Soviet War Experience: A Deception Case Study
Abstract
Maskirovka deception has always been a primary consideration in Soviet planning and conduct of military operation. Combat experience has demonstrated that successful maskirovka yields surprise and hence marked advantage over the enemy. Soviet concern for maskirovka dates to the pre-Second World War years when military theorists worked out the theoretical basis for its conduct and real measures for its implementation on the battlefield. By the late 1930s Soviet planners at front and army level were expected to employ maskirovka planning in each military operation. Specifically planners prepared extensive operational maskirovka plans which tied specific measures and techniques to a single set of deception aims. During the initial phases of the Great Patriotic War (Russo-German War) combat circumstances associated with wholesale German success prevented widespread Soviet use of maskirovka planning. However, in 1942 when the momentum of war began swinging in the Soviet's favor that planning began anew. As was the case in other areas it would take considerable practice before those plans would realize their full potential. The attached document is taken from a Soviet general staff analysis of war experiences. It contains a early Soviet maskirovka plan and a critique of how well the plan worked.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 1988
- Accession Number
- ADA216428
Entities
People
- David M. Glantz