The Focus of the U.S. Army's Operational Art: a Question of Balance
Abstract
This monograph considers whether the emphasis upon 'campaigns and major operations' expressed in the definition of operational art in the current edition of FM 100-5, Operations, is consistent with the most probable threats facing the U.S. Army of the 1990's and 21st century. The study examines the question of balance by employing the following methodology: first, an examination of the terms related to the study of operational art; second, a strategic analysis presenting the challenges that the Army may encounter in the years to come; third, a closer look at low-intensity conflict, with emphasis on the final draft of FM 100-20; fourth, an assessment of the Army's post 1986 doctrinal publications, officer education system, and key training events in the context of a balanced approach to the identified strategic missions; and finally, a review of the PPBS cycle as an instrument for translating strategic policy into tactical capability, and as a program requiring the Army to develop credible operational concepts and priorities. The document concludes that the current focus of operational concepts is too limited. It proposes that the definition of operational art should be changed to reflect a broad and all encompassing approach to the process of translating strategic goals into the tactical application of Army forces and resources throughout the spectrum of conflict. Lastly, it implies a need for corresponding adjustments to the definitions of other related operational terms including: campaigns, major operations, and operational maneuver. (sdw)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 05, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA215856
Entities
People
- Harry A. Tomlin
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College