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TESTS FOR CONSISTENCY OF VULNERABILITY MODELS

DAVID W. WEBB

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II and up until recent years the United States Army has conducted limited live-fire tests of armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) to investigate the interaction occurring between munitions and these vehicles. The live-fire tests were conducted only occasionally because of extremely high costs of resources necessary for those tests. Although vulnerability studies of AFVs have used the insights gathered from such vehicle tests, they have relied more on mathematical modeling, computer simulation, live-fire tests of components, and inferences made from firing at armor plate. The live-fire testing of armored vehicles has recently intensified involving a very limited number of vehicles and shots. One question which Army researchers wish to answer is how well do computer model predictions compare with the results from live-fire field testing of AFVs. The answer to that question is the topic of this report.

The outcome of a direct hit on a target vehicle may be examined on three different levels. We may look at

1. the entire system (e.g., catastrophic kill),
2. subsystems (e.g., personnel, fire control), and
3. components (e.g., projectile tubes, propellant cases).

If the test results are described as either "kill" or "no-kill", we have a Bernoulli trial in which the outcome can be one of only two possible states. Vulnerability estimates are expressed as kill probabilities (P_k)'s, which represent the proportion of hits resulting in a kill.

Recently a computer model has been developed that incorporates randomness in its calculations so that simulated repeated firings at an AFV under identical shot conditions produce varying degrees of destruction. Through many runs of the model, vulnerability researchers can obtain hypothesized values (or estimates) of the true P_k 's for the entire system, subsystems and components. It would be an experimental luxury to be able to fire munitions at hundreds of AFVs under the same shot conditions to see how well these hypothesized values from the model replicate the live-fire results. Due to the destructive nature of the test and the cost of AFVs, such an experiment is economically infeasible. Usually the same munition or different munition types are fired at vehicles under varying shot conditions with no duplication of shots and the experimenter is left to assess the validity of computer based vulnerability estimates from the firing of a single round. It is impossible to statistically analyze a hypothesized P_k on the basis of one fired round. However, if we look at a group of components, for example, then we can make a statistically valid statement for the corresponding group of P_k 's if we assume that the components are independent. What is meant by independence is that the outcome of any component (kill or no-kill) has no influence on the probability that the other components in the group will be killed.

This report details four procedures for testing a group of hypothesized probabilities. The argument is presented that one of the four is the asymptotically most powerful test of the possible procedures. This problem was first studied by Dr. J. Richard Moore, formerly of the US Army Ballistic Research Laboratory (BRL), in response to requests from the Vulnerability/Lethality Division (VLD) of BRL. The author joined Dr. Moore in his research in 1986. Since then VLD has used some of the results in examining computed estimates, which were calculated with a expected value model, for consistency with observed test results from firings at AFVs.

II. TEST CONCEPTS

Assume that as a result of our computer simulation, we obtain a set of P_k estimates. Perhaps they are for a group of components within a subsystem of the AFV. Denote this set of estimates by the vector $[p_1^o, p_2^o, \dots, p_l^o]$, where p_i^o is the estimated kill probability of the i^{th} component of interest and l is the number of components. Also, let the true but unknown kill probabilities be denoted by the vector $[p_1, p_2, \dots, p_l]$. If we assume that the components are independent, then we may begin to develop our test strategy by writing the null hypothesis:

$$H_0: p_1 = p_1^o, p_2 = p_2^o, \dots, p_l = p_l^o.$$

Note that while this is similar to the hypothesis for the binomial test, one fundamental difference exists: We allow for the p_i^o 's to be unequal. We call this a test of generalized binomial proportions. The binomial test is a special case of this, namely $p_i = p_j$ for all i, j .

If the data do not support the null hypothesis, then it is rejected in favor of its converse, the alternative hypothesis,

$$H_A: p_i \neq p_i^o \text{ for some } i.$$

The alternative hypothesis states that only one inequality has to exist; i.e., only one estimate needs to be incorrect. However, because the analysis is based upon as little as one round, gross inequalities are needed before a procedure will be able to reject the null hypothesis with satisfactory power.

Suppose we observe a set of l independent Bernoulli outcomes from the live fire testing (denoted by 0 or 1, corresponding to no-kill or kill, respectively), and write them in the form of a row vector $A = [a_1, a_2, \dots, a_l]$. For example, if $l=5$, we may observe $A = [0, 1, 0, 0, 1]$. There are 2^l possible outcome vectors $A_1, A_2, \dots, A_{2^l}$, which we collectively define to be Ω . Any test of the null hypothesis requires a measure of performance (MOP) for each of the 2^l outcomes and some ordering of the measure. At this point we branch our discussion into four different MOP's and thus four different testing procedures.

III. PROCEDURE 1 - THE ORDER BY PROBABILITY (OP) PROCEDURE

This procedure rejects the null hypothesis if the observed vector is among a defined critical set of "rarest" outcomes. The MOP for the procedure is simply $P(A)$, the probability with which outcome A occurs assuming our hypothesized probabilities $p_1^o, p_2^o, \dots, p_l^o$. The outcome set, Ω , is ordered by $P(A)$ in increasing magnitude, and each outcome is numbered so that $A_{(1)}$ is the least likely outcome and $A_{(2')}$ is most likely. We then define a cumulative function B , where

$$B_i = \begin{cases} P(A_{(i)}) & i=1 \\ B_{i-1} + P(A_{(i)}) & i=2,3,4, \dots, 2' \end{cases}$$

We pick a desired level of significance, α , and find "c" such that $c = \max \{j | B_j \leq \alpha \text{ and } P(A_{(j)}) \neq P(A_{(j+1)})\}$. Then the set $RR_{op} = \{A_{(1)}, A_{(2)}, \dots, A_{(c)}\}$ represents the c rarest outcomes in Ω and is the rejection region for the test of H_0 at a $100\alpha\%$ level of significance. The "test statistic" is the observed outcome vector A ; if $A \in RR_{op}$, then H_0 is rejected.

IV. PROCEDURE 2 - THE KILLS TEST

This test uses for its MOP, the number of kills (1's) observed. The underlying notion is that under the null hypothesis, a certain number of kills is expected. Letting $K(A)$ denote the number of kills in our observed outcome vector A , then the expected value of $K(A)$ is

$$E[K(A)] = p_1^o + p_2^o + \dots + p_l^o$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^l p_i^o.$$

If the observed $K(A)$ is much smaller than $E[K(A)]$, then perhaps the model estimates are inflated estimates of the true kill probabilities. Likewise, if the observed $K(A)$ is much larger than $E[K(A)]$, then the estimated kill probabilities are probably too small.

To perform this test, we begin by calculating $K(A)$ and $P(A)$ for all $2'$ outcomes. The outcomes are then ordered in increasing magnitude by $K(A)$ and numbered, so that

$$K(A_{(1)}) \leq K(A_{(2)}) \leq \dots \leq K(A_{(2')}).$$

The order among outcomes with equal $K(A)$ is irrelevant. Similar to the OP procedure the "cumulative function" is calculated. Since rejecting H_0 may be due to either too small or too large a value of $K(A)$, a two-tailed test is used. Critical values c_1 and c_2 are selected so that the actual alpha level

$$P[K(A) \leq c_1] + P[K(A) \geq c_2]$$

is maximized but still less than or equal to α . The rejection region for this test is $RR_K = \{A | K(A) \in \{0, 1, \dots, c_1\} \cup \{c_2, c_2 + 1, \dots, l\}\}$. The model estimates will be rejected as inconsistent with the field tests if $A \in RR_K$.

V. PROCEDURE 3 - THE MORE-LIKELY RESPONSE (MLR) TEST

This test examines the number of more-likely, or "correct" responses where a more-likely response is defined as

$$\gamma_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a_i = 0 \text{ when } p_i^o < .5, \text{ or if } a_i = 1 \text{ when } p_i^o > .5 \\ .5 & \text{if } p_i^o = .5 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

In other words a more-likely response is the response which we expect to see more often than not in the long run. So if $p_i^o = .8$ we would expect to observe a kill more often than a no-kill. If $a_i = 1$, a kill, then $\gamma_i = 1$ and the observed response is considered "correct". When $p_i^o = .5$, we are essentially saying that we have no inclination as to which response is more likely. Therefore we compromise and always assign $\gamma_i = .5$.

The MOP is the total number of correct responses

$$M(A) = \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 + \dots + \gamma_l$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^l \gamma_i.$$

The reasoning behind this procedure is that if we observe an unusually low number of more-likely responses, then our model estimates are too large when they should be smaller and/or too small when they should be larger. We also note that it is possible to observe too many correct responses. This would tend to indicate that our large estimates ($p_i^o > .5$) are not large enough and/or that our small estimates ($p_i^o < .5$) are not small enough.

The expected value of $M(A)$ is

$$E[M(A)] = M_L + S^*/2 + M_U$$

where

$$M_L = \sum_j (1 - p_j^0) \text{ for all } p_j^0 < .5$$

$$M_U = \sum_j p_j^0 \text{ for all } p_j^0 > .5$$

$$S^* = \text{number of } p_j^0 \text{ equal to } .5$$

We start by calculating $M(A)$ and $P(A)$ for all possible outcomes. The outcomes are arranged in increasing magnitude by $M(A)$ without regard for ties so that

$$M(A_{(1)}) \leq M(A_{(2)}) \leq \dots \leq M(A_{(2^l)})$$

The cumulative function is computed as usual. Since obtaining a value of $M(A)$ much smaller or larger than the expected value leads us to believe that H_0 is false, a two-tailed test is desired. Critical values c_1 and c_2 are selected as in the Kills test to maximize the actual alpha level. The rejection region becomes $RR_{MLR} = \{A | M(A) \in \{0, 1, \dots, c_1\} \cup \{c_2, c_2 + 1, \dots, l\}\}$, and we will reject H_0 at the α level of significance if $A \in RR_{MLR}$. In practice, though, c_2 will usually not exist and a one-tailed test will be used instead.

VI. PROCEDURE 4 - THE SQUARED DISTANCE MEASURE (SDM) TEST

This test involves the calculation of a "squared distance measure" for each component of the outcome vector. The SDM is $(p_i^0 - a_i)^2$. Squaring assures that all values are positive so that each component produces an additive effect; it also increases the "penalty" for responses which are very far from p_i^0 . Note that the SDM for any given component must lie in the interval $[0, 1]$; and the two values SDM may take on are more extreme the nearer to 0 or 1 p_i^0 is. The SDM acts as a penalty function. As p_i^0 approaches 0 (or 1), the penalty associated with being incorrect is greater. If p_i^0 is close to .5 (i.e., we have less confidence in our ability to predict a_i), then the penalty for an incorrect response is not much different than the SDM for a correct response. The MOP is simply the sum of the SDM's,

$$S(A) = (p_1^0 - a_1)^2 + (p_2^0 - a_2)^2 + \dots + (p_l^0 - a_l)^2$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^l (p_i^0 - a_i)^2$$

The expected value of $S(A)$ is

$$E[S(A)] = \sum_{i=1}^l p_i^0 (1 - p_i^0)$$

Again, we calculate $S(A)$ and $P(A)$ for each of the 2^J outcomes, and arrange them in decreasing magnitude by $S(A)$ with no regard for ties so that

$$S(A_{(1)}) \geq S(A_{(2)}) \geq \cdots \geq S(A_{(2^J)})$$

The B_i 's are computed in the usual fashion. We would tend to believe that H_0 is false if $S(A)$ is too large, therefore a one-tailed procedure is used. Given alpha, we select c which satisfies

$$c = \max\{j | B_j \leq \alpha \text{ and } S(A_{(j)}) \neq S(A_{(j+1)})\}.$$

The set of outcomes $RR_s = \{A | S(A) \geq S(A_{(c)})\}$ represents the rejection region for our test of H_0 . Therefore if $S(A) \geq S(A_{(c)})$ we reject H_0 at the α level of significance.

VII. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

Assume that the model estimates of kill probabilities for five independent tank components are as follows:

$$A = [.23, .64, .19, .91, .70]$$

Figure 1 shows each of the $2^5 = 32$ possible vector outcomes along with their associated $P(A_i)$, $K(A_i)$, $M(A_i)$, and $S(A_i)$. The outcomes are ordered by a binary counting scheme. The OP procedure is illustrated in Figure 2. Note that the vectors are now ordered by their probability of occurrence. The rejection region for an $\alpha = .05$ level of significance is all the outcomes above the line. Figure 3 shows the Kills test ordering scheme and resultant two-tailed rejection region outside the two lines. Note the additional columns $P[K(A_{(i)})]$ and $B[K(A_{(i)})]$. Since our test statistic is $K(A)$, vectors having an equal number of kills are indistinguishable. Therefore $P[K(A_{(i)})]$ represents the probability of getting $K(A_{(i)})$ kills and $B[K(A_{(i)})]$ represents the cumulative probability for the same number of kills. In Figure 4, the MLR test is shown. Although a two-tailed procedure can be used, the rejection region only includes a lower tail of six vectors. This is because the vector with $M(A_{(32)}) = 5$ has a probability mass greater than alpha. The columns $P[M(A_{(i)})]$ and $B[M(A_{(i)})]$ are analogous to the additional columns of Figure 3. We see the SDM test in Figure 5. It has a rejection region of 13 vectors containing the largest values of $S(A_{(i)})$. Note that $B_{14} < \alpha$, however $A_{(14)}$ is not in the rejection region. This is because $S(A_{(14)}) = S(A_{(15)})$ and $B_{15} > \alpha$. Recall that in each of the tests, outcomes with equal MOP's are considered indistinguishable. If we had allowed $A_{(14)} \in RR_s$ and $A_{(15)} \notin RR_s$ then we would be violating the rule by differentiating between two outcomes with the same SDM. Figure 6 summarizes the rejection regions of the four procedures, with OP having the largest region and the kills test having the smallest.

The hypothesized probabilities are: [0.23, 0.64, 0.19, 0.91, 0.70]				
Vector A_i	Prob. $P(A_i)$	Kills $K(A_i)$	MLR $M(A_i)$	SDM $S(A_i)$
00000	0.00606	0	2	1.8167
00001	0.01415	1	3	1.4167
00010	0.06130	1	3	0.9967
00011	0.14303	2	4	0.5967
00100	0.00142	1	1	2.4367
00101	0.00332	2	2	2.0367
00110	0.01438	2	2	1.6167
00111	0.03355	3	3	1.2167
01000	0.01078	1	3	1.5367
01001	0.02515	2	4	1.1367
01010	0.10897	2	4	0.7167
01011	0.25427	3	5	0.3167
01100	0.00253	2	2	2.1567
01101	0.00590	3	3	1.7567
01110	0.02556	3	3	1.3367
01111	0.05964	4	4	0.9367
10000	0.00181	1	1	2.3567
10001	0.00423	2	2	1.9567
10010	0.01831	2	2	1.5367
10011	0.04272	3	3	1.1367
10100	0.00042	2	0	2.9767
10101	0.00099	3	1	2.5767
10110	0.00429	3	1	2.1567
10111	0.01002	4	2	1.7567
11000	0.00322	2	2	2.0767
11001	0.00751	3	3	1.6767
11010	0.03255	3	3	1.2567
11011	0.07595	4	4	0.8567
11100	0.00076	3	1	2.6967
11101	0.00176	4	2	2.2967
11110	0.00764	4	2	1.8767
11111	0.01782	5	3	1.4767

Figure 1. Hypothetical 5-component example: All possible outcomes and measures of performance.

The hypothesized probabilities are: [0.23, 0.64, 0.19, 0.91, 0.70]			
i	Vector $A_{(i)}$	Prob. $P(A_{(i)})$	Cum.Prob. B_i
1	1 0 1 0 0	0.00042	0.00042
2	1 1 1 0 0	0.00076	0.00118
3	1 0 1 0 1	0.00099	0.00217
4	0 0 1 0 0	0.00142	0.00359
5	1 1 1 0 1	0.00176	0.00536
6	1 0 0 0 0	0.00181	0.00717
7	0 1 1 0 0	0.00253	0.00969
8	1 1 0 0 0	0.00322	0.01291
9	0 0 1 0 1	0.00332	0.01623
10	1 0 0 0 1	0.00423	0.02046
11	1 0 1 1 0	0.00429	0.02475
12	0 1 1 0 1	0.00590	0.03065
13	0 0 0 0 0	0.00606	0.03671
14	1 1 0 0 1	0.00751	0.04422
15	1 1 1 1 0	0.00764	0.05186
16	1 0 1 1 1	0.01002	0.06188
17	0 1 0 0 0	0.01078	0.07266
18	0 0 0 0 1	0.01415	0.08680
19	0 0 1 1 0	0.01438	0.10118
20	1 1 1 1 1	0.01782	0.11900
21	1 0 0 1 0	0.01831	0.13731
22	0 1 0 0 1	0.02515	0.16246
23	0 1 1 1 0	0.02556	0.18802
24	1 1 0 1 0	0.03255	0.22057
25	0 0 1 1 1	0.03355	0.25412
26	1 0 0 1 1	0.04272	0.29684
27	0 1 1 1 1	0.05964	0.35648
28	0 0 0 1 0	0.06130	0.41778
29	1 1 0 1 1	0.07595	0.49373
30	0 1 0 1 0	0.10897	0.60270
31	0 0 0 1 1	0.14303	0.74573
32	0 1 0 1 1	0.25427	1.00000

Figure 2. Hypothetical 5-component example: Summary of Order by Probability (OP) Procedure.

The hypothesized probabilities are: [0.23, 0.64, 0.19, 0.91, 0.70]						
i	Vector $A_{(i)}$	Kills $K(A_{(i)})$	Probability $P(A_{(i)})$ $P[K(A_{(i)})]$		Cumulative Probability B_i $B[K(A_{(i)})]$	
1	00000	0	0.00606	0.00606	0.00606	0.00606
2	00001	1	0.01415	0.08945	0.02021	0.09552
3	00010	1	0.06130		0.08151	
4	00100	1	0.00142		0.08293	
5	01000	1	0.01078		0.09371	
6	10000	1	0.00181		0.09552	
7	00011	2	0.14303	0.32355	0.23855	0.41906
8	00101	2	0.00332		0.24186	
9	00110	2	0.01438		0.25624	
10	01001	2	0.02515		0.28139	
11	01010	2	0.10897		0.39036	
12	01100	2	0.00253		0.39289	
13	10001	2	0.00423		0.39711	
14	10010	2	0.01831		0.41542	
15	10100	2	0.00042		0.41585	
16	11000	2	0.00322		0.41906	
17	00111	3	0.03355	0.40811	0.45262	0.82717
18	01011	3	0.25427		0.70689	
19	01101	3	0.00590		0.71278	
20	01110	3	0.02556		0.73835	
21	10011	3	0.04272		0.78107	
22	10101	3	0.00099		0.78206	
23	10110	3	0.00429		0.78635	
24	11001	3	0.00751		0.79387	
25	11010	3	0.03255		0.82642	
26	11100	3	0.00076		0.82717	
27	01111	4	0.05964	0.15501	0.88682	0.98218
28	10111	4	0.01002		0.89684	
29	11011	4	0.07595		0.97279	
30	11101	4	0.00176		0.97455	
31	11110	4	0.00764		0.98218	
32	11111	5	0.01782	0.01782	1.00000	1.00000

Figure 3. Hypothetical 5-component example: Summary of Kills test.

The hypothesized probabilities are: [0.23, 0.64, 0.19, 0.91, 0.70]						
i	Vector $A_{(i)}$	MLR $M(A_{(i)})$	Probability $P(A_{(i)})$ $P[M(A_{(i)})]$		Cumulative Probability B_i $B[M(A_{(i)})]$	
1	1 0 1 0 0	0	0.00042	0.00042	0.00042	0.00042
2	0 0 1 0 0	1	0.00142	0.00927	0.00185	0.00970
3	1 0 0 0 0	1	0.00181		0.00366	
4	1 0 1 0 1	1	0.00099		0.00465	
5	1 0 1 1 0	1	0.00429		0.00894	
6	1 1 1 0 0	1	0.00076		0.00970	
7	0 0 0 0 0	2	0.00606	0.07146	0.01576	0.08116
8	0 0 1 0 1	2	0.00332		0.01908	
9	0 0 1 1 0	2	0.01438		0.03346	
10	0 1 1 0 0	2	0.00253		0.03599	
11	1 0 0 0 1	2	0.00423		0.04021	
12	1 0 0 1 0	2	0.01831		0.05852	
13	1 0 1 1 1	2	0.01002		0.06854	
14	1 1 0 0 0	2	0.00322		0.07176	
15	1 1 1 0 1	2	0.00176		0.07352	
16	1 1 1 1 0	2	0.00764		0.08116	
17	0 0 0 0 1	3	0.01415	0.25183	0.09530	0.33299
18	0 0 0 1 0	3	0.06130		0.15660	
19	0 0 1 1 1	3	0.03355		0.19015	
20	0 1 0 0 0	3	0.01078		0.20093	
21	0 1 1 0 1	3	0.00590		0.20683	
22	0 1 1 1 0	3	0.02556		0.23239	
23	1 0 0 1 1	3	0.04272		0.27511	
24	1 1 0 0 1	3	0.00751		0.28262	
25	1 1 0 1 0	3	0.03255		0.31517	
26	1 1 1 1 1	3	0.01782		0.33299	
27	0 0 0 1 1	4	0.14303	0.41274	0.47602	0.74573
28	0 1 0 0 1	4	0.02515		0.50117	
29	0 1 0 1 0	4	0.10897		0.61014	
30	0 1 1 1 1	4	0.05964		0.66978	
31	1 1 0 1 1	4	0.07595	0.25427	0.74573	1.00000
32	0 1 0 1 1	5	0.25427		1.00000	

Figure 4. Hypothetical 5-component example: Summary of More-Likely Response (MLR) test.

The hypothesized probabilities are: [0.23, 0.64, 0.19, 0.91, 0.70]						
i	Vector $A_{(i)}$	SDM $S(A_{(i)})$	Probability $P(A_{(i)})$ $P[S(A_{(i)})]$		Cumulative Probability B_i $B[S(A_{(i)})]$	
1	1 0 1 0 0	2.9767	0.00042	0.00042	0.00042	0.00042
2	1 1 1 0 0	2.6967	0.00076	0.00076	0.00118	0.00118
3	1 0 1 0 1	2.5767	0.00099	0.00099	0.00217	0.00217
4	0 0 1 0 0	2.4367	0.00142	0.00142	0.00359	0.00359
5	1 0 0 0 0	2.3567	0.00181	0.00181	0.00540	0.00540
6	1 1 1 0 1	2.2967	0.00176	0.00176	0.00716	0.00717
7	0 1 1 0 0	2.1567	0.00253	0.00682	0.00969	0.01399
8	1 0 1 1 0	2.1567	0.00429		0.01399	
9	1 1 0 0 0	2.0767	0.00322	0.00322	0.01721	0.01721
10	0 0 1 0 1	2.0367	0.00332	0.00332	0.02053	0.02053
11	1 0 0 0 1	1.9567	0.00423	0.00423	0.02475	0.02475
12	1 1 1 1 0	1.8767	0.00764	0.00764	0.03239	0.03239
13	0 0 0 0 0	1.8167	0.00606	0.00606	0.03845	0.03845
14	0 1 1 0 1	1.7567	0.00590	0.01592	0.04435	0.05437
15	1 0 1 1 1	1.7567	0.01002		0.05437	
16	1 1 0 0 1	1.6767	0.00751	0.00751	0.06188	0.06188
17	0 0 1 1 0	1.6167	0.01438	0.01438	0.07626	0.07626
18	0 1 0 0 0	1.5367	0.01078	0.02909	0.08704	0.10535
19	1 0 0 1 0	1.5367	0.01831		0.10535	
20	1 1 1 1 1	1.4767	0.01782	0.01782	0.12316	0.12316
21	0 0 0 0 1	1.4167	0.01415	0.01415	0.13731	0.13731
22	0 1 1 1 0	1.3367	0.02556	0.02556	0.16287	0.16287
23	1 1 0 1 0	1.2567	0.03255	0.03255	0.19542	0.19542
24	0 0 1 1 1	1.2167	0.03355	0.03355	0.22897	0.22897
25	0 1 0 0 1	1.1367	0.02515	0.07287	0.25412	0.29684
26	1 0 0 1 1	1.1367	0.04272		0.29684	
27	0 0 0 1 0	0.9967	0.06130	0.06130	0.35814	0.35814
28	0 1 1 1 1	0.9367	0.05964	0.05964	0.41778	0.41778
29	1 1 0 1 1	0.8567	0.07595	0.07595	0.49373	0.49373
30	0 1 0 1 0	0.7167	0.10897	0.10897	0.60270	0.60270
31	0 0 0 1 1	0.5967	0.14303	0.14303	0.74573	0.74573
32	0 1 0 1 1	0.3167	0.25427	0.25427	1.00000	1.00000

Figure 5. Hypothetical 5-component example: Summary of Squared Distance Measure (SDM) test.

Order by Probability (OP) Procedure -- RR OP (14 outcomes)

1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1

Kills Test -- RR K (2 outcomes)

0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1

More-Likely Response (MLR) Test -- RR MLO (6 outcomes)

1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0

Squared Distance Measure (SDM) Test -- RR SDM (13 outcomes)

1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0

Figure 6. Hypothetical 5-component example: Rejection regions for each procedure.

VIII. PROCEDURE COMPARISONS

To study the four procedures, 2000 pairs of l -dimensional probability vectors were randomly generated for $l = 5, 6, 7, 8, 9$, and 10 . The first vector of a pair $(\vec{h}_0, \vec{h}_A)$ was considered the hypothesized probability vector and the second was considered the alternative probability vector. The level of significance was set at $\alpha = .05$. The power of each test (i.e., the probability of rejecting H_0 when H_A is true) was computed for each pair $(\vec{h}_0, \vec{h}_A)$.

Figure 7 shows a graphic way of comparing the power of two test procedures, call them A and B. For a given pair of vectors $(\vec{h}_0, \vec{h}_A)$, we compute the ordered pair (β_A, β_B) where β_A and β_B are the powers of A and B respectively. Then the scatterplot of all 2000 points, (β_A, β_B) , will give us a comparison of the two tests. If Procedure A is more powerful than Procedure B, then we expect to see a graph similar to Figure 7(A). If the opposite is true, the plot will be similar to Figure 7(B). But if both procedures have approximately the same power, then Figure 7(C) is the proper scatterplot.

Comparisons of the four procedures consistently show the OP procedure to be the most powerful (See Figures 8 and 9). The SDM test appears to be only slightly less powerful. The MLR and Kills tests both showed poor ability to reject H_0 when other l 's were used.

These findings are reinforced when the median power of each procedure is computed. In Figure 10, we see again that OP slightly outpowers SDM, with MLR and Kills exhibiting less power. It is impossible to tell for certain which of the four procedures is best unless we know $\vec{h}_A$. But from the strictest viewpoint in which we assume no prior knowledge of the p_i 's, this is not the case. When we do not know any information about $\vec{h}_A$, we must assume that all possible $\vec{h}_A$'s are equally likely. Therefore it makes sense to pick that procedure with the greatest number of outcomes in its rejection region.

IX. THE FISHBOWL ARGUMENT


Assume that the null hypothesis we are interested in testing is one that completely defines the distribution of the outcome space Ω . For example, our illustrative example from Figures 1-6 is concerned with the null hypothesis

$$H_0: p_1 = .23, p_2 = .64, p_3 = .19, p_4 = .91, p_5 = .70.$$


Given the estimated probabilities in this hypothesis, $P(A_i)$ can be calculated for all possible outcomes. Another null hypothesis that we may be interested in is:

$$H_0: p_1 = .23, p_2 = .64, p_3 = .19, p_4 = p_5$$


Note that this does not contain all the probability estimates needed to compute $P(A)$, however it is certainly a valid hypothesis. We will define a simple null hypothesis to be one that completely defines the distribution of the outcome space, and denote it by H_0^s .



(a)



(b)



(c)

Figure 7. Possible power versus power plots.





Figure 8. Power versus power plots for $l=6$.





Figure 9. Power versus power plots for $l=10$.




Figure 10. Median power of the four candidate procedures.

Now make the additional assumption that an experiment has a finite outcome space, Ω . If we are interested in testing some simple null hypothesis at the α level of significance, how many different ways can we perform a test of H_0^s and which is the optimal way?

To attempt to answer these questions let Ω be of size N , $m < N$, and $\{O_1, O_2, \dots, O_m\}$ be any subset of Ω such that under H_0^s ,


$$P(O_1) + P(O_2) + \dots + P(O_m) \leq \alpha.$$

Then we claim that $\{O_1, O_2, \dots, O_m\}$ is a rejection region for some test of H_0^s . Why? Because under H_0^s , the chance of observing an outcome from this subset is less than or equal to α , our desired level of significance. Therefore we have the foundations of a statistical test, even if the reasoning behind the selection of the subset is not specified.

To help explain this concept, Figure 11 shows an example of an outcome set with $N=16$. Each circle represents one of the 16 possible outcomes and its size is proportional to the density of the outcome under the simple null hypothesis. In Figure 12, each group of circles (outcomes) connected by a horizontal line symbolizes a subset satisfying our condition (i.e., $\alpha \leq .05$) to be a rejection region for some test of the simple null hypothesis. The probability of observing an outcome from each subset is indicated by the number in the right column. Note that these values (which are computed by summing the probabilities of the outcomes in the subset) are all less than or equal to .05, the desired alpha level, and that the addition of any other outcome to each set makes the new sum greater than .05. We therefore consider each of these 24 subsets a rejection region to test H_0^s .

For each rejection region, the probability of observing an outcome in that region is at most α under the simple null hypothesis. However, if some alternative hypothesis is true, the probability of observing an outcome in the rejection region (thereby correctly rejecting H_0^s) is some other value $1-\beta$, which we call the power of the test. Unfortunately the power is unknown to us if we do not know which alternative hypothesis is true. At best, we can only say that all alternative hypotheses are equally likely. Therefore each outcome in a rejection region is equally likely to occur, and the optimal rejection region is that one which contains the most outcomes. The way to build this rejection region is to include the least likely outcomes until no more can be added. In Figure 12, the star labels the rejection region that we would use since it contains six outcomes, more than any other rejection region.

As an analogy, assume you are given a small fishbowl partially filled with water and a large number of pebbles with which to completely fill it. Also assume that each pebble has a different volume. If you were instructed to raise the water level to the top of the fishbowl by adding as many pebbles as possible, how would you set out to do so? Instead of occupying space with one large pebble, you would fill the same space with smaller pebbles. Therefore you would begin by selecting the smallest pebble and putting it in the bowl. Then you would drop in the second smallest pebble. The third pebble would be the next smallest, and so on until the water level reaches the brim. The remaining pebbles would of course be the largest ones.



OUTCOME SET

Figure 11. Sample outcome space with events drawn proportional to density.




Figure 12. All possible 5% rejection regions for sample outcome space.

The OP procedure uses this "fishbowl" technique by filling up the rejection region with those outcomes having the smallest probabilities. The only restriction to the technique is that the last outcome entered into the rejection region cannot have the same density as any outcome excluded from the region

X. FURTHER NOTES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The OP procedure was only tested for $l = 5, 6, 7, 8, 9$ and 10 , for two reasons. Firstly, the data that spawned this research was only for small l , namely $l \leq 10$. Secondly, the computational time and storage needed to compute the $P(A)$'s, B 's, etc. grows nearly exponentially with each unit increase in l . Simulations using $l = 12$ were attempted but ran non-stop for a couple of days on a Gould 9050 minicomputer.*

Since the SDM tests does a good job of mimicking the OP procedure it may be an easier test to use when l is larger than 10 , if the distribution of $S(A)$ can be approximated. Initial attempts to find such an approximation were not successful. A listing of the computer program is given in the Appendix at the end of this report.

XI. CONCLUSIONS

This problem is complicated by the fact that we must judge the entire set of computer generated estimates on a single shot. It must be admitted that while OP is the best procedure of those studied, occasionally H_0 was not rejected although the alternative hypothesis differed greatly from it. Great care must be taken in interpreting the final decision. In rejecting H_0 we can confidently say that the set of hypothesized kill probabilities is incorrect. However, venturing to say which components are incorrect and by how much is dangerous. It is vital to remember that we are trying to make inferences from one round. If we do not reject H_0 , then this does not allow us to "accept H_0 as being true". It simply says that there is not enough evidence to say that H_0 is false. We cannot validate the estimates, we can only state that they are consistent with the live fire results.

We must take care to see that our assumption of independent components is met. All the calculations involved in the OP procedure are made under these assumptions. Therefore the selection of components is critical, and we should avoid including incendiary components, shielded components, etc., in the analysis.

The OP procedure works best of the four tried because it does not lose any information by collapsing the data into a univariate test statistic. It simply creates that rejection region with the most outcomes.

* Lawrence D. Losie of the Ballistic Research Laboratory has made recommendations for improving the computational efficiency of the OP procedure. This work is unpublished but may be obtained through private communication with Mr. Losie.

TABLE OF SYMBOLS

A	vector of observed outcomes
$A_{(i)}$	i^{th} ordered vector of observed outcomes
AFV	armored fighting vehicle
a_i	i^{th} component of vector A
α	level of significance
$B[K(A_{(i)})]$	probability of observing that number of kills (or less) associated with the i^{th} ordered vector $A_{(i)}$
$B[M(A_{(i)})]$	probability of observing that MLR value (or less) associated with the i^{th} ordered vector $A_{(i)}$
$B[S(A_{(i)})]$	probability of observing that SDM value (or less) associated with the i^{th} ordered vector $A_{(i)}$
B_i	cumulative function value of vector $A_{(i)}$
β_A	power of some test procedure A
C	critical value for one-sided rejection region
C_1	lower critical value for two-sided rejection region
C_2	upper critical value for two-sided rejection region
γ_i	more likely response value for i^{th} component of vector A
E	expected value operator
H_A	alternative hypothesis
$\vec{h}_A$	vectors of alternative probabilities
H_0	null hypothesis
$\vec{h}_0^s$	vector of hypothesized probabilities
H_0^s	null hypothesis which completely defines the distribution of the outcome space
$K(A)$	number of kills in vector A
l	number of components
$M(A)$	number of "more-likely-responses" in vector A
MLR	more-likely-response
MOP	measure-of-performance
M_L	expected number of non-kills for the group of components whose estimated probability of kill is less than one-half
M_U	expected number of kills for the group of components whose estimated probability of kill is greater than one-half
O_i	an element of the outcome space Ω
OP	order-by-probability
$P(A)$	probability of vector A
$P[K(A_{(i)})]$	probability of observing that number of kills associated with the i^{th} ordered vector $A_{(i)}$
$P[M(A_{(i)})]$	probability of observing that MLR value associated with the i^{th} ordered vector $A_{(i)}$
$P[S(A_{(i)})]$	probability of observing that SDM value associated with the i^{th} ordered vector $A_{(i)}$
P_k	probability of kill
p_{i_b}	true probability of kill for i^{th} component
p_i	estimated probability of kill for i^{th} component
RR	rejection region
S	number of estimated probabilities equal to one-half
SDM	squared-distance-measure
$S(A)$	squared-distance-measure for vector A
Ω	set of all possible outcomes

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

```

c FILE: vul.f
c
c This program takes a vector of k probabilities of 0,1 outcomes,
c enumerates all possible outcome vectors and calculates the
c probability of each, using the vector of outcome probabilities
c given. It then sorts each of the outcome vectors according to
c their probability of occurrence. It calculates and prints the
c cumulative probability.
c
c k < 13, is the dimension of the vector.
c p(i), i=1,k is the vector of input probabilities.
c jout(i,j) is the 2**k by k matrix of possible outcome vectors.
c
c This program is written to run in the interactive mode but
c it can be run batch mode by reading k, the desired alpha level
c and p(i), i=1,k from one file and writing the results in
c another file. For example, vul.e < data.inp > data.out will
c read input from a file named data.inp and write the results
c into a file called data.out.
c
      common jout(4097,10),prob(4097),n,k
      double precision prob(4097),cum(4097)
      dimension p(12)
      read(5,*) k
      read(5,*) dalp
      read(5,*)(p(i),i=1,k)
      epsilon=0.00000001
      n=2**k
c GENERATE MATRIX OF ALL POSSIBLE OUTCOMES
      do 10 j=1,n
        do 10 i=1,k
          jout(j,i)=0
10 continue
      do 20 i=1,k
        ni=2**(k-i)
        nj=2*ni
        do 20 nk=ni+1,n,nj
          do 20 nl=nk,nk+ni-1
            jout(nl,i)=1
20 continue
      write(6,120)
      write(6,130)(p(i),i=1,k)
      write(6,140)
      write(6,150)
      do 30 i = 1,n
        prob(i) = 1.
        do 30 j = 1,k
          prob(i) = prob(i)*p(j)**(jout(i,j))*(1.-p(j))**(1-jout(i,j))
30 continue

```

```

c ORDER ALL OUTCOMES BY PROBABILITY, FROM LOWEST TO HIGHEST
  do 50 j=1,n-1
    do 50 m=j+1,n
      if (prob(j).gt.prob(m)) then
        do 40 i=1,k
          isave=jout(j,i)
          jout(j,i)=jout(m,i)
          jout(m,i)=isave
40      continue
        save=prob(j)
        prob(j)=prob(m)
        prob(m)=save
      endif
50    continue
c CALCULATE CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION
  cum(1)=prob(1)
  do 60 j=2,n
    cum(j)=cum(j-1)+prob(j)
60  continue
  do 70 i=1,n
    write(6,160)i,prob(i),cum(i),(jout(i,j),j=1,k)
70  continue
c DETERMINE REJECTION REGION
  irr=n
80  irr=irr-1
  if (cum(irr).ge.dalp) goto 80
  if (prob(irr+1)-prob(irr).lt.epsilon) goto 80
  talp=cum(irr)
c OUTPUT REJECTION REGION VECTORS
  write(6,170)irr
  do 110 i=1,irr
    write(6,180)(jout(i,j),j=1,k)
110  continue
  write(6,190)talp
120  format('The input probabilities are:')
130  format(12f6.3)
140  format('// Vector      Prob.      Cum.Prob.      Vector')
150  format('  No.      '/')
160  format(i6,2x,e10.5,f10.6,2x,11i2)
170  format('//The rejection region consists of these ',i3,' vectors:')
180  format(4x,11i2)
190  format('//The true alpha level is ',f6.3)
  stop
end

```

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


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