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RETURN OF THE STRATEGIC MINUTEMAN

Lt Col Archie J. Berberian

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


Return of the Strategic Minuteman

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Return of the Strategic Minuteman

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
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Foreword

The United States military is engaged in a continuous struggle to maintain a sufficient force structure to counter threats to our country's national security interests while minimizing the cost to taxpayers. Traditionally, the National Guard has provided reserve forces to the Army and the Air Force during periods of prolonged conflict. However, that responsibility changed after the Berlin crisis of 1961, when many Guard units were federally activated and used as a political tool. Their new role required them to be deployable immediately after mobilization and to be equipped with and trained on modern weapon systems. It was now possible to transfer missions and weapon systems to the Guard without loss of combat capability and without undue expense.

All indications are that the transfer of frontline transport aircraft to the Guard will continue throughout the 1990s. Colonel Berberian's study examines the history of the Guard's involvement in the strategic airlift mission and evaluates its performance. Not only does he determine the extent to which the Guard and the active Air Force are prepared for the Guard's planned return to this mission after an 11-year hiatus, but also he recommends how existing plans can be improved to better utilize the Guard in strategic airlift. Colonel Berberian's work should prove valuable when decisions have to be made about Guard involvement in the strategic transport of troops and materiel.



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About the Author

LT COL ARCHIE J. BERBERIAN is currently the branch chief of the air operations center of the Air National Guard Support Center at Andrews AFB, Maryland. In this position, Colonel Berberian is responsible for allocation of airlift missions, including strategic airlift, to Guard transport units. He completed this study while assigned as the Air National Guard (ANG) command-sponsored research fellow for 1987-88 at the Airpower Research Institute of the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (AUCADRE).

Colonel Berberian earned a BS degree in business administration from Bryant College, Rhode Island, a BS in industrial technology from the University of Southern Illinois, and an MBA from Troy State University, Alabama. He is a career guardsman with many years of operational as well as staff experience with the adjutant general of Rhode Island.

Prior to being selected as a research fellow, Colonel Berberian was the ANG adviser to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Military Airlift Command (MAC), Scott AFB, Illinois. In that position, he monitored the training activities of all MAC-gained ANG airlift units and provided major command guidance and assistance to those units. He also was instrumental in planning and implementing the conversion of two Guard units to the strategic airlift mission. His experience with both Guard and active duty airlift issues and his tenure at AUCADRE have prepared him to be an authority on the role of the Air National Guard in strategic airlift.

Preface

I first became aware of the controversy surrounding the role of the Air National Guard in the strategic airlift mission during my stay at Headquarters Military Airlift Command (MAC), from November 1983 to June 1987. On the one hand, MAC seemed to feel that the Guard was not capable of performing strategic airlift because of its commitment to tactical airlift. On the other hand, the Guard was confident that it could in fact fly strategic airlift, pointing out that it had done so quite successfully in the past. Indeed, I could remember large airlift aircraft flying into my home unit as early as August 1966, picking up people and cargo, and delivering them worldwide. I myself flew on C-121s and C-124s to Panama, where I did two annual training tours. Further, *National Guardsman* and *Air Reservist* magazines at one time carried monthly articles about the Guard's flying airlift aircraft all over the world: transporting cattle to Afghanistan, medical supplies to the Philippines, cargo to Africa, and routine Air Force cargo to almost every part of the globe. I seemed to be the only person at MAC who remembered that the Guard used to fly heavy strategic airlift for the Military Air Transport Service, MAC's predecessor. Evidently, the Guard's past performance in strategic airlift carried little weight at MAC. Therefore, if the Guard were to receive proper recognition for its accomplishments—both for the sake of historical accuracy and as baseline evidence for future decisions concerning strategic airlift—a guardsman would have to tell the story.

It would be impossible to mention all of the people who helped me with this project. I would, however, like to give special thanks to Dr Stephen Blank, my reading group chairman and research adviser, for his encouragement and confidence; to Dr Marvin Bassett, my editor, for his efforts toward making this report readable; to Lt Col Manfred Koczur, chief of the Command Research Division, for his friendly prodding that kept me trudging along on the project; and to Dr Lewis B. Ware, my office mate, for his friendship. My family, of course, has my deepest gratitude for coming with me to Montgomery: my wife Linda, who gave me love and support throughout the year and made many personal sacrifices; my son A. J., who courageously left his friends and school to be with me; and my younger son Alex, who kept us entertained with his exploits on the soccer and baseball fields.

Archie J. Berberian

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Introduction

The conversion of the 105th Military Airlift Group (MAG) at Newburgh, New York, to the C-5A Galaxy in 1985 and the conversion of the 172d MAG in Jackson, Mississippi, to the C-141 StarLifter in 1986 marked the beginning of a gradual return of the Air National Guard (ANG) to the strategic airlift mission of the Military Airlift Command (MAC). Both conversion planning and actual conversions of Guard units are currently taking place without a coordinated understanding between MAC and ANG of individual and mutual concerns or of the objectives for the overall strategic airlift mission. Each organization has its own agenda for the return of the Guard to strategic airlift. In some cases their agendas have common objectives; in other instances, however, they are opposed. This paper examines those interests and objectives to identify both goal congruence and conflicts of interest.

The basic approach of this study is a historic examination of the inception and development of the Guard's strategic airlift mission during the sixties and early seventies. It examines both the events that led to the Guard's inclusion in this mission and the motives of the Air Force and Congress in adding it to the purview of the Guard. At the same time it is important to consider the reasons the Guard was so eager to participate in the mission and to identify its objectives and goals. This historical approach concentrates on the political, budgetary, and doctrinal reasons underlying the original plans to include the ANG in strategic airlift and evaluates the extent to which those first conversions were successful. The study then examines the expansion of the mission during the sixties into various branches of strategic airlift and discusses the different types of airlift aircraft used. Throughout, the paper shows how the development of the total force policy affected the Guard airlift units and how it changed the relationship between the ANG and MAC.

In addition to examining the performance of the Guard in terms of its mission and aircraft, one must also consider the effect of the Guard's current status on its performance. The Guard has performed its mission under four distinct status levels, each requiring a different degree of involvement in the everyday mission of the active Air Force. The four levels are (1) guardsmen status, (2) activated status, (3) short-term nonmobilized status (performing Air Force missions), and (4) protracted nonmobilized status (performing Air Force missions for a prolonged period of time). These status levels reflect the responsibilities of the Guard during (1) peacetime training, (2) federal or state mobilization, (3) short-term voluntary missions, and (4) protracted voluntary missions. An evaluation of the Guard's past performance under a variety of circumstances helps in answering questions about its future effectiveness.

Finally, this paper compares and contrasts the events of the past with the current situation to determine whether any lessons learned about strategic airlift might still apply. It is of utmost importance that planners and staffers from both MAC and ANG understand each other's needs so that they develop policies and procedures that facilitate the Guard's return to the strategic airlift mission. Unless we learn from both the mistakes and successes of the past, we are doomed to repeat our errors and waste precious time.

Keywords: Air National Guard and operations; (er)

Chapter 1

Seeds of Change

AS THE 1950s drew to a close, a number of factors combined to shape the makeup of the Air National Guard forces for many years to come. First, the cold war of the post-Korean War fifties affected the military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. Both countries gradually became heavily dependent on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICMBs) and nuclear strategies. The US force structure was particularly dependent on nuclear weapons and by the end of the fifties had relatively little conventional capability. The defensive thinking was that a nuclear missile strike posed a greater threat than an attack by manned bombers, thereby making a retaliatory ICBM strike the only credible type of defense. Many military theorists of the time, such as Maj W. D. McGlasson, concluded that the importance of the manned interceptor, and perhaps even the manned fighter aircraft, was diminishing.¹ The Air Guard of the 1950s was predominantly a fighter aircraft force, but rocketry and a nuclear deterrent strategy were slowly eliminating the need for Guard air defense squadrons.

The second factor influencing the reshaping of the Air Guard was the desire of Congress to modernize the military and thereby upgrade its capability to fight a conventional war. After World War II and the Korean War, many of the Guard units were flying old, leftover aircraft that lacked the capability or supportability necessary to be used in an immediately deployable force. Congress wished to decrease the size of the active Air Force yet did not want to eliminate any of its capabilities or lessen its commitment to our allies. The lawmakers felt that they could reduce the size of the active military, modernize it, and increase its conventional capability by better utilizing the Guard. The very successful mobilization of the Guard during Korea convinced Congress that these forces could effectively meet wartime military requirements. René Francillon points out that the Guard's outdated aircraft needed to be brought in line with the more modern aircraft of the active Air Force and that the modernization process would require replacing the older Guard aircraft with modern, high-performance jet fighters.² Many of the Guard's flying squadrons, however, were located in major metropolitan areas at municipal airports that did not have the runways or facilities capable of handling the new jets proposed for them. Furthermore, urban

residents did not relish the prospect of having to tolerate increased levels of noise and smoke that the new aircraft would bring.

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) felt that the modernization would be beneficial and that the Guard could provide the type of capability Congress wanted from the Air Force. But the perception of a diminished need for Guard air defense and the inability of some units to adapt to newer aircraft posed a threat to the overall Air Guard force structure. A primary concern of the Air National Guard has always been a twofold retention of force structure: (1) maintaining at least one flying squadron in each state and (2) maintaining the same number of total flying squadrons overall. The Guard felt that it was impractical and wasteful to alter the size of its forces according to the temporary needs of the Air Force. Therefore, finding new missions and different types of aircraft for its squadrons had a very high priority at the NGB.

The final factor affecting the Guard was the federal budget. Congress was determined to reduce the size of the defense budget during the latter part of the fifties. By then it was a well-known fact that a Guard unit could operate for a fraction of the cost of a similar active duty unit yet still provide the same wartime capability, as was demonstrated in Korea. Congress pressured the Air Force to transfer as many missions as possible to the Guard and used the budget as leverage. If the Air Force wanted new equipment, it would have to relinquish some of its current inventory to the Guard. This procedure eventually evolved into the total force policy.

During the post-Korean period, the Air Force attempted to correct the problems encountered in the activation and mobilization of the Guard during the Korean War. Charles Joseph Gross observes that many boards and study groups met to solve those problems and find better ways to incorporate the Guard into both the wartime and peacetime missions of the Air Force. The Air Reserve Forces Review Committee, which became known as the Stone Board, was the most successful of these groups. The board was chaired by Lt Gen Charles B. Stone III, commander of the Continental Air Command, the gaining command of the Guard interceptor and fighter units. The board convened in November 1956 and presented its findings to the chief of staff in February 1957.³ The findings of the Stone

Board would have far-reaching effects for both the Air Force and the Air Guard for many years to come.

Gross elaborates on the board's primary conclusion that the Air Reserve forces (Air Guard and Air Force Reserve) should be expanded to include the peacetime support functions of the Air Force. The board determined that the Air Reserve forces could perform five functions just as well as their active duty counterparts at a substantially lower cost. These missions were aircraft control and warning, air evacuation, tow target, certain logistical functions, and other unspecified defense missions. The report also concluded that the Air Reserve forces could provide substantial assistance to the Air Force in nine other areas: Air Defense Command fighter activities, troop carrier operations, air rescue, fighter-bomber missions, tactical reconnaissance, tactical control, radio relay, communication, and construction maintenance. Last, the board found that peacetime Guard participation would not be practical in six other areas: aerial resupply, weather service, airway and air communications, air terminal augmentation, personnel processing, and medical services.⁴

General Stone voiced his concern about "impending cuts in the Air Force budget" and suggested that the "Air Reserve forces could be better employed to augment the active Air Force than current concepts and policies permitted."⁵ Experience has shown that some of those missions the board thought to be most appropriate for the Guard were not suitable at all and that the Guard proved very successful in other missions thought to be unsuitable. Of significance was General Stone's idea that the Guard could perform peacetime functions simultaneously with its training for wartime

missions. That is, while training for these missions, the Guard could actually be performing everyday duties for the Air Force. The Guard has used this concept very well in the implementation of the total force. For example, the use of Guard airlift training to fly the ground units of both the Army and Air Guards to training locations with their active duty counterparts has played an integral role in the development of the total force. The need for additional airlift to support the total force concept was only loosely identified in those early days of incorporating the Guard into the mission of the active force. However, the phrase *airlift, a by-product of training* would soon become well known.

According to Francillon, the Guard began operating light airlift aircraft in 1946. For the next 30 years, the C-47A Gooney Bird provided airlift for both the state headquarters and the NGB. The Alaska Guard's 144th Air Transport Squadron (ATS) flew them between 1957 and 1960. Four Guard squadrons flew a combination of the SA-16 Albatross and the Curtiss C-46 Commando in air resupply squadrons. The Guard also flew the C-46 and the C-119 Flying Boxcar in aeromedical evacuation missions during the fifties.⁶ Although the Guard's airlift experience prior to 1960 was limited to light aircraft, this restriction would not hamper its upcoming performance with the big airlifters. One report shows that by the end of the fifties the Guard airlift fleet consisted of 40 SA-16s, seven C-47s, and 30 C-119s.⁷ The factors of change, modernization, unit incompatibility with jet fighters, and budget reductions would soon combine to start one of the greatest periods of transition the Guard had ever experienced.

Notes

1. Maj W. D. McGlasson, "For the Air Guard, All Signs Point to Change—And More Change—in the Years Ahead!" *National Guardsman* 14, no. 2 (February 1960): 6.

2. René Francillon, *The Air Guard*, Aerograph Series, no. 2 (Austin, Tex.: Aerofax, Inc., c. 1983), 51-53.

3. Charles Joseph Gross, *Prelude to the Total Force: The Air National Guard, 1943-1969* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1985), 110.

4. *Ibid.*, 111.

5. *Ibid.*, 110.

6. Francillon, 160-61.

7. End of Year Report of the Director of the Air National Guard to the Chief of the Air National Guard Bureau, June 1959.

Chapter 2

The First Heavy Airlifters

THE year 1960 brought a new president and a new secretary of defense who would radically change the doctrine and strategy of the US military. They felt that the country had become too dependent on nuclear deterrence as a defense strategy and that conventional military forces had suffered from inattention and underfunding since the end of the Korean War. Robert S. McNamara, the secretary of defense, spoke to Congress about the administration's approach to defense in his now-famous counterforce strategy speech, a part of which follows:

So long as the adversaries of freedom continue to expand their stockpiles of mass destruction weapons, the United States has no alternative but to ensure that at all times and under all circumstances it has the capability to deter their use.

In this age of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, the ability to deter rests heavily on the existence of a force which can weather a massive nuclear attack, even with little or no warning, in sufficient strength to strike a decisive counterblow.

This force must be of a character which will permit its use, in event of attack, in a cool and deliberate fashion and always under the complete control of the constituted authority.

No effort should be spared, no measure overlooked, which can reasonably be expected to contribute to the strengthening, protection, and sure control of these crucial retaliatory forces. Particularly, we must emphasize those weapons systems which inherently have, or can be provided with, a high degree of survivability under a massive ICBM attack.¹

He further emphasized that the counterforce strategy required certain elements: penetration to all necessary targets; preattack and postattack reconnaissance; restrike capability; aircraft or weapon systems able to seek out and destroy hard-to-find targets, including mobile objectives; and proper utilization of active and passive defensive measures. Clearly, the administration intended to revitalize the defense establishment and set the stage for changes in airlift.

The May 1960 issue of the *National Guardsman* reports that the Army and the Military Air Transport Service (MATS)—predecessor of MAC—testified jointly in Congress about the Air Force's acute lack of airlift capability. MATS testified that despite the fact it was running the largest and safest airline in the world,

it could not meet the emergency needs of the Air Force and the other military branches. Even if it were tasked to meet the needs of a limited emergency by airlifting only a moderately sized force, its aircraft were "too old, too slow, and too few" to accomplish the mission. MATS requested more funds to buy modern jet transport aircraft that would meet both present and future needs. The president of the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), Army Guard Maj Gen William H. Harrison, supported MATS' position in his testimony before the House Armed Services Special Subcommittee on Military Airlift, chaired by South Carolina's L. Mendell Rivers:

If we should become involved in war, big or small, our Army National Guardsmen, serving as an element of the Active Army, will meet the enemy overseas—and we must count on airlift to get them there. . . . You cannot provide for the Active Army without providing for the Guard and the Reserve. This is true in personnel, in equipment, in facilities. It is also true in airlift.²

Already the Army Guard had become an integral part of the active Army in that its units rounded out regular Army divisions, enabling those divisions to go to war. Later, as the total force concept became a reality, the Guard would recognize a need for airlift capability to move these Army Guard units to annual training sites with their active Army counterparts.

The report in the *National Guardsman* further states that Congressman Rivers' subcommittee concluded that an appropriation of \$300 million was needed to finance the immediate manufacture of 100 new aircraft. Rivers strongly backed Lt Gen W. H. Tunner, MATS commander, who had told the subcommittee that MATS needed \$2 billion in the next eight years to give the country an adequate emergency airlift capability. General Tunner agreed with a presidential budget request calling for \$50 million to develop a new "workhorse" airlifter for MATS. He further recommended the purchase of off-the-shelf jet and turboprop transports during the next 15 to 18 months.³

A passage in the *Air Reservist* of April 1961 mentions the Guard's relationship to MATS with regard to strategic airlift:

The Air Force's Military Air Transport Service must provide two types of airlift approved by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff for general war. The first is "critical" or "hard core" airlift—and is required by the Air Force, Army and Navy. The second is the emergency strategic airlift for other, less critical deployments and for essential logistical buildup. It may be carried out either by MATS or by other augmentation forces under MATS control. These forces, the other members of the U.S. strategic airlift team, are the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard forces.⁴

The attitude of the new administration, the combined effort of all military services to increase total Air Force airlift, and the attitude of MATS toward the role of the Guard all led to the decision to put strategic airlift aircraft into the Guard.

The C-97

General Tunner's description of the wartime mission of MATS seemed compatible with the operation of the Guard: "In wartime, our activities would be greatly expanded, but not essentially changed. . . . We do not shift into a new and strange operation. We merely step up the tempo of what we have been doing all along."⁵

One of the off-the-shelf aircraft that MATS bought in 1960 was the C-135, the military cargo version of the Boeing 707. Writing in the *National Guardsman*, Maj W. D. McGlasson reported that to make room in the budget, MATS decided to give the Guard 47 C-97s, "the first four-engine transports allocated to any of the Air Reserve forces."⁶ Representatives of Headquarters USAF, the NGB, and MATS met at Headquarters MATS, Scott AFB, Illinois, to lay the groundwork for transfer of the aircraft. On 15 January 1960 the aircraft were moved to six Guard squadrons that were subsequently designated air transport squadrons, heavy.⁷

The NGB and the squadrons immediately began to make plans for the conversion training of the units. Major McGlasson stated the requirements for the conversion in his article for the *National Guardsman*:

There'll have to be a complete retraining program as the jet jockeys take over the controls of the big four-engine birds. Gen [Winston P.] Wilson [head of NGB's Air Force Division] says a good solid core of each of the converted Sq[ua]drons will have to take some training at USAF schools in an active duty status, probably at MATS's Travis AFB, Calif, but the bulk of the transition training will be conducted at home stations by the units themselves. The General expects all converted units to have climbed back to their current operational readiness level within one year.⁸

This concept of conversion training for Guard units would become known as the "initial-cadre" approach and would serve as a model for the many Guard conversions to follow.

The Guard and MATS agreed on an eight-week aircrew training course conducted by active duty personnel at Travis. The accomplishments of the intensive training are recorded in the *National Guardsman* of June 1960: the regular program took three months, but by training 12 hours a day, seven days a week, and taking advantage of the pilots' previous experience, the instructors hoped to finish in the shorter time period and minimize the time lost from the trainees' civilian jobs. In the eight-week school, 225 guardsmen logged 941 hours, made 1,463 landings, and flew a final check ride to Tokyo. During the training period two of the California crews made optimum use of their time by picking up a backlog of cargo to Hickam AFB, Hawaii. The program was an overwhelming success. Many of the guardsmen set new records for course grade averages and as a group scored consistently higher than their active duty counterparts. For example, two Guard pilots beat the previous MATS high score of 98 percent with identical scores of 99.4 percent. The cooperation of the MATS instructors was also outstanding. The active duty personnel at Travis met the intensive training schedule man-for-man and hour-for-hour. Furthermore, the pilots harbored no resentment for having to give up their glamorous fighter aircraft. In fact, their attitude was nicely expressed at a briefing when they shouted out in unison, "We hate fighter pilots!"⁹

The first test of the new MATS Guard units occurred before the conversion process was completed. The *National Guardsman* of August 1961 reports that in May 1961 they responded to an urgent call from MATS requesting three aircraft from each squadron with support personnel and aircrews to haul cargo in the Pacific for a couple of weeks. Although the guardsmen were inconvenienced by the short notice and their civilian employers were perturbed by the unexpected loss of their workers, each squadron met its deadline. Seventeen Air Guard planes moved more than 600,000 pounds of cargo. Each aircrew logged up to 115 hours, as much as most Guard fighter pilots would fly in a year. MATS and the NGB were both well pleased that the conversion was a success and that the plan for the Guard to fly strategic airlift was sound.¹⁰

The article in the *National Guardsman* did point out, however, that the mission was not perfect. One problem observed but not properly corrected was the inability of MATS to provide logistic support for aircraft that were no longer in its active inventory, specifically the Guard C-97s. The proposed solution was to have the Guard send out en route support for each exercise. This scheme proved to be impractical.¹¹ Only in recent years have all aircraft types been mixed between active and reserve forces to permit continuing maintenance of the entire fleet. The early tasking of these units did prove two significant points: (1) Guard units could

respond quickly and capably to an emergency, despite the fact that their training was incomplete, and (2) the Air Force could gain a significant amount of airlift as a by-product of Air Guard training.

Impressed by the performance of these six Guard squadrons equipped with C-97 aircraft, the NGB and the Air Force quickly expanded the force. René Francillon notes that from 1960 to 1972, the Guard reached its peak with the C-97 when it furnished 18 squadrons with the aircraft. The first C-97 was delivered to the 133d ATS in Manchester, New Hampshire, in September 1960, and the last was flown by the 197th Military Airlift Squadron of Phoenix, Arizona, on 1 August 1972.¹²

The C-121

By the latter part of 1961, the transfer of C-97s to the Guard was proceeding to the satisfaction of both the Air Force and the NGB. An article in the *Air Reservist* of November 1961 indicates that they were convinced the Guard's participation in the strategic airlift mission would be beneficial to everyone:

The Reserve Forces are playing an increasingly important part in MATS existence, in planning, mission accomplishment and right down the line. By their performance to date, the Reserve Forces have demonstrated that, as MATS adapts and grows to meet increasing demands of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they will be at hand, ready to provide the depth which makes the difference.¹³

At the same time, MATS continued to modernize its fleet with jet aircraft, making additional propeller-driven aircraft available for transfer to the Guard.

The next of these aircraft to be transferred was the C-121C Super Constellation (Superconnie). Francillon tells us that before our involvement in World War II,

commercial airlines had placed orders for this aircraft; however, the armed forces appropriated them for use as C-69 military transports, later becoming C-121s used as transports and airborne early warning aircraft.¹⁴

By the time the aircraft were transferred to the ANG, however, the Navy was using them as airlifters and had assigned them to MATS in the Pacific. The Superconnies were the Cadillacs of the sky during the late 1950s, and the Guard was delighted to get them. According to Francillon, the Superconnie had a top speed of 376 knots and a maximum range of 2,100 miles. It was only the second four-engine aircraft to go to the Guard and, because it had a capacity of 36,000 pounds, could be used either as a troop carrier or an airlifter.¹⁵

The addition of the C-121C to the Guard's inventory of aircraft facilitated the desire of Congress to modernize the Guard and to expand its capability. These aircraft replaced the aeromedical transport squadrons' C-119 Flying Boxcars—twin-engine, unpressurized, Korean War-vintage aircraft that were not well suited to the aeromedical mission. In addition to being faster than the C-119, the C-121 provided a more comfortable ride for its passengers. Furthermore, because of the aircraft's transoceanic range, speed, and cargo capacity, the newly equipped units would be able to include strategic airlift in their mission.

The first unit to receive the C-121 was the 183d Aeromedical Transport Squadron in Jackson, Mississippi, in 1961, and conversions continued through 1963, when seven squadrons were flying the Superconnie.¹⁶ During the next few years these seven units expanded their training and capabilities into a worldwide aeromedical and strategic airlift mission. They, along with the growing number of C-97 squadrons, were flying both active duty and Guardlift (see chapter 4) cargo around the world.

Notes

1. "Air Force Point of View: 'Decisive Counterblow' Ability Needed," *Air Reservist* 13, no. 4 (April 1961): 15.

2. "Washington Report: MATS Planes Too Old, Too Slow, Too Few," *National Guardsman* 14, no. 5 (May 1960): 11.

3. *Ibid.*

4. "Air Force Point of View: Strategic Airlift," *Air Reservist* 13, no. 4 (April 1961): 15.

5. Lt Gen William H. Tunner, "The Role of the Reservist in MATS," *Air Reservist* 11, no. 5 (May 1959): 3.

6. Maj W. D. McGlasson, "For the Air Guard, All Signs Point to Change—And More Change—in the Years Ahead!" *National Guardsman* 14, no. 2 (February 1960): 6.

7. The six squadrons were the 109th ATS, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.; 115th ATS, Van Nuys, Calif.; 125th ATS, Tulsa, Okla.; 133d ATS, Manchester, N.H.; 139th ATS, Schenectady, N.Y.; and the

195th ATS, Van Nuys, Calif. "Jet 'Retreads' Break MATS Records in Speed-up Transport Training," *National Guardsman* 14, no. 6 (June 1960): 26.

8. McGlasson, 6.

9. "Jet 'Retreads,'" 6-7.

10. "Air Guard Hauls Cargo for MATS, Draws Praise," *National Guardsman* 15, no. 8 (August 1961): 17, 32.

11. *Ibid.*

12. René Francillon, *The Air Guard*, Aerograph Series, no. 2 (Austin, Tex.: Aerofax, Inc., c. 1983), 156. The 18 C-97 squadrons are as follows: 102d ATS, Brooklyn, N.Y.; 103d ATS, Willow Grove, Pa.; 105th ATS, Nashville, Tenn.; 109th ATS, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.; 115th ATS, Van Nuys, Calif.; 125th ATS, Tulsa, Okla.; 128th ATS, Dobbins AFB, Ga.; 133d ATS, Manchester, N.H.; 137th ATS, White Plains, N.Y.; 139th ATS, Schenectady, N.Y.; 142d

ATS, Wilmington, Del.; 155th ATS, Memphis, Tenn.; 158th ATS, Savannah, Ga.; 180th ATS, St. Joseph, Mo.; 185th ATS, Oklahoma City, Okla.; 191st ATS, Salt Lake City, Utah; 195th ATS, Van Nuys, Calif.; 197th ATS, Phoenix, Ariz.

13. "MATS Responsibility to Its Reserve Forces," *Air Reservist* 13, no. 9 (November 1961): 7.

14. Francillon, 162.

15. Ibid., 173.

16. Ibid., 162. The seven squadrons are as follows: 140th Air Transport Squadron, Harrisburg, Pa.; 147th Aeromedical Transport Squadron, Pittsburgh, Pa.; 150th Air Transport Squadron, McGuire AFB, N.J.; 156th Aeromedical Transport Squadron, Charlotte, N.C.; 167th Aeromedical Transport Squadron, Martinsburg, W. Va.; 183d Aeromedical Transport Squadron, Jackson, Miss.; 187th Aeromedical Transport Squadron, Cheyenne, Wyo.

Chapter 3

Guard Strategic Airlift: Crisis Action

THE capability of the Guard was tested a little more than a year after it received the first transfer of C-97s. An NGB history of the National Guard relates that

in the summer of 1961, the Soviets began to build a wall around West Berlin, isolated inside communist East Germany. When Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev threatened newly-elected President John Kennedy over the western military presence in West Berlin, Kennedy responded by alerting some U.S. military forces. In September, October, and November 1961 40 Air National Guard squadrons were mobilized "for not more than a year"; 22 of them were sent to Europe.¹

Kennedy found himself in a difficult position because the US post-Korean War force structure was based on a nuclear deterrent strategy, yet he faced a nonnuclear threat. Charles Joseph Gross notes that the National Guard squadrons activated in October included one tactical control unit, four tactical reconnaissance squadrons, six air transport squadrons, and 18 tactical fighter squadrons. Altogether, the activation affected 21,067 guardsmen, who responded with less than a 1-percent no-show rate.²

The Berlin Crisis

The six air transport squadrons were activated in place, and on 2 October an aircraft from the 138th Air Transport Group (ATG) in Tulsa, Oklahoma, entered the MATS system.³ This activation marked the first time that guardsmen were used as an instrument in the cold war. It sent a clear signal to the Soviets that mobilization of the Reserve forces was a prelude to accelerating military activities. The activated airlift units were the six original C-97 squadrons that had started their conversions a little more than a year earlier. Their rapid conversion made them available months sooner than had been expected.

Operation Stairstep was the code name for the deployment of the Guard fighter squadrons to Europe. The activated Guard airlift units played a major role in this exercise by transporting their sister Guard units. Gen Curtis LeMay, then the Air Force chief of staff, said of Operation Stairstep,

Never before has the United States Air Force depended so heavily on the ability of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve to respond so quickly and effectively. Never before have the Air Reserve Forces met a challenge with such speed and efficiency.⁴

The airlift squadrons began flying regular MATS missions on 2 October 1961 and at the same time continued the last of their home-station aircrew conversion training. Despite having to perform double duty, all six squadrons completed their MATS missions. Each squadron was combat ready by December and received an operational readiness inspection in January 1962. Maj Corb Sarchet reports that during their 11 months on active duty these units completed more than 800 strategic airlift missions into 25 countries.⁵ According to Maj Dean A. Dversdall and Maj Chester J. Loewe, the 138th ATG from Tulsa compiled impressive statistics during its 11 months. This unit flew more than 8,600 hours, covered 5.2 million passenger miles, and amassed 5.6 million cargo ton-miles with only seven aircraft available.⁶ The unit also assisted the North American Air Defense Command with the calibration of early warning radar sites and filled an alert commitment for the Strategic Air Command (SAC).

In addition to accumulating impressive statistics, these units made other significant contributions. For example, Dversdall and Loewe note that the 157th ATG from Grenier Air Force Base in Manchester, New Hampshire, used its own initiative in deploying supply and transient maintenance personnel to the Azores, England, West Germany, Spain, and France. Teams, each consisting of 65 personnel, served for 90 days at a time. In all, 300 guardsmen participated in the program. It is difficult to determine the extent to which these people improved the airlift system in Europe; however, it was this kind of effort on the part of all the activated Guard units that made the mission successful.⁷

In an open letter printed in the *National Guardsman* of September 1962, General LeMay noted that there were some problems with activation and mobilization. First, because of congressionally imposed unit strength ceilings, as many as one-fifth of certain positions were vacant at the time of activation and had to be filled by active duty personnel. In later years congressional action solved this problem. Second, the Air Force felt

restricted in the use of Guard units by having to activate an entire group in order to activate subordinate units (e.g., flying squadrons or maintenance squadrons). Changes in regulations reorganized the groups and wings into smaller subgroups, a modification that allowed the Air Force to call up Guard forces that could be better tailored to its needs. Pay was the final major problem. Many Guard airmen suffered substantial financial losses during their 11 months on active duty. There was as much as a 61-percent differential between their military and civilian incomes, with no legal relief from their financial obligations.⁸ This problem could not easily be resolved, and it remains a problem today. In fact, as the gap between military and civilian pay widens in today's economy, it has the potential to become a problem in the officer corps as well. Dversdall and Loewe report that despite the problems encountered during the call-up, 88 percent of the men in the 109th ATS in Minneapolis who were activated remained with the unit and reenlisted.⁹ These few problems notwithstanding, the activation of the six air transport squadrons for the Berlin crisis in 1961 was an overwhelming success. These conventional forces gave the president the capability he needed to respond to the nonnuclear threats with which the Soviets had confronted him. President Kennedy stated that he intended to have "a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action."¹⁰

Three milestones emerged from the Berlin crisis activation of 1961. First, this political incident solidified the administration's belief that our defenses had become far too dependent on nuclear deterrence. The United States needed to revitalize its conventional military capability in order to respond in kind to conventional aggression. The second milestone was the use of the Guard as a political instrument of the cold war. Immediate call-up of the Guard in response to threats, followed by mobilization and forward deployment, sent an explicit message to our adversaries. Also, the efficiency and rapidity of the mobilization became the standard by which the Reserve force would be evaluated for years to come. In his letter, General LeMay further pointed out that the activation of the Guard increased the Air Force's tactical fighter strength by 37 percent and its heavy transport capability by 28 percent. He then evaluated the mobilization in the following manner:

The prompt, efficient actions of the Nation's Reserve Forces—Army, Navy and Air Force—amply justified the dependence the Nation places upon its citizen-soldiers. The Air National Guard's rapid reaction and thoroughly successful deployment across the Atlantic proved its state of readiness beyond question.¹¹

The years immediately following the Berlin crisis were a time of growth for Guard heavy airlift. In 1965

the number of Guard heavy airlift squadrons peaked at 26. The amount of airlift that the Air Force realized from units training for their worldwide mission grew steadily as well. Statistics reported in the January 1966 issue of the *National Guardsman* show that during eight months in 1961, Guard airlifters moved 13,650 passengers and 1,645 tons of cargo. By 1963 those numbers had increased to 54,828 passengers and 13,454 tons of cargo, excluding the last two months of the year and the Christmas Star exercise (see chapter 4). These airlift units represented a combat-ready force of 1,122 pilots and 212 strategic airlift aircraft—a third of the total assets of MATS.¹² Berlin proved that, when federalized, the Guard's strategic airlift arm could respond quickly and efficiently to a national military crisis. The next few years would provide several opportunities for the Guard to react to a wide range of crises on a nonmobilized, voluntary basis.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

An article in the *National Guardsman* of January 1963 illustrates that although the Guard was not activated for the Cuban missile crisis that occurred late in 1962, it did play a significant role in the resolution of that event. Twenty-six Guard bases were used to house 186 active Air Force aircraft. Most of these bases received little advance notice of their guests' arrival—typically just a telephone call the night before. Ninety-five SAC bombers and 91 interceptors from the Air Defense Command used these bases as staging areas. The bases were completely at the disposal of their visitors, providing maintenance, refueling, communications, security, messing, billeting, and medical services. Many Guard units used their support aircraft to operate an air shuttle service for their guests to provide a supply line back to their home bases. The National Guard Bureau ordered its strategic airlift squadrons to assume responsibility for 29 additional special assignment airlift missions (SAAMs) from MATS in order to free the active duty airlifters to participate as needed in the Cuban situation. One unit, the 139th ATS of Schenectady, New York, airlifted 93,000 pounds of cargo to overseas locations. The *Guardsman* article further notes that, in his letter to the NGB, Col O. F. Lassiter, commander of SAC's 801st Air Division, summarized the active duty perception of the support provided by the Guard during the crisis:

The Strategic Air Command expects a high standard of performance and takes justifiable pride in the dedication and professionalism exhibited by its personnel in achieving these high standards. The outstanding support provided to our detachment at the Philadelphia Interna-

tional Airport by the personnel of the 111th Air Transport Group has shown us that dedication and professionalism are not personal qualities exclusive to personnel of this command.¹³

The Dominican Republic Crisis

According to an account published in the *Air Reservist* of July 1965, the crisis in the Dominican Republic during April and May 1965 provided another example of the Guard's capably and responsively augmenting the Air Force without being activated. On 30 April the United States deployed forces to protect its interests on this small Caribbean island. The airlift portion of the exercise was code-named Power Pack. As military equipment and personnel were airlifted in, US citizens and foreign nationals desiring to leave were moved out. As they had done for the Cuban crisis, Guard airlift forces assumed responsibility for a number of MATS

missions so that active duty MATS airlift resources could be diverted to the Caribbean for Power Pack. The Guard performed an extra 43 SAAMs in addition to its regular schedule of 100 overseas training missions during May.¹⁴ These 43 missions accounted for 618.6 of the 1,774 tons airlifted by the Guard that month.¹⁵

The article in the *Air Reservist* further stated that, in all, 25 airlift units voluntarily met the call from the NGB, immediately and without question. The 137th Air Transport Wing (ATW) also participated with its Talking Bird aircraft. It operated as it always did when called upon—under the direct control of Headquarters USAF, providing 24-hour communications linkups from its forward deployment in the Caribbean to the national command authorities (NCA) back in the United States.¹⁶ The Guard once again demonstrated its willingness and ability to respond immediately through the NGB to MATS' request for additional strategic airlift, without the need for federal activation.

Notes

1. *A Brief History of the Militia and the National Guard* (National Guard Bureau, Office of Public Affairs, July 1986), 53.

2. Charles Joseph Gross, *Prelude to the Total Force: The Air National Guard, 1943-1969* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1985), 128.

3. Maj Dean A. Dversdall and Maj. Lester J. Loewe, *Data Base for Condensed Brochure on the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserves*, Deputy for Reserve Affairs and Education, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 21 October 1974, 21.

4. *Ibid.*, 20.

5. Maj Corb Sarchet, "The Air Guard's Airlift . . . Anywhere, Anytime," *National Guardsman* 20, no. 1 (January 1966): 12.

6. Dversdall and Loewe, 22.

7. *Ibid.*, 37.

8. "The Air National Guard in the Berlin Crisis," *National Guardsman* 16, no. 9 (September 1962): 16.

9. Dversdall and Loewe, 31.

10. "The Air National Guard," 15.

11. *Ibid.*, 16.

12. Sarchet, 9.

13. "The Air National Guard in the Cuban Crisis," *National Guardsman* 17, no. 1 (January 1963): 10-11.

14. "Reservists in Crisis," *Air Reservist* 17, no. 6 (July 1965): 4.

15. NGB/XOX Flying Hour Report, May 1965.

16. "Reservists in Crisis," 4-5.

Guard Strategic Airlift: Vietnam Era

THE National Guard Bureau was first asked to support the Vietnam buildup in August 1964 by assisting MATS with strategic airlift. Ten hours after the NGB received the request from MATS, the first Guard aircraft was waiting for its cargo at the MATS terminal at Travis AFB, California. As ground units of the Army and Air Guards were gradually integrated into the total force, the necessity of moving them during annual training to active duty bases and training locations provided another opportunity to use Guard airlifters.

Guardlift

Guardlift was the term used for the growing requirement to move Guard units to training locations where they could receive the real-world training required for the development of the total force. This airlift was provided free to the user—unlike airlift provided by the active duty airlifters, which had to be paid for through the airlift service industrial fund (ASIF). The Guard airlifters felt that—since they had to fly outside their local areas, away from their home stations, to give the pilots and navigators proper route training—they might as well be moving fellow guardsmen to their training sites. At the same time, the loadmasters would receive additional training in loading equipment and taking care of passengers in flight. Everyone seemed to benefit from the arrangement. Opportune airlift—the practice of providing free airlift while accomplishing flying training—also became known by the phrase *airlift, a by-product of training*. In the early days of the total force policy, this type of transportation was always underfunded. Even today, when *Guardlift* is bigger than ever, Department of Defense (DOD) budgeteers have not adequately provided for these requirements nor does MAC include this airlift as part of its total airlift accomplishments.

Maj Dean A. Dversdall and Maj Chester J. Loewe note that in the summer of 1964 the amount of Guard airlift had grown large enough to require a coordinating agent. The 118th Air Transport Wing (ATW) at Nashville was the primary airlifter involved in *Guardlift I* that summer. During this exercise, Army and Air Guard personnel were airlifted to and from locations

where they annually trained. The 118th agreed to serve as the NGB's coordinating agent and to use the wing command post during the exercise. This arrangement marked the beginning of the air operations center (AOC), which later—along with other coordinating functions of the NGB—would become the Air National Guard Support Center (ANGSC). The 118th command post set up a high-frequency radio communications network, formulated an alert list, and developed planning and monitoring techniques to best utilize the airlift assets of the Guard. During the summer of 1965, the 118th ATW again coordinated the movement of Army and Air guardsmen during *Guardlift II*, which was even bigger than its predecessor. The summer's activities included airlifting a Tactical Air Command deployment to West Germany and an Army Guard annual training exercise to France.¹

Aeromedical Airlift

In the April 1966 issue of the *National Guardsman*, Robert K. Ruhl writes that on 1 August 1965 the Air Force and MATS asked the Guard to fly live aeromedical missions for the active force in order to free aircraft that were fully committed to overseas locations. Although Guard C-97s had already performed regular MATS missions, this was the first time that Guard aeromedical units had been asked for help, and they were eager to fly actual missions.²

A report on ANG activities for fiscal year 1965 states that the 1405th Aeromedical Transport Wing, located at Scott AFB, Illinois, operated the military aeromedical evacuation system in the United States. The 1405th coordinated support from various Guard units through the 171st Air Transport Wing of the Pennsylvania ANG in Pittsburgh. The 171st acted as the agent of the NGB in scheduling the different units for their missions and accounting for the funding reimbursement to the NGB and the states.³ According to Ruhl, stateside missions were flown between regular MATS trunk-line stops at Scott; Kelly AFB, Texas; Andrews AFB, Maryland; McGuire AFB, New Jersey; and Maxwell AFB, Alabama. They were also routed to many feeder stops and basically flew the same mission as did the 1405th.⁴

The original scheduling sent the Guard crews out on five-day missions, but those proved too demanding for the guardsmen's civilian employers, so they were changed to a more acceptable three-day cycle. Off-shore missions were also set up on two coasts. The East Coast missions were flown by C-121s to Newfoundland, Labrador, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Panama, and Guantanamo Air Base (AB), Cuba. West Coast missions were flown by the Van Nuys, California, and Tulsa, Oklahoma, units with aeromedically configured C-97s. These missions lasted two weeks and went through Travis AFB, California; McChord AFB, Washington; and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska.

The C-97s performed very well, but the C-121 was much better suited to the aeromedical mission because of its in-flight pressurization and air conditioning. The desire and motivation of the medical crews were outstanding. Aeromedical crewmembers from units neither equipped with the C-121 nor tasked with live missions frequently volunteered to fly the C-121 units, thereby increasing the aircraft's capability by providing additional aircrews. Ruhl points out that only seven months after the first call for help, Guard aeromedical units were providing 12 percent of the total MAC* stateside aeromedical airlift. They had flown more than five million patient-miles, carrying 4,161 patients, in 2,145 flying hours.⁵

In January 1966 the 1405th was reorganized as the 375th Aeromedical Airlift Wing without any significant mission change. All aeromedical transport squadrons—both active and Guard—were similarly reorganized. The need for stateside aeromedical airlift steadily increased because of the growing number of personnel wounded in Vietnam who had to be moved between Air Force hospitals. René Francillon notes that to meet this need, the 147th Fighter Squadron at Pittsburgh became the flying squadron of the 171st Aeromedical Transport Group. It was placed under the 375th to serve two years and perform both aeromedical and strategic airlift missions. Along with inactive Guard C-121 units, the 171st began flying numerous Southeast Asia (SEA) missions but provided more help in the European theater. Its work in Europe allowed MAC aircraft to support the buildup in SEA.⁶

The real story of the Guard's participation in the aeromedical airlift mission should not focus so much on the aircraft as on the crewmembers who flew them. These guardsmen—both aviators and medical personnel—were glad to help out with the war in any way they could, and employers were liberal in granting them time away from their jobs. One medical crewmember explained that if Guard airlifters were not going to be called to duty, they had to do whatever they could to

support the effort in SEA. Giving aid and comfort to returning soldiers was more important than staying at their civilian jobs. Because of the adverse attention the war was getting in the media, guardsmen wanted to assure the returning soldiers that many Americans supported and appreciated their efforts. These citizen soldiers indicated that they had donated 60 to 90 days a year to the military on both Guard and active duty missions alike. Flight nurses and other medical crewmembers of the Guard frequently volunteered to fly MAC aeromedical missions—both in-country and to SEA—through an NGB-coordinated program conducted by the 375th at Scott AFB. These missions took place between 1965 and 1969, lasted from 10 to 15 days each, and were in addition to regular duties.⁷

Christmas Star

Christmas Star was launched in November 1965 and established a permanent requirement for a Guard airlift coordinating agency. An article in the *National Guardsman* explains that this mission began as a grassroots effort in Oklahoma to show appreciation of and support for servicemen in Vietnam by sending them gifts donated by the American people. The outpouring of support was overwhelming and spread rapidly across the country. MATS already had more than it could handle delivering essential war materiel to SEA, so it asked the NGB to take the responsibility for coordinating the consolidation and delivery of the gifts. The NGB again asked the 118th Air Transport Wing in Nashville to handle the job. The 118th used Air Force Reserve (AFRES) C-119s to pick up the gifts at collection points around the country and drop them off at consolidation points—Guard air transport sites. The air transport units would then use their larger C-97s and C-121s to deliver the gifts to Vietnam and other SEA locations.⁸

The article further stated that, in all, 461 tons of goods were airlifted between 18 November and 22 December. Seventy-six Air Guard missions and six AFRES missions were required to complete the airlift. Each trip took about 96 flying hours and covered 16,000 miles. The first mission flew out of Nashville on 18 November, and the last one departed from McGuire AFB, New Jersey, for SEA on 15 December, flown by the 170th ATS. The 145th ATG of Charlotte, North Carolina, set a record for the amount of cargo hauled on a C-121, with 21,000 pounds of gifts. The 111th ATG of the Pennsylvania ANG flew the longest mission, by way of Rhein-Main AB, West Germany, en route to Nha Trang, Republic of Vietnam.⁹ Along with the Christmas Star cargo, an additional 883,262 pounds of opportune cargo moved out of MATS aerial ports. The airlift occupied a total of 5,548 Guard flying

*MATS was redesignated MAC on 1 January 1966.

hours.¹⁰ Guardsmen of the era felt that there was no better way to train aircrews than flying actual missions that allowed them to demonstrate their professionalism. This mission also demonstrated the Guard's ability to work across state lines and with other Air Force agencies in order to accomplish a complex mission. Further, the mission allowed the 118th command post to refine its capabilities in coordinating Guard airlift.

Combat Leave

The operation designated Combat Leave provided emergency airlift from the Guard to servicemen departing on leave from or traveling to SEA, who found themselves without transportation due to a commercial airlines strike. An account of the situation in the *Air Reservist* states that the airline machinists struck the five largest US airlines in July 1966. Travel was nearly impossible, especially on long-distance trips. President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered DOD to use the Air Guard to move stranded men to one of the large MAC aerial ports. Continental Air Command and NGB coordinated the setup of trunk-line and feeder routes. Together with the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard flew 16 missions per day through August 1966. By 22 August airlifters of MAC, ANG, and AFRES had moved 111,000 servicemen, 61 percent by reserve forces. The Guard flew 409 (61 percent) of the 736 long-range missions that constituted Combat Leave. In remarks to Congress, Sen John G. Tower of Texas praised the performance of the reserve forces: "I believe this activity once again points up the value to the Nation of an active, ready Reserve force. They can and do meet tasks assigned them."¹¹ Once again the Guard strategic airlift force proved itself ready and willing to meet the needs of the Air Force.

Vietnam Airlift

As mentioned earlier, the Guard began flying MATS-funded strategic airlift missions to Vietnam and SEA in August 1964. Dversdall and Loewe note that MATS was heavily committed to the crisis in the Dominican Republic and needed assistance keeping materiel flowing through its ports en route to SEA. The Guard's 27 SAAMs for the month included destinations such as Saigon, Manila, Bangkok, Okinawa, and Tokyo.¹²

Although successfully accomplished, the previous airlifts and crises that the Guard had participated in were of a limited nature, in terms of the amount of help requested and the duration of commitment to the Air Force. The Guard's involvement in the Vietnam airlift would continue for eight years—until the end of

American involvement in the war. The amount of airlift provided to the Air Force during this time, although considerable (table I), did not accurately reflect the Guard's total airlift capability. Had they been asked to do so, Guard airlift units could have provided additional airlift to the active force—and an even greater amount if they had been equipped with the C-141 or C-5. The Guard's role during this eight-year period answered any questions that might have existed about its dependability in an unpopular war.

TABLE I
CARGO AIRLIFTED BY MAC AND ANG
(thousands of tons)

Fiscal Year	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
MAC and ANG	253	338	599	679	729	659	523	517	451
MAC and ANG (SEA Only)	102	211	454	538	544	440	303	274	244
MAC Routes (ANG Only)	11.4	29.1	38.0	17.9	17.8	13.0	5.9	1.8	2.0
ANG (SEA Only)	5.3	7.7	17.0	3.2	2.3	1.9	1.6	.4	.1

Sources: Maj Dean A. Dversdall and Maj Chester J. Loewe, *Data Base for Condensed Brochure on the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve*, Deputy for Reserve Affairs and Education, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 21 October 1974, 166.

After the completion of Christmas Star in December 1965, MAC ports were still jammed with cargo and passengers bound for SEA. MAC's new C-141 Star-Lifter aircraft were being delivered to operational units, and C-124s were being retired to the Reserve forces. MAC realized that it could use the Guard airlift capability recently demonstrated in Christmas Star and, as reported by Dversdall and Loewe, in January 1966 asked the NGB to fly 75 special assignment airlift missions financed by the airlift service industrial fund each month for the remainder of the fiscal year.¹³ These missions were in addition to the 100 overseas training missions the Guard was already performing, which involved hauling MAC opportune cargo. The air operations center, acting as sole NGB agent for airlift, coordinated the activities of the Guard's 25 airlift squadrons among the states, the NGB, and MAC. The air operations center operated without command authority, crossing state lines, and seldom encountered any problems.

Dversdall and Loewe note that during the following months units began flying the first of 485 SEA missions, and by the end of June 1966 they had completed these flights plus 202 training missions into the area.¹⁴ That fiscal year Guard airlifters flew 117,520 hours on Air Force missions, moving 90,732 passengers and

18,427 tons of cargo.¹⁵ During fiscal year 1966 the Guard airlifted 307,498 passengers and 75,405 tons of cargo.¹⁶

An example of the Guard's actual capability, as pointed out by Dversdall and Loewe, was an airlift mission performed by the 172d MAG at Jackson, Mississippi, in October 1969. The unit sent seven C-124s on an 11-day mission to Vietnam, totally supported by the unit's training funds. Group personnel wanted to demonstrate hometown support of the troops in Vietnam during a period of antiwar activity in the United States.¹⁷ Many guardsmen felt that, if necessary, each unit could have performed similar missions every other month. Such an operation would have produced over 1,000 missions a year.

Maj Gen Raymond E. Hebrank, former commander of the 146th Military Airlift Wing and an aircrew member during those years, commented on his participation in airlift to Vietnam:

I and many of the other part-time Guard would spend between six and eight weeks a year flying missions to SEA or anywhere else we were needed. I was flying 800 hours a year back then. We felt if we could do the job as guardsmen in a volunteer status there wouldn't be a need for the Air Force to call us up.¹⁸

Maj Gen Stanley F. Newman, retired commander of the 137th Military Airlift Wing of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, offered these comments about the Guard's involvement in SEA:

Even when the war protesters were at their peak, the support of the aircrews and the community remained very high. . . . I think that strategic airlift was very well suited to the Guard. The crews get their training while accomplishing the mission and they enjoy the adventure of flying around the world.¹⁹

The Guard airlift units had certainly demonstrated their proficiency at strategic airlift. Whether operating in federalized status as in the Berlin crisis; assisting on short notice with crises involving Cuba, the Dominican Republic, or commercial airlines; participating in high-volume missions such as Christmas Star; or performing extended periods of volunteer service in Vietnam, the Guard proved that it could do the job. However, certain practices in the acquisition of new aircraft for the Air Force during this period would prove detrimental to Guard strategic airlift.

Effect of the C-141 and C-9

The new MATS heavy strategic aircraft, the C-141 StarLifter, entered service in 1964 and began to have a significant impact on airlift by mid-1966. By the end of 1967, 220 C-141s were well established in the active

squadrons, and eventually, 277 would be in place. With all C-141s fully operational, the Air Force's total airlift capacity increased by 47 percent during 1967. Dversdall and Loewe note that, compared to the Guard's propeller-driven airlifters, the C-141 carried four times the cargo, twice as fast, with a more rapid turnaround capability.²⁰ Similarly, Lt Col William K. Cash, an ANG officer who attended the Air War College in 1970, showed in his paper comparing the C-141 to the C-124 that the C-141 could complete a mission in half the time.²¹ That fact alone suggests that Guard units equipped with C-141s could have been twice as effective as they were. However, the MAC worldwide airlift system of maintenance support and cargo handling for the older Guard airlifters rapidly diminished. Many of the older guardsmen who had flown in the MAC system before and after the introduction of the C-141 said that its arrival marked the beginning of a gradual change in attitude among the active duty MAC personnel toward the Guard airlifters. One guardsman noted that he felt like a poor cousin after the delivery of the C-141s. Often, Guard crews arrived at MAC aerial ports for a scheduled mission only to find them empty because the newer airplanes were moving cargo much faster than had been anticipated.²² The Guard felt the impact of the new airlifters in November 1967 when MAC canceled 14 previously scheduled SEA and several Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Guard missions in June, indicating that the Guard's airlift capability was now inadequate.²³

In the early stages of the C-141 development program, both Air Force and Guard officials anticipated that some of the Guard airlift units would convert to the new aircraft. However, when the Air Force decided that these aircraft would be manned by a combination of active duty and Guard or Reserve personnel—an arrangement known as the associate program—controversy erupted within the Guard. Advocates of the program felt that the lack of available aircraft necessitated the Guard's sharing with the active forces. Opponents viewed the matter as a constitutional issue involving an infringement of states' rights and, therefore, a violation of the Guard's charter. The constitutionalist, or states' rights, side won the argument, and the Guard did not accept the associate program or the C-141. Only after the Guard began to return to strategic airlift after an 11-year absence from this mission were C-141s added to its inventory.

Just as the C-141 StarLifter revolutionized strategic airlift so did the C-9 Nightingale enhance aeromedical airlift. The C-9 flew its first mission on 2 October 1968, operating out of the 375th Aeromedical Airlift Wing.²⁴ This new airplane was specially designed for aeromedical airlift. Powered by jet engines and highly reliable, the C-9 soon made the older SuperConnies

expendable. Modernization of the Air Force was slowly eliminating the need for many Guard airlifters. The reduced patient load and the superior capability of the C-9 together with the gradual withdrawal of US forces from SEA marked the end of extensive Guard involvement in strategic airlift.

No matter how successful the partnership between the Guard and MAC, the practice of purchasing new aircraft for the Air Force without modernizing the Guard's air fleet undermined the basic premise of the total force policy. So serious were these problems that the Guard did not participate in the strategic airlift mission from 1974 to 1985.

Notes

1. Maj Dean A. Dversdall and Maj Chester J. Loewe, *Data Base for Condensed Brochure on the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserves*, Deputy for Reserve Affairs and Education, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 21 October 1974, 160.
2. Robert K. Ruhl, "Mercy Flies a Mile High," *National Guardsman* 20, no. 4 (April 1966): 22.
3. Report on Air National Guard activities to the chief, National Guard Bureau, fiscal year 1965.
4. Ruhl, 24.
5. *Ibid.*, 22.
6. René Francillon, *The Air Guard*, Aerograph Series, no. 2 (Austin, Tex.: Aerofax Inc., c. 1983), 117.
7. Lt Col J. J. Wright, 118th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, Tennessee Air National Guard, interview with author, October 1987.
8. "Santas In Flying Suits," *National Guardsman* 20, no. 1 (January 1966): 18.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Dversdall and Loewe, 162.
11. "Combat Leave," *Air Reservist* 18, no. 7 (August-September 1966): 4.
12. Dversdall and Loewe, 162.
13. *Ibid.*, 163.
14. *Ibid.*
15. NGB/XOX Flying Hour Report, fiscal year 1965.
16. Dversdall and Loewe, 163.
17. *Ibid.*, 169.
18. Maj Gen Raymond E. Hebrank, ANG, Retired, Channel Island Harbor, Calif., interview with author, 14 January 1988.
19. Maj Gen Stanley F. Newman, ANG, Retired, Oklahoma City, Okla., interview with author, 12 January 1988.
20. Dversdall and Loewe, 165.
21. Lt Col William K. Cash, *The Feasibility of Assigning C-141 Aircraft to the ANG as Compared to the C-124*, Professional Study 4091 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, November 1970), 11.
22. SMSgt Billy J. Agnew, 146th Tactical Airlift Wing, Van Nuys, California, interview with author, 9 November 1987. SMSgt Agnew has been a crewmember on the C-97 since the first conversion in 1966 to the present.
23. Dversdall and Loewe, 164.
24. NGB Activity Input to Project Corona Harvest, Book 1, 31 August 1970, 17.

The Return to Strategic Airlift

IN 1983 the NGB began developing plans for regaining strategic airlift capability. At the same time, MAC was preparing to meet the requirements of the congressionally mandated mobility study (CMMS) of 30 April 1981. The CMMS evaluated mobility requirements of four distinct scenarios: (1) a regional conflict in the Persian Gulf, (2) a Soviet invasion of Iran, (3) a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, and (4) a conflict in the Persian Gulf with precautionary reinforcement in Europe. The study recommended a balanced approach to mobilization, including airlift, sealift, and prepositioning. To meet the requirements of the study, the Air Force would have to increase its forecasted airlift capability for 1986 by 20 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) to 66 MTM/D.¹ It is important to note that this number was fiscally constrained and did not meet the requirements of any of the four scenarios; instead, it represented what the Air Force felt could be funded. Airlift requirements for these scenarios actually ranged from 73 MTM/D to 125 MTM/D.²

In order for the Air Force to increase its airlift capability to the required 66 MTM/D, it would have to buy more airlifters. MAC's solution was its family-of-aircraft concept, which called for a combination of aircraft flown by a variety of organizations. The aircraft would include C-130s, C-141s, C-5s, civilian aircraft, and the proposed C-17. The organizations flying them would be MAC, the associate Reserve, unit-equipped (see below) Reserve, unit-equipped Air National Guard, and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). All of the required moves, changes, and acquisitions necessary to reach the goal of 66 MTM/D by 1998 were developed in the US Air Force Airlift Master Plan (AMP).

The cornerstone of the AMP is the C-17. This airlifter would combine the large capacity of the C-5 with the ability of the C-130 to deliver cargo to forward operation areas with unimproved runways. The proposal for the C-17 enjoyed the support of all the other branches of service because this aircraft would fulfill all their airlift needs. At the same time, Congress and the Air Force were developing plans for a second buy of C-5s. The C-5B would be an improved version of the earlier model. Its purchase would alleviate airlift shortfalls during peacetime and situations short of total mobilization. Because the mobilized shortfall for air-

lift was not required for operations in peacetime, the secretary of defense felt that it was neither necessary nor economically feasible for all of the aircraft to stay with the active force. Therefore, plans were made to have 16 of the older C-5As transferred to AFRES at Kelly AFB, Texas. This organization would be a unit-equipped wing—a Reserve or Guard unit that owns its airplanes without sharing them with the regular Air Force—unlike the associate Reserve units already established. The final phase of the plan to acquire enough airlift called for a transfer of C-141s to unit-equipped Guard and Reserve squadrons as the C-17s were delivered to the active Air Force. AMP, then, was an attempt by MAC and the Air Force to resolve the airlift shortfall identified in the CMMS.

Plans formulated in 1983 by the National Guard Bureau for the 105th Military Airlift Group of the New York ANG, however, called for conversion to a mix of Boeing 747s. Two of the 747s would come from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which used them to fly the space shuttle to its launch pad in Florida and move it around the country for displays. The NGB also intended to buy two cargo-conversion aircraft from the excess commercial fleet and put all four aircraft at Stewart Air Force Base in Newburgh, New York. The unit was to be dual-tasked: (1) to support the shuttle and (2) to function as a military troop carrier and airlifter, a tasking that would give the Guard much needed strategic capability.

At first glance, MAC did not appear to be very concerned about the 105th's conversion to 747s. Most of the planners at MAC seemed to feel that even though the new unit would come under MAC's wartime jurisdiction, the matter was the business of the Guard. The official command position on the 105th conversion was stated best in David W. Wragg's *Airlift, A History of Military Air Transport*:

The importance of the Air National Guard Unit is such that in recent years the opportunity has been taken to buy secondhand commercial airliners, mainly Boeing 707-320's and 747's, taking advantage of depressed prices during the recession, to augment the strength of the ANG squadrons, and especially their strategic transport capability: the 707's are designated 18A's and the 747's C19A's, making use of ANG members who have civilian

jobs with airlines, and also ensuring that the aircraft are not sold outside of the United States so that the USAF retains an adequate reserve airlift capability.³

Although this passage appears to show some degree of support for the Guard proposal that would allow a return to the strategic airlift business, MAC Headquarters had other ideas.

MAC Plans (XP) had reservations about adding another aircraft, especially the 747, to the MAC family, feeling that the addition would not be consistent with the rest of the airlift system. They felt that problems such as a lack of en route maintenance support, incompatible cargo-handling equipment, and the aircraft's inability to carry outsized cargo would make support difficult and fail to solve the airlift shortfall. MAC's recommendation to the Air Staff on the C-19 (747) proposal was negative. When the final budget proposal came out of the secretary of defense's office, the C-19s for the 105th were no longer in it; however, in their place was the funding to move the unit from White Plains, New York, to Stewart and equip it with C-5s.

After the secretary's office released the budget proposal, both MAC and ANG staffs began working on plans to implement the C-5 conversion at Stewart and to include the Guard in the Airlift Master Plan. The outcome was to include the Guard in all of the MAC aircraft conversions. Stewart would be the only proposed Guard C-5 unit. The Guard would receive two or three squadrons of C-17s toward the end of the production schedule, and as the C-17s were delivered to the active units, the Guard would get four squadrons of C-141s. As the planning process continued over the next year, both staffs struggled to determine the right mix of aircraft among the active, Reserve, and Guard units.

One of the central issues that the MAC staffers kept raising was the matter of determining the Guard level of participation in the everyday mission of MAC and during periods of increased activities (i.e., determining the Guard's role during a nonmobilized contingency—a short-notice demand for increased airlift that would not require activation of the Guard). There seemed to be no question that the Guard could be counted on to perform equally as well as active or Reserve units in a federalized status. In its briefing on the Airlift Master Plan, the MAC briefing team stated that the Guard and Reserve could be counted on to provide no more than 20 to 25 percent of their aircrews during a nonmobilized contingency. This estimate, they argued, represented the technician aircrews who would be readily available during any contingency. The NGB did not agree with this assessment, feeling that it was too low. However,

since the NGB did not provide an alternative estimate to MAC, the briefing team used its own. This incident suggested that these analysts needed a more accurate way of determining how much airlift could be transferred to the Guard and Reserve without degrading the overall performance of MAC.

In March of 1985 the National Guard Association's Airlift Advisory Council visited MAC so that it could be brought up-to-date on current command issues and directions for the future. The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) in Washington, D.C., is a very influential promilitary lobby. MAC wanted to elicit NGAUS's support for its airlift plans, especially those concerning the C-17. MAC briefed the council on the command, from pilot retention problems and aircrew training initiatives to the Airlift Master Plan and the C-17. The briefing session proceeded smoothly until it addressed the issue of a 20-percent Guard response to a nonmobilized contingency. The gentlemen on the council—in particular, Brig Gen William J. Spruance, US Air Force, Retired, former Guard airlifter of the sixties—objected strongly to both the percentage and the methodology the MAC staffers had used in deriving it. He pointed out that the history of the Guard's participation in strategic airlift during the sixties and early seventies contradicted their findings and strongly recommended that the MAC staffers examine those facts before they made any further conclusions. The council's visit continued with some other lively debates without resolving the question of nonmobilized contingency. Unfortunately, some key questions concerning the force structure of the Military Airlift Command had not been properly answered.

The next phase of the Guard's return to the strategic airlift mission took place in the fall of 1985 when the secretary of defense announced that the 172d Tactical Airlift Group at Jackson, Mississippi, would become the 172d Military Airlift Group in July 1986 and would be assigned eight C-141 StarLifters. This conversion took place well ahead of MAC's plans to transfer C-141s to the Guard. It was a result of congressional action to reduce Air Force manning and at the same time make good an Air Force promise to the state of Mississippi to return the Jackson unit to strategic airlift (the unit's last strategic airlift mission was in May 1972 when it converted from the C-124 to the C-130). MAC again raised questions about the Guard's ability to perform missions, the kinds of missions it would or should perform, and the capability for delivering strategic airlift to the gaining command.

Notes

1. Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study, 30 April 1981.
2. Ibid.

3. David W. Wragg, *Airlift: A History of Military Air Transport* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, c. 1986), 130.

Current Status and Outlook for the Future

HAVING resumed strategic airlift operations in 1985, the Guard is now in its fourth year of the mission and anticipates increased involvement through 1999. The two units that led the way in converting to heavy airlifters—the 105th and the 172d Military Airlift Groups—did so without much forethought or strategic planning concerning the goals and objectives of the Air Force or the Air Guard. Neither did they consider the objectives Congress had in mind when it directed DOD to order the conversions. The plans that implemented the conversions were based on current knowledge—specifically, the experience of NGB action officers gained during previous C-130 conversions, and recollections by older members of the two units involved of how things were done in the early days of strategic airlift.

Since 1985 staffers from both MAC and NGB have quantified and documented aspects of the Guard's participation in strategic airlift that are important to each organization. This knowledge will facilitate future conversions by providing planners with some direction that allows them to avoid past mistakes. Furthermore, the conversion plans of the 105th and 172d MAGs and the file histories of their conversions should be valuable guides for the future. We also have other documents that give focus and direction. The Airlift Master Plan, Vista 1999, and the MAC/NGB Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on strategic airlift operations all identify many concerns of MAC and the NGB. By examining these documents, we can benefit from our early efforts to implement the mission.

Current Conversions

Considering the complexities of the operations, the conversions of the 105th and 172d MAGs have proceeded quite well. It is important to note that although the two conversions were similar in some respects, they were essentially quite different. The C-5 conversion at Stewart Air Force Base is still in progress and is not scheduled for completion until the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1990 (table 2). The completion date of the 105th's conversion has been changed from

the first quarter to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1990 because of hangar construction problems and delays in completing the aircraft parking ramp.

This conversion has been a lengthy one due to a protracted aircraft delivery schedule. Consequently, recruiting and training of personnel have been scheduled to coincide with the delivery of the aircraft in order to continue their qualification training, which requires hands-on practice on the few aircraft available. Ever since its hasty inception, delays have been characteristic of this conversion. For example, problems encountered during a move to larger facilities at Stewart complicated the early phase of the process. An entire support base had to be designed, planned, funded, and constructed before the unit could become operational. The 105th did an outstanding job of training and operating in temporary facilities and of performing all maintenance out of doors.

TABLE 2
STATUS OF CONVERSION OF 105TH MAG

	Aircraft	Aircrew
Authorized	10	20
Assigned	9	15
Mission Ready	5	8

Source: 105th MAG Aircrew Training Report, 1 October 1988.

Once the conversion of the 105th became a reality, MAC's primary concern was the amount of airlift capability that would be temporarily lost because of the transfer of aircraft to a nonoperational squadron. The command staff was briefed monthly on the number of aircrews trained and the number of productive MAC missions flown (table 3). Although conversion regulations usually do not require units to report this type of data, the command felt that because of the length of the process, it needed to keep track of the unit's progress. In this case, the reports did not detract from the conversion effort and, in fact, may have aided it by attracting four-star attention to problems that neither the unit nor the NGB had been able to solve (e.g., procuring aircraft

and missions for aircrews of the 105th when the unit was unable to generate enough of its own to satisfy training requirements).

TABLE 3
AIRLIFT FLOWN BY 105TH MAG IN FY 1988

	Missions	Hours	PAX/ Ton-Miles	Cargo/ Ton-Miles
Guardlift	55	630.6	3,013	4,430,486
MAC/ASIF	63	263.3	1,048	5,269,038
MAC/Opportune	<u>23</u>	<u>181.2</u>	<u>822</u>	<u>1,016,855</u>
Total	141	1,075.8	4,883	10,716,379

Source: Maj Leonard R. Frederick, ANGSC/DOC, Strategic Airlift Report, Andrews AFB, Md., 11 October 1988.

The conversion of the 172d MAG at Jackson, Mississippi, to the C-141 was considerably different from that of the 105th. At the time of the conversion, the 172d was already an active airlift unit flying the C-130H, and many of its senior leaders had operational experience in strategic airlift with the unit in the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, no extensive development of facilities for the C-141 was necessary at Jackson, as was the case at Stewart. The major obstacles that had to be overcome involved the mind-sets on both sides of the conversion (i.e., of MAC and Guard personnel). On one side was an inflexible attitude, unwilling to recognize the different requirements caused by the part-time nature of Guard duty. On the other was an attitude that all the command requirements were nonsense and needed to be changed. Fortunately, more rational minds usually prevailed, and most of these barriers were eventually broken down. However, because of the transient nature of active duty staffers, it is often necessary to reestablish policy and procedures with the changing of personnel. Active duty Air Force personnel seem to have a short corporate memory, and the more permanent Guard personnel often lose patience by having to tread the same ground over and over.

The conversion of the 172d also took place on an extended timetable; however, in this case the timetable hampered progress. Two aircraft were delivered each quarter for a year, and even though operations and maintenance personnel tried to schedule their training to match aircraft deliveries, demands for training time on available aircraft created conflict. The command's requirement that mission accomplishment and capability during conversion be reported monthly also impeded the unit's efforts (table 4).

The 172d completed its conversion in April 1988 as planned and was scheduled for an operational readiness inspection later in the year (table 5). One of the most troublesome problems during the conversion was coor-

minating with MAC and the C-141 formal training school at Altus, Oklahoma, concerning the required specialized training. At the direction of the MAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCS/OPS), many meetings took place at Altus between the school program managers, MAC trainers, unit trainers, and NGB staffers in an effort to coordinate conversion training requirements. The guardsmen felt that, in view of their substantial aircrew experience, shorter training courses were justified and would minimize time spent away from their full-time jobs. The school program managers felt that their courses required no alteration and that no special considerations were necessary. In the end, the director of training at MAC instructed the school to make the requested adjustments to the courses. Most students in the training program were very successful and were equal to the accelerated pace of the courses. These short courses, however, were not retained, even on a limited-availability basis, despite the understanding that all qualified heavy-aircraft aircrew personnel would be eligible.

TABLE 4
AIRLIFT FLOWN BY 172D MAG IN FY 1988

	Missions	Hours	PAX	Cargo/ Ton-Miles
Guardlift	116	1,898.0	18,425	4,194,532
MAC/ASIF	129	950.2	2,870	4,152,127
MAC/Opportune	<u>76</u>	<u>463.0</u>	<u>2,515</u>	<u>1,138,942</u>
Total	321	3,311.2	23,810	9,485,601

Source: Maj Leonard R. Frederick, ANGSC/DOC, Strategic Airlift Report, Andrews AFB, Md., 11 October 1988.

TABLE 5
STATUS OF CONVERSION OF 172D MAG

	Aircraft	Aircrew
Authorized	8	24
Assigned	8	19
Mission Ready	7	16

Source: 172d MAG aircrew training records, 1 October 1988.

The Airlift Master Plan

The Airlift Master Plan addresses strategic and theater airlift requirements and shortfalls by assessing command capability in the baseline year 1989 and by developing plans to meet the congressionally mandated mobility study requirement of a 66-million ton-miles per day airlift capability by 1998. The plan takes a comprehensive approach by considering aircraft and

aircrew requirements necessary to meet the goal. For the first time, it addresses the total force aspects by identifying the numbers of aircraft and aircrews to be allocated to the active Air Force, associate Reserve, Guard, and Civil Reserve Air Fleet. It also articulates aircraft modernization requirements and thus represents a complete plan to meet the nation's mobility needs. The plan calls for a variety of aircraft to meet the 66 MTM/D requirement (the family-of-aircraft concept, table 6).

TABLE 6
AIRCRAFT PROPOSAL
(Active/AFRES-ANG)

	FY 1980	FY 1987	FY 1992	FY 2000
C-5	70*/0	66*/15	70*/44	70*/44
C-141	234*/0	218*/16	202*/32	100*/80
C-17	0/0	0/0	12/0	132*/48
C-130	218/256	202/296	192/260	190/152
Total Percent	67/33	61/39	59/41	60/40

* Includes active/associate Reserve program.

Source: HQ MAC/XP briefing slides, 1987.

When the time comes to make revisions, future planners should keep in mind the original objectives of the plan: (1) maintaining sufficient capability on active duty to operate the MAC airlift system during peacetime, (2) maintaining enough capability on active duty to meet contingency requirements, (3) placing no more than 50 percent of the total number of any one aircraft solely in the Reserve force, and (4) never putting the total number of any one aircraft in a single branch.¹ The final objective hopefully would preclude a recurrence of the airlift system's inability to support older airlift aircraft. The number of aircrews assigned to each organization is also important in maintaining capability and training systems (table 7). The high percentage of C-5 crewmembers is a function of high training costs and pilot aging. It is much more cost-effective to keep a higher percentage of crewmembers in the Reserve force, flying fewer hours per year and taking advantage of the experience they gain while flying for civilian airlines. Regardless of the cost-effectiveness of C-5s being assigned to the Reserve forces, the basic principle of keeping a balanced force in order to maintain supportability is still valid and should be adhered to.

Also for the first time, the plan allocates new aircraft—the C-17—to unit-equipped Guard and Reserve units. The C-17 will serve as a dual-purpose aircraft, providing both direct delivery and one intratheater shuttle mission before returning to the strategic airlift flow. In this way it can meet the 66

MTM/D goal and increase intratheater airlift capability. The C-17 will increase the 1989 baseline intertheater airlift capability from 48.5 MTM/D to 66 MTM/D by 1998. During the same period, it will increase intratheater airlift by 78 percent—from 9,000 ton-miles per day (TM/D) to 16,000 TM/D.²

TABLE 7
CREW COMPARISON
(Percent Active/AFRES-ANG)

	FY 1980	FY 1987	FY 1992	FY 2000
C-5	50/50	47/53	37/63	37/63
C-141	50/50	49/51	45/55	56/44
C-17	0/0	0/0	60/40	50/50
C-130	46/54	41/59	42/58	56/44
Total Percent	48/52	45/55	43/57	51/49

Source: HQ MAC/XP briefing slides, 1987.

The plan has specific benefits for the Guard in that it returns strategic airlift to Guard airlift forces. This provision will help the Guard meet the increasing need for peacetime training in the total force. The C-130 tactical airlift fleet of the Guard has been strained to the limit for many years trying to meet both its own tactical training requirements and the expanding strategic airlift needs of the Army and Air Guards. At present, the Guard is able to fill less than 50 percent of all validated airlift requests. The force-mix recommendations of the Airlift Master Plan will enable the Guard to meet these requests in the 1990s and help it satisfy MAC's global requirements.

Vista 1999

Vista 1999 was a task force formed in December 1980, consisting of Guard general officers, adjutants general, and other officers. It was charged by the director of the NGB to take a long-term, no-holds-barred look at the scope, size, nature, and methods of operation most appropriate in fulfilling the constitutional and statutory responsibilities of the Army and Air National Guard through 1999. The report of the task force cites a need to develop Guard airlift capability in order to meet the growing requirements of the total force:

Organic air transportation is essential to permit the use of the specialized facilities during limited training periods. Even greater effort should be made to make such airlift available and, if possible, in a non-reimbursable basis.³

The phrase *nonreimbursable airlift* refers to the Guard's practice of supporting Army and Air Guard training while conducting its own aircrew training.

Because Guard airlift aircrews do more local training than their active duty counterparts, there is a need to complete this training away from the units' local traffic patterns. NGB operations personnel are attempting to quantify this requirement and secure funding for it. The by-product of this training will satisfy the requirement for nonreimbursable airlift. As revised, the Vista report strongly supports the Air Force AMP, MAC's family-of-aircraft concept, and the acquisition of the C-17. It also supports the acquisition of C-130H aircraft to replace aging A and B models, wide-bodied C-130s, CV-22s, and C-23s.⁴ These aircraft would relieve a deficit in intratheater airlift estimated to be between 13,500 and 18,000 TM/D.

The Strategic Airlift Memorandum of Agreement

A Memorandum of Agreement between MAC and NGB establishes procedures and responsibilities during pre mobilization conditions. It applies to ANG organic strategic airlift unit operations in the airlift service industrial fund of the airlift transportation system. An understanding of the contents of the memorandum is essential to successful inclusion of Guard strategic airlift units into the total force. The MOA includes procedures that quantify Guard participation in strategic airlift, definitions of the four status levels of mission performance, descriptions of four types of missions, and procedures for reimbursing the Guard for these missions.

According to the MOA, 50 percent of the Guard strategic overseas sorties will be funded out of the ASIF. This provision allows the approved version of the Guard's flying budget to include the number of hours allocated for strategic overseas training. The ASIF must fund enough missions to complete the budgeted number of flying hours. This mission status will be identified as ANG MAClift. Missions on ANG Guardlift status, however, will be funded by ANG operations and maintenance funds rather than ASIF and will fulfill Guard airlift requirements while performing aircrew training. The third type of mission status—ANG overfly airlift—describes missions that exceed the normal requirements of MAC and ANG. Like ANG MAClift, it is funded by ASIF. Last, opportune airlift status applies to missions in the MAC airlift system provided at no cost to the user on a space-available basis.⁵

MAC wants the Guard to fly its required ASIF-funded missions across the spectrum of MAC operations. These operations include four basic mission types flown throughout the year: (1) channel, (2) special assignment airlift missions, (3) joint airborne/air transportability training (JA/ATT), and (4) exercise. According to the time of year when they are flown, these mission types vary in duration, advance notice, frequency, and aircrew desirability (i.e., aircrews consider some missions less desirable than others). In MAC's estimation, assigning the least objectionable missions to Guard units would have an adverse effect on the morale of active aircrews. Consequently, the MOA requires that the Guard participate in all types of missions to the maximum extent permitted by its predominantly part-time force (table 8).

The figures in table 8 representing MAClift hours do not constitute the sole direct benefit to MAC. For example, if ANG airlift units did not use their training hours to move Army and Air Guard personnel to training sites, the responsibility would be MAC's and would add to its present work load. Actually, a more accurate indication of the support provided by these units to the airlift community would be those figures representing hours "available for airlift."

TABLE 8
ANG STRATEGIC
AIRLIFT OPERATIONS IN FY 1989

Category	C-141	C-5
Programmed Hours	3,904	3,829
Local Training Hours	1,170	766
Hours Available for Airlift	2,734	3,063
MAClift Hours (ASIF)	864	860
Guardlift Hours	1,870	2,203

Source: ANGSC/DOT Flying-Hour Allocation Program, October 1988.

These are the tools available to make the Guard's return to the strategic airlift mission beneficial to all parties involved and advantageous to the total force. It is important that this system work because in the 1990s the responsibility for the strategic airlift mission, both in peacetime and wartime, will be shared between the active and Reserve forces. Any one branch of these forces working independently, without regard for the benefit of the whole, will destroy the total force's goal of maintaining the largest and best trained force imaginable to assure the security of the American people.

Notes

1. Department of the Air Force, *Airlift Total Force Plan: The Active Air-Reserve Force Mix* (Scott AFB, Ill.: Headquarters Military Airlift Command/XPPB, 17 September 1984), iv.

2. Department of the Air Force, *Airlift Master Plan* (Scott AFB, Ill.: Headquarters Military Airlift Command/XPPB, 29 September 1983), V-9, V-10 (unclassified version).

3. Maj Gen Francis R. Gerard et al., *Vista 1999, a Long-Range Look at the Future of the Army and Air National Guard*, March 1982, 45.

4. *Ibid.*, 3.

5. *Memorandum of Agreement Between Headquarters MAC and ANG for ANG Organic Strategic Airlift Units Operating in the ASIP Airlift Transportation System*, January 1988, 2.

Making It Work: Conclusions and Recommendations

BRINGING the Guard back into the strategic airlift mission is only one provision of the total force policy. Since the Korean War, the notion of striking a balance between active, Reserve, and Guard forces has evolved slowly. Although the Reserve force has played a relatively minor role during phases of very rapid growth, the last 30 years have seen increased participation by the Guard and Reserve within the total force (except for a temporary reversal during the Vietnam era).

Traditionally and historically, this country has relied more heavily on civilian soldiers than on a professional military force to defend it. In fact, not until the conclusion of the Korean conflict did we recognize a need for a large active force to ensure that future conflicts would be kept as far away from our shores as possible. Therefore, including Reserve forces as an integral part of our defense came naturally.

Because implementation of the total force policy affects MAC and ANG very differently, it is often difficult to keep in mind that the policy is supposed to benefit the Air Force in general. Objectivity becomes strained when one organization's gain becomes another's loss. MAC and ANG both have strong feelings about their roles and responsibilities in the strategic airlift mission. Nevertheless, these organizations must understand each other's aims and concerns regarding the Guard conversion to strategic airlift if they are to attain goal congruence.

Concerns of the Military Airlift Command

The Military Airlift Command has three major concerns about the Guard's return to strategic airlift: (1) whether the Guard will be able to operate in different degrees of readiness, (2) whether the Guard will be able to perform across the entire spectrum of the mission, and (3) whether MAC will lose any airlift capability when the Guard is not mobilized. Like most fears and beliefs, MAC's concerns lie somewhere between truth and fiction. Nevertheless, each deserves objective consideration.

MAC's initial concern was that the Guard would not perform adequately in a low state of readiness, especially during a nonmobilized contingency. The command fears that the Guard's responsiveness will be impaired by having to obtain approval of proposed involvement from both the NGB and the state adjutant general, especially for an unpopular military action. Although this procedure is technically correct, past call-ups indicate that it has rarely been a problem and that at no time during emergency or contingency conditions has it prevented the active force from gaining needed support from the Guard. In fact, the Guard has almost always given more than its share of airlift when asked and has done so voluntarily, without requiring a call-up.

MAC also has reservations about the Guard's willingness to fly every type of airlift in the command's repertoire: channel, JA/ATT, SAAM, and exercise. A channel mission follows an established route to a specified location at a scheduled date for a designated length of time. Traditionally, Reserve crews have done most of their overseas mission training on the shortest channel mission available because it seemed best suited for part-time airmen. Consequently, the active force is left with a disproportionate share of SAAMs—missions that give aircrews very little notice and inhibit their planning for personal activities. Whether the Guard's traditional mission assignments (e.g., to the shorter, more well-defined channel mission) constitute preferential treatment is debatable. However, if active duty aircrews perceive them as such, a problem exists. Nevertheless, by implementing some creative techniques for solving problems and viewing the inclusion of the Guard as an opportunity to solve rather than exacerbate old problems, perhaps we can formulate new initiatives to benefit everyone. For example, the Guard could set up a weekend alert crew—at relatively little cost—that could assume responsibility for last-minute taskings. As more strategic airplanes are transferred from MAC forces, these alert crews could be expanded to include the Air Force Reserve. The NGB could also assign a scheduler to MAC's Current Operations (MAC/DOOM) to coordinate Guard strategic airlift activities. This person could be assigned to the Guard support center but stationed at MAC, working on

reciprocal airlift support. Furthermore, increasing the number of strategic airlifters could create a place in the Guard for active duty pilots who intend to fly commercial airliners. Presently, only a small number of pilots leaving the active force for an airline career find their way to the Guard.

In recent years, Reserve aircrews have flown relatively infrequently and for brief duration. As mentioned previously, however, Guard strategic airlifters during the sixties participated in many missions of long duration each year. Generals Hebrank and Newman said that the participation of these crewmembers was based upon the expectations of their superiors.¹ In today's world of tactical airlift, we expect crewmembers to fly numerous airdrop missions. Consequently, they are accustomed to flying intensive training missions of short duration rather than long overseas missions. As was the case in the sixties, these crews are performing as we expect them to. However, it is erroneous to construe that behavior as an inability to perform otherwise. No doubt it would take some time to reorient these units to fly the longer missions typical of the active force, but it probably could be done—and just as successfully as before.

MAC's concern that the transfer of its aircraft would cause a loss of airlift capability is justified—but only for the short term. The Airlift Master Plan phases MAC's aircraft into the Guard as the active force receives newer aircraft, so the net effect should be an overall gain in airlift capability. On the one hand, some conversions, such as the one involving the C-141, have come almost unannounced. On the other hand, the transferred C-5s were replaced by active duty C-5Bs, and the C-141s will eventually be replaced by C-17s. Even if the transferred aircraft were not replaced, their loss would not be completely detrimental. For years the Guard airlift fleet has been trying to support the strategic airlift needs generated by ground units of the ANG and Army National Guard—nearly 500,000 men strong. The addition of strategic airlifters to the Guard's inventory will give the Guard the capability to move its troops in support of the total force. In its reports to Congress, MAC should perhaps consider all airlift done by the Reserve; if not for the Reserve, the responsibility would surely rest with MAC.

Although these concerns have some basis in fact, MAC must realize that the AMP is the only means by which the command can reach its goal of 66 MTM/D and that the Guard is an important part of that plan. Now is the time for MAC and ANG to acknowledge each other's goals for strategic airlift and to work in concert.

Concerns of the Guard

The predominant concern of Guard senior leadership is the fear that a return to strategic airlift will be

temporary—as it was in the sixties—and that all the work and time required to convert units to the mission will be wasted. This apprehension is based upon the fact that the Air Force has been less than enthusiastic about the proposed return and that Air Force leadership has objections to an expansion of the Guard's role in strategic airlift. Permanence and force stability have always been important to the Guard. State political leadership has always thought of their Guard units as favorite sons and have fought in Congress and the state capitals to maintain their force structure.

Many individuals who oppose the Guard's return to strategic airlift feel that the best airlift aircraft for the Guard is the C-130, for several reasons: (1) the ability of NGAUS to continue congressional authorization for the purchase of new H models, (2) the size of the airplane and of the unit required to support it, and (3) the congruence of mission scope and unit capability. Some people go so far as to advocate the Guard's taking over the C-130 operation and the tactical airlift mission, arguing that the Guard could then run the mission with little command interference.

Such advocates ignore the intent of the total force policy to include the Guard as an equal partner in force structure allocations. Past experience (e.g., with the C-97) has shown that when Reserve forces have become the sole operator of a weapon system, the ability to maintain it deteriorates, and the aircraft rapidly becomes expendable. As mentioned earlier, introduction of the C-141 into the inventory of the active Air Force changed opinions on employment of strategic airlift to the detriment of the Guard's older aircraft.

The Airlift Master Plan, however, redresses the problem by applying its family-of-aircraft concept to all elements of the Air Force—active, Guard, and Reserve. This approach to force structure development ensures that each organization receives a proportionate distribution of aircraft and technological acquisitions while maintaining a cost-effective mix between active and part-time military. The AMP also establishes formal roles and identifies the extent of each organization's involvement in those roles.

The Guard must also consider whether its need for strategic airlift is legitimate. The development of the total force—particularly as it affects nonflying units of the Army and Air Guards—has created a rapidly increasing need for strategic airlift, both in peacetime and during periods of activation. People outside the airlift operation may not appreciate this need, persuaded that airlift provided by Guard C-130s is more than sufficient. But the Guard tactical airlift community finds itself in the position of attempting to satisfy the airlift needs of the NGB and the state adjutants general while meeting its own considerable requirements for tactical training and theater deployment. Strategic airlifters would enable the Guard to meet these requirements for airlift much more efficiently and free the tactical airlifters to concentrate on their airdrop mission.

Although the Stone Board concluded that the tactical airdrop mission was unsuitable for the Guard, the Guard has proved it can do the mission well. People outside the airlift operation must recognize that differences between aircraft used in strategic and tactical airlift are more involved than mere variations in size. The C-141 and C-5 do not simply represent a larger space to be filled than does the C-130—they represent a different mission.

Making It Work

Aside from reconciling differences between MAC and ANG and trusting in the benefits of the AMP and total force policy, it is necessary to find enough money to finance the Guard's return to the strategic airlift mission. For example, the C-5 facility at Stewart put a strain on the NGB budget. Congress reduces the DOD budget and transfers weapon systems to the Guard; however, the Air Force apportions budget cuts among the active, Guard, and Reserve forces. These two policies work at cross-purposes. If the Guard continues to accept the newer, more costly equipment, it must realize a corresponding increase in funding or a decrease in mission requirements.

In view of current fiscal realities, the Guard must consider alternate concepts that might use the available dollars more efficiently. Examples include basing, aircraft allocation, and manpower initiatives. Perhaps it is time for the Air Force and Guard to reconsider the current practice of locating Guard units apart from Air Force bases. Collocating active and Reserve forces would permit sharing of equipment, facilities, and expertise. Aircraft maintenance and base supply would benefit considerably. Moreover, active force personnel would benefit from the skills of senior guardsmen, and Guard personnel would benefit from the energy of the youthful active force.

The cost of developing another C-5 base for the Guard has been the major barrier to further transfers of C-5s; however, placing the unit at an existing C-5 base would cut costs and make the transfers feasible. The 166th Tactical Airlift Group at Wilmington, Delaware, could be considered for conversion to the C-5 and moved to Dover AFB, Delaware, as a unit-equipped group sharing facilities and equipment with the active force.

Another possibility is the creation of large strategic units in the Guard rather than the traditionally small ones. There are some problems with this idea. Although this approach saves construction money, it eliminates opportunities to convert and modernize other units and magnifies the task of recruiting pilots. For example, a C-17 unit with 12 aircraft would require 120 squadron pilots because of its proposed manning ratio of 5.0 crews per aircraft at two pilots per crew.

This number is almost double that of the largest current Guard airlift units. Even if units are carefully placed, this type of basing plan would experience severe, if not insurmountable, problems.

Alternatively, an expanded version of the current maintenance structure for support aircraft might be feasible. C-130 support aircraft located at Guard fighter units presently use a central facility for maintenance. Guard C-17s could employ a similar concept by using one centrally located support base for major problems and smaller bases for day-to-day support. This approach would require only 60 pilots per location, assuming six aircraft for each unit and one central maintenance facility, possibly located at the wing or even at an active base. This plan would modernize four units rather than one and keep the task of recruiting and retaining pilots within manageable limits. An argument has also been made about there being an optimum amount of cross-country flying that any one area could support (i.e., doubling the size of a unit would not necessarily double the amount of airlift). Although this idea is difficult to prove because factors other than size come into play, it seems logical enough.

Alternatives to the present program of aircraft allocation should also be explored. The active force flies its aircraft more frequently than does the Guard, thereby aging them more quickly. Furthermore, because maintenance personnel in the active force are younger and less experienced than those in the Guard, the condition of aircraft in the active force is not quite as good as that of Guard aircraft. These factors should become more evident when the Guard receives new aircraft at the same time as the active force. Guard aircraft will age slowly in comparison to the airplanes of the active force. A possible solution would involve rotating the aircraft between the active and Reserve forces, allowing them to age evenly. Under this system, aircraft should last far beyond present estimates. This extended lifespan could be a tremendous boon to the airlift business, where obsolescence is more the result of wear and tear on the airframe than of technological advances. This approach would not be well received by Guard maintenance personnel because of the extra work load involved. But from a broad perspective, everyone should benefit: the Guard flies the same equipment as the regular Air Force, and the Air Force keeps its inventory of aircraft for a longer period of time.

Making the total force work in the airlift business is no different from making it work in any other organization of the military. If planners from all affected organizations selflessly dedicate themselves to the betterment of the total force, they can bring about changes that will benefit the entire Air Force. This dedication should be communicated throughout MAC

and NGB so that there is no doubt that the leadership of these organizations supports the total force policy. Competition for funds, whether at the acquisition level or at the mission allocation level, is counterproductive to the well-being of the Air Force.

There is no doubt that the Guard can perform the strategic airlift mission just as well as the active forces. This paper has documented the need for additional airlift and the Guard's ability to meet that need. Whenever the active force was unable to supply airlift, MAC and ANG had to work together to get the job done. That need was communicated at the highest levels of each organization. When MATS needed airlift support from the Guard, that fact was communicated to the NGB—commander to commander. Therefore, there was never any confusion on the part of subordinates about the desires of the organizational heads.

Today, both the Guard and MAC have complex airlift organizations, and although assisting the command is part of the responsibility of the Guard Airlift Center, the Center is predisposed to Guardlift. MAC must understand that Guardlift is necessary to make the total force work and that it is the first priority of the Guard airlift community. On the other hand, it is equally important for Guard people to understand that our airlifters are responsible for augmenting the active force. The facts of the matter, both past and present, speak for themselves. Guard strategic airlifters, even in the process of conversion, have contributed substan-

tially to MAC airlift. During the sixties, requirements of real-world contingencies and of ongoing operations always had the first consideration of Guard airlifters.

In the final analysis, the key to success is goal congruence. The beneficiaries of airlift operations do not care who flies or maintains the aircraft. As far as they are concerned, Air Force aircraft represent the United States of America. A statement released by Headquarters MAC News Service makes this point very well:

More than 50 Military Airlift Command airplanes airlifted some 3,200 U.S. soldiers to Honduras in support of an emergency deployment readiness exercise. MAC aircraft and crews began the no-notice deployment to Palmerola AB, Honduras, March 17. The first transporter carrying combat soldiers left Pope AFB, N.C., less than 12 hours after President Reagan gave the signal to send troops into the Central American country. Active duty C-5 Galaxy's from Dover AFB, Delaware, and C-141 Starlifters from Charleston AFB, S.C., McChord AFB, Wash., and Norton AFB, Calif., were deployed. Air Force Reserve C-141s from Andrews AFB, Md., and Air National Guard C-141s from Jackson, Miss., were also involved in the airlift.²

What the article failed to mention was that the first aircraft to arrive in Palmerola was a Guard C-141 from Jackson, and that its unit airlifted 17 percent of the total mission despite representing only 3 percent of the capability. From all indications, the return of the strategic minuteman will be successful and will benefit the entire Air Force.

Notes

1. Maj Gen Raymond E. Hebrank, ANG, Retired, Channel Island Harbor, Calif., interview with author, 14 January 1988; Maj Gen

Stanley F. Newman, ANG, Retired, Oklahoma City, Okla., interview with author, 12 January 1988.

2. Headquarters MAC News Service release, 25 March 1988.

Glossary

AB	air base
AFB	Air Force base
AFRES	Air Force Reserve
AMP	Airlift Master Plan
ANG	Air National Guard
ANGSC	Air National Guard Support Center
AOC	air operations center
ASIF	airlift service industrial fund
ATG	air transport group
ATS	air transport squadron
ATW	air transport wing
CMMS	congressionally mandated mobility study
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DOD	Department of Defense
FY	fiscal year
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
JA/ATT	joint airborne/air transportability training
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAG	military airlift group
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MAW	military airlift wing
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MTM/D	million ton-miles per day
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	national command authorities
NGAUS	National Guard Association of the United States
NGB	National Guard Bureau
SAAM	special assignment airlift mission
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SEA	Southeast Asia
TM/D	ton-miles per day
USAF	United States Air Force