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**EMPLOYMENT OF IRREGULAR FORCES
IN SUPPORT OF CONVENTIONAL CAMPAIGNS**

**A Monograph
by
Major Thomas A. Dempsey
Infantry**



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**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
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in Support of Conventional Campaigns**

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25 April 1989

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

EMPLOYMENT OF IRREGULAR FORCES IN SUPPORT OF CONVENTIONAL CAMPAIGNS by MAJ Thomas A. Dempsey, USA, 46 pages.

This monograph addresses the suitability of irregular forces for employment at the operational level in support of a conventional campaign. The study is motivated by force shortfalls and resource constraints in U.S. contingency planning for conventional campaigns in Southwest Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. A partial solution to these shortfalls and constraints is offered through the employment of Bedouin irregular forces to augment U.S. conventional operations in the area.

The study presents a model of the process by which strategic goals are translated into major operations and tactical results within a theater of operations campaign. That model in turn drives an analysis of the role of irregular forces in Allenby's 1918 campaign in Palestine. The analysis answers the question of whether irregular forces can play an independent operational role in a conventional campaign, and examines why and how they can do so.

The monograph concludes that irregulars did play a key role in the Palestine campaign, largely as a result of the imagination and operational artistry of General Allenby and his subordinate, T. E. Lawrence. The reasons behind their success with irregulars are identified, and then used to generate specific recommendations for techniques which USCENTCOM might use to exploit irregular warfare in a conventional conflict in Southwest Asia or the Arabian Peninsula.

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I. Introduction

The proliferation of advanced weaponry and the rapidly growing military institutions in and around the Arabian Gulf have altered fundamentally the character of operations in the U. S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Operations (AOR).

Traditional emphasis on low intensity conflict has given way to the necessity of planning for conventional operations in a high-tempo mid-intensity environment. If U.S. military planners wish to exploit the potential of local irregular forces, they must do so in the context of a conventional campaign involving relatively large and well-developed regional military powers. Success in unifying irregular operations with a conventional campaign could become a key factor in accomplishing the strategic objectives of U.S. contingency operations in the Arabian Peninsula.

This paper presents a model of the process by which strategic goals are translated into major operations and tactical results within a theater of operations campaign. That model in turn drives an analysis of the role of irregular forces in Allenby's 1918 campaign in Palestine. The analysis answers the question of whether irregular forces can play an independent operational role in a conventional campaign, and also examines why and how they did so in Palestine. The results of the analysis are then applied to the situation in the USCENTCOM AOR to generate specific recommendations for employment of irregular forces by USCENTCOM.

The analysis of Allenby's campaign indicates that irregulars played a key role in the success of the British operations in Palestine in 1918. That success was for the most part a result

of the efforts of two men: General Sir Edmund H. H. Allenby, Commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) and the Palestine theater of operations; and T. E. Lawrence, Allenby's principal representative with the Northern Arab Army. Allenby translated the War Cabinet's strategic objectives for the Palestine theater of operations into a campaign plan which thoroughly integrated the irregular forces of the Arab Army. The army was assigned specific operational objectives and an independent line of operations, along which it conducted several major operations in pursuit of the strategic objectives in the theater. T. E. Lawrence assisted Prince Feisal (Commander of the Arab Army) in accomplishing the tasks assigned by Allenby. Lawrence demonstrated a remarkable talent for planning and executing major operations in support of the theater campaign plan. He also understood the employment of irregular forces at the tactical level, ensuring that the tactical actions of the Arab Army yielded the results necessary to realize the army operational objectives. The British and Arab accounts at both the theater level and the subordinate command levels clearly indicate that the Bedouin irregulars made critical contributions to the overall conventional campaign.

The Central Powers also attribute to the Bedouin irregulars of the Arab Army a major role in the Turkish defeat in Palestine in 1918. According to General Liman Von Sanders, the commander of the Turkish and German forces in Palestine, the Arab Northern Army fulfilled all of Allenby's expectations. It occupied the attention of the Turks at the critical stage in September of 1918, and actually induced them to commit most of their precious

reserves to guard against the irregular threat to their open desert flank. This in turn assured the success of Allenby's main attack along the coast. Von Sanders' commentary also substantiates Lawrence's talent for forging the link between tactical results and operational objectives[1].

There are many lessons to be learned from the campaign in Palestine about the effective employment of irregular forces within the context of a conventional campaign. The lessons of particular relevance to U.S. military operations in the USCENTCOM AOR are detailed in Section V. If USCENTCOM can put those lessons into practice, it can tap into the tremendous potential of the Bedouin tribes in Arabia to conduct irregular warfare.

II. The Model

The model used in this paper is portrayed graphically in the form of a flow chart at Appendix 1. It envisions five levels of war: policy formulation, strategic, operational, operational-tactical, and tactical. The model is my own[2] and is intended solely as an aid to understanding how strategic guidance and decisions were translated into tactical actions in the Palestine campaign. The model is simply an elaboration of current U.S. Army doctrinal definitions of levels of war as explained in FM 100-5[3]. It is not intended to be prescriptive, and is used in this paper simply as an analytical tool. The following sections briefly explain the model as illustrated in the flow chart.

The Policy Formulation Level of War

At the national policy level, a national government (or group of governments, in the case of coalition warfare)

identifies national aims, goals and interests, and prioritizes them in some way. This prioritization in turn generates a national military strategy. The strategy determines specific regional objectives, or in some cases general geopolitical goals, which are necessary to attainment of the national goals or preservation of national interests. Separate theaters of war are designated as necessary to support the regional objectives and geopolitical aims of the national strategy. Resources are allocated to the separate theaters of war based on the priorities of the national leadership, and are distributed to each theater. The policy decisions embodied in the national military strategy, and the resources allocated to achieve them, represent the downward linkage to the next level of war: the strategic level.

The Strategic Level of War

At the strategic level of war, the commander of a separate theater of war prepares a theater war plan on the basis of the regional objectives and geopolitical aims provided to him by the national leadership. In his war plan, the theater commander envisions the simultaneous and sequential campaigns which, in combination, will accomplish the regional objectives and aims identified for the theater. Strategic objectives are designated for each campaign. Branches, or alternative campaigns designed to accomplish the same strategic objective(s), are included in the plan. Sequels are mapped out, to order the consecutive campaigns which will move the conflict from its opening stages through the accomplishment of the theater of war objectives. Theater sustainment planning is affected to provide the necessary forces to the campaign commanders, and to maintain those forces

in combat. The theater commander also orchestrates the strategic deception effort in support of his strategic vision. The war plan constitutes the theater commander's primary tool in synchronizing campaigns to achieve strategic objectives across the theater of war. These objectives, together with the commander's guidance on how they are to be accomplished, represent the linkage downward to the operational level of war.

The Operational Level of War

At the operational level of war, the commander of a separate theater of operations prepares a campaign plan on the basis of the strategic objectives provided to him by the theater of war commander. In his campaign plan, the campaign commander envisions the simultaneous and sequential major operations which, in combination, will accomplish the strategic objectives identified for his area. Operational objectives, lines of operation, and lines of support are designated for each major operation. Branches, or alternative major operations designed to accomplish the same operational objective(s), are included in the plan. Sequels are mapped out, to order the consecutive major operations which will move the campaign from its opening stages through the accomplishment of the campaign strategic objectives. Theater sustainment planning is affected to provide the necessary forces to the major operation commanders, and to maintain those forces in combat. The campaign commander also orchestrates the operational deception effort in support of his operational vision. The campaign plan constitutes the campaign commander's primary tool in synchronizing major operations to achieve operational objectives across his assigned area. These

objectives, together with the commander's guidance on how they are to be accomplished, represent the linkage downward to the operational-tactical level of war.

The Operational-tactical Level of War

The operational-tactical commander uses the operational objectives and the accompanying guidance in the campaign plan to generate a major operations plan. Generally, the campaign commander will assign one operational-tactical commander for each distinct line of operations. Through the major operations plan, the operational-tactical commander identifies the tactical objectives which must be accomplished to achieve the end state of a particular major operation. He employs operational maneuver, operational fires and operational sustainment in such a way that his tactical forces can attain those tactical objectives through battles. Generally speaking, operational maneuver postures forces for a battle. Operational fires influence the posturing of those forces (or the posturing of the enemy's) to provide a relative advantage in the battle. Operational sustainment makes possible operational maneuver and operational fires, and assures that adequate supply is available to the tactical forces undertaking the battle. Together, operational maneuver, operational fires and operational sustainment are the activities by which the operational artist creates the necessary preconditions for tactical success.

The operational-tactical commander is the executor of the campaign commander's operational vision, synchronizing the pursuit of several tactical objectives. These tactical objectives, and the major operations plan which directs their

accomplishment, constitute the downward linkage to the tactical level.

The Tactical Level of War
and the Model's Upward Linkages

Tactical results are actually generated at the tactical level of war. The principal tools of the tactical commander are tactical maneuver, engagements, combat support and combat service support. Tactical maneuver and engagements are used to achieve tactical results within a specific battle. Combat support is used to favorably influence those results. Combat service support translates the resources provided through the operational sustainment effort into combat power on the battlefield, and enables tactical maneuver. When these tools are employed in a synchronized fashion (via the combined arms team in U.S. Army doctrine) the specific tactical results, in combination, achieve the tactical objectives of the commander. The successful pursuit of a series of these tactical objectives in combination will accomplish one or more operational objectives at the operational-tactical level, within the context of a single operational objectives for several simultaneous and sequential campaign plan, satisfies the strategic objectives assigned to the operational commander. Successful completion of a series of campaigns throughout a theater of war satisfies the regional objectives and geopolitical aims determined for that theater by the national military strategy. If the military strategy determined upon by the national leadership is sound, then these regional objectives and aims in turn will contribute to the

national goals, aims and interests, which were identified at the policy formulation level to initiate the process. All of these relationships together represent the upward linkages in the model. They complete the process of translating strategic guidance and decisions into tactical results, the totality of which accomplishes the end state intended by the national leadership.

It is important to emphasize that this is a model, and that, like all models, it is only a fair reflection of reality. In practice, the arrows in the flow chart should point both ways; results at lower levels frequently influence how reality is perceived at the higher levels, and have an impact on planning and decision making. The arrows should probably also be dotted; the linkages do not always work properly, and sometimes seem to be absent entirely, leaving commanders at various levels to operate in an independent or even random mode. In some cases the arrows might bypass entire sections of the model, as when a tactical commander deals directly with the national leadership, bypassing intervening layers of command. The best way to view the model is as a collection of interrelationships, not always precisely defined nor always consistent, but operating generally in the directions indicated.

Having provided an explanation of the analytical model, the following sections will analyze the Palestine campaign at the policy formulation, strategic, operational, operational-tactical and tactical levels. The integration of irregular forces in the

campaign will be explored in detail at each level. Factors contributing to the successful employment of irregulars will be identified, establishing the basis for the recommendations provided in the concluding section, regarding employment of irregulars in U.S. contingency operations within the USCENTCOM AOR.

III. The Role of Irregular Forces in the Palestine Campaign

The Policy Formulation and Strategic Levels

In June of 1917, General Sir Edmund Allenby was appointed commander of the EEF and of the Palestine theater of operations, replacing General Sir Archibald Murray. The appointment was accompanied by two developments which placed the campaign on a sound strategic footing, and which would be essential to Allenby's success: the clarification of his campaign objectives by the War Cabinet; and the unification of command for the irregular and conventional forces in the area.

At this point in the First World War, national policy formulation for the British was the purview of Lloyd George as Prime Minister, his personal advisors, and his party leaders. The strategic level of war was dealt with by the War Cabinet, a bipartisan group set up for the expressed purpose of overseeing the British war effort, and headed by Lloyd George himself.

General Murray, Allenby's predecessor, had been consistently frustrated by the inconsistent and contradictory nature of his strategic guidance from the War Cabinet. In his fourth official despatch to the Secretary of State for War, dated 28 June, 1917, Murray writes:

. . . I think it necessary to point out that the policy of the War Cabinet, as communicated to me in instructions from the War Office, underwent several changes between the end of 1916 and April, 1917. In October, 1916, I was informed that the policy in Egypt was to be mainly defensive, though it was hoped that all preparations were being made for an advance on El Arish . . . early in the month of December, I was asked by telegram to send my proposals for action beyond El Arish, and to state the additional troops which I should require to carry them out; and it was pointed out to me that the gaining of a military success in this theater was very desirable . . . The next communication which I received (dated 15th December) indicated that the War Cabinet were not prepared to give me the troops asked for. I was informed that, notwithstanding recent instructions to make the maximum effort possible during the winter, my primary mission was the defense of Egypt, and that I should be notified if and when the War Cabinet changed this policy.[4]

Murray's frustration is evident and is in marked contrast to the tenor of Allenby's first meeting with Lloyd George. Lloyd George stated that he expected Allenby to take Jerusalem and that Allenby would be provided with whatever supplies and reinforcements were required to do so. At the same time, Lloyd George emphasized the freedom of action which he would accord Allenby in accomplishing that objective and the weight which the War Cabinet would give to Allenby's analysis of the situation in Palestine as the commander on the ground.[5] This atmosphere of candid trust was a far cry from the lack of confidence displayed by the Cabinet in Murray during his final months in command.

Candid communications between Allenby and the War Cabinet were maintained throughout the campaign. Allenby kept the Cabinet informed and consistently sought and received additional clarification of his strategic objectives as the campaign developed. The most important strategic guidance was provided after the fall of Jerusalem. General Jan Christian Smuts was dispatched to Palestine to consult directly with Allenby on behalf of the War Cabinet. Following this visit, the Cabinet clearly identified the strategic objective for the theater: the seizure of Damascus.[6] This objective provided the focus for the campaign plan in which Allenby would enjoy his most spectacular successes with irregular forces.

The second development of significance for Allenby's campaign was the decision, in August of 1917, to transfer the Northern Arab Army to his command. The Northern Arab Army was one of the armies of the Arab Revolt in the Hejaz. It consisted of former soldiers of the Ottoman Empire in revolt against their erstwhile masters; a few British advisors with some regular British, Indian and Egyptian troops; and Bedouin tribesmen, recruited locally to wage irregular warfare against the Turkish forces in the Hejaz. Referring to the irregular component of the Northern Arab Army, Lawrence wrote:

Our largest available resources were the tribesmen, men quite unused to formal warfare, whose assets were movement, endurance, individual intelligence, knowledge of the country, courage... The precious element of our forces were [these] Bedouin irregulars, and not the regulars whose role would only be to occupy the places to which the irregulars had already given access.[7]

It was this army which would provide the irregular forces employed by Allenby in Palestine.

Prior to this time the armies of the Arab Revolt had operated in the Hejaz under the direction of General Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor-General of the Sudan, and Sherif Hussein, the former Ottoman Governor of Mecca. The Revolt was pursuing strategic objectives entirely separate from, and frequently at odds with, those of the EEF in Palestine. The decision by General Wingate to cede complete control of the Northern Arab Army to Allenby, and his success in convincing Hussein to agree to this decision, must be regarded as a major factor in the successful British integration of irregular and regular forces in the subsequent campaign.[8]

The Operational Level

The principal British and Arab sources agree that the irregular forces of the Northern Arab Army played a central role in the latter stages of the Palestine campaign. Lawrence's account of this phase of the campaign points to the Bedouin irregulars of the Northern Arab Army as playing the decisive role in the destruction of the Fourth Army.[9] The operational impact of this contribution is illustrated by Allenby's comment that

On Sept. 26 . . . the enemy could have formed a force capable of delaying my advance [to Damascus]. The destruction of the remnants of the IVth Army and the capture of an additional 20,000 prisoners, prevented any possibility of this.[10]

The seizure of Damascus was the strategic objective for the theater of operations as determined by the War Cabinet. Significant delays would have compromised attainment of this objective, given that the end of declared hostilities with the

Central Powers was very near. Thus the irregular forces of the Arab Army can be said to have contributed directly to the success of the conventional campaign. This successful employment of irregulars at the operational level was a result of several factors, the most important of which was the role played by the commander of the theater of operations, General Allenby.

Throughout the campaign, General Allenby displayed a grasp of irregular warfare, its capabilities and its limitations, which was practically unique among senior British military commanders in the First World War. As a result of his previous service in the Boer War, Allenby was one of the few senior British commanders with extensive experience of modern irregular warfare. He commanded a "mobile column" during the guerrilla phase of the Boer War, facing many of the same problems that the Turkish forces faced in confronting Lawrence's Bedouin irregulars in Palestine. The Boers demonstrated convincingly to Allenby the potential of lightly armed, highly mobile local irregular forces in raids against conventionally trained regular troops. Even the best trained British companies, equipped with modern machine guns and artillery, could in an unwary moment be overrun by the Boer commandos. At the same time, Allenby witnessed time and again the inability of Boer irregulars to withstand regular forces in a conventional fight. He also learned of the achilles heel of most irregular forces: their vulnerable sustainment base and minimal logistics resources. It was this vulnerability that the British exploited to bring an end to the Boers' guerrilla activities.[11]

Upon assuming command of the Palestine theater of operations, Allenby demonstrated his mastery of the lessons of

the Boer War as they applied to irregular warfare. Recognizing the limitations imposed on irregular forces by their underdeveloped sustainment base, Allenby established in July of 1917 a theater sustainment base for the Northern Arab Army at Akaba. This enabled Lawrence to shift his operational sustainment effort from the northern Hejaz to Palestine.[12] As Allenby required the Arab Army to extend its operations farther north towards Damascus, he also extended the theater sustainment effort in support of the irregulars, continually expanding their radius of activity.[13] Without this continual extension of the theater line of support to Lawrence, the Arab Army could not have sustained major operations along the line of operations assigned to it by Allenby in 1918.

Related to the campaign sustainment effort was Allenby's decision in February of 1918 to provide additional operational sustainment resources to the Arab Army in the form of seven hundred baggage camels. These resources were identified by Lawrence as essential to the role of irregular forces in Allenby's campaign plan. The additional camels provided to the Arab Army the operational sustainment capability necessary to the accomplishment of its operational objectives. In May of 1918, Allenby provided two thousand additional riding camels to the Arab Army. Just as the baggage camels were critical to Lawrence's operational sustainment effort, so the extra riding camels provided his forces with the operational maneuver capability necessary to reach Deraa in September.[14] Of particular importance in this respect was the suitability of the additional assets to the needs of the Arab Army and to the

environment in which it had to operate. Motorized transport, for example, could have provided much greater lift capability, but was unsuited to the irregulars' harsh desert environment.

The role envisioned by Allenby for Lawrence's irregulars required them to confront the regular Turkish garrisons along the Hejaz Railway and exposed them to conventional counterattack by available Turkish reserves east of the Jordan River. Allenby sought to improve the Bedouin irregulars' capabilities against the garrisons by providing to the Arab Army limited numbers of modern conventional weapons, suitable for employment by light irregular forces. These weapons included machine guns, light mountain guns and explosives along with British experts to demonstrate their use to the Bedouins.[15] To further enhance the irregulars' offensive capabilities and to diminish their vulnerability to attack by conventional Turkish forces, Allenby attached a limited number of conventionally trained regular forces directly to the Arab Army. These forces included armored car units, additional artillery, and a battalion of camel-mounted conventional British cavalry.[16] This force structure provided the tools necessary for Lawrence to forge, from his Bedouin irregulars, an effective instrument at the operational-tactical level. The most important factor, however, in the successful employment of that instrument within the context of the overall campaign was Allenby's thorough integration of the Arab Army into his operational vision.

It is clear from Lawrence's interviews with Allenby, and from Allenby's own despatches in 1918, that the Bedouin irregulars were far more than simply an auxiliary to Allenby's

conventional forces. In designing the major operations necessary to accomplish his strategic objectives, Allenby accorded independent and coequal roles to his conventional forces in the west and the Arab Army in the east. During the first half of 1918, he planned a series of major operations "to provide more effectively for the security of Jerusalem and Jaffa" by advancing his lines north beyond Jerusalem and east beyond the Jordan River[17]. The conventional forces were to conduct operations to seize the Jordan River bridges, clear the River valley, and then advance along the line of operations Jerusalem-Jericho-Es Salt-Amman (see Map 1 at Appendix 2). The Arab Army was assigned an entirely separate series of operational objectives along an independent line of operations. In recounting the planning meeting with Allenby and his Chief of Staff, Dawnay, Lawrence wrote:

They would ask us in the lull to come north towards the dead sea until, if possible, we linked right up to its southern end, and renewed the continuous front... The talk left us a clear course of operations. We were to reach the Dead Sea as soon as possible; to stop the transport of food [by the Turks] up it to Jericho before the middle of February; and to arrive at the Jordan before the end of March.[18]

Examination of Map 1 shows two converging lines of operation, one for the conventional effort and one for the irregular forces of the Arab Army. The two efforts were not only synchronized with respect to the lines of operation, but also with respect to the operational objectives envisioned. Quoting again from Allenby's Despatches:

[These operations] would compel the enemy to maintain a considerable force to cover Amman. The troops available to operate against the Arabs

would be reduced, and possibly the enemy might transfer a portion of his reserves from the west to the east of the Jordan, thereby weakening his power to make or meet any attack on the main front.[19]

This series of operations illustrates Allenby's practice of designing conventional major operations to support his irregular effort, while at the same time focusing his irregular major operations on enhancing the impact of his conventional main effort. In this way Allenby succeeded in creating a synergistic effect at the operational level, using regular and irregular major operations in combination. The most spectacular example of this synergism is found in the destruction of the Turkish Fourth Army following the initial battles in September of 1918. Lawrence described the synchronization of conventional and irregular major operations in this phase of the campaign in some detail. Using aircraft to communicate with the pursuing British cavalry columns, Lawrence deployed his irregulars in the path of the retreating Turkish army, slowing it sufficiently for the pursuing cavalry to close with the rear of Turkish columns. Bedouin irregulars and regular cavalry then fell upon the disorganized Turkish columns completely destroying them.[20] The action demonstrated the potential of synchronized major operations by conventional and irregular forces, and points incidentally to another factor in Allenby's successful employment of irregulars: his use of air power.

In any examination of irregular warfare in the twentieth century, a common theme quickly emerges: the vulnerability of irregular forces to air attack, especially in an environment offering little concealment from aerial observation. The German-

built and -piloted aircraft which supported the Turkish forces in Palestine were a serious threat to Lawrence's irregulars, and one against which he had very little defense. To deal with this problem, Allenby agreed to place detachments of British pursuit aircraft under Lawrence's direct control operating from temporary air strips located with elements of the Arab Army. On several occasions, this decision proved to be critical when British aircraft broke up Turkish air attacks on Lawrence's irregulars. These attacks threatened to disrupt the major operations undertaken by the Arab Army during the advance on Damascus[21]. Allenby also directed his theater air commander, General Salmon, to provide air support to the irregular forces in the form of bombing raids. These raids decreased the vulnerability of the irregulars by interdicting the movement of Turkish counterattack forces and enhanced the irregulars' effectiveness by providing the equivalent (in fire power) of regular force augmentation for attacks on small Turkish garrisons[22]. In addition to air support and air cover, the Royal Air Force provided vital intelligence to the Arab Army through aerial reconnaissance while the counter-air effort denied this vital service to the Turks. The Turkish lack of effective aerial reconnaissance also contributed to the success of Allenby's operational deception plans which in turn enhanced the contribution of his irregular forces at the operational level.

Allenby's previous experience with irregular forces combined with his demonstrated facility for planning at the operational level helped him to develop a clear vision of how the strategic

objectives of the Palestine theater of operations would be achieved. This vision thoroughly integrated the irregular forces available in the theater on a basis coequal with that of the conventional elements of the EEF. But while Allenby was the originator of this vision, T. E. Lawrence was its executor at the operational-tactical level at least as far as the irregular component was concerned.

The Operational-tactical Level

The record of irregular forces in Palestine is more uneven at the operational-tactical level. The first major operation the Arab Army undertook was the destruction of the Yarmuk Bridges in support of Allenby's attack on the Gaza-Bersheeba Line in October of 1917. The operation revealed shortcomings in the area of operational maneuver and sustainment as Lawrence was unable either to deliver sufficient forces to the vicinity of the bridges or to sustain the forces that he did deliver in the face of initial reverses and delays[23]. The subsequent major operation to link the Arab Army with the right flank of the conventional forces north of the Dead Sea was much more successful. All but one of the operational objectives assigned to the irregulars were achieved and the failure to make the actual linkup was a result of setbacks to the conventional major operation in support of the Arab Army[24]. In the final major operation to envelop the Turkish left at Deraa and advance on Damascus the Bedouin irregulars fully demonstrated their potential value at the operational-tactical level. All of the operational objectives identified by Allenby were accomplished with the destruction of the Turkish Fourth Army being an

unexpected bonus. The Arab Army showed a mastery of operational maneuver, operational fires and operational sustainment as they apply to irregular warfare. The contrast between this last major operation and the initial failures and shortcomings of the irregular effort offers an excellent basis for analyzing the reasons for Lawrence's successes in the final stages of the campaign.

The foundation of irregular participation at the operational-tactical level was Lawrence's conviction that the greatest contribution the Arabs could make to the campaign was through their conduct of irregular warfare against Turkish garrisons and communications. An important dispute over this issue had developed in April of 1917 between Lawrence and the other British advisors with the Arab Revolt. General Wingate instructed his advisors to build a conventional Arab capability around regular forces of the Egyptian Army which Wingate had dispatched to the Hejaz. Wingate's intent was to concentrate the armies of the Revolt around Medina and Mecca, and to defeat the Turkish forces in conventional battle.[25] Lawrence, on the other hand, believed that

our largest resources, the Beduin on whom our war must be built, were unused to formal operations, but had assets of mobility, toughness, self-assurance, knowledge of the country, intelligent courage. With them dispersal was strength. Consequently we must extend our front to its maximum, to impose on the Turks the longest possible passive defense, since that was, materially, their most costly form of war.[26]

Lawrence was unsuccessful in converting his fellow advisors to his point of view and the armies operating in the southern

Hejaz continued to emphasize conventional as opposed to irregular warfare. In August of 1917, however, the decision to transfer the Northern Arab Army to Allenby's control provided an opportunity for Lawrence to put his ideas about irregular warfare into practice.

Lawrence believed from the outset of his involvement in Palestine that irregular warfare could have a decisive impact at the operational-tactical level. Writing to Brigadier-General Gilbert Clayton (Chief of the Arab Bureau) as early as July of 1917, Lawrence provided an analysis of what major operations might be appropriate to irregular Bedouin forces active in Palestine. His proposals included an advance on Deraa designed to unhinge the entire Turkish left wing[27]. The design is remarkably similar to that of the major operation which Allenby would assign to the Arab Army in September of 1918.

In designing major operations to implement the guidance he received from Allenby, Lawrence displayed a notable talent for selecting tactical objectives suited to the capabilities of his irregular forces. He specified several propositions which governed his selections:

Firstly, that irregulars would not attack places, and so remained incapable of forcing a decision. Secondly, that they were as unable to defend a line or point as they were to attack it. Thirdly, that their virtue lay in depth, not in face. Our aim was to seek the enemy's weakest material link and bear only on that till time made their whole length fail.[28]

These propositions led Lawrence to avoid confronting Turkish strength, and to seek those areas vulnerable to irregular warfare. Exposed flanks, long lines of communication, and small

or isolated garrisons became the focus of Lawrence's tactical objectives. He rejected the dictum of Foch, fashionable at the time, "that the ethic of modern war is to seek for the enemy's army, his center of power, and destroy it in battle";[29] Lawrence sought instead to accomplish the operational objective indirectly. Several years later, his techniques would provide some of the basis for B. H. Liddell Hart's theories of the indirect approach in warfare.

Two major operations provide examples of Lawrence's indirect approach in practice. In the first, during Allenby's advance north and east from Jerusalem in early 1918, the Arab Army was required to occupy the rail center of Ma'an in southern Palestine. The town was defended by a large Turkish garrison. Rather than attempting to carry the town by assault, Lawrence planned to position the Arab Army at a point on the railway several miles north of Ma'an, interdicting the Turks' only source of supply and reinforcement. When the garrison emerged from its defensive positions in the town to reestablish its communications, the Arab Army would engage it in the open desert where the advantages of Turkish firepower and defensive preparations would be minimized. While the plan failed in execution due to mistakes at the tactical level, it clearly illustrates Lawrence's operational-tactical thinking and would probably have worked had his subordinate commanders executed it as Lawrence envisioned.[30]

A more successful example is provided by the final major operation undertaken by the Arab Army: the envelopment of the Turkish left at Deraa. The operational objective was to stop all

traffic through the Deraa rail center for a period of one week. Lawrence certainly could have accomplished this by storming and holding Deraa itself, but he would eventually have faced the kind of pitched battle that was the antithesis of irregular warfare and the indirect approach as Lawrence practiced it. Instead, Lawrence selected as tactical objectives several bridges and stretches of track around Deraa the destruction of which would completely halt rail traffic through the town. Once these objectives had been taken and destroyed, the irregulars would maintain surveillance around the sites. Turkish sorties to retake and repair the damaged lines would face the forces of the Arab Army in the same kind of running fight that Lawrence had anticipated at Ma'an. In this case, however, his subordinate tactical commanders executed his plan and succeeded in completely isolating Deraa for the required period of time.[31]

Lawrence, citing Saxe, suggested that it would be possible to use the indirect approach illustrated above in order to achieve results without fighting at all, and to "reach victory without battle, by pressing our advantages mathematical and psychological." He goes on to say in the same passage, however, that

our physical weakness was not such as to demand this. We were richer than the Turks in transport, machine guns, [armored] cars, high explosive. We could develop a highly mobile, highly equipped striking force of the smallest size, and use it successively at distributed points of the Turkish line, to make them strengthen their posts beyond the defensive minimum of twenty men. This would be a shortcut to success.[32]

Lawrence is referring here to the regular component of the Arab Army. This component eventually came to include 500 camel-

mounted British regular infantry, a camel-mounted British regular cavalry battalion, a battery of mountain howitzers, armored cars, combat engineers, and a plentiful supply of machine guns and high explosives to equip the non-Bedouin Arabs who were trained for conventional operations.[33]

By synchronizing the conventional battles of the regular forces with the irregular warfare of his Bedouin guerrillas, Lawrence was able to create a synergistic effect at the operational-tactical level. Clearing an area of irregulars required the Turks to disperse their forces throughout the area and to dispatch numerous small columns from their fortifications to pursue the Bedouin tribesmen. Confronting the well-trained and lavishly equipped British regulars, however, required the Turks to concentrate their forces in strong defensive positions. This concentration to deal with a conventional threat left the long and tenuous Turkish line of communications vulnerable to raiding and interdiction by the irregulars. Thus combining actions by regular and irregular forces made them more effective than either could have been operating alone.

The synergism of conventional battles synchronized with irregular warfare can best be observed in May of 1918 after the miscarriage of the Ma'an attack. The Arab Army had to maintain a foothold around Ma'an in order to support Allenby's coming offensive to take Damascus. Lawrence employed his regular forces in a series of battles to destroy the smaller Turkish garrisons around Ma'an and to keep the larger garrison in Ma'an itself bottled up. This allowed the Bedouin irregulars to remain around

and north of Ma'an, raiding the railway between Amman and Ma'an. The raiding by the irregulars, in turn, prevented the Turks from transferring large forces by rail south to Ma'an, an action which could have broken the siege being maintained by Lawrence's regular troops.[34] The synergism created by synchronizing conventional battles with irregular warfare in a single major operation allowed the full potential of irregular forces to be realized; exploiting this potential was a function of Lawrence's mastery of operational maneuver, operational sustainment and operational fires.

Operational maneuver was central to Lawrence's concept of irregular warfare. Pursuing lines of operation in great depth and along widely extended frontages with relatively low force densities places a premium on the ability to concentrate rapidly at any point. Lawrence paid tribute to the unique capabilities of Bedouin irregulars in this regard when he wrote that "the virtue of irregulars lay in depth, not in face." [35] Lawrence sought consistently to accomplish through operational maneuver what he could not accomplish through superior numbers or firepower:

In character our operations... should be like naval war, in mobility, ubiquity, independence of bases and communications, ignoring of ground features, of strategic areas, of fixed points. 'He who commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will.' And we commanded the desert. Camel raiding parties, self-contained like ships, might cruise confidently along the enemy's cultivation frontier, sure of an unhindered retreat into their desert-element which the Turks could not explore.[36]

The relative advantage enjoyed by the Arab Army in mobility at the operational-tactical level gave it a critical edge over the Turks in posturing forces for battle. This advantage extended to the regular as well as the irregular component of the army for several reasons. Lawrence was careful in structuring his force to include only those conventional units suited to ease of sustainment and maneuver over long distances which characterized irregular warfare. The conventional forces which Lawrence did incorporate learned from the Bedouin irregulars many of the techniques which facilitated survival and travel in the desert. The regular British units in the Arab Army maintained rates of march (in some cases in excess of forty miles a day) which were well beyond the capabilities of the conventional forces of the EEF.[37] Finally, the augmentation by conventional combat forces was accompanied by augmentation with an extensive conventional sustainment capability. This enabled the regular units to maneuver into the depths of the Turkish rear as well as enhancing both the range and the staying power of the irregulars.

Operational sustainment, as is demonstrated by this last point, played an essential role in the major operations of the Arab Army. Lawrence and the other British advisors devoted much of their time and effort to sustainment problems and committed a major portion of their resources to solving those problems. Essential preliminaries to the major operation against Deraa included establishing supply caches deep in the desert and developing an elaborate network for providing resupply to the forces of the Arab Army when they reached Deraa.[38] The operational sustainment effort made use of camels, armored cars,

and even airlift using the large British Hadley-Page bombers as cargo aircraft.[39] The augmentation of the operational sustainment capabilities for the Arab Army and the advice and assistance in this area provided by Lawrence and his British logistics specialists were critical to the success of the irregular effort. Without this augmentation and expertise, the Arab Army could never have penetrated to Deraa nor could it have remained there for the period necessary to accomplish the mission.

Operational fires in this series of major operations were provided in part by the RAF bombing attacks in support of the Arab Army. Lawrence requested air attacks against key Turkish rail centers in May of 1918, in conjunction with Arab Army operations around Ma'an. Lawrence attributed the failure of the Turks to initiate a large scale counter-offensive south from Amman towards Ma'an partly to this RAF bombing of Turkish communications.[40] The air effort extended far beyond bombing raids on Turkish railways, however. Recall that the analytical model defines operational fires as those fires which influence the posturing of forces (friendly or enemy) to provide a relative advantage in battle. Within the context of this definition, operational fires must embrace the British counter-air effort in support of the Arab Army. Throughout the campaign, Lawrence employed pursuit aircraft under his direct control to assure his own freedom of action at the operational-tactical level and to deny that freedom of action to the enemy. He did this not simply through the air cover provided to his columns, but also through

the aerial counter-reconnaissance effort which denied critical intelligence to the Turks and through strikes on Turkish aerodromes. In fact, in the midst of the actions around Deraa, Lawrence executed an armored car raid on a Turkish aerodrome in the area destroying one aircraft and forcing the others to abandon the location.[41] Inasmuch as it contributed directly to the ability of the Arab Army to posture forces for battle, the raid should be regarded as an example of operational fires and one which contributed significantly to the success of the Bedouin irregulars.

Lawrence demonstrated throughout this campaign a tremendous talent for operational art and for synchronizing regular and irregular warfare. He selected sound tactical objectives which were within the capabilities of his forces and which accomplished the operational objectives assigned to him by Allenby. Employing operational maneuver, operational sustainment and operational fires in combination, Lawrence created the preconditions necessary for tactical success.

The Tactical Level

The performance of Bedouin irregulars at the tactical level was extremely varied. They enjoyed some remarkable successes, but also suffered some major reverses. Lawrence drew several lessons from his experiences with irregular warfare at the tactical level. As he applied these lessons in the latter stages of the campaign, the tactical performance of the Arab Army became more consistent. During the envelopment of Deraa and the pursuit of the Turkish Fourth Army, both regular and irregular components

of the army enjoyed repeated tactical successes against some of the best Turkish troops in Palestine.[42]

Lawrence learned by bitter experience that Bedouin irregulars could not face regular Turkish troops in conventional combat at the tactical level. Throughout Lawrence's accounts, from his earliest experiences in the southern Hejaz to the final stages of the campaign, whenever he or his subordinates allowed their Bedouin guerrillas to be drawn into a conventional fight with the Turks the results were nothing short of disastrous. After a particularly damaging engagement at Hesa, north of Ma'an, Lawrence wrote:

By my decision to fight, I had killed twenty or thirty of our six hundred men, and the wounded would be perhaps three times as many. It was one-sixth of our force gone on a verbal triumph... [that] would not effect the issue of the war.[43]

Losses on this scale would quickly cause the powerful Bedouin tribes to abandon Lawrence entirely, putting an immediate end to the irregular warfare component of his major operations. Lawrence fully understood this and commented following this fight (which the British regarded as quite a success) that "Hesa's sole profit lay... in its lesson to myself. Never again were we combative, whether in jest, or betting on a certainty." [44]

In response to experiences like this one, Lawrence insisted that Bedouin irregulars could not be called upon to assault well-defended positions nor could they be asked to defend a fixed location in the face of a determined Turkish assault. The basis of the Bedouin irregular's tactical effectiveness was his traditional background of raiding and tribal warfare combined with his superior knowledge of terrain and his tactical mobility

in the desert. Bedouins fought as individuals, capitalizing on each man's personal skills as a desert warrior. Lawrence insisted that regular discipline, organization, and tactics were foreign to the Bedouin irregular's style of combat. To be most effective, the Bedouin must be free to pursue his traditional methods of warfare.[45]

Consistent with these observations about the Bedouin style of irregular warfare, Lawrence resisted attempts to organize locally recruited Bedouin tribesmen into conventional companies and battalions. The Bedouin irregulars retained their native character in terms of equipment, dress, and organization. While Lawrence provided general guidance about what he wanted the irregulars to accomplish, his involvement at the tactical level was minimal. The irregulars followed their own tribal leaders into battle, using the traditional methods of warfare which had served them for generations. Even the modern machine guns provided to the irregulars were employed in a uniquely Bedouin manner rather than in accordance with the conventional tactics of British and French field manuals.[46] Lawrence was convinced that one of the main factors in the success of the irregular effort was his insistence that it remain essentially Bedouin in character.

Another characteristic which emerges from an examination of tactical actions by the Arab Army is the segregation of regular and irregular forces at the tactical level. While at the operational-tactical level synchronized operations by regular and irregular components had a synergistic effect, at the tactical level the opposite seems to have been true. Regular and

irregular forces were very seldom combined to fight an integrated battle and where they were the results were not generally favorable. In part this seems to have been a natural consequence of the incompatibility of conventional tactics with irregular warfare, exacerbated by the ill feelings which developed between regular and irregular when they operated in close proximity to one another. The British regulars resented the refusal of the Bedouin to engage in conventional fights with the Turks believing that the irregulars were deliberately refusing to support their British allies.[47] The Bedouin, for their part, distrusted foreigners in general and regarded the discipline, spit and polish, and military traditions of the British Army as more or less insane and certainly unsuited to the harsh world of the Arabian desert. In any case and regardless of the merits of the respective points of view, Lawrence concluded that regulars and irregulars were much more effective at the tactical level when employed in separate actions.

Bedouin Irregulars in Perspective

The tactical results achieved by irregular warfare complemented those of the conventional battles fought by the regular component of the Arab Army. The tactical objectives accomplished by the synchronized activities of regular and irregular forces led to the operational results required by Lawrence and anticipated by Allenby. One of the most revealing comments in this regard is found in Allenby's October 31, 1918 Despatch to the War Cabinet:

El Afule, Beisan and Deraa were the vital points on his [the Turk's] communications. If they could be seized, the enemy's retreat would be cut off. Deraa was beyond my reach, but not beyond that of mobile detachments of the Arab Army. It was not to be expected that these detachments could hold this railway junction, but it was within their power to dislocate all traffic.[48]

Allenby anticipated that the Bedouin irregulars of the Arab Army would make a vital contribution to the success of his campaign, and one which was beyond the capabilities of the conventional forces of the EEF. Allenby's expectations were more than satisfied, as he acknowledges in the closing paragraphs of the same Despatch:

The Arab Army has rendered valuable assistance, both in cutting the enemy's communications, before, and during, the operations, and in co-operating with my cavalry during the advance on Damascus. By throwing itself across the enemy's line of retreat, north of Deraa, it prevented the escape of portions of the IVth Turkish Army, and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.[49]

IV. The Turkish Viewpoint

The preceding analysis examined the Bedouin irregulars' contribution to Allenby's conventional campaign in Palestine from the British and Arab perspective. While the key British participants in that campaign, to include Lawrence and Allenby himself, clearly believed that the irregulars made a crucial contribution to Allenby's victories, the perceptions on one side of a conflict are not always accurate reflections of reality. Historians of this particular campaign are fortunate to have an invaluable perspective on the Turkish war effort in this theater in the memoirs of the senior Central Powers commander in Palestine, German General Liman von Sanders.

General von Sanders assumed command of the Turkish, German and Austrian forces in Palestine March 1, 1918. In his memoirs, he describes the final campaign and the fall of Damascus. Von Sanders relies on his own recollections recorded at the time in his military journal as well as the official records and communications of the Turkish Army to which he had access.

Von Sanders' account confirms the British impressions about the impact of Lawrence's Bedouin irregulars at the operational level. One of von Sanders' first actions upon assuming command was to concentrate all of his cavalry assets on his open left flank, to counter the raids of the Arab Army.[50] The raiding of Turkish communications by Bedouin irregulars was a continual problem for von Sanders. It impeded the distribution of forces among his operational-tactical commanders to meet the developing British and Arab threats.[51]

The Bedouin irregulars placed major constraints on von Sanders' design of the Turkish defensive campaign. A voluntary retirement of the Turkish lines in July of 1918 could have greatly strengthened the Turkish defenses and would have completely dislocated Allenby's planned offensive. Von Sanders was precluded from such a retirement "because we no longer could have stopped the progress of the Arab insurrection in rear of our army." [52]

At the operational-tactical level, von Sanders' commentary concerning Lawrence's major operation against Deraa brings the role of the Bedouin irregulars into sharp focus. Their raids around Deraa on the eve of Allenby's main attack completely

occupied Turkish attention causing von Sanders to commit most of his meager reserves to the defense of the Deraa station.[53]

As Allenby's attack developed, the irregulars had a progressively greater impact. Turkish communications degenerated rapidly as more and more Arabs joined Lawrence's irregular raiders killing Turkish couriers, cutting Turkish wire communications, and destroying isolated patrols and stragglers. By September 20, the Turkish operational-tactical commanders and von Sanders himself were capable neither of learning what the situation was on the battlefield nor of exercising effective command and control of their remaining forces.[54]

From 16 through 24 September, the Turks attempted to reopen the rail lines from Amman to Deraa in order to concentrate sufficient forces to restore the situation on the Turkish left flank. Von Sanders details the complete failure of these attempts in the face of synchronized efforts by the regular and irregular components of the Arab Army. In excess of 3000 fully equipped, fresh Turkish troops were committed from Amman to reopen the Deraa rail lines which testifies to the magnitude of Lawrence's success in his major operation to keep the lines closed.[55]

Of the destruction of the Fourth Army, von Sanders says very little beyond vague references to "some engagements with the enemy." [56] It appears from his account of this phase of the campaign that Turkish Army Group Headquarters lost touch completely with the Fourth Army Headquarters. The army disappears entirely from von Sanders commentary after this point, with the following exception, referring to Turkish attempts at

constituting a defense around Aleppo on October 3: "The Fourth Army, under Djemal Pasha, if it could still be called an army, was to remain at Homs until pushed back by the enemy." [57] On October 12, the headquarters of Fourth Army was dissolved.

The Turkish Fourth Army began the campaign as the largest Turkish army in Palestine (including its garrisons along the Hejaz railway) and it included the only regular German infantry regiment in the theater. [58] Von Sanders identifies the Fourth Army as being in better condition than either of his other two armies in September of 1918, Fourth Army having received recent and substantial reinforcement with fresh troops. [59] The loss of this army can only be regarded as a crippling blow to the Turks and fully justifies the British and Arab belief that the Bedouin irregulars played a crucial and possibly decisive role in the pursuit to Damascus.

At the tactical level, very little detail is available from Turkish or German sources relating to the employment of Bedouin irregulars. Some tentative conclusions can be drawn from von Sanders' memoirs. Throughout the account, he expresses a recurring fear of a general insurrection by the Bedouin tribes suggesting that von Sanders, at least, feared the tactical capabilities of the Bedouin raiders. The failure of the Turkish attempts to reopen the Deraa rail center can also be regarded, in part, as an indication of the effectiveness of the Bedouin irregulars at the tactical level. Nonetheless, the most that can be said with confidence is that the Turkish and German accounts provided by von Sanders do not contradict the British and Arab

sources, as far as tactical employment of the irregulars is concerned.

As a whole, von Sanders' description of the campaign supports the conclusions drawn from British and Arab sources. The Bedouin irregulars played a vital role at the operational level and were essential to the major operations conducted by Lawrence and the Arab Army in support of Allenby's campaign.

V. Conclusion: Implications for Employment of Bedouin Irregulars by USCENTCOM

The British experiences in Palestine can be generalized to the current situation in the USCENTCOM AOR. Like the EEF, USCENTCOM will probably face a relatively large and well-equipped conventional threat in an austere and immature theater. The conditions which facilitated recruitment and employment of Bedouin irregulars in 1918 are still present to a large extent in the USCENTCOM AOR today. Just as irregular forces provided the margin of success in Allenby's drive on Damascus, they can contribute today to U.S. contingency operations in the Middle East. The experiences of the British in Palestine offer many valuable lessons for the U.S. military in how the potential of Bedouin irregulars can be harnessed in support of a conventional campaign.

At the policy formulation level, clear and consistent guidance from the national leadership is essential to providing the foundation for irregular participation in a conventional campaign. Also critical is a unified command at the theater of

war (strategic) level embracing both conventional and irregular forces.

At the operational level, the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander commands the theater of operations and plays the primary role in the integration of irregular warfare into the conventional campaign. Previous experience with irregular warfare is a tremendous advantage to the theater of operations commander-- without it the commander may have difficulty recognizing the potential value of irregular warfare to his efforts.

To be most effective at both the operational and the operational-tactical levels, irregulars should be incorporated in an independent command with its own line of operations and operational objectives. The command should be provided with conventional augmentation by regular combat forces as well as an extensive additional sustainment capability. In designing this augmentation, the needs of the irregular forces and the characteristics of irregular warfare in the Arabian environment should be paramount. Generally, combat units should be light, highly mobile, and able to operate with a minimum of logistics support. The current organization of the 9th Motorized Division is probably close to the ideal. Sustainment resources should be appropriate to the experience level of the irregulars, easy to maintain and to operate. As was the case in Chad, small Toyota pickup trucks, ubiquitous in the area and familiar to the Bedouin, would be far more useful than more capable but unfamiliar U.S. military vehicles.

Major operations by this mixed force command of regulars and irregulars should be synchronized with the conventional effort. Irregular warfare should obviously support the main conventional effort of the campaign, but the theater of operations commander should also attempt to tailor his conventional major operations to provide some support to the irregulars. Of particular importance in this regard, the enemy must not be permitted to concentrate the bulk of his conventional forces against the irregular effort.

Some provision must be made at the operational level for the protection of the irregular forces from hostile air attack. This could be limited to augmenting the irregulars with simple and easy to use air defense systems such as Stinger. A determined enemy air offensive against the irregular forces, however, will probably require the dedication of U.S. Air Force, Navy or Marine Corps air assets to the protection of the irregulars. Given the dispersed and unpredictable nature of irregular warfare, the best method of employment for these assets would be to place them, as Allenby did, under the direct control of the mixed force commander.

Operational fires will be critical to the survival of the irregulars, given the mobility of the modern conventional threat forces. Operational fires will also provide a substitute for heavy firepower among the lighter regular units provided to augment the irregular forces. The operational commander should insure that a portion of his operational fires capabilities is dedicated to the mixed force.

At the operational-tactical level, the character of the commander becomes even more critical to successful integration of irregular forces into the conventional campaign. The mixed force commander must understand the theory and practice of irregular warfare, and avoid the temptation to employ his Bedouin irregulars as "extra infantry battalions." The distinction between regular and irregular forces should be clearly recognized and both components given coequal status. If one component or the other dominates the major operations of the mixed force then the synergism created by synchronizing regular battles with irregular warfare will be lost.

The mixed force should generally pursue an indirect approach in selecting tactical objectives for its major operations, avoiding enemy strength and seeking enemy weakness. This will probably be quite difficult for American commanders; U.S. doctrine since the early days of the Second World War has revolved around mass and firepower applied at the decisive point. Breaking this mold is essential to realizing the full potential of irregular warfare. Major operations for the mixed force must focus on enemy communications, vulnerable logistics nodes, isolated garrisons and over-extended forces.

Operational maneuver is the key to successful application of the indirect approach. The mixed force commander must capitalize on the relative mobility advantages of his Bedouin irregulars and must exploit the experience and knowledge of those irregulars to provide the same mobility advantage to his regular component. Maneuver must occupy center stage in mixed force major operations assuming the prime role that battle has traditionally played for

conventional forces. Range and depth provide the decisive edge, not mass and firepower.

In the area of operational sustainment, an extensive network should be constructed capable of sustaining maneuver by both regular and irregular forces as far into the depths of the enemy's line of communications as possible. To the greatest extent possible, the network should be locally procured, operated and maintained. Bedouin truck drivers intimately familiar with the great deserts of Arabia are plentiful and easily hired; local shops can repair and service the small trucks common to the area. Where necessary, camels and handlers are available in substantial numbers to carry cargo over terrain not trafficable to motorized transport.

The officers responsible for the sustainment effort must be prepared to deal in hard cash, on the basis of verbal agreements and prompt payment. Elaborate contracting procedures and time-consuming negotiations will bring the whole network to a screeching halt.

To the extent that U.S. military resources are committed to the sustainment effort, they must be robust and capable of functioning in the harsh environment of the Arabian deserts. The most useful resource would be one or two C-130 transport aircraft. These aircraft would lend invaluable flexibility, range and responsiveness to the sustainment effort and they perform very well in this austere environment.

At the tactical level, one simple rule of thumb overshadows all other considerations: don't take casualties. Dead Bedouins are the quickest way to end an operation by irregular forces in

the desert. Avoid actions which will expose Bedouin irregulars to attack by the enemy's conventional forces, especially during the early stages of any major operation.

Do not combine regular and irregular forces in battle; provide separate tactical objectives suited to the capabilities of each type of force. Objectives which will benefit the Bedouin warriors as individuals-- enemy supply dumps, for example-- are the best choice for the irregulars, as their loss damages the enemy and enhances irregular recruitment at the same time.


To the extent possible, avoid assigning non-Bedouin as tactical commanders of Bedouin forces. Rely on tribal leaders, and provide training and assistance as necessary to those leaders. Avoid attempts to organize, equip and train copies of U.S. infantry battalions using Bedouin recruits. Such units will be incapable of performing either regular or irregular warfare adequately.

The Bedouin tribes of the Arabian Peninsula are a resource with tremendous military potential. In an austere environment with force levels which may be less than adequate for the tasks assigned, USCENTCOM could very easily find itself in a position where irregular warfare by Bedouin guerrillas is the margin between success and failure. In this eventuality, the ability of U.S. forces to absorb and profit from the British example in Palestine may be critical.

Appendix 1: The Model.


LEVELS OF WAR

END STATES



Appendix 2: Map 1.

Allenby's advance north and east of Jerusalem, Feb-April, 1918.
 SOURCE: ALLENBY, A BRIEF RECORD OF THE ADVANCE OF THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE



ENDNOTES

1. GEN Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, (Annapolis, 1927), pp. 268-305.
2. While the model is my own, I would be remiss if I failed to mention Professor James Schneider of the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, to whose inspiration I owe many of the ideas incorporated in the model.
3. See FM 100-5, Operations, and LTC Floyd T. Banks and COL William W. Mendel, Campaign Planning, (Carlisle Barracks, 1988).
4. GEN Sir Archibald Murray, Sir Archibald Murray's Despatches, (London, 1920), pp. 129-131.
5. Brian Gardner, Allenby of Arabia: Lawrence's General, (New York, 1966), pp. 113-114.
6. Ibid., pp. 165-167.
7. T. E. Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt," Army Quarterly, (October, 1920), p. 63.
8. Sir Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan: The Life and Times of General Sir Reginald Wingate, (London, 1955), pp. 194-197.
9. T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (hereafter cited as Seven Pillars), (New York, 1986), pp. 649-656, 660-661.
10. General Sir Edmund H. Allenby, Despatch of October 31, 1918, as cited in A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (hereafter cited as Allenby, followed by the date of the Despatch and page number), (London, 1919), p. 33.
11. Gardner, Allenby of Arabia, pp.44-53, and GEN Sir Archibald Wavell, Allenby: A Study in Greatness, (New York, 1941), pp. 101-109.
12. Lawrence, Seven Pillars, pp. 331-332.
13. Ibid., p. 464.
14. Ibid., p. 515.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., pp. 543-544, 554-555.
17. Allenby, September 18, 1918, p. 11.
18. Lawrence, Seven Pillars, pp. 464-465.
19. Allenby, September 18, 1918, pp. 17-18.

20. Lawrence, Seven Pillars, pp. 644, 660-662.
21. Ibid., pp. 615-616, 636-640.
22. Ibid., pp. 540, 641-643.
23. Ibid., pp. 424-427, 429-433.
24. Ibid., pp. 539-540.
25. Wingate, pp. 187-189.
26. Lawrence, Seven Pillars, pp. 231-232.
27. David Garnett, ed., The Letters of T. E. Lawrence, (London, 1938), pp. 228-230.
28. Lawrence, Seven Pillars, p. 231.
29. Lawrence, "Evolution of a Revolt," pp. 56-57.
30. Lawrence, Seven Pillars, p. 515.
31. Ibid., pp. 613-614, 624-625, 641-642.
32. Ibid., p. 232.
33. Ibid., p. 556.
34. Ibid., pp. 543-545.
35. Lawrence, "Evolution of a Revolt," p. 57.
36. Lawrence, Seven Pillars, p. 345.
37. Ibid., pp. 585-586, 589.
38. Ibid., pp. 556-557, 592.
39. Ibid., pp. 640-641.
40. Ibid., p. 540.
41. Ibid., pp. 631-632.
42. Ibid., pp. 630-642, and Sulieman Mousa, T. E. Lawrence: An Arab View, (New York, 1966), pp. 186-204.
43. Lawrence, Seven Pillars, p. 491.
44. Ibid., p. 493.
45. Ibid., pp. 346-348.
46. Lawrence, "Evolution of a Revolt," pp. 65-66.

50. Von Sanders, p. 208.
51. Ibid., p. 211.
52. Ibid., p. 273.
53. Ibid., p.274.
54. Ibid., pp. 290-294.
55. Ibid., p. 295.
56. Ibid., p. 302.
57. Ibid., p. 309.
58. Wavell, The Palestine Campaigns, pp. 194-195.
59. Von Sanders, pp. 270-271.

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