Operational Deception Doctrine Melding the Air, Ground, and Naval Effort
Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between the theory and practice of operational deception, and our new Battlefield Deception doctrine. The paper begins with an examination of the art of war focusing on what both ancient and modern theorists reveal about deception and its relationship to surprise. It continues with the historical review and analysis of several successful deception operations beginning with those conducted during the Second World War. Following this campaign analysis the paper examines our new doctrine on battlefield deception to determine the maxims of deception. These deception maxims are then compared with the theory and practice of deception to determine if our new doctrine is flawed. The study concludes that while adequate for tactical operations, the doctrine is flawed at the operational level. The authors have written the manual purely from a land component perspective, ignoring the fact that it is at the operational level of war that the effects of air, ground, and naval components are joined. It also is inconsistent with the historical cases reviewed. Historically it is proven that the Army and Army Group commanders integrated air and naval operations into their operational deception plans. Modern EAC level commanders must conduct both battle and deception using more than their own service components. Operational deception is Joint deception. (kr)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 15, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA215564
Entities
People
- Clinton T. Anderson
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College