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CHANGING SOVIET OBJECTIVE DEPTHS:

A REFLECTION OF CHANGING

COMBAT CIRCUMSTANCES

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NATURE OF THE BATTLEFIELD IS CAUSING THE SOVIETS TO ALTER THE
MANNER IN WHICH MISSIONS AND OBJECTIVE DEPTHS ARE ASSIGNED TO
TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL FORMATIONS. RECENT SOVIET WRITINGS INDICATE
THAT THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND INCREASED
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CHANGING SOVIET OBJECTIVE DEPTHS:
A REFLECTION OF CHANGING COMBAT CIRCUMSTANCES

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March 1989

The views expressed here are those of the
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necessarily be construed as validated threat doctrine.

CHANGING SOVIET OBJECTIVE DEPTHS:
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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. ground commander normally designates his objective with a "goose egg" on his map. This "goose egg" usually encloses key terrain and reflects the western practice of orienting on the seizure or retention of key terrain during combat. Because of their combat experience, the Soviets describe objectives differently.

The Russian army and later the Soviet army garnered most of its combat experience on the great European plains - large, flat, expanses broken only by wide, slow-moving rivers. Only in distinctly secondary theaters, such as the Arctic, Manchuria, Karelia, the Caucasus and Carpathian mountains, and lately in Afghanistan, has rugged terrain had a significant impact on Russian and Soviet military art. Consequently, Russian and Soviet military art has historically focused on the enemy, and not on key terrain, when selecting operational and tactical objectives. The Soviets consistently represent these objectives by lines [rubezh], rather than "goose eggs", and refer to them as missions [zadacha], rather than objectives. They then usually subdivide these missions into immediate and subsequent which correspond to the rear boundaries of defending enemy units. Historically, when the Soviets have used "goose egg" objectives, they have been for their maneuver (deep attack and exploitation) forces - not for their line (ground gaining) forces.¹

The Soviets define an offensive combat mission as follows:

a mission assigned by a higher commander to a subunit, unit, formation, or large formation ...for the purpose of achieving a specific objective in a battle (operation) by a specified time. The content of a combat mission depends on the function, numerical strength, fighting efficiency and combat capabilities of friendly and enemy troops (forces), as well as other situational factors. A combat mission of a combined arms large formation (formation, unit or subunit) ...usually consists of destroying principal enemy forces within a designated zone within a sector (area), advancing to and securing a designated line (seizure of an area or objective), and may be divided into an immediate and a subsequent mission....The immediate mission ...usually consists of destroying enemy fire support (nuclear) assets, destroying enemy forces within a specified zone (area) and occupying a specified line (area, objective), capture of which promotes offensive exploitation and successful accomplishment of the subsequent mission. The subsequent mission...is accomplished following the immediate mission. For the large formation, it usually consists of the completion of the destruction of the enemy force, operational reserve and seizure of areas which accomplish the operational objective. For units, it consists of completion of the destruction of the enemy force, approaching enemy reserves, and seizure of the ground to the line designated for the end of a twenty-four hour advance. For the subunit, it usually consists of completion of the destruction of enemy forces within a designated area, development of the offensive in depth and seizure of a specified line (objective) within the enemy dispositions.²

The depth to which Soviet tactical and operational forces are expected to conduct a penetration operation according to planning norms is increasing. For example, in 1966 a motorized rifle battalion in a regimental first echelon normally received an immediate mission of attacking, in conjunction with one or more other motorized rifle battalions, through a forward defending enemy battalion. This usually meant that the motorized rifle battalion first attacked a defending company and then

joined forces with adjacent attacking battalions to attack the defending reserve company. The battalion was not assigned a subsequent mission but rather was given a direction of attack.³ This was because the battalion's combat power could have been too depleted in the initial attack to be able to independently carry out another mission. Therefore, it would contribute its surviving combat power to the continuing attack. Furthermore, battalions received a direction of attack because on a high-tempo, dynamic nuclear battlefield, actions in the tactical depth would be difficult to forecast accurately. Consequently, a direction of advance would be more suitable than a subsequent mission. By 1987, however, this criteria changed. Now the first echelon motorized rifle battalion was assigned an immediate mission of attacking through a defending battalion, a subsequent mission of attacking through the depths of a defending brigade and, thereafter, a continuing direction of attack!⁴

What is the reason for these greater objective depths? Has Soviet ground forces modernization, including the build up and greater mobility of artillery forces, the increased availability and lethality of helicopter gunships, and the enhanced mobility and sustainment potential of combat/combat service support resources, brought about this change? Is the Soviet commander better equipped to forecast the course of battle? Has the introduction of enhanced, precision - guided conventional weaponry, air assault forces, and directed energy weapons led to this change? Or are we faced with far more tactically competent



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Soviet commanders, staffs and ground forces than was previously the case? This paper will examine the nature and justification for changes in objective depths, and will include selected planning factors that we may consider in determining how to meet a Soviet attack.

THE INCREASING TACTICAL OBJECTIVE DEPTHS

Prior to 1984, Soviet tactical commanders operated in accordance with V. G. Reznichenko's 1966 tactical guide and appropriate regulations. The 1966 Taktika assumed that future war would invariably be nuclear and reflected this orientation in its tactical examples. Consequently, the normal immediate mission for an attacking motorized rifle battalion was the destruction and seizure of strong points in the defending first echelon battalion. The attacking motorized rifle battalion usually did not receive a subsequent mission. Instead, it was given a direction of advance.⁵

U.S. Army Field Manual FM 100-2-1, The Soviet Army - Operations and Tactics, reflects the 1966 Taktika when it describes Soviet tactical objectives.

Soviet tactical objectives are expressed as dashed lines on a terrain map, arrayed at various depths, based on enemy dispositions and terrain. Assignment of an objective to a maneuver unit requires that unit to attack to the limit of the objective line and to destroy or neutralize enemy troops, weapons, equipment, and support systems.

The objective lines, all normally assigned by the next higher commander, are based on his knowledge of the enemy and his concept of attack. Divisions and regiments normally are assigned an immediate objective and a subsequent objective. Battalions and companies

normally receive an immediate objective and a subsequent direction of attack. A battalion may sometimes be assigned a subsequent objective.

At the tactical level, objectives form a progressively higher and deeper hierarchy. The depths of objectives are not fixed dimensions, but vary with each situation.⁶

The manual then presents an "idealized, but representative hierarchy" based on the Soviet commander maintaining a three-to-one advantage in combat power at each level. The hierarchy represents "normal combat", e.g., an attack against an enemy in prepared defenses. This is reproduced below as figure 1.




Figure 1

The US field manual actually ascribes a reduced objective depth to the attacking battalion. Whereas the 1966 Taktika postulates an attacking battalion would advance to the depth of the defending enemy battalion, the field manual postulates an attacking Soviet battalion will have an immediate mission to the depth of the defending first echelon company.

The 1965 Soviet study, The Motorized Rifle Battalion in Modern Combat, discussed objective depths in terms of a nuclear and a non-nuclear environment.

The immediate mission of a battalion attacking in the first echelon usually consists of destroying the enemy personnel and weapons in the strong-points of the enemy first-echelon battalion and in seizing them.

In an attack in a direction of a nuclear strike, the battalion's immediate mission may be even deeper.⁸

The study then illustrates motorized rifle company and battalion objective depths when exploiting the effects of a nuclear strike against the reserve company of a defending enemy mechanized infantry (MI) battalion (figure 2).⁹





Figure 2

The motorized rifle (MR) battalion attacks on a frontage of 2000 meters with two forward motorized rifle companies (following

a tank company) attacking on a frontage of up to 800 meters. The gap of up to 500 meters between the two attacking forward motorized rifle companies provides protection against enemy use of nuclear weapons. The motorized rifle battalion reserve consists of a motorized rifle company.

The motorized rifle battalion exploits the effects of the nuclear strike and the subsequent artillery preparation to penetrate the well-prepared defense of an enemy mechanized infantry company. The right flank company has the immediate mission [zadacha] to reach the rear of the defending company and then a direction of advance which carries it through an enemy artillery battalion and a brigade reserve mechanized infantry company. The left flank company has a deeper immediate mission [zadacha]-to the depth of the defending enemy battalion (at the western edge of the nuclear strike) and a subsequent direction of advance which carries it through another reserve mechanized infantry company. The motorized rifle battalion itself has an immediate mission [zadacha] in the depths of the defending brigade and a direction of further advance which facilitates the achievement of the regimental immediate mission [zadacha].¹⁰



Another illustration in the 1965 study represents an attack against a defending enemy without the use of nuclear weapons (figure 3). The attacking battalion is formed in two echelons with a tank company and two motorized rifle companies in the first echelon and a motorized rifle company in second echelon. While, in a nuclear context, the motorized rifle battalion attacked on a frontage of 2000 meters, in this non-nuclear case, the motorized rifle battalion is attacking on a frontage of 1000 meters against a less well prepared defense. The attack frontage of the motorized rifle companies has been reduced from 800 to 500 meters, and there are no significant gaps between the forward attacking motorized rifle companies. Although the illustrator did not adjust his drawings to show the reduction in frontage, in both cases the enemy mechanized infantry company is defending on a frontage of 1,500 meters and a depth of 1,100 meters. The mechanized infantry platoons are defending with a 400 meter frontage and a 200 meter depth.

Because it is exploiting an artillery preparation, but not a nuclear strike, this motorized rifle battalion attacks to a shallower depth. The immediate mission of the right flank motorized rifle company is still the rear of the defending mechanized infantry company. Now, however, the immediate mission of the left flank motorized rifle company is also the rear of the defending mechanized infantry company. Both companies have a subsequent direction of advance to the depth of the motorized rifle battalion's immediate mission--the rear of the defending

mechanized infantry battalion. Since the trailing motorized rifle company is now in second echelon and not in reserve, it would be committed to the attack in the vicinity of the immediate mission of the left flank motorized rifle company to overcome the nearby enemy mechanized infantry platoon. The Soviet battalion has a direction of further advance which takes it, in conjunction with other attacking battalions, into the depth of the defending enemy brigade. Thus, prior to 1984, a motorized rifle battalion in a regimental first echelon normally received an immediate mission of attacking, in conjunction with one or more other motorized rifle battalions, through a forward defending enemy battalion. The battalion was not assigned a subsequent mission but rather was given a direction of attack.

The 1984 edition of Reznichenko's Taktika apparently changes this concept. Reznichenko states:

combat missions are now determined in a manner different from the past. During the last war, only an immediate mission was assigned to a battalion operating in the first echelon, but now, in an offensive against a prepared enemy defense, a battalion is assigned an immediate and subsequent mission and a direction of advance.

The immediate mission of a first echelon battalion may be to destroy the enemy in the first echelon battalion defensive area and to seize this first position. Its subsequent mission includes developing the offensive, completely destroying the enemy brigade (regimental) reserves and seizing the line they held. The battalion's direction of further advance supports achievement of the regiment's mission.¹¹

This is a significant change, particularly since, by this time, the Soviet emphasis is on avoiding nuclear war and, if involved in a conflict in Europe, fighting conventionally under

nuclear threatened conditions. Under conventional conditions, the battalion is expected to accomplish an immediate and subsequent mission and a direction of further advance! The study further addresses company-level missions.

The immediate mission of a first echelon company, acting in concert with adjacent subunits, normally includes the destruction and seizure of enemy company strong points. The company's direction of subsequent advance supports the complete destruction of the enemy in the depths of the first echelon battalion defensive area. The immediate mission of a tank company attached to a motorized rifle battalion normally is the destruction and seizure of enemy company strong points in cooperation with the motorized rifle companies. The tank company's direction of further advance is planned to support the achievement of the immediate mission of the motorized rifle battalion.

Normally, a second echelon company is given a direction of advance and a sequence of movement, possible lines for commitment to battle, an immediate mission and a direction of subsequent advance.^{1 2}

Reznichenko then illustrated this concept (figure 4).





Figure 4

This schematic clearly shows that the first echelon, BMP-equipped, motorized rifle battalion receives an immediate mission in the rear of the defending enemy battalion and a subsequent mission to the rear of the brigade reserve. Subsequently, the battalion has a direction of advance through the remaining reserve (here a platoon). Within the battalion, first echelon motorized rifle companies have an immediate mission in the rear of defending enemy first echelon companies and a subsequent direction of advance to match the battalion's immediate mission. The line for expected commitment of the battalion's second echelon motorized rifle company has been indicated (immediately to the west of the MR battalion's immediate objective) as has the immediate mission and direction of advance for that company. No tanks are included in the attacking force.

There is an anomaly here. The second echelon motorized rifle company has an immediate mission, but apparently attacks mainly through the gap between two defending reserve companies. This company does not expend significant combat power upon achieving the line [rubezh] of its immediate mission. Instead, it encounters a defending platoon after it has reached its immediate mission and has begun its direction of further advance.¹⁴

The 1987 edition of Reznichenko's Taktika repeated, practically verbatim, the written description of the 1984 Taktika,¹⁵ but his illustration differed slightly (figure 5).



MI PLT and MI CO indicate Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Mechanized Infantry Company

MR CO and MR BN indicate Motorized Rifle Company and Motorized Rifle Battalion

Figure 5

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The attacking BMP-equipped, motorized rifle battalion now has a subsequent mission which includes the reserve platoon (now the immediate mission of the second echelon motorized rifle company). Clearly, the first echelon motorized rifle battalion is now normally expected to attack through the rear of a defending mechanized infantry brigade.

In December 1987, Voyenny vestnik [Military herald] addressed the same issue.

Reinforced motorized rifle and tank battalions, attacking an enemy defending in the first echelon, have immediate and subsequent missions. Furthermore, subunits have directions of further advance. Today,

the objective depth is greater than during the war years since the area defended by the enemy and the depth of the combat formation of our subunits has greatly increased.

The fact that the combat mission of the battalion is divided into a number of sequentially fulfilled tasks, dependent on the structure and methods of the enemy's conduct of the defense, is important. Regulations of our probable enemy recommend the employment of an active, deeply echeloned defense. In this defense, the main groupings of battalions and companies are deployed to conduct combat throughout the entire depth of the defensive area. It follows that, in order to fulfill successfully the offensive combat missions, it is necessary sequentially and rapidly to destroy in the first place the main forces of the opposing side (the defensive area of the defending first echelon brigade).¹⁷

The priority mission then is the early destruction of the forward defending brigades throughout the depths of the brigade area.

All this is in the predetermined content of the immediate and subsequent mission. Normally, the immediate mission of a first echelon battalion includes the destruction of the enemy in that area of the defending first echelon battalion, which is within the attacker's area of advance, and seizing the first position. The subsequent mission of a battalion includes exploiting the offensive, destroying the enemy brigade (regimental) reserve in coordination with the neighboring attacking battalions, and seizing the line they held. The direction of further advance is determined in such a way as to ensure fulfillment of the regimental combat mission.¹⁸

Again, Voyennyy vestnik confirms the immediate and subsequent missions of a battalion and its direction of further advance as postulated in the 1984 and 1987 Taktika. Then the article moves on to the crucial point.

It should be noted that the immediate and subsequent missions will be different if the battalion is participating in either an attack against a well-prepared, well-engineered and developed enemy defense; an offensive through a fortified region; or the forcing of a significant water obstacle.¹⁹

This is the crux of the matter. The Soviet view of future war envisions as a normal condition an attack against an unprepared or partially prepared defense! The attack against a well-prepared defense is treated as an exceptional circumstance! The Soviets have no intention of routinely battling a prepared defense.

The 1986 Soviet battalion tactical study, Motorized Rifle (Tank) Battalion in Combat had a great deal to say about objective depths. Specifically,

The battalion's combat mission is determined depending on the nature of the enemy defense, the extent of its neutralization, the concept of action, and also the battalion's combat capabilities, the peculiarities of the terrain, and other situational factors.

A regiment's first echelon battalion is given an immediate mission, a subsequent mission and a direction of further advance; a second echelon battalion is given an immediate mission and a direction of further advance.²⁰

The study goes on to discuss the normal immediate and subsequent missions of a battalion attacking in the first echelon. As before, the motorized rifle battalion attacks to destroy the enemy in zone. The motorized rifle battalion's immediate mission involves penetration to the rear of the defending enemy battalion and destruction of enemy forces in sector. The battalion's subsequent mission is to develop the offensive, defeat the enemy brigade (or regimental) reserves in coordination with adjacent attacking battalions, and to penetrate and seize the line to the rear of the brigade (or regimental) reserve. The battalion then has a

direction of further advance which ensures accomplishment of the regimental subsequent mission.²¹

However, the content of the immediate and subsequent missions will be different when breaking through an enemy defense prepared in advance and developed in an engineer respect, and also when attacking a fortified area or forcing large water obstacles. In these conditions, the battalion's immediate mission will be to destroy the enemy at company strongpoints of the first echelon in its zone of attack and seize them; the subsequent mission will be to develop the offensive, defeat the enemy in coordination with adjacent battalions in the depth of the defensive area and seize the first (battalion) position.²²

Again, the normal circumstance in future war appears to be an attack against an unprepared or partially prepared defense. An attack against a prepared defense is considered less likely and involves shallower objective depths. The study points out that a first echelon battalion that is making the main attack usually has a narrower attack frontage and has more reinforcements than battalions making supporting attacks. This is done in order to insure success where the enemy defense is to be penetrated.²³

The study then turns to a discussion of the missions of battalions in the second echelon or reserve:

The battalion operating in the regiment's second echelon is intended primarily for exploiting success on the main axis. In addition, it may be used for carrying out a combat mission on a new axis, for repelling a counterattack, and also for destroying or capturing the enemy remaining on the flanks or in the rear of the attacking subunits.

The content of the immediate mission of the regiment's second echelon battalion during its commitment to battle may be to defeat the enemy's divisional or brigade (regimental) reserves jointly with first echelon battalions and seize their line.

The direction of further advance, in this case, is set so as to ensure fulfillment of the regimental subsequent mission.

A battalion, acting as a reserve, is used to carry out the most varied missions which arise in the course of combat.²⁴

The study concludes with a discussion of company missions:

The immediate mission of a company located in the first echelon usually involves destroying the enemy, in coordination with neighboring subunits, at the company strongpoint at the forward edge of the enemy defense, and seizing it. The direction of further advance is determined so as to ensure the defeat of the enemy in the depth of the first echelon battalion's defensive area.

The immediate mission of a second echelon company during its commitment to combat usually is to defeat the enemy's brigade (regimental) reserves jointly with first echelon companies and to seize their line or complete the destruction of the enemy in strongpoints located in the depth of the first echelon battalion's defensive area and seize the first (battalion) position.²⁵

These passages demonstrate that the Soviets consider an attack against an unprepared or partially prepared defense rather than an attack against a prepared defense as the most likely form of attack against an enemy. Another 1988 Soviet tactical study entitled The Motorized Rifle (Tank) Company in Combat also expresses this view:

During the course of an offensive against an enemy in the process of hastily converting to the defense [Author's emphasis] and in other circumstances, the immediate mission of the first echelon company will include the destruction of the enemy, in coordination with neighboring subunits, in the defending first echelon strong points and their capture.

The direction of further advance is determined so as to ensure the defeat of the enemy in the depth of the first echelon battalion's defensive area.

During the breakthrough of a well-prepared, well-engineered and developed enemy defense; or the forcing of a significant water obstacle, the immediate mission

of the first echelon company will consist of the destruction of the enemy first echelon platoon strong points and their capture.

The direction of further advance, in this case, is determined to ensure the attainment of the battalion's immediate mission.²⁶

The 1988 company study compliments the battalion study, the 1984 and the 1987 Taktika and the article in Voyennyy vestnik. The normal case is the attack against an enemy in a hasty or partially prepared defense and the company immediate mission and direction of further advance are designed to help the battalion destroy the enemy in sector past the depths of the defending brigade. In the event of an attack against a prepared defense, across a significant water barrier or other unusual situation, the mission is adjusted to a shallower depth. The study continues:

Depending on the complex situations arising during the course of battle, the second echelon company's immediate mission upon introduction into combat may include assisting the first echelon companies in the completion of the destruction of the enemy brigade reserve and seizing their line or completing the destruction of the enemy in strong points in the depth of the first echelon battalion's defensive position and seizing the first (defending battalion) position. The direction of further advance in the first case would be to ensure the fulfillment of the regimental mission and in the second case, to ensure the fulfillment of the battalion's [immediate] mission.

Great importance is attached to the attainment of the company's immediate mission since the destruction of the enemy within the confines of his defensive depths breaks the stability of his defense.

After fulfilling the immediate mission, the company continues to advance in the earlier designated direction or is given a new mission.²⁷

The company tactical study includes an illustration of the company immediate mission and direction of further advance

against an enemy in the process of hastily converting to the defense as well as the breakthrough of a prepared defense (figure 6).




Figure 6

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The left-hand illustration shows that the company's immediate mission is to advance to the rear of the defending mechanized infantry company in sector and destroy it. The direction of further advance continues to the battalion's immediate mission which, in this case, should be the rear boundary of the defending enemy battalion.

The company tactical study also includes an illustration of the immediate and subsequent missions of a tank battalion (figure 7):




Figure 7 TC and TB indicate Soviet Tank Company and Tank Battalion
MI Plt and MI Co indicate Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Company

The illustration shows that the tank battalion has as its immediate mission the rear of the defending mechanized infantry

battalion and as its subsequent mission the rear of the enemy brigade reserve. The second echelon tank company is committed after completion of the immediate mission and, in conjunction with the first echelon tank companies, it advances to achieve the battalion's subsequent mission. After achieving the subsequent mission, the tank battalion continues in a direction of further advance.

Why do the Soviets seem to consider the normal offensive situation to be an attack against an unprepared or partially prepared defense, while most Western military writings assume that the Soviets will primarily engage well-prepared defenses? The most probable answer lies in the Soviet view of future war.

THE SOVIET VIEW OF FUTURE WAR

The Soviets are, by nature, conservative and will initiate war only when the risks of peace outweigh the risks of war.³⁰ As they look to the possibility of military operations in Central Europe, they envision a conventional war fought within the context of enemy use of tactical nuclear or high precision weapons (VTO). Theater operations using new, very lethal and precise conventional weapons must achieve their objectives rapidly before NATO can deploy and utilize surviving nuclear or high precision weapons. The Soviets believe that the United States, when faced with a fait accompli, would not be likely to use its intercontinental strategic systems, but rather would acknowledge the decoupling of Western Europe.³¹ It should be

noted that the Warsaw Pact defensive doctrine proclaimed in May 1987 does not necessarily change the basic objectives of Soviet security policy, nor policy at large. Defensiveness does not imply pacifism. Rather, defensive doctrine is essentially politically motivated and does not alter the basic Soviet faith in the ultimate primacy of offensive operations. The Soviets believe that the future battlefield will be a high tempo, lethal arena in which the meeting engagement will be a primary form of combat. The prolonged, linear struggle against a prepared defender with tied-in flanks will be a rarity since this would heighten the possibility of the war becoming nuclear. Initial operational surprise must be achieved and little opportunity or time for operational reinforcement will exist.

The topic of surprise has long been of interest to Russian and Soviet theoreticians and practitioners of military art. The 1987 edition of Taktika states that the

experience of history shows that he who has utilized surprise in battle has always gained an advantage over the enemy. As a rule the side that was subjected to a surprise attack and was unable to quickly adapt itself to the new situation suffered defeat. Surprise in battle and destruction of an enemy caught unawares with minimum losses to oneself and with minimum expenditure of resources has been and continues to be treated as one of the most important indicators of a high level of military art.... Surprise has long been the most important principle of military art.... Use of nuclear weapons, highly effective conventional weapons of destruction and highly mobile troops in modern combat has sharply increased the role and significance of surprise attacks. Surprise makes it possible to catch the enemy unawares, to produce panic in his ranks, to paralyze his will to resist, to sharply reduce his fighting efficiency, to constrain his actions, to disorganize command and control, to deprive him of the possibility of quickly implementing

effective countermeasures and, consequently, to destroy even superior enemy forces in a short time with the least losses to one's own troops.³²

In the Soviet view, if one can achieve operational surprise and catch the enemy in an unprepared or partially prepared defense, one's forces will be capable of attacking to much greater depths.

Do the Soviets actually consider that surprise will be a constant requirement and, thus, an attack against a partially prepared or unprepared defense will be the normal attack? The 1987 Taktika states

Surprise is not some one-time act occurring, for example, during the preparation for or at the beginning of a battle. It must lie at the basis of all combat activities of forces. Surprise obtained at the beginning of combat may exhaust itself after a while. Its effect is limited by the time required by the enemy to equalize the unequal conditions brought about by the unexpected actions of the opposing side. Therefore, an effort must be made in the course of combat both to maximally capitalize on previously obtained surprise and to introduce new elements of surprise into the actions of all troop units.³³

During the Great Patriotic War, the Manchurian campaign, the invasion of Hungary, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets proved to be masters of deception, concealment, and achievement of operational surprise.³⁴

Further, the Soviets do not view future war in a linear context which always entails an attacker and a defender. The Soviets envision a non-linear battlefield, where both sides attempt to seize and retain the initiative from each other

through a series of meeting engagements. Only when one side or the other has been defeated or forced into a hasty defense, will the attack against an unprepared or partially prepared defense occur. Meeting engagements may occur in the initial period of a war, following the breakthrough of a defensive position, during deep operations within an enemy's rear area, or as a counterattack during defensive battle.³⁵

HIGHER - LEVEL TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE DEPTHS

Having established what the current, normal objective depths of the company and battalion are, it remains to determine the objective depths of the regiment/brigade, division/corps, army and front.³⁶

Since there is a hierarchy of objectives and since the subsequent mission of a lower unit is often the immediate mission of the next higher unit, one can postulate that since the objective depth of the subsequent mission of a first echelon battalion is the defending brigade rear, the regimental/brigade immediate objective is also the defending brigade rear. Does the regiment/brigade have a subsequent mission and is that mission the defending division rear?

By the Soviet definition given on page two of this paper, the regiment/brigade will normally be assigned a subsequent mission. Further, by this same definition, the regiment/brigade

subsequent mission will be achieved at the end of a twenty-four hour advance. The 1987 Taktika states:

according to the experience of exercises conducted by NATO armies, the depth of the tactical defensive zone is 40-50 kilometers or more. This is three to four times greater than the tactical defensive zone encountered in World War II. Consequently, if the troops are to penetrate such defenses in the first twenty-four hours of an operation, they would have to achieve a higher rate of advance than in the past. Possessing high mobility, attacking formations are in a position to satisfy this requirement, as is confirmed by the experience of many tactical exercises. ³⁷

This indicates that the Soviets believe that division-sized units can penetrate the tactical defensive zone in twenty-four hours. The tactical defensive zone is the main defensive zone of a defending division. The Soviets characterize the depth of the main defensive zone of a US mechanized division in an active, mobile, or positional defense as 20 to 50 kilometers.³⁸ They characterize the depth of the main defensive zone of a West German panzer grenadier division as greater than 50 kilometers in the positional and mobile defense.³⁹

The following chart was developed from materials taught in the Voroshilov General Staff Academy during the mid-1970s. It shows times and objective depths for division, army and front (figure 8):

FRONT OFFENSIVE PLANNING FACTORS




Figure 8

40

The upper left hand corner box shows a division in a one - day action. The division has an immediate mission within the depths of the defense of 8 to 18 kilometers, approximately the depth of a defending NATO forward brigade. The division has a subsequent objective within the depths of the defense of 22 to 35 kilometers, approximately the depth of the defending division's reserve.

The main chart shows the objective depths for army and front. The upper right section of the chart shows the army objective depths. The first echelon of the army (the army's

first echelon divisions) penetrates to the army immediate objective by D+2 (the second day) or D+3. The army level OMG is committed on D+1. The army immediate objective is located approximately 150 kilometers deep (most likely to the depth of a defending corps. The Soviets consider 100 to 150 kilometers as the average depth of a deployed corps⁴¹). At the army immediate objective, army second echelon divisions are committed to attack to the army subsequent (long range) objective, which should be achieved by D+5 to D+8. The army subsequent (long range) objective is located some 250 to 350 kilometers deep (most likely the defending army group rear boundary or a significant geographic feature such as crossing sites over a major river). The army first echelon elements continue to lend their combat power to the second echelon as they all attack in concert to the subsequent objective. The army subsequent (long range) objective is the front immediate objective.

The bottom part of the chart shows the front objective depths. The first echelon of the front (the first echelon armies) advances to secure the front immediate objective which it achieves by D+5 to D+8. The front OMG is committed on D+2 or D+3. At the front immediate objective, second echelon armies are committed to attack out to approximately 800 kilometers. It should achieve this depth on D+11 to D+14. Theater reinforcements, ports, political centers, etc. are likely to be the prizes of the front's subsequent (long range) objective. At this point, a follow-on front could be introduced, or follow-on

forces could reinforce the attacking front as it pauses and regroups for further operations.

Since this material is from the mid-1970s, is it still current? Issues of the persistence of effects of operational surprise, sustainability and reasonableness need to be addressed. During an attack against a defending enemy, the Soviets normally plan on committing their second echelon force (when constituted) in the vicinity of the immediate mission. Thus, it is important that this immediate mission be located to the rear of a defending unit, so that the second echelon unit can be committed relatively unmolested. The second echelon force normally has less relative combat power than the first echelon, but is often tank heavy to facilitate exploitation within the depths of the enemy defense. In trying to determine the current subsequent mission of the motorized rifle regiment/brigade, the duration of the effects of surprise and nature of the reserve brigade within the defending western division must be considered.

The effects of achieving operational surprise, while dramatic, cannot last forever. As a point of departure, the maximum benefits of operational surprise are realized on the first day. Thereafter, substantial benefits from surprise still accrue on the second day, but by the third day the opposing theater commander will have been able to adjust forces and operational scale reserves to compensate for operational surprise. At this point, the army immediate mission (the defending corps rear boundary or major river crossing sites) may

or may not have been achieved, but the tactical zone defense of the defending forward divisions will have been penetrated. The Soviets will still have enemy forces, other than operational reserves, to deal with. If the Soviets are attacking an unprepared or partially prepared defense (less than 96 hours preparation time⁴²), the forward defending divisions will not be fully closed, nor will they have had time to form a fully coordinated, organized defense. As the initial battle is being fought, units and support elements will still be closing into the area. If the Soviets penetrate the forward brigades and defeat the reserve brigades and division artillery, there will still be combat effective units present in the division rear area or coming into the area. These will have to be met and defeated. Additionally, bypassed pockets of resistance within the breakthrough zone will have to be reduced.

Logic would suggest that the subsequent mission of the attacking first echelon regiment would be to defeat the defending reserve brigade. Thus, the division's immediate mission would be the defeat of the defending reserve brigade and the division's subsequent mission would be the rear of the division support area. The division would then continue to advance for the next several days out to the army immediate mission or further. The rest of the hierarchy of objective depths, as taught in the Voroshilov Academy in the mid-1970s, should still remain valid.

NATURE OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES

This paper began by describing Soviet objectives as lines generally drawn to the rear of defending units. This is true, but requires some amplification.

In an attack against a defending enemy, combat units above company level are usually given an immediate mission, a subsequent mission and a direction of further advance. The mission as normally stated is to destroy the enemy within a geographic area delineated by terrain features and to seize a line (which normally corresponds to the rear of a defending enemy force). The subsequent mission is again to destroy the enemy within a geographic area delineated by terrain features and to seize a line (which again normally corresponds to the rear of a defending enemy force). The direction of further advance is normally given in terms of a geographic point. Thus, the mission has two components - physical destruction of an enemy within a geographic area and seizure of a line.⁴³

As mentioned at the start of this paper, operational maneuver groups and forward detachments can have a terrain oriented mission. The predecessor to the Operational Maneuver Group, the mobile group, was often given missions in terms of a "goose egg" and a time by which the "goose egg" must be seized. Forward detachments are tasked with performing a wide variety of missions in conventional and nuclear environments.⁴⁴ Today's forward detachment is often given missions that consist of a direction of advance, an area to be seized and a time by which it

must be accomplished. Since their purpose is often to preempt or disrupt the defense, forward detachments are frequently given one, two or three geographic objectives to seize at various depths and times. Enemy forces may or may not be located on these terrain objectives and the mission may be accomplished without serious enemy contact.⁴⁵ The tactical maneuver of the forward detachment (and the operational maneuver of the Operational Maneuver Group) must complement the actions of the main force units. Preemption of the defense by seizure of successive terrain objectives is certainly one method of doing such.

Air assault, airborne and amphibious forces are often always given a "goose egg" objective which is stated in terms of the direction of advance, a target or terrain to be seized and the time by which it must be accomplished.⁴⁶ Any of these type forces is capable of supporting or serving as a forward detachment.

In a meeting engagement, an immediate mission and direction of further advance are prescribed. The immediate mission is normally described in terms of seizing only a line--not a geographic area and a line.⁴⁷

The Soviet army has become increasingly terrain oriented. When one's presumed opponent is especially terrain conscious, terrain must be taken into account--particularly since the potential Central European battlefield is much different from the USSR and much of Eastern Europe. Urbanization, reforestation and

modern obstacle systems employed by NATO create special difficulties. It may not be sufficient to mass an attacking company against a defending platoon if the terrain significantly enhances the combat potential of the defender. The correlation of forces is not a comparison of only the combat potential of the adversaries; rather it is a comparison of the combat potentials of the adversaries adjusted for such factors as terrain, status of defense, fatigue, morale, timing, locale of attack, surprise, sustainability, and training. After adjusting for these factors, the main object remains the destruction of the enemy.

The content of a combat mission in an offensive is to defeat the enemy grouping and to capture the given line (area) on the terrain by the specified time.

The main objective of the actions of advancing troops is unquestionably the enemy. Only by the annihilation (capture) of his personnel and the destruction (capture) of his weapons can the creation of the conditions for mission success be realized.

The art of commanders and staffs in determining the manner of defeating the enemy consists of their ability to determine what objectives in his disposition would have to be captured in order to undermine his combat stability and disrupt his fire plan, control and defenses.⁴⁸

The Soviets show a great deal of interest in the western IPB process with its "go", "slow go", and "no go" terrain, mobility corridors, hydrology overlays and templating of enemy forces. The use of this process to fit terrain to the western defense provides, in the Soviet view, some predictability and opportunities for tactical surprise. The Soviets realize that the side which utilizes terrain more competently gains commensurate advantages.

Selection of the areas of terrain that must be captured is also inseparably associated with determining what key terrain must be defended by the enemy. As the advancing subunits destroy the enemy, they move forward and simultaneously capture lines and areas of terrain. In other words, destroying the enemy and capturing lines and areas of terrain make up a single process....

In an offensive, in order to create favorable conditions for the destruction of the enemy groupings, the key terrain objectives such as road junctions, populated areas, commanding heights, mountain passes, and crossings over water obstacles must be seized. With the loss of such key terrain, the defending enemy usually loses many important advantages. Maneuver of personnel and equipment becomes more difficult, fire planning, coordination and troop control are disrupted and the attacking forces gain the opportunity to dictate their will on the enemy and exploit their success.

Competent use of terrain for maneuver for the purpose of swiftly reaching the enemy flank and rear, inflicting decisive blows on him, dividing his combat formation and destroying it in detail demonstrates the combat proficiency of subunits.⁴⁹

The Soviet view of future war places a premium on disrupting or preempting the enemy defense in order to avoid being struck by enemy nuclear weapons or high precision weapons and having to overcome a linear defense. Future war, as Soviet planners assess, will be fought in terms of meeting engagements, preemptive maneuvers of forward detachments, and attacks against an enemy in a partially prepared or unprepared defense. The Soviet shift toward missions defined in terms of terrain or in terms of terrain and a line support this view of future war. Reznichenko noted that in developing new offensive tactics:

one must note, that today, when combat operations embrace simultaneously the entire depth of the combat formation of both contending sides, the necessity arises for a positive reassessment of the contents of combat missions of forces on the offensive. In particular, it seems expedient to determine them not by line, as it was done before, but rather by important

area (objective)[rayon (ob"ekt)], the seizure of which will secure the undermining of the tactical stability of the enemy defense.

....troops no longer advance from one line to the next, as in the past war. Instead, they penetrate deep into enemy defenses and develop the offensive in specific directions in coordination with air assault landings in the enemy rear.⁵⁰

Perhaps, one day, the rayon or "goose egg" will replace the line in all Soviet missions. This "goose egg", however, will not be a carbon copy of the western "goose egg" nor will it be derived or applied in the same fashion. The western commander first determines whether his objective is key terrain or the enemy force and then determines his graphics based on the situation. The Soviet's first concern is the destruction of the enemy. He analyzes terrain to determine how it can facilitate surprise, preempt or unhinge the defense and aid or hinder the destruction of the enemy. The Soviet rayon reflects these concerns.

CONCLUSIONS

The Soviet concept of objective depths has changed with the changes in their concept of warfighting. As they now look to the possibility of a Central European war, they envision a conventional war in which precision guided munitions will be employed on a wide scale and one fought under nuclear-threatened conditions. Although force and equipment modernization, increasing holdings of improved artillery, helicopters, and sustainability systems, better planning methods, more proficient commanders and increased tactical competence must facilitate the

conduct of future war, these alone are not sufficient to warrant an increase in objective depths. Rather, increasing objective depths are to a great extent, a function of operational surprise. On the future, fast-paced, highly-lethal battlefield, the Soviets prefer to employ the meeting engagement and the attack against an unprepared defense. Soviet forces must not confront a linear battlefield in which they have to "gnaw through" one prepared defense after another. In order to avoid the linear battlefield, the Soviets believe that they must obtain operational surprise to preempt the defense through the employment of forward detachments and deep attack forces. With operational surprise, the defending enemy they would encounter would be in hasty or partially-prepared defenses. This is the scenario which the Soviet planners prefer and for which they have created their objective depths.

Soviet objective depths against a defending enemy in hasty or partially prepared positions are as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Immediate Mission</u>	<u>Subsequent Mission</u>
Battalion	Rear of enemy battalion	Rear of enemy brigade
Regiment/ Brigade	Rear of enemy brigade	Destruction of reserve brigade
Division/ Corps	Destruction of reserve brigade	Rear of enemy division
Army	Rear of enemy corps	Rear of enemy army group
<u>Front</u>	Rear of enemy army group	Key points in enemy COMZ

All the above forces would have a direction of further advance which would facilitate the mission attainment of the

next higher echelon. Forces, particularly divisions, will have additional missions assigned as they attack through their subsequent missions. Forces, such as the army and front, may be given time lines to be reached short of the immediate and long range missions. Should the enemy be in a prepared defense, defending along a major river line or in a fortified region, the objective depths will be decreased to those shown on page 5.

The changing Soviet concept of future war will require units which are organized and equipped differently than today. Units will need to be more self-sufficient on the fragmented future battlefield. New missions will require new structure. The evident Soviet response envisions the use of a combined arms structure down to battalion level with the combined arms battalion likely becoming the standard maneuver unit of the future.⁵¹ The combined arms battalion with integrated armor, motorized rifle, artillery, air defense, chemical defense and engineer forces, will probably resemble the existing task-organized forward detachment. In discussing maneuver, Reznichenko notes: "Extensive maneuver and simultaneous strikes from the front, flanks, rear and the air are becoming a typical method of combat, not only for formations and units [division/corps and regiment/brigade], but also for battalion tactical groups."⁵² With such a structure, competent leadership, and surprise, achievement of the tactical depths developed by Soviet planners would be possible.

Objective depths, however, are only guidelines for the commander and planner. They will not be blindly applied, but will be adjusted to the reality of each impending combat action. They will change depending on the nature of the defense, the terrain, the morale and training of the enemy and one's own forces, etc. The increased objective depths are a reflection of the Soviet concepts of surprise, maneuver and the nonlinear battlefield and are a logical extension of the Soviet application of military science to the problem of conventional war under nuclear-threatened conditions in an environment of increasing conventional lethality.

ENDNOTES

1. Historically, Soviet line forces have been organized along the regimental and division structure. Forces which perform specialized functional missions, such as deep reconnaissance, operational maneuver, exploitation, deep attack and raids, and specialized fire missions, have been organized as brigades and corps.
2. S. F. Akhromeyev, et al. (2 ed), Voyennyi entsiklopedicheskiy slovar' [Military encyclopedic dictionary], (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1986), 85. Use of the terms "large formation, formation, unit and subunit" may be confusing to the reader. Generally, a large formation can be equated to a field army, a formation to a division or corps, a unit to a regiment or brigade and a subunit to a battalion or smaller tactical entity.
3. V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika [Tactics], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966), Translated by Foreign Technology Division, FTD-MT-67-35, 173.
4. V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika [Tactics], (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1987), 196.
5. Reznichenko, Taktika, 1966 ed., 173.
6. Department of the Army, FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army-Operations and Tactics, (Washington, D.C., 1984), 5-14.
7. Ibid., 5-15.
8. D. F. Loza, C. I Garbuz and I.F. Sazonov, Motostrelkovyy batal'on v sovremennom boyu [The motorized rifle battalion in modern combat], (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1965), p. 36.
9. Ibid., 35.
10. Ibid.
11. V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika [Tactics], (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1984), 92.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., Diagram 3.
14. The Soviets admit that the production of the 1984 Taktika was rushed and that there are errors, inconsistencies, and omissions which have been corrected in the 1987 Taktika - see P. Kukushkin's "Voenizdat v 1987 godu" [The military publishing house in 1987], Voyennyi vestnik [Military herald], No.2

(February 1987), 92. Furthermore, in the book review of the 1984 Taktika this specific illustration is singled out as one suffering from inconsistency with regulations and containing annoying, minor mistakes. The author believes that the immediate mission of the second echelon company is actually in the rear of the reserve platoon-as illustrated in the 1987 Taktika. For the book review, see V. Lobov, "Taktika" [Tactics], Voyennyy vestnik [Military herald], No. 9 (September 1985), 89-91.

15. Reznichenko, Taktika, 1987 ed., 196-197.

16. Ibid., Illustration 3.

17. P. Konoplya, "Nastupleniye: Vchera i segodnya" [The offensive: Yesterday and today], Voyennyy vestnik [Military herald], No. 12 (December 1987), 23.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. D. A. Dragunskiy, Motostrelkovyy (tankovyy) batal'on v boyu [The motorized rifle (tank) battalion in combat], (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1986, 46.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 46-47.

23. Ibid. 47.

24. Ibid. Second echelon forces are given their mission at the same time as first echelon forces and include exploitation, actions to be taken in event of a shift in the main effort, expected enemy counterattack actions and plans to deal with those counterattack actions, and destruction of bypassed forces. Reserve forces are given contingency missions that arise during the course of battle.

25. Ibid. 47-48.

26. A. S. Noskov, Motostrelkovaya (tankovaya) rota v boyu [The motorized rifle (tank) company in combat], (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1988), 52-53.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., Illustration 4.

29. Ibid.

30. Dr. Jacob Kipp during discussions at the Soviet Army Studies Office.

31. D. L. Smith and A. L. Meier, "Ogarkov's Revolution-Soviet Military Doctrine for the 1990s", International Defense Review, July 1987, 869-873.

32. Reznichenko, Taktika, 1987 ed., 73-74.

33. Ibid., 74.

34. The Soviet use of deception and concealment (maskirovka) to achieve surprise is a topic which cannot be covered in depth here, but is crucial to the achievement of modern objective depths. For initial study of the topic, I recommend the following SASO papers: "Soviet Use of War Experience: A Deception Case Study" by David M. Glantz; "Surprise and Maskirovka in Contemporary War" by David M. Glantz. I further recommend the Combat Studies Institute Special Study Soviet Operational Deception: The Red Cloak by Richard N. Armstrong. In 1986, M. M. Kir'yan published a book entitled The Element of Surprise in Offensive Operation of the Great Patriotic War which is available in JPRS translation JPRS-UMA-87-006-L dated 5 June 1987.

35. Reznichenko, Taktika, 1987 ed., 279-290. A. A. Siderenko, "Vstrechnyy Boy" [Meeting engagement], Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya [Soviet military encyclopedia] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), 2: in 407-408.

36. There are numerous indications that the Soviets may be changing from a regimental to a brigade structure and from a division to a corps structure. The Hungarian forces have already done so. David M. Glantz discusses this issue in the 1989 Soviet Army Studies Office paper "Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform" [See endnote 51]. Therefore, this paper is examining the objective depths of a regiment and a brigade - and a division and a corps synonymously.

37. Reznichenko, Taktika, 1987 ed., 195.

38. S. V. Grishin, Soyedineniya i chasti v boyu [Formations and units in battle], (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1985), 209, 219, 223.

39. Ibid., 238, 245.

40. John G. Hines, "Soviet Front Operations in Europe-Planning for Encirclement", Spotlight on the Soviet Union, (Oslo, Forsvarets Hogskoleforening, 1986), 100. It should be noted that the Army and frontal OMGs that are depicted on the chart were not part of the Voroshilov lectures of that time. The work on OMGs was either on-going or just about to start at the time of the lectures. John Hines, through careful research and analysis,

developed the time phasing for OMG insertion. The author is quite comfortable with this OMG depiction. Though this is not the place for a detailed discussion of the OMG, it should be noted that the OMG may not be the final or ideal solution for the problem of deep operations.

41. N. K. Glazunov and N. C. Nikitin, Operatsiya i boy [Operations and battle], (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1983), 194.

42. The Soviets cite West German sources, when stating that a division will take 6-8 hours to establish a hasty defense, up to 48 hours to establish a partially prepared defense, and 4 to 5 days to establish a fully prepared defense. See p. 25 of A. Yegorov's "Tankovaya diviziya bundesvera v oborone" [The tank division of the Bundeswehr in the defense], Zarubezhnoye Voennoye Obozreniye [Foreign Military Review], Moskva: Voenizdat, January, 1987.

43. Dragunskiy, 87, 132. It should be noted that missions often also include the time by which the action must be completed and the manner in which it will be accomplished.

44. David M. Glantz, "Spearhead of the Attack: The Role of the Forward Detachment in Tactical Maneuver," (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1988), 8.

45. F. D. Sverdlov, Peredovyye otryady v boyu [Forward detachments in combat], (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1986), 79.

46. Desant forces (airborne, air assault and amphibious forces) with a raid mission can have a terrain or target objective (or a series of terrain and/or target objectives) along a general route of advance.

47. Reznichenko, Taktika, 1987 ed., 291.

48. Ibid., 191-192.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., 200.

51. David M. Glantz, "Soviet Force Structure in an Era of Reform," (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1989). This study discusses several variants of future Soviet force structure in light of current Soviet writings, combat experience, and announced troop reductions.

52. Ibid., 65.

Appendix 1: Objective Depths Against a Defending Enemy

<u>Unit/Reference</u>	<u>Immediate Mission</u>	<u>Subsequent Mission</u>	<u>Further Mission</u>
1st Echelon MRC			
66 Taktika	1st Echelon Company	Direction of Advance	-----
74 Voroshilov	1st Echelon Company	Direction of Advance	-----
84 Bn Night	1st Echelon Company	Direction of Advance	-----
84 Taktika	1st Echelon Company	Direction of Advance	-----
87 Taktika	1st Echelon Company	Direction of Advance	-----
86 MRB(TB)	1st Echelon Company	Direction of Advance	-----
88 MRC(TC)	1st Echelon Company	Direction of Advance	-----
2d Echelon MRC			
74 Voroshilov	Direction of Advance	2d Echelon Company	Direction of Advance
84 Bn Night	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	-----	-----
84 Taktika	Planned line of Deployment	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	Direction of Advance
	Direction of Advance		
87 Taktika	March Formation	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	Direction of Advance
	Planned line of Deployment		
	Direction of Advance		
86 MRB(TB)	March Formation	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	Direction of Advance
	Planned line of Deployment		
	Direction of Advance		
88 MRC(TC)	March Formation	Direction of Advance	
	Brigade Reserve		
	or		
	Destruction of 1st echelon	Direction of Advance	-----
	Battalion strong points		

<u>Unit/Reference</u>	<u>Immediate Mission</u>	<u>Subsequent Mission</u>	<u>Further Mission</u>
1st Echelon TC			
66 Taktika	1st Echelon Company	Direction of Advance	-----
84 Bn Night	1st Echelon Company	Direction of Advance to MRB	-----
		Immediate Mission	
84 Taktika	Same as 1st Ech MRC	Direction of Advance to MRB	-----
		Immediate Mission	
87 Taktika	Same as 1st Ech MRC	Direction of Advance to MRB	-----
		Immediate mission	
86 MRB(TB)	Same as 1st or 2d Ech MRC	Same as 1st or 2d Ech MRC	Same as MRC
88 MRC(TC)	Same as 1st or 2d Ech MRC	Same as 1st or 2d Ech MRC	Same as MRC
1st Ech MRB			
65 MRB	1st Echelon Battalion	Direction of Advance	-----
66 Taktika	1st Echelon Battalion	Direction of Advance	-----
74 Voroshilov	1st Echelon Company (H+1/2)	1st Echelon Battalion (H+2/3)	Direction of Advance
FM 100-2-1	Fwd Plt & Co Strongpoints	Direction of Advance	-----
84 Bn Night	1st Echelon Battalion	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	Direction of Advance
84 Taktika	1st Echelon Battalion	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	Direction of Advance
87 Taktika	1st Echelon Battalion	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	Direction of Advance
86 MRB (TB)	1st Echelon Battalion	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	Direction of Advance
88 MRC (TC)	1st Echelon Bn (unprepared)	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	Direction of Advance
	or		
	1st Echelon Co (prepared)	1st Echelon Battalion	-----
2d Ech MRB (TB)			
72 TB	1st Echelon Battalion	Direction of Advance	-----
74 Voroshilov	Direction of Advance	Brigade Rear	Direction of Advance
FM 100-2-1	-----	1st Echelon Bn Rear	-----
84 Bn Night	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	-----	-----
84 Taktika	Direction of Advance	Brigade rear minus rear most reserve infantry platoon	Direction of Advance
		Brigade rear	
87 Taktika	Direction of Advance	Division or Bde (Regt)	Direction of Advance
86 MRB (TB)	-----	Reserve	Direction of Advance
		Brigade Rear	
74 Voroshilov	Direction of Advance		Direction of Advance

<u>Unit/Reference</u>	<u>Immediate Mission</u>	<u>Subsequent Mission</u>	<u>Further Mission</u>
1st Ech Tk Bn			
66 Taktika	1st Echelon Battalion	Direction of Advance	-----
70 DIA	1st Echelon Battalion	Direction of Advance	-----
72 TB	1st Echelon Battalion	Direction of Advance	-----
84 Taktika	1st Echelon Battalion	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	Direction of Advance
87 Taktika	1st Echelon Battalion	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	Direction of Advance
86 MRB (TB)	1st Echelon Battalion	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	Direction of Advance
88 MRC (TC)	1st Echelon Battalion	Brigade (Regt) Reserve	Direction of Advance
1st Ech MRR			
74 Voroshilov	1st Echelon Bn (H+2/3)	Brigade Rear (H+6/7)	Direction of Advance
FM 100-2-1	1st Echelon Company	1st Echelon Battalion	-----
84 Taktika	1st Echelon Battalion	Brigade rear minus rearmost reserve infantry platoon	Direction of Advance
87 Taktika	1st Echelon Battalion	Brigade Rear	Direction of Advance
86 MRB (TB)			
2d Ech MRR			
FM 100-2-1	-----	Brigade Rear	-----
Tank Regt			
74 Voroshilov	Direction of Advance	Direction of Advance	Division Reserve
1st Ech MRD			
74 Voroshilov	Brigade Rear (H+6/7)	Division Reserve (H+8/10)	Division Rear
FM 100-2-1	Enemy Battalion Rear	Enemy Brigade Rear	Division Rear
84 Taktika	Enemy Brigade Rear	-----	-----
87 Taktika	Enemy Brigade Rear	-----	-----
2d Ech MRD			
74 Voroshilov	Uncommitted from D 'til D+2/3	Corps rear at D+5/8	Direction of Advance

<u>Unit/Reference</u>	<u>Immediate Mission</u>	<u>Long Range Mission</u>	<u>Further Mission</u>
1st Ech Army			
74 Voroshilov	Corps rear at D+2/3	Army group rear at D+5/8	Direction of Advance
2d Ech Army			
74 Voroshilov	Uncommitted 'till D+5/8	Key points in COMZ at D+11/14	Subsequent Operation
1st Ech Front			
74 Voroshilov	Army group rear at D+5/8	Key points in COMZ at D+11/14	Subsequent operation

65 MRB = D. F. Loza, Motorized Rifle Battalion in Modern Combat, 1965.
 66 Taktika = V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika, 1966.
 70 DIA = DIA, Soviet Armed Forces Medium Tank Battalion, 1970.
 72 TB = P. I. Konoplya, Tank Battalion in Combat, 1972.
 74 Voroshilov = Lecture materials from the Voroshilov Academy of the General Staff, 1974 (approx).
 FM 100-2-1 = U. S. Army FM 100-2-1, The Soviet Army, 1984.
 84 Bn Night = A. A. Rybyan, Subunits in Night Attack, 1984.
 84 Taktika = V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika, 1984.
 86 MRB (TB) = D. A. Dragunskiy, Motorized Rifle (Tank) Battalion in Combat, 1986.
 87 Taktika = V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika, 1987.
 88 MRC (TC) = A. S. Noskova, Motorized Rifle (Tank) Company in the Attack, 1988.

MRC = Motorized Rifle Company
 TC = Tank Company
 MRB = Motorized Rifle Battalion
 TB = Tank Battalion
 MRR = Motorized Rifle Regiment
 MRD = Motorized Rifle Division