Deep Operations: Should we Fire or Maneuver?
Abstract
The purpose of this monograph is to determine if operational fires or operational maneuver should be the primary means of conducting deep operations. Two possible scenarios for an attack against NATO are considered. The first is an attack after complete mobilization. The second is a short notice, 72 hrs, surprise attack. A METT-T analysis of each scenario is done to determine requirements for a deep operational maneuver. Logistics requirements for deep operations in each scenario are then compared to current logistics capabilities. This study finds that deep operational maneuver is not logistically supportable in the first scenario. However, in the second scenario capabilities meet deep maneuver requirements. The overall conclusion is that neither operational fires nor operational maneuver should hold a dominant position in current doctrine.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 26, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA215570
Entities
People
- Thomas P. Connors
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College