The Combat Support Role in Operational Movements: Another Step in Learning the Art of Operational Maneuver
Abstract
The principles of AirLand Battle Doctrine reflect the tested theories of war and the past experience of the U.S. Army. A fundamental concern of AirLand Battle Doctrine is the ability of the U.S. Army to conduct maneuver at the operational level of war. The reason for this concern is the complexity of the task and the fact that the future will provide the operational commander with ample opportunity to direct combat power by shifting large forces against enemy weaknesses. To shift forces and concentrate combat power implies an ability to move. This paper examines the methods used by the Wehrmacht, the Red Army, and the U.S. Army to conduct operational movements during World War II. In reviewing their history we find that each army applied solutions that were remarkably similar. They were alike in that each army emphasized the importance of concentration, the timely employment of reconnaissance, the use of engineers to reinforce the route, the need to maintain communications while on the move, the need for traffic control, and the importance of maintaining unit integrity. In each army, the commander was ultimately responsible for the move. Operational commanders in the German and U.S. Armies designated a special movements and traffic control officer to exercise overall responsibility for the move while the Soviet commander appeared to exercise more centralized control. Keywords: Combat mobility; Rapid deployment; Logistics planning; Military strategy. (kt)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 30, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA215767
Entities
People
- Daniel G. Karis
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College