PHILLIP J. HUTCHISON					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT THESIS/DISSERTATION		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1988	
15. PAGE COUNT 197					
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE IAW AFR 190-1 ERNEST A. HAYGOOD, 1st Lt, USAF Executive Officer, Civilian Institution Programs					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS					
21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED					
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL ERNEST A. HAYGOOD, 1st Lt, USAF			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (513) 255-2259		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AFIT/CI

ABSTRACT

Military leadership is a subject that has beguiled military and civilian researchers for decades. Despite extensive study, much of which was funded by the military, military leadership remains an enigma. Further, the military still faces nagging criticism, from both its members and civilian sources, that military leadership has many shortcomings.

This study examined the possibility that such perceived shortcomings result from the military's failure to effectively teach leadership skills to its members. To test this hypothesis, the author analyzed the ways in which one branch of the military (the Air Force) uses language to mediate leadership.

The author employed a method of critical analysis which views human communication as narrative. This methodology was designed to identify latent cultural politics and priorities which dictate how an abstract concept such as "leadership" is depicted. It was assumed that military members may subsequently base their leadership actions on the attitudes and priorities they perceive from these verbal depictions.

The analysis found that military leadership training programs implicitly emphasize cultural indoctrination over promoting social influence skills. In this material, the

theme of promoting leadership as a process of social influence was clearly subordinate to dominant themes of maintaining both the military hierarchy and traditional romantic views of the military profession.

The author speculated that these priorities may promote several dysfunctional situations. Most notably, military members are prone to equate social control processes with social influence skills, to approach productivity problems in a myopic manner and to disrespect female leaders. (5)

The author noted that, since the priorities for mediating military leadership represent integral cultural motives, it is unlikely that such problems will be corrected significantly.

Copyright © Phillip J. Hutchison 1988

All Rights Reserved

THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH GRADUATE SCHOOL

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE APPROVAL

of a thesis submitted by

Phillip J. Hutchison

This thesis has been read by each member of the following supervisory committee and by majority vote has been found to be satisfactory.

Dec. 1, 1988

Chair:

Douglas D. Birkhead

Dec. 1, 1988

G. Lloyd Drecksel

Dec. 1, 1988

Malcolm O. Sillars

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	☒
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By	
Distribution	
Date	
Dist	
A-1	



THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH GRADUATE SCHOOL


FINAL READING APPROVAL

To the Graduate Council of the University of Utah:

I have read the thesis of Phillip J. Hutchison in its final form and have found that (1) its format, citations, and bibliographic style are consistent and acceptable; (2) its illustrative materials including figures, tables, and charts are in place; (3) the final manuscript is satisfactory to the Supervisory Committee and is ready for submission to the Graduate School.

Dec. 1, 1988

Date



Douglas D. Birkhead

Chair, Supervisory Committee

Approved for the Major Department



Malcolm O. Sillars

Chair/Dean

Approved for the Graduate Council

B. Gale Dick

Dean of The Graduate School

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.	iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	xi
Chapter	
1. THE SITUATION	1
Overview	1
Introduction.	1
Perceived Leadership Shortcomings	2
Perceived Importance of Leadership.	5
What is Leadership?	6
Research Objectives	7
Background	7
Studying Leadership	7
Leadership versus Management.	10
Military Leadership Training.	11
Renewed Interest in Leadership.	13
Research Challenges.	15
Notes	19
2. METHODOLOGY	21
Approach	21
Communication as Narrative.	21
Rationale	25
Achieving Research Objectives	25
Verbal Images	29
Narrative Rationality.	31
Method	35
Structure and Purpose	35
Assumptions About the Audience.	37
The Analyst's Role.	40
Advantages and Limitations.	41
Notes.	43
3. A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS.	45
Introduction	45
Legitimizing Military Authority.	47

Introduction to this Section.	47
Assessing Narrative Voice	48
Additional Cultural Influences.	51
Positioning Participants in the Text.	55
Assessing the Text's "Tone"	56
The Moral of the Story.	60
Leadership and the Military Hierarchy.	68
A Process or a Position?.	68
Leadership as a Position.	69
Creating Experts.	70
Creating Heroes	71
Examining Dramatic Counterpoint	72
Leadership as an Ideograph	74
Summarizing Values.	74
Evidence of the Ideograph	75
Management: An Antagonistic Ideograph	78
The Ideograph as a Unifying Theme	82
"Sense Making" with Ideographs.	84
Ensuring Narrative Fidelity	85
In Praise of Positivism.	89
Introduction.	89
Justifying Management Skills.	89
Identifying Positivism.	91
Positivism as Reductionism.	92
Separating "People" from "Mission".	95
The Value of Models	97
Leadership and Masculinity	99
Be a Man.	99
Sexism and the Military Culture	101
Covert Sexism	103
Notes.	108
4. DISCUSSION.	111
Narrative Rationality and the Ideograph	111
Evaluating the Findings	111
The Advantages of Ambiguity.	112
The Problems with Ambiguity.	115
Promoting Values	117
Values and Mythology.	119
The "Costs" of the Ideograph	121
The Ideograph and Sexism.	126
Positivism.	130
Positivism and the Ideograph.	130
Problems with Positivism.	133
Creating Predispositions to Act.	138
Productivity and Cohesiveness.	140
Relativism versus Positivism:	
Maintaining Narrative Fidelity	141
Problems with Simplification	143
Potential Antidotes.	146
Chapter Summary	147

Notes..	149
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	152
Conclusions	152
In Review	152
The Need For Change.	155
Back to Reality	157
The Military and Change	158
Recommendations.	161
The Value of Critical Research	161
Confronting Difficult Issues	161
Modeling	163
Senior Military Leadership	165
Emergent versus Appointed Leadership	166
The Leader as a Medium	166
Leadership as a Symbolic Process	168
Evaluating Leadership	170
Research Suggestions	172
Closing Thoughts	177
Notes	179
REFERENCES	181

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACSC	Air Command and Staff College
AFP	Air Force Pamphlet
AFR	Air Force Regulation
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
OTS	Officer Training School
PFE	Professional Fitness Examination
PME	Professional Military Education
SOS	Squadron Officer School

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank the members of my supervisory committee, which comprised chairperson Douglas Birkhead, G. Lloyd Drecksel and Malcolm Sillars, for their encouragement, patience and guidance. I found their professionalism, expertise and dedication to their students to be truly impressive. It has been an honor and a pleasure to have studied under and worked with these distinguished individuals for the past 15 months.

I would also like to thank Larry Browning of the University of Texas at Austin for volunteering to supervise my completion of an independent study course on leadership issues. Many of the ideas contained in this thesis evolved from the research and stimulating discussions which this course afforded to me.

I would like to give special thanks to Edith Welch of the University of Utah Department of Communication for cheerfully assisting me with my many special academic requirements. Her responsiveness and spirit of cooperation not only played a large role in my choosing to attend the University of Utah, but her valuable advice helped ensure that I could finish my academic program on time.

Finally, I would like to thank each of my fellow "blue suiters" who provided me with the textual material which was analyzed for this thesis.

CHAPTER 1

THE SITUATION

Overview

Introduction

Just prior to the D-Day invasion of Normandy, the Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower is reputed to have placed a string on a table around which sat his senior staff and instructed each of them to push the string across the table. When his commanders were unable to do so, he grabbed one end of the string and pulled it smoothly across the table.<1>

By using this string analogy, Eisenhower sought to teach his staff about a concept that he, and virtually all other senior military officers past and present, considered to be indispensable to the military mission: leadership. Yet, despite this acknowledged importance to the military mission, leadership has been an elusive concept that is far easier to describe by pulling a piece of string across the table than to define verbally. This elusive nature of defining military leadership has made it "an intriguing as well as a beguiling subject for military men and scholars alike."<2>

Thus, a wealth of studies on military leadership, ranging from the "simple 'Follow Me' approach to the more complex and analytical examinations of management, headship and social motivation theories," have been undertaken. <3> These studies represent myriad approaches to studying leadership including analyses which seek to define leadership, address its ethical issues, and assess how leadership is affected by technology. However, despite these numerous and varied studies, the military is still trying to combat a deep-seated, nagging perception that its leadership has many shortcomings. The purpose of this thesis is to examine some of the issues that underlie this situation. This study analyzes the ways in which issues of military leadership traditionally have been studied and proposes alternative approaches to help better understand the enigmatic concept of military leadership. The objective was not to add to the already extensive body of empirical leadership research. Rather, this study demonstrates how long-standing "qualitative" communication analytical methodologies can help uncover some of the causes of the perceived problems with military leadership.

Perceived Leadership Shortcomings

Public criticism of military leadership became conspicuous during the Vietnam War. Members of the public, service members and ex-service members argued--and continue

to argue--that poor military leadership was among the key factors that lead to America's failed Vietnam policy. As Douglas Kinnard, a former senior military officer, noted:

Late in the (Vietnam) war, superficial leadership was well covered by the press in the form of stories about desertion rates, drug addictions, minor mutinies and the assassination (fragging) of junior officers and non-commissioned officers ... Let's set it straight, the problem, where it existed, was one of ineffective leadership. In large part because many leaders made a career out of their own careers rather than a career out of leading their units. (4)

Malham Wakin, an authority on military ethics, noted that in the 1970s military members began to complain about the hypocrisies inherent in a military system that stressed the indispensable value of leadership, then tended to reward members who obviously displayed a variety of dysfunctional leadership behaviors. As a respondent to a 1970 Army War College survey observed:

My superior was a competent, professional, knowledgeable military officer who led by fear, would doublecross anyone to obtain a star, drank too much and lived openly by no moral code. He is now a Brigadier General! (5)

As subsequent studies by both the Navy and Air Force revealed, these problems were not unique to the Army, but were endemic to the entire military culture. (6) Nor are these problems merely an artifact of the Vietnam era. As military leadership scholar William J. Taylor noted:

By the late 1970s the evidence had mounted to demonstrate that leadership (in the military) was in serious trouble. Studies based on opinion surveys and analyses...were marked "sensitive" and "close hold," so serious were their findings and so great was the paranoia by senior officers. (7)

Taylor asserted that this paranoia was reflected in repeated efforts by military officials to stifle reports that addressed morale problems resulting from military practices. In fact, the Washington Star of Dec. 15, 1980, reported that a U.S. Army human readiness report had found morale in the Army to be so bad that the secretary of the Army ordered the report "canned." <8>

A 1988 U.S. News & World Report study of officers at The School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, noted that officers still were dissatisfied with the quality of United States military leadership. <9>

A related article stressed the military's need for responsive, innovate leaders who could respond to the challenge of doing more with less in the face of significant Soviet numerical superiority. The article referenced an example that occurred during recent tank maneuvers in the Mojave desert. In this instance, a senior tank commander passed up "a perfect opportunity to attack," while a young lieutenant with just two surviving tanks attacked the numerically superior mock enemy forces and scored 10 simulated kills. This prompted a senior military-doctrine expert to ask:

What motivated him, while a more experienced officer did nothing? Something he'd gotten from a Little League coach or a high-school English teacher. Technical and tactical competence can be taught in schools but getting that spark of leadership is the real trick. <10>

The Perceived Importance of Leadership

Such observations demonstrate that leadership is clearly perceived as a crucial determinant of military success. The military officially has advanced this view. Traditionally, documents reflecting all levels of military doctrine have asserted that leadership is a real phenomenon which has significant, if not profound, impact on the military mission. These contentions are usually supported by a wealth of anecdotal evidence as well as both military- and civilian- sponsored empirical research.

The overwhelming majority of leadership studies conducted in the past 40 years suggest that leadership significantly affects human behavior. This claim is not only reflected by myriad studies on group behavior, but also is used as the basis for developing many organizational behavioral theories. Theories asserting that leadership is the hallmark of successful organizations have been popular in the 1980s. During this decade, such theories have been most visibly reflected in three best-selling books on organizational excellence which were authored or co-authored by Thomas J. Peters. These books (In Search of Excellence, A Passion for Excellence, and Thriving on Chaos) have been acclaimed by members of academia, private business and military authorities for their concise assessments of the factors that determine organizational success. (11) Each of

these books shares the fundamental claim that quality leadership is vital to an organization's success.

What is Leadership?

Despite this strong consensus on the importance of leadership, there is little agreement on what constitutes leadership and how to define the concept. In 1977, a leadership scholar summarized the current state of leadership knowledge by asserting:

The study of leadership in the last 70 years has resulted in little accumulated knowledge that permits one to understand or predict the effects of leadership approaches or that provides a better understanding of how to be an effective leader.<12>

In the late 1980s social and political leadership scholars were still citing this assessment of the state of leadership research. These difficulties inherent to understanding and promoting leadership also have perplexed military leadership scholars. One such researcher, Samuel Hays, wrote that:

The art of leading (military) men has held a basic fascination for man throughout the ages. Historians, philosophers and scholars as well as men of affairs have speculated endlessly about the qualities or conditions that have endowed some men with the accolade of successful leadership while denying it to others. Despite this intense study, there has been little agreement.<13>

Such shortcomings in existing leadership research combined with the widely perceived need to improve the quality of military leadership have underscored the need for the military to continue searching for cogent, concise ways

to promote effective leadership. To meet this need, the military has, for many years, actively promoted and funded military leadership research in both the civilian and military academic communities.

Research Objectives

This thesis analyzes one dimension of how the military has assimilated this wealth of data and is applying it in its leadership training programs. Specifically, this analysis focuses on the efforts of one branch of the military--the Air Force--to promote a better understanding of leadership among its members. The objectives of this research are two-fold: (1) to identify the approaches the Air Force currently is taking to define the enigmatic concept of leadership to its members; and (2) to evaluate some of the influences and predispositions these approaches have on the way leadership is perceived--hence practiced--among Air Force members.

Background

Studying Leadership

In an effort to better understand the enigmatic concept called leadership, the military has actively promoted and funded leadership research for more than 40 years. As early as 1946, the United States Military Academy created the office of Military Psychology and Leadership. Subsequently,

each branch of the service has initiated similar organizations that share the common goal of trying to improve the quality of leadership in the field. <14>

Over the years, researchers have performed numerous studies of leadership. These studies have taken a variety of forms and applied a variety of research methodologies from several academic disciplines. They have produced a constantly expanding body of knowledge that has evolved from the fairly simple trait-oriented leadership theories of the pre-World War II years to today's more complex situational contingency theories. <15>

World War II apparently brought military leadership into academic focus. <16> Initial post-World War II leadership studies quickly began to point out the inadequacies of the prevalent "great man" approach to understanding military leadership. By 1948, a landmark leadership study by Ralph Stogdill concluded that, based on an exhaustive review of 20th century academic literature, there was no single trait that could identify a person as a leader. <17> The increasingly apparent shortcomings in the "trait" approach to studying leadership lead researchers to develop other theories.

Among the most popular of these was the situationalist leadership theory. This approach suggested that the situation determines the effectiveness of leaders and the units they lead. However, further studies revealed that the

situationalist approach also had shortcomings. As leading leadership researcher F. E. Fiedler observed, "we know of men who consistently manage to build up ineffective groups and sick organizations, while there are others who could not lead a troop of hungry girl scouts to a hamburger stand."<18> Thus, researchers developed a leadership theory that stressed the interaction between the leader and the situation in which he or she was leading. Known as the interactionalist approach, this approach is generally considered today to be "the most useful and most productive" means of studying and understanding military leadership.<19>

The study of leadership, however, has been further complicated by the multiplicity of definitions of the concept. One author found more than 130 definitions of leadership that reflected the many diverse approaches of research.<20> These studies have focused on numerous issues including group behavior, the personality or behavior of the leader, the exercise and influence of power, the attainment of group goals, the differentiation of roles and the effects of interaction.<21>

Part of the problem in defining leadership--particularly in a military context--has been separating it from other concepts, such as management, which seem to possess many overlapping objectives. While some researchers view leadership and management as essentially the same concept, the military does not share this view.<22> The

simple axiom that "you can't manage a combat unit up a hill into enemy fire to seize an objective"<23> is frequently used by military members to illustrate that leadership and management are clearly separate processes.

Leadership Versus Management

While there is still considerable debate among academicians about how to separate leadership from management, the military has settled on a simple, but apparently workable, distinction. Although this distinction is articulated somewhat differently throughout the literature on military leadership, the "bottom line" of these approaches is consistent: people are led and resources (including human resources at the aggregate level) are managed. As it has been phrased:

Leadership is the energizing of human resources to move willingly and coherently toward organization goals, despite the potential hardship of those goals. Management (is) the effective and efficient allocation of resources -- human and material -- toward desired goals.<24>

Each branch of the military has officially acknowledged this distinction. For example, the Air Force--which is the focus of this research--noted in Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 35-49 titled Air Force Leadership that:

Leadership has been defined as the art of influencing and directing people to accomplish the mission. Management is the manner in which resources are used to achieve objectives...In essence, you lead people and you manage things.<25>

Although a preliminary review of Air Force leadership training material indicates that this distinction is consistently applied when directly comparing leadership to management, this consensus is not maintained when the terms are referred to separately. This observation reflects the results of a 1975 study funded by the Department of the Army. This study found that in various armed forces officers guides "the terms command, management and leadership are used frequently interchangeably and always nebulously." (26)

Military Leadership Training

Despite the absence of a consistently applied, precise definition of leadership, leadership training is still an important part of most military training programs. In the case of the Air Force, leadership training is provided through a series of professional development programs, known as Professional Military Education (PME), commissioning processes and a variety of specialized seminars.

Although AFP 35-49 provides a general discussion of leadership issues, the 25-page, pocket-sized pamphlet was not intended to be a rigid policy statement on leadership. It is merely a "basic guide" (27) to assist Air Force personnel desiring a general understanding of the concept.

Consequently, PME leadership curricula and other programs for promoting leadership are not developed by a centralized authority [although curriculum directors say

there is an informal professional network for sharing helpful information]. Essentially, each level of leadership training develops its own curriculum. These curricula are regularly modified or redesigned.

Further, not all PME programs are centralized. For example, the various levels of enlisted PME are taught at bases throughout the world. As the PME student's rank increases, the PME training becomes more centralized. The lowest level enlisted PME courses are generally taught at the base level, while the courses for non-commissioned officers are taught regionally and the course for senior non-commissioned officers is taught at a central location. Although the leadership portions of these courses are based on the material in Air Force Pamphlet 50-39 (the professional fitness manuals for enlisted personnel), each course develops its unique program for emphasizing the material.

Leadership training for officers is provided at commissioning sources (The Air Force Academy, Officer Training School and the Reserve Officer Training Corps), each of which develops its own curriculum. PME for officers is divided into three levels: Squadron Officer School (SOS) for company grade officers (i.e., lieutenants and captains), Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) for emerging field grade officers (usually majors) and Air War College (AWC)

for senior officers. Each of these programs is offered in residency, seminar and correspondence formats.

The leadership curricula for each level of PME varies greatly. Generally, leadership (i.e., the communicative skills to motivate people) is stressed more at the lower levels of PME, while management skills (i.e., organizing and allocating resources) are emphasized at the higher levels.

Renewed Interest in Leadership

As mentioned earlier, although the Air Force clearly emphasizes that leadership and management are separate concepts, recent military history suggests that the distinction between these concepts is problematic. As military leadership scholar Lawrence Korb noted, the environment that precipitated the current emphasis on management skills dates back to Robert McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense in the early 1960s. Korb writes that since this time:

The Department of Defense has relied increasingly on rationalistic bureaucratic methods of organization and a cost-effective methodology for decision-making. As a result, civilian values and attitudes are now widely accepted, even among military personnel in the field. Thus, it is not surprising that the characteristics associated with the notion of leadership have also changed markedly. This change is casually referred to as a shift from the traditional leader model to the modern military manager. (28)

This tendency has not been well-received by senior military officers, including those who direct the Air Force. By the late 1970s, senior military officers had publicly

criticized the "excessive dependence on management skills at the expense of leadership skills"<29> and by the early 1980s efforts had been taken to correct these problems.

An Air Command and Staff College leadership training pamphlet from the mid-1980s discusses the three primary approaches the Air Force took to improve the quality of its leadership. These efforts include "pushing to decentralize decision making, increasing tour lengths to promote continuity and stressing institutional values over occupationalism."<30> The latter approach is being stressed in several ways including emphasizing it in leadership training at all levels. A good example of this trend is AFP 35-49, which devotes three pages to discussing leadership values.

The idea of stressing institutional values over occupationalism has become a visible trend in teaching military leadership. This approach does not seek to teach leadership skills directly; rather, it seeks to promote leadership by instilling "traditional values" such as integrity, loyalty, commitment and selflessness among its members.<31>

Although leadership is widely taught and discussed in official Air Force programs, these efforts continue to be complicated by the lack of a precise definition of leadership. Thus, despite the military's considerable

expense and efforts to study leadership, the concept still remains an enigma.

Research Challenges

It may seem odd that the military has yet to fully articulate a precise, consistently applied definition of a concept that it deems so vital to its mission. This is especially true given the large volume of leadership research funded by the military.<32> Military sociologist David Segal commented on this situation:

The interpretation of the results of leadership research in the military, and the conduct of leadership training, would in all likelihood be simplified by an acceptance of the convention that leadership refers to interpersonal processes in social groups, through which some individuals assist or direct the group toward the completion of group goals. It is a process characterized by participation on the part of the leader and the follower. Other more abstract and general processes aimed at the fulfillment of organizational goals are not irrelevant, but they are more likely to require management than leadership skills. Categorizing them all as leadership largely because the term leadership has a nice traditional military ring to it--which I think is a large part of the problem--makes the tasks of research, training, and doctrine development difficult.<33>

The assertion that the military would avoid specifically defining leadership because the word has a "traditional military ring to it," is troubling given the asserted importance of leadership to the military mission.

Yet, even a general overview of nearly any military leadership text supports Segal's observations. These texts abound with empirical studies combined with generalizations

about values and leadership cliches. Words such as leadership, command and management are used interchangeably. Often, leadership does appear to be treated as a "catch all" for military virtues.

Do these seemingly contradictory approaches to promoting leadership to military audiences merely reflect the lack of consensus that has always marred leadership research? Or, as Segal suggested, are there some underlying, unidentified agendas buried in these texts?

Such questions have, thus far, been unaddressed in military leadership research. However, this study seeks to demonstrate that the answers to such questions provide valuable insights into how the military culture influences the way leadership is practiced among its members.

This study seeks to demonstrate that an effective way to help understand the dynamics of how a specialized, occupational culture influences the practice of leadership is to better understand the culture and the ways in which it produces social reality through language. In other words, the use of language in training texts and other material reflects culturally determined politics, priorities and strategies that influence the way a concept such as leadership is "mediated" (i.e., the way it is portrayed through language). It may be assumed that audience members will form many of their attitudes and beliefs about

leadership based on their perceptions of this mediated portrayal of the concept.

One of the approaches communication scholars have used to assesses textual influences on audiences has been to identify and analyze the latent cultural influences inherent in texts. Scholars taking this approach assume that these influences--many of which are covert--are assimilated by audience members. The audience, then, creates--or maintains--belief systems based on such influences and, subsequently, will act in accordance with these beliefs.

For instance, if an audience is constantly exposed to the messages about women inherent to 1950s television situation comedies such as The Donna Reed Show or Father Knows Best, the audience will [assuming they haven't been exposed to much contrary information] form particular attitudes about women. Many of these attitudes will be reflected in the way audience members act towards women and define women's roles in the culture.

There are several approaches to gaining insights into how a military leadership text mediates leadership. These approaches include analyzing both what is being communicated in leadership texts (i.e., how leadership is defined and how it ideally should be practiced) and how the military culture influences these views. Since these latent cultural influences haven't been adequately identified, they

may, in fact, be key obstacles to promoting effective military leadership.

Thus, this research, which will expand the existing literature on military leadership, is based on the following assumptions:

(1) Although military leadership authorities have addressed the methodological problems in promoting leadership to a military audience (i.e., assimilating and disseminating research on leadership), the cultural barriers (i.e., the politics inherent to a culture) to promoting the enigmatic concept of leadership to a military audience have not been adequately identified. Consequently, these obstacles are, as Segal suggests, hindering the understanding and practice of leadership in the field.

(2) Longstanding rhetorical criticism methodologies (i.e., approaches to analyzing a communicative "text"), particularly those which evaluate communication as a series of stories, narratives or dramas, are excellent means to identify and assess latent cultural influences on a communicative text. By applying these methodologies to analyze military leadership training material, many previously unidentified culturally produced obstacles to promoting military leadership can be identified and analyzed.

Notes

1. Robert E. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach, Military Leadership (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), xiii.
2. Sam C. Sarkesian, "Forward," in Military Leadership, ed. James Buck and Lawrence Korb (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981), 7.
3. Ibid.
4. Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Wayne, NJ: Avery, 1985), 111-112
5. Malham Wakin, "The Ethics of Leadership," in Military Leadership, ed. James H. Buck and Lawrence J. Korb (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981), 96.
6. Jeffery C. Benton, "Promoting Leadership in the Air Force's Management Environment," Air University Review 33 (March-April 1982), 18.
7. William J. Taylor, "Leading the Army," Washington Quarterly, A Review of Strategic and International Studies, 6 (1983): 44.
8. "The Report No One Wants to Talk About," Washington Star, 15 December 1980, 1.
9. "You Need a Warrior Mentality," U.S. News & World Report, 18 April 1988, 38.
10. "The Military's New Stars," U.S. News & World Report, 18 April 1988, 38.
11. These books are required reading in organizational culture and management courses at major universities throughout the United States. Further, they are repeatedly referenced in military leadership development courses.
12. A. Melcher, "Leadership Models and Research Approaches," in Leadership: the Cutting Edge, ed. James Hunt and Lars Larson (Carbondale, IL: University of Southern Illinois Press, 1977), 94-108.
13. Samuel H. Hays and William N. Thomas, Taking Command (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1967), 9.
14. Ibid.

15. Paul M. Bons, An Organizational Study of Leadership. (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1976), 14.
16. Ibid., 15.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 17.
20. Thomas M. Scheidel, "The Study of Leadership," speech remarks, B. Aubrey Fisher Memorial Lecture, University of Utah, April 23, 1987.
21. Ralph Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership (New York: Free Press, 1974).
22. Taylor and Rosenbach, 75.
23. Edward C. Meyer, "Leadership: A Return to Basics," Military Review, July 1980, 2.
24. William E. Turcotte, "Leadership Versus Management," The Washington Quarterly, A Review of Strategic and International Studies 6 (1983): 106-107.
25. Department of the Air Force, "Air Force Leadership," Air Force Pamphlet 35-49, September 1985, 14-15.
26. David R. Segal, "Leadership and Management: Organizational Theory " in Military Leadership, ed. James Buck and Lawrence Korb (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1981), 45.
27. AFP 35-49, 1.
28. Buck and Korb, 235.
29. Meyer, 1.
30. Department of the Air Force, "Leadership Perspectives," Air Command and Staff College Course 00035A LO2 8503 ([Maxwell AFB, AL]: Air University, Air Command and Staff College, 1985), ix.
31. AFP 35-49, 3-6. See also Meyer and Wakin articles.
32. Segal, 45.
33. Segal, 45.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

Approach

Communication as Narrative

Noted author and poet T.S. Eliot once wrote that we understand nothing until it is dramatized for us.<1> Eliot's words, while not specifically referencing communication theory, reflect views on the nature of human communication that have come to be shared by many communication scholars. This communication theory holds that because humans are neither omnipotent nor omnipresent, they are incapable of understanding the diverse forces that create reality. Thus, in order to make sense out of the world, humans must reduce this incomprehensible complexity to an understandable form. Many scholars have argued that this "understandable form" closely resembles--if it is not indistinguishable from--conventional dramatic forms.

Communication scholar Bruce Gronbeck observes that in the last 30 years "fields as diverse as political science, sociology, criminology, psychology, mass communication, anthropology...are springing scholars armed with dramaturgical perspectives on the world."<2>

Communication scholars who advocate this philosophy have developed a variety of approaches to characterizing how human communication is structured in dramatic or narrative form. While each of these makes a variety of unique claims, this research focuses on the similarities, not the differences, among these theories. Further, in this analysis, the term "narrative" is to refer to this approach to communication analysis. <3>

One of the common denominators linking these theories is that each treats communication as what communication theorist James Carey calls a "ritual." Carey contrasts this view of communication to what he refers to as a "transmission" model of communication. The transmission model, originally based on the metaphor of geography and transportation, views communication as the means to "transmit messages over a distance for the purpose of control." <4> The "ritual" model of communication, however, views communication as "a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired and transformed." <5>

Communication theorist Kenneth Burke has noted that "man is a symbol-using animal...However important to us is the tiny sliver of reality each of us has experienced first hand, the overall 'picture' is but a construct of our symbol systems." <6>

Burke's reference to the word "picture" brings out another concept that is important to understanding the

narrative qualities of communication. This concept holds that people think and act based on the pictures they carry and create in their minds. Psychologists dating back at least to Sigmund Freud have identified and discussed the significance of humans' innate ability to create and act on mental images. (7) This process has been called, among other things, visualization, imagery, mythology and fantasy.

Linguists also have recognized for many years that language reflects this innate ability of humans to create mental images. As linguist Robert Scholes noted, recognizing the "iconic" (i.e., the ability to create images) qualities of language has been a long-standing fundamental of linguistic theory. (8) When communication is examined for its narrative properties, particular attention is paid to the iconic qualities of language. These verbal images reflect implicit attitudes which are viewed as integral components of the narrative structure of any text.

As noted previously, the process of dramatizing reality is reductionistic. Political scientists Dan Nimmo and James Combs observe that this process substitutes "a simplified single (dramatized) reality for the complex, overlapping, and contradictory versions possible through communication." (9) Narrative theorists assert that these simplified realities are structured in dramatic forms. This means these forms include things such as a plot, actors, a

scene, acts, motives, dramatic counterpoint and momentum shifts.

Many of the dramatized qualities of communication are easily identified because communication is often structured in a story (i.e., narrative) form. For many years stories and dramas have been analyzed and evaluated against what is known as "generic" or "formal" standards. Such analyses of a text examine dramatic and narrative structures with regard to their aesthetic qualities. Analysts using this methodology generally judge a communicative text's use of dramatic structures by comparing it to a set of generic standards regarding the use of conventions such as plot, themes and characters. These standards usually reflect current views of artistic excellence relative to that particular type of communication. This aesthetic approach to communication analysis is commonly applied in reviewing drama, motion pictures and the novel.

A narrative analysis, while applying many of the same conventions and standards, differs from this approach in several ways. Most notably, narrative analysis is less concerned with the aesthetic qualities of dramatized forms. Instead, narrative analysis is more concerned with identifying the ways in which dramatized forms reflect a culture. Also, as Gronbeck notes, proponents of narrative analysis argue that many dramatized forms are imbedded in a text's "deep structure" (i.e., they are implicit or latent

to the text). He writes that these "latent meanings" are produced "not so much by what is said, as in the act of saying." Thus, to identify and evaluate these latent structures an analyst must evaluate the "non-discursive" processes (i.e., processes inherent in the use of language that are not reflected as latent verbal reasoning) in the text. <10>

A narrative analysis, then, seeks to evaluate the way a cultural system creates and maintains social reality through language by analyzing the narrative structures--both overt and covert--of a text.

This research applies this methodological approach to analyze Air Force leadership training material. The objective of the analysis is to identify latent cultural influences which have been structured--both implicitly and explicitly--in narrative elements. These elements include things such as characters, themes, values, plots, morals and counterpoint.

Rationale

Achieving Research Objectives

As noted previously, a key objective of this analysis is to consider the possibility that much of the previously documented dissatisfaction with the quality of military leadership reflects shortcomings in leadership training. The objective in addressing these issues is to identify and

discuss both the extent and possible causes of such shortcomings. The value of such an analysis is that it can lead to insights which, in turn, might lead to cogent strategies for more effectively promoting military leadership.

Several longstanding rhetorical critical methodologies could help assess the accuracy, effectiveness or impact of leadership training material. For instance, by using the most traditional form of communication analysis, one could analyze the argumentative structure of this material and assess its appropriateness for its intended audience. Or, one could apply the previously discussed formal standards to analyze the aesthetic qualities of these texts. This could include comparing the authors' use of language and other presentational forms (i.e., graphics, visual composition, etc.) to what are generally considered to be the standards for quality training materials.

By applying such standards to Air Force leadership training texts, it probably would not be difficult to reconfirm the previously cited results of the 1975 Department of Army study or to reconfirm Segal's assessment of leadership training and doctrine development. That is, that these documents are rife with contradictions, often tediously written and use key terms both nebulously and inconsistently. Such observations, when well-documented and presented in cogent form, could be useful and productive for

anyone wishing to develop military leadership doctrine or training programs.

However, such traditional approaches to analyzing communication do little to address questions concerning the motives or politics that underlie communication (11). In an analysis of leadership training material such questions could include: "Why does this material represent these particular forms?" "Do these forms merely represent efforts to 'keep it simple' for the intended audiences, or do they represent latent cultural influences and politics?"

As noted previously, one of the key objectives of this research is to assess the cultural influences on the way leadership is promoted to military audiences. To do this, there is a need to pay somewhat less attention to the presentational form or discursive content of this material and more attention to the motives or politics behind this content. In other words, this analysis examines the extent to which problems with the material's presentational forms (i.e., contradictions, inconsistent use of language, etc.) may be symptoms of problems rooted in the military culture itself. A narrative analysis can help accomplish such objectives by identifying, classifying and analyzing the key artifacts of any culture: the stories (or story forms) the culture uses to produce and maintain itself.

Another benefit of a narrative analysis is that, because it is predicated on treating communication as a

"ritual" rather than "transmission" process, the audience can be viewed as something other than a passive "target." Gronbeck observed that dramaturgical (i.e., narrative in the context of this paper) approaches to analyzing communication allow the audience to be conceptualized as "participant spectators." <12> As he put it, the audience can be viewed as "meaning builders in rhetorical transactions... 'audience centeredness' takes on a richer association in dramaturgical than in many rhetorical theories." <13>

As anthropologist Edward Bruner observed, the audience plays a vital role in maintaining and creating social reality:

A ritual must be enacted, a myth recited, a narrative told, a novel read, a drama performed for these enactments, recitals, tellings, readings performances are what make the text transformative. <14>

Similarly, Carey notes that when the audience "participates" in such communication rituals "the model is not that of information acquisition, though such acquisition occurs, but of dramatic action in which the reader joins a world of contending forces as an observer at play." That is, the audience is viewed as participating in a ritual that "gives to life an overa'll form, order, tone." <15>

In this respect, Carey observes that communication, when viewed as ritual, does not "encounter questions about the effect or function of messages as such, but the role of presentation and involvement in structuring the reader's life and time." <16> Thus, questions of static "effects" on

audiences potentially can be readdressed as tendencies to "predispose" audience members to act in certain ways.

Communication scholars--as well as members of other academic disciplines--have developed a variety of names for the tendency for culturally produced realities to predispose members to act in particular ways. For the purposes of this research, this process is referred to by what social scientists have termed "perceptual bias."

Communication scholar D. J. Crowley explains that perceptual bias does not refer to psychological matters (e.g., personal or group prejudice or stereotyping) but "to the way in which our second-level awareness constitutes a shared set of coded meanings and values by which cultures implicitly stabilize and orient the interactions of its members...(perceptual) bias consists of the multiplicity of codes--unconscious as well as conscious, latent as well as manifest--found in a culture at any given time."<17>

Proponents of narrative theory have argued that many of these cultural "codes" exist in dramatic or narrative form. A narrative analysis of a communicative text allows these forms to be addressed at least at two levels: verbal images and narrative rationality.

Verbal Images

Anthropologist Benjamin Whorf, who once worked for a fire insurance company, used the term "verbal images" to

explain some seemingly irrational behavior he noticed among factory workers who worked near gasoline drums. Whorf observed that the workers were careful around the drums they knew to be full. However, they smoked openly and discarded their butts around empty gasoline drums.<18> Of course, empty gasoline containers are potentially more dangerous than full containers because of their volatile vapors. However, in the workers' minds the mental image of an empty barrel conveyed less a sense of threat than did the full containers.

Edward Bruner asserts that this distinction between verbal and visual mental processes has been underemphasized in academic research. He argued: "As social scientists we have long given too much weight to verbalizations at the expense of visualizations, to language at the expense of images."<19>

A narrative analysis of a text, however, is predicated on paying close attention to visualizations. One of the leading proponents of this form of communicative analysis, Ernest Bormann, sought to link the traditional Freudian concept of "fantasy" (i.e., mental visualizations) with the traditional literary and dramatic concept of a "theme." In doing so, he created what he termed a "fantasy theme" approach to communication analysis. A fantasy theme, in essence, is a structured form of visualization that can be manifest at any level of communication including

interpersonal, group or mass communication. However, Bormann characterized a "fantasy theme" that is identifiable to and accepted by larger (usually mass) audiences as a "rhetorical vision."⁽²⁰⁾ Again, the emphasis is on analyzing the visual qualities of language.

Narrative Rationality

A second level or perspective from which a narrative analysis can view a communicative text is called "narrative rationality" or "narrative reasoning." When a text is examined for its narrative rationality, instead of focusing on the visual qualities of language or symbols, the analyst examines a broader form of sense making. This form, while integrally linked to visualizations, is more akin to conventional verbal logic (i.e., rationality).

Communication scholar Walter Fisher, who is perhaps the leading proponent of viewing human communication as narrative, has described narrative rationality as "reasoning" which works "by identification rather than demonstration."⁽²¹⁾ As he explains it, humans judge and act on communication based on their assessment of the narrative forms inherent to the communication rather than being convinced by argumentation. This means that, instead of applying traditional argumentative standards (i.e., assessing the logical validity of argumentative claims and proofs), audiences compare the narrative structures of the

text to stories they have encountered throughout their lives. <22>

Fisher has argued that there are two standards from which narrative rationality is judged: narrative probability (i.e., how well the story hangs together) and narrative fidelity (i.e., how fully it rings true with experience). <23> He has argued the case for narrative rationality perhaps stronger than anyone by calling it a "paradigm." That is, it is a way of viewing the world. He argues that narrative logic presupposes all other forms of logic.

Other communication scholars such as Michael McGee and John Nelson have acknowledged the pervasiveness of narrative reasoning to human communication, but disagree with Fisher that it presupposes--or is totally distinct from--rationality. For the purposes of this paper, a resolution of such conflict is not vital. Of more importance is the idea that humans may behave "reasonably" without behaving "logically." That is, much human behavior may be better explained by looking for the "reasons," in accordance with narrative rationality as Fisher described it, than to assume that behavior does--or should--reflect the use of conventional logic.

The concept of narrative rationality allows communication analysts to examine the possibility that there may be sense-making qualities to communication that may be

"irrational" by traditional standards of logic. For example, advertisers of all sorts thrive on selling people things they do not need, nor often can afford. Yet something about the advertisements obviously predisposes customers to "irrationally" buy these products. This occurs despite the fact that most advertisements contain easy-to-identify logical fallacies.

Some might argue that only uneducated persons might succumb to such deceptions. However, a quick walk-through of most faculty parking lots in major universities most assuredly will reveal a variety of expensive sports cars and recreational vehicles that cost perhaps twice as much as more practical vehicles with similar features. Although it is difficult to defend such major purchases from a rational perspective, clearly there were reasons why these vehicles were purchased. Among these reasons are the self image the purchaser holds and the way this image relates to symbolism identified with his or her vehicle. In short, such purchases--and countless other examples of similar behavior--by persons well-versed in the standards of argumentation, logic and fallacies reflect a departure from conventional rationality and the adoption of a different form of reasoning: narrative rationality.

When narrative rationality is considered a viable means of human sense making, a communicative text theoretically can depart from traditional rational forms and still be

viewed as coherent by its audience. One of the most clear examples of this is the case of political demagogues. Known for their ability to exploit popular myths and prejudices among "the common folk" to further their personal ambitions, demagogues are people who make an art form out of appealing to narrative rationality at the expense of conventional logic.

A narrative analysis of communication is a good means to better understand how and why such approaches succeed. It provides the framework for a communication analyst to examine a culture and determine how it constructs reality so that such "irrational" appeals can be viewed as "reasonable" by its members.

From this perspective, a narrative analysis of Air Force leadership texts allows a communication analyst to examine the latent dramatized messages in Air Force leadership training material and identify the images and attitudes these messages project to service members. It is assumed that the gestalt (i.e., holistic) qualities of such images and narrative structures will form many of the perceptual biases Air Force members will reflect when they practice leadership.

Method

Structure and Purpose

This analysis was done in two parts. The first part consists of a narrative analysis of selected Air Force leadership texts. The second part compares and corresponds the findings of the narrative analysis to current trends in leadership research and theory.

In the narrative analysis seven separate Air Force leadership training texts were examined. These texts include AFP 35-49, the basic guide to Air Force leadership; the leadership portions of AFP 50-39 Volumes I and II, the professional fitness manuals for non-commissioned officers and senior non-commissioned officers, respectively; the leadership study guide used at Air Force Officer Training School; the leadership study guide from the Squadron Officer School residence program; the leadership block of the Squadron Officer School correspondence course; and the leadership block of the Air Command and Staff College correspondence/seminar program.

These documents were selected to represent the various levels of Air Force leadership training. The purpose of analyzing this material was to identify and analyze their inherent narrative forms. The objective was to identify patterns that emerge when this material is viewed as different elements of a single communicative text: the Air Force culture.

It should be noted here that the purpose of this analysis was not to critique or question the propriety of any particular course or curriculum. Rather, the objective was to analyze the ways in which the Air Force culture, as a representative military culture, mediates the concept of leadership for its members.

In this respect, this analysis should not be considered a comprehensive assessment of how the Air Force promotes leadership. First, not all of the many programs and courses the Air Force is using, or has used recently, were analyzed. Also, the material being analyzed is regularly updated, thus, its specific content may reflect only temporary trends. Finally, the analysis examined only efforts to textually "mediate" leadership (i.e., to create a social reality around which students will base their perceptions and actions). It did not address the Air Force's many hands-on training programs such as leadership laboratories or programs designed to allow students to work with senior staff members. [However, it is useful to note here that many of the perceptual biases students receive through mediated leadership training will color their perceptions of what they experience in these programs.]

The objective of this analysis was to examine these documents primarily for their narrative forms. These forms include elements such as implied images, characters, plot structures, narrative voice, values, morals and counterpoint

inherent to the texts. As such, this effort does not represent a quantitative content analysis. Unlike a content analysis which seeks to account for, label and categorize each significant element of a text, this narrative analysis was designed to discover the recurrent or dominant themes which represent a text's gestalt properties. These gestalt properties represent dimensions of meaning (i.e., intensity or implicit attitudes) which might elude the net of a content analysis. The themes which were identified through this analysis were "typed" based on the roles they play in maintaining--or detracting from--the texts' narrative rationality.

This analysis thus sought to assess the ways in which these themes function--both independently and interdependently--to unify the texts' diverse, and often contradictory, characterizations of the word "leadership" into a culturally coherent or "reasonable" form.

Assumptions About the Audience

When communication is viewed as ritual, the audience is considered to play an important role in imparting meaning to it. This approach differs from the transmission model of communication which implies that a text's meaning can be found in the text itself. Instead, the ritual model of communication views meaning as something that is created through the relationship between the author, the text, and

the audience. From this perspective, the communication analyst does not focus on any one of these elements; rather, he or she focuses on the relationship between these three elements.

Since the intended audience for these texts is considered to be a "participant spectator" in creating and maintaining social reality through their consumption of this material, it is important to understand the specific cultural roles the audience members will be playing in this communication ritual. These roles represent the perspective from which audience members will impart meaning to the texts.

One of the most significant ways an audience imparts meaning to communication is by filling in gaps in a text's content. These gaps could include missing premises or attitudes implicit to particular uses of language. For instance, the dates July 4, 1776; December 7, 1941; and November 22, 1963 have no universal meaning. To someone unfamiliar with United States history this list merely represents three random dates. However, to someone who, through cultural indoctrination, is familiar with United States history, this list is significant. This significance or meaning was not implicit to the list itself, but was supplied by the audience.

To better understand the audience's role in imparting

meaning to Air Force leadership training material, the two following assumptions were made about the audience:

(1) Audience members have been, or are in the process of being, indoctrinated into the military culture and its value systems. They have received both the intensified military cultural indoctrination through either basic training or pre-commissioning training and regularly reinforce these cultural standards through participation in military rituals and customs. Thus, they are thoroughly familiar with the roles they play in this culture.

(2) Audience members were assumed to be unfamiliar with leadership theory, since it is somewhat esoteric. Thus, the audience will be viewed as having few theoretical preconceptions about leadership behavior which might conflict with the mediated representations which were analyzed. On a more practical level, however, audience members can be assumed to be familiar with the roles and characteristics the American culture has traditionally attributed to leadership [as discussed in more detail in Chapter 4]. Consequently, most of the audience's perceptual biases about leadership (i.e., predispositions to act) will be based on mediated military leadership training and other military cultural influences. Other pre-existing culturally influenced attitudes about leadership will serve as a basis from which the audience will fill in gaps (or missing premises) from the mediated representations of leadership.

The Analyst's Role

The analyst's role in this research was to become an "observer" of the culture which is being examined. Carey noted that "A wise man once defined the purpose of art as 'making a phenomenon strange.'" (24) In other words, many cultural rituals and forms are so familiar that members no longer perceive them. Like the artist, the role of a cultural analyst--or critic--is to make cultural forms "strange." This is accomplished by, among other things, questioning the seemingly mundane conventions and forms which most all members of a culture take for granted.

To help meet these objectives, the narrative analysis is followed by a chapter discussing some of the implications of the findings. This section summarizes the issues and trends revealed by the narrative analysis. It also discusses some of the ways in which these issues impact the practice of military leadership. This was accomplished, in part, by corresponding the trends revealed by the analysis with prevailing theories and concepts in academic leadership research.

The objective of this section was not to assess the accuracy of the material presented by the Air Force texts. Instead, the objective was to give perspective to issues revealed through the narrative analysis. Thus, the purpose of this section was to identify issues that need to be

addressed and (or) reconciled by those seeking to promote military leadership.

Advantages and Limitations

It should be noted at this point that there are both advantages and limitations inherent to this type of research. Many of these advantages and disadvantages are rooted in the long-standing methodological debate over the merits of quantitative versus qualitative research.

In short, this study represents a form of qualitative analysis often called "critical" analysis. Communication scholar Wayne Brockriede asserts that this sort of research is best viewed as a form of argumentation. (25) That is, its merit is reflected in how well the author supports his or her claims. When viewed as such, the advantage of such research is that it can address nebulous, elusive issues which are difficult to pin down with empirical methodologies. Further, as Brockriede argued, by making inferential leaps from existing knowledge to new knowledge, the researcher can rapidly develop and support insights that empirical scholars would have to approach in increments.

However, there are also limitations to critical or qualitative research. Among the most notable limitations is that, at best, such approaches offer only minimal safeguards against selective perception by the author. Second, such research is often difficult to replicate--thus, it is

difficult to verify. It has been argued--to put it colloquially--that in many respects such studies represent no more than the author's efforts to raise an idea up the flagpole and see if anyone salutes.

However, assuming someone does "salute" the insights revealed by such research, such a study may represent a significant step in breaking out of the sort of ruts that have hindered leadership research for years. The value of this particular approach to research is that it may identify and confront nagging issues that previously have been eluded to but were difficult to "nail down" (e.g., Segal's comments). Further, it may serve as the basis or rationale for new approaches to empirical leadership research.

The critic, by making a culture "strange," can help both members of the culture and cultural analysts view the culture in a new light. As such, this research may serve not only as a means of better understanding the military culture, but it also may serve as a reference point for new directions in military leadership research.

Notes

1. cited in Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs, Mediated Political Realities (New York and London: Longman, 1983), 16.

2. Bruce E. Gronbeck, "Dramaturgical Theory and Criticism: The State of the Art (or Science?)," The Western Journal of Speech Communication 44 (Winter 1980): 315.

3. The exact distinctions between concepts including "dramatism," "dramaturgy," and "narrative" is a subject of ongoing debate among scholars. See Gronbeck and Fisher for varying perspectives representing this debate.

4. James W. Carey, "A Cultural Approach to Communication," Communication 2 (1975): 7.

5. Ibid., 10.

6. Kenneth Burke, "Dramatism," Communication: Concepts and Perspectives, ed. Lee Thayer (Washington: Spartan Books, 1967), 359.

7. W. Barnett Pearce and Vernon E. Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 79.

8. Robert Scholes, "Afterthoughts on Narrative," Critical Inquiry 66 (1981): 208-209.

9. Nimmo and Combs, 8.

10. Gronbeck, 329.

11. Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London and New York: Methuen, 1980): 1-55.

12. Gronbeck, 328.

13. Ibid.

14. Edward M. Bruner, and Victor Turner, The Anthropology of Experience. (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 7.

15. Carey, 8.

16. Ibid.

17. D. J. Crowley, Understanding Communication, (New York: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1982), 108.

18. Benjamin L. Whorf, "The Name of the Situation as Affecting Behavior," Social Psychology thorough Symbolic Interaction, ed. G. Stone and H. Farberman (Toronto: Xerox College Publishing, 1970).

19. Bruner, 5.

20. Ernest Bormann, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," Quarterly Journal of Speech 58 (1972): 396-407.

21. Walter R. Fisher, "The Narrative Paradigm: In the Beginning," Journal of Communication 35 (1985): 86.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Carey, 11.

25. Wayne R. Brockriede, "Rhetorical Criticism as Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech 60 (1974): 166-167.

CHAPTER 3

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

Introduction

One of the primary goals of a narrative analysis is to reveal the ways in which meaning is constructed and maintained through communication. Similarly, the objective of the following analysis was to identify and examine the texts for dominant narrative structures which reveal these processes.

As such, the following analysis does not represent a content analysis which seeks to account for, categorize and dissect every item in the texts. Rather, this analysis identified dominant themes which were common to each of the texts. These themes were identified and analyzed to discover what communication scholar Kenneth Burke termed "motives."¹ In this context, "motives" refers to the politics and priorities for establishing meaning. These processes often go beyond what is intended or consciously understood by those persons who devise them.

This analysis identifies and discusses five dominant motives which are represented as themes in the narrative structure of Air Force leadership training material. These

themes are (1) deference to military authority; (2) establishing "leadership" as synonymous with military authority; (3) attributing heroic values to the word "leadership;" (4) establishing a positivistic representation of the social world; (5) promoting "masculinity." While these themes are being discussed separately to better identify the texts' narrative rationality, these themes do not function separately in this role. Instead, these themes function interdependently to create a coherent narrative rationality among the texts. As such, the insights gained in analyzing these themes are cumulative.

It should be noted here that the insights gained or issues identified in this analysis are not necessarily unique to Air Force leadership training material. Many of the following findings also may apply to other efforts to mediate abstract concepts such as "leadership" for both military and civilian audiences. In fact, many of the following findings may be attributed directly to civilian efforts to mediate leadership. Therefore, the objective of this thesis was not to establish a locus of control (i.e., the origins or responsibility) for the motives identified in this analysis.

Instead, the purpose was to provide a better understanding of some of the motives inherent in the ways in which leadership is mediated for a military audience. Thus, to more concisely assess this primary research objective,

the scope of the following analysis and discussion has been restricted. As noted in Chapter 2, one way to meet this objective is "to make a (familiar) phenomenon strange" to gain a better understanding of that phenomenon. The following analysis thus was designed to make the texts "strange" to help gain such understandings.

Legitimizing Military Authority

Introduction to this Section

When communication is viewed as a "ritual" as opposed to a "transmission" process, a communication analyst can gain new--and often broader--insights into a text's meaning. As noted previously, when communication is viewed as "ritual," meaning is no longer simply something to be transmitted from a source to a receiver. Rather, meaning is something that is produced and maintained through communication. As noted in Chapter 2, communication is analyzed for the role it plays in establishing the audience's life and time. One of the ways a narrative analysis can reveal such insights is by examining the implicit relationship between a text's narrator and its audience.

The word "relationship" is used in this context because, as noted in Chapter 2, narrative analyses of communication often view the audience as a "participant spectator" rather than a "target." From this perspective,

the audience is viewed as playing a role in the construction and maintenance of social reality through its consumption of the text. Therefore, the ultimate meaning of the communication is not in the text, but is constructed, in part, by the audience. The audience's role in constructing a text's meaning can be better understood by examining the overt and covert indicators of an implied relationship between the narrator and the audience. This relationship, for many years, has been assessed in dramatic and literary criticism by examining the "narrative voice" implicit to the text. <2>

Assessing the Narrative Voice

Narrative voice reveals how the narrator (i.e., the author or "teller" of the story) regards himself or herself in relation to the audience. This relationship can be assessed by asking questions such as: How much credibility is assigned to the narrator? To what extent does the narrator assert--or imply--to be omnipotent or omnipresent? How does the narrator establish credibility? How much and what information is withheld from the audience? What assumed role is the audience playing while participating in this particular communication ritual?

Answering this latter question is a good starting point for a narrative analysis of Air Force leadership training material. In doing so, a better understanding can be gained

into the "tone" of this material and how this "tone" might influence the audience's interpretation of the text.

One indicator of the audience's role in a communication ritual is the extent to which the narrator seeks to establish credibility with the audience. For example, a term paper written by a student for a college professor contains a far different narrative voice than does either a lecture from a professor to a class or a research paper presented at a professional symposium.

In each of these cases, the positions of status within the academic culture inherently determine the relationship between the narrator and the audience. In the case of a student writing a paper for a professor, the narrative voice will most likely reflect an inherent deference to the audience. Thus, the author usually must establish credibility by thoroughly supporting his or her claims and avoid absolutism. However, in the reverse instance of a professor lecturing to a class, these standards should be noticeably different. By virtue of a professor's status within academia, he or she can be more didactic and need not as thoroughly document and support each claim. In the case of a professional symposium, the audience likely consists of professional peers. Thus, material is written in a way that regards the audience as colleagues of roughly equal status who, doubtlessly, will scrutinize the material. In this context, ambiguities and paradoxes are more likely to be

acknowledged and claims will need to be supported by culturally approved sources. Therefore, introductory college textbooks might support a claim made in an undergraduate student's term paper, but they will not adequately support claims made at a symposium.

A communication ritual not only represents a relationship between the author and the audience, but it also reflects a relationship between the audience and the text. Thus, because communicative texts are often consumed by multiple audiences, the meaning of a text can vary depending on the audience. A well-written academic research paper, because of its reliance on arcane terms, could be viewed as elitist when read by an audience unfamiliar with such esoterica. Because a text's meaning can change as its audience changes, it is important to understand the social context surrounding the audience's relationship to both the author and the text.

In the case of Air Force leadership training material, the social relationship between the narrator and audience is clear. These texts are written for members of the military culture to develop skills to apply in a military environment. This restricted view of the audience is not only implicit in the text, but also is stated overtly by the words "For school purposes only" on the cover of the PME material. This means that audience members are expected to have--and be playing--roles in the military culture. Persons

without roles in the military culture, essentially, are non-entities in the communication rituals represented by these texts. Therefore, a narrative analysis of this material will consider the intended relationship between the narrator and the audience in the context of the military culture.

Additional Cultural Influences

Within this context--as with the previously cited examples from the academic culture--several variations of narrator-audience relationships are theoretically possible. These variations could include superior-to-subordinate, subordinate-to-superior and colleague-to-colleague. However, when examining the military culture, it is crucial to understand the unique authoritarian hierarchial rank structure which is the foundation of military social systems. A fundamental training objective of virtually all forms of military indoctrination (i.e., basic training or commissioning programs) is to promote deference to this hierarchy. All participants in this training wear highly visible symbols of their respective prestige within this hierarchy (i.e., rank insignia and, in some cases, special uniforms). Also, as is well-known by almost everyone who has undergone military indoctrination or even experienced mediated versions of military training through books, motion pictures or television, extensive effort is taken to teach members to acknowledge and defer almost reflexively to

superior members of this hierarchy. This is accomplished by, among other things, saluting, addressing superiors as "sir" or "ma'am" and calling the room to attention when a superior officer enters.

One key objective of military socialization is to identify military regulations and training material as representations of the hierarchy. To help meet this objective, all levels of military indoctrination are governed by some sort of regulation or operating instruction prescribing acceptable behavior in the training environment. During indoctrinational training, this document usually is so rigidly adhered to that it often becomes known as the "Bible" of the particular military training program. Much of the prescribed behavior is strictly limited to the training environment (e.g., eating "square" meals or folding underwear to precise dimensions); other standards such as saluting are regularly reaffirmed in daily military life.

Both anthropologists and communication scholars have viewed this sort of behavior as symbolic social rituals. Communication scholar Richard Gregg notes these rituals function to create and maintain social order in several ways. Rituals establish and reinforce standards of behavior, impose moral order and "enhance the pervasiveness of authority by relating those individuals who perform important roles with the functions and accomplishments or the sanctioned order." (3)

Military rituals such as rigid adherence to highly specific training rules serve to reinforce the relationship between military directives and the military hierarchy. Like the Judeo-Christian Bible, the training "Bible" is viewed as the unquestionable standards of behavior issued from above. Official military regulations thus are integral symbols of the military hierarchy.

Air Force leadership training material clearly does not reflect the arbitrary standards used in indoctrinational training. However, leadership training texts do represent official Air Force publications which have been "blessed" [to borrow a colloquialism used in numerous organizational cultures] from above. As such, there is a narrative voice or "tone" implicit to a sanctioned Air Force publication which transcends its content.

In addition to this implicit meaning, "official" military documents inherently reflect the didactic, absolutist "tone" which has been carefully associated with the military hierarchy. The material contained in such documents can, in a military context, be considered as unproblematic representations of an external reality unless the material is accompanied by overt disclaimers.

There are, in fact, legalistic disclaimers printed in small type on the inside covers of the PME course guides manuals [official pamphlets carry no disclaimers]. These disclaimers, in effect, say that the views presented in

these publications may not reflect official doctrine, but were prepared by competent sources. In the context of a narrative analysis, such routine disclaimers, which were designed to allow the editors to maintain a legalistic distance from a text's content while still asserting the validity of the material, do not serve to significantly alter the overall impact or tone of the text's narrative voice.

In the context of a narrative analysis, a true disclaimer might be one which says in effect:

This is a notoriously enigmatic subject. Since there isn't much agreement on many of these issues--even among experts--please view it merely as an effort to run some ideas up the flagpole for discussion purposes.

Air Force leadership training materials contain no such overt disclaimers. Instead, the material usually is endorsed by highly prestigious members of the Air Force hierarchy. The opening page of AFP 35-49 [a document that is referenced and paraphrased repeatedly in other leadership training manuals] contains a good example of such an endorsement. This endorsement is a letter addressed to "the men and women of the Air Force" signed by the most significant person in the Air Force hierarchy, the Air Force chief of staff.

Thus, the superior-subordinate relationship implicit to official military documents has been underscored both by overt endorsements and lack of content disclaimers. Keeping this in mind, the content of the manuals can be examined for

deviations, clarifications or affirmations of this relationship.

Positioning Participants in the Text

These objectives can be achieved by analyzing how the text positions the narrator with the audience. In analyzing Air Force leadership training material this can be revealed by examining the degree to which the text--overtly or covertly--refers to the audience's roles as military members.

As noted previously, AFP 35-49 opens by specifically addressing its audience as "the men and women of the Air Force." Each level of training material follows this trend and specifically addresses audience members through their roles in the Air Force hierarchy. For instance, material for NCOs discusses the responsibilities incumbent upon "your role as an NCO." Further, officer PME course guides specifically refer to students by their respective ranks or approximate positions of responsibility (e.g., lieutenants, captains, squadron commanders, etc.).

This may seem to be an obvious point since these courses have been developed for specific audiences. However, in the context of a narrative analysis, it is a significant point because, when communication is viewed as "ritual," the meaning of communication is not merely "in" the text, but also is constructed by the audience. As noted previously,

audience participation in social rituals such as military training can be viewed as a symbolic means of creating and maintaining social order. Thus, by participating in such rituals in the context of their assigned cultural roles, audience members are acknowledging the social order represented by the particular training ritual.

While the texts are specific in addressing the audience through their roles in the military culture, the narrative voice of the text is less specific--and consistent--in identifying itself. This is, in part, attributable to the multiple authors and many outside articles which these texts comprise. Despite these multiple voices, however, these texts consistently position the narrator higher than the audience. This observation is overtly revealed by the extent to which the narrative voice consistently does not treat reality as problematic.

Assessing a Text's "Tone"

As the previously presented analogy about academia illustrated, when a text reflects a "classic" superior-subordinate relationship, the narrative voice may treat reality in fairly absolute terms. That is, the narrator need spend only minimal effort establishing credibility and supporting his or her claims.

The narrative voice of all levels of Air Force leadership training material closely follows this pattern.

While each text varies the tone of its voice, a consistent theme among these texts is their "directive" tone. This tone is revealed by the high degree of certainty in which the texts describe leadership principles to the audience. As opposed to treating leadership as an enigmatic concept, all levels of training present leadership, to some degree, as a series of steps or variables.

In the narrative context, this high degree of certainty reveals a paternalistic relationship between the narrator and the audience. This paternalistic relationship is revealed in several ways. One of these indicators is the almost "laundry list" characterization of leadership principles found in these texts. An example of this can be found in AFP 35-49. This list, which is repeated verbatim or paraphrased in several other texts, includes: "know your job, know yourself, set the example, care for people, communicate, educate, equip, motivate and develop team work." <4>

The use of such lists reveals several insights about the narrator. Since lists usually do not reflect problematic assessments of reality, a narrator who communicates such lists can be assumed to perceive reality as a concrete structure which can be packaged and transmitted. For example, implicit to a shopping list including eggs, sausage and milk is the assumption that such things exist and the author has the authority to define and characterize these

items as such. In such simple cases rarely does the narrator see a need to support the propriety of such an assessment of reality. Thus, such a simple list would reflect comparatively little about the perceived relationship between the narrator and the audience.

However, if a grade-school teacher instructs students that to be successful they should "do their best, always listen and be honest," the narrator is implying a far more didactic, paternalistic relationship with the audience. In this instance, such a list can be critiqued by a variety of audiences for a variety of potential shortcomings including vagueness, accuracy and honesty--to name a few. The fact that a narrator can offer such problematic lists with little or no support reflects a paternalistic relationship between the narrator and the audience.

Likewise, Air Force leadership training material, by repeatedly using a directive "laundry list" approach to characterizing an enigmatic concept such as leadership, denotes a similarly paternalistic narrator-audience relationship.

The implicit certainty with which the narrative voice defines reality in Air Force leadership training material also is evidenced in other ways. One of these ways is the use of sweeping "blanket" statements with little or no support for the claims. For instance the PFE manual for NCOs notes: "Its easy to identity the essential elements of

leadership."(5)

The objective of a narrative analysis of communication is not to assess the accuracy of such statements--although some, doubtless, could challenge their accuracy. Rather, in this context, the objective is to identify what such statements reflect about the relationship between the narrator and the audience. Again, in the case of "blanket" statements, the unproblematic characterization of reality evidences a paternalistic relationship between the narrator and the audience. Implicit to making such broad claims is the assumption, "I (the narrator) have sufficient knowledge to make such claims and there is no need for you (the audience) to question my credibility on these issues."

Not all manuals consistently make such sweeping claims--particularly those designed for audiences of higher ranks. In manuals such as the SOS and ACSC course guides, words such as "may" and "suggest" appear more commonly than in the enlisted manuals. However, because of the high number of other indicators of a superior-to-subordinate narrative voice in these texts, this tendency does not fundamentally change this relationship. In these texts, the superior-subordinate relationship is merely raised to higher levels on both ends.

One of the most visible and prevalent of these indicators are the "learning objectives" included in PME manuals. "Learning objectives" usually precede each lesson

and summarize the areas over which students will be tested. Because military tests traditionally are very similar to the material summarized in the learning objectives, students pay close attention to these objectives. As such, learning objectives inherently prioritize the material for students. Further, since all questions are multiple choice, there is one asserted "correct" answer to each question. This correct answer, invariably, will correspond to the narrator's--not the audience's--interpretation of reality. Thus, even emerging field-grade officers are put in a position where they must "summarize the five 'musts' of leadership" on a multiple choice test in order to pass the course. <6>

The Moral of the Story

Another indicator of a paternalistic relationship between the narrator and the audience includes the narrator's efforts to overtly structure morals in narrative form.

Narratives designed to overtly dramatize a moral message are well-recognized artifacts of human communication throughout history. Some anthropologists such as Joseph Campbell go as far as asserting that moralistic stories are universal to human culture. <7> Some scholars who have advocated narrative theories, including Walter Fisher and Hayden White, assert that moralizing is inherent to any narrative. <8> Therefore, a narrative analysis often seeks

to examine both overt and covert morals in a text's narrative forms. Among the issues that can be examined when analyzing the morals to stories include identifying the morals themselves, differentiating between overt and covert moralizing and assessing how much leeway the narrator gives the audience to interpret the moral.

Examining the latter issue can reveal valuable insights about the nature of the relationship between the narrator and the audience. An [albeit extremel] example of this can be found in comparing how the morals are expressed in Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman to the morals expressed in the classic children's tale The Little Boy Who Cried 'Wolf.' Clearly, the morals inherent to Miller's story are considerably more ambiguous and open to interpretation than are those in the children's story. In the latter case, the narrator reduces narrative ambiguities to a point where even 5-year-old children will understand the moral. In examining the overt morals represented by Air Force leadership training material it becomes clear that the morals are more akin to those found in The Boy Who Cried 'Wolf' than Death of a Salesman. That is, the moralizing in stories found in leadership training material resembles the paternalistic tone of tales adults tell to children.

A good example of this tone can be found in an article that appears in both the enlisted PFE manuals and the SOS readings. The article, originally written for another Air

Force program [as are many readings in these guides] discusses how the "working climate" represents various approaches to leadership. The narrator, a civilian Air Force employee with a Ph.D in interpersonal communication, tells the audience that "work climates" fall into three categories: dehumanized, overhumanized and situational.

When communication is viewed as narrative, the creation of such categories can potentially be viewed as parallel to creating characters for a drama. That is, like the characters in a drama, such categories do not, in fact, exist. Rather, both characters and categories represent the author's effort to reduce, differentiate and characterize various forces or situations into identifiable forms. <9> Therefore, the three "climates" in this article represent the author's attempt to characterize and categorize (i.e., differentiate) various forces in the social world.

In this instance, the author clearly identifies the characteristics (i.e., properties of a "character") that distinguish these "climates." In the case of the "dehumanized" climate [a term not coined by the author, but reflecting a long-standing principle of management theory] the organization generally "neglects human relations in the work place." <10> The narrator explains that in such an environment, leaders are autocratic and information usually flows in only one direction: downward. Thus, informal patterns of information transmission develop and

organizational effectiveness is impaired because "subordinates are not motivated."

The narrator, then, contrasts this extreme with the "overhumanized" climate in which there is "undue preoccupation with human relations."^{<11>} This means that organizational objectives have been deemphasized in effort to keep everyone happy. Ultimately, however, this means that not only does productivity suffer, but employees must keep frustrations bottled up in order to minimize conflict. This causes employees to take their frustrations home and vent them on their families. This, the narrator asserts, is "more damaging to the individuals than conflict at work."

Finally, the narrator presents the "situational climate" as the "appropriate" approach. This climate is portrayed as "flexible and adaptable" and is offered as the proper balance between the extremes. Since the "situational approach" is not static, but theoretically matches itself to each situation, it is clearly superior to the other two climates. The supervisor who uses this latter approach "can expect certain responses from subordinates." These responses include: "increased self-worth and respect for others, improved communication and increased productivity."^{<12>}

To develop this moral that in essence says "flexibility is the best policy," the author reduced the complexity of the social world to a relationship between three characters. The first two represent extremes and the third one is "just

right." Narrators, particularly those who present children's stories, for years have sought to reduce social forces or characters into this trifurcated form. A good example of this is the story of The Three Little Pigs in which the foolish pigs build their houses out of straw and wood, respectively. In contrast, the virtuous pig builds a house of brick and is justly rewarded. Another example of this trifurcated form being used in a classic children's tale can be found in Goldilocks and the Three Bears. In this story, Goldilocks encounters three bowls of porridge and three beds, respectively. In both cases, the first two represent extremes and the third option is "just right."

The morals inherent to all these narratives is that virtue can be found between the extremes--usually in a nicely packaged form. This moral can be structured in a variety of narrative forms. However, most significant in the context of this analysis of narrative voice is the use of a simple "children's story" character trifurcation to represent complex social forces. In other words, such overt use of highly simplified trifurcated character relationships represents a paternalistic relationship between the narrator and the audience.

This is not to imply that trifurcated character relationships are the only, nor even most common, form of narrator moralizing found in these documents. Other forms exist and, with all but a few exceptions, they project a

paternalistic tone. One of the more common of these narratives, in effect, says: "If you listen to me (the narrator) and do what I say, you will live happily ever after."

Examples of this sort of message can be found in most all levels of Air Force leadership training material. For instance, an article reprinted in the ACSC course guide notes:

But your perseverance, your dedication to the mission, will be a clear measure of your character and will, in the long run, gain you loyalty, respect and admiration. <13>

Similarly, enlisted members are told in PFE manual for NCOs:

Give our Air Force people reasonable goals they can understand and support and the wherewithal to do the job and the trust and authority to do it, get out of the way and they'll do it...When we follow these principles, the results are exciting and gratifying. <14>

An opposite extreme to this form of moralizing is akin to the familiar warnings parents give to children such as: "If you cross your eyes like that they'll stay that way." Or, "If you go swimming right after you eat you'll sink like a rock."

The military version of such warnings can take the following forms:

Do not impair your people's confidence in higher echelons of command...Never disclose to your people your disagreements with directives. Do not criticize your leaders and their methods. Carry out directives enthusiastically; do not alibi or "pass the buck." Failure to support your superiors will compromise your

efforts. When you criticize your leaders and their methods, you can rest assured that you will be criticized by your people. Your own poor example will have pointed the way. <15>

Or, as AFP 35-49 points out:

As a leader you are responsible for performing the unit's mission. If you fail, you are accountable for the consequences. Any unwillingness to accept responsibility for failure destroys your credibility as a leader and creates the loss of respect and loyalty. <16>

The objective in a narrative analysis of such warnings is not to question their accuracy nor their propriety. As noted previously, the objective is to identify what these narratives reveal about the relationship between the narrator and the audience. In this instance, the more specific objective was to determine who has the authority to define reality, causes and effects and consequences.

This analysis of narrative voice indicates that the relationship between the narrator and the audience in Air Force leadership training material is rooted in the military hierarchy. This means that to the extent that the audience participates in their respective roles in this hierarchy, they do not have permission to question the material in the texts. To do so would require stepping outside of their assigned roles in the Air Force culture.

While this analysis of narrative voice does not directly address leadership issues, the issues examined in this analysis will affect how mediated leadership will be perceived. As noted in this portion of the analysis, the

perception of the issues in these texts will be heavily influenced by the narrative voice. This influence reflects the boundaries the narrative voice establishes for the acceptable interpretation and application of this material. Therefore, when assessing how Air Force leadership training material characterizes leadership, it is important to understand how the narrative voice has established "ground rules" for assigning meaning to this material.

This, however, does not mean that the narrative voice, by itself, predisposes the audience to act in particular ways. Rather, by positioning the audience with the text, the narrative voice sets priorities and boundaries for how the training material is to be interpreted. The audience's perceptual biases about leadership, then, will be based on these interpretations. As noted in Chapter 1, many communication analysts have asserted that if they understand an audience's perceptual biases, they can deduce certain probable predispositions to act.

Therefore, understanding the issues inherent in the implied relationship between the narrator and the audience can be a good first step toward better understanding the way meaning is assigned to Air Force leadership training material.

Leadership and the Military Hierarchy

A Position or a Process?

The military hierarchy that is implicit in the relationship between the narrator and the audience also is an overt theme in Air Force leadership training material. This overt theme is manifest in efforts to characterize leadership as a position in the military hierarchy. This approach to characterizing leadership can be contrasted to efforts to define leadership as a communicative or a symbolic process.

This distinction between leadership as a hierarchial position and leadership as a process is not a minor one in the opinion of many leadership researchers. These researchers, including Robert Dubin and B. Aubrey Fisher, have noted that "organizations...tend to equate the status hierarchy of their formally established structure with the phenomenon of leadership." (17) This characterization, Dubin and Fisher argued, obscures the understanding of leadership and is a prevalent shortcoming of much leadership research.

At this point, however, this narrative analysis is not primarily concerned with judging such characterizations of leadership on their theoretical merit. Instead, a narrative analysis is more concerned with analyzing the themes, characters and values inherent in such characterizations. In doing so, the goal is to better understand how these structures reflect a culture's efforts to produce and

maintain itself.

As noted in the previous section, the establishment and maintenance of the military hierarchy is a dominant feature of military cultures. As such, it should not be surprising that a branch of the military would emphasize efforts to prepare personnel to assume roles in this hierarchy. Of more interest in the context of this analysis is how and to what extent these hierarchial positions are characterized as leadership.

Leadership as a Position

It should be noted that while these texts repeatedly link leadership with hierarchial positions, the texts do not exclusively treat leadership as synonymous with hierarchy. In fact, leadership is characterized in several ways [some of which will be analyzed later]. However, a narrative analysis of these texts frequently reveals an overt theme that treats leadership and hierarchial positions as synonymous. For example, several of the texts reference the Air Force dictionary which defines "command" as "the exercise of leadership and power of decision over a person, persons, unit or forces in effort to carry out a task or mission."

Other references to leadership, such as the introductory letter from the Air Force chief of staff in AFP 35-49, more overtly link leadership with hierarchial

positions. As the letter notes: "Those of us in leadership positions ..."

Creating Experts

Another means most of these texts use to characterize leadership as a hierarchial position is to present senior military officials as experts on leadership. The issue here is not whether these officials are, in fact, experts on leadership. Rather, the objective is to determine how--and to whom--the texts confer expert status and to what qualifications the texts refer to support these decisions.

Air Force leadership training material is rife with quotes from, and articles written by, retired and active senior military officials. These officials include Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, George Patton, Curtis LeMay, Douglas MacArthur and many more. A good example of the extent to which expert status is assigned to senior military officials can be found in the opening pages of the SOS residence program study guide. This guide includes a series of 51 quotes about various aspects of military leadership including leadership attributes, values and traits. Of these 51 quotes, 38 were made by senior military officials (i.e., general officer or higher).

Again, from the perspective of a narrative analysis, the propriety in doing this is not in question. Instead, the more significant issue is the way in which credibility is

assigned and justified. To do so helps reveal the values and priorities that are inherent to the texts.

As noted previously, all levels of Air Force leadership training material routinely assigned expert status to senior military officials. Based on the absence of other cited qualifications (e.g., academic degrees, books published, etc.), this expert status (i.e., inclusion in the text) clearly is based on noted success in senior military positions. This is not to imply that only senior military officials are assigned expert status in these texts. In fact, these texts include a variety of military and civilian authors representing a variety of backgrounds. Rather, the objective is to demonstrate a clear correlation between success in the military hierarchy and being granted an expert status on leadership.

Creating Heroes

Another prevalent way these texts link hierarchial positions with leadership is by using senior military officials as heroic icons in the text. This process differs from efforts to confer expert status in several ways. The former process concerns the text assigning credibility on certain subjects to certain individuals. The latter process concerns the text legitimizing its claims by deferring to certain individuals. To do so, these individuals must have some established source of cultural status. In the case of

senior military officials, this status, again, is based on noted success in high level military positions.

Throughout all levels of Air Force leadership training material senior military officials are cited by name far more often than any other group of people. For example, AFP 35-49 supported its claims 21 times by citing persons by name. Of these 21 citations, 19 cited senior military officials. As Ernest Bormann noted, the process of deferring to verbal images--or "rhetorical visions" as he calls them--to establish or represent a claim is an effective, commonly used means of focusing attention on a specific theme. (18) In the case of using senior military officials as heroes, or icons, in a narrative, the theme of linking leadership to positions in the military hierarchy is underscored.

Examining Dramatic Counterpoint

Another pervasive way these texts underscore this theme is by positioning its characters (i.e., establishing a protagonist and antagonist) within a narrative structure. This process can be identified by, among other means, examining the frequently used technique of illustrating leadership issues through hypothetical situations (i.e., narratives). The objective of such an analysis is to determine how the concept of leadership is related to the positioning of the narrative's characters. The following are three examples of these commonly used short hypothetical

narratives:

Sgt. Smith, your administrative clerk, a well-liked, usually hard working NCO, has begun coming to work late once or twice a week with what is obviously a hangover. <19>

You, a newly commissioned second lieutenant, are downtown in uniform and see an airman, also in uniform, acting in a disorderly manner. You call him aside and reprimand him for conduct unbecoming an airman. Is your reprimand a proper application of authority? <20>

You are the squadron commander of a missile squadron. One of your officers comes to the pre-departure briefing very much in need of a haircut. <21>

Each of these narratives is supplied with a list of three or four alternate actions "you" the leader may take. However, in this context, examining the alternative courses of action is not as important as is identifying the relationship between the protagonist and antagonist of these narratives. In each of these cited cases, the protagonist is exercising leadership by virtue of a position in the hierarchy. The antagonist is clearly the subordinate in this hierarchy. This pattern is followed in nearly every example of such hypothetical narratives.

Whether the text uses overt efforts to link leadership with hierarchial positions or it uses covert means such as the positioning of characters, the same theme is established: that leadership is synonymous with positions in the military hierarchy. This theme is dominant in Air Force leadership training material.

Leadership as an Ideograph

Summarizing Values

It would be extremely inaccurate to imply that Air Force leadership training materials treat leadership solely--or even primarily--as a position in the military hierarchy. In fact, these texts discuss factors such as leadership "traits," "values" and "skills" at length. As Segal suggested in Chapter 1, such diverse characterizations of leadership may seem contradictory, but a narrative analysis of these texts allows this diversity to be viewed differently. In the context of a narrative analysis, it is possible to reveal an inherent consistency among these seemingly contradictory characterizations of leadership.

Many of these contradictions can be reconciled when leadership is viewed as a military "ideograph." An "ideograph" is a term communication scholar Michael McGee used to describe how social reality can be represented "in a vocabulary of complex, high order abstractions." McGee describes an ideograph as "a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular and ill-defined normative goal." (22) In essence, an ideograph is a term which represents or symbolizes a series of cultural values.

Viewing leadership as a military ideograph provides a foundation for identifying a narrative rationality that links the diverse characterizations of leadership found in

Air Force leadership training material. When viewed as an ideograph, leadership can become a term which symbolizes or encompasses a multitude of military virtues (i.e., positive values). "Leadership," when used in this context, does not primarily reflect a position nor a process. Rather, it is being used to represent a system of cultural virtues which, as McGee notes, "signify collective commitment." (23) To distinguish the use of leadership as an ideograph from other uses of the term (e.g., to describe a position or a process of influence), the analyst should examine the degree to which values are implicit to the word's usage. When this criterion is applied to Air Force leadership training material, it quickly becomes apparent that "leadership" frequently is used as an ideograph.

Evidence of the Ideograph

Perhaps the most overt evidence of such usage can be found in an article reprinted in the senior NCO's PFE manual. This article corresponds a leadership virtue with each letter in the word "leadership." Thus, "L" is for loyalty, "E" is for education, "A" is for articulation, "D" is for diplomacy, "E" is for excellence, "R" is for responsibility, "S" is for scientific management, "H" is for honesty, "I" is for innovation and "P" is for pride. (24)

A similar example of leadership being used overtly as an ideograph can be found in the PFE manual for NCOs. In

this instance, a corner of the cover page of the chapter on leadership contains a graphic titled "Traits of a Leader." (25) This heading comprises a list of virtues including "integrity, responsibility, competence, enthusiasm, emotional stability, humanness and self-confidence." This list of virtues is flanked by a head-on photograph of an NCO who is wearing a perfectly pressed uniform while standing rigidly at attention. The words and the photograph are juxtaposed to visually convey the image of an NCO who embodies virtue.

These examples represent only a few of the virtues cited or implied by other uses of "leadership" as an ideograph in these texts. Among the other virtues attributed to leadership are decisiveness, energy, selflessness, inspiration, courage, courteousness, cheerfulness, toughness, discipline, masculinity, character and spirit. These virtues reflect a fairly complete summary of traditional military virtues.

While McGee did not intend that the term "ideograph" should specifically be applied to narrative analyses of communication, the term can be extremely useful for such analyses. For instance, the concept of an ideograph in many ways parallels the use of characters in a narrative. Like the ideograph, characters are often forms or entities which represent a variety of traits or values. As noted previously, characters in a narrative represent a means of

differentiating a variety of social forces. If the ideograph of leadership were to be translated into a character that could be positioned in narrative form, a most appropriate character would be the warrior hero.

The characterization can be determined in several ways. First, as noted in the previous section, these texts repeatedly defer to traditional military war heroes. These war heroes, many of whom never served in the Air Force, are positioned as both leadership experts and heroes in these texts. These texts convey hero status by, among other means, citing numerous anecdotes (i.e., narratives) in which these individuals are cast as heroes.

The idea of using characters to act as the embodiment of certain virtues reflects a long-standing dramatic tradition. In western culture this tradition dates back at least to the morality plays of the 15th century. A morality play was a drama in which characters were used to represent abstract passions, vices and virtues including, death, evil, mercy and holiness.<26>

As noted in Chapter 2, such characterizations serve to reduce the incomprehensible complexity of the social world to recognizable forms. As such, characterizations or--in the context of a narrative analysis-- many forms of categorization serve to differentiate social forces so that causes and effects may be attributed.<27> If the ideograph of leadership and its representative icons (i.e., war

heroes) are viewed as a protagonist in the narrative structure of leadership training texts, there also should be an identifiable antagonist against which to differentiate the protagonist.

Management: an Antagonistic Ideograph

Analyzing the narrative structure of Air Force leadership training material reveals such an antagonistic counterpoint to the ideograph of leadership: the ideograph of "management."

As noted in Chapter 1, the trend towards "a shift from the traditional leader model to the modern military manager" has not been well received by senior military officials. During the Vietnam era, many observers of the military culture attributed reports of low-morale and poor performance to "an excessive reliance on management skills at the expense of leadership skills." (28) This philosophy was notably represented by military sociologist Morris Janowitz, who in 1971 attributed many of the military's problems in Vietnam to excessive emphasis on "occupationism and managerial efficiency." As Janowitz noted:

Because the military establishment is managerially oriented, the gap between the heroic leader and the military manager has also narrowed...The technologist is likely to be most concerned with means, the manager with the purpose of military policy...Presently the military academies are deeply concerned with whether they can adequately present an image of a 'whole man' who, realistically, is both a modern heroic leader and a military manager. (29)

The military service, in part, sought to rectify this perceived situation by emphasizing leadership as an ideograph. This is not to imply that using leadership as a military ideograph was invented for this purpose. In fact, this ideograph has a longstanding tradition that dates back, at least, to the American revolution.<30> Rather, by the late 1970s, many military scholars clearly had turned to this long-standing characterization of leadership to explain undesirable trends in the military culture. These theorists asserted that many of the problems attributed to poor leadership--particularly those which surfaced during the Vietnam era--resulted from a "shift" from leadership to management skills.

Several articles in the Air Force texts exemplify these views. Interestingly, one of the strongest advocates of characterizing leadership as an ideograph is made by civilian management scholar Warren Bennis. In his article, originally written for a non-military audience, Bennis observed that "Leaders are people who do the right thing; managers are people who do things right." Bennis asserted that, by creating this distinction, he wasn't passing judgment on managers--whom he claims are important to an organization. He explained that, he merely sought to differentiate the concepts of leadership and management.

When Bennis' article is viewed as narrative, however, such differentiations reveal significant judgments about

leadership. To imply that managers merely do things right also implies that they often do the wrong thing well. As such, the manager is cast in the role of a colorless technocrat who personifies mediocrity. Such a character easily can be positioned as the antithesis of the virtuous, heroic leader. Bennis supports this characterization by asserting that an excessive reliance on management led to America's declining productivity in the late 1970s. He specifically cited former president Jimmy Carter as an icon who represented the ideograph of management. Bennis characterizes Carter as being "boring" and "indistinct"--the archetype for the colorless, semicompetent technocrat. As Bennis explained it, "Carter had more facts at his fingertips than almost any other president." Yet all he seemed to bring to America was "malaise" and "despair."

In contrast to this characterization of Carter as the archetypal manager who embodies mediocrity and ineffectiveness, Bennis offered his version of the heroic leader. Bennis cited numerous characters whom he depicted in short anecdotal narratives as demonstrating leadership. The common denominator among all of these narratives was "success." In contrast to his characterization of Jimmy Carter, Bennis characterized leaders as exhibiting "significance," "competence," "community," "excitement," "effective(ness)" and "quality."

The texts also contain articles by military authors

who, similarly, characterized leadership and management as ideographs representing virtue and vice, respectively. However, these articles are noticeably more blatant. For example, an article written by retired admiral, Vietnam prisoner of war and Congressional Medal of Honor recipient James Stockdale bluntly differentiates these characterizations. This article, reprinted in the SOS manuals, asserts that leadership is a reflection of virtues that "can only be tested in a real life crisis." (31)

In contrast, management is practiced by "efficiency worshipping functionaries." Stockdale asserts that these people are "harmless...as long as business as usual and riding the bicycle of bureaucratic procedure continues to be the order of the day."

Leaders, however, are depicted as "imaginative," "classically educated" and are "trail blazers;" their actions reflect "insight and inspiration for leadership." In short, Stockdale asserts that leaders "illuminate" the basic principles of "right, good, honor, duty, freedom, necessity, law, and justice."

To underscore these distinctions, Stockdale went into great detail about values the ideograph of management represents. He defined managers as "steadfast plodders" who rely on "trendy psychological case sessions" to make ethical judgments. In times of crisis, managers have nothing to fall back on but "their endless stream of particularized

guidance, programmatic blueprints, acronyms and buzzwords." Ultimately, they will "succumb to emotional paralysis and withdrawal."

The Ideograph as a Unifying Theme

This protagonist-antagonist relationship between the ideographs of leadership and management is implied repeatedly in Air Force leadership training material. Its prevalent usage demonstrates the important role the ideograph of leadership plays in the narrative structure of these texts. In this context, this ideograph serves, among other purposes, to link leadership as a position with leadership as a process.

As Segal asserted in Chapter 1, when military leadership training texts are viewed for their rational content they seem to be contradictory and confusing. Much of this contradiction is based in the use of the word "leadership" to simultaneously define a position in the military hierarchy and a variety of communication and management processes.

However, when these texts are viewed as narrative, the concept of leadership as an ideograph can be shown to make these seeming contradictions more coherent. As this analysis has noted, the ideograph of leadership reflects a series of virtues. Because of what McGee termed the inherent "ill-defined" nature of such "normative goals," <32> these

virtues reasonably can be attributed to either a person or a process. The process can reflect upon the person practicing it and vice versa. Thus, because virtues are vague enough to be projected in several directions simultaneously, they can link processes with positions in the hierarchy.

Ethics scholar Alasdair MacIntyre noted that such a link between an act and the actor is an integral part of heroic societies:

A man in heroic societies is what he does. Herman Frankel wrote of Homeric man that 'a man and his actions become identical, and he makes himself completely and adequately comprehended in them; he has no hidden depths...In (the epics) factual reports of what men do and say everything that men are, is expressed because they are no more than what they do and say and suffer.' To judge a man therefore is to judge his actions. By performing actions of a particular kind in a particular situation a man gives warrant for judgment upon his virtues and vices; for virtues just are those qualities which sustain a free man and which manifest themselves in those actions which his role requires. And what Frankel says and suggests about Homeric man holds also of man in other heroic portrayals. (33)

While this "link" is difficult to defend using rational world logic, it can be explained using the standards of narrative rationality or "reasonableness." As noted in Chapter 2, narrative rationality is viewed by proponents of communication-as-narrative theory as a means of finding standards of "reasonableness" in communication that is not necessarily "rational." This standard explains how seemingly contradictory processes and positions "reasonably" can be linked together in a military context merely because, as Segal noted, the term "leadership" has a "traditional

military ring to it."

"Sense Making" with Ideographs

The ideograph of leadership plays another important role in creating and maintaining a military culture. As leadership researchers James Meindl, Sanford Erlich and Janet Dukerich observed, leadership often is used as a vehicle for attributing organizational outcomes which otherwise might not be understood. These authors suggest that a highly romanticized heroic view of leadership reflects "an attempt to make sense out of organizationally relevant phenomena." (34) These researchers assert that leadership plays an "important part in the sense-making process (by attempting) to generate causal attributions for organizational events and occurrences." (35)

This view of leadership also explains to some degree how the ideograph of leadership can function in a narrative. From this perspective, leadership is seen as an element of organizational language which is used to attribute organizational outcomes. As noted previously, the word "leadership" frequently is used in military texts to attribute success.

Meindl, Erlich and Dukerich assert that such attributions are made because of the "ambiguity of relevant information and the perceived importance of events." The authors verified this hypothesis by performing a

correlational analysis of leadership research. In this study, the authors found a high correlation between an interest in leadership (i.e., leadership research, the use of the word "leadership" in newspaper articles, periodicals and corporate literature) and periods of crisis (i.e., financial, cultural, etc.).

Ensuring Narrative Fidelity

Viewing communication as narrative is a useful way of explaining how and why the mystification of a concept such as leadership both occurs and works. However, to this point the narrative analysis has focused exclusively on demonstrating how the ideograph of leadership can provide what Walter Fisher terms "narrative probability" (i.e., how well a narrative hangs together). Fisher notes that not only must a narrative "hang together," but it must also demonstrate "narrative fidelity." That is, it must "ring true" with the reader's experiences. This means that for the texts to constitute a coherent narrative, they cannot merely rely on the ideograph of leadership to provide a "reasonable" link to seemingly contradictory forces. The texts also must "ring true" with the audience members' experiences.

Some of the inferences in using leadership as an ideograph may have trouble meeting this latter standard. For instance, implicit to using leadership as an ideograph is

the inference that virtue, competency and success are synonymous with leadership. It is quite possible that many of the readers of Air Force leadership training material have experienced that this is not the case. Often, as leadership researcher Jeffery Pfeffer noted, people experience that external factors, which no person nor process could have prevented, clearly caused a failure. <36> These experiences could have occurred in a military context; in this instance, however, that isn't necessary. For instance, many civilian sports fans may have witnessed a great coach or athlete experience a winless season merely because his or her team members or teammates lacked talent or were racked by injuries.

Therefore, to maintain the narrative fidelity of using leadership as an ideograph, the text needs to provide the explanation for the adage, "You can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear."

The readings in Air Force leadership training materials do, in fact, provide a rationalization for such a contingency. This rationalization is summarized by the ideograph of "followership." As a reading in the SOS residence program noted, "It takes both leaders and followers working together to get the job done." <37> the reading goes on to acknowledge a finding, which has been frequently cited in leadership research, that "standards maintained by followers seem more important to group

performance than standards maintained by leaders."

"Followership" is not treated merely as a concept in these texts; rather, it is used as a parallel ideograph to leadership. The ideograph of followership in essence summarizes the same virtues as does the ideograph of leadership. Some of the virtues specifically cited in the texts' references to followership are "sacrifice," "pride," "respect," "honesty," and "responsibility." The ideograph of followership has other names in these texts including "dynamic subordinacy." However, despite different names, the values the ideograph represents (e.g., "stewardship," "knowledge," "competence," "responsibility," "motivation," "challenge," "commitment," etc.) indicate that the same ideograph is being referenced.

The ideograph of followership plays an important role in establishing the narrative fidelity of Air Force leadership training material. Most notably, it serves as a standing rationalization to explain any inconsistencies the audience might perceive between the ideograph of leadership and their personal experiences. Therefore, if audience members question what has been attributed to "leadership," they need not simultaneously challenge the values inherent to the ideograph of leadership. The ideograph of followership allows these values to be maintained and applied at a parallel level if ideograph of leadership is questioned.

This latter point is important for several reasons. First, it allows persons in hierarchial positions to be viewed as virtuous in spite of failures. The ideograph of followership allows persons who have witnessed or experienced failures to maintain face (i.e., refer to themselves as leaders) by blaming their followers. Thus, persons in hierarchial positions may rationalize, "My failures don't necessarily reflect my 'leadership' skills; rather, my subordinates merely lacked 'followership.'"

Also, the ideograph of followership helps prevent complacency among followers which might result from the overmystification of leadership. For instance, if followers take the values attributed to the ideograph of leadership literally, they might attribute so much responsibility for their fates to their leaders that followers might neglect their own responsibilities. Discussing "followership" is a way of saying, in effect, "Leaders are important, but followers must never forget their responsibilities."

Finally, as noted previously, it is the values encompassed by the ideograph of leadership which help maintain "narrative probability" in these texts. By maintaining the legitimacy of these values through merely reapplying them from a different perspective, the "glue" which holds the narrative together is not compromised if the ideograph of leadership is questioned.

In Praise of Positivism

Introduction

In seeming direct contradiction to the dominant theme that leadership is synonymous with military virtues, Air Force leadership training material contains another prevalent theme which promotes rational management skills.

It may seem contradictory that management, which is clearly cast as an antagonist in the narrative structure of these texts, would also be promoted. However, a closer examination of this situation reveals that such a characterization is not contradictory within the texts' narrative structure.

Justifying Management Skills

Despite the heavy emphasis on values inherent to the ideographic characterization of leadership, the fact remains that nearly all positions in the military hierarchy require extensive management skills. In this context, management skills refer to a series of administrative functions implicit to most hierarchial positions. Many administration or management theorists have summarized these skills under the acronym PODSCORB (i.e., planning, organizing, directing, staffing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting). This widely accepted acronym has been modified somewhat in Air Force leadership training material, but its functions remain similar. The SOS guides cite the specific five functions of

management including planning, coordinating, directing, controlling and organizing.

Interestingly, the articles which specifically discuss and define management--as well as articles which discuss management skills such as problem solving, goal setting, and implementing various programs--are included under the heading of "leadership." For instance, AFP 35-49 officially defines "management" as "the manner in which resources are used to achieve objectives." It then lists "securing funds and then obtaining the necessary weapons, tools and equipment" and managing Air Force educational programs under the heading "Leadership Principles."

This and numerous other similar examples from the other texts support earlier criticisms--such as Segal's--that terms such as leadership and management are used interchangeably. However, as demonstrated in the previous section, when these texts are viewed as narrative, many such contradictions can be reconciled. As noted in that section, the negative connotations of the ideograph of management serve to differentiate and legitimate the ideograph of leadership. Given these negative connotations, to assert that among the primary responsibilities of members of the hierarchy is management would undermine the texts' narrative probability. This problem can be solved, however, by simply classifying managerial functions as leadership. Further, as discussed previously in this chapter, managerial positions

can easily be called "leadership positions."

The extensive emphasis on rationality implicit to the discussions of management functions and skills serves other purposes in the narrative structure of these texts. As noted in the section discussing narrative voice, the extent to which the narrator presents reality as a concrete process reflects the narrator's authority over the audience. Positivism (i.e., the view that the social world can be empirically verified), inherently reinforces this process.

Identifying Positivism

The texts demonstrate this deference to positivism in several ways. Inherent to each of these approaches is the assumption that reality is an objective phenomenon that can be measured, classified and verified.

One of the most prevalent indicators of this assumption is the use of multiple-choice exercises and tests to "measure" a student's knowledge. All levels of formal leadership training including the enlisted PFE manuals, OTS manuals, both SOS course and ACSC, use multiple choice tests to verify students' understanding of the respective material. Also, most courses contain "exercises" in which students read a set of hypothetical situations and select an appropriate response from a list of three or four alternatives provided in the text. In some instances, a student's selected answers are categorized to determine

which leadership "style" is being used. In either case, the clear implication is that the list of alternatives provided by the text represents a complete or reasonable assessment of the available options. This systematized classification of reality by the author is underscored and legitimated by the audience's participation in the ritual of multiple choice tests and learning objectives.

Positivism as Reductionism

In terms of the way leadership is characterized, the deference to positivism is reflected by efforts to reduce leadership processes or situations to a list of variables. In some cases, as in AFP 35-49, these variables are articulated as "steps" or "principles" such as "know your job, know yourself, set the example, care for people, communicate, evaluate, equip, motivate, accept responsibility and develop team work." (38)

As noted in the first section of this chapter, the implication to using lists or categories is that the entities which they contain actually exist. This assumption is relatively unproblematic when developing shopping lists or citing the steps necessary to assemble an M-16 rifle. However, when more complex processes are categorized in this manner, many of the steps potentially can be viewed as problematic. Thus, for ambiguous guidelines such as "know yourself" and "motivate people" to be offered as

representations of external reality reflects several assumptions: First, that as noted in the first section of this chapter, the narrator must be in position of authority relative to the audience; second, that positivism is being emphasized.

This latter assumption serves a valuable purpose in strengthening the texts' pervasive theme of deference to the hierarchy. As noted previously, these texts cast leaders as heroic figures possessing almost mythic qualities. These figures are portrayed as people who do things right, have the right answers and are people of action. Most of the fantasy themes used to sustain this "image" are similar to the following fantasy themes taken from readings in the SOS and ACSC correspondence courses, respectively:

(Civil War General) Sherman was a good example of a leader with outstanding mental and physical energy. During the advance from Chattanooga to Atlanta, he often went for days with only two or three hours of sleep per night and was constantly in the saddle reconnoitering. He often knew the dispositions and terrain so well that he could maneuver the enemy out of position without a serious fight and with minimum losses. (39)

What's dedication? Maybe it's Michelangelo lying on his back painting the great expanses of the Sistine Chapel; Louis Pasteur slowly working out problems to the solutions of disease; George Washington holding the remnants of his army together; or Billy Mitchell preaching air power in spite of the hostile environment that opposed him. (40)

In context of the roles in which these characters have been cast, it is difficult to envision such people needing to ponder questions about the ambiguous nature of social

reality, the symbolism inherent to their actions or the relative nature of the meaning of words. As Stockdale noted in his article on leadership, leaders (i.e., military heroes) don't make judgments based on "a welter of relativism." Instead, as MacIntyre noted previously, heroes are "men" who are inseparable from their actions. That is, heroes are people of action; they are people of values. In short, heroes need answers, not questions.

The positivism implicit to leadership training texts helps support such a characterization. Consistent with the theme that leaders have the answers is the concept that there are answers to be had. Directive or positivistic characterizations of leadership provide such implied certainty.

However, such positivism often requires that complex processes need to be reduced to simple variables. For instance, communication is frequently characterized as a directional transmission of information. As the PFE manual for NCOs notes, "Perhaps the most important function of the small unit leader is to direct this flow of communication information -- up, down and laterally." (41) By categorizing communication as such, the text not only implies that communication is primarily a directional transmission of information, but it simultaneously excludes the possibility that there are other ways to characterize the role communication plays in leadership.

Separating "People" from "Mission"

This trend is perhaps most significantly represented in these texts by assertions that the Air Force's mission and its people are separate variables in the leadership equation. This assertion is a fundamental part of the way the process of leadership [as opposed to the ideograph] is mediated for Air Force members.

As Air Force pamphlet 35-49 notes, leadership "encompasses two fundamental elements: the mission (and) the people." <42> While the text goes on to note that each of these concepts is "complex," they are still characterized as separate concepts [as opposed to being treated as interdependent concepts].

This characterization of leadership as separate "mission" and "people" variables is represented throughout Air Force leadership training material by several leadership "models." These models, which were developed by civilian management and leadership researchers, share the common trait of separating leadership processes into "task" (i.e., mission) and "social" (i.e., the people) variables.

The two most frequently cited examples of such models are the Situational Leadership model, developed by Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard in 1977, <43> and the "Managerial Grid," developed by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton in 1964. <44> Each of these models represents leadership as

a grid composed of two perpendicular axes. One of these axes--usually the vertical one--represents task-oriented leadership; the other axis represents social-oriented leadership behavior. Each axis usually uses a 1-9 scale to represent the respective magnitudes of task or social leadership behavior. These grids theoretically allow for the graphic representation of up to 81 different degrees of leadership behavior.

However, the grids in fact are used to represent only four or five noticeably different leadership styles. These styles represent the extremes of the grids. The developers of the Managerial Grid thus categorize leaders as demonstrating the following styles: high-task and low-social (9,1), low task and high social (1,9), moderate task and moderate social (5,5), and high task and high social (9,9). This model advocates that 9,9 is the most effective leadership style.

The Situational Leadership model also uses a similar grid to mediate leadership. However, this model contends that the optimum leadership style depends on the situation. The situation, as defined by the model, refers to the maturity level (i.e., the skills and knowledge) of the group. The developers of this model argued that the 9,1 leadership style (they call it "telling") is most appropriate for an immature group while 1,9 leadership ("selling") is most appropriate for mature groups.

While Air Force leadership training material cites both models, the Situational Leadership model is clearly emphasized. Another model cited less frequently by these texts is called the "ReadAct" model. This model does not plot leadership styles on a grid, but, like the other models, is based on separating leadership situations into task and social dimensions. This model separates leadership behavior into two categories "Read" (i.e., the ability to understand the social dimensions) and "Act" (i.e., ability to command the task dimensions). Like the Managerial Grid, this model separates the leaders by the degrees to which one dimension or the other is emphasized. Thus, the 9,1 leader is called "r"ead "A"ct and the 1,9 leader would be "R"ead, "a"ct. As with the managerial grid, 9,9 or "R"ead "A"ct leadership is advocated as the best style.

The Value of Models

Such positivistic models play a valuable role in creating and maintaining the narrative structure of Air Force leadership training material. These models, which form the framework for mediating leadership processes in all levels of training, provide students with a standardized, by-the-numbers approach to reducing social reality into an understandable form. Such models support the view that leaders may act with certainty and need not struggle with ambiguities or paradoxes. The models provide neat boundaries

and consistent answers.

The OTS manual and the SOS residence program demonstrate how Air Force members are encouraged to apply this information. In each of these courses, leadership students are shown the critically acclaimed film 12 O'Clock High. This 1949 film stars Gregory Peck as a World War II brigadier general who has been assigned to straighten out a struggling B-17 bomb group. This group, which had been assigned the highly dangerous mission of daylight bombing of heavily defended German industrial targets, had been suffering high casualties and low-mission effectiveness under a commander named Colonel Davenport. The colonel's superiors asserted that he had become too close to his personnel and, although he was extremely well-liked, he had lost his effectiveness. The film focuses on Gregory Peck (General Savage) as he uses authoritarian tactics to take over and revive the group. Although initially successful, irony was interjected into the film and Peck's character befell the same fate of Colonel Davenport: he became too emotionally involved with his personnel and suffered a nervous breakdown.

Students are asked to view and analyze this complex, paradoxical film. However, instead of being asked open-ended discussion questions focusing on the ironies and paradoxes reflected by this narrative, students are asked to apply the Situational Leadership model to the film's events. In this

context, this model serves to eliminate this film's inherent paradoxes by establishing boundaries for attributing meaning to events. Thus, virtually every event in the film can be reduced to an analysis of how General Savage is either focusing on the task or the social dimension of the group based on how he assesses the group's maturity.

Such models and exercises play an important role in creating and maintaining the narrative structure of Air Force leadership training material. Their directive tone corresponds to the didactic, positivistic tone of the narrative voice, which, as noted previously, is based on establishing and maintaining the authority of the military hierarchy. Second, positivistic characterizations of social reality circumvents the ambiguities and paradoxes which might conflict with the prevalent depiction of the warrior hero as the embodiment of military virtue. Finally, when such positivism begins to appear similar to the sterile bureaucratic processes which were villainized by the ideograph of management, positivism may be called "leadership" to circumvent contradictions within the texts' narrative structure.

Leadership and Masculinity

Be a Man

A value that is closely linked to the ideograph of leadership and its representative icon, the warrior hero, is

"masculinity." This value is both overtly and covertly referenced throughout Air Force leadership training material. Perhaps the most distinct reference to this value can be found in a reading from the SOS correspondence course text:

(To be a leader) know your stuff--and be a man. That is number two. Be a man...I never knew a great American seaman, I never knew a great American soldier, or read about one, who was not fundamentally a man. And that means a man of character; it means a man of industry; it means a man of fair play. <45>

Although this specific reading was not included in other courses, all the texts linked masculinity with the ideograph of leadership. This identification was overtly reflected by "sexist" language <46> and covertly implied by the icons and values that correspond to the ideograph of leadership.

All the texts overtly reflected sexist language in their references to leadership. This language was commonly represented by remarks such as "The leaders and the men who follow him represent one of the oldest, most natural, and most effective of all human relationships;" <47> or, "A commander's effectiveness diminishes to the extent that he must use his authority to lead his men." <48>

To be fair, many--but not all--overt uses of sexist language were represented in articles or quotes made before public consciousness was raised to such issues. However, it should also be noted that, despite the extensive use of such language, the texts do not offer disclaimers for such

language. The sections written by the actual editors of the material [as opposed to material taken from outside sources] tends to use non-sexist language. However, even the course editors did not always avoid sexist language as evidenced by this rhetorical question asked by the editors of the OTS course guide: "Who are the leaders American military men look to as examples?" (49)

Although some of the readings in these texts originally may have been addressed to all-male audiences, these texts were not written for all-male audiences. Air Force records indicate that approximately 13 percent of active duty members are women. (50) Although women are prohibited by law from serving in front-line combat positions, in the Air Force women are represented in nearly every career field including operational positions such as pilots, security police personnel, missile launch crews and aircraft maintenance. Women are routinely assigned to nearly all overseas duty locations and hold numerous command positions throughout the Air Force. However, women are often non-entities in the narrative structure of Air Force efforts to mediate leadership.

Sexism and the Military Culture

British military analyst Norman Dixon asserts that a preoccupation with masculinity--which often is manifest in a contempt for effeminacy--is deeply rooted in many military

cultures.<51> Dixon notes that during various forms of military training male students who have not met a particular training environment's enacted standards of military virtue often have had their masculinity questioned. Often, Dixon notes, these students are crudely characterized as representing various parts of the female anatomy. One of the least offensive of these characterizations, he notes, is "aimed at (male) officer cadets who make a poor showing during ceremonial drill." These cadets are told that they "look pregnant." Ironically, he notes, this putdown is almost never aimed at women cadets to whom "there might actually be some truth to the assertion." <52>

Dixon attributes the long-standing military tradition of linking military virtue with masculinity to psychological predispositions fostered by the military culture. Other authors such as MacIntyre have noted that heroic cultures--upon which many traditional military virtues are based--were highly patriarchal for functional reasons. <53>

While such theories provide interesting perspectives to this situation, a narrative analysis is more concerned with examining the role such characterizations play in producing and maintaining a culture. In the case of military leadership training, the emphasis on masculine traits can be traced to the ideograph of leadership and its iconic representation, the warrior hero. This deference to the warrior hero character, as noted previously in this chapter,

is represented both by conferring expert status on military leadership issues to military heroes and by casting military heroes as the protagonist in the texts' narrative structure. Most of the individuals cast as warrior heroes earned this status by serving in combat positions or by directing combat forces. Ironically, many of the individuals cast in this role in the narrative structure of Air Force leadership training material were U.S. Army infantry officers.

Since women are prohibited from serving in combat positions, this strong link between combat skills--particularly infantry skills--and leadership skills clearly excludes women from significant roles in the narrative structure of these texts.

Covert Sexism

Women are not merely omitted from the narrative structure of leadership training material, but to some degree women are cast as a dramatic counterpoint to the virtues inherent to the ideograph of leadership. While "femininity" is not overtly villainized as is the ideograph of management, some texts tend to position feminine values in an antagonistic role to masculine values.

Since it is often problematic to merely characterize a value as "masculine" or "feminine," there is a need to examine the context in which values are used before assessing characterizations. A modified version of the

Managerial Grid, which is included in the OTS manual, demonstrates how values can be positioned within a particular context to covertly differentiate their meanings.

This model was designed by a military officer to demonstrate how the Managerial Grid can be applied in a military context. (54) As such, it lists, names and characterizes four of the five leadership styles identified by the Managerial Grid. These styles include the 9,1 style (high task and low social); the 1,9 style (low task and high social); the 1,1 style (low task and low social) and the 9-9 style (high task and high social). In providing names and characteristics to each of these styles the author--probably unknowingly--distinguished the styles by the values each represents.

As noted in the discussion of the Managerial Grid in the previous section, the author agreed with the developers of the Managerial Grid that the 9,9 leadership style was the optimum one-size-fits-all leadership style. Correspondingly, the Military Managerial Grid labels this style as "Involved Participating (leadership)." The values used to further characterize this style include "teamwork," "mission," "involvement," "willingness" and "commitment."

More significant is the manner in which the 9,1 and 1,9 leadership styles are characterized, positioned and contrasted. The autocratic 9,1 style is labeled "Strong, Tough." Both of these labels represent values frequently

attributed to the ideograph of leadership. In contrast, the 1,9 style is labeled "Soft, Weak." When the values "strong" and "tough" are viewed alone a link with masculinity is implied; when these values are positioned against "soft" and "weak" a noticeable masculine-feminine dichotomy is characterized. Further, within the context of the ideograph of leadership, masculine values clearly are positioned as virtues.

These characterizations are underscored by the additional values used to "explain" the respective labels for each style. The 9,1 leader is described as "Max(imum) mission." In a culture where a predominant normative catch phrase is "The mission comes first," this value clearly is identified as a virtue. Further, the 9,1 leader is "aggressive"--specifically citing another virtue included under the ideograph of leadership. Two other military virtues, "motivation" and "goal-(oriented)" also are attributed to the 9,1 leader.

The 1,9 leader is characterized as "minimal mission," "lacks commitment," "passive" and "smooths over conflict." The meaning attributed to these values can be determined by positioning them against the dominant ideograph of leadership. In this case they clearly imply feminine characteristics and clearly are considered vices.

The emphasis on masculine values also can be revealed by analyzing the values attributed to the protagonists in

the anecdotal narratives contained in these texts. As noted previously, most of the protagonists in these texts' anecdotal narratives are either combatants or direct other combatants. Many of these heroes, as noted in a reading from the SOS correspondence course, proved their masculinity (i.e., their worthiness to be warrior heroes) prior to battle in male-only endeavors such as football or "hazing" at the military academies:

While these leaders (Dwight Eisenhower, George Marshall and Douglas MacArthur) were not born to command, many of the qualities which were to make them great were evident in their early years as cadets....Their courage was revealed in Eisenhower's reactions to his football injuries and in Marshall's and MacArthur's reactions to their hazing. (55)

The most obvious evidence of gender bias inherent to such anecdotal narratives is the paucity of women cast as protagonists. The texts made many hundreds of references to leadership icons; only three times were these icons women (Elizabeth I, Margaret Thatcher and Joan of Arc). Each of these women was referenced only once.

These trends reflect the extent to which the values comprised by the ideograph of leadership dominate efforts to mediate leadership for military audiences. As noted throughout this chapter, the ideograph of leadership plays a vital role in maintaining the narrative probability and narrative fidelity of Air Force leadership training material.

This section noted that masculinity and masculine

traits are key values in the ideograph of leadership. These values are manifest in the narrative structure of these texts by the ideograph of leadership and its iconic representation as the warrior hero. Because of the need to emphasize these values, this narrative is unable to accommodate the many roles women play as leaders in the modern military. To have done otherwise would have undermined the validity of the military ideograph of leadership. Given the significant role this ideograph plays in unifying the narrative structure of these texts, to undermine this ideograph would have indicated a need to significantly alter existing approaches to mediating military leadership.

Notes

1. Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1962), 49-65.
2. F. K. Stanzel, A Theory of Narrative (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
3. Richard Gregg, Symbolic Inducement and Knowing (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1984), 116.
4. Department of the Air Force, "Air Force Leadership," Air Force Pamphlet 35-49, 1 September 1985, 7-14.
5. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Pamphlet 50-34 Volume I, 1 April 1987, 12.1.
6. Department of the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College Associate Program 00035A L02 8705 ([Maxwell AFB, AL]: Air University, Air Command and Staff College, 1987), v.
7. W. Barnett Pearce and V.E. Coronen, Communication, Action and Meaning: The Creation of Social Realities (New York: Praeger, 1980), 79.
8. Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," in On Narrative, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1-21.
9. Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs, Mediated Political Realities (New York and London: Longman, 1983), 1-2.
10. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Pamphlet 50-34 Volume II, 1 March 1985, 4.4.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid, 4-5.
13. ACSC, 3.
14. AFP 50-34 Vol. I, 12.4.
15. Department of the Air Force, Military Training Officer Basic Military Training, Precommissioning Leadership and Management LMAPM0103-000/A000/001, ([Lackland AFB, TX]: Air Training Command, Officer Training School, 1987), 4.23-4.24.
16. AFP 35-49, 13.

17. B. Aubrey Fisher, "Leadership: When Does the Difference Make a Difference?" in Communication and Group Decision Making, ed. Randy Hirokawa and Marshall Poole (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1986), 198-201.

18. Ernest G. Bormann, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," Quarterly Journal of Speech 58 (1972): 397.

19. Department of the Air Force, "Leadership in the Air Force," Squadron Officer School Residence Program ([Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, Squadron Officer School, 1988), 54.

20. OTS, 4.19.

21. SOS Residence, 60.

22. Michael C. McGee, "The 'Ideograph': A link between Rhetoric and Ideology," Quarterly Journal of Speech 66 (1980): 15.

23. Ibid.

24. AFP 50-34 Vol. II, 4.8.

25. AFP 50-34 Vol. I, 12.1.

26. Christopher R. Reaske, How to Analyze Drama (New York: Monarch Press, 1984), 9-10.

27. Nimmo and Combs, 1-13.

28. Edward C. Meyer, "Leadership: A Return to Basics." Military Review, July 1980, 2.

29. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1971) 425.

30. Barry Schwartz, "George Washington and the Whig Conception of Heroic Leadership," American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 18-33.

31. SOS Residence, 9-11.

32. McGee, 16.

33. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, second edition, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 122.

34. James R. Meindl, Sanford B. Ehrlich, and Janet M. Dukerich, "The Romance of Leadership," Administrative Science Quarterly 30 (1985): 78-102.

35. Ibid, 79.

36. Jeffery Pfeffer, "The Ambiguity of Leadership," Academy of Management Review 2 (1977): 104-112.

37. SOS Correspondence Vol. III, 15.

38. AFP 35-49, 14-21.

39. SOS Correspondence Vol. I, 44.

40. ACSC, 3.

41. AFP 50-34 Vol. I, 12.7.

42. AFP 35-49, 2.

43. Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1982).

44. Robert R. Blake, and Jane S. Mouton, The Managerial Grid (Houston, Texas: Gulf Publishing, 1964).

45. SOS Correspondence Vol. I, 48.

46. The use of "sexist" language is expressly discouraged in virtually all major publication handbooks.

47. AFP 35-49, 15.

48. ACSC, 1.

49. OTS, 4.3.

50. The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1988 Edition, (New York, Newspaper Enterprise Association, 1988), 328.

51. Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), 209.

52. Ibid.

53. MacIntyre, 78-79.

54. OTS, 4.5.

55. SOS Correspondence Vol. I, 39.

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

Narrative Rationality and the Ideograph

Evaluating the Findings

The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast the findings of the narrative analysis to current trends in leadership research. This discussion also will assess some of the prices and payoffs inherent to the ways in which the texts mediate leadership for military members.

The narrative analysis of Air Force leadership training material revealed several pervasive themes among the texts' narrative forms. The themes were viewed as both reflecting the military culture's motives and establishing a common "narrative rationality" among the texts. As noted throughout the analysis, these themes seem contradictory when viewed for their logical content. To this extent, the narrative analysis confirmed previous findings which were cited in Chapter 1. These findings noted that words such as "leadership," "command" and "management" were used inconsistently and often interchangeably throughout military leadership texts.

The narrative analysis, however, demonstrated that when the texts were viewed for their "narrative rationality,"

many of these contradictions can be reconciled. Although these themes seemingly are contradictory, they represent a coherent narrative rationality (i.e., a "reasonableness" based in the standards of narrative probability and narrative fidelity). From a narrative perspective this thematic coherence transcends the "logical" contradictions among these texts.

This thematic coherence among the dominant textual themes became more evident when the concept of the "ideograph" was applied to the analysis. As noted in the analysis, the use of the word "leadership" as an ideograph provided the basis for making a "reasonable" narrative about the role leadership plays in a military culture.

Most significantly, the analysis demonstrated how the use of leadership as an ideograph provided a reasonable link between two dominant, but seemingly contradictory, themes. These themes included efforts to utilize the word "leadership" to define and legitimize status positions within the military hierarchy and efforts to use the word "leadership" to describe a variety of functional processes including rational management skills (i.e., PODSCORB) and social influence processes.

The Advantages of Ambiguity

The analysis demonstrated the ways in which the ideograph of leadership unified these seemingly

contradictory themes into a coherent, reasonable form. In this case, the values summarized by the ideograph of leadership were ambiguous enough to establish a narrative rationality which unified these themes.

This finding is underscored by management communication scholars Karl Weick's and Larry Browning's observation that, "As communication is followed deeper into organizations, it becomes obvious that clarity and authenticity are not always desirable."⁽¹⁾ These authors cited a study by communication scholar E.M. Eisenberg which characterized an organizational culture's production of meaning as being "less one of consensus making and more one of using language strategically to express values at a level of abstraction at which agreement can occur."⁽²⁾

An ideograph such as "leadership," which, as McGee noted, summarizes "ambiguous and ill defined normative standards," illustrates Eisenberg's concept of "strategic ambiguity" within organizations. As Eisenberg asserted, this ambiguity promotes a "unified diversity" within organizations through which members can interpret information differently and still maintain consensus. The ambiguous nature of the values summarized by the ideograph of leadership allow the ideograph to serve this purpose in a military culture.

In a popular book which sought to explain military shortcomings in the Vietnam war, military scholars Richard

Gabriel and Paul Savage noted that military cultures face a perceived need to establish an "organizationally based morality" and "communal goals." It was the lack of such standards, Gabriel and Savage assert, which lead to dissatisfaction with military leadership during the Vietnam era. <3> As demonstrated by the Air Force's previously cited efforts to "promote institutional values over occupational values," those persons developing military doctrine apparently agree with Gabriel's and Savage's widely cited assessment. In this respect, the use of ideographs such as "leadership" can represent efforts to utilize strategic ambiguity to create "communal goals."

Alasdair MacIntyre noted that such goals can serve to underscore "relevant virtues" in the context of a culture's traditions. <4> MacIntyre asserted that such virtues can "sustain traditions which provide both practices and individual lives with the necessary historical context. He noted that this sense of traditional virtues is valuable to a culture because "it manifests itself in a grasp of the future possibilities which have been made available to the present." As such, the ideograph of leadership can be viewed as a means to identify virtues which are rooted in military traditions and establish these virtues as normative standards for hierarchial positions.

The Problems with Ambiguity

The "down side" to this strategy is that the ambiguous, relative virtues, captured in ideographs, are difficult to translate into cogent tactics for action. Norman Dixon argued that this "traditional" approach to characterizing leadership as a catch-all for military virtues has required members of the military hierarchy to "fulfill incompatible roles." As he noted:

They (military officers) are expected to show initiative, yet remain hemmed in by regulations. They must be aggressive, yet never insubordinate. They must be assiduous in caring for their men, yet maintain an enormous social distance. They must know everything about everything yet never appear intellectual. (5)

In essence, Dixon joins Segal in asserting that treating leadership as an ideograph obscures the understanding and practice of social influence skills (i.e., leadership as most specifically defined in military doctrine). He further noted:

Discussion of leadership is so often overloaded with vague but emotive ideas that one is hard put to nail the concept down. To cut through the panoply of such quasi-moral and unexceptionable associations as "patriotism," "play up and play the game," the "never-asking-your-men-to-do-something-you-wouldn't-do-yourself" formula, "not giving in (or up)," the square-jaw-frank-eyes-steadfast-gaze" formula, and the "if...you'll be a man" recipe, one comes to the simple truth that leadership is no more than exercising such an influence upon others that they tend to act in concert towards achieving a goal which they might not have had achieved so readily had they been left to their own devices. (6)

Dixon and Segal, among others, have charged that associating leadership with myriad military virtues

mystifies the concept. They assert that this mystification represents a significant drawback to the ways in which "leadership" is often used in military contexts. They argue that among other problems, such mystification obscures both the understanding and practice of important human influence processes among military members.

If there were no perceived problems with the quality of military leadership, there would be fewer problems with obscuring the understanding of these processes in order to promote a sense of collectivism. However, as documented throughout Chapter 1, there is notable dissatisfaction with the quality of military leadership. Much of this dissatisfaction has been articulated by military members themselves. Further, this dissatisfaction often centers on a perceived inability of the military to develop personnel who can act as catalysts for effective mission performance.

Given the perceived importance of social influence processes to the military mission, it is troubling to assert that the military, through its efforts to create and maintain a cultural identity, is inhibiting the development of these skills. These assertions are even more troubling in the context of a narrative analysis of mediated military leadership. As noted in Chapter 3, the ideograph of leadership is the "glue" which binds many different characterizations of leadership into a coherent narrative. When the validity of the ideograph of leadership is

undermined, the narrative probability of leadership training material begins to unravel.

Promoting Values

Proponents of promoting traditional leadership values, including Janowitz, Gabriel, Savage and apparently many persons who develop military leadership doctrine, have asserted that such values promote collectivism. It is asserted that emphasizing these collective values in military training programs will manifest them in the field.

In the context of current communication research, there are at least two key problems with such assumptions. These problems can be summarized by the following questions: First, can values be taught at all? Second, why must these values be called "leadership?"

The first question has been addressed extensively in communication research on values. For example, communication scholars Malcolm Sillars and Patricia Ganer note that "all evidence points to the fact that people do not easily or readily change their values...it is rare to see people acquire new values or abandon old values."<7> The authors also note that some researchers have developed approaches to "redistribute" or "rescale" existing values, but that efforts to instill or change values is extremely difficult.

Even if values can be taught, or at least "redistributed" to correspond to cultural priorities, the

second question remains germane. Theoretically, the values inherent to the ideograph of leadership could be attributed to other ideographs (e.g., professionalism, command or officership). However, to use Segal's words, none of these words has the same "traditional military ring to it" as does "leadership."

The narrative analysis provided several insights as to why this is the case. As noted in the analysis, the ideograph of leadership frequently was symbolized in numerous narratives by warrior hero characters. Historian Barry Schwartz notes that the link between leadership and heroic figures represents a longstanding American tradition. Schwartz traced this link to George Washington who "was virtually deified" by his generation. (8)

Schwartz differentiated the model of the heroic leader from Max Weber's often-cited model of the charismatic leader in several ways. (9) Schwartz portrayed the charismatic leader as a self-glorifying autocrat who uses charismatic personality traits to gain and maintain personal power. In contrast, Schwartz portrays the heroic leader as a living symbol of cultural values.

As Schwartz noted, George Washington lacked most all of the personality traits necessary to qualify himself as a charismatic leader. Further, Schwartz observed that "the excited expressions of praise preceded any concrete achievements on his part." (10) As he noted:

In brief, the earliest manifestations of worship of "godlike Washington" did not depend--could not have depended on--technical genius. It emerged in the context of society's need to articulate and make concrete the fervent emotions of its citizens and the intangible virtues of its cause. And it was in the context of this need that Washington became a living symbol of the Revolution.<11>

Schwartz notes that sociologist Emil Durkheim once observed that "We see society constantly creating sacred things out of ordinary ones." Durkheim added that if society finds a person who represents its "principle aspirations...this man will be raised above the others, as it were, deified."<12>

From this perspective, it might be somewhat incorrect to say the heroic leader symbolizes the ideograph of leadership. Rather, it is more appropriate to say that the ideograph of leadership was created to describe a culture's heroic archetypes. These archetypes were created to symbolize important cultural values. As such, the ideograph of leadership was created to describe what Durkheim would call this "sacred" cultural artifact, the heroic leader. Therefore, it is not surprising that the ideograph of leadership plays such an important role in mediating military leadership.

Values and Mythology

Communication scholars and anthropologists, among others, traditionally have referred to the process of creating archetypal forms (i.e., creating characters or

paradigms) to represent widely shared values as "myths." <13> Essayist Anne Roiphe observed that "Man has always invented stories, gods and heroes to give him a sense of understanding and control of the lightning, the thunder, accident and death." <14>

This process of "myth making" parallels the attributional processes discussed in Chapter 3. As noted in the narrative analysis, some leadership researchers, including Jeffery Pfeffer and James Meindl, Sanford Ehrlich and Janet Dukerich, have documented how leadership often has been used "to understand, interpret and otherwise give meaning to organizational activities and outcomes." <15>

Regardless of what it is called, the process of linking cultural values to "leadership" and representing these values with heroic figures plays an important role in creating and maintaining a military culture.

This narrative analysis helped demonstrate how and why this is the case. As the analysis revealed, a dominant motive of Air Force leadership training material is to legitimize the military hierarchy. This motive was represented by both the paternalistic, didactic tone of the narrative voice and by the overt efforts to characterize leadership as a position in the military hierarchy.

Meindl, et al. explained how "romanticizing" leadership helps legitimate hierarchical positions:

A romanticized view of leadership is probably also an outgrowth of a general faith in human organizations as

potentially effective and efficient value-producing systems that fulfill the various interests of their participants....The potency and promise of human organizations and all the values they represent come to be symbolized in the formal hierarchy of authority and the officials who occupy the elite positions of power and status.<16>

Such insights underscore a fundamental finding of the narrative analysis: that the ideograph of leadership is an integral part of military culture. Among the important functions this ideograph was shown to play in creating and maintaining the military culture are summarizing key cultural virtues, serving as a standing explanation for myriad culturally significant events and legitimating the military hierarchy.

The "Costs" of the Ideograph

As noted previously, however, a key question remains: What are the costs inherent to centering the efforts to mediate leadership around the ideograph of leadership?

One of the most persistent complaints about using leadership as an ideograph is that it obscures a genuine understanding of social influence processes. Much of the previously cited frustration with the state of leadership research reflected difficulties in separating attempts to develop cogent analyses of social influence processes around the ideograph of leadership. Leadership researchers Michael Lombardo and Morgan McCall observed in their 1978 assessment of the state of leadership research that preoccupations with

the ideograph of leadership had been pervasive in most leadership research. As they noted:

Leadership in its present sense is a myth designed to simplify events and their causation, and the myths of leadership should be separated from the analysis of leadership as a process of social influence. <17>

Leadership researchers including Robert Dubin and B. Aubrey Fisher have argued that key among the drawbacks inherent to this situation is that leadership research has failed to distinguish between processes of social control and social influence.

As noted in the narrative analysis, viewing leadership as an ideograph predisposes audiences--and for that matter leadership researchers--to equate leadership with hierarchical positions. Fisher asserted that viewing leadership as such assumes that supervisor-subordinate relationships are synonymous with leader-follower relationships. This assumption, as the narrative analysis demonstrated, is a dominant theme among all levels of Air Force leadership training material.

Fisher argued that a significant problem with equating leadership with positions in a status network is that it conceptualizes leadership as "a suit of clothes to be put on or taken off at will." <18> He went on to explain that equating leadership with positions leads to a "tunnel vision understanding of leadership." This approach, Fisher argued, can result in significant drawbacks in efforts to understand and practice leadership. Equating leadership with

hierarchical positions predisposes people to oversimplify complex processes of social influence [some of the drawbacks inherent to doing this will be discussed later]. This approach also can predispose organizations to ignore and potentially inhibit the natural process of emergent leadership. As Fisher explained:

We are all familiar with situations in which the person in the position of leader, by not performing the role of leader, is circumvented by other group members and forced to give up that position. The Caine Mutiny and Mr. Roberts come to mind readily as literary examples of this rather common phenomenon." <19>

It is interesting that both of these instances of mutiny involved military organizations. Those military analysts who explain such events by deferring to the ideograph of leadership argue that such events--and less entertaining instances such as the previously cited fragging of appointed leaders in Vietnam--primarily result from a "lack of virtue" on the part of the leader. Such explanations do serve as "catch-all" explanations for such problems.

However, this approach is in many ways reminiscent of the response a golf pro once gave when asked how to get out of a sand trap without a sand wedge. The golf pro replied, "Use the utmost skill." Similarly, the idea that appointed leaders will avoid such problems if they embody military virtues is perhaps universally applicable and accurate, but clearly vague and difficult to apply in specific situations.

Fisher offers a more precise explanation for such

problems. He implies that mutiny often reflects organizational failures to properly manage naturally occurring processes of social influence. That is, an organization, by vesting all power to control group activities in a person holding hierarchial positions, is setting itself up for a potential backlash in times of crisis. Fisher argued that real leadership is emergent, not appointed. Thus, "when the going gets tough" a group will automatically turn to its emergent, not appointed, leaders. To ignore this reality may result in relatively benign problems such as uncooperative or passive-aggressive behavior when it is business as usual. However, during times of crisis, a clash between appointed leaders and emergent leaders may result in mutiny.

From this perspective, the antidote for such problems would not be just to teach virtues to appointed leaders and hope that these virtues will be manifest in the leaders' actions. Rather, the antidote would be to help appointed leaders understand the dynamics of emergent leadership and how it relates to appointed leadership in specific situations. In doing so, it would be hoped persons in the organizational hierarchy would develop the flexibility and the skills to manage, instead of ignore, natural group processes.

Dixon notes that not only does promoting a preoccupation with vaguely defined values obscure the

genuine understanding of social influence practices, but it also predisposes leadership students to act in counterproductive manners. He noted previously that the contradictory nature of many of the values summarized by the ideograph of leadership require military members to "fulfil incompatible roles."

Dixon cited a field study undertaken at a British military academy to demonstrate how efforts "to imbue future military officers with proper values" can be counterproductive. This study documented the progression of four middle class British youths through "a crash course in martial expertise and spartan morality designed to turn (them) into highly professional officers." <20> This program contained many of the standard military indoctrination rituals (e.g., saluting, cadet rank structures, honor codes, etc.) which were discussed in Chapter 3. The author analyzed several of these rituals and discussed how each was designed to instill leadership "traits" (i.e., virtues) including "enthusiasm," "honesty," "courage," "humor," and "responsibility." The author noted, however, that instead of instilling these values among the students, the students became self-righteous and arrogant in their relations with subordinates.

Dixon commented that the students "emerged as four neo-feudal paternalistic despots, extraordinary anachronisms in the military forces of a modern democracy." <21> He

postulated that such problems ensued from this training largely because, as Sillars and Ganer noted earlier, values develop early in life and cannot be easily taught nor changed. Dixon asserted that if a value is not evident in an adult, attempts to forceably instill it will "produce sizeable problems of adjustment." That is, persons will become conscious of the "gap" between their existing values and the new values which they are expected to exhibit. This, argues Dixon, "will cause them to overcompensate" resulting in a variety of excessive, bizarre behaviors. (22)

The Ideograph and Sexism

Another question made evident by the narrative analysis is: To what extent do some efforts to promote traditional military values inherently discriminate against female service members?

The analysis noted that most efforts to promote the ideograph of leadership overtly or covertly equated masculine values with leadership. As this narrative analysis examined the values inherent to the ideograph of leadership, it became apparent that the ideograph cannot accommodate the roles women play in the modern military. Therefore, a most significant problem with the use of the ideograph of leadership as a unifying theme in efforts to mediate military leadership is that, to maintain the coherence of the ideograph, 13 percent of the active duty Air Force must

be ignored.

The ideograph of leadership not only casts women as non-entities in the narrative structure of mediated military leadership, but it both overtly and covertly casts women as antagonistic forces to the virtues which it comprises. This is apparent in part through the frequent use of gender-biased language in the texts. It is also revealed through the ways in which the texts position feminine values as antagonistic counterpoints to heroic masculine virtues.

This approach to mediating leadership may undermine the practice of military leadership in several ways. First, the ideograph of leadership predisposes military members to identify leaders based on their "image" as it relates to a series of ambiguous cultural values and the heroic characters who represent these values. This means military members may be less likely to select and respond to leaders based on their qualifications.

Leadership researchers Lenelis Kruse and Margret Wintermantel note that numerous leadership studies have demonstrated how this tendency to attribute leadership to peoples' images rather than to their qualifications can discriminate against women. These studies found that "women and men are judged and evaluated differently even when actual performance is held constant."²³

In a 1983 study Natalie Porter demonstrated how preconceptions about leadership and leaders can determine

who is perceived as a leader. In this analysis of mixed sex groups, men and women were alternately placed at the head of the table and asked to perform similar leadership functions. The researchers found that women usually were viewed as non-leaders even when carefully controlled situational cues indicated that they were leaders. <24>

Kruse and Wintermantel further observed that several studies of "people's naive causal explanations" (i.e., leadership attribution processes) clearly reflected attitudes that leadership is related to masculinity. As they noted:

A man's successful achievement of a task is generally attributed to ability, whereas a woman's success on the same task is explained by luck or effort. However, failure on a task by men is attributed to bad luck and failure by women to low ability. <25>

Such attitudes can be problematic to a military culture in several ways. First, such attitudes probably will undermine the credibility and perceived legitimacy of women holding appointed positions of authority. This may not only diminish the effectiveness of the women who hold these positions, but, ironically, it also may undermine the deference to the military hierarchy--a function which is so important to the ideograph of leadership.

Such attitudes also may breed disrespect for all female service members. Since women may not serve in combat, the ideograph's conspicuous deference to combat heroes, particularly infantry soldiers, may cause women to be viewed

as second-class members of the military culture. This is clearly detrimental to a culture which stresses teamwork and communal values. It is also ironic for a culture such as the Air Force, in which it has been estimated that less than 15 percent of service members serve in combat-related positions, (26) to characterize non-combatants as second-class citizens in the culture.

Theoretically, while some of these many Air Force non-combatants might serve near combat during wartime, many face practically no chance of ever serving in combat. Some are medically disqualified for any combat duty while many others (i.e., certain engineers, systems analysts, etc.) are totally untrained for combat duty. However, only women, by virtue of their gender, are immediately identifiable as non-combatants. Consequently, women potentially can be viewed by those who attribute organizational success to the ideograph's values, not only as second-class members of the Air Force culture, but as "excess baggage" to the Air Force's "romanticized" mission (i.e., "To fly and fight").

As such, it is not unreasonable to expect that more than a few Air Force members might apply the reasoning articulated by an officer who once characterized the shortcomings of the modern Air Force by saying: "That's the problem with the Air Force today--a pregnant 'tech' (technical) sergeant." That is, military members could apply the characterizations implicit to the Military Managerial

Grid and cast women as icons representing all that is wrong with the modern military.

These problems will be compounded by the fact that none of the texts even address the unique needs of female leaders--much less train women to help overcome these culturally erected obstacles. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that most female service members will be ill-equipped to handle these additional demands.

As Dixon noted, military leaders tend to overcompensate for any "gaps" between their backgrounds and their expectations. When this hypothesis is applied to female military leaders, they can be expected to almost compulsively overreact to many situations. This could be reflected by, among other things, excessively authoritarian and/or excessively defensive behavior. Such behavior will not only hinder their effectiveness as appointed and emergent military leaders, but it will also underscore the belief that women are inferior leaders. <27>

Positivism

Positivism and the Ideograph

The narrative analysis demonstrated that not only did the ideograph of leadership promote or underscore certain values, it also acted as a unifying theme among the texts' different characterizations of leadership. The ideograph established a clear thematic link between persons holding

positions in the military hierarchy and various heroic characters.

One of the ways the texts achieve this unification is through a dominant emphasis of positivism. The analysis noted that positivism underscores both the authority and implied omnipotence attributed to the narrative's heroic characters. This is, in part, accomplished by characterizing reality as a concrete process, which, if understood, is seldom ambiguous. By avoiding any inferences to situational ambiguity or relativity, the narrative avoids undermining its heroic characters' legitimacy. Correspondingly, because of the narrative's parallels between heroic figures and status positions in the military hierarchy, positivism also underscores the legitimacy of persons holding these positions.

As many previously cited leadership researchers have argued, the use of the word "leadership" in organizational cultures often parallels traditional uses of mythology. That is, "leadership" serves to explain that which otherwise could not be explained. Further, because of the implied omnipotence of the narrative's heroic characters, the narrative needs to reflect that these characters understand how these "mystic" processes work. This is particularly true in western cultures in which, as educational scholars Michael Apple and Lois Weis observe, "technocist ideologies" represent key cultural values. This, they note, is

continually reflected in western educational programs' pervasive need to translate "questions of 'why'...into questions of 'how to.'"(28). Therefore, to prevent the audience from viewing the narrative's heroic characters as "witch doctors" or other mysticists, leadership training texts need to stress "how to" practice leadership.

The narrative analysis clearly demonstrated that the texts are filled with examples of complex leadership processes being reduced to positivistic "how to" lists or models. It is possible to view this process of simplification or reductionism in several ways.

One explanation could be that positivistic characterizations of leadership represent efforts to make the concept more understandable to the audience. That is, simplification represents efforts to minimize audience confusion by "keeping it simple."

Others could view positivism as an attempt to oversimplify inherently complex phenomena. Doing this, critics of this approach could argue, merely imbues both the author and the audience with the false perception that they understand the phenomena. Many leadership researchers, including Fisher, Lombardo and McCall, Pfeffer, Meindl, et al. and Weick, support this latter characterization.

The narrative analysis also supports this view. It accomplishes this by demonstrating the extent to which the texts reflect multiple, often contradictory

characterizations of leadership to maintain narrative probability. Thus, if positivism genuinely reflected efforts to "keep it simple" the texts would, as Segal and Dixon suggested, merely focus on leadership as a process of social influence. Instead, the texts go to great lengths to establish a "reasonable" link among myriad values, hierarchial positions, motivational theories and management functions.

Problems with Positivism

B. Aubrey Fisher argued that efforts to oversimplify leadership to simple lists or variables probably make the concept less understandable. Fisher and Lombardo and McCall assert that such reductionism has created a series of leadership "myths," which are widely believed but not supported by research. (29)

One of the leadership "myths" Fisher specifically cited was the idea that "leaders typically behave with a specific style, typically described as democratic, autocratic or laissez faire." (30) The assertion that leaders behave with a particular style is directly linked to leadership models which separate leader behavior into task or social dimensions. As noted in Chapter 3, such models are a fundamental part of the way leadership as a social influence process is mediated for Air Force members.

This, however, does not imply that such models were

designed by or specifically for military audiences. In fact, Ralph Stogdill noted in his massive review of leadership research that such models have dominated leadership research for years. <31> However, as Lombardo and McCall note, by the late 1970s many researchers had become disillusioned with such traditional approaches to characterizing leadership. As Fisher notes, the most persistent critique of reductionistic leadership models is that, because they are simplistic, they have detracted from better understanding the true dynamics of leadership.

Many of the oversimplifications inherent to such models reflect efforts to separate leadership into task and social variables. Fisher asserted that such distinctions, while sometimes useful for certain research purposes, represent an artificial distinction between two "interdependent variables." <32>

Numerous researchers dating back at least to H.H. Kelley and J. W. Thibaut in 1954, recognized the interdependence of these variables. As Kelley and Thibaut observed, "The task-oriented part of the total social system is highly interdependent with the other parts. <33> Thus, they found the task dimension "virtually indistinguishable from the social dimension."

Fisher likened the interdependence of these variables to a rectangle. He wrote, "(rectangles) exist in two dimensions--height and width. Height cannot be separated

from width without destroying the rectangle itself." (34)

Interestingly, one of the strongest arguments for the interdependence of the task and social dimensions of leadership interactions comes from Blake and Mouton. The irony here is that these authors based their Managerial Grid on the separation of these two variables. As they noted:

It is important to understand that these Grid variables of leadership are conceptualized as interdependent with one another. It is impossible to exercise leadership without both a task to be done and people to do it. (35)

In the context of the narrative structure of efforts to mediate military leadership, the differences between characterizing the task and social dimensions of leadership interactions as independent or interdependent are significant. Treating the task and leadership dimensions as interdependent does not provide members of the military hierarchy with the implied certainty of action needed to maintain the texts' narrative rationality.

When the social and task dimensions of leadership interactions are viewed as interdependent, it is implied that decision makers must constantly reassess the ambiguous relationship between the situation, the specific task at hand, unit morale and long-term mission objectives. To acknowledge such ambiguity would mean that there is no absolute course of action or pre-established set of priorities upon which to rely.

While the payoff to such an approach is that it

promotes independent, flexible thinking, the price is two-fold. First, decisions will not be standardized, thus, actions and policies will not be consistently implemented. Second, acknowledging such ambiguity would place all hierarchial decisions at question since it could no longer be implied that hierarchial actions are based on absolute, concrete standards.

Not surprisingly in light of the narrative's heavy emphasis on deferring to and legitimating the military hierarchy, such ambiguities are not directly acknowledged in Air Force leadership training material. Instead, the texts are rife with absolute standards such as "The mission comes first."

In a culture in which members are frequently asked to risk--and often give--their lives for the mission, it would seem necessary to articulate such priorities. However, as implied previously, "the mission" is an ambiguous concept. For instance, it is one thing for a commander of a fighter squadron to send personnel on combat missions from which they may never return. It is another thing for a commander to cavalierly incur disproportionate losses to achieve a mission objective of questionable significance. It is yet another issue for an office supervisor to force a subordinate to miss a once-in-a-lifetime personal opportunity to attend a routine, insignificant meeting.

While each of these examples represent distinctly

different circumstances, each of these actions could be rationalized by asserting "The mission comes first." The priorities inherent to such absolutist standards clearly imply that the task is independent from the people who perform the task.

The standard "The mission comes first," while referenced repeatedly throughout the texts, does not represent a unique textual theme in itself. It is not represented by any of the leadership grids, for example. Instead, "The mission comes first" standard represents a value which is included in the ideograph of leadership. The texts, however, do parallel the "mission" value to the task dimension of leadership grids, including the Situational Leadership model and the Managerial Grid.

This parallel is not necessarily congruous to the intentions of the authors of these models. While both leadership models and the "mission" and "people" values similarly reflect the asserted independence of these concepts, the leadership models do not attribute values to these categories. The fact that the military inherently treats the task variable as a paramount cultural virtue inherently changes the meaning of these models. Therefore, this potentially could change significantly the way these models will be applied in the field.

Creating Predispositions to Act

Leadership researchers have demonstrated that supervisors seem predisposed to act based on "common sense" presumptions about the relationship between task behavior and productivity. Such presumptions seem unrelated to any awareness of leadership training grids--much less to overt cultural indoctrination of the respective values of the task and social dimensions of leadership interactions.

For example, leadership researchers Henry Sims and Charles Manz examined the reciprocal influences of leaders' and followers' behavior (i.e., how followers' behavior also influences leaders' behavior). They found that leaders' presumptions about the relationship between task and social behavior and productivity affected the leaders' behavior.<36>

In their 1984 study, Sims and Manz found that when appointed leaders were disappointed with their followers' productivity, the leaders tended to increase their task behavior in hopes of increasing productivity. These actions reflected the leaders' presumptions about the cause-and-effect relationship between task behavior and productivity.

This study confirmed earlier research done by Sims. In this study, Sims observed the reactions of MBA students who were assigned to supervisory positions to the various performance levels of their subordinates. Here again, he found a strong correlation between low subordinate

performance and supervisor punitive behavior. (37)

Sims and Manz also cited three studies published by Andrew Szilagyi in 1980. In these studies, the author observed and compared the supervisory behavior of employees (including non-supervisory employees, clerks and first-line supervisors, respectively) in a retail store. In each case and at each level, low follower performance caused supervisor punitive behavior.

These studies seem to demonstrate that persons in supervisory positions almost reflexively increase task behavior and reduce social behavior when they desire increased productivity. This almost instinctive reaction will most likely be underscored in a military environment in which task behavior is paralleled with fundamental cultural virtues.

As the previously discussed Military Leadership Grid demonstrated, the high-task oriented, authoritarian 9,1 leader effectively was endorsed by the grid. This was accomplished by positioning military virtues with this characterization of a leader. These virtues included toughness, mission orientation, aggressiveness and action orientation. By closely positioning these virtues with particular "styles" of supervisory behavior, the military culture is, perhaps unknowingly, encouraging such behaviors as solutions for productivity problems.

In effect, the texts reduce the complexity of

leadership situations to a point at which military supervisors might almost reflexively turn to high task behavior to increase productivity. Supervisors can then justify these authoritarian approaches with the standing rationalization: "The mission comes first."

Productivity and Cohesiveness

Inherent to acting in such a manner is the assumption that productivity is negatively correlated to group cohesiveness. Fisher noted that, while this sometimes may be true, often such an assumption is erroneous. Fisher argued that productivity and cohesiveness, in fact, have a curvilinear relationship. This means that if productivity and cohesiveness are plotted on a graph, the resulting curve will resemble an inverted letter "U." Thus, productivity increases as cohesiveness increases--up to a point. At that point--the exact location of which varies among groups--cohesiveness becomes somewhat counterproductive. As Fisher explained:

Extremely cohesive groups are more likely to have moderate to low productivity. Although the productivity of highly cohesive groups probably doesn't sink to the level of groups that are extremely low in cohesiveness, such groups are not nearly as likely to be as productive as groups with moderately high cohesiveness.
<38>

Implicit to such a view of the relationship between productivity (i.e., the task dimension) and cohesiveness (i.e., the social dimension) is the assertion that these

dimensions are interdependent, not independent. That is, a leader cannot affect one dimension without affecting the other.

As noted previously, however, this assertion does not correspond well to the dominant theme of positivism found in mediated military leadership. Such interdependence implies situational ambiguity and such ambiguity implies that appointed leaders have no absolute standards of action upon which to defer. In essence, the link between members of the military hierarchy and the heroic leader--who, as Warren Bennis notes always "does the right thing"--are challenged by implications of relativism.

Relativism versus Positivism:
Maintaining Narrative Fidelity

As noted in the narrative analysis, the texts must also maintain narrative fidelity as well as narrative probability. Therefore, because various forms of relativism are so ingrained in western society in everything from religion to child development to academia, it is highly unlikely that "undiluted" positivism would "ring true" with the experiences of many audience members. Thus, to maintain narrative rationality, military texts should temper the absolutism inherent to positivism with some acknowledgement of situational factors. However, it is also clear that to maintain the narrative probability of the texts, the texts

should in no way imply "the welter of relativism" which, as Stockdale suggested in Chapter 3, is the antithesis of the heroic leader.

In the context of mediating leadership skills, the Hersey-Blanchard Situational Leadership model meets both of these requirements. Not surprisingly, it is the most frequently cited leadership model found in Air Force leadership training material. The Situational Leadership model offers a coherent compromise between situational contingency leadership models (i.e., models which are similar to what Fisher termed an "it all depends" hypothesis) (39) and positivism.

In short, the situational leadership model holds that there is no absolute correct leadership style for all situations. That is, the situation dictates the correct leadership style. However, the model then implies that the correct leadership style for a particular situation can be determined by weighing only three variables: The task, the social dimension and the group's maturity. Thus, the authors are able to acknowledge situational contingencies, yet still can reduce the list of behavioral options available to leaders to merely four styles: selling, telling, negotiating and directing.

Problems with Simplification

B. Aubrey Fisher argued that the problem with this approach is that situational leadership depends, not on the interaction of three variables, but "on a bewildering array of different variables." As he noted:

For example, either the leader or the followers could represent one or more of over 2,000 different personality types. The task or situation could be any one of 20 different task types. The number of potential elements in the physical setting could be in the thousands. In short, the contingency approach to leadership seems intuitively reasonable. However, the number of variables which are potentially contingent on leadership and the possible combinations of those variables of situation, leader, and followers are virtually impossible to comprehend. <40>

Fisher argued that any efforts to oversimplify this inherent complexity will result in the sorts of leadership "myths" that continue to confound the understanding and practice of leadership. As this discussion has demonstrated, many of these "myths" are rooted in the idea that the task and social dimensions of leadership interactions are independent variables. This assumption predisposes supervisors to increase task behavior when dissatisfied with subordinates performance. Military cultures, by linking task variables to military virtues, most likely will exacerbate this tendency.

Such strategies may in fact degrade unit productivity and genuine mission performance. As the classic Hawthorne experiment demonstrated in the 1930s, an increase in group cohesiveness often precipitates increased productivity. In

this famous study, researchers sought to measure the negative effects of certain detrimental working conditions (e.g., inadequate light levels) on productivity. However, the researchers found that because of the increased attention (social behavior) paid to the workers, productivity actually increased as working conditions worsened. <41>

In this context, the moral to this particular narrative is that "common sense" tends to underestimate the effects cohesiveness and morale have on productivity. That is, efforts to influence humans based on oversimplifications such as the artificial separation of task and social variables may not only be unsuccessful, but also may be counterproductive. Excessive dependence on task-behavior to affect higher productivity may in the long run lower productivity. Szilagyi noted in his study of supervisors that positive reinforcement, not punitive behavior, had the stronger correlation with productivity increases. <42>

Further, some leadership researchers have argued that preoccupations with leadership "styles" as the locus of control for productivity shifts attention away from more significant causal factors such as the quality of interactions between leaders and followers. For instance, leadership researcher George Graen demonstrated in a 1982 article, which other researchers have replicated, that employee turnover was more closely related to the quality of

the individual communicative exchanges between leaders and followers than it was on the leader's style. <43> This study demonstrated that employee turnover could be predicted by the degree to which employees were dissatisfied with their individual communicative relationships with supervisors.

Therefore, a dominant emphasis on positivistic leadership "styles" inherent to mediated military leadership potentially may hinder more than just productivity. These efforts also may affect service member retention--particularly in the most critical skill areas. As Graen noted in his study, the link between poor leader-follower relations and employee turnover is particularly evident in career fields representing highly marketable technical skills [Graen tested systems analysts and computer programmers].

This finding is particularly significant to the military since all branches of the service go to great lengths to recruit and retain persons with such technical skills. If the quality of leader-follower communicative transactions is a strong predictor of employee satisfaction and retention, to the extent which military services ignore this phenomenon in order to focus on teaching positivistic leadership styles, the services may be hindering retention. This situation is underscored by the fact that the military cannot always match the pay and benefits offered to these highly skilled members by private sector firms.

Potential Antidotes

Several leadership researchers including Fisher and Weick have argued that the antidote for such problems is to understand "leadership in all its complexity." <44> That is, rather than trying to understand leadership by simplifying it, it should be treated as the complex phenomenon that it is.

From this perspective, efforts to teach and promote leadership should center around efforts to make leaders more complex. Fisher recommends teaching people to "maximize their repertoire of types of behavior and increasing their capacity to be flexible and adaptable to changing situations." <45>

In many ways such an approach is diametrically opposed to efforts to mediate military leadership which were analyzed in Chapter 3. As the narrative analysis demonstrated, in order to maintain the texts' narrative rationality, the concept of leadership needed to be simultaneously mystified and simplified. In the narrative structure of these texts, the theme of promoting leadership as a process of social influence was clearly subordinate to the dominant themes of promoting and maintaining both the military hierarchy and traditional romantic views of the military profession.

Further, the extensive emphasis on positivism in these

texts seems to be the antithesis of promoting complexity among military members. In many ways the narrative representations of the heroic leader imply that such a person is the ultimate conformist (i.e., a follower). This is most ironically represented in the head-on photograph of the model NCO who is positioned as the embodiment of military virtues in AFP 50-34 Vol. I. Because of the direct frontal angle of this photograph, the subject is portrayed as a two-dimensional, cardboard-like figure. More significantly, the model's posture (i.e., a full-frontal view while standing rigidly at attention) is almost identical to the posture a pantomime artist assumes when depicting a bowling pin. Symbolically, few items are less complex and more conformist than a bowling pin.

Chapter Summary

The analysis confirmed earlier criticisms that in military leadership texts words such as command, management and leadership often are used interchangeably and ambiguously. The analysis helped identify some of the latent cultural motives which, if understood, could help explain these seeming inconsistencies and contradictions. Among these motives were the perceived need to maintain the military hierarchy and need to reconfirm the longstanding tradition of attributing military success to heroic figures.

This discussion noted that meeting these objectives

helps create and maintain the military culture in several ways. These payoffs include strengthening the communal identities of military members, preserving deference to the military hierarchy and providing common standards for explaining organizationally significant events.

This discussion also noted that inherent to these payoffs are several significant prices. These prices include, obscuring the understanding of social influence processes, promoting myopic approaches to achieving higher productivity and undermining the legitimacy and effectiveness of female service members, who represent 10-15 percent of the active duty Air Force.

The advantage of this approach to research is that by promoting a better understanding of these motives and their respective prices and payoffs, it should help establish more cogent approaches to promoting leadership among military members. This knowledge should help those genuinely interested in developing more effective leadership training programs and increase the accountability of those who, for whatever reasons, seek to hinder this effectiveness.

Notes

1. Karl E. Weick and Larry D. Browning, "Argument and Narration in Organizational Communication," Journal of Management 12 (1986): 248.

2. E. M. Eisenberg, "Ambiguity as Strategy in Organizational communication," Communication Monographs 51 (1984): 231.

3. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul Savage, Crisis in Command (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 97-116.

4. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, second edition, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 223.

5. Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), 214.

6. Ibid.

7. Malcolm O. Sillars and Patricia Ganer, "Values and Beliefs: A Systematic Basis for Argumentation," in Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research, ed. J.R. Cox and C. A. Willard (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), 191.

8. Barry Schwartz, "George Washington and the Whig Conception of Heroic Leadership," American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 18-33.

9. Ibid, 31.

10. Ibid., 21.

11. Ibid., 24.

12. Ibid., 21.

13. Janice Hocker Rushing and Thomas S. Frenz, "'The Deer Hunter' Rhetoric of the Warrior," The Quarterly Journal of Speech 66 (1980): 394.

14. Anne Roiphe, "Ma and Pa and John Boy in Mythic America: The Waltons," in Television: The Critical View, second edition, ed. Horace Newcomb (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1979), 73.

15. James Meindl, Sanford Ehrlich and Janet M. Dukerich, "The Romance of Leadership," Administrative Science Quarterly 30 (1985): 78-79.

16. Meindl, et al., 97.
17. Michael Lombardo and Morgan McCall, "Leadership," in Leadership: Where Else Can We Go?, ed. Michael Lombardo and Morgan McCall (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1978), 9-10.
18. B. Aubrey Fisher, "Leadership: When Does the Difference Make a Difference?" in Communication and Group Decision Making, ed. Randy Hirokawa and Marshall Poole (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1986), 199.
19. Ibid., 201.
20. Dixon, 321.
21. Dixon, 232.
22. Ibid.
23. Lenelis Kruse and Margret Wintermantel, "Leadership Ms.-Qualified: I. The Gender Bias in Everyday and Scientific Thinking," in Changing Conceptions of Leadership, ed. C.F. Graumann and S. Moscovici (New York: Springer Verlag, 1986), 186.
24. Natalie Porter, "Are Women Invisible as Leaders?" Sex Roles 9 (1983): 1035-1049.
25. Ibid.
26. "USAF in Facts and Figures," Air Force Magazine, May 1988, 79-91.
27. Ibid., 172.
28. Michael W. Apple and Lois Weis, Ideology and Practice in Schooling (Temple University Press, 1982), 6.
29. Fisher, 1986, 210-215.
30. Ibid., 213.
31. Ralph Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership (New York: Free Press, 1974), 365-402.
32. B. Aubrey Fisher, Small Group Decision Making, second edition, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1980), 38.

33. H.H. Kelley and J.W. Thibaut, "Experimental Studies of Group Problem Solving and Process," in Communication and Group Decision Making, ed. G. Lindzey (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954), 736.

34. Fisher, 1980, 38.

35. Robert Blake and Jane Mouton, "Theory and Research for Developing a Science of Leadership," Journal of Applied Behavioral Sciences 18 (1982): 275-292.

36. Henry Sims and Charles Manz, "Observing Leader Verbal Behavior: Toward Reciprocal Determinism in Leadership Theory," Journal of Applied Psychology 69 (1984): 222-232. While it was not the authors' objective to measure the effects of such presumptions, the results of this study can be interpreted to demonstrate such presumptions.

37. Henry Sims, "The Leader as a Manager of Reinforcement Contingencies: An Empirical Example and a Model," in Leadership the Cutting Edge, ed. James Hunt and Lars Larson (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), 121-129.

38. Fisher, 1980, 41-42.

39. Fisher, 1986, 203.

40. Ibid., 203-204.

41. Cited in Fisher, 1980, 43.

42. Andrew Szilagyi, "Causal Inferences Between Leader Reward Behavior and Subordinate Performance, Absenteeism and Work Satisfaction," Journal of Occupational Psychology 53 (1980): 195.

43. George Graen, "Role of Leadership in Employee Withdrawal Process," Journal of Applied Psychology 67 (1982): 868-872.

44. Fisher, 1986, 198.

45. Ibid., 215.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

In Review

Military leadership has beguiled those who have studied it for many years. Despite extensive civilian and military research, military leadership remains an enigma.

Despite its mysterious nature, all branches of the United States military have characterized leadership as indispensable to their mission. Consequently, for the past 40 years the military has actively promoted and funded leadership research in hopes of improving the quality of military leadership in the field.

In spite of this extensive research, however, there has been--and continues to be--nagging perceptions that military leadership at all levels has many shortcomings. The specific criticisms of military leadership have been many and varied. However, much of this criticism centers on the military's inability to effectively and consistently help its members become better leaders.

This analysis assessed the extent to which efforts to teach leadership skills to military members might be

responsible for some of these perceived shortcomings. As noted in Chapter 1, both military leadership doctrine and training programs have been criticized by a variety of sources for allegedly obscuring the understanding of leadership. Persons making such charges assert that the military services have failed to develop a concise, consistently applied definition of leadership. They assert that in both military doctrine and in military leadership training programs the word "leadership" is used inconsistently and ambiguously. In these documents, "leadership" is described as hierarchial positions, ambiguous values, management functions, communication skills and combat tactics--to name a few.

This analysis assessed not only the degree to which such criticism might be true, but it also offered insights into why these shortcomings might be evident. This thesis sought to achieve these objectives by analyzing the ways in which one military service, the Air Force, uses language to mediate leadership for its members.

This study was based on the assumption that a culture's use of language reflects implicit cultural motives. These motives represent the politics and priorities which--often covertly--dictate the ways in which a culture creates and maintains itself.

This study identified and assessed these cultural motives by analyzing the narratives and narrative forms implicit to Air

Force leadership training material.

This approach to research reflects a widely acknowledged communication theory. This theory asserts that communication represents efforts to reduce the otherwise incomprehensible complexities of social reality to an understandable form. Proponents of this communication theory hold that this form closely resembles a drama or narrative. These resemblances are viewed by proponents of communication-as-narrative theories as significant even if the forms were neither consciously considered nor intended. Proponents of these theories argue that, because a culture's motives are implicit to these narrative forms, cultural motives can be identified and better understood by analyzing a communicative texts' narrative forms.

The analysis in Chapter 3 represented a narrative "reading" of Air Force leadership training material. As such, this analysis differed from more traditional forms of communication analysis by paying comparatively less attention to these texts' conventional rationality and presentational forms. Instead, this analysis examined the texts' narrative rationality and implicit narrative structure.

This analysis observed that among the most significant and revealing motives implicit to mediated military leadership were prevalent efforts to underscore the military hierarchy. The analysis also revealed that efforts to

legitimate the use of the word "leadership" to summarize traditional military virtues and traditional explanations of military outcomes represented another dominant textual theme.

This analysis demonstrated the important roles each of these motives play in creating and maintaining a military culture. Previously, these priorities had been difficult to assess. Specifically, the analysis demonstrated that a military culture--as revealed by its narratives--places a higher priority upon promoting the military hierarchy and traditional explanations of military outcomes than upon understanding and promoting social influence skills.

The Need for Change

These priorities clearly differ from the priorities implied by official military definitions of leadership. As AFP 35-49 noted, military leadership is most often defined as "the art of influencing and directing people to accomplish the mission." (1) Such a contradiction suggests the need to change current approaches to mediating military leadership. Ideally, these changes should reflect the priorities implied by official definitions of military leadership.

Leadership researchers frequently have charged that several dominant approaches to mediating military leadership in fact do obscure the understanding of social influence

processes. These counterproductive efforts include using leadership as an ideograph, positioning leadership as synonymous with hierarchial positions and reducing complex leadership interactions to simplistic lists or variables.

Identifying these problematic approaches indicates clear strategies for more effectively promoting social influence skills among military members. These include not only abandoning the previously discussed "counterproductive" strategies, but actively "debunking" the myths which these approaches represent.

This analysis notes that Air Force leadership training material represents several prevalent leadership myths. These myths include the implication that leadership is a form of management; that management is antagonistic to leadership in a military context; that leaders exhibit particular styles (e.g., telling, selling, 9,1, 9,9, 1,9, ReadAct, etc.); that leadership is synonymous with universal values and traits; that the "task" and "social" dimensions of leadership interactions are independent; that leadership and masculinity are synonymous; and that leadership is only exercised in combat situations.

Further steps for improving leadership training programs could include redirecting the traditional military virtues summarized by the ideograph of leadership to other--less important--terms such as "command," "professionalism," "officership" or "followership." Other steps might involve

developing concise definitions of these terms and ensuring that they are used consistently in all military documents and leadership training programs. To help achieve this latter goal, speeches about leadership made by former military officers or war heroes should either be edited to meet the new standards or omitted from leadership texts.

Finally, efforts to promote leadership should focus on promoting understanding of the inherent complexity of social influence processes. The objective of such efforts should be to help appointed leaders expand their repertoire of interaction skills and symbolic management skills.

Back to Reality

While these changes may seem logical, a central point to this thesis is that there is little chance such significant changes would be adopted by any branch of the military. As noted throughout this thesis, communication-as-narrative theory holds that conventional conceptions of rationality do not dictate the content of mediated military leadership. Instead, the content of this material represents standards of narrative rationality or "reasonableness."

This analysis has demonstrated that despite the apparent contradictions and ambiguities, the texts can be shown to represent a narrative rationality which "makes sense" to a military audience. This analysis demonstrated

the pivotal role the word "leadership" plays in creating and maintaining the military culture. The previously cited suggestions for improving mediated military leadership simply are not congruous with this purpose.

The narrative analysis suggests that current strategies for mediating military leadership are deeply ingrained in the military culture. Any attempt to radically modify these strategies begins to undermine some of the foundations upon which the military culture has been built. Thus, the current strategies cannot be abandoned without creating great turmoil within the culture.

Significantly changing the way "leadership" is mediated for military audiences would require reevaluating the roles several longstanding traditions play in military cultures. These traditions include the role hierarchy plays in the military culture and longstanding romanticized views of the military profession. For curriculum directors or persons developing military doctrine to significantly redefine current approaches to mediating military leadership would require them to undermine the legitimacy of such institutions. Consequently, such changes cannot be expected.

The Military and Change

In his psychoanalytic analysis of military culture, Norman Dixon stressed that one of the most difficult--if not

impossible--undertakings in a military culture is to abandon deeply entrenched "romantic" traditions. Dixon asserts that even when mission requirements and tradition directly conflict, tradition usually prevails. Dixon cited numerous examples from British and American military history to demonstrate this point.

Dixon cited the continued practice of once useful rituals such as military drill, saluting, wearing hats and wearing epaulets long after there was any functional use for such ritual. However, he noted that such traditions, while "petty" and "time wasting," were comparatively benign. Some military traditions, he argued, have caused many needless deaths and, in some cases, caused military defeat.

Among the most flagrant examples Dixon cited included the insistence of infantry officers to assemble infantry units in traditional column formations and mount frontal assaults even after the advent of the machine gun. He noted that commanders had to suffer monumental losses before such "traditional" tactics were abandoned. <2>

Another of Dixon's historical examples of how strongly military units cling to tradition was the reluctance of the British and American armies to disband cavalry units in favor of tanks. Dixon noted that the British Army, despite its awareness of Germany's rapid and massive expansion of mechanized forces, delayed the expansion of its tank corps to fund lavish, but useless, cavalry units. He noted that in

1935 and 1936, when Hitler announced that his peacetime army would comprise 36 divisions, the British army decided that the amount spent on feed for horses should be increased from 44,000 to 400,000 British pounds. At the same time, the amount spent on fuel for British tanks was increased from 12,000 to 121,000 British pounds. (3)

A similar example of preoccupation with military tradition was the British and American navies' reluctance to abandon battleships in favor of aircraft carriers. As Dixon noted:

As mechanization threatened horses, so aircraft threatened battleships. But unlike horses in military minds, battleships were only the last of a succession of obstacles to progressive naval thinking. Before it had been wood, and before that sail. Each relinquishment and transition had been bitterly and heavily opposed...to most admirals the respective value of battleships and aircraft was not basically a technological issue, but more in the nature of a spiritual issue...a battle ship had long been to an admiral what a cathedral was to a bishop." (4)

Unfortunately, it took several disasters early in World War II--most notably Pearl Harbor--to realize the pathology of such traditions.

In the context of this thesis, such narratives dramatize the profound effect tradition has on military policy. Given this dominant role, combined with the dominant role the word "leadership" plays in maintaining military traditions, it is unrealistic to expect significant changes in the narrative structure of mediated military leadership.

Recommendations

The Value of Critical Research

Despite the pessimism implied in the previous section, findings from this analysis do point to more practical and cogent strategies for promoting leadership. The results of this study also can help identify several areas for future leadership research.

This study applied critical research methods to identify and assess the ways in which leadership is mediated for military members. One benefit to this type of research, regardless of whether all audience members agree with each of the analysis's points or premises, is that such research potentially can raise important issues which previously may have been overlooked. To the extent that such issues are raised and discussed, the primary objective of this thesis has been achieved. As such, instead of viewing the findings of this research as concrete, indisputable representations of reality, these findings may be more useful if viewed as challenges to future researchers.

Confronting Difficult Issues

This analysis has identified several difficult issues which need to be addressed by persons developing military leadership doctrine. While the previous section noted that cultural obstacles will negate radical changes to existing approaches of mediating military leadership, the extent to

which any of these previously under-addressed issues are faced may enhance the quality of military leadership.

One of the most significant of these issues is the need to further explore the primary research objective of this thesis. This objective was to examine the extent to which existing military cultural structures obscure the understanding of more pertinent cause-effect relationships.

For example, Dixon argued that many of the U.S. military's shortcomings in Vietnam--which many military analysts have attributed to "too much management and not enough leadership"--may reflect more complex and longstanding shortcomings in the military culture. These latent problems may merely have been exacerbated by unique situational demands in Vietnam.

One significant cultural shortcoming, which Dixon implies may have hindered military leadership in Vietnam far more than an overemphasis of management skills, was culturally induced anxiety. As Dixon noted:

It is a feature of armed services that the penalty for error is very much more substantial than the reward for success. Whereas the naval officer who, through an error of judgment on the part of his subordinates, puts his ship aground will almost certainly be court martialled and stands a fair chance of being heavily punished, the reward for taking bold action which pays off may be no more than a mention in dispatches or some decoration with little or no effect upon promotional prospects. <5>

Dixon argues that the result of such bias towards negative reinforcement--a condition which has existed since the military's earliest days--is that "fear of failure

rather than hope of success tends to be the dominant motivating force in decision making." Further, the higher the rank of the decision maker "the stronger is this motive because there is farther to fall." <6>

Modeling

The military culture's bias towards negative reinforcement is just one of the problems which is obscured by preoccupations with traditional views of military leadership. A related issue is the effects leadership modeling (i.e., how subordinates model their behavior after leaders' action) has on behavior in a military context.

The impacts of modeling on military leadership is particularly important in a military context because, as this analysis has demonstrated, leadership is presented to military members as being synonymous with hierarchial positions. That is, because of the asserted parallels between leadership and hierarchial positions, military members are in effect encouraged to view superiors' behavior--whatever it may be--as leadership. In some cases, including AFP 35-49, subordinates are overtly encouraged to "observe leaders (i.e., military supervisors) in action." <7> Thus, it can be expected that the priorities symbolized through the actions of senior military members will, to varying degrees, predispose similar patterns in supervisor-subordinate relationships throughout the organization.

The issues related to modeling go far beyond what is implied by the cliché "lead by example." Some civilian leadership researchers have begun to assess the complex behavioral chains represented by modeling. For instance, in a 1986 study Henry Sims and Charles Manz assessed the complex relationship of modeling and leadership behavior and reported clear links between modeling and predispositions to act in particular ways. They identified the need for more research to examine this complex process. (8)

Similarly, Thomas Peters and Robert Waterman, in their best-selling book In Search of Excellence, devoted a chapter to discussing how the values articulated by senior management reverberate throughout an organization. (9)

Promoting values through modeling, however, is markedly different than promoting values through the ideograph of leadership. The most significant difference is that efforts to instill traditional values in organizational members are primarily aimed at subordinates. The objective of this approach is that by instilling values at the bottom level, these individuals will reflect these values in their actions. Modeling assumes that leadership priorities and organizational values are formulated at the top of an organization and flow downward.

Senior Military Leadership

Interestingly, programs designed to mediate leadership for senior military officers tend to rely heavily on anecdotal analyses from guest speakers. Most of these guest speakers are other senior members of the military hierarchy. Such programs reflect the previously discussed theme that success in senior military positions is synonymous with leadership skills.

However, when many of the romantic and mythic conceptions of leadership are removed from a discussion of leadership, this assumption becomes problematic. A key questions remains: To what extent are current and former senior military officials really effective leaders? A related question is: By what standards is the quality of senior military leadership measured?

Candid answers to such questions may be a good starting point for assessing the effects of modeling on military leadership. Further, by measuring leadership by standards other than mission success--which, as noted previously, may be unrelated to leadership--military analysts may more precisely determine causal factors in a variety of circumstances.

Further, such approaches might also provide more specific insights into the factors which determine an individual's success in particular situations. Instead of attributing this success to leadership skills, analysts

could more precisely attribute more pertinent personal attributes. These attributes might include managerial skills, combat tactics, technical competence, ability to "play" the system and myriad combinations of these traits and situational factors.

Emergent versus Appointed Leadership

This analysis noted that most leadership researchers consider emergent leadership and appointed leadership to be separate phenomena. The analysis also noted that the texts focus on leadership primarily as an appointed phenomenon. Thus, the discussion in Chapter 4 identified a need for leadership training texts to address more specifically the role emergent leadership plays in a military context. Similarly, there is a need for persons developing military leadership doctrine to assess the extent to which--and under what circumstances--emergent leadership has been underemphasized or ignored.

The Leader as a Medium

Michael Lombardo and Morgan McCall note that by the late 1970s, many leadership researchers had become disillusioned. <10> Since that time, however, several different and useful approaches to characterizing leadership have emerged. Many of these approaches differ from traditional leadership research by more directly addressing

the symbolic processes of leadership.

Karl Weick's metaphor of a leader as a medium represents an early example of such a divergent approach. This approach holds that complexity is central to social influence processes. In the role of a medium, the leader is responsible for interpreting and reducing complex social situations into understandable forms and translating this understanding into action. To meet these complex requirements, the leader must be complex because, as B. Aubrey Fisher notes, "only complexity can regulate complexity." (11)

Weick cited three functions which determine the complexity of a medium: "(1) the number of elements in the medium; (2) the degree to which each element is independent of other elements; (3) the degree to which each element is externally, rather than internally, constrained." (12)

Fisher identified a variety of communicative indicators which can reveal a complex medium. These indicators include possessing a large repertoire of communicative skills and being open-minded and adaptive to many situations. (13) Such standards might be useful starting points for developing more cogent strategies for training and evaluating military leaders.

Leadership as a Symbolic Process

Closely related to the conceptualization of a leader as a medium is the idea that the leader manages the meaning of social reality for followers. That is, the leader exerts social influence by symbolically assigning meaning to what otherwise would be incomprehensibly complex issues and events.

Leadership researchers Smircich and Morgan defined this role of leadership as "the process whereby one or more individuals succeeds in attempting to frame and define the reality of others." They argued that research on emergent leadership indicates that this process is both an "obligation" and a "perceived" right. (14)

Smircich and Morgan further asserted that authority relationships "institutionalize a hierarchial pattern of interaction in which certain individuals are expected to define reality for others." (15) Like Weick, they assert that the effective leader is one who possess the necessary complexity to effectively manage symbolic forms and rituals in a variety of circumstances.

Leadership researcher Thomas Gilmore further defined functions of process as "the management of boundaries between one's person and one's role." (16) In an organizational context this means the effective leader is one who, through boundary management, influences subordinates to "bring in more of their outside lives than

they did previously." (17) That is, the leader is a medium who by managing symbolic forms can influence people to become more passionately involved with their work.

Interestingly, in the context of previous discussions of the negative role management plays in military leadership narratives, he asserts that bureaucratic stagnation results from a failure of leaders to properly mediate social boundaries rather than an over-reliance on management skills. As he noted:

The concept of bureaucracy has become increasingly loaded with negative connotations...To stay in role, or make decisions based on one's role rather than based on one's person are the hallmarks of a bureaucrat. (18)

Such theories also identify the need for military leadership researchers to better assess the effectiveness of symbolic actions in a variety of circumstances. Such knowledge would help military leaders become more aware of the complex relationships between values and symbols and how these structures function under a variety of circumstances. Implicit in this requirement is the need to avoid characterizing such findings with the sort of positivism reflected by leadership training grids.

Efforts to promote complexity among military leaders might well be supported by stressing the axiom that "You cannot not communicate." That is, every action--or failure to act--is imbued with symbolic meaning. From this perspective, a well-trained leader will understand the relative nature of meaning and will be flexible enough to

adapt to these situations. Open-ended, thought-provoking discussions about the symbolic nature of a variety of previously taken-for-granted actions may be effective ways to promote such flexibility among military members.

Evaluating Leadership

The analysis noted that the word "leadership" is used both ambiguously and inconsistently throughout the texts. Because of this inability to define leadership precisely and consistently in military doctrine, it is currently difficult to fully assess how leadership affects the military mission.

The analysis also demonstrated that "leadership" is often used as a means of attributing organizational outcomes. Much of the criticism of military leadership cited in Chapter 1 seems to use "leadership" in this ambiguous manner. The problem with using leadership as an attributional process is that it tends to be imprecise, although this does not necessarily invalidate these criticisms.

A clearer definition of leadership will ultimately help military officials better assess the factors which most significantly impact mission accomplishment. More precise definitions of words such as "command," "management," and "leadership" will also allow military analysts to better answer questions such as: "To what degree do social influence skills affect mission performance?" "How do

mission requirements impact the effectiveness of certain social influence efforts?" "Do attributed problems with leadership reflect a commander's lack of social influence skills, management skills or lack of vision?" "When are battle management skills--or other management skills--more important to the mission than social influence skills?"

A more precise definition of leadership would also allow military analysts to better assess how effectively leaders (ranging from supervisory NCOs to general officers) are applying social influence skills. One way of achieving such a goal is through survey programs designed to assess some of the symbolic issues inherent to various policies.

Such surveys ideally would identify and evaluate subordinates' perceptions of pertinent symbolic issues. These issues could include supervisory behavior, command policy, the effectiveness of mission slogans and myriad other symbolic issues.

The analysis noted that cliches such as "The mission comes first" potentially serves as carte blanche rationalizations for numerous questionable leadership actions. A leadership survey program would be most effective if it stressed the sort of accountability for symbolic action that currently seems to be missing. If properly managed (i.e., so they do not merely turn into supervisor evaluation forms or report cards), such surveys may provide more insightful and pertinent assessments of

unit effectiveness than do current inspection programs.

An advantage to survey programs is that they can be open-ended and flexible enough to assess latent situational factors (i.e., low morale, perceived leader indifference, perceived senses of purposelessness, etc.) which are difficult to assess using the sometimes arbitrary and artificial standards inherent to by-the-book inspection programs. As such, leadership effectiveness surveys potentially could supplement the insights gained by inspection programs such as Operational Readiness Inspections and Unit Effectiveness Inspections.

Research Suggestions

This analysis was designed not only to identify and discuss latent cultural obstacles to promoting effective military leadership; it also was designed to identify issues which require further research. High on this list of issues is a need to better understand problems relating to women and military leadership. Specifically, there is a need to compare the perceptions of female leadership behavior in a military context with perceptions of similar behavior in a civilian context. There is also a need to better understand how particular leader behavior is perceived in specific military situations (i.e., senior management positions versus office management positions, or line versus staff positions).

The analysis noted that mediated military leadership narratives were unable to fully accommodate the roles women play as leaders in the modern military. The analysis demonstrated that, to some degree, women were cast as antagonistic forces to the dominant romanticized views of military leadership. The discussion in Chapter 4 speculated that such factors may predispose some military members to disrespect female leaders. There is a need to survey the attitudes of military members to determine the extent to which this speculation may be true. There also is a corresponding need to assess the extent to which women's efforts to overcompensate for such culturally erected obstacles may fuel perceptions that women are inferior leaders.

The analysis implied that there is a need for more research into the effects of leadership training. In his massive summary of leadership research, Ralph Stogdill noted that leadership training research has been unfocused and is often based on anecdotal evidence. (19) This analysis helped underscore the need for more specific insights into the effects of leadership training.

For instance, this analysis asserted that leadership grids promote several persistent leadership "myths." The discussion in Chapter 4 illustrated how such "myths," if widely accepted, can be translated into counterproductive leadership strategies. However, there is a need for

empirical research to verify the extent to which this may be true. There is a particular need to better understand how various attitudes about leadership interactions relate to subsequent leader behavior. Further, there is a need to assess how such attitudes affect emergent versus appointed leader behavior.

While some of these issues could be addressed through laboratory research, extensive field research also will be necessary to fully understand these complex issues. Some leadership topics such as leadership modeling issues are even more dependent on field research.

Suggestions for field research on leadership modeling in a military context might focus on comparing the effects and attitudes of senior commanders on overall organizational leadership behavior. These findings then could be replicated and compared at supervisor levels. There also is a need to explore how the effects of modeling can relate to both line and staff missions.

As noted in this analysis, the effects of leadership modeling is closely linked to symbolic action theory. Consequently, there is a need to assess the symbolism inherent to a wide variety of leadership actions. As stressed throughout this thesis, for such information to be truly valuable to military leaders, assessments of symbolic action need to avoid the positivism reflected in current efforts to mediate military leadership. Further application

of critical research methods [similar, but not necessarily identical, to those applied in this thesis] may be useful in this context.

The object of such research would be to help raise the consciousness of both military analysts and military leaders regarding some of the many factors which potentially influence the effectiveness of symbolic actions. As this analysis noted, the inherent deference to military hierarchical positions may significantly affect current efforts to judge the symbolic actions of senior military leaders. For instance, many efforts to create strategic or collective vision through symbolism may be perceived as effective merely by virtue of the position from which they were instituted.

Further research on the effects of symbolic action may help military analysts answer questions such as: To what extent do cliched unit slogans such as "The best making it better" serve to promote unit cohesiveness and vision or merely promote cynicism and apathy? Or, To what extent does the fear of negative reinforcement rather than the hope for reward influence the actions of military leaders?

A good example of such research was a 1958 field study of Air Force basic training units which demonstrated how certain training objectives promoted counterproductive results. In this case, the study demonstrated how efforts to promote time management skills by denying basic trainees

adequate time to complete required tasks ultimately promoted disrespect for proper procedures. This study showed that, because the students could not legitimately perform their tasks, they learned to "beat the system" by cheating. The end result of this indoctrination was that it encouraged and legitimized disrespect for official procedures. <20>

Again, the purpose of such research is not to establish clear cause-effect relationships, but to forewarn the potential "backlash" of certain policies and actions. Similarly, because the United States military is a pluralistic culture, there is a need for further research into how different audiences perceive various symbolic actions.

An example of such research was a 1981 analysis of the perceptions of black and white audiences to specific leadership images. This study verified that black and white audiences tend to view certain symbolic actions differently. For instance, black audiences were shown to value impulsiveness more than white audiences. White audiences placed comparatively higher value on perceived candidness, reasonableness, clarity and believability. <21>

Finally, because this analysis focused on only one branch of the military--the Air Force--there is a need to replicate this research by analyzing other branches of the military. Since many of the articles and narrative research cited in the Air Force texts comes out of a common "pool" of

generic military leadership theory and research, many of the findings of comparative analyses of other services will be similar. However, since each branch of the service has different missions and priorities, further insights into the unique narrative strategies of each culture will be useful.

Closing Thoughts

The goal of this research was to consider the possibility that perceived problems with military leadership may be related to culturally induced shortcomings in military leadership training. This analysis demonstrated that there is a strong possibility that deeply seated cultural motives may be--and have been--hindering efforts to understand and practice effective military leadership.

By viewing mediated military leadership as narrative, this analysis helped demonstrate the important roles that the concept of "leadership" plays in creating and maintaining a military culture. The analysis also helped illustrate the extent to which efforts to promote social influence skills among military members must be developed around these roles.

Consequently, efforts to textually mediate and promote military leadership seem inconsistent and contradictory. The narrative analysis implied that mediated military leadership more closely represents cultural indoctrination than leadership (i.e., using the military's official definition

of the word) training.

Military leaders thus can be expected to be more familiar with their idealized roles in the military hierarchy than with social influence processes. These priorities doubtlessly have been reflected in the way leadership is practiced by military members.

However, the paucity of research on the specific effects of various attitudes and preconceptions on subsequent leader behavior makes it difficult to fully assess the effects these cultural priorities will have on the military mission. This analysis, however, has speculated that current efforts to textually mediate military leadership predisposes members to act in rigid authoritarian manners, to almost sanctimoniously emphasize social control over social influence skills, to disrespect female leaders and to approach productivity problems in a myopic manner.

The key caveat in this assessment is the word "predisposes." Until there is much more research into the specific effects of leadership training and clearer standards for judging the quality of military leadership, assessments of these factors will have to rely on speculation and anecdotal evidence. However, given the preponderance of criticism of military leadership, there is clearly reason to be concerned by this researcher's findings.

Notes

1. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Pamphlet 35-49, 1 September 1985, 21.
2. Norman Dixon, On The Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), 81-82.
3. Ibid., 116-117.
4. Ibid., 119-120.
5. Ibid., 222.
6. Ibid.
7. AFP 35-49, 21.
8. Charles Manz and Henry Sims, "Beyond Imitation: Complex Behavioral and Affective Linkages Resulting from Exposure to Leadership Training Models," Journal of Applied Psychology 71 (1986): 571-578.
9. Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence, (New York: Warner Books, 1983), 279-292.
10. Michael Lombardo and Morgan McCall, Leadership: Where Else Can We Go? (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1978), 9-10.
11. B. Aubrey Fisher, "Leadership: When does the Difference Make a Difference?" in Communication and Group Decision Making, ed. Randy Hirokawa and Marshall Poole (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1986), 199.
12. Karl Weick, "The Spines of Leaders," in Leadership: Where Else Can We Go?, ed. Michael Lombardo and Morgan McCall (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1978), 39.
13. Fisher, 207.
14. Linda Smircich and Gareth Morgan, "Leadership: The Management of Meaning," Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 18 (1982): 257.
15. Ibid.
16. Thomas Gilmore, "Leadership and Boundary Management," Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 18 (1982): 343.

17. Ibid., 344.
18. Ibid., 346.
19. Ralph Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership (New York: Free Press, 1974), 199.
20. Mortimer A. Sullivan, Stuart A. Queen and Ralph C. Patrick, "Participant Observation as Employed in the Study of a Military Training Program," American Sociological Review 23 (1958): 660-677.
21. Carolyn Calloway-Thomas and Raymond G. Smith, "Images of Leadership: Black and White," Southern Speech Communication Journal 46 (1981): 263-277.

REFERENCES

- Apple, Michael W. and Lois Weis. 1982. Ideology and practice in schooling. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Benton, Jeffery C. 1982. Promoting leadership in the Air Force's management environment. Air University Review, 33 (March-April): 17-28.
- Blake, Robert R. and Jane S. Mouton. 1964. The managerial grid. Houston: Gulf Publishing.
- Blake, Robert R. and Jane S. Mouton. 1982. Theory and research for developing a science of leadership. Journal of Applied Behavioral Sciences, 18: 275-292.
- Bons, Paul M. 1976. An organizational study of leadership. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Bormann, Ernest. 1972. Fantasy and rhetorical vision: The rhetorical criticism of social reality. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 58: 396-407.
- Burke, Kenneth. 1950. A rhetoric of motives. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Burke, Kenneth. 1967. Dramatism. In Communication: Concepts and perspectives, ed. Lee Thayer, 350-367. Washington D.C.: Spartan Books.
- Brockreide, Wayne R. 1974. Rhetorical criticism as argument. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 60: 165-171.
- Bruner, Edward M. and Victor Turner. 1984. The anthropology of experience. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Calloway-Thomas, Carolyn and Raymond G. Smith. 1981. Images of leadership: Black and white. Southern Speech Communication Journal, 46: 263-277.
- Carey, James W. 1975. A cultural approach to communication. Journal of Communication, 2: 1-15.

- Crowley, D. J. 1982. Understanding communication. New York: Gordon and Breach.
- Fisher, B. Aubrey. 1980. Small group decision making. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Dixon, Norman. 1976. On the psychology of military incompetence. London: Jonathon Cape.
- Eisenberg, E. M. 1984. Ambiguity as strategy in organizational communication. Communication Monographs, 51: 231.
- Fisher, B. Aubrey. 1986. Leadership: When does the difference make a difference? In Communication and group decision making, ed. Randy Y. Hirokawa and Marshall Scott Poole, 197-215. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Fisher, Walter R. 1984. Narration as a human communication paradigm: The case of public moral argument. Communication Monographs, 51: 1-22.
- Fisher, Walter R. 1985. The narrative paradigm: In the beginning. Journal of Communication 35: 82-91.
- Gabriel, Richard A. and Paul Savage. 1978. Crisis in command. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Gilmore, Thomas N. 1982. Leadership and boundary management. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 18: 343-356.
- Graen, George. 1982. Role of leadership in the employee withdrawal process. Journal of Applied Psychology, 67: 868-872.
- Gregg, Richard. 1984. Symbolic inducement and knowing. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
- Gronbeck, Bruce E. 1980. Dramaturgical theory and criticism: The state of the art (or science)? The Western Journal of Speech Communication, 44: 315-330.
- Hays, Samuel H. and William N. Thomas. 1967. Taking command. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books.
- Hersey, Paul and Kenneth H. Blanchard. 1977. Management of organizational behavior, 3d ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Janowitz, Morris. 1971. The professional soldier. New York: Free Press.

- Kelley, H.H. and J. W. Thibaut. 1954. Experimental studies of group problem solving and process. In Handbook of social psychology, ed. G. Lindzey, 735-785. Reading MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Kinnard, Douglas. 1985. The war managers. Wayne, NJ: Avery.
- Kruse, Lenelis. and Margret Wintermantel. 1986. Leadership ms. qualified: I. The gender bias in everyday and scientific thinking. In Changing conceptions of leadership, ed. Carl F. Grauman and Serge Moscovi, 171-193. New York: Springer Verlag.
- Lombardo, Michael and Morgan McCall. 1978. Leadership. In Leadership: Where else can we go?, ed. Michael Lombardo and Morgan McCall, 1-11. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1984. After virtue, 2d ed. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Manz, Charles and Henry Sims. 1986. Beyond imitation: complex behavioral and affective linkages resulting from exposure to leadership training models. Journal of Applied Psychology, 71: 571-578.
- McGee, Michael C. 1980. The "ideograph": A link between rhetoric and ideology. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66: 1-15.
- Meindl, James R., Sanford B. Ehrlich, and Janet M. Dukerich. 1985. The romance of leadership. Administrative Science Quarterly, 30: 78-102.
- Melcher, A. 1977. Leadership models and research approaches. In Leadership: The cutting edge, ed. James Hunt and Lars Larson, 94-108. Carbondale IL: University of Southern Illinois University Press.
- Meyer, Edward C. 1980. Leadership: A return to basics. Military Review (July): 1-8.
- Nimmo, Dan and James E. Combs. 1983. Mediated political realities. New York and London: Longman.
- Pearce, W. Barnett and Vernon E. Cronen. 1980. Communication, action and meaning. New York: Praeger.
- Peters, Thomas J. 1987. Thriving on chaos. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

- Peters, Thomas J. and Nancy Austin, 1985. A passion for excellence. New York: Random House.
- Peters, Thomas J. and Robert H. Waterman. 1983. In search of excellence. New York: Warner Books.
- Pfeffer, Jeffery. 1977. The ambiguity of leadership. Academy of Management Journal, 2: 104-111.
- Porter, Natalie. 1983. Are women invisible as leaders? Sex Roles, 9: 1035-1049.
- Reaske, Christopher R. 1984. How to analyze drama. New York: Monarch Press.
- Rophie, Ann. 1979. Ma and Pa and John Boy in mythic America: The Waltons. In Television: The critical view, ed. Horace Newcomb, 66-73. New York and London: Oxford University Press.
- Rushing, Janice H. and Thomas S. Frenzt. 1980. "The deer hunter": Rhetoric of the warrior. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66: 392-406.
- Sarkesian, Sam C. 1981. Forward. In Military leadership, ed. James H. Buck and Lawrence J. Korb, 7-8. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Scheidel, Thomas W. 1986. The study of leadership. B. Aubrey Fisher Memorial Lecture, speech remarks. University of Utah, April 23, 1986.
- Scholes, Robert. 1981. Afterthoughts on narrative. Critical Inquiry, 66: 205-212.
- Schwartz, Barry. 1983. George Washington and the Whig conception of heroic leadership. American Sociological Review, 48: 18-33.
- Segal, David R. 1981. Leadership and management: Organizational theory. In Military leadership, ed. James H. Buck and Lawrence J. Korb, 41-70. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Sillars, Malcolm O. and Patricia Ganer. 1982. Values and beliefs: A systematic basis for argumentation. In Advances in argumentation theory and research, ed. J. R. Cox and C. A. Willard. Carbondale, IL: University of Southern Illinois Press.
- Sims, Henry. 1977. The leader as a manager of reinforcement contingencies: An empirical example and a model. In

- Leadership: The cutting edge, ed. James Hunt and Lars Larson, 121-137. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Sims, Henry and Charles Manz. 1984. Observing leader verbal behavior: Toward reciprocal determinism in leadership theory. Journal of Applied Psychology, 69: 222-232.
- Smircich, Linda and Gareth Morgan. 1982. Leadership: The management of meaning. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 18: 257-273.
- Stanzel, F. K. 1984. A theory of narrative. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Stogdill, Ralph. 1974. Handbook of leadership. New York: Free Press.
- Sullivan, Mortimer A., Stuart A. Queen and Ralph C. Patrick. 1958. Participant observation as employed in the study of a military training program. American Sociological Review 23: 660-667.
- Szilagyi, Andrew. 1980. Causal interferences between leader reward behavior and subordinate performance, absenteeism and work satisfaction. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 53: 195-201.
- Taylor, Robert E. and William E. Rosenbach. 1984. Military leadership. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Taylor, William J. 1983. Leading the Army. Washington Quarterly: A Review of Strategic and International Issues, 6: 40-45.
- Turcotte, William E. 1983. Leadership versus management. Washington Quarterly: A Review of Strategic and International Issues 6: 46-53.
- U.S. Department of the Air Force. Air Force leadership. 1985. Air Force Pamphlet 35-49. [Washington, D.C.]: Headquarters, U.S. Air Force.
- U.S. Department of the Air Force. Leadership. 1984. Squadron Officer School Air University Non-Resident Program 00022C 02 8408. [Maxwell AFB, AL]: Air University, Extension Course Institute.
- U.S. Department of the Air Force. Leadership and management. 1987. Military Training: Officer Basic Military Training, Precommissioning Leadership and Management LMAPMO103-000/A000/001. [Lackland AFB, TX]: Air

Training Command, Officer Training School.

- U.S. Department of the Air Force. Leadership in the Air Force. 1988. Squadron Officer School Residence Program. [Maxwell AFB, AL]: Air University, Squadron Officer School.
- U.S. Department of the Air Force. Leadership perspectives. 1985. Air Command and Staff College Course 00035A LO2 8503. [Maxwell AFB, AL]: Air University, Air Command and Staff College.
- U.S. Department of the Air Force. Professional fitness manual for non-commissioned officers. 1987. Air Force Pamphlet 50-34 Volume I. [Washington, D.C.]: Headquarters, U.S. Air Force.
- U.S. Department of the Air Force. Professional fitness manual for senior non-commissioned officers. 1985. Air Force Pamphlet 50-34 Volume II. [Washington, D.C.]: Headquarters, U.S. Air Force.
- U.S. News & World Report. 1988. April 18.
- Wakin, Malham. 1981. The ethics of leadership. In Military leadership, ed. James H. Buck and Lawrence J. Korb, 95-112. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Weick, Karl E. 1978. The spines of leaders. In Leadership: Where else can we go?, ed. Michael Lombardo and Morgan McCall, 37-61. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Weick, Karl E. and Larry D. Browning. 1986. Argument and narration in organizational communication. Journal of Management, 12: 243-256.
- White, Hayden. 1984. The value of narrativity in the presentation of reality. In On narrative, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell, 1-21. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Whorf, Benjamin L. 1970. The name of the situation as affecting behavior. In Social psychology through symbolic interaction, ed. G. Stone and H. Farberman, 113-135. Toronto: Xerox College Publishing.