The Operational Implications of Deception at the Battle of Kursk
Abstract
This paper analyzes German and Soviet use of deception in the battle of Kursk. It uses a paradigm consisting of: commander's aim, intelligence, centralized control, synchronization and operations security to determine why Soviet deception succeeded and German deception failed. The analysis provides insights into the use of operational deception on the modern battlefield. The study's conclusions suggest that: 1) operational deception is not a separate deception activity; 2) it can be used in the offense or defense; 3) it can be a viable combat multiplier today; and 4) deception is an acquired skill. The study shows that operational deception must organize and control the deception efforts at the tactical level and that simple battlefield deception techniques can produce an operational effect. The paper shows the critical role commanders have in establishing an appropriate course of action that sets the stage for deception. The selected course of action must provide a picture of duplicity to the enemy commander by presenting two possible objectives. The concept of alternative objectives allows the deception activity to flow naturally from the COA and confuse the enemy. The report recommends incorporation of deception into the officer corps' professional development through professional reading programs in schools and practical application at the National Training Center, Combat Maneuver Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center and the Battle Command Training Program.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 15, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA215721
Entities
People
- James E. Elder
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College