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
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STUDENT REPORT

SOUTH AMERICA:
U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

MAJOR JOSE A. NEGRON JR. 88-1960

"insights into tomorrow"



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PREFACE

The defense of North America is the primary concern of U.S. policy makers. However, world events have influenced U.S. policy makers to neglect the defense of the Western Hemisphere. This study examines the significant force functions (factors) influencing current and future stability in South America.

In understanding the force functions influencing U.S. national security interests in South America the paper focuses on the physical assets and capabilities of the continent; reviews the major Third World characteristics found in South America; summarizes past and current U.S. national policies; and discusses external and internal threats of the continent as they relate to U.S. national security policies. Finally, the last chapter analyzes U.S. national security policies and the military instrument of power used in influencing those policies.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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"insights into tomorrow"

REPORT NUMBER

88-1960

AUTHOR(S)

MAJOR JOSE A. NEGRON, JR., USAF

TITLE

SOUTH AMERICA: U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

I. Purpose: To examine the significant force functions (factors) influencing current and future stability in South America. Also, determine how the United States instruments of power have been and will be used in encouraging the stability of the continent. The study's emphasis was placed on the U.S. military instrument.

II. Problem: In the last four decades, the U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere has declined. U.S. national security policies toward South America have been influenced by North-South, East-West, and bipolar and multipolar perspectives. Challenging U.S. policy makers is the coordination of U.S. instruments of power in the region. By applying these instruments of power against significant force functions the current and future stability of South America will be determined.

III. Data: Traditionally, U.S. national security policies have considered the Western Hemisphere a low threat area. Yet, U.S. security and diplomatic relations with South America in the last four decades have been very fragile. Internal and external force functions which were evident forty years ago continue to

CONTINUED

plague U.S. policy makers today. The force functions influencing the continent are grouped into four categories-- sociological, economic, military, and nationalistic factors. Trying to influence these force functions, the U.S. has projected the three instruments of power, thus assuring U.S. national policies are met. Two major external and internal force functions are encountered in South America. The major external factors are the nation-states territorial disputes and foreign government interference. The two major internal threats are drug trafficking and insurgent activities. Soviet force projection into this area has concerned U.S. policy makers. While the U.S. has projected its instruments of power in the area, legislative restrictions have diminished their total contribution.

IV. Conclusions: The defense of North America is the primary concern of U.S. policy makers. However, world events have influenced policy makers to neglect the defense of the hemisphere. In so doing, our southern neighbors have courted other major world powers. Thus, a global interdependency has been achieved by some of these South American countries. As a result, Soviet influence has increased in the region due to inconsistent U.S. foreign policies. Therefore, a coordinated effort in the application of U.S. instruments of power must be established. The military instrument can play a major role in representing a positive influence on U.S. foreign policy.

V. Recommendations: In promoting regional security the governments of South America and the U.S. must establish major military exercises. In conjunction with these exercises, military civic action programs would be performed with the local governments to counter current force functions. To continue regional participation and counter these force functions a low-intensity conflict center would be established. This center would provide civilian and military leaders an understanding of Third World conflicts. Finally, a coordinated effort in the use of the U.S. instruments of power -- political, economic, and military -- would be provided by the establishment of a federal regional agency.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

During the past four decades, the United States global stature and influence has declined in the Western Hemisphere. The decline of the United States influence is attributed to post World War II political, economic, and military events (15:17). Additionally, affecting United States national security policies towards South American countries were East-West conflicts, North-South differences, and bipolar-multipolar perspectives. Secretary of State George Shultz emphasized these differences, but at the same time, underlined the importance of our relationship:

For much of the past generation, there has been a tendency to focus on what divides the peoples and nations of the Americas. We all know the refrains of division and doubt Differences there are, but these litanies ignore more powerful realities: we are united by geography; we are united by the course of history; and we are united by choice... (32:65).

The continued stability of South America is contingent on U.S. policy makers understanding current and future national security requirements in the region. Fundamentally, the national security strategy is the linchpin to the security and defense of North America (14:3). Meanwhile, the application of U.S. national security policies are influenced by South America's nationalism, interdependency, and self-interest (4:4). Therefore, the objective of this study is to determine the significant force functions (factors) influencing the continent of South America and analyze the affect of the force functions on current and future hemispheric stability. In addition, the study assesses the United States resolve in conducting future national security policies.

FORCE FUNCTIONS

Force functions are factors influenced by the interaction of domestic, regional, and international events or actors. These factors are responsible for influencing United States national security policies. The three instruments of power -- political, economic, and military -- are the means through which U.S.

national security policies are conducted. The interrelationship of these instruments forms the basis for effective foreign policy (14:9-11).

South America's national and international problems are derived from an array of Third World characteristics. These characteristics are significant factors in destabilizing the region, thus influencing U.S. national security policy. Influencing U.S. policies towards South America are four major force functions: (1) sociological -- extreme poverty, tremendous population growth rate, extreme social services needs, and urbanization, (2) economic -- steep inflation, tremendous debt, and high unemployment, (3) military -- growth in size and military expenditures to combat internal and external forces, and (4) nationalistic -- independence from superpower ideologies (8:158).

SOUTH AMERICA'S INTERESTS

In the last 20 years, an adversarial view emerged between the United States and South America, especially in the more progressive nation-states of the region. Consequently, foreign aid was reduced or totally withdrawn, diplomatic and military missions declined in size, and U.S. investors sought more profitable ventures elsewhere (35:1). These actions encouraged the countries of South America to establish a global perspective in dealing with their domestic and international environment. Domestically, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela emerged more prosperous than other Third World countries. This progressive nature reinforced their self-confidence in controlling their own destinies (11:158). Internationally, other actors such as the Soviet Union, Japan, France, Germany, Spain, and some Eastern bloc countries immersed themselves in the region (35:1).

As a result, South American nations became intertwined in the global community. This international interdependency is continuing for these Third World countries. Also, emerging from these South American countries are strong democratic ideals; over 90% of the countries have established democratic governments (16:79). However, continuing economic crises, rising international instability of democratic governments, violations of human rights, the exportation of narcotics, and a strong sense of nationalistic fervor have strained South American courtship with Washington (35:1).

UNITED STATES INTERESTS

The Western Hemisphere increased interaction in the world community has influenced U.S. policy makers. As a result, U.S.

national security policies in the region were established to protect U.S. strategic interests. In the last four decades, the following strategic interests were established: availability to raw materials and economic markets, continued military balance in the region which avoided the diversion of resources to the hemisphere, an opportunity to attain bases and facilities, and finally, securing the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in the region (11:150).

U.S. interests were restrained from addressing the important issues in the region by post World War II events. For instance, rebuilding Japanese and German infrastructures diverted U.S. resources from the Western Hemisphere. Above all, influencing U.S. national security strategy was the postwar policy of Soviet containment. During this time, the Soviet Union and its surrogates' redirected U.S. efforts to Western Europe, Korea, and Vietnam.

However, U.S. instruments of power were applied sporadically in Latin America to secure U.S. and Western Hemisphere interests. Direct application of U.S. instruments of power were projected in Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1962, the Dominican Republic in 1965, Panama in the 1970's, Nicaragua in the 1980's, and Grenada in 1983 (9:158). As early as 1815, the projection of power to secure the interests of the hemisphere was embraced by President James Madison. He stated, "The U.S. considers any attempt to extend other systems to this hemisphere dangerous to our peace and safety" (29:2). In reemphasizing the security interests of the hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine was "enunciated 150 years earlier as the sole authority" for intervention (29:2).

The Western Hemisphere has traditionally taken a low priority in U.S. strategic planning during in the postwar period. Recent events, such as regional disputes, increased insurgency activities, and Soviet and surrogate influences, have highlighted the vulnerability of the region (11:5). In understanding the force functions influencing U.S. national security strategy in South America this paper focuses on the physical nature and capabilities of the continent; reviews major Third World characteristics found in South America; summarizes past and current U.S. national policies; and discusses external and internal threats of the continent as they relate to the United States national security policies. Finally, the last chapter analyzes U.S. national security policies and the military instrument of power used in influencing those policies.

The interrelationships of these force functions make up the complexity of this region today. To limit the scope of this paper major economic and political factors are only highlighted. These elements must be further studied by other researchers. This study emphasizes the military instrument of national policy.

Chapter Two

SOUTH AMERICA

Influencing United States national security policies are the perceptions of U.S. policy makers. Therefore, a review of the continent's heritage, traditional geographic features, future expectations, and strategic significance is in order. Overall, U.S. interests are underlined by geopolitical considerations.

MONOLITHIC SOCIETY

The most glaring misunderstanding of the past, was the use of the collective term, "Latin America." This collective term was used by U.S. policy makers in referring to the countries and islands in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean Basin (see map Appendix A). This artificial designation is still used today. Naturally, this nomenclature has created a misunderstanding between U.S. policy makers and the emerging economic countries of South America. Historical factors limit the future use of the term "Latin America" to identifying the area in geographic terms only. This relationship becomes evident, with the 33 independent states and 24 dependencies, representing 57 separate political units (1:5).

Three major characteristics have influenced the 57 political units in Latin America. First, each nation was influenced by a European power. South America was colonized by the five colonial powers -- France, England, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. Second, if homogeneity existed, the languages of the region influenced this perception, since 98% of the population speaks Spanish, Portuguese or French. The third commonality held in the region was the strong belief in Roman Catholic views (2:1). The rich traditional heritage, the languages, and common religious views all contributed to the misconceptions of the region.

GEOGRAPHY

The continent of South America is comprised of 6.8 million square miles and extends 7000 miles from north to south. This is approximately the same distance traveled from London, England to Cape Town, South Africa. In fact, the Pacific coast of South America lies roughly south of Washington D.C. Sixteen hundred

nautical miles (1600 nm) separate the easternmost shore of the continent from the African coast. South American cities are as close to the European landmass as they are to the U.S. New York is further from Rio de Janeiro than Lisbon (12:2). In short, Moscow is as close to Santiago, Chile, as New York (15:20).

Twelve countries and one dependency form the continent of South America (see map Appendix B). These countries are Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, Surinam, Guyana, Venezuela, and the dependency of French Guiana (1:5). This area alone contains 85% of the landmass and 70% of the population in Latin America (1:7).

Of the thirteen political units, Brazil occupies half of the continental landmass with Argentina enclosing another quarter. The remaining fourth being shared by the other eleven political units (10:177-178). Argentina and Brazil have emerged as Third World leaders while Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela compete for regional influence (35:1).

The continent's natural land features are divided into four major sections. The subdivisions are 25% mountainous, 25% rain forest, 10% desert or semi-arid, and the remaining 40% encompassing habitable flat lands (12:2). Four major river systems are present in the continent: the Amazon, La Plata, Orinoco, and Magdalena. The Amazon River basin alone has 2000 tributaries and 10,000 miles of navigable waterways. The Amazon River carries 14 times the volume of water as the Mississippi. This underdeveloped river basin, even today, is a sanctuary for an estimated 2000 primitive Indians (22:18A).

Another important geographic feature which has limited the economic growth of the region has been the Andean Cordillera Mountains, known as the Andean Ridge. These mountains form the longest mountain chain in the world and are second only to the Himalayas in altitude (10:178). Both of these natural features, the mountains and rivers, have limited the influence of the transportation network, hindered the exploitation of natural resources, and restrained the industrial and commercial development of South America (12:2).

Geography, an obstacle for communication and the exploitation of minerals, has influenced the continent's two major negative social trends--urbanization and population distribution (3:3). Demographics in Latin America between 1960 and 1980, revealed the most striking changes in the region. In 1960, 200 million persons inhabited this area. One-third of its population lived in cities which had over 20,000 residents. By 1980, the population total was over 400 million or twice that of the U.S. Twenty five cities in Latin America each had over a million inhabitants. Brazil contained nine of them (7:9). Consequently, Brazil the size of the United States, saw 90% of its population

inhabiting only 30% of its land (3:42). The capital of Brazil, Brasilia, was built in the interior of the country in an effort to disperse its population (3:43). These two social conditions plague most of South America today.

A MAJOR PLAYER

An international leader in the world community in terms of political, economic, and military strength has not yet emerged from a South American country. Although, in the last two decades Brazil's aspiration toward the attainment of this lofty goal is remarkable. Other countries are following Brazil's example. To this end, regional interaction and global interdependency express the region's desire for success (4:15). Its determination for recognition in the world community could make this continent live up to its 1953 billing by J. A. Comacho. In his BBC series on Latin America, he stated these facts:

But even in those zones that are already peopled and developed, the national wealth is great. Argentina is one of the granaries of the world; Venezuela the world's largest exporter of petroleum; Chile one of the most important suppliers of copper; Bolivia one of the main suppliers of tin. The wealth of Brazil is so varied and vast that even an inadequate picture would take up the whole of the period of this talk. In fact, in Latin America there is room for expansion and development, for the increased exploitation of a national wealth, whose exhaustion is not even remotely in sight. And there is a rapidly expanding population, with a rising standard of living. It is not, perhaps, too much to say that Latin America is the land of the future (2:29-30).

Questioned today is Comacho's optimism. The rapid progress of growth has not materialized over the last 35 years. However, renewed interest by foreign investors, increased interdependency with other global powers, and the growth of regional economic markets could eventually contribute to this continent's true growth potential .

Chapter Three

SOUTH AMERICAN REGIONAL ASSESSMENT

From the end of World War II to the late 1970's, South America had successfully avoided a continental war. The continent limited its nation-states' disputes to only minor conflicts. This nonaggression between states, resulted in the economic growth of the region. Industrialization of Latin America occurred between 1960 and 1970 (7:10). This achievement was the direct result of regional governments' commitment to the diplomatic process in avoiding major wars. The text reviews the methods employed in limiting these conflicts and the existing realities which have prevented them.

INTERSTATE CONFLICTS

The strong commitment in resolving regional disputes through diplomatic means limited the major wars in South America (8:141). This resolve from 1943 to 1980 was instrumental in limiting the continent to two major conflicts. The first conflict involved Peru, Chile, and Bolivia in 1970. This conflict erupted over Bolivia's landlocked status. The second conflict in 1978 between Argentina and Chile was the result of territorial disputes over the rights of the Beagle Channel. However, by the early 1980's, diplomatic agreements had given way to wars between nations. This was evident by the conflict of Peru and Ecuador in 1981 and war between Argentina and Great Britain in 1982 (8:143).

Several fundamental principles were responsible in avoiding armed conflicts prior to the 1980's. These principles have encouraged the peaceful resolutions of interstate disagreements. These accommodations were characterized by five major principles. First, Brazilian strong leadership emphasized a policy of disengagement and placed a high degree of confidence in diplomatic negotiations in settling boundary or territorial disputes. After all, Brazil is encircled by all the nations in South America with the exception of two, Ecuador and Chile. Second, the development of a "cooling off" period provided the warring nations an opportunity to assess their consequences. Venezuela and Guyana displayed this instrument of diplomacy between 1970 and 1982 (8:143).

Third, sincerity was necessary in negotiating or arbitrating productive solutions. Argentina and Chile exhibited such faith

by negotiating the Beagle Channel dispute. The negotiation used an intermediary, a Vatican emissary. Fourth, the ability to be flexible and accept a creative resolution involving concessions by both parties. Argentina and Uruguay demonstrated this principle. Both countries agreed to use the La Plata River as a navigational boundary yet showed flexibility in adapting another territorial marker for the exploitation of resources (8:143).

Finally, intermediaries forced the cooperation of the combative parties. The diplomatic efforts of the Organization of American States (OAS) and Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) furnished the needed resolutions required in avoiding these conflicts. Today, a single party or group of states continue to act as mediators (8:143).

FUTURE CONFLICTS

The rapid application of advanced technology, increased militarization of the armed forces, and development of the arms industry in the early 1980's rapidly increased the possibility of future conflicts in South America. The introduction of new technology revived old territorial disputes between nations. The exploitation of offshore hydrocarbons, minerals, and extended fishing rights created an economic bonanza for these underdeveloped countries (8:144).

Increased gross national products (GNP) and the perceived threat of neighboring countries resulted in the military arms build-up. Between 1960 and 1980, Latin American countries experienced a growth rate of 211% in its gross national product. This tremendous growth contributed to the militarization in the South American countries. This enabled Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela to build-up their military capabilities. Peru's military arsenal improved in its quality by the acquisition of Soviet arms. These purchases significantly influenced Ecuador and Chile to increase their military arms (8:145).

Therefore, the pressure to build-up a credible military force resulted in the development of an arms industry. The growth of this industry was tremendous. Regional markets as well as international markets were established. The developing countries of Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela were encouraged by the prosperity and industrialization attained through this industry. Establishing a credible arms exporting industry were Argentina and Brazil. In the early 1980's, Brazil's arms industry was surpassed only by Israel and South Africa among Third World countries (8:146).

Even today, South America's military establishments are mobilized for internal defense rather than for external adventurism. Limited war is possible, but discouraged by the

political, economic, and military realities.

POLITICAL REALITIES

The 1980's economic crises contributed to the successful return of civilian rule to all but two South American countries--Chile and Paraguay (3:1). These governments have "traditionally been military-oriented with the armed forces command and government being effectively synonymous" (24:1). During the last eleven years the U.S. has led a campaign for democratization of Latin America. In 1976, only 34% of Latin American countries had established democratic forms of government. Today, it is seen at 91% (19:58). Democratization is in jeopardy due to the old social and political problems, economic woes, and the region's population explosion.

ECONOMIC REALITIES

Economically, the turmoil in South America started prior to 1984. A number of factors have contributed to their dismal record. First, the astronomical inflation rate soared from 86% in 1982 to 190% in 1984. Bolivia alone saw 4500% increase in 1985 and Argentina's was above 1000%. Second, increased unemployment and lower earnings have spawned social unrest throughout the continent. The governments accused the International Monetary Fund of requiring them to implement "austere measures" against their populations in order to secure future loans (3:2).

Third, capital flight by the wealthy encouraged economic stagnation and nationalization of commercial property. This undermined the underdeveloped infrastructure that existed. Finally, the overwhelming external debt of \$420 billion for Latin America required an interest payment of \$32 billion. Interest rates that were attained at a fix rate of 13-15% (3:2).

MILITARY REALITIES

The economic crisis resulted in the deceleration of military purchases from internal and external sources. However, countries such as Brazil and Argentina continued their arms exporting business. This industry is perceived to guarantee these countries continued industrialization and economic growth.

The United States arms transfers to South America have been very erratic. The President and the Congress have disagreed over the employment of national policies furthering the instability of the region. Between 1951 and 1968 policies were very supportive of military arms sales and training. However, aid was linked to

the elimination of communist guerrillas. Emphasis on countering these insurgent movements have preoccupied the military and political establishments of the U.S. and South America.

U.S. military aid is only provided to countries with strong established human right agreements. As a result, the reduction of military aid to Brazil and the eventual loss of a 25 year-old military pact occurred through such violations (3:48). The restrictions on military aid, arms sales, and weapons use have encouraged these countries to find alternate suppliers.

South America's economic prosperity depends on the political and military stability of the region. U.S. policies have at times encouraged such resolutions, while at the same time discouraged such actions. John C. Whitehead, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, stated before the Mid-America Committee in February 1987: "The serious mismatch between our policies and our resources creates vacuums that others can -- and will -- exploit to their advantage" (34:2).

Chapter Four

AMERICA'S RELATIONSHIP

U.S. INVOLVEMENT

Five distinct periods have evolved in the relationship between the Latin American countries and the United States. This involvement was first observed from 1820 to 1880 with the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine. However, minimal contact between the United States and its southern neighbors was evident during this period. The second significant era occurred in 1880 to 1930 with the expansion of "imperialism" and the "big stick" policy. The third engagement was from 1930 to 1945, reflecting the "Good Neighbor" policy. Our fourth period was 1945 to 1959, a period affected by the Cold War, anti-communism, and "benign neglect." Finally, from 1959 to the 1980's the U.S. was influenced by the Cuban Revolution, the Alliance for Progress, Marxist and Soviet influence in the hemisphere, political polarization, and ideological confrontations (3:15).

South America's international influence increased during the postwar era. The Rio Treaty of 1947 formalized the establishment of the "Inter-American System" for the mutual defense of the Western Hemisphere. The establishment of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948 continued South American international influence. This alliance was a diplomatic effort formed to "promote the peaceful settlement of trade" (4:8).

The 1948 organization, encouraged U.S. leadership to establish training programs, defense councils, and resources for joint exercises. The OAS supported various educational, agricultural, and industrial activities which were provided by U.S. economic and technical assistance programs (7:27). Due to the nature of the OAS agreement, different priorities began to emerge between the U.S. and Latin America. The U.S. considered the alliance the tool for the "containment" of communism. The Latin American countries envisioned the alliance as the instrument for solving their economic and social problems (4:8-9).

The divergence in priorities had Latin American countries questioned the sincerity of U.S. commitment to the region. Latin American governments had envisioned another "Marshall Plan" to

solve their social and economic problems. However, the aspiration for such a plan in the hemisphere was defeated by the OAS Caracas meeting in 1954. The lack of consensus for the plan initiated the turning point in U.S. economic and political unity in the Western Hemisphere (7:28).

To overcome the strong resentment of U.S. policies, the Kennedy administration initiated the Alliance for Progress. This new policy contributed to the resurgence of U.S. influence in the region. It established the most comprehensive political, economic, and military security package seen since the Cuban Revolution (7:29). The new political package would rekindle economic growth, expand the middle class, initiate social reforms, encourage democratic governments, and enhance internal stability in the area. The administration aspired to the elimination of poverty and inequalities in order to maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere. The objective of the Alliance was to remove the seeds of instability (7:29). In reality, the Alliance never materialized to its full potential.

Nationalism in South America continued to gain strength as aggressive U.S. entrepreneurs collided with local governments' national and economic objectives (7:31). President Johnson precipitated the decline of the Alliance as his attention was diverted to U.S. activity in Vietnam (7:38).

The Republican administrations of Nixon and Ford, were also unsuccessful in emphasizing economic growth and commitment to the region. Both of these presidents followed the "Mature Partnership" policy that reduced U.S. involvement in the region. This policy drastically diminished U.S. programs, rhetoric, and presence in Latin America (7:39). It was not until the 1973 Arab oil embargo, that the Ford administration shifted U.S. policy to the "New Dialogue" formula. This new policy was introduced in 1974 by the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere. It was initiated to encourage hemispheric harmony. This policy enabled the Ford administration to reaffirm its Latin American commitment in acquiring petroleum and raw materials from region (7:39-40).

President Carter's administration related to the region in North-South economic terms. The administration was instrumental in shifting U.S. policies by dealing directly with the emerging Third World countries of South America. Also encouraged was the tolerance for "ideological pluralism." The most significant impact throughout his administration was the support for democracy and human rights issues. However, prior to his departure he reverted to earlier administrations policies (7:41-43).

The Reagan administration entered office committed to the re-establishment of U.S. prominence. Achieving such prominence

would be the direct result of private investment or applied military power. Centered around the new package were ideas of containing the Soviet and Cuban influences, restoring a stronger and a more influential alliance, strengthening military commitments, enhancing inter-American institutions, and encouraging continued peace in the hemisphere (7:44).

CONTEMPORARY U.S. POLICIES

"Since the early nineteenth century, the primary interest of the United States in Latin America has been to have a peaceful area, a secured southern flank" (13:34). Committed to this concept was the Reagan administration, as it laid at the heart of the North American defense. This commitment was reflected in the administration's National Security Strategy guide published in January 1987:

U.S. national security policy for the Western Hemisphere seeks... the promotion of democracy, fostering economic development, strengthening dialogue and diplomacy within and among area countries, and contributing to defensive capabilities that allow progress without debilitating external interference ... Our national security requires an emphasis on political and economic support for the hemisphere's democracies and diplomatic initiatives to strengthen alliances (14:14).

President Reagan's security strategies were formulated on the beliefs supported by the four conceptual models. These models are described by President Reagan as:

1. The Credibility Gap: "If the United States cannot respond to a threat near our own borders, why should Europeans or Asians believe we are seriously concerned about threats to them? If we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be in jeopardy."

2. The Munich Syndrome: "If we come to our senses too late, when our vital interests are even more directly threatened, and after a lack of American support causes our friends to lose the ability to defend themselves, then the risks to our security and our way of life will be infinitely greater."

3. The Domino Theory: "Must we accept the destabilization of an entire region"

4. Preventive Interference: "...become the stage for a bold attempt by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua to install communism by force throughout the hemisphere" (9:553-554).

Yet, the reluctance of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru influenced Washington to reconsider its policies (7:47). The emergence of this opposition encouraged the Reagan administration to embrace the new policy of democratization. The new policy established "Support for democracy, the very essence of American society ... becoming the new organizing principle for American foreign policies" (19:70). The new approach enhanced the start of real cooperation between the U.S. and its southern neighbors. Democratization is providing the economic stability and security needed for the future prosperity of the Western Hemisphere.

Chapter Five

SOUTH AMERICA'S REGIONAL SECURITY

South America's military training before 1938 was exclusively European. It was not until the late 1930's that the U.S. formulated a defense plan for the Western Hemisphere. Prior to this time, the only regional military contact was that of the U.S. Navy in Brazil and Peru (6:14). From 1938 to the Cuban Revolution, military missions of the army, navy, and air forces from the United States were established. These missions were located in nine major states of South America. The creation and passage of military grants by the U.S. furthered the continental cooperation for regional defense. These grants were first introduced with the passage of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (6:14).

For the following ten years, military grants were available to the countries of South America. These grants aided the local governments in combating the external threats in the region, specifically from communist countries. By 1961, military aid had shifted from hemispheric defense to internal protection (6:16). The Alliance for Progress provided the local governments with new tactics, economic and military aid, and political support. The U.S. supported the "counterinsurgency" activities implemented by these countries. The Cuban communist and indigenous guerrillas were now increasing domestic pressures to undermine established governments (6:16). In the early 1960's, the insurgencies found limited success in Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela. However, Brazil and Bolivia were countries most seriously threatened by this internal unrest (6:81).

Today, similar external and internal force functions are challenging the southern continent. The major external threats encountered are regional disputes and foreign interference. Since 1948, the two internal threats destabilizing the region are economic and political factors. However, Latin Americans primary concerns are not the foreign threats but the domestic crises (9:592-593). These concerns are responsible for the "Inter-American System" and the mutual cooperation seen between the Americas (4:13).

In response to these force functions, three U.S. military security interests were perceived in the Western Hemisphere. U.S. regional policies were formulated for the Western Hemisphere from these three factors. First, the U.S. would

prevent Soviet military expansion and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the hemisphere. Second, it enabled the recurring assessment of Soviet and surrogate activities throughout the region. Finally, it provided the guarantee needed for the delivery of oil and other strategic materials to the U.S. (9:527).

EXTERNAL THREATS

Global rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was not new. However, Russia's increased capability to project forces into the Western Hemisphere was instrumental in renewing U.S. interests (9:599). These concerns arose, not only from hot spots such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada, but the Soviet's increased blue water navy presence in the Atlantic (13:253). Furthermore, military presence was not the only influential tool used by the Soviet Union in developing its Latin American policies. Soviet emphasis increased in trade, diplomacy, and cultural initiatives, thus rivaling U.S. interest in the region (31:104).

The Soviet Academy of Sciences Institute of Latin America established in 1961 is responsible for this new vision. This new approach for the USSR outlined its foreign policy agenda for the 70's and 80's in South America. This new emphasis has significantly increased its diplomatic, commercial, and cultural endeavors while de-emphasizing insurgent policies (30:65). In the 1950's, the Soviets had diplomatic relations with only three countries. Today the number has increased to sixteen (31:104). In South America alone, 10 Embassies, 7 trade offices, 6 civilian technical missions, and 1 military mission are now established (25:2).

Soviet diplomatic success has resulted in the buying and selling of goods from seven South American countries for over fifteen years. By the early 1980's, the Soviets had purchased iron ore and pig-iron from Brazil, acquired tin and machinery from Bolivia, exchanged consumer products with Uruguay, traded nonferrous metals and wool in Peru, imported Colombian coffee, acquired bauxite from Guyana, and purchased large volumes of grain from Argentina (20:75-77).

At the same time, significant Soviet commitment was made in the arms industry. The military benefits received by Peru alone amounted to \$1.5 billion in 1987 (20:78). Soviet gains in South America were directly attributed to U.S. military arms mistakes. For example, when the U.S. Congress denied the sale of F-5s to Peru, the Soviet Union quickly sold them 36 Sukhoi (SU22s) aircraft (5:240).

Two other major Soviet efforts are the cultural and scholastic exchange programs. To aid its cultural exchanges, 16

Russian journals are distributed throughout the major cities in South America. These journals are written in Spanish and Portuguese, two of the most common languages. Magazine distribution is free in Bogota, Colombia; Guayaquil, Ecuador; Lima, Peru; and Caracas, Venezuela (31:107). Another successful venture is the increasing enrollment in its scholastic programs. The number of students attending Soviet institutions has climbed from 2,900 in 1979 to 8,140 in 1984. Definitely, the Soviets provided more scholarships than the U.S. (25:1). Additionally, 2,900 students attended Eastern-bloc schools and 6,400 were educated in Cuba. One-fifth of these students come from Colombia (31:107).

These active and sophisticated Soviet efforts are sustained through aggressive and consistent policies dealing with Latin America. Policies which are continuing and even expanding with Mikhail Gorbachev leadership. The future visit of the Secretary General to this region can be seen as the conformation of these Soviet policies (23:92).

Not only have these new Soviet policies been a concern to U.S. policy makers, but also the region's nuclear proliferation. It was the nuclear proliferation and the use of this new technology which influenced U.S. policy makers to decrease U.S. presence in the region. Latin America's nuclear program began in the 1950's with the United States' Atoms for Peace project. However, in the late 1960's nuclear cooperation between the two continents diminished.

It was this action which encouraged the region to increase its interaction with European companies. British, French, Swiss, Dutch, and Spanish suppliers provided the necessary supplies for South America's nuclear growth. The principal supplier, West Germany, initiated the nuclear growth in Argentina and Brazil (5:245). Nuclear power plants are seen today in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (5:244). The nuclear growth industry has encouraged national pride for the industrialization found in South America. The countries of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela will soon have nuclear power capabilities (5:245). This capability will certainly influence U.S. instruments of power.

INTERNAL THREATS

South America continues to demand its right to self-determination and nonintervention from the U.S. However, economic and political stability are at the core of South America's relationship with the United States'. It is this relationship which has provided the continued support in addressing the internal force functions in the region. The two most important internal force functions in the area are

economic and political factors. Specifically, the increased activities by narcotic traffickers and subversive groups threaten the stability of the local governments (26:2).

The distribution of narcotics from Latin America has resulted in the involvement of U.S. military forces. Operation Blast Furnace utilized U.S. Army helicopters in a series of raids against narco traffickers at the request of Bolivia's government (28:2). Latin America is the source for all cocaine, 4/5 of the marijuana, and 1/3 of the heroin used in the U.S. (28:1).

Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Brazil produce the world's supply of cocaine (28:1). This international activity undermines the fragile existence of many local South American governments. The common links between the U.S. and South American governments is found in the interdiction of these illicit drugs. In April 1986, the Organization of American States adopted a resolution to increase such cooperation against the drug traffickers (28:1).

As mentioned earlier, all the countries in South America have democratic governments except Chile and Paraguay. In fact, Paraguay has the distinction of having the longest ruling dictator in the 20th century in Latin America (35:4). Democratization has not come easily for this socially and economically depressed area. The influences projected by Marxist teachers and insurgent activities are contributing to the governments' instability. Besides this advantage, Communist parties in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia are re-entering the political process (18:95).

In supporting the process of democratization and the termination of narcotic distribution, the U.S. government supports economic and military assistance in the Western Hemisphere. Military training and Peace Corps activities are just a few examples of the aid provided. However, current legislation prohibits certain governments from attending training sessions needed to oppose the very ills that destabilize the South American governments (27:5-6).

U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS

A dichotomy of interests exists between the U.S. and Latin America. South America views the Soviets as business partners in the region, a philosophy expressed by many of the countries in Latin America. These business activities have included construction projects, transportation networks, hydroelectric stations, and other technical enterprises (18:93). In return the Soviet Union have solicited the "Latins" cooperative efforts for bilateral business agreements. This was especially true with Argentina. These transactions have encouraged the Soviet Union

to ask the Argentines for technical advice in modernizing its industries. Increasing such cooperation could result in a joint Soviet-Argentine space venture (18:94).

As the Soviet Union projected a positive perception in the region, the U.S. encountered a foreign policy nightmare. This was the war between Britain and Argentina over the Malvinas Islands. U.S. political clout in the area once again suffered when the U.S. supported Great Britain (17:1). Though Argentina initiated this controversy, it placed the U.S. against the Latin American states. This disagreement has furthered the nationalistic cause of the continent while at the same time fueling anti-Americanism throughout the land (36:13A).

Nevertheless, U.S. national security interests are based on the containment of projected Soviet power (14:3). Therefore, South American geopolitical importance has influenced national security policies. The military command responsible for the security and defense of Latin America is the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) located in Panama. However, uncertainty does exist for the command's headquarters, as it transfers the defense of the Canal to the Panamanian government by the year 2000 (13:166-167).

This event could impact future projection of U.S. forces throughout the Western Hemisphere. More than anything else, a major national security goal of securing the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) may be jeopardized. The SLOCs surrounding South America are divided into three geographic areas known as Caribbean, South Atlantic, and South Pacific (5:219).

The Caribbean sea lanes are considered the most important due to its strategic role in the U.S. international defense commitment. It is the primary route for commercial and naval traffic between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. As a result, the State Department has considered Colombia as the most strategic country in South America since it overlooks both entrances to the Panama Canal (13:215). Thirteen major trade routes lead to the Canal (13:199). President Reagan summarized the importance of this region by the following statement, "The Caribbean ... vital strategic and commercial artery of the United States ... nearly half of our trade, two-thirds of our imported oil, and over half of our strategic minerals pass through the Panama Canal or the Gulf of Mexico" (13:227).

The importance of the South Atlantic has increased as a result of the new supertankers navigating through these sea lanes. Challenging the national policies in the region is the growing threat of the Soviet's blue water navy. These communication lines support the commercial traffic of oil and raw materials enroute to all the major regions of the world,

Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific (5:227).

The South Pacific is significantly less important than the previous two sea lanes. However, the reliance on strategic materials from South America to the U.S. makes this sea lane an item of interest. If the closing of the Panama Canal ever occurred, it would significantly increase the vulnerability of the sea lines of communication around South America.

The U.S. imports about 50% of its strategic minerals from Latin America. Latin America exports thirty minerals as well as petroleum to the United States. Nine of these materials are classified as "essential strategic minerals." Continued delivery of these raw materials are made to the U.S. at a modest rate. Another important factor, is that Brazil contains the largest deposit of unexploited minerals in South America.

Navigating through these sea lanes are the commercial interests of the industrial nations. In fact, these interests are at the heart of U.S. regional security issues. The threat to the sea lines of communication have plagued U.S. policy makers since World War I. Securing these sea lanes and encouraging the stability in the Western Hemisphere are the objectives of the U.S. military instrument of power.

Chapter VI

SUMMARY

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, we have seen U.S. national security policies toward the Western Hemisphere vacillate by world events. Throughout this period, there has been a strong relationship that has bonded the two continents. The proximity of the landmasses and the historical interactions are elements that have encouraged this bonding process. Yet, U.S. security and diplomatic relations with South America in the last four decades have been very fragile. The internal and external force functions that were present in the hemisphere forty years ago continue to plague U.S. policy makers today.

Throughout this study, we have observed the four major force functions influencing United States national security policies in the Western Hemisphere. These force functions are grouped into four general categories: sociological, economic, military, and nationalistic factors. These are Third World characteristics responsible for the instability and security concerns influencing U.S. national security policies. The interrelationships of these force functions have created the destabilizing factors influencing the governments of South America and the United States.

The U.S. continues to apply the three instruments of power to project U.S. national security policies in the Western Hemisphere. It is the combined application of the political, economic, and military instruments of power that effectively enhances U.S. policies. These instruments of power are consistently challenged by external and internal force functions.

In pursuit of U.S. national security interests in Latin America, policy makers have formulated the following four principles: access to raw materials and economic markets, maintenance of the military balance in the region, establishment of military facilities, and securing the sea lines of communications. By applying the instruments of power the U.S. is assured that its national objectives are met.

In supporting the above objectives, the U.S. initiated a new policy of democratization in applying foreign policies. The Reagan administration continues to support this policy. It is a policy that will assure U.S. national security interests in the

Western Hemisphere are maintained. Consequently, the U.S. must display a strong resolve to assure stability in the region.

Threatening this stability are external and internal force functions. The two major external threats that the nation-states of South America encounter are territorial disputes and foreign government interference in internal or external matters. The most serious internal threats encountered are economic and political destabilization.

External influences in South America have contributed to two major wars. The two major wars were Ecuador and Peru in 1981 followed by Argentina and Great Britain in 1982. Both of these conflicts were the results of territorial disputes. Brazil, the largest country in South America, is defending its territory with the capability of nuclear missiles (33:12A). These missiles are capable of striking any country on the continent. Foreign intervention, another external factor, has created a militaristic attitude in the region. Encouraging this attitude was the economic growth of the 1970's and the declining influence of U.S. world power.

The two most destabilizing internal influences in South America are narcotic trafficking and the growth of subversive groups. These two influences jeopardize the present existence of democratic governments in the region. Approximately 91% of Latin American governments have established democratic rule. In South America, all but two countries--Chile and Paraguay--have established democracies.

The decline of U.S. dominance in the South America contributed to other foreign governments establishing strong economic and military ties with U.S. southern neighbors. The Soviet Union has attained over the last 27 years a strong business relationship with South America. Also, it has maintained a strong influence over its surrogate, Cuba. Cuba has given the Soviet Union the ability to project forces into the Western Hemisphere. As a result, continued monitoring of Soviet naval forces is essential in protecting U.S. interests.

Present U.S. legislation restricts the application of the U.S. military instrument of power. This is evident by sporadic military sales and training programs in the region. Limited assistance by the U.S. has resulted in the South American governments establishing their own military arms industry.

CONCLUSIONS

The defense of North America is the primary concern of U.S. policy makers. However, world events have influenced U.S. policy makers to neglect the defense of our own hemisphere.

Pursuit of U.S. interests in other regions of the world has resulted in our southern neighbors courting other major world powers. Their pursuit of economic and social necessities has created a global interdependency.

The growing influence of the Soviet Union in South America is attributed to inconsistent U.S. foreign policies. Policies limiting industrial and technological growth, such as nuclear power, limited U.S. influence among South American countries. The President, Congress, and the rest of the Executive branch must envision the long term threats emanating from the region. Throughout this study we have seen policies incorporated and then fall short of fruition. Thus, these policies are limiting the expectations of both continents, South America and North America.

The most serious threat to U.S. national security policies and South American internal stability in the 1990's will be that of combating drug trafficking and subversive activities. These countries are all coping with the current force functions -- sociological, economic, military, and nationalistic factors. The hardships encountered through these force functions must be dealt with simultaneously. Of the thirteen nations, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela are the nation-states most capable of coping with these threats. This, then, requires U.S. political, economic, and military assistance.

On the other hand; lack of coordination of all three instruments of power has contributed to the ineffectiveness of U.S. policies. Simultaneous application of these instruments are necessary to improve U.S. stature in the region. Past assistance to the area lacks the unity of effort in applying the instruments of national power. If defense of North America lies in a secure "southern flank" then our intent can not stop at our water's edge.

An alliance made by narcotic traffickers and insurgent movements could topple the already fragile democratic governments. An example of the influence that can be projected by these two groups is evident in Peru. The Shining Path, an insurgent movement, has mounted a seven-year insurgency. The growth and sale of narcotics has enabled these insurgents to acquire sophisticated weapons to combat government forces. Their coffers influence the region, thus destabilizing local governments (21:10D). The termination of this cooperation must actively involve U.S. instruments of power. South American governments with U.S. assistance can accomplish this goal.

The military instrument could play a major role in representing the positive influence of U.S. foreign policy. Too often military engagements are not initiated until "shots have been fired." Narcotic and insurgent activities exist in the region. It is necessary that a strong commitment be made to

increase paramilitary and police training to combat this major threat. An effective use of the military instrument of power is the coordination of civic action projects with military exercises. Military civic action projects coordinated with the local government during training exercises support U.S. national security policies.

The four major force functions threaten South America's internal growth and external influence. The continuation of narcotic and insurgent movements will destabilize the region. These force functions will continue to undermine the governments' stability and their ability to counter these threats without U.S. assistance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. To promote regional security in South America, the U.S. and the South American governments must establish major military exercises. These regional exercises will foster good diplomatic relations.
2. Specific military civic action programs must be developed to help local inhabitants. Poverty stricken areas are in desperate need of humanitarian benefits. These efforts could be achieved through military activities with the participation of the local governments. Low-intensity conflict characteristics are encountered by local governments limiting their capabilities to meet initial needs of its people-- schools, roads, wells, etc.
3. Instability in South America is derived from low-intensity conflicts that are initiated by the major force functions. The establishment of a low-intensity conflict center is essential in training civilian and military senior leadership.
4. The continued expansion of U.S. military training and academic scholarships are necessary to project future democratic ideals in the area. These efforts would provide a continuing relationship between both governments.
5. A long term policy with Latin American governments designed to eradicate the distribution of narcotics is necessary. This will require the coordinated efforts of the Executive and Legislative branches in order to control the destabilizing influences in South America.
6. A training center should be established to assist South American governments in developing coordinated narcotic, police, and paramilitary training programs.
7. The increased activity of low-intensity conflicts relating to insurgencies and terrorism necessitate coordination between all

four military services. These activities are at the heart of combating a limited war. Active participation in a low-intensity center is essential.

8. The coordination of the instrument of powers must be attained in order to assure that U.S. interests are achieved in the region.

9. A federal agency must be established to insure the cooperation between the Executive branch -- the State Department and the Department of Defense -- and the Legislative branch in conducting low-intensity conflicts.

10. A coordinated training program for regional experts is required. Training of regional experts starts with a comprehensive understanding of regional issues and a first hand visits to the region. First hand experience is necessary in conducting effective national security policies. The country team should play a major role in training civilian and military cadre.

The implementation of these recommendations by U.S. policy makers will insure that the defense of the Western Hemisphere is maintained. The mutual cooperation in the region will require the coordination of U.S. instruments of power. By understanding U.S. interests and the interests of South America, the future security in the region is assured.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

MAP OF LATIN AMERICA

United States

Mexico

Central America:

- Guatemala
- El Salvador
- Honduras
- Nicaragua
- Costa Rica
- Panama
- Belize

Caribbean:

- Cuba
- Haiti
- Dominican Republic
- Jamaica
- Kingston
- Port-au-Prince
- Santo Domingo
- Puerto Rico
- St. Christopher and Nevis
- Antigua and Barbuda
- Dominica
- St. Lucia
- Barbados
- Trinidad and Tobago
- Port-of-Spain
- Guyana
- Georgetown
- Suriname
- Paramaribo
- French Guiana (Fr.)

South America:

- Venezuela
- Colombia
- Ecuador
- Peru
- Bolivia
- Chile
- Argentina
- Uruguay
- Brazil

Other locations:

- Bermuda (U.K.)
- The Bahamas
- Nassau
- Merida
- San Jose
- Medellin
- Quito
- Guayaquil
- Trujillo
- Lima
- Antofagasta
- Valparaiso
- Santiago
- Concepcion
- Ciudad
- Rosario
- Buenos Aires
- Montevideo
- Rio de Janeiro
- Salvador
- Easter Island (Chile)
- Galapagos Islands (Ecuador)
- Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) (administered by U.K. claimed by Argentina)
- South Georgia (Falkland Islands)
- Cape Horn

Scale 1:50,000,000

0 1000 Kilometers 1000 Miles

Azimuthal Equal Area Projection

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative

APPENDIX

APPENDIX B

MAP OF SOUTH AMERICA

South America

