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
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STUDENT REPORT
GETTYSBURG: A CASE STUDY IN
STRATEGY DECISION MAKING

MAJOR RICHARD B. AIKEN 88-0040

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<p>This paper is an historical analysis of how General Lee determined the requirement for an offensive strategy resulting in the Battle of Gettysburg. Chapter one introduces Colonel Drew's Strategy Process Model and uses the model to explain the Confederacy's situation in the spring of 1863. Chapter two describes the military balance of power which dictated, in Lee's mind, the need to invade Pennsylvania. Chapter three reviews the external factors that supported Lee's decision to invade. Chapter four looks at other external factors Lee failed to consider.</p>						
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**Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of
requirements for graduation.**

**AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
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PREFACE

This paper is an historical analysis of the development of Lee's offensive strategy which culminated in the battle at Gettysburg. This case study in Confederate strategy development uses the Strategy Process Model devised by Colonel Dennis Drew of AU/CADRE. The South, faced with invasion by the North, initially employed a defensive strategy. As larger and larger Union armies encroached on Confederate soil, the South realized only a more offensive strategy would retain the initiative. By attacking, the South could choose the time and place of battle and, in this way, offset the North's numerical superiority. Lee's offensive-defensive strategy was born of the necessity to maintain the initiative. His strategy gained several spectacular military victories for the Confederacy but at a prohibitive cost in manpower attrition.

After two years of war, Lee determined an invasion of the North was necessary to win the war before Northern numerical superiority overwhelmed the South. This paper examines the military situation and external factors which influenced Lee's decision to conduct the Gettysburg campaign. International politics, domestic politics, economic considerations and morale all influenced Lee's decision to invade the North.

Lee based his decision to invade on an incomplete analysis of the external factors as depicted in the Strategy Process Model. He developed his offensive strategy by viewing external constraints through rose-colored glasses and only saw the advantages victory would gain for the Confederacy. Lee never considered the impact on the South if his Army of Northern Virginia was defeated on Northern soil.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Major Aiken is currently a member of the ACSC residence class of 1988. His decorations include the Meritorious Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters.

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REPORT NUMBER 88-0040

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR RICHARD B. AIKEN

TITLE

GETTYSBURG: A CASE STUDY IN STRATEGY DECISION MAKING

I. **Purpose:** To examine the development of a historical strategic campaign using the Strategy Process Model developed by Colonel Drew of AU/CADRE.

II. **Discussion of Analysis:** Strategy is not born in a vacuum. A good strategy takes its cue from the national objective it supports and is influenced by external factors. The South, faced with invasion by the North, initially employed a defensive strategy. As larger Union armies encroached on Confederate soil, the South realized only a more offensive strategy would retain the initiative. By attacking, the South could choose the time and place of battle and, in this way, offset the North's numerical superiority. This offensive-defensive strategy gained several spectacular military victories for the Confederacy but at a prohibitive cost in manpower attrition.

After two years of attrition warfare, Lee determined that he had to invade the North in order to win the war before Northern numerical superiority overwhelmed the South. This paper describes the military situation and external factors which influenced Lee's adoption of an offensive strategy. The external factors of international politics, domestic politics, economic considerations and morale are described in detail.

CONTINUED

III. Conclusion: Lee based his decision to invade the North on an incomplete analysis of the external factors as depicted in the Strategy Process Model. The likelihood that Lee's Army of Northern Virginia would win a decisive victory on Northern soil was small. But, Lee based his decision to invade on the benefits of victory with no consideration for the risks of defeat. A second look at the influences of external constraints in light of the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg will show how Lee's offensive strategy failed to support the Confederate national objective of independent sovereignty.

INTRODUCTION

During the American Civil War, the South decided to invade Pennsylvania. This decision resulted in the battle at Gettysburg in July of 1863. The South's decision to invade provides an excellent case study of strategy as a decision-making process connecting the ends (objectives) to the means of achieving those ends. (39:12)

Civil War historian Bruce Catton contends that when the South invaded the North, it made a battle of attrition inevitable. Catton further states, "Not even Robert E. Lee could win that kind of fight. When an army like Lee's took the offensive against a larger army, in the enemy's own country, it committed itself to the wrong kind of fight." (14:108)

This paper will use Colonel Drew's Strategy Process Model (Figure 1) to examine the South's decision to invade. Chapter one will lay the foundation for this examination by relating the strategy process to the South's situation in 1863. Chapter two will describe the military situation in 1863 and show why the Gettysburg campaign was undertaken. Chapter three will examine external factors Lee considered in developing his offensive strategy. Chapter four will discuss the external factors Lee failed to consider in his decision to invade the North.

The purpose of this paper is to present a balanced study of how effectively Lee's Gettysburg campaign supported the national objectives of the Confederate States of America. This study concludes Lee decided to invade Pennsylvania based on an incomplete analysis of the external factors influencing his offensive strategy. Lee failed to consider the consequences of defeat on Northern soil and that neglected consideration resulted in the development of an offensive strategy which did not support the national objective of the Confederacy.

Chapter One

THE STRATEGY PROCESS MODEL

Colonel Drew's Strategy Process Model (Figure 1) is a five step process with each step created from and supporting the step above. (39:21) For example: Military strategy must be consistent with a country's grand strategy, and grand strategy is developed to serve the national objectives. This chapter will examine the South's national objective, grand strategy, and military strategy. Particular emphasis will be placed on the differing views of military strategy held by Davis and Lee. Operational strategy will be covered in chapters two through four. Discussion of battlefield strategy is not applicable to the purpose of this paper.

The determination of national objectives is the first and most crucial step in the strategy process. (39:15) National objectives are those fundamental goals which support the survival and prosperity of individual nations. Since the creation of the Confederacy in February of 1861, its national objective remained clear, consistent, and unchanged. Confederate President Davis articulated the South's national objective in his address to a special session of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States:

All we ask is to be let alone. If Lincoln adopts a let-alone policy the sword shall drop from our grasp and we shall be ready to enter into treaties of amity and commerce that can but be mutually beneficial. As long as the United States shows a desire to subjugate the South, we shall continue to struggle for our inherent right to freedom, independence, and self-government.
(14:341)

The next step in the model is to determine which instruments of national power should be used to achieve the national objective. The coordination of national power to accomplish the national objectives is called grand strategy. (39:15) National power can be categorized as political, economic, or military. The most effective grand strategy is one which uses all three types of power to the best advantage. The South had little political or economic power to draw on, and invasion from the North made the use of military power the most appropriate grand strategy.

The South's military strategy was evolutionary in nature. Military strategy is the coordination of force development, force deployment, and force employment in support of national objectives as directed by grand strategy. (39:74) The nature of the Civil War made the South's force deployment and employment essentially defensive because the Confederacy began the war in charge of their own territory. (37:92) Confederate President Davis, an 1828 graduate of West Point and commander-in-chief of all Confederate forces, also believed the South's best strategy was a defensive one. (25:151-156) Confederate General Alexander, however, believed the South couldn't afford to wage a purely defensive war because, "A decisive defeat of Lee's army in any summer campaign of 1862, 1863, or 1864--and particularly a defeat on the defensive, well within Southern boundaries--would have meant the end of the struggle." (1:363)

General Lee's experiences early in the Civil War led him to agree with General Alexander. With thousands of miles of land and sea boundaries, the South could not defend everywhere. Lee had attempted to defend the mountains of West Virginia and failed. When assigned to defend a 300-mile stretch of seacoast in Georgia and South Carolina, he failed again. (37:102) Lee concluded, "It is only by concentration of our troops that we can hope to win any decisive advantage. We must decide between the positive loss of inactivity and the risk of action." (11:868) Lee further recommended that the kind of concentration that served the defensive strategy best was that which caused the enemy to draw strength away from vital points or make him disperse his forces. (37:104) By attacking, Lee could retain the initiative and wage battle at the time and place of his choosing, and the South could collect adequate numbers and resources at these critical places despite overall inferiority of strength. Lee's initiative greatly offset the North's numerical superiority and was the essence of his offensive-defensive strategy.

The problem with the offensive-defensive strategy was the cost in manpower attrition traded for gain in initiative. (37:97) Because of this attrition and the South's available manpower pool, by 1863 the Confederacy had reached the limits of its manpower. From 1863 on, the longer the war was protracted the greater would be the disparity of strength between North and South. (22:6) In 1862, Georgia Governor Brown proclaimed, "We shall need a million men in the spring for nothing short of this can save ten million Southern freemen from subjugation by twenty million Yankees." (21:313) The South, however, couldn't even keep half a million men in the field. In early 1863, the Confederate armies reached their maximum fighting strength with a total present for duty of 473,000 men. Effective for combat was roughly 325,000 and, after 1863, this number would decline steadily. (34:8)

The chapter has reviewed the South's national objective and grand strategy. This chapter has also related the different military strategy beliefs held by President Davis (defensive) and General Lee (offensive-defensive). Chapter two will develop the military situation in 1863 and show how this situation led to the adoption of the Gettysburg campaign.

STRATEGY PROCESS MODEL

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

GRAND STRATEGY




FIGURE 1

Chapter Two

THE MILITARY SITUATION

Chapter two covers three areas. First, the status and location of opposing forces will be examined. The status of forces shows the threat to Vicksburg, and the second part of this chapter examines why the Confederates decide not to relieve Vicksburg directly. The third portion of this chapter shows how the disagreement over the best military strategy, defensive or offensive-defensive, was resolved in the Eastern theater.

Although the South had 325,000 men ready to fight, Southern armies contested their Northern counterparts in three pivotal areas during the spring of 1863. In an area around Tullahoma in mid-Tennessee, Confederate General Bragg and 47,000 effectives faced Union General Rosecrans with 50,000 men. (34:9) Confederate forces in Tennessee defended the rail approaches to the Deep South which were accessible through Tennessee. The most threatening area of conflict to the South was represented by Grant's besieging armies at Vicksburg. Unless the Confederates could think of some way to lessen Grant's hold, the siege of Vicksburg would result in an important Union victory and control of the Mississippi River. (20:4) General Grant and his reinforced army of 75,000 men had Confederate General Pemberton and 30,000 men locked inside Vicksburg while keeping General Joe Johnston and his 25,000-man army at bay in the area around Jackson, Mississippi. (23:888; 13:137) Finally, the largest concentration of forces remained in the war-ravaged countryside between Washington, DC, and Richmond. After the Confederate victory at Chancellorsville and the return of General Longstreet's corps, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was made up of 77,000 men. (36:18) Lee faced General Hooker's Army of the Potomac containing 115,000 men. (23:886)

With the victory at Chancellorsville providing the Confederate Eastern theater with breathing room, the South turned its attention to the pending disaster at Vicksburg. On 7 May 1863, Joseph E. Johnston, chief general in the West, knew a concentration of Confederate forces was necessary to save Vicksburg. In a letter to Secretary of War Seddon, Johnston stated,

We are too much outnumbered everywhere. . . . Burnside may go through E. Tennessee to the Ga. Railroad. The enemy is fortified in front of Bragg, who for that

reason can't attack. Mississippi is invaded by an army 50 percent greater than ours, and our general (Pemberton) . . . can't comprehend that by attempting to defend all valuable points at once he exposes his troops to being defeated everywhere. (30:163,196)

After receipt of Johnston's letter, Secretary Seddon was sufficiently alarmed to notify Lee it might be necessary to detach at least one of Longstreet's divisions and send it to Vicksburg. (10:215)

President Davis was considering an indirect solution to his Vicksburg dilemma. The armies facing each other in Tennessee were stalemated because their strength was closely balanced. Davis believed that reinforcing his army in Tennessee would allow it to go on the offensive, and diversionary actions in Tennessee might draw Federal troops away from the siege of Vicksburg. (37:114) Earlier in the year, General Beauregard had urged President Davis to send Lee to Tennessee, taking Longstreet's corps with him, and to take command of General Bragg's army. Using Bragg's army thus augmented, Beauregard believed Lee could stage an offensive in Tennessee that would compel the Federal Government to recall Grant from Mississippi. As for Virginia, the Army of the Potomac was notoriously slow to act and the depleted Army of Northern Virginia could probably hold it off until Lee and Longstreet's corps returned. (15:5) General Longstreet had proposed a similar plan to Secretary Seddon stating, "The only way to equalize the contest is by skillful use of our interior lines." (27:429) Longstreet proposed Johnston's and his forces join forces with Bragg's army and march for the Ohio River Valley forcing Grant to withdraw from Vicksburg. (16:152)

President Davis was aware of Lee's desire to invade the North. Despite his confidence in Lee, President Davis favored a more defensive strategy and felt doubts about Lee's movement beyond his usual offensive-defensive strategy to one of pure offense. (37:114) Thus the idea of reinforcing the West still held appeal for President Davis when, on 26 May 1863, he invited Lee to present his recommendation for action before the war cabinet in Richmond. (20:7)

Lee was not responsive to Davis' plans to reinforce the West for six reasons. First, Lee's Virginia parochialism played a part. Lee, however, would have fought at the North Pole if he believed he could save the South and indirectly his beloved Virginia. Second, the vast expanses of the Mississippi did not afford the opportunity for the limited manpower of the Confederate armies to mount an offensive which could hope for decisive results. (37:114,115) Third, the poor condition of the railroads did not allow for the effective use of interior lines as advocated by Longstreet. (24:172,173) Fourth, Lee believed the Vicksburg dilemma would be solved either militarily or by the

heat of summer temperatures before the South could relieve Pemberton. (27:430) Fifth, Lee didn't believe the Army of the Potomac would remain idle during the summer. In a communique to Secretary of War Seddon, Lee related the Union plans for the summer campaign in the East:

Union General Hooker planned to turn the Confederate left while Federal troops on the peninsula advanced directly on Richmond. The Federal commander at Fort Monroe, Major General John A. Dix, had some 32,000 men arrayed on both sides of the James River, and to oppose him Richmond had fewer than 8,000 under Major General Arnold E. Elzey. A simultaneous advance by Hooker and Dix could present a most difficult problem. (9:833,834)

Sixth, Lee believed his invasion of Pennsylvania stood just as good a chance of drawing forces away from Grant's siege at Vicksburg as any operation in Tennessee. (11:930-931)

When asked his opinion of what actions Confederate forces should take in the summer of 1863, Lee replied: "I considered the problem in every possible phase, and to my mind it resolved itself into a choice of one of two things: either to retire to Richmond and stand a siege, which must ultimately end in surrender, or to invade Pennsylvania." (27:430) Although the Northern army had suffered heavy losses at Chancellorsville, it was still intact and would renew the offensive if given a breathing spell. The Confederates could not afford to wait. Lee believed he had to gain a decisive victory that summer, as time was running out and never again would the South be so strong. (20:4)

Richmond was important for practical and symbolic reasons and had to be defended. Symbolically, the Union had attached great emphasis to the capture of the Confederate capital. By 1863, the blood and money spent in defending Richmond caused the South to view Richmond as an important symbol also. (7:181) On the practical side, Richmond was home to the greatest triumph of all Confederate war industries--the Tredegar Iron Works. Known as the mother arsenal of the new nation, the Richmond plant turned out more than a thousand cannon, enormous quantities of artillery shells, naval mines, gun carriages, submersible vessels, armor plating and machinery for warships and was the research center for development of new armaments including the Brooke rifled navy gun. (18:21-22) Richmond simply could not be surrendered.

Lee was convinced the only way of defending Richmond successfully was by occupying the Federal army at a distance from the capital and preventing a siege. (7:183) Because the South faced exhaustion in a protracted conflict, it was important to accomplish quickly the greatest possible results with the smallest loss. Lee believed the best way to use a limited number of men to bring about a satisfactory peace while frustrating the

immediate plans of the enemy was to invade the enemy territory.
(7:187,188)

General Doubleday, second in command at Fort Sumter and a Union general at Gettysburg, believed that the deteriorating situation at Vicksburg finally convinced President Davis to pin his hopes on Lee's Gettysburg campaign. A defensive strategy of retiring on Richmond would save the great labor of transportation of food and war material to the frontier and remove the Northern army still further from its sources of supply. However, the fall of Vicksburg combined with the retreat of Lee's army into Richmond would dishearten the Southern people and stimulate the North to new efforts. (3:76) It became essential, therefore, to counter balance the impending disaster in the West with some brilliant exploit in the East. Major Charles Marshall, a member of Lee's staff, summed up the situation neatly when he wrote: "So, if General Lee remained inactive, both Richmond and Vicksburg would be imperilled, whereas if he were successful north of the Potomac, both would be saved." (20:9)

This chapter developed the military situation the Confederates faced in the spring of 1863. The grave situation facing the South at Vicksburg forced Confederate leaders to re-evaluate their military strategy. An offensive strategy was adopted and the invasion of Pennsylvania was set in motion. There is more, however, to the development of strategy than merely the reaction to a given military situation. Colonel Drew's Strategy Process Model reflects the influence of various external factors on strategy development. Chapter three will examine the external factors which influenced Lee in his decision to invade the North.

Chapter Three

OPERATIONAL STRATEGY AND EXTERNAL FACTORS

As the title suggests, this chapter will discuss operational strategy and the external factors which influence strategy development. Operational strategy is the planning, directing, and orchestrating of a military campaign within a theater of operations; (39:18) in this case, the Gettysburg campaign in the Eastern theater of operations of the American Civil War. External factors directly influence the straight-line flow of strategy making from the national objective level to the level of battlefield strategy. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the pushing and tugging of external factors on the strategy process. (39:21) Chapter two examined how the threat to Vicksburg and Richmond gained President Davis' approval for the Gettysburg campaign. Now we will look at the influences of international politics, domestic politics, economic considerations, and morale.

Lee believed a decisive Confederate victory on Northern soil might decide European opinion in favor of recognizing the South's independence. The Confederacy had desired recognition of its sovereignty since the beginning of the Civil War. The international recognition of the Confederacy by the European powers, particularly France and England, would go a long way toward balancing the relative strengths of North and South. General Abner Doubleday provides an excellent overview of the international political environment:

England still made a pretense of neutrality, but the aristocracy and the ruling classes sided with the South, and a large association of their most influential men was established at Manchester to aid the slaveholding oligarchy. The rebels were fighting us with English guns and war materials furnished by blockade runners while English Shenandoah's and Alabama's, manned by English seamen, under the Confederate flag, burned our merchant vessels and swept our commercial marine from the ocean. The French government was hostile to us (the Union), and there was hardly a kingdom in Europe which did not sympathize with the South. The agents of the Confederate government stated in their official dispatches that if General Lee could establish his army firmly on Northern soil, England would at once acknowledge the independence of the South, in which case

ample loans could not only be obtained on Southern securities, but a foreign alliance might be formed, and perhaps a fleet furnished to re-open the Southern ports. . . . (3:77)

The international factor was heavily influenced by the domestic political environment in the United States as well, particularly the peace movement in the North. When news of Lee's Northern invasion reached Europe, the anticipation of Confederate victory was heightened by news of disaffection in the North. (31:147)

Just as with the Europeans, Lee believed a victory in Pennsylvania would influence the growing Northern peace movement in favor of a cessation of hostilities. Few Southerners believed that the people of the North had their hearts in the war and that before long the Northerners would give up the struggle. The South viewed Northerners as too well off, too self-centered, and too anxious to save what they had. In Ohio, Federal troops had to put down anti-war mobs and arrest one candidate for governor. In Illinois, a Federal regiment had mutinied, and the army commander at Cairo warned, "We have a population in southern Illinois ready to spring up and join any organization opposed to the current government." (16:161) State conventions of the Democratic Party in Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa saw the party taking more outright positions in favor of peace. Encouragement for the peace movement was developing in the East. The Democrats of Connecticut had nominated a peace man as their candidate for governor. In New York City on 3 June, a huge mass meeting under the auspices of former Mayor Fernando Wood overflowed the Cooper Union hall, calling for immediate peace and urging Democrats everywhere to repudiate the war. The Davenport Daily Gazette on 3 January 1863, proudly quoted Jefferson Davis from a speech in Jackson, Mississippi, where he stated he looked to the Northwest for the first gleam of peace. (31:146,147)

The near collapse of the economy in the Confederacy and particularly Virginia also influenced Lee's plans for a Northern invasion. Many Virginians had seen their beautiful and productive farms turned into a bloody and muddy battlefield for the last two years. The anguish and suffering of many Virginians echo in the words of Virginian Judith McGuire who, upon hearing rumors of an imminent battle in Pennsylvania, wrote:

So may it be! We are harassed to death with their ruinous raids, and why should not the North feel it in their homes? Nothing but their personal suffering will shorten the war. I want their horses taken for our cavalry and wagons, in return for the hundreds of thousands that they have taken from us; I want their fat cattle driven into Virginia to feed our army. (18:110)

Another example of the devastation suffered in Virginia comes from a petition sent to Governor Letcher from the farmers of Pocahontas country. They declared that destruction of property by both armies had left little land suitable for farming and that enlistments and disease had taken all but a few of the men needed to gather what crops there were. They sought relief from any further manpower levies, for the families of the county could barely sustain their meager existence. (34:29)

The remainder of the South was in dire straits as well. The devitalization of the Confederacy by the blockade, by the destruction of railroads and bridges, by the capture of mines and factories, and by sheer wear and wastage, was a process that, by the spring of 1863, produced grave consternation in the South. (34:14) The South felt every death list, every sinking of a steamboat, and every loss of a gun. Herds of beeves and shipments of foreign munitions were moving eastward from the Mississippi in dwindling and uncertain dribbles. (34:2) Food was in short supply. The Confederate Congress and the states had passed laws urging food crops be planted instead of cotton and tobacco. The Columbus, Georgia Sun cried, "Plant corn and be free, or plant cotton and be whipped." (18:29) In 1863, the food shortage was acute for all main armies and growing worse. Even though huge supplies of corn were available in Georgia and Alabama, lack of transportation, horses or railroad, prevented it from getting to where it was needed. (34:22)

Morale, both at home and on the front lines, was another factor Lee considered when developing strategy. We have already discussed President Davis' concerns for the impact on Southern morale if Vicksburg were lost with no Confederate victory elsewhere to balance the scales. But the hopes of the Confederacy relied on the successes of its army in battle, and no army had ever been more ready for battle than Lee's. The Confederate victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville had inspired a sense of invincibility in the Army of Northern Virginia. (8:313) The Army of Northern Virginia was in such high spirits that, in the words of General Longstreet, it was "capable of anything." (6:352) With an army so finely tuned and high strung, Lee knew that inactivity on his part would adversely affect the morale of his army, and indirectly the morale of the entire Confederacy.

Every external factor Lee considered pointed him toward a decisive battle on Northern soil. If Lee went to Pennsylvania, he knew Hooker would have to follow him because Lincoln would become more concerned about protecting Washington, DC, rather than capturing Richmond. Lee further hoped that while pursuing Lee, Hooker might make a mistake and expose the Union army to a decisive defeat. (16:152)

The key to the decisive victory Lee sought was that it occur on Northern soil. When asked by one of his aides whether it might be better to engage Hooker in the vicinity of Manassas, "General Lee objected because no results of decisive value to the Confederate States could come from a victory in that locality. The Federal army, if defeated, would fall back to the defenses of Washington, as on previous occasions, where it would reorganize in safety and again take the field in full force." (6:268) Lee believed an offensive campaign north of the Potomac was the best strategy for the Confederacy in 1863. In dispatches to Davis, Lee stated that once Confederate forces crossed the Potomac, Hooker would be supported by "troops designed to operate against other parts of the country." (20:8; 11:930-931). This meant Grant's forces at Vicksburg. Lee's analysis of the external factors supported his decision to adopt an offensive strategy.

This chapter has shown that Lee believed a victory on Northern soil would favorably influence international recognition of Confederate independence. Further, Lee felt arguments for peace in the North would be much more convincing if victory placed Washington, Baltimore or Philadelphia within his reach. (7:186) Lee knew how savagely Virginia had been stripped of supplies, and he felt the importance of the herds of cattle, droves of horses, wagons, clothes, shoes and arms Pennsylvania might offer. (34:18) He knew his army could live off the land in the North, and if Federal armies left Virginia and followed him into Pennsylvania, so much better for the folks at home. (16:153) Finally, his confidence in success drew strength from the high spirit of his army. (6:269) But, was Lee's analysis of external factors accurate? He certainly understood the benefits the South would receive from a victory on Northern soil. Chapter four will examine the external factors from the opposite point of view and show that had Lee considered the impacts of defeat he might not have crossed the Potomac.

Chapter Four

EXTERNAL FACTORS: A SECOND LOOK

Colonel Drew states that the main purpose of the Strategy Process Model is to ensure that battlefield means are linked to political ends. (39:19) Battlefield means are the result of force deployment and employment as devised by operational strategy which takes its cue from the military strategy supporting national objectives. Chapter two outlined the military situation facing the Confederacy and how the South decided to meet the Union threat by the adoption of an offensive strategy. In chapter three, we reviewed Lee's thought process as he examined the external factors influencing strategy development. This chapter will take a second look at the external factors influencing Lee's strategy process. But, before discussing the external factors, the original military situation which prompted the Confederate offensive response warrants further evaluation.

Chapter two explained a twofold military threat to the Confederacy: Grant's siege of Vicksburg and the need to defend Richmond against Hooker's Army of the Potomac. First, recall that Lee believed operations North of the Potomac might indirectly relieve the siege of Vicksburg. (11:924,925; 12:260; 27:432) But, rather than draw down his strength, Grant was reinforced despite Lee's Gettysburg campaign. Historian Bruce Catton validates that not one man, gun, or wagon load of supplies was withheld from Grant because of the invasion of Pennsylvania. (15:107) Also, Lee's plan to divert Grant from Vicksburg does not meet the chronological test. The siege of Vicksburg began on 19 May. It would be the end of June before Lee could get his army across the Potomac. This gave Grant too much time to prosecute his siege. (15:5) As for the threat posed by the Army of the Potomac, it's true that Hooker's army had not been demoralized after Chancellorsville. (13:137) But Lee had overstated the threat posed by the Army of the Potomac. Hooker's army was losing strength rather than being reinforced for battle. As enlistment terms expired, more than 30,000 of Hooker's best and most seasoned soldiers were going home. (5:125) Therefore, Lee's Northern invasion would not influence the outcome at Vicksburg and, in the summer of 1863, Richmond was not in danger from the Army of the Potomac.

A second look at the external factors influencing Lee's decision to adopt an offensive strategy is also necessary.

Internationally, few informed Confederates retained much hope of foreign recognition. The popular response of the European middle classes to the Emancipation Proclamation was the primary reason the sympathetic ruling class would not offer formal recognition of the Confederacy. (34:5) Encouragement from Napoleon III, the ruler of France, and news that Lee had crossed the Potomac prompted a motion for recognition of the Confederacy in the British House of Commons. But lack of support caused the motion to be withdrawn even before the news of Lee's defeat was known. (36:208) The action of the British Parliament prompted Davis to recall his representative from England because, "Her Majesty's Government was determined to persist indefinitely in a course of policy which under professions of neutrality had become subservient to the designs of our enemy." (36:240)

Domestically, Lee also miscalculated possible support from the Northern peace movement. The South overrated the influence of the Copperhead or anti-war party and hoped that a Confederate invasion would be followed by outbreaks in the principal Northern cities, which would paralyze every effort to reinforce Federal forces in the field. (3:77) At the very least the South knew there was much war weariness in the North. Lee believed his invasion should be timed with a peace initiative. He wanted to let the people of the North believe the Union could be restored through negotiation. He felt if they stopped fighting to negotiate, the North would be reluctant to start fighting again when negotiations broke down. Lee's thoughts were:

. . . ingenuous, particularly in its assumption of contrast between the peoples of the North and the South that the latter would be willing to resume fighting if negotiations produced no better terms than a restoration of the Union, whereas the former would be willing to concede the Confederacy's independence rather than have the war begin again. (27:442)

Too many lives and too much treasure had been spent for the North to settle for anything less than restoration. General Beauregard believed that threatening Washington, DC would arouse the North to renewed efforts to protect their capitol and end the war. (27:432) Finally, Lee failed to calculate the damage to the Northern peace movement that would be caused by the failure of his offensive campaign in the North. After Gettysburg, doubters of the war effort were discredited. Republicans who had been utterly discouraged a few weeks before were now convinced the backbone of the rebellion had been broken. The teeth of the Northern peace movement had been pulled by the Confederate army retreating from Gettysburg. (31:148)

Lee should have taken a second look at the impact a defeat of his offensive strategy would have on morale in the South. Henry Kyd Douglas, a past member of Jackson's staff then assigned to

Lee's army, provided insight regarding the impact on morale of Lee's invasion strategy:

I could not get over the feeling that an invasion of the enemy's territory, however tempting, was the wrong policy for us; but at the same time I believed that General Lee must know better than I did. We brought nothing from Pennsylvania which can be considered even partial compensation for what we left at Gettysburg, while we aroused the weary and discouraged North to renewed energy and animosity. (4:243)

Although Lee knew the impact on morale if he did nothing, he never looked at what the impact might be if he didn't do enough. Once Lee reached Pennsylvania, to withdraw without battle would look like a defeat. To give battle and withdraw would still look like a defeat by the Confederate public unless he was able to destroy the Army of the Potomac--a most unlikely eventuality. (12:264) The headlines of the Charleston Mercury validated this assertion. Contrast the exultation of "A brilliant and crushing victory has been achieved" (27:641) which ran on 8 July with the headlines which ran on 30 July asserting, "It is impossible for an invasion to have been more foolish and disastrous." (28:168) Another sign of the impact of Gettysburg on Southern morale was the results of the fall 1863 elections to the Confederate Congress. Two-thirds of the freshmen selected were men who had opposed secession in 1861. (12:265) The impact on the morale of the Army of Northern Virginia was slight. Though weary and cut up, Lee's army retained confidence in itself and its commander. (20:535)

As ominous as the depression in the South was the exhilaration in the North. The Army of the Potomac had beaten the best the South would ever send against them and the soldiers would never forget that. (20:573) Just as important, the tense anxiety that had gripped the North at the end of June was eased. The North was confident that the Confederacy would, in time, be subdued. Not since the surrender of Fort Donelson, a year-and-a-half before, had there been such an occasion for celebration. Bonfires, bands, parades, and booming cannon articulated the relief and regenerated confidence. (31:148)

On 31 May 1863, Lee started North with 70,000 soldiers ready for battle. (3:78) By 3 July, the Northern invasion had failed and the South had suffered 20,451 casualties in three days of battle. (20:536) Of the 52 Confederate generals who crossed the Potomac, 17 became casualties. Eighteen colonels were killed or captured, many of them officers of high promise, slated for promotion. The Army of Northern Virginia suffered a loss in leadership from which it would never recover. (27:577) At Gettysburg the Confederacy made its bid for independence and failed because the South just wasn't strong enough. (15:104) If

Lee had analyzed the military situation and external factors from a more pragmatic viewpoint he might have concurred with the conclusions reached in this chapter. The military situation didn't warrant an offensive reaction, international recognition wasn't likely, aggressive action might place a blossoming peace movement at risk, and, as far as morale was concerned, the South had little to gain and a great deal to lose.

CONCLUSION

This paper reviewed the flow of Confederate strategy which supported the South's national objective of independence. Independence was a consistent national objective supported primarily by the military instrument of power at the grand strategy level. The evolution of Confederate military strategy from a pure defensive to an offensive-defensive mixture was the subject of much debate amongst Confederate leaders. The proponents of the offensive school of strategy won the opportunity to prove their case with the go-ahead for the Gettysburg campaign.

Lee was ruled by the logic of the offensive-defensive strategy which emphasized the offensive to the point that it aimed at the destruction of the enemy army. (37:109) Lee's mastery of the offensive-defensive strategy was proven over and over but at a cost. The brilliant Confederate victory at Second Manassas garnered 19 percent losses compared with 13 percent for the Union. (10:657) In the Seven Days Battle, the Union army had not been destroyed and the Confederate advantage was mainly moral and psychological. (37:109)

Lee based his decision for the invasion of the North on an incomplete analysis of the external factors influencing his strategy development. If he had considered the implications resulting from a defeat of his offensive strategy he might have concluded several things. First, international recognition of the South's independence was unlikely due to the popularity of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation in Europe, and a Southern military defeat would only reinforce Europe's neutrality. Domestically, a failure in battle on Northern soil would rejuvenate the morale of the Union and undercut the growing peace movement in the North. Finally, the impact of defeat on Southern morale would be catastrophic since it was founded on the military prowess of their armies and generals. The defeat at Gettysburg stabbed at the heart of Southern morale; a wound from which the South would never recover. Robert E. Lee was a great general and had he considered these impacts, he would have devised a much better strategy. The 20,000 Confederate casualties suffered at Gettysburg could have been used to better purpose in the summer of 1863.

This paper presented the Confederate situation from many different aspects. The Strategy Process Model is a valuable tool for tailoring strategy to support national objectives. The key to accurate strategy development is in the complete analysis of the influences and constraints caused by external factors. These factors are the "tea leaves" which must be read and correctly interpreted in order to devise the proper strategy.

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