The Light Infantry Division: No Tool for the Tactical Commander
Abstract
The light infantry division has been a source of considerable conflict within Army circles since its inception in 1984. At the heart of the matter is the ideological difference between the U.S. and European concepts of what makes an infantry unit 'light'. This difference is crucial because it determines the doctrinal employment of that force. The US Army's definition treats light infantry divisions as regular infantry only with less equipment. In a mid to high intensity scenario they would be augmented and assigned missions closely resembling those given to the mechanized infantry. The European definition treats light infantry more as a separate arm, to be employed in a manner which complements, rather than supports, the mechanized forces. The Duke of Wellington and Field Marshal Sir William Slim are two historical examples, spanning the era of light infantry, who illustrate how theater commanders, employing their light and heavy forces in a complementary manner, can defeat a numerically superior force. The pitfalls of employing light forces according to US doctrine are identified, illustrating that the tactical commander is not as capable as the operational commander of employing light forces, because he lacks the necessary perspective, assets, and time to employ them properly. NATO military tactics/doctrine. (edc)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 25, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA215776
Entities
People
- Charles A. Peddy
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College