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ASSESSMENT OF THE INFLUENCE THAILAND
AND THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST
ASIAN NATIONS HAVE ON THE SETTLEMENT
OF THE KAMPUCHEAN CONFLICT

THESIS

Nicholas C. Emmack
Captain, USAF

AFIT/GCM/LSM/89S-4

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

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THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems
and Logistics of the Air Force Institute of Technology

Air University

In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Logistics Management

Nicholas C. Emmack, B.S.B.A.

Captain, USAF

SEPTEMBER 1989

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Abstract

The purpose of this research effort was to explore the influence Thailand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have on the settlement of the Kampuchean Conflict. Because Thailand is one of the original members of ASEAN and potentially faces the most direct threat from the conflict, Thailand's relationships with its neighbors and with ASEAN were examined. Although some background information is included, the major emphasis of this research is placed on events occurring after the invasion of Kampuchea in 1978 by Soviet-backed Vietnam.

Political, economic, and strategic events provide a background in which the relationships of the major players in the Southeast Asian region are studied. Towards this end, a brief history of the relationship between Thailand and the United States is discussed to show how the foreign policy interests of the United States coincide with those of Thailand. Along the same lines, the Soviets' relationship with Vietnam and Kampuchea was explored as well as the influence exerted by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the region.

The role Thailand and ASEAN play in the settlement is examined to determine how each interacts with the other as the conflict progresses. Previously proposed solutions and the current prospects for a settlement to the Kampuchean problem are then examined and evaluated to determine the

positive and negative aspects to them. Also, a look at the political and military side of ASEAN is offered to determine if ASEAN has changed its nature and purpose in the face of the Kampuchean conflict. Finally, information is provided on the impact a settlement would have on Thailand, Vietnam, and the other nations of the Southeast Asian region.

ASSESSMENT OF THE INFLUENCE THAILAND AND THE
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I. Introduction

Overview

The history of the nations of Southeast Asia has been one filled with many changes in each nation's political, military, and economic fortunes. In the last twenty-five years, these changes have been more dramatic with the direct and indirect involvement of the United States, China, and the Soviet Union in the affairs of these nations. United States' support of South Vietnam and the Soviet Union's support of North Vietnam during the late 1960s set the stage for continuing dramatic and dynamic changes in the region. The fall of South Vietnam to North Vietnam in the mid-1970s represented another very important strategic change impacting the region. Finally, the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in the late 1970s raised a few questions about possible confrontations between Soviet and U.S. client states in the region during the 1980s. With the United States' support of Thailand and its allies, it seems the superpowers, through their respective proxies, will continue to jockey for influence in the region well into the twenty-first century.

Decision makers in Thailand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in response to the Soviet-Vietnamese-Kampuchean threat, should examine how their political, military, strategic, and economic relationships impact the balance of power in the region. This examination should result in a determination of whether Thailand and ASEAN are effectively and efficiently working together to bring about a solution to the Kampuchean conflict. If either party determines that there are major problems and/or conflicts in the relationship that would hinder progress towards finding a solution to the conflict, then a basis for change can be established to help Thailand and ASEAN more effectively deal with the conflict.

General Issue

After the United States ended its involvement with the Vietnam conflict in April, 1975, the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia had reason to believe that peace would finally come to their region of the world. Indeed, these nations, principally through their regional grouping called the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), made several efforts to establish friendly relations with the Indochinese nations of Vietnam, Laos, and Democratic Kampuchea. Nevertheless, the dark clouds started to appear on the horizon just a few months after the U.S. left Vietnam. Within these few months, the North Vietnamese quickly invaded and established control over South Vietnam with massive

Soviet backing. The newly created nation was called the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The new and unified Vietnam would become much stronger and more of a threat than the old divided Vietnam after signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviets in November 1978. In return for military and economic aid, the Soviets received the right to use several military facilities and bases on Vietnamese soil. With the use of these military bases and facilities, especially the base at Cam Ranh Bay, the Soviets had the capability of projecting massive amounts of military power into the Southeast Asian region (36:52). For the first time, the Soviets could directly influence events in the region. Also, the PRC and the other nations of Southeast Asia would take note at Vietnam's increased strength because of increased influence by the Soviets.

Unfortunately, the Soviets and the Vietnamese were not content to stop at Vietnam's borders. Because the PRC was able to influence events in Southeast Asia through its support of Kampuchea, the Soviets and the Vietnamese perceived the PRC and Kampuchea to be a threat to them in the region. Thus, Vietnam moved to intimidate Kampuchea (24:749). From 1975 to 1978, the relations between Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea were strained because of border clashes and open warfare between the two nations. Ultimately, through a full scale invasion on Christmas Day 1978, Vietnam installed a new government in Kampuchea lead by Heng Samrin, the former head of the Democratic Kampuchea govern-

ment. With this new "puppet" regime installed, Vietnam now controlled Kampuchea (7:14). This caused great concern within ASEAN because the Vietnamese now posed a threat to ASEAN. More importantly, one of the original members of ASEAN, Thailand, sees Vietnam and Kampuchea as a direct threat because Thailand shares a common border with Kampuchea (18:125). To this day, Vietnam occupies Kampuchea.

Specific Issue

This thesis explores efforts by Thailand and ASEAN to influence the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations provided an ideal mechanism for Thailand and other non-communist countries in the Southeast Asian region to influence the outcome of the Kampuchean conflict (25:3). The members of ASEAN, cognizant of the threat to the security of all of their nations, would take steps as a unified group to reduce Soviet and Vietnamese influence in the region. This study will look at the efforts taken by ASEAN and Thailand to influence the outcome of the conflict. Also, a brief background is provided to show who the major players are and how they related to one another. Finally, answers will be proposed to several investigative questions.

Investigative Questions

The following research or investigative questions were developed to focus the research on the issues discussed previously. The questions are:

1. What role do Thailand and ASEAN play in the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict?

2. What are the proposed solutions and current prospects for a settlement to the Kampuchean conflict?

3. Has the Kampuchean conflict pushed ASEAN towards becoming a military alliance?

4. What impact will the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict have on Thailand, Vietnam, and the other nations of the Southeast Asian region?

Scope and Limitations

Other than the information contained in the background section (Chapter II) on the major players in the Kampuchean conflict, the main thrust of this study will be placed on the time period after Vietnam established a new government in Kampuchea on 7 January 1979. This study focuses on the political, military, and strategic factors as they relate to the role Thailand and ASEAN play in influencing the outcome of the conflict. In addition, many outside influences and pressures have changed the focus of ASEAN over the years (25:3). These factors are explored. As far as focus on the members of ASEAN, the main thrust is on Thailand which faces the most direct threat from the Kampuchean conflict. The activities of the remaining members of ASEAN will be discussed only in the context of finding a solution to the conflict. Also, this study will not provide information on the early history of Thailand. Only informa-

tion of an unclassified nature was collected to avoid any potential security violations and permit wider dissemination of the study.

Methodology

In order to answer the investigative questions in this study, information was collected from a variety of sources. Historical data pertaining to ASEAN and the background of the conflict was collected from the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) and the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) libraries. Additional information was obtained from documents supplied by the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) as well as through the inter-library loan service.

To solve the problem of obtaining current information on the answers to the investigative questions, extensive interviews were be conducted with experts from various organizations. Experts from the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), DISAM, HQ USAF, AFLC/ILC (International Logistics Center), the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) in Thailand, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Foreign Service Institute were interviewed. These interviews were conducted by telephone or in person on an unstructured basis. The respondents were selected on the basis of their area of expertise as it relates to the subject matter of this thesis. Unstructured interviews were chosen as a means to collect data because they afford the

respondent the maximum opportunity to provide in-depth and timely information on the subject. Questions were developed after all appropriate literature was collected and studied by the interviewer. By conducting interviews with these experts, as well as some follow-up interviews, the most up-to-date information was obtained for this study.

Plan of Presentation

The purpose of this thesis is to provide the reader with information on the influence ASEAN and Thailand have on the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict. Towards this end, chapters II, III, IV, and V are presented as follows.

Chapter II, "Background on the Kampuchean Conflict", traces the history of the conflict from its beginning through July 1989. Also, the relationships of the major players in the conflict are explored.

Chapter III, "Literature Review", reviews the information obtained from the literature search as it pertains to each investigative question.

Chapter IV, "Findings and Discussion", reviews the information obtained from the interviews as it pertains to the investigative questions. A discussion of relevant topics by the experts is included to help provide a clearer

Chapter V, "Conclusions and Recommendations", draws conclusions based on the answers to the investigative questions and recommends areas for further study.

II. Background on the Kampuchean Conflict

The main purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with information on how the Kampuchean conflict started. Toward this end, this chapter looks at the major players involved and discusses their roles in the conflict. In addition, this chapter will draw a picture for the reader of how everyone on the Southeast Asian continent is, in some way or the other, impacted by the Kampuchean conflict.

The first subject to be discussed is the historical and current relationship between the U.S. and Thailand. This will show how the U.S. is indirectly involved in the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict. Next, the nature and purpose of ASEAN is outlined. After that, Thailand's relationship with Burma, Laos, and China is delineated to show how Thailand interacts with its other neighbors. Finally, as for the players directly involved in the conflict, the Soviet and Vietnamese attempted domination of Kampuchea is discussed as well as the PRC's role in this conflict.

The Historical Relationship Between the U.S. and Thailand

The U.S. has a long history of friendly relations with Thailand. At the end of World War II, the United States was the only nation on friendly terms with Thailand. Other countries, such as the allied nations, refused to deal with Thailand because it was allied with Japan during the war. The U.S. did not want to see Thailand "fall into the wrong hands", so the U.S. guaranteed the sovereignty of Thailand.

This was to be the beginning of a long and friendly relationship with the people of Thailand. The relationship continued to strengthen when, in 1950, Thailand sent troops, ships, an air transport squadron, and 40,000 tons of rice to help the United Nations in the Korean "police action". The government of Thailand was rewarded for this effort with the signing of the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement in September of 1950. This agreement, between the U.S. and Thailand, provided technical assistance and financial aid to help the economy of Thailand (41:5).

Prior to this time, no military assistance agreements had been signed with Thailand. This changed in late 1950 when the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed, and the first pieces of U.S. military equipment arrived in January 1951. Nevertheless, this agreement was not a military alliance. Because there was still no formal military alliance and the environment was rapidly changing in Asia, Thailand and the U.S., as well as several other nations, signed a treaty called the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. This treaty established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The SEATO treaty had two major points with respect to the national security of the members who signed it: 1) each member agreed they would act together to meet a common danger; and 2) each member agreed to consult immediately on the measures to be taken for the common defense of the treaty members. At last, Thailand had secured an alliance with the U.S. which brought a long-

term commitment to the Southeast Asia mainland by the U.S. Other benefits of the alliance included a large increase in U.S. economic and military aid (41:8).

In 1962, the U.S. and Thailand signed a bilateral agreement called the Thanat-Khoman agreement. This agreement committed the U.S. to come to the assistance of Thailand if there was any aggression against the state. This agreement was significant because it upgraded the commitment of the U.S. to defend Thailand beyond the requirements in SEATO. Some members of Congress were disturbed by this agreement because they viewed it as requiring the U.S. to fight any war in which Thailand might enter. According to SEATO, the U.S. only had to consult with the other members of SEATO in the event of conflict between Thailand and some other country. Clearly, with the signing of this treaty, the U.S. relationship with Thailand was becoming closer and closer (5:37).

Over the next several years, from 1962 through 1975, many small agreements were negotiated between the U.S. and Thailand. The U.S. established the Military Assistance Command for Thailand (MACTHAI) in 1962. In 1963, the Special Logistics Action Thailand (SLAT) agreement was signed with Thailand. This agreement upgraded the military capabilities of Thailand to respond to possible SEATO operations in the future. In 1964, the two countries agreed to upgrade the logistical capabilities of Thailand. From 1964 until

the end of the Vietnam conflict, Thailand agreed to allow the U.S. to deploy U.S. forces in Thailand for the war in Vietnam. This last agreement was not meant to involve Thailand in the war, only to provide a staging area for U.S. troops entering the conflict (41:12).

After the U.S. withdrew from the conflict in Vietnam in 1975, the relationship among the U.S., Thailand, and the entire Asian region changed significantly. Because of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the North Vietnamese, backed by the Soviet Union, were free to pursue their attack on South Vietnam. When South Vietnam finally fell to the North Vietnamese, many world leaders feared that the other countries of Southeast Asia, mainly Kampuchea and Laos, would also fall. This caused the U.S. to renew its resolve to protect Thailand from foreign intervention. The Nixon Doctrine, which was signed in 1969 and stated the U.S. would continue to abide by its treaty commitments, provided a basis for this renewed resolve. Although Thailand was pressing for the removal of U.S. troops from their soil after the Vietnam conflict, Thailand would nevertheless need to be supported in order to maintain the balance of power in the region. This support came in the form of increased grants under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and increased Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits. While grants under MAP did not require repayment, credit under the FMS program would have to be repaid at some time in the future. Of course, because of the excellent past relations

between Thailand and the U.S., the U.S. also felt a moral obligation to protect its friend. The people of Thailand and the U.S. were determined to have a long-term mutually beneficial relationship (41:64-66).

Currently, and for the last ten years, the relationship between the U.S. and Thailand has been much the same as after Vietnam. Thailand has remained a good friend and ally of the U.S., and the U.S. has provided a large amount of military and economic assistance.

Militarily, the current objectives of the U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) program include the following: 1) Enhance capabilities for defense against major Vietnamese infantry, artillery, and armor incursions; 2) Enhance tactical mobility for ground forces and sustainability in combat for all forces, and expand naval capabilities beyond coastal patrol; 3) Create an air defense system composed of radar integrated with a command, control and communications system that is substantially interoperable with U.S. systems; and 4) Sustain the ability of the Thailand government to carry out generous policies towards Indochinese refugees (9:272).

In the 1990 Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, the military aid requested was based on several policy considerations. These considerations can be summarized in four areas: 1) Help Thailand cope with communist insurgency; 2) Help Thailand become a stabilizing

influence in Southeast Asia; 3) Help Thailand combat narcotics trafficking; and 4) Help Thailand sustain its asylum policies for Indochinese refugees (9:271-272).

Although the U.S. has not been directly involved in trying to settle the Kampuchean conflict, it is, and has been for years, directly involved in supporting Thailand with military and economic aid. Because Thailand is directly threatened from the conflict, U.S. policy is to help Thailand combat any threat to its security. Arms sales to Thailand is the method the U.S. uses to help combat the threat posed by the Kampuchean conflict. As will be discussed next, Thailand is also a member of a larger organization called ASEAN which has some influence in the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict. An understanding of what ASEAN is is an important basis for understanding any possible solution to the conflict.

The Nature and Purpose of ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was founded 8 August 1967, with the original members consisting of Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Brunei Darussalam joined as the sixth member in January of 1984. The purpose of ASEAN is to strengthen regional cohesion through economic, cultural, and social cooperation of its members. Although ASEAN developed slowly at first because of fragile political relationships among its mem-

bers, subsequent regional events such as the elimination of SEATO and the Kampuchean conflict have served to speed-up the development of the organization (45:3)

A military role for ASEAN was specifically excluded when the original charter was established because of the SEATO. Nevertheless, it was hoped that ASEAN would contribute to regional security as its members worked together to become economically successful. In his article, ASEAN and Regional Security, Noordin Sopiee cites seven reasons why ASEAN has contributed to regional security:

- (1) ASEAN has played a critical role in banishing that psychological sense of isolation which can often lead to panic action.
- (2) ASEAN has succeeded in preventing a sense of powerlessness on the part of the member states.
- (3) ASEAN has provided the community with a sturdy policy-making process.
- (4) ASEAN has created a sense of community.
- (5) ASEAN has created a structure of trust, confidence and goodwill between member states.
- (6) ASEAN has provided a conflict resolution mechanism.
- (7) ASEAN has layed down the rules of the peace game within the sub-region. (32:223-229)

Obviously, ASEAN provides member-nations with a sense of purpose and structure for conducting their affairs. When SEATO was phased out in 1977, because the British and the French were unwilling to support U.S. actions in the region, the importance of ASEAN increased as its members perceived Vietnam as a growing threat.

Of course, Thailand's relationship with ASEAN has been one of mutual cooperation and support for the efforts ASEAN has put forth in finding a solution to the Kampuchean conflict and in providing some sense of security for the region (4:1). Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapter's III and IV, Thailand sees itself in the leadership role when it comes to ASEAN's efforts to influence the settlement of the conflict. Thailand also has some unique relationships with its neighbors.

Thailand's Relationship with Burma, Laos, and China

Burma. While Kampuchea lies to the east of Thailand, Burma lies to the north. Over the last two decades, Burma has had very little to do with Thailand. Burma refused to join ASEAN when it was formed in 1967 and has remained neutral in all regional conflicts. When the Chinese and Soviets have attempted to invade Burma in the past, Burma has managed to persuade them to leave. Recently, however, Burma has changed its dealings with Thailand.

When Saw Maung and his armed forces took over the government in September 1988, he pushed many dissident students into sanctuaries in Thailand. In response to this, many countries such as the U.S. withdrew foreign aid to Burma. Of course, this hurt Burma very badly because it relied on this aid to keep the country working. As a way to earn some money, Burma started to make some deals with Thailand. Thailand used to grow and produce a lot of timber

for its own use. However, it is now out of timber. Therefore, Burma agreed to sell timber to Thailand to help Thailand with its needs and provide cash to Burma. The other part of this deal was that Thailand agreed to push the dissident students back into Burma so Burma could arrest them (4:1). Timber also plays a role in Thailand's relationship with Laos.

Laos. Laos has been an independent country since 1948. Nevertheless, Laos and Thailand have had a few border disputes recently, and these disputes are about timber. Lao-tian army generals have been receiving payoffs for allowing loggers from Thailand to come into Laos and retrieve timber for Thailand's use. Thailand's army decided that these loggers from Thailand should be paying them bribes for timber owned by Laos. So, Thailand's army started to fight the Laotian army over the land being logged. The problem was that Laos owned this land by a 1907 treaty with France. The result was that the Laotian army kicked Thailand's army out of Laos (4:1).

Another important, but not entirely clear, Southeast Asian relationship is known as the golden triangle drug trade. The golden triangle is composed of the countries of Thailand, Laos, and Burma which are thought to supply vast quantities of opium to Asia and the United States. Although the relative dollar value of this drug trade is unknown, many individuals such as Professor Eugene Bruns of the Foreign Service Institute believe that Laos has used the

drug trade to supplement its foreign exchange earnings. Professor Bruns also believes that the army of Thailand has used money derived from the sale of opium to finance its growth, especially during the time before the U.S. provided Thailand with a large amount of military assistance (4:1). Of course, because of the dangerous nature of the drug trade, actual information on the drug trade is difficult to obtain.

China. During the time the U.S. was involved with Vietnam, Thailand had a close relationship with the U.S. and perceived the PRC as a threat. This was due to the fact that, while the U.S. was using Thailand as a staging area for its war with Vietnam, the PRC was supporting an insurgency in northern Thailand (27:1). More recently, especially after the U.S. left Vietnam, Thailand's relationship with the PRC has changed to one of friendship.

In 1987, Thailand purchased several T-69 tanks and armored personnel carriers from the PRC. The interesting part of this purchase was that Thailand only paid prices that were about five percent of the total value of the equipment. In addition, repayment did not have to start until after a 10-year grace period (38:715). In 1988, Thailand agreed to purchase several F-7 fighters from the PRC. No terms of the deal or numbers of aircraft were

announced. Clearly, Thailand wants to continue improving its relationship with the PRC as well as develop other sources of weapons supply (22:1).

The Kampuchean Conflict and the Players Involved

Prior to the invasion of Kampuchea by the Soviet-backed Vietnamese, which was the spark that caused the conflict, Kampuchea had received most of its support from the PRC. Specifically, from 1975 to the invasion on Christmas 1978, Kampuchea was ruled by the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge was led by a dreaded leader called Pol Pot and was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Kampuchean residents. Many died of exhaustion and starvation, and many more were tortured to death in detention centers (15:17).

After of Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge were driven back to the Thai-Kampuchean border. A new government called the "People's Revolutionary Council" was installed by the Vietnamese on 7 January 1979 to govern Kampuchea. The new president was Heng Samrin, who was an official of the previous Democratic Kampuchean government. At first, many people in Kampuchea welcomed the invasion because of the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that the Vietnamese had invaded for reasons other than human rights violations by the Khmer Rouge. With 200,000 troops in Kampuchea and 40,000 troops in Laos, many Asian leaders believed that Vietnam wanted to dominate Laos and

Kampuchea, thus unifying Indochina (7:14). It is interesting to note that there is a historical basis for Vietnam's desire to dominate Indochina. Nearly forty years ago, General Vo Nguyen Giap, Vietnam's leading military theorist, stated that Indochina should be viewed as a single theatre of operations. He also stated that Vietnam could not stand to have Kampuchea or Laos dominated by imperialism. Nevertheless, only the future will determine if Indochina is unified (21:2).

Although the Vietnamese invasion force was very strong and drove the opposition to various parts on the Thai-Kampuchean border, many of the Kampuchean people banded together to resist Vietnam. The official name of the opposition to the Vietnamese government is the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), and it consists of three factions. The first faction is called the Khmer People's National Liberation Front and is led by Son Sann. The next faction is led by Prince Sihanouk and is called the United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia. The final faction is the Khmer Rouge and is led by the Pol Pot/ Khieu Samphan group. This last group is the same group responsible for the deaths of thousands of people just previous to the Vietnamese invasion (30:191).

Although Pol Pot has not been seen in public since 1979, he is still believed to be the de facto chief of the Khmer Rouge. In recent years there have been rumors that he is dying, but these rumors have never been proven to be

true. Nevertheless, Khieu Samphan, the head of state, is still believed to take his orders from Pol Pot to this day. Some individuals believe the reason Pol Pot remains in hiding, aside from possible health problems, is because he was responsible for the deaths of so many Kampuchean residents in the mid 1970s. In addition, these same individuals are concerned about Pol Pot's possible role in any settlement of the conflict. The PRC and ASEAN have resisted bringing Pol Pot to trial for past murderous acts because they view the Khmer Rouge as the main weapon against Vietnam. On the other hand, ASEAN and Vietnam are not sure they want the Khmer Rouge to take over Kampuchea after a settlement because of the possibility that Pol Pot may repeat past acts of indiscretion. The Pol Pot factor will definitely impact a settlement in the Kampuchean conflict (15:18).

Standing behind the CGDK are the PRC and Thailand. The PRC's support of the CGDK is based on their support of the Khmer Rouge. The PRC has a long history of adverse relations with the Soviets and the Vietnamese. When the Vietnamese invaded Kampuchea, the PRC saw this as a threat and stepped up its aid to the Khmer Rouge and Thailand. Thailand became involved when thousands of Kampuchean civilians fled to Thailand to escape the Vietnamese invasion. Although the flow of civilians from Kampuchea impacted Thailand, the situation became serious when the Vietnamese forces started to violate Thailand's territorial integrity.

This was important to Thailand, and especially the PRC, because Thailand had been supporting the Khmer Rouge by allowing them to set up training and resupply camps on Thai soil. The PRC did not want to lose these camps, so they increased support to Thailand. On at least ten separate occasions Vietnamese forces conducted military operations on Thailand territory. Despite strong evidence, Vietnam refused to admit they violated Thailand's sovereignty. These territorial violations served to increase Thailand's, ASEAN's, and the PRC's support for the CGDK (7:19).

There are four main issues which underlie the Kampuchean conflict. These issues will have to be resolved in some way or another for any solution to be effective. The first issue deals with possible threats to Vietnam's security by the PRC. One of the main reasons Vietnam and the Soviets are so close is because Vietnam perceives the PRC to be a threat. With the PRC backing the Khmer Rouge and Vietnam backing the puppet government in Kampuchea, the threat is increased. The next issue is the threat to Thailand. Because Thailand is backed by the U.S., ASEAN, and the PRC, a threat to the security of Thailand necessarily becomes a concern to these three players. An interesting point here is the cooperation of a non-communist nation (Thailand) with a communist nation (the PRC). The third issue is the PRC's concern for its own security. With the Soviets backing the Vietnamese, the PRC is vulnerable on several fronts. To the north of the PRC is the U.S.S.R. and

to the south is Vietnam and Laos. The PRC is concerned about possible encirclement of its land area by the Soviets and its proxies. Therefore, the PRC wants Vietnam completely out of Kampuchea as a settlement to the conflict. This would reduce Vietnamese pressure on the PRC's southern borders. Finally, the last issue is the competing strategic interests of the U.S. and the Soviets. Because the U.S. does not want to see Kampuchea and possibly Thailand threatened by Vietnam and the Soviets do not want Vietnam threatened by the PRC, the two superpowers have conflict interests in the region. Any solution must address these issues to be effective (18:122). These issues will be discussed in more detail in following chapters.

The next chapter is a Literature Review which covers published information concerning the investigative questions. Information will be provided to help answer the questions and provide insight into a possible settlement of the Kampuchean conflict.

III. Literature Review

Literature concerning the Kampuchean conflict can be found in numerous academic and professional journals as well as magazines focusing on regional affairs. For instance, Asiaweek and Far Eastern Economic Review are two magazines which concentrate on the Asian region of the world and are published weekly. These two magazines provided a great deal of up-to-date information on the current status of settlement discussions on the Kampuchean conflict as well as information on the impact a settlement would have on the nations of the Southeast Asian region. As for professional journals and studies, Asian Survey provided several articles concerning ASEAN's role in the Kampuchean conflict. Other good sources of professional studies were: (1) a study from the Centre for Security and Conflict Studies; (2) a book entitled Regional Security in the Third World; and (3) a RAND paper on ASEAN. This chapter will comprehensively review this material as it relates to the four investigative questions.

Investigative Question 1

What role do Thailand and ASEAN play in the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict?

The Role of Thailand. According to Soon (30), Thailand's role in the Kampuchean conflict was viewed as the vanguard for ASEAN's position on the problem because of the perceived threat to Thailand's security. When the conflict

started in December 1978, all ASEAN governments supported Thailand's position that Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea posed a security problem to Thailand. Nevertheless, each ASEAN government secretly held a different idea on how to approach the problem. Initially, although ASEAN's "official" position was that Vietnam should completely withdraw from Kampuchea, Thailand would have settled for a partial withdrawal of Vietnamese troops if Thailand's security interests were protected. Thailand believed that the Vietnamese should withdraw its troops to the east bank of the Mekong River and establish a coalition government in Phnom Pehn to protect Thailand's security. This position by Thailand only lasted for a short period of time (30:30).

With the election of General Prem Tinsulanon as Prime Minister of Thailand in April 1980, and incursions into Thailand by the Vietnamese in June 1980, Thailand changed its position towards the conflict. General Prem Tinsulanon's government policy was strongly anti-Vietnamese. Thailand now wanted Vietnam to completely withdraw its troops from Kampuchea. Thus, Thailand's policy moved in line with ASEAN's "official" policy (30:31).

Thailand's main role in the Kampuchean conflict is viewed somewhat similarly by another author. Chang Pao-Min in his Asian Survey article (24) states the following:

If Thailand should decide to strike a bargain with Vietnam and accept a de facto Vietnamese domination of all of Indochina, then the resistance movement would immediately lose its invaluable sanctuaries and routes of logistic support. In fact, Thailand

has played the pivotal role in the entire conflict vis-a-vis Vietnam. If Thailand as the frontline state decided to quit the war, the entire anti-Vietnamese united front would collapse immediately, and no other state would be in any position to sustain the resistance forces even if it chose to do so. A political solution in favor of Vietnam would therefore be imposed upon all the resistance groups whether they liked it or not, and the movement would disintegrate. Even if the Khmer Rouge refused to go along, it would have severe difficulties in sustaining itself militarily. (24:760)

Although Thailand's role and position concerning the conflict remained basically the same from 1980 to 1987, a significant change occurred in 1988. Previously, Thailand was content to condemn the Vietnamese for the invasion and follow the party line requiring Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea before any settlement could be reached. With the election of Chatichai Choonhavan to be Prime Minister in August 1988, Thailand's role and position on the settlement of the conflict would change significantly. As Sricharatchanya (33) relates, Prime Minister Chatichai sought to increase Thailand's influence in the region by actively seeking a settlement to the Kampuchean conflict, something which had not been done by Thailand before. Chatichai's dream is to turn Indochina from a battleground to a marketplace. He wants to boost trade with Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam after a settlement of the Kampuchean conflict. One way he has pursued this dream is by establishing rapprochement with many Asian communist leaders. However, this is not new to Chatichai. He was responsible for Thailand's establishment of relations with China in 1975, a great asset in light of

the current conflict in Kampuchea. Since becoming Prime Minister, he has visited the ASEAN nations, China, Laos, India, and Japan. Nevertheless, this new found activity on the part of Thailand has caused problems with the rest of the anti-Vietnamese alliance, especially ASEAN. This will be discussed after ASEAN's role in the conflict is discussed (33:24).

ASEAN'S Role in the Conflict. ASEAN, as an organization of six Southeast Asian nations, had a much broader role in the conflict than does Thailand. Because all six nations supported Thailand's position and could benefit economically from a settlement of the conflict, ASEAN provided an ideal front against the Vietnamese threat to Kampuchea. Lau Teik Soon (30), in his 1982 Asian Survey article, states that ASEAN developed three main objectives concerning the problem in the initial stages of the conflict. These objectives were: 1) maintain and, where possible, improve the support given to the government of Democratic Kampuchea at the United Nations (UN); 2) convene an international conference on Kampuchea under United Nations control; and 3) promote the formation of a united front government among the anti-Vietnamese Kampuchean forces.

With respect to the first objective, ASEAN successfully mobilized the support of the United Nations for the original government of Democratic Kampuchea as the legitimate government. Therefore, the original government could retain its

seat in the United Nations. Of course, this was a major blow to the Heng Samrin government installed by the Vietnamese. The vote was held in October of 1980 in the 35th United Nations General Assembly. A total vote of 74 for the government of Democratic Kampuchea, 35 against, and 32 abstaining was collected. This vote compared favorably to the 1979 United Nations vote of 71 for, 35 against, and 34 abstaining. One of the main reasons given for the UN support of the government of Democratic Kampuchea was that recognizing the Heng Samrin government would be an admission that a militarily powerful government had the right to overthrow a weaker neighboring government. Therefore, the UN would be legitimatizing an international hostile act.

ASEAN worked towards the second objective by sponsoring an October, 1980 resolution in the UN calling for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and for convening an international conference in 1981 to discuss a settlement of the conflict. For this resolution, the vote was 97 for, 23 against, and 23 abstaining. Obviously, the UN was very much behind ASEAN in wanting to find a solution to the Kampuchean conflict. As part of the solution, ASEAN wanted the following:

- (1) Total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops within a specified time and with UN verification.
- (2) UN measures during the withdrawal period to prevent Kampuchean armed elements from seizing power.
- (3) UN guarantees against the interference by external powers.

- (4) UN-supervised free elections.
- (5) Agreement to prohibit the introduction of foreign forces into Kampuchea.
- (6) Respect for Kampuchea's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.
- (7) Assurances that Kampuchea will not be a threat to any of its neighbors. (30:30)

The final objective was to promote a united front government among the anti-Vietnamese Kampuchians. Recall that there are three distinct factions in the anti-Vietnamese movement: 1) the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot/Khieu Samphan; 2) the Khmer People's National Liberation Front under Son Sann; and 3) the United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia led by Prince Sihanouk. ASEAN's goal was to encourage these three factions to discuss among themselves ways in which they could effectively bring about a settlement to the Kampuchean conflict. However, ASEAN also recognized that it needed to acquire the support of China for these discussions because China was a major supporter of the Khmer Rouge. This was important because several nations within ASEAN did not want to see the Khmer Rouge become dominant in the anti-Vietnamese movement based on the Khmer Rouge's history of murderous acts against the people of Kampuchea. So, China needed to be persuaded to hold the Khmer Rouge in check while allowing the other resistance factions to increase their participation in the government of Democratic Kampuchea. As a result of these discussions, China began to consider

allowing the other anti-Vietnamese factions to increase their participation in the government. This also set the stage for possible changes within ASEAN and the PRC.

Just as Thailand's role had changed as the conflict progressed, so had ASEAN's. Leszek Buszynski (6) discusses how ASEAN changed in his 1987 article entitled ASEAN: A Changing Regional Role. According to Buszynski, one of ASEAN's main purposes was to present a united front against the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and support Thailand's view that all Vietnamese forces should be removed from Kampuchea. However, two of the members of ASEAN, Indonesia and Malaysia, privately held that it was not necessary for Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea to come to a settlement of the conflict. This tension started in March 1980 when Indonesia and Malaysia developed the so-called "Kuantan formula" to probe for ways a compromise with Vietnam could be reached. But it was not until 1985 that the division within ASEAN became clear. On April 27, 1985, Malaysia introduced a proposal calling for "proximity talks" between the three Khmer factions and Heng Samrin, the leader of the Vietnamese occupation forces. Thailand countered with a its own version for "proximity talks" calling for negotiations between Vietnam and the three Khmer factions, excluding Heng Samrin. As could be expected, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers supported the version put forth by Thailand. Clearly, ASEAN was losing its effectiveness as a united front against Vietnam (6:768).

With this division within ASEAN, ASEAN found that it could not develop any resolutions with any realistic hope of their implementation. Morale began to suffer because any possible solution to the conflict seemed to be years away. Nonetheless, ASEAN chose to change its role and strategy in the conflict. Instead of trying to act on its own by passing resolutions, ASEAN's new strategy entailed influencing external powers such as the U.S., the PRC, and the Soviets.

In the case of the U.S., ASEAN wanted the U.S. to normalize its relations with Vietnam, thereby lessening Vietnam's dependence on the Soviets. It was reasoned that if Vietnam was less dependent on the Soviets, Vietnam may be more willing to come to a settlement in the conflict. The second approach ASEAN wanted the U.S. to take was to have the U.S. raise the issue of Kampuchea with the Soviets during superpower negotiations. If the U.S. would link progress in superpower relations with a settlement in the Kampuchean conflict, then possibly the Soviets would be motivated to push Vietnam for a settlement. As could be expected, the U.S. was certainly willing to listen to ASEAN's ideas but was not willing to endanger superpower relations over the Kampuchean conflict.

Buszynski (6) goes on to say that ASEAN then approached the Soviets directly in the hopes of finding a solution. ASEAN wanted the Soviets to compel Vietnam to find a settlement to the conflict. ASEAN reasoned that the Soviets would

rather gain some influence within ASEAN than continue to support a very burdensome Vietnam. Although this approach certainly had a low probability of succeeding, ASEAN had nothing to lose. The Soviets's response to this effort by ASEAN was to the point. Soviet policy on the conflict was that the Kampuchean issue must be negotiated between ASEAN and Vietnam. The Soviet Union would not influence Vietnam on ASEAN's behalf.

Finally, after failing with the U.S. and the Soviets, ASEAN attempted to influence the PRC. ASEAN's objective with the PRC was to have them exercise more control over the Khmer Rouge, militarily the strongest faction of the anti-Vietnamese forces. In effect, ASEAN wanted the PRC to reduce its military aid to the Khmer Rouge. Less aid meant less strength for the Khmer Rouge. Recall that many South-east Asian nations did not want the Khmer Rouge to have a dominant position in any settlement of the conflict because of their past record of extreme violence. The PRC's response to ASEAN's moves was less than expected but nevertheless important.

On March 17, 1986, the PRC sponsored a meeting of the three factions of the anti-Vietnamese forces in Beijing. At this meeting, the three factions agreed on an eight-point proposal concerning a settlement of the conflict. The proposal included the following:

- (1) Negotiations with Vietnam for a withdrawal of forces from Kampuchea.

- (2) A ceasefire in Kampuchea.
- (3) UN supervision of the ceasefire.
- (4) A quadripartite government of all Khmer factions including Heng Samrin.
- (5) Free elections under UN supervision.
- (6) Establishment of a neutral and nonaligned Kampuchea to be governed by a democratic regime.
- (7) Foreign assistance for Kampuchea.
- (8) The negotiation of a nonaggression treaty with Vietnam. (6:773)

These eight points did not conclude the proposal however.

The leader of the Khmer Rouge, Khieu Samphan, added an addendum which stated that the Khmer Rouge would keep their weapons even if a political solution to the conflict was reached. Obviously, the PRC's control over the Khmer Rouge was less than was previously expected.

With ASEAN's inability to negotiate with Vietnam directly or bring the superpowers into the loop, the effectiveness of ASEAN's role in the Kampuchean conflict is called into question once again. Several ASEAN leaders believe their role should be one of maintaining diplomatic pressure on Vietnam to negotiate a settlement. The next Investigative question will provide the latest information on the changing nature of Thailand's and ASEAN's role in the Kampuchean conflict.

Investigative Question 2

What are the proposed solutions and current prospects for a settlement to the Kampuchean conflict?

The Proposed Solutions. The history of the solutions which have been proposed for ending the Kampuchean conflict is both long and varied. As the literature for Investigative Question 1 intimated, although ASEAN as a whole presented a united front against the Vietnamese occupation, individual members of ASEAN had their own ideas on how to solve the problem. The best example of this is the "Kuantan formula" developed by Indonesia and Malaysia in 1980. Of course, the Soviets, the PRC, and Vietnam also had different ideas on how to solve the conflict. Naturally, these ideas came from their concerns about protecting their interests in the region. Each round of negotiations between the various countries would bring forth new proposals and problems. With all of the varied interests in the region, developing a solution to meet the needs of each country would be difficult at best. The literature, unfortunately, does not provide a chronicle of the proposals made by all countries during the early negotiation sessions. Nevertheless, there are two authors that provide information on some of the earliest proposed solutions.

Lau Teik Soon (30), in his article ASEAN and The Cambodian Problem, mentions two rounds of proposed solutions to the problem. The first round of proposed solutions were made before the 34th UN General Assembly in 1979. During this round, ASEAN proposed a settlement of the conflict including Vietnam's withdrawal from Kampuchea, the right of

self-determination for the Kampuchean people, and UN supervised elections for the Kampuchean people. In response, Vietnam proposed convening a regional conference of Southeast Asian states to search for solutions to the conflict. This Vietnamese response was based on their Vientiane Declaration of July 1979 which said basically the same thing as their response. In part, because there had been tensions in the region before the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, Vietnam wanted to establish a regional conference to deal with these tensions. Naturally, ASEAN did not want to be part of a Vietnamese-led conference of Southeast Asian states.

In June 1980, Vietnam made another proposal. This time, Vietnam wanted to establish a demilitarized zone on both sides of the border between Thailand and Kampuchea. In Vietnam's view, this demilitarized zone would safeguard Thailand's security because no fighting would be allowed in the zone. Thailand opposed this proposal because it would be difficult to police the zone.

The next round of proposals arose from ASEAN's actions during the 35th United Nations General Assembly. Since Vietnam was not about to leave Kampuchea, ASEAN took its case to the UN once again. By a vote of 74 for, 35 against, and 32 abstaining, the UN recognized the government of Democratic Kampuchea as the legitimate government of Kampuchea over the new government installed by the Vietnamese. After this vote, ASEAN sponsored a resolution in the UN

calling for Vietnam's withdrawal from Kampuchea and for convening an international conference in 1981 to discuss a settlement of the conflict. This conference proposed by ASEAN would be international in scope in comparison to Vietnam's proposal for a regional conference. As could be expected, the resolution passed overwhelmingly with 97 out of 142 voting for the resolution and only 23 members voting against it. With these two votes, it became increasingly clear to Vietnam that the international community would continue to support ASEAN and the government of Democratic Kampuchea.

Vietnam presented a proposal of its own at the 35th UN General Assembly. In the proposal, Vietnam wanted a settlement of the conflict based on the Vientiane Declaration described above, the Kuantan Principle described earlier in investigative question 1, and a declaration made in November 1971 by ASEAN called the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration would establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. In effect, the Kuala Lumpur said the stability of the Southeast Asian region should be maintained through the internal development of each nation, and each nation should have a policy of non-alignment towards the superpowers. According to Soon (30), the essence of this Vietnamese proposal was that the PRC and the Soviets should not interfere in any settlement of the conflict.

As an addition to the proposal above, the Vietnamese later proposed that they would consider a partial withdrawal of their troops from Kampuchea if Thailand would stop supporting the Khmer Rouge and other anti-Vietnamese forces which use Thailand as a sanctuary. As far as ASEAN and the PRC were concerned, none of the proposals that Vietnam made during the 35th UN meeting was acceptable. ASEAN was not about to accept anything less than a complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, and Vietnam continued to insist that its forces were in Kampuchea at the request of the Heng Samrin regime. Thus, the conflict raged on with little hope of settlement.

At this point in the conflict, early 1981, the literature provides little information. It is not until 1986 that the literature again provides information on possible solutions for the Kampuchean conflict. In fact, Arthur Lim Joo-Jock (18), in his 1986 article entitled The Kampuchean Conflict and Regional Security: A Suggested Solution, says the following about the progress towards a solution to the conflict:

More than six years after Vietnam invaded Democratic Kampuchea in order, in her terms, to secure her borders which were alleged to have been threatened by the forces of the Pol Pot government, the Kampuchean problem remains as intractable as ever, and seems no nearer a solution than it did in January 1979. (18:119)

The problem seemed to be that past proposals tended to concentrate on the positions taken by ASEAN and Vietnam with little regard for the positions of the other significant

countries in the conflict such as the Soviets, the PRC, or the various factions of the anti-Vietnamese forces. Without considering these views, finding a solution could be difficult. Thus, any solution must consider all countries involved.

Joo-Jock (18) proposes a solution which takes into account all of the countries' positions in the conflict. His solution is called "The Expanding Central Corridor Concept." This solution makes an attempt to take into account what he considers to be the chief concerns of the regional countries. These concerns are:

- (1) Assuring Kampuchea's independence.
- (2) Assuring the security of Thailand's border with Kampuchea.
- (3) Assuring Vietnam's security in the areas bordering Kampuchea.
- (4) Assuring Vietnam of security on her northern borders and decreasing her fear of China.
- (5) Satisfying the PRC that Vietnam would not dominate Kampuchea or mainland Southeast Asia.
- (6) Meeting the Soviet need for bases and a role in Southeast Asia.
- (7) Assuring the U.S. that there is no diminution of her role in Southeast Asia and that none of her strategic interests in the region are compromised, or made worse than the existing position. (18:128-129)

By taking these concerns into account, his proposed solution should be more acceptable to the countries in the region. The proposal itself consists of the following steps:

- (1) Create a central zone under UN supervision around Phnom Penh with access to the sea via Kompong Som and with Vietnamese forces to the east and Kampuchean forces to the west.
- (2) The complete withdrawal of all opposing forces from this zone to be supervised by a UN peace-keeping force.
- (3) All propaganda barrages from all protagonists to cease, particularly those emanating from Beijing, Hanoi, and the various capitals of ASEAN.
- (4) The setting up of an interim or caretaker Kampuchean government, to be headed by Prince Sihanouk leading the coalition, to the exclusion of Pol Pot and his immediate circle, but not the Khmer Rouge as a political party.
- (5) A phased withdrawal from the western zone by the Kampuchean forces, with an accompanying gradual but steady expansion of the area controlled by the UN for the interim government.
- (6) The simultaneous phased withdrawal to the east by the Vietnamese.
- (7) A progressive expansion of the area controlled by the UN.
- (8) A temporary belt along the Thai border, to be supervised by the UN, for the purpose of providing an encampment of the Khmer forces.
- (9) A similar arrangement for the Vietnamese-controlled border zone to the east, with Vietnam allowed to station troops in the UN supervised belt in the border region.
- (10) The holding of UN supervised free elections when all, or nearly all, populated areas of the country, come under UN control.
- (11) The independent Kampuchea to receive aid channeled through the UN.

- (12) China to be persuaded not to attack Vietnam during this process.
- (13) All parties must agree that the question of Soviet bases in Vietnam is a matter strictly between Hanoi and Moscow, and Vietnam and the USSR must not oppose the presence of U.S. bases in Southeast Asia.
- (14) UN forces to remain for as long as requested by the Kampuchean government.
- (15) A guarantee, underwritten by ASEAN, Vietnam and China that the new Kampuchean government will be neutral, neutralist and equidistant from all contending parties.
- (16) In the closing stages of this exercise, China would sign a non-aggression pact with Vietnam in return for the Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea and the relinquishing of the Vietnamese concept of an Indochina federation. (18:129-130)

Obviously, after looking at the preceding proposed solution, it becomes apparent that any solution to the conflict will require a fair amount of creativity and sacrifice among the countries involved. Nevertheless, no potential solution will be successful unless each country involved brings a genuine desire to reach a settlement. In his concluding remarks, Joo-Jock states that it is highly questionable whether Vietnam has a genuine desire to find a settlement to the conflict. To him, it seemed that Vietnam had been equivocating in its past negotiation sessions with ASEAN just as it had done with the U.S. during negotiations concerning the Vietnam war. Thus, he felt Vietnam has no "real" intention of leaving Kampuchea. This, of course, would make finding a solution to the Kampuchean conflict very difficult (18:132).

The Current Prospects. Although in the past it seemed that finding a solution to the conflict would be difficult because of the entrenched positions of each country involved, this changed in June 1988. Michael Leifer (21) discusses this change and the current prospects for a settlement to the Kampuchean conflict in his May 1989 article entitled Cambodian Conflict-The Final Phase? Recall that one of the main obstacles to the resumption of relations between the PRC and the Soviets has been the Kampuchean conflict. The PRC supports the Khmer Rouge, and the Soviets support Vietnam which invaded Kampuchea. Nevertheless, with President Reagan's encouragement in June 1988, Soviet President Gorbachev sought to improve Sino-Soviet relations. It was hoped that one result of improved Sino-Soviet relations would be talks between these countries on ways to settle the conflict. Indeed, discussions concerning the Kampuchean conflict did begin shortly after the meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev.

In the context of rapprochement between the PRC and the Soviets, discussions concerning Kampuchea began in August 1988. After four lengthy sessions, the Soviets appeared willing to encourage Vietnam's withdrawal of forces from Kampuchea, and the PRC appeared willing to match this by taking efforts to contain the Khmer Rouge. Then, in late November 1988, Hanoi announced that 50,000 of its troops would be withdrawn from Kampuchea by the end of December of 1988. Concurrently with this troop withdrawal, the PRC

would phase out support for the Khmer Rouge. Finally, some significant progress had been made towards a settlement of the Conflict.

Leifer (21) goes on to say that in January 1989, Vietnam announced its commitment to withdrawal all of its forces from Kampuchea. In return, it was understood by Vietnam that all military aid to all parties in Kampuchea would cease upon Vietnam's withdrawal. This announcement was in the context of a meeting between the foreign ministers of the PRC and the USSR. Interestingly, the U.S. position on military aid to Kampuchea was not accounted for in the PRC-USSR Foreign Minister meeting. As of the meeting, President Bush planned to give \$5 million in military aid to the anti-Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea. Obviously, if the U.S. wants to send military aid to Kampuchea at a time when the PRC has said that all military aid would stop, then reaching a solution becomes more complicated. Nevertheless, it is clear the PRC and the Soviets wanted to find a solution to this nearly ten year old problem.

Even more importantly, the Deputy Foreign Minister from Vietnam, Dinh Nho Liem, arrived in Beijing on 14 January 1989 to discuss the settlement of the conflict with the Deputy Foreign Minister from the PRC, Liu Shuqing. This is the first time in almost ten years that the PRC and Vietnam had had diplomatic relations. This new Sino-Vietnamese

relationship served to enhance Sino-Soviet rapprochement and increase the likelihood the settlement to the Kampuchean conflict would occur in September 1989 (21:20-22).

In mid-February 1989, representatives from the CGDK and Phnom Penh met in Jakarta, Indonesia to discuss the political settlement of the Kampuchean conflict. Prince Sihanouk as head of the CGDK was present as was the head of the Vietnamese-backed government, Hun Sen. While the PRC and the Soviets had basically agreed to a settlement, the leaders within Kampuchea still had to find a way to implement the settlement. This would prove to be difficult.

By May 1989, the fourth round of meetings between the leaders within Kampuchea began in Jakarta. At issue for the first three rounds was who would exercise power. Prince Sihanouk wanted to be the executive president of the new government with "real" authority. He did not want some figurehead position with no authority. On the other hand, the Khmer Rouge faction of the CGDK and its leader, Khieu Samphan, also wanted to exercise significant power in the new government. The Khmer Rouge felt it should have a significant amount of power because it was the most powerful militarily of the three factions of the CGDK. As has been discussed before, many people in Kampuchea and the region do not want the Khmer Rouge to have much power in the new government because of its history of human rights violations. The fourth round ended with an agreement to meet in July 1989, in Paris. Although some progress had been made,

a final accord on the settlement still eluded them (21:27). Unfortunately, for the purposes of this study, no literature was collected after July 1989.

Investigative Question 3

Has the Kampuchean conflict pushed ASEAN towards becoming a military alliance?

As the ASEAN background information in chapter II pointed out, ASEAN was originally conceived as an organization to foster economic and cultural cooperation. In short, ASEAN was not established as a military alliance. Nevertheless, at least one author has put forth the argument that ASEAN is moving in that direction. Guy J Pauker (25), in his article ASEAN Perspectives on International Developments in Southeast Asia, says the following about ASEAN's possible move to a military alliance:

By invading Kampuchea and granting the Soviet Union access to air and naval facilities, Vietnam has not only secured the lasting hostility of the People's Republic of China, but it is causing a subtle transformation of ASEAN into a military alliance. The first step in that direction is a substantial increase in ASEAN defense budgets. (25:9)

As Pauker states in his article, the first clue is an increase in defense budgets. Prior to Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in 1978, the five ASEAN governments were reluctant to increase defense spending substantially on an annual basis. Instead ASEAN governments chose to spend their money on economic development, which of course was the purpose of ASEAN in the first place. Nonetheless, since

Vietnam's actions in 1978, ASEAN defense expenditures have increased dramatically. From 1978 to 1981, total defense expenditures for ASEAN increased by 131 percent. Most of the increase was devoted to the modernization and expansion of the defense forces of the nations.

Another indication of ASEAN's possible move towards a military alliance is an increase in the number of joint military exercises held among ASEAN members. Between 1979 and 1982, ASEAN countries held a record 17 bilateral or trilateral military exercises among member nations. Pauker goes on to say that ASEAN governments have been giving much thought to standardization of equipment, interoperability of weapons systems, and the exchange of intelligence information.

One additional reason, other than Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, pointed out for a possible military alliance among ASEAN has to do with the Soviet's activity in the Southeast Asian region since the invasion. Both Pauker (25) and Dong Ta (36) discuss Soviet activity in their articles. According to these two articles, the Soviet Pacific Fleet has undergone a very rapid expansion since the invasion to become the largest of the four Soviet fleets. With this expanded fleet, the Soviets have been quite willing to project their naval power into the region. Naturally, the use of Vietnamese bases has also helped the Soviets maintain

this projection of power. This rapid expansion is of great concern not only to the ASEAN countries but also to the U.S. and the PRC.

For comparison purposes, Dong Ta (36) cites an unclassified military estimate which places Soviet naval strength at 804 ships versus 206 U.S. naval ships in the region. As for the Soviet Far East Air Force, the same military estimate places Soviet strength at 1,725 planes versus 1,157 aircraft for the U.S. Pacific Air Command. This power projection has also impacted the PRC. The Soviets have deployed more than 130 mobile SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in Soviet Asia. Clearly, ASEAN has some incentive to consider a military alliance, especially since SEATO was phased out in 1977.

With all of reasons cited above, the question still remains unanswered: Is ASEAN turning into a military alliance? Lau Teik Soon (31) does not believe so. According to him, ASEAN is not likely to become a military alliance because doing so would create greater tension in the region. The Soviets and their proxy, Vietnam, could easily construe an ASEAN military pact as a threat to their positions in the region. Instead ASEAN is content to conduct its joint military exercises, modernize its military forces, and rely on its relations with the U.S. and the PRC to stabilize activities in the region. Also, given each nation's differing

viewpoints on possible solutions to the Kampuchean conflict, it would be difficult to get the ASEAN countries to agree on the form and nature of a military alliance (31:192).

Investigative Question 4

What impact will the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict have on Thailand, Vietnam, and the other nations of the Southeast Asian region?

The Impact on Thailand. Recall that the Sricharatchanya (33) article stated Thailand's goal under Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan was to turn Indochina's battlegrounds into a marketplace. Even before a settlement has been reached, there is some evidence that his dream is turning into a reality. According to the article Uncle Chat's Whirlwind (42), Thailand and Kampuchea are already engaged in a fair amount of trade activities between the countries and with other countries of Southeast Asia. In the port of Ban Pak Klong, which is in the Kampuchean coastal town of Koh Kong, over \$16 million worth of goods arrive monthly from Thailand, Indonesia, and Japan. This trade is a result of a January 1989 meeting held in Thailand between Prime Minister Chatichai and Hun Sen, the head of the Vietnamese backed Phnom Penh regime. In this meeting, the two leaders agreed that Kampuchea should keep its doorway open to non-communist goods even though ASEAN's "official" position is that there should be no trade between the two.

The article goes on to say that Prime Minister Chatichai is very bullish about the future prospects of increased trade with Kampuchea and the other nations of Indochina. If Vietnam follows up on its recent announcement to complete troop withdrawal by September 1989, then Thailand may consider lifting its trade and aid embargo with Vietnam. Naturally, this would allow Thailand to move farther towards its goal of making Indochina a marketplace. Clearly, a settlement of the Kampuchean conflict would be very economically beneficial to Thailand.

The Impact on Vietnam. If a settlement of the Kampuchean conflict would benefit Thailand, it would be a salvation for Vietnam. Murray Hiebert (16) discusses this in his article The Toughest Battle. According to Hiebert, Vietnam has been economically decimated by its 10-year occupation of Kampuchea even though the Soviets have provided a considerable amount of military and economic aid. In 1988, the economy suffered from acute food shortages, 700% inflation per year, and 20% unemployment. Other structural problems include an infrastructure that was destroyed by the Vietnam war, a poorly educated population, and trouble paying its foreign debts.

One of the main reasons for Vietnam's problems is it was effectively ostracized from the world economy after invading Kampuchea. The U.S., Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank cut

off loans and other aid after the invasion. Other European countries also cut off trade and loans to Vietnam. Without access to the world economy, Vietnam was forced to rely more heavily on limited Soviet aid which, of course, was not enough.

Nevertheless, with Vietnam's promise to remove its remaining troops from Kampuchea by September 1989 and a new foreign investment code, Vietnam could change its economic fortunes for the better. In anticipation of the settlement, an increasing number of trade delegations from all over Southeast Asia have been going to Vietnam. Many of the ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, and Australia have been signing contracts to develop business in Vietnam after a settlement. The IMF and the World Bank are also planning to visit Vietnam before a settlement.

With all of the foreign delegations visiting Vietnam described above, it would seem that Vietnam is well on its way to solving its economic problems. This is not the case. Although many countries have been holding discussions with Vietnam, the fact still remains that Vietnam must completely leave Kampuchea before these discussions can yield results. The IMF, Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank have told Vietnam that it must leave Kampuchea and reschedule its current debt before any new loans will be given. Likewise, the European Community will consider resuming aid and trade once Vietnam leaves Kampuchea. The U.S. probably would be reluctant to resume aid because they cut off aid because of

the Vietnam war, not in response to the Kampuchean conflict. Finally, the UN, which reduced aid to about \$100 million per year after the invasion, might consider increasing aid following a settlement. Clearly, Vietnam would benefit most of all from a settlement of the conflict (16:68-73).

As for benefits to the other nations of Southeast Asia, the literature is less clear. According to the articles above, all nations of Southeast Asia would certainly benefit from peace in Kampuchea and increased trade in the region. However, the literature did not specifically specify how Laos, China, or the remaining countries of Southeast Asia would benefit. The next chapter will provide a discussion of the findings for each investigative question.

IV. Findings and Discussion

This chapter will take a look at information obtained from interviews as it pertains to the investigative questions. Several individuals with detailed knowledge of the Southeast Asian region and the Kampuchean conflict were interviewed to obtain this information. However, there were three particular individuals which provided the majority of the relevant information concerning the investigative questions. These individuals were: 1) Eugene Bruns, Professor of Southeast Asian Studies from the Foreign Service Institute; 2) Lt Col Robert Nelson, Chief of Air Force Logistics Management from the Joint United States Military Assistance Group in Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI); and 3) Col Lawrence Reichner, State Department Desk Officer for the Southeast Asian Region. The information from the interviews will be compared to the information obtained from the literature to discover areas of possible differences and similarities between the two sources concerning the investigative questions. By doing so, it is hoped a clearer understanding of the answers to the investigative questions will be gained.

Investigative Question 1

What role do Thailand and ASEAN play in the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict?

Bruns (4), Nelson (22), and Reichner (28) all agree that Thailand's main role in the Kampuchean conflict is that of lead policy maker for the ASEAN countries. Because

Thailand is geographically located next to Kampuchea and faces the most direct threat, it should be the frontline state in dealing with the conflict. This is consistent with the literature discussed in Chapter III. Also provided in Chapter III was information on a division within ASEAN concerning the settlement of the conflict. Bruns (4) provides more detail on this division which involves Indonesia and Malaysia.

Recall that Indonesia and Malaysia, in March 1980, wanted to explore ways a solution with Vietnam could be reached. This was called the Kuantan Doctrine. This doctrine made the other members of ASEAN nervous because it represented a division within ASEAN over the Kampuchean conflict. According to Bruns, there was a very clear reason why Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, wanted to find a solution to the conflict quickly. This reason was Thailand's involvement with the PRC. Indonesia has a historically confrontational relationship with the PRC. The PRC has supported communist insurgencies in Indonesia for years. When Thailand chose to seek support from the PRC, the Indonesians feared that the PRC would possibly increase its influence in the Southeast Asian region beyond their support for Thailand and the Khmer Rouge. The reason Indonesia wanted a quick settlement to the conflict was it wanted to stabilize relations among Thailand, Kampuchea, and Vietnam. Indonesia views these countries as a buffer zone

between it and the PRC. By finding a quick solution, Indonesia and Malaysia felt it would be more secure from possible Chinese influence (4:1).

Despite an apparent division within ASEAN concerning the Kampuchean conflict, ASEAN managed to put together a united front against the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchean. The very decisive votes in the 34th and 35th UN General Assemblies were evidence of this united front. It was not until much later that morale began to suffer when members of ASEAN realized their actions were not effective at bringing about a solution. This is when ASEAN tried to persuade the superpowers to step in. Although initially this was not effective, it was the actions of the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the PRC which resulted in Vietnam announcing that it would withdraw its troops from Kampuchea by September 1989. Thus, ASEAN had the right idea for the beginning of the settlement process, but it took some time for U.S.-Soviet relations to get to the point where they could discuss the Kampuchean conflict.

Investigative Question 2

What are the proposed solutions and current prospects for a settlement to the Kampuchean conflict?

As far as proposed solutions are concerned, the main point that Bruns (4) and Reichner (28) made was that it did not matter how many proposed solutions there were to the conflict. As long as the PRC and Thailand were adamant in

their support for the anti-Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, and Vietnam continued to support its troops in Kampuchea, a solution would be very difficult to find. Recall that the PRC and Thailand stated that all Vietnamese backed forces in Kampuchea must be removed before any settlement can occur. On the other side, Vietnam stated that it would support its forces in Kampuchea as long as the government requested their support. Obviously, each side will have to change its position before any "real" settlement talks can begin (4:1; 28:1).

The current prospects for a settlement are encouraging. Bruns (4) cited Sino-Soviet rapprochement as a positive first step for the settlement process. As a result of improved relations between the PRC and the Soviets, the PRC and Vietnam have also begun to talk about the conflict. After several rounds of discussions, the Vietnamese have stated they will withdraw their troops from Kampuchea by September 1989. While the major powers have, in effect, come to a limited agreement on how to settle the conflict, the individual groups such as the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese-backed government in Kampuchea have not reached a solution to the problem. The issue is who will hold power after the Vietnamese troops leave Kampuchea in late 1989. This, of course, assumes the Vietnam does remove its remaining troops as announced. The Vietnamese do not want Pol Pot's organization to gain control over the new organization

for fear it would return to the same murderous policies of the past. Thailand and the PRC do not want another "puppet" government backed by the Vietnamese with the aim of unifying Indochina. As of July 1989, these problems have not been solved.

Investigative Question 3

Has the Kampuchean conflict pushed ASEAN towards becoming a military alliance?

Both Nelson (22) and Bruns (4) do not believe ASEAN is in danger of becoming a military alliance. Both Bruns and Nelson point out that many of the ASEAN countries do not trust each other. According to them, Thailand and Singapore may have a joint exercise, but the remaining countries of ASEAN will refuse to participate if Singapore is involved. This is because nobody in ASEAN except Thailand likes Singapore. This animosity towards Singapore stems from the fact that its population is made of many people with Chinese ancestry. The countries of ASEAN, especially the Indonesians and the Malaysians, distrust the Chinese.

Another reason Nelson and Bruns do not believe ASEAN is turning towards a military alliance is related to a possible settlement of the Kampuchean conflict. They reason that if the Vietnamese do leave Kampuchea as announced, then the immediate threat to Thailand and the region is removed. In effect, ASEAN will lose its motivation to work together as a military alliance because each member of ASEAN no longer

has a common threat to hold the team together. If the military threat is gone, then ASEAN will have to return to its previous business of economic cooperation. Many people, including Noordin Sopiee (32), believe that ASEAN really never delivered as an economic entity. Thus, ASEAN could have trouble surviving a settlement to the Kampuchean conflict (22:1; 4:1).

Investigative Question 4

What impact will the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict have on Thailand, Vietnam, and the other nations of the Southeast Asian region?

A settlement of the Kampuchean conflict involving Vietnam's complete withdrawal from Kampuchea would have many benefits for the nations of Southeast Asia. Bruns (4) agreed with the literature concerning a settlement's impact on Vietnam. Clearly, Vietnam would have the most to gain from a settlement. Years of war have left Vietnam with a economy that is shattered. While the Soviets have provided billions in aid to the Vietnamese, the rest of the world has ostracized them from doing business in the world community. An acceptable settlement would open the door to renewed aid, loans, and grants to Vietnam. There are still some problems, but a new start for Vietnam would be preferable to its current position.

A settlement of the conflict would also be beneficial to Thailand. As the literature and personal interviews

indicated, Thailand seeks to turn Vietnam and the rest of Indochina from a battleground to a marketplace. In fact, Thailand already does a substantial amount of business with Kampuchea. Thailand has also sent trade representatives to Vietnam to discuss ways to increase trade and investment. A few years ago, this would have never occurred.

One interesting point made by Bruns (4) was that a favorable settlement to the conflict would heat up the economic competition between Thailand and Singapore. Historically, these two countries have been competing for economic leadership among the ASEAN countries. Singapore has held the lead for some time, but Thailand had been closing the gap in recent years. A settlement would create the opportunity for Thailand to close the gap because it could then concentrate on exploiting economic opportunities in the Indochinese marketplace (4:1).

The impact of a settlement on the rest of Southeast Asia would surely be positive as well. Indonesia and Malaysia would once again have that buffer zone from the PRC that they have sought for many years. If Indochina did, in fact, become a marketplace, other nations of Southeast Asia such as the Philippines could benefit by doing business there. Japan and Taiwan have expressed an interest in doing business in Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. Thus, any reasonable settlement of the Kampuchean conflict would certainly be better than conditions experienced in the last ten years of war and despair.

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

In this final chapter, conclusions will be drawn based on the answers to the investigative questions. Additionally, because the Kampuchean conflict has not been resolved as of July 1989, which is the end of the research period for this thesis, a few recommendations for areas of further study are included.

Conclusions

Investigative Question 1. What role do Thailand and ASEAN play in the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict?

From the beginning of the conflict, it was relatively clear what role Thailand would play in the conflict. Thailand became the lead policy maker for the ASEAN organization by virtue of the fact that it was, in many ways, directly involved in the conflict. This direct involvement started with clashes between its soldiers and Vietnamese-backed troops on its border with Kampuchea. Soon thereafter, Thailand provided sanctuaries on Thai soil for anti-Vietnamese forces. Much later, Thailand, which is a non-communist country, would seek aid and support from a communist country, the PRC, in an effort to influence the progress of the conflict.

Interestingly, as lead policy maker for ASEAN, Thailand's policies were not always consistent with the other ASEAN countries. At one point in the beginning of the conflict, Thailand would have settled for a partial with-

drawal of Vietnamese troops. This soon changed to move in line with ASEAN's "official" policy of a complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. After several years, this changed once again with the election of Chatichai Choonhaven as Prime Minister. The Prime Minister's policy, which is the current one, is to turn Kampuchea and the rest of Indochina into a marketplace.

ASEAN's role, on the other hand, was not so clear at the beginning. ASEAN, established primarily as an organization with an economic orientation, found itself dealing with a matter which was political in nature. Nonetheless, the ASEAN organization itself provided a foundation upon which an anti-Vietnamese coalition could be formed. After the conflict started, ASEAN mobilized the support of the UN against the Vietnamese. In 1980 and 1981, the UN passed measures overwhelmingly which legitimize the original government of Kampuchea and called for the removal of Vietnamese-backed troops from Kampuchea.

As the conflict stretched on, however, ASEAN started to question its role. After seven years of trying to come up with a settlement to the conflict, ASEAN decided to change its role. Instead of concentrating on finding solutions itself, ASEAN attempted to persuade the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the PRC to get involved in finding a solution. Initially, this ASEAN tactic did not work. Later, in the context of U.S.-USSR and PRC-USSR rapprochement, this tactic

started the process which led the Vietnamese to declare that they would withdraw their troops from Kampuchea by September 1989. Thus, ASEAN found its role had changed over the course of the conflict just as Thailand's role had changed.

Investigative Question 2. What are the proposed solutions and current prospects for a settlement to the Kampuchean conflict?

Separating the genuine proposed solutions from pure gamesmanship is very difficult when dealing with a conflict as complex as the Kampuchean issue. After reviewing the proposals put forth by the various countries, it appears there are really only two proposed solutions or positions on the conflict. On the Thailand-ASEAN side, Vietnam must completely withdraw its troops from Kampuchea before a settlement can be reached. This has been the position of ASEAN since it first appealed to the UN for international support in late 1980.

The other position in the conflict is Vietnam's. Vietnam has always insisted that its troops are in Kampuchea at the request of the current "puppet" government to combat the atrocities of the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge regime. Vietnam's proposed solution is to set up a regional conference, led by Vietnam, to deal with the conflict. Because each side's basic position has remained the same since the beginning of the conflict, the possibility of any "real" solution has been small.

Even though the current prospects seem to be the best they have been in years, there are still some problems which may hinder any possible settlement. The biggest problem is who will hold power after the Vietnamese leave in late 1989. Assuming the Vietnamese leave, the CGDK and the Vietnamese-backed Hun Sen must develop a structure for the new government which will satisfy the desires of all parties involved in the settlement. If a structure cannot be developed, then any settlement could be delayed. If a new government structure is not developed and the Vietnamese leave Kampuchea as scheduled, then a power void would occur. Naturally, CGDK factions as well as pro-Vietnamese supporters in Kampuchea would attempt to fill this void. If the parties could not find a way to fill the power void peacefully, there is the possibility violent acts could occur. Nevertheless, September 1989 will be an interesting time in the history of the Kampuchean conflict.

Investigative Question 3. Has the Kampuchean conflict pushed ASEAN towards becoming a military alliance?

Clearly, the answer is no. Although various ASEAN countries such as Thailand and Singapore do hold two or three small military exercises per year, exercises involving all ASEAN powers do not occur. A long history of mistrust among ASEAN members is the main reason they cannot cooperate as a military alliance. It is doubtful that this aura of mistrust will change at anytime in the future.

The biggest reason ASEAN will not be pushed towards becoming a military alliance involves the nature of the conflict itself. Based on the answers to Investigative Question 2, it is clear that several countries in the South-east Asian region want to establish a peaceful settlement. Without the conflict in Kampuchea, ASEAN will have to focus its energies on other priorities. Most likely these priorities will be economic in nature because ASEAN was, after all, developed as an organization to promote the economic interests of its members. Barring any future conflicts in the region which would directly threaten the members of ASEAN, the motivation to work together as a military alliance would diminish.

Investigative Question 4. What impact will the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict have on Thailand, Vietnam, and the other nations of the Southeast Asian region?

It is not hard to see that a settlement to the Kampuchean conflict would benefit all of the nations of Southeast Asia in some way or another. Vietnam, with its shattered economy, would gain the most because it could once again receive foreign aid, loans, and grants from members of the international community. If Thailand's goal of turning Indochina into a marketplace becomes a reality, and there is evidence that it is moving in that direction, then all nations in Southeast Asia would benefit even more. Vietnam would benefit because it badly needs to increase exports to

raise currency to make interest payments on its debts to foreign banks. Vietnam also needs foreign investment to help rebuild its infrastructure after years of war and neglect. Thailand would benefit because it could increase its economic power base by expanding into new markets created by peace in Indochina. Thailand already does a substantial amount of business in Kampuchea and has sent trade representatives to Vietnam to explore ways to develop new markets there. The other nations of Southeast Asia would benefit from a settlement for much the same reasons as Thailand.

Recommendations

This thesis has concentrated on how Thailand and ASEAN have been able to influence the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict from the beginning of the conflict until July 1989. Unfortunately, the most crucial events in a possible settlement will occur after the research period for this thesis has ended. That is, the Vietnamese are expected to withdraw their troops in September 1989 and a new government established to lead Kampuchea into the future.

A follow-on study covering the events after July 1989 would be interesting. In this study, the actual events occurring could be compared to the planned events to determine the extent to which progress on a settlement is being made. These future events may also impact some of the answers to the current investigative questions or bring

forth new investigative questions which need to be answered. For example, a question might be asked concerning what will happen to Thailand-PRC relations if a peaceful settlement of the conflict does occur. It would be interesting to see if non-communist Thailand continues to seek a close relationship with communist China after the Vietnamese threat has subsided.

This study as well as the follow-on study could then be used as reference material for service members moving to Thailand. These studies would provide the service members with a fairly brief background of the dynamics of Thailand's and ASEAN's influence on the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict.

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> The purpose of this research effort was to explore the influence Thailand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have on the settlement of the Kampuchean Conflict. Because Thailand is one of the original members of ASEAN and potentially faces the most direct threat from the conflict, Thailand's relationships with its neighbors and with ASEAN were examined. Although some background information is included, the major emphasis of this research is placed on events occurring after the invasion of Kampuchea in 1978 by Soviet-backed Vietnam.

Political, economic, and strategic events provide a background in which the relationships of the major players in the Southeast Asian region are studied. Towards this end, a brief history of the relationship between Thailand and the United States is discussed to show how the foreign policy interests of the United States coincide with those of Thailand. Along the same lines, the Soviets' relationship with Vietnam and Kampuchea was explored as well as the influence exerted by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the region. *Theses. (SDW)* ←

The role Thailand and ASEAN play in the settlement is examined to determine how each interacts with the other as the conflict progresses. Previously proposed solutions and the current prospects for a settlement to the Kampuchean problem are then examined and evaluated to determine the positive and negative aspects to them. Also, a look at the political and military side of ASEAN is offered to determine if ASEAN has changed its nature and purpose in the face of the Kampuchean conflict. Finally, information is provided on the impact a settlement would have on Thailand, Vietnam, and the other nations of the Southeast Asian region.

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