Palestine: 1918 -- A Missing Link in the Evolution of the Operational Art
Abstract
This study analyzes the Palestine Campaign of 1918, fought between the British led Egyptian Expenditionary Force (EEF) and the German-Turkish Army Group, Yilderim. The campaign serves as an historical illustration of the theory of operational planning and the development of operational maneuver--two aspects of warfare commonly considered missing in the First World War. The monograph is structured around a systematic examination of the decisions and choices combatants made to balance ends, means, and risks . Inherent in the discussion of ways, is an analysis of how the EEF made the transition from static trench warfare to operational maneuver. Finally, this paper presents conclusion about where this campaign fits in the history of the evolution of the military art and implications as to its relevance to future operational level planners and commanders. This study concludes that this campaign is an important missing link in the history the evolution of the operational art. The operational planning, the setting of conditions for the tactical battles, and the integration of available technology with the synchronization of diverse forces and operations are impressive and forecast subsequent developments in warfare. Finally, this monograph assets that the phased used of air assets, the use of irregular forces and the creation of conditions for operational maneuver in this campaign provided important implications for future operational artists.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 15, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA216234
Entities
People
- Gary J. Tocchet
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College