Soviet Foreign Policy under Gorbachev
Abstract
In the early 1980s the image of the Soviet Union that was at once the 'strongest military power in a world' yet at the same time an 'economic basket case' became the point of departure for a great deal of prognostication and punditry. Allowing for exaggeration in at least one if not both parts of the cliche, the disparity between the Soviet Union's success in amassing military power and its failure in virtually every other sphere of national performance described a paradox of enormous significance for the future of both the USSR and the world order. Precisely what that significance may be was then and remains today a matter of great uncertainty and debate. In the early 1980s some argued that the leaders of a militarily powerful but internally weakened USSR were more likely than ever to resort to external aggression in order to seize crucial new geopolitical positions and resources before their own declining domestic capabilities and more competitive Western adversaries closed their 'window of opportunity'. Since the most striking new evidence of Soviet decline at that time-the CIA's forecast of an imminent downturn in Soviet oil production- coincided roughly with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, this belief led to predictions of a dramatic Soviet breakout into the Persian Gulf calculated to deal a mortal blow to the oil-hungry West. (RRH)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 1986
- Accession Number
- ADA216983
Entities
People
- Arnold L. Horelick
Organizations
- RAND Corporation