The Impact of an Operational Void: The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961- 1963

Abstract

The Vietnam conflict spread dissension into every corner of our political and cultural environment and shattered the foreign policy consensus that had guided US relations since World War II. The initial combined effort of the United States and South Vietnam to defeat the insurgency was the Strategic Hamlet Program failed due to the absence of an operational link between strategic concept and tactical execution. The monograph initially reviews the strategic context that existed in South Vietnam during the critical period of 1961-1963, that window in time in which the United States first became an active and full-fledged ally of the South Vietnamese. This review established that the two partners held very different perspectives on the conflict and had different objectives in mind when they entered into the Strategic Hamlet Program as a combined effort. (RRH)

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 16, 1989
Accession Number
ADA215569

Entities

People

  • Gregory B. Conover

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Army
  • California
  • Classification
  • Counterinsurgency
  • Governments
  • Intergovernmental Organizations
  • International Organizations
  • Local Governments
  • Minority Groups
  • National Politics
  • New York
  • North Vietnam
  • Second World War
  • South Vietnam
  • Treaties
  • United States
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Library and Information Science/ Studies, Southeast Asia Studies, Bibliography of Vietnam and Lao Studies.
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.