

AD-A217 292

DTIC FILE COPY

2



AIR WAR COLLEGE


RESEARCH REPORT

EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN THE
20TH CENTURY AND THE U.S. RESPONSE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM M. F. PHILLIPS

1989

DTIC
ELECTE
JAN 31 1990
S E D



AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION
UNLIMITED

90 01 31 116

AIR WAR COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY

EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN THE
20th CENTURY AND THE U.S. RESPONSE

by

William M.F. Phillips
Lt Col, USAF

A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Lt Col Paul J. Smith

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

March 1989

DISCLAIMER

This study represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government.

Loan copies of this document may be obtained through the interlibrary loan desk of the Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5564 (Telephone: [205] 293-7223 or AUTOVON 875-7233).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Evolution and Impact of Terrorism in the 20th Century and the U.S. Response

AUTHOR: William M.F. Phillips, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

This document
Remarks on some of the historical developments in the phenomenon of modern international terrorism and the developing U.S. policy response. ¹¹ Reviews the changing nature of terrorism in the 20th century, with particular emphasis on the 1960s to the present, while underscoring the resultant evolution of the American policy response.

Some of the more predominant difficulties in coming to terms with the nature of modern terrorism and roadblocks to reducing the scope of international terrorism are identified. (KR)



Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	☒
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By _____	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel William M.F. Phillips is a 1969 graduate of the University of Alabama. He received a B.S. in Political Science and was a distinguished graduate of the AFROTC program. Lieutenant Colonel Phillips received a M.A. in Business and Personnel Management from Websters University, Saint Louis, Missouri.

Lieutenant Colonel Phillips has served in Strategic Air Command, Pacific Air Forces, Commander in Chief Pacific Forces staff, North American Air Defense Command, Air Force Military Personnel Center and Air Training Command. He is a Command Pilot with over 3000 hours in several different aircraft and has over 1000 hours of instructor pilot flying time.

Colonel Phillips is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1989.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
DISCLAIMER.....	ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.....	iv
I INTRODUCTION.....	1
II DEFINING TERRORISM.....	4
Myths and Realities.....	5
Scope of Terrorism.....	8
American Attempts.....	10
III TERRORISM IN THE EARLY 20th CENTURY.....	12
Turn of the Century to the 1960s.....	12
Characteristics in the 1960s.....	14
Patterns and Objectives.....	15
U.S. Policy - Early Nixon Administration.....	16
IV WATERSHED YEARS 1968-1969.....	18
The State of Israel and the PLO.....	20
Israel.....	20
The PLO.....	22
The Six Day War.....	24
Student Uprisings.....	26
International Links.....	28
The Cubans.....	29
The Soviets.....	30
V TERRORISM IN THE 1970s.....	33
Terrorism on the Rise.....	33

Some Firsts in the 1970s.....	34
Munich and U.S. Policy.....	34
Ford Policy 1974-1977.....	37
The Carter Legacy.....	37
VI THE REAGAN ERA.....	39
Early Reagan Policy.....	40
NSDD 138.....	41
Vice Presidential Task Force.....	43
Public Report.....	44
U.S. Policy.....	44
Task Force Report.....	46
Impact of the Report.....	46
Current Policy and Programs.....	50
VII SOME PERSPECTIVES.....	53
State Sponsorship.....	53
Domestic Scene.....	55
Role of the Media.....	57
VIII CONCLUSIONS.....	60
NOTES.....	63
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	68
GLOSSARY.....	71
APPENDIX.....	72

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The following chapters will explore terrorism as it has evolved in the last several decades and develop both a historical and contemporary contextual framework to evaluate the U.S. policy response.

Terrorism is a recurring problem of arguable proportions. The American policy response to terrorism is substantial and ongoing. However some feel, compared to other issues facing mankind, terrorism is insignificant. One of the major problems is defining the term and its implications. One man's terrorist may be another man's patriot and sometimes the line between the patriotic revolutionary and the terrorist is one that is very hard to distinguish.

There are many definitions of terrorism proposed as the world community attempts to seek closure on the phenomenon of modern terrorism. The terrorist enjoys support from various elements in the world community that seem to fall into two general categories. The first category of individuals, communities, and states, see the terrorist as a valid means of supporting interests and provide the terrorist with a support infrastructure. The second category of individuals and groups see the terrorist in somewhat romantic terms as a patriot fighting for a just

cause and support the terrorist without question regarding his motives and methods.

Although terrorists have been with us for centuries, international terrorism as a world phenomenon arrived on the scene in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a result of Arab inability to militarily subdue the state of Israel. The frustrations of the Arab world led to the rise of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as an answer to the might of the Israeli state. At the same time the world witnessed the activities of various "student" groups seemingly dedicated to the overthrow of duly constituted governments and active in their denunciation of "unjust" causes, events, and national policies.

The 1970s witnessed the first proofs of international cooperation and linkage between terrorist groups, and ushered in the first coordinated efforts of the terrorists on an international scope. The American response to international terrorism started to solidify beginning with the Nixon Administration in 1969.

The Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan Administrations' policies in combatting international terrorism have varied. Additionally, there seems to be a difference between official policy, what we say we will do, and actions, the measures taken in each administration to deal with terrorism. The ascendancy of Vice President Bush to the office of President may give increased importance to the findings and recommendations of the Vice President's Task

Force on Combatting Terrorism published in 1986. To date, the record of the impact of that task force is a mixed one. However President Bush and Secretary of State Baker place terrorism high on their list of priorities.

This analysis of international terrorism will explore the U.S. policy response to terrorism across primarily four administrations. The characteristics and traits of terrorism have changed significantly in the 20th century, particularly in the last two decades. The U.S. policy of response to terrorism has evolved along with the changing nature in the tactics and targets of the international terrorist. There are several obstacles in dealing with terrorism to include: the PLO question; misunderstanding of goals and motivation of terrorists and their movements; defining terrorism; the role of the media in terrorist incidents; and the issue of dealing with state sponsorship.

Finally, this report will draw some conclusions on the current nature of terrorism and the likely path U.S. "counter" (proactive) and "anti" (defensive) terrorism policy will follow. Many of the roadblocks in dealing with terrorism are solvable, however the PLO issue is one that is particularly difficult but central to a resolution of the overall terrorism problem.

A glossary of commonly referred to terrorist groups, counterterrorism organizations, and related terms is provided at page 71.

CHAPTER II

DEFINING TERRORISM

The word terrorism evokes emotional response. Terrorism is many different things to different people. One of the central problems in dealing with terrorism, if not the central problem, is finding a definition the world community can agree upon. While several attempts have been made, no one definition covers all cases. Part of the problem of definition is what the Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, L. Paul Bremer III, refers to as "myths and realities" of terrorism. The extent of the threat terrorism poses to the world community is also unclear. As the leader of the free world the United States has sought to resolve exactly what constitutes terrorism, but even within the current government no consensus exists as to a definition. The problem of defining terrorism or just what constitutes a terrorist was dealt with eloquently by Senator Henry Jackson.

The idea that one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries do not blow up buses containing noncombatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters do not set out to capture and slaughter innocent school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters do not assassinate innocent businessmen or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the use of the treasured word freedom to be associated with acts of terrorists.¹

Myths and Realities

Speaking before the Norwegian Atlantic Committee in Oslo, Norway, on February 4, 1988, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, pointed out that much of what is written and said about terrorism has created a mythology which serves to confuse the public and romanticize terrorists instead of creating understanding of the nature and scope of terrorism. Ambassador Bremer identifies three myths in particular that confuse thinking about terrorism. First, if we solve the underlying problem, terrorism will cease. Second, terrorists are crazy. Third, vigorous action against terrorism may not have the desired effect, but may serve to increase it.² Ambassador Bremer went on to discuss each myth as he defined them.

Myth One: Solve the Underlying Problem and Terrorism Will Cease. Too often terrorist acts are followed by guilt ridden responses which begin by pointing out the wrongs done to the terrorists and end by declaring that there is no solution until the underlying problem is solved. This argument, often made by well intentioned people, closely parallels the line of reasoning put forward by the terrorists....'Had we been treated justly there would be no violence. We seek justice. Whatever we do in pursuit of justice is, therefore, justified.' This line of reasoning is not only arrogant, leaving the judgment of right and wrong to the terrorists, but unsupported by the facts....Again and again terrorist attacks...have been specifically designed to derail progress in dealing with the region's deep problems. In 1948, UN mediator Count Bernadotte was assassinated as he worked on a cease fire during Israel's war for independence. In 1950, King Abdallah of Jordan was assassinated in part because of his talks with Israel. In 1974, while Secretary of State Kissinger was negotiating a disengagement in the Golan Heights, Palestinian terrorists seized and killed 32 Israeli school children in Ma'alot....Terrorists have been active in other democratic, free countries...²

Ambassador Bremer's argument is that frequently individuals join groups because of a need to belong. Further, he sees social isolation and personal failure as a part of many preterrorist's history. He cites a study by Dr. Jerrold M. Post of George Washington University that concludes that the "cause" is not the fundamental reason most terrorists join up. The "cause" provides the rationale, but the motivation is the terrorist's desire to belong to a group. He argues that while we should not ignore underlying problems, we do not have the luxury of choosing between policies which counter terrorism and those which seek to resolve underlying problems.²

Myth Two: Terrorists are Suicidal Lunatics. A second myth is that terrorists are crazy; a corollary is that they are willing to die for their cause, so arresting and imprisoning them will have no deterrent effect....Most terrorists are not crazy. In fact, it is their sanity that makes them dangerous. They are calculating fanatics. They may use unstable people in their operations, but it is their ability to calculate and plan which makes them dangerous. Terrorism is rarely mindless....According to a study of terrorist missions between 1969 and 1974, less than 2% of all terrorist attacks are genuinely suicidal....So terrorists make careful calculations about their attacks. They intend to escape unharmed.²

Ambassador Bremer points out that few terrorist attacks actually plan on the death of the terrorist. Spectacular bombings, such as those against the Marine barracks and the U.S. Embassy in Beirut have drawn attention to suicide attacks. Yet very few terrorist attacks are deliberately suicidal.²

Myth Three: Forceful Action Against Terrorist Only Fuels Terrorism.

...jailing terrorists only leads to attacks to free them, military action only leads to counter action. This is a myth, and a dangerous one, because it can paralyze us to inaction. By forceful action, I mean not just military response but aggressive law enforcement practices and stiff sentences....One of the reasons that we have so little domestic terrorism in the United States is that the FBI and the Justice Department have, for years, brought the full weight of the law to bear on organizations....Tough law enforcement in Europe...coincides with a 40% decline in international terrorism there.2

Although the U.S. received criticism for the 1986 bombing raid on Libya, Ambassador Bremer believes that Libya dropped plans for as many as 35 incidents within weeks after the attack.

Walter Laqueur gives a different view. In his efforts to set a base for his work, The Age of Terrorism, Laqueur contends his study of terrorism grew out of dissatisfaction with many current attempts to explain and interpret political terrorism. He lists several "widespread but mistaken" beliefs concerning the main features of contemporary terrorism. He believes several of these misconceptions warrant special attention:

- 1) Terrorism is a new and unprecedented phenomenon. For this reason its antecedents are of little importance.
- 2) Terrorism is one of the most important and dangerous problems facing mankind today and it should figure uppermost on our agenda.
- 3) The moralists claim that terrorism is the natural response to injustice, oppression and persecution.
- 4)...the only means of reducing the likelihood of terrorism is a reduction of the grievances.
- 5)...one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.
- 6)...terrorists are fanatical believers driven to despair by intolerable conditions.
- 7) Terrorists are poor and their inspiration is deeply ideological.
- 8) Terrorism is essentially a Middle Eastern problem and most of the victims of terrorism are American.
- 9) State sponsored terrorism presents a new dimension and is a far more

dangerous threat than any past terrorist movement.
10) Terrorism can happen anywhere.³

Scope of Terrorism

"Terrorism creates tremendous noise. It will continue to cause destruction and the loss of life. It will always attract much publicity but, politically, it tends to be ineffective. Compared with other dangers threatening mankind, it is almost irrelevant."⁴ Most analysts and terrorist groups probably would not agree with Laqueur's sentiment. However, it is useful in drawing a more refined focus on the issue.

The number of incidents classified as terrorism and the number of victims involved, on the surface, do not seem to warrant the billions currently spent by the United States alone and the additional resources spent worldwide in countering terrorism. From 1968 to the end of 1980, some 3,700 people died as a direct result of terrorist activity.⁵ More specifically, between 1976 and 1986 the total deaths attributed to terrorism were approximately 5,000 of which 400 were Americans; to include the 240+ Marines killed in Beirut. There are no terrorist groups operating today that were formed in the last five years. Of 80 groups identified in the last ten to fifteen years, about 40 of them are no longer in business and there are only about 15 to 20 groups that are active to a degree⁶ warranting attention.

The focus becomes sharper when one considers the record of serial killer Ted Bundy. Bundy, executed January 24, 1989, is suspected in the murder of over 100 people according to Bob Keple, an investigator for the Washington State Attorney General.⁷ But we should not belittle the importance of terrorism just because the number of victims appears relatively small. One of the goals of a terrorist organization is the destabilization of governments and small casualty numbers do nothing to alleviate the feelings on the part of some that governments are powerless to counter the terrorist threat.

Ambassador Bremer cites progress against the terrorists with a drop in international terrorism in 1986 and 1987. The Ambassador cites a 6% drop in 1986 and a further 10% drop in 1987 in a speech he delivered in October of 1987. He indicates a 33% decrease in terrorist activities in Europe and points to two hijackings in 1986 as the lowest in 20 years.⁸ But in spite of the Ambassador's reassuring remarks, the record seems to tell a different story. An analysis of the Department of State publication, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1987, signed by Ambassador Bremer in August, 1988, points to a steady rise in terrorist events. The Department's statistics show under 200 incidents in 1968, 500 per year in the 1980 to 1983 time frame and then a dramatic rise to 800 incidents in 1985. There was a slight decline from 1985 to 1986 but then a 7% rise in 1987. The discrepancy, according to

Ambassador Bremer, is due to the activities of the Afghan Intelligence Service against Pakistan assistance to the "resistance fighters" in Afghanistan.

American Attempts

Terrorism in its many forms has been with us throughout the centuries. In the 14th century, Tamerlane, the Asian conqueror from Samarkand, destroyed the last strongholds of Shaikh al Jabal and his Persian followers who called themselves Ashishin. The Ashishin, who lent their name to the development of the word "assassin," terrorized Asia and Europe, committed murders, executions, kidnappings and other terrorist acts. Their downfall began when they murdered a Mongol prince. These "terrorists" viewed themselves as a religious group doing the bidding of a holy man. Again, part of the problem in dealing with terrorism is defining the term.

Terrorism has been defined many different ways in recent history. The U.S. government alone has had some degree of difficulty in coming to grips with the term.

1. DOD, 1983: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals or property with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for political or ideological purposes.
2. Army Regulation 190-52: The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion or instilling fear. Terrorism involves a criminal act that is often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.
3. ITAC, 1985: Terrorism is the use of violence by persons trying to cause political change. Acts of

terrorism are aimed at a larger audience than the immediate victims. Their goals include creating alarm and chaos, spreading fear among the general populace and government, and publicizing their cause.

4. CIA/DOS: Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

5. FBI, 1983: The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

6. Department of Justice, 1984: Violent criminal conduct apparently intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the conduct of a government by intimidation or coercion; to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.¹¹

The Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism characterized terrorism as "a phenomenon that is¹² easier to describe than define." As a base line, the report defines terrorism as:

The unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is generally intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify their behavior or policies. The terrorist's methods may include hostage taking, aircraft piracy or sabotage, assassinations, threats, hoaxes, indiscriminate bombings or shootings. Yet most victims of terrorism seldom have a role in either causing or affecting the terrorist's grievances.¹²

This definition seems to form the basis for the Department of State statistical accounting of the nature and size of terrorism. It is different from most definitions to date in that it spells out specific acts considered as terroristic in nature.

CHAPTER III

TERRORISM IN THE EARLY 20th CENTURY

As mentioned earlier, terrorism has been with us for quite some time in organized as well as less organized forms. Michael Waltzer in his book, The New Terrorists, argues terrorism as we know it today is less than a century old.¹ The terrorist in the 1960s was likely to be limited in his objectives and patterns of operation and tended to conduct terrorist activities close to home.

Although there was no clear indication of an international terrorist conspiracy, the roots of international terrorist coordination and operations existed with the cooperation and encouragement of the Cubans and Soviets.

Turn of the Century to the 1960s

Terrorism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries has sometimes been characterized by the image of a mad man with a bomb and gun. Although terrorism was not as spectacular as it sometimes is today, there were some spectacular terrorist events in the early 20th century. Terrorism tended to target specific political aims. According to Marc A. Celmer, author of Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies, "the 20th century has witnessed the evolution of terrorist behavior. The period from 1914 to 1940 witnessed two of the most significant international terrorist incidents ever. On June 28th, 1914, Archduke Ferdinand...and his wife were assassinated

by a Serbian nationalist..." leading to World War I. Also, in 1934 "...the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia...in the streets of Marseilles, France, by the members of the Ustasa Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization..." leading to the formulation and adoption of the 1937 Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism by the League of Nations, the first international attempt to deal with terrorism.²

Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne in their book, The Carlos Complex, argue that to understand the phenomenon of terrorism, one must go back to 1945 and to the "blighted hopes of the peace agreement which failed to bring the justice and tranquillity so fervently desired by the world after the horrors of the Second World War."³ They go on to identify two themes in world politics during the period immediately after 1945: first, the decolorization flavor of world affairs and; second, the stand off between the two great superpowers and the advent of the cold war. They term the period as not one of peace but one of "unwar" with both superpowers using surrogates to fight in their behalf thus avoiding direct conflict. They go on to say:

Colonial uprisings which in the old days of empire might have been put down with a swift decisiveness were allowed to linger on because the European colonial powers were too tired by five years of war to use the traditional methods effectively while the revolutionaries more often than not enjoyed the support of one of the superpowers. Strong currents of violence began to run in countries which had once been firmly administered.³

The world was now prepared for the rise of what is termed modern terrorism. The Vietnam experience for both the French and U.S., and the establishment of the State of Israel and subsequent events proved to be catalytic as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Characteristics in the 1960s

Terrorism was not perceived by the world in general as a threat prior to the 1970s, perhaps because terrorism had yet to assume its international character as it did during the 1970s and 1980s. To be sure, the roots of international terrorism existed, but the terrorist of the 1960s was more likely to operate on home grounds, regardless of where he was trained and equipped. According to Neil Livingstone and Terrel Arnold in their work, Fighting Back, most terrorist groups prior to 1970 were self-sufficient, autonomous, homegrown organizations with local agendas and little outside support. They cite Ted Gurr's study of some 335 terrorist group's activities between 1961 and 1970. Gurr could only find 19 groups that received significant outside aid in the form of safe havens, training, arms, or other material assistance. In the 1960s and early 1970s, terrorists began going abroad to acquire their weapons and training, but more often than not they returned home to use their new skills, training, and hardware. Their attacks were still directed largely at their own leaders and at supporters of the home government.⁴ Foreigners were still secondary targets.

Patterns and Objectives

Michael Stohl also cites Gurr's statistical analysis of terrorism in the 1960s in his book, The Politics of Terrorism. Gurr attempted to delineate the nature of terrorism in the decade and derived some common patterns. Political terrorism was a relatively common tactic in all kinds of nations throughout the decade. It was not a new phenomenon, although its incidence evidently increased during the second half of the 1960s. The great majority of terrorist campaigns were short-lived and, with a few notable exceptions, they were not particularly deadly. Probably the most striking fact is that political terrorism was relatively less common in poorer, authoritarian, and Third World states than in the 5 prosperous democracies of Europe and Latin America.

Given the home grown characteristics of terrorist groups in the 1960s and the predominately local patterns terrorists followed in the decade, it is not surprising that, on the whole, the terrorists limited their objectives to a large degree. The world community was yet to see the wars of liberation and the encouragement of violence and strife for its own sake on an international scale. Gurr asserts that political terrorism in the 1960s was at least twice as likely to have limited objectives of the kinds experienced in conventional politics and political demonstrations as they were to have revolutionary objectives. None of the regional groups of nations

deviated markedly from this pattern, except that the seizure of power is distinctly more common an objective among the Afro-Asian terrorists than among those elsewhere. The European terrorist groups conformed to the general pattern, with one notable exception. Social motives were considerably more common there than elsewhere; this is another manifestation of the prevalence of separatist and communal bases and objectives of a number of European and North American terrorists in the 1960s.⁶

U.S. Policy - Early Nixon Administration

President Nixon assumed office in the middle of what later turned out to be the watershed years of international terrorism. As will be discussed later, 1968 and 1969, in retrospect, seemed to be the years of the initial outbreaks of what is now called the rise of modern terrorism. Prior to 1968, terrorism lay almost dormant in terms of its present form. There were a large number of groups within the United States that engaged in terrorist style activities, but on the international scene, terrorism was yet to be known in its current form. Terrorism was not perceived to be as serious a problem as many people see it today. Nevertheless, the country was concerned with the violence within America. "...the marvel of American politics previously had been its ability to channel passions into a peaceful choice of directions. In 1968, hate burst out of the channel, and hate, whether from student ideologues, unabashed white racists or black

extremists, incubated further hate, loosing lunatics,
gunmen, rock throwers and club wielders." ⁷ The Nixon
response was a strong law and order effort which carried
over into his treatment of the issue of international
violence.

The Munich massacre, which will be discussed in
Chapter 5, galvanized American thought and efforts
concerning international terrorism. Prior to the 1972
Munich incident, the U.S. had no structured approach to
deal with international terrorism. America seemed content
to rely on international law and order in dealing with the
problem. "...the United States strongly supported the
actions of the International Civil Aviation Organization
and other international forums for dealing with specific
acts of terrorism...the U.S. antiterrorist program relied
heavily on the use of international law and organizations.
International terrorism was seen by the United States, and
many other nations, as a secondary foreign policy issue." ⁸

CHAPTER IV

WATERSHED YEARS 1968-1969

Dobson and Payne in their book, The Terrorist, highlighted 1968 as a watershed year of terrorism.

It was the year in which Arab terrorists became active following the defeat of the Arab armies in the Six Day War of 1967. At that time the Palestinian guerillas were the only forces in the Arab world able to carry the war to the Israelis. This they did by launching small scale raids inside Israel which were quickly stamped out and then turning to international terrorism. 1968 was also the year of the student uprisings in Europe, which failed in its objective of overturning governments but which led, through the frustration of the militants, to the formation of groups prepared to use terrorism to achieve the upheaval that the riots had failed to bring about. In addition, it was the year that saw the emergence of the Provisional IRA and the start of the present round of "the troubles" in Ireland. Finally, it was the year in which the first tentative moves were made towards international cooperation among the terrorists.¹

Beginning in 1968, and using the criteria of events that have affected national and world affairs, Dobson and Payne saw three incidents in 1968 and seven in 1969 as the starting point of modern terrorism.

1968

July 22: In Rome, the Palestinians hijack their first aircraft. An El Al airliner flying to Tel Aviv is taken to Algeria. PFLP

December 26: In Athens, two men attacked an El Al aircraft with light arms and grenades. One passenger was killed. The terrorists were captured, but later released with the hijacking of a Greek airliner. PFLP

December 28: First Israeli retaliatory raid on Beirut destroying or damaging 13 aircraft. Israeli Army

1969

February 18: In Zurich, Arab terrorists machine gun an El Al airliner preparing to take off. Co pilot was killed and five passengers were wounded. One terrorist was killed, three others captured but later released at the hijacking of a Swissair aircraft. PFLP

July 18: In London, Jewish owned stores are bombed with Palestinian threats to bomb other Jewish owned stores worldwide. PFLP

August 29: TWA airliner enroute from Rome to Tel Aviv is hijacked to Damascus. Two Israelis held until two Syrian pilots were released by the Israelis. Aircraft destroyed. PFLP

September 4: The first of the diplomatic kidnappings with the seizure of the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil. Held until 15 prisoners were released and flown to Mexico. MR-8, ALN

September 8: Israeli officers were attacked in Brussels. PFLP

October 6: Bombs damage the offices of several U.S. companies in Argentina as the start of a three day campaign against U.S. institutions. Unknown

December 12: Bomb explodes in U.S. Army officer's club. Other bombs were found in Germany and disarmed.

¹
Baader-Meinhof

What were the reasons for the dramatic increase in international terrorism? The Six Day War had a tremendous impact on the Arab world and led to the increased influence of the PLO. The war in Vietnam caused increased restlessness and dissatisfaction with the "old order" in Europe and America and lead to the rise of various protest and fringe groups. Finally, the international links of terrorism, forged in the mid to late 1960s began to emerge¹ on the world stage.

The State of Israel and The PLO

In a sense, the proclamation of the State of Israel in 1948 acted as the catalyst for over 3000 years of history in the area claimed as the Jewish national home. A basic understanding of Jewish and Palestinian interests in the region and specifically the points of view of the Jewish and Palestinian fundamentalists are an important factor in considering the rise in international terrorism as led by the PLO and the "revolutionary" nature of the Palestinian movement.

Israel

According to Maxime Rodinson in The Arabs, the Zionist movement gained momentum with the publication of Theodore Herzl's The Jewish State in 1896, and was organized on firm grounds by 1897, with the announced intention of making Palestine a Jewish State. Rodinson saw five steps in the creation of the State of Israel: the Balfour Declaration (1917); Jewish immigration under the

British mandate in Palestine increasing the Jewish population in the region from 11% to 31%; the UN decision to divide Palestine and the British withdrawal; the Proclamation of the State of Israel (1948) and ensuing war, which expanded its territory; and finally, the June 1967 War, which lead to the occupation of all of Palestine up to the Jordan River, along with certain other territories.²

There are some other terms and concepts useful in trying to understand the nature of Jewish fundamentalism and the historic context in which it operates. The first of these is the question of the "Golah" or exile. Abraham Yeshoshua in his work Between Right and Wrong, indicated it was the most important and profound question a Jew had to pose to himself when trying to probe the essence of the Jewish nation and that the Golah was the source of the problems the Jewish people had been struggling with for generations, especially the last one hundred years. He saw the Golah at the very heart of practical problems that the State of Israel was struggling with. The Jewish people viewed the Golah from two directions. First, some Jews considered the Golah as inflicted by others or something that just happened. The second view accepts the Golah as a feature of the Jewish people. In the first case the nation never lost its desire to return to its land, there to reestablish its independence, there to win its national and spiritual redemption. The second view recognized the Jew as a Diaspora people, and that is their existential strength.³

One can argue whether the Golah was imposed or voluntary and the extent to which the world Jewish community has returned to Israel. However, the unique thread that seemed to be pertinent to a fundamentalist outlook was the idea of a divine mandate to return to the land of Israel.

The Holocaust slammed into the concept of "Golah" in particular, the idea that the Jewish people should fundamentally be a Diaspora people. The Holocaust is viewed in two basic ways by the Jewish people: first, as proof there could be no God; and second, as proof of the uniqueness of the Jewish people in the eyes of God. In any event, Yehoshua saw the Holocaust as proof of the utter impossibility of escaping from a Jewish identity. Jews who tried to assimilate or deny their identity were forcibly⁴ returned to the fold of their people. In the context of fundamentalism, however, the Holocaust must provide a powerful motivator for not only the establishment of a Jewish state but the resolve to insure its existence above all other considerations. Additionally from a fundamentalist point of view, the fact that the Jewish people survived the Holocaust must be considered as proof of the uniqueness of the Jewish people above all others and further proof of the divinely ordained destiny of a Jewish⁴ nation based in Israel.

The PLO

The Palestinians also lay historical claim to the territories in the area of Israel. The Palestinian

movement as we know it today developed as a result of disenfranchisement in what they considered their historic home. "...in the course of the struggle against the British and the Zionists, parochial ties (among the Palestinians) began to give way to a sense of regional identity. Palestinian political awareness in the 1920s was cultivated by an Arab elite which tried to build a massive resistance of Palestinians to Zionism. This elite divided into two segments. The first were the nationalists, who formed in 1918 the first Muslim - Christian associations...⁵ The second Palestinian elite was Muslim." The Palestinian movement has gone through several convulsions since its inception to the present and its focus has changed somewhat. In very familiar terms the focus now seems to be on the need to return to their historic home and assert a national identity. As in the Jewish community, there is a faction in the current Palestinian movement with strong religious overtones. "...the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine...espouse not only the restoration of Palestinians to their homeland but a revolutionary transformation of all Arab countries as a prelude to the showdown with Israel."⁶

Like the Jewish fundamentalist, the Palestinian fundamentalist cite history and religion to assert their rights. They deny the claims of the Jewish people in the area and see the lands in question as historically and religiously their own. "All the arguments about the

Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations decision to establish a British mandate, and the UN General Assembly resolution to partition the country have, of course, no moral force whatever."⁶

As to the religious argument the Palestinian will say:

...so you genuinely believe that God promised you this land, but in the Koran, which I and 550 million other Moslems believe, it is written: 'And you shall fight against those who do not believe in God and on the last day if they will not forsake what God has forbidden them, if they do not observe the true religion (Islam), and those who were given the Book (the Jews) will pay their dues in their hands and will be subservient' are you ready to respect this belief of mine and to accept my behavior in accordance with it?7

To the Palestinian there seems to be little difference between the invasions of the Crusaders, the incursions of the West, and the establishment of the State of Israel. All seem to be equally illegitimate in historical, moral, and religious terms.

The Six Day War

The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 disenfranchised hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and caused them to move to refugee camps. The conditions in these camps were ripe for the development of so called "revolutionary" movements. They became breeding grounds for hate. The Six Day War compounded the situation.

...cause and the origins of the modern terrorist movement came into being in 1948, with the founding of the State of Israel. In 1948, when Israel was born, three quarters of a million Palestinian Arabs fled or were forced to flee from their homes. The position was exacerbated after the Six Day War which brought the

West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip under Israeli control and turned another four hundred thousand Palestinians into refugees, many of them living in miserable tents and shacks on handouts from UNRWA (The United Nations Relief and Works Agency).⁸

The defeat of the Arab armies in the Six Day War increased Palestinian frustration and lead them to rely almost solely on terrorism to redress what they saw as legitimate grievances. Paul Wilkinson in Terrorism and International Order, cites two reasons for the rise in modern terrorism.

First was the overwhelming defeat of the military forces of the Arab states in their June 1967 war with Israel. Terrorism was by no means new to the Middle East. But there is no doubt that as a result of this setback and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Sinai Peninsula, and the Israeli takeover of the whole of Jerusalem, Palestinian militants concluded that the routes of defeating Israel by conventional military force, or regaining their homelands by diplomatic negotiation, were blocked to them. The Arab states were too divided and Israel was too militarily powerful. The militant Palestinians concluded they would gain more by a campaign of political violence striking Israel and its supporters around the world in a continuing war of terrorist attrition.⁹

Dobson and Payne attempt to paint the conditions in the Palestinian community leading to this propensity for terrorist activity.

It is difficult for Westerners to understand the depth of the hatred that the Palestinians feel for the Israelis. No conversation can be held with a Palestinian which does not come full circle to a discussion of their iniquities. The bitterness is blind and unreasoning and the logic of the arguments so conditioned that any act of violence is justifiable as long as it is seen to harm Israel.

The refugee camps, with young men and women growing up in this atmosphere of bitterness and with nothing to do but hate, became the breeding grounds, recruiting

centers and training fields of the various resistance groups, groups which were often at war with each other, fighting for the control of particular camps.¹⁰

A review of most lists of terrorist events in the late 1960s indicates the PLO as a major source for the rise in international terrorism. The PLO question remains the major source of terrorism in the Middle East today and is one not easily answered. The issues between the Israelis and Palestinians are deeply set and nearly irreconcilable, due in part to the similarity of the positions and arguments. Both sides cite history for their legitimacy and use historical context to deny the legitimacy of the other. Both positions stand on deeply felt religious convictions that are fanatical and extremely militant in nature. Both see a need to assert a national identity to fulfill both religious and historical destinies and use both historical and religious arguments to deny the very right of existence of the other.

Student Uprisings

The Vietnam war served as a focal point for dissidents at home and abroad and encouraged the growth of sometimes violent opposition to American world policies and the established governments both in the United States and other countries. These movements also encouraged coordination between radical and terrorist groups on an international scale. Wilkinson describes some conditions that lead to the growth of international terrorism during this period. He argues the general strategic situation,

specifically the balance of terror, favors unconventional means of conflict as the superpowers wish to avoid confrontation and escalation in the nuclear age. He talks about the psychology of relative deprivation and the feelings of political injustice felt by particular groups. Deep feelings of political injustice, deprivation of political rights or exclusion from power or influence within a community, can often lead to violent rebellion. In this contextual setting, Wilkinson sees two international events that held the key role in triggering the outbreak of modern international terrorism.¹¹ The first, the Six Day War, has been discussed. Wilkinson identifies the second event.

The second development was the resurgence of the neo-Marxist and Trotskyist left among the student populations of the industrial countries. Their common rallying points were bitter opposition to U.S. policy in the Vietnam war, and to American policy in the Third World generally, which they designated neo-imperialism. Although the majority of the student left abandoned political violence following the street demonstrations and battles with the police in 1968 - 1969, there remained a hard core of ideological extremists who decided that what was really needed was a more professional and long term campaign of urban violence against the 'system'. These groups resolved to form an underground which engaged in a sustained campaign of terrorism. The main groups that sprang from this movement included the Baader-Meinhof gang in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, and the Japanese Red Army. With their shared neo-Marxist ideology and self perceptions as part of a broader international revolutionary movement, they maintained international links with movements abroad, including the Palestinians. There is considerable evidence that they learned from each other.¹¹

As Dobson and Payne point out:

...the young idealist, many of them experienced in

warfare in Indo-China and the Middle East, found themselves moving almost unknowingly towards violence themselves. They reached for the Kalashnikov and the bomb to strike back and destroy what they hated so much. They became intellectuals with a pistol in the drawer. Revolution and terror became the first priority and eventually ends in themselves for people who no longer had clear ideas about what sort of world they would try to build once they had torn down the old system. The very act of destruction was sufficient. Something better was certain to emerge from the ruins.¹²

Although these groups maintained links with each other on an international basis, they were not the only players in attempts to institutionalize terrorism as an international phenomenon. The 1960s were relatively quiet on the terrorism front until the latter years and there was little real proof of terrorism as an internationally coordinated strategy. However, efforts to reach just that goal were underway.

International Links

Laqueur defines international terrorism as a term that "...covers a number of different issues in the contemporary world, from state sponsored terrorism against foreign countries to cooperation between various terrorist groups. It also frequently refers to attacks against foreign nationals or property in the terrorist's own country or anywhere else."¹³

The groups that started out as student type organizations made some of the early attempts at international coordination, but they were not alone. The Soviets, with varying motives, saw disorder in the world as

a favorable situation and the terrorist groups operating on an international scale as a strategy in support of their goals. Castro in Cuba turned away from the West and declared war on the governments in the Hemisphere. He too saw terrorism and violent revolution as a strategy to achieve his goals. Other countries in the Eastern Bloc and Middle East in particular supported the terrorist on an international scale.

The Cubans

In the mid 1960s, terrorism had yet to become an international phenomenon in the eyes of the world. However, in January 1966, Castro with the support of the Soviets and world communist movement convened what later was called the Tricontinental Conference. It was originally billed as the First Conference of Solidarity of the People of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and had representatives from some 82 countries to include the Soviet Union with a delegation of some 40 members.¹⁴ Although the Soviets were also sponsors of the conference, Castro managed to give them reason for discomfort with his remarks.

The conference encouraged worldwide wars of liberation, revolution, and terrorism. Two permanent organizations grew out of the proceedings: the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, whose purpose was to unite, coordinate and further the "struggle" on those three continents; and

the Latin American Organization of Solidarity, formed after the conference in the face of Soviet opposition, whose purpose was to utilize all the means within its reach in order to support the movements of liberation.¹⁵ The Soviets were uncomfortable with the conference, because not only had Castro loaded the agenda with what the Soviets saw as ultra revolutionaries, he scarcely "...hid his contempt¹⁶ for the old men serving Moscow.

If...it is understood once and for all that sooner or later all or almost all peoples will have to take up arms to liberate themselves, then the hour of liberation for this continent will be advanced. What with the ones who theorize, and the ones who criticize those who theorize while beginning to rhetorize themselves, much time and energy is unfortunately lost; we believe that on this continent, in the case of all or almost all peoples, the battle will take the most violent forms.¹⁶

The Soviets would soon reel Castro in but for the time being they subdued their reaction to the ultra revolutionaries.

The Soviets

Moscow has supported violence and disorder as a strategy in support of her interests for much of the 20th century and has institutionalized that support.

...holding that social discord and political turmoil in enemy territory is likely to advance Moscow's cause. The Bolsheviks therefore created the Communist International (Commintern) in March 1919 to promote the inevitable proletarian victory. Although this organization was abolished during World War II, the Soviet constitution, revised in 1977, declares that the Soviet Union has an obligation to support national liberation movements.¹⁷

Soviet encouragement of terrorism and revolutionary activities are well documented, however, in the 1960s Soviet actions took a slightly different direction. The Soviets participated in international conventions against hijacking for her own interests and has taken a public stance against terrorism. But Soviet actions speak louder than their rhetoric. Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander in Terrorism: the Soviet Connection, report an increase in Soviet support of terrorism in the post Khrushchev era and find two major factors:

...the turbulent 1960s saw some surprising global developments:

First, the failure of the rural guerilla movements in Latin America and the resort to urban guerilla warfare and terrorism; the defeat of the Arabs in the June 1967 war and the subsequent rise of Palestinian terrorism; the Vietnam war and the widespread demonstrations against U.S. involvement in the war; the French student's revolt in 1968.

Second, many subnational movements adopted a certain comradeship in their struggle against imperialism, capitalism, and international Zionism, for the liberation of dependent peoples.¹⁸

Soviet support takes the form of weapons, training and funding either directly or through surrogates and is the single most important underpinning of terrorism on the international scene and in many senses the Soviet and Soviet Bloc's preferred method of warfare in recent times. Livingstone comments on modern Soviet support of international terrorists:

The USSR, by means of its training, indoctrination, and other support activities, has managed slowly, relentlessly, to take over from within most of the world's major terrorist movements....The USSR and its Eastern Bloc allies are, operating largely through

surrogates, the chief sponsors and patrons of global terrorism, and they regard this as an effective and economical strategy for undermining the Western democracies and for making gains in the developing world, without running the risk of outright conflict.¹⁹

Future Soviet encouragement and sponsorship of international terrorism may undergo some change in light of Soviet economic problems and pressure from the United States. This could be especially true depending on the strength of the linkage America applies between economic and technical aid to the Soviets and a decrease in terrorism sponsorship.

CHAPTER V

TERRORISM IN THE 1970s

In the 1970s the world witnessed an explosion of terrorism on the international scene that has continued in varying intensity until today. One of the key traits of modern terrorism is its ability to influence world affairs evidenced by the incidents at Lod Airport, Munich, and the U.S. Embassy in Terehan. This is perhaps the dominant characteristic of modern terrorism.

Terrorism on the Rise

Modern terrorism seems to be more organized and far more lethal than its predecessors. Dobson and Payne, maintain then, as today, the feeling of power enjoyed by a terrorist held strong attraction for intellectuals who turned to the gun and the bomb when their political arguments failed to convince. That turn of the century terrorist's descendants are still intent upon making a violent clean sweep of the old morality. The same battle rages, and it is fought under the same principles of terrorist war by similar people with similar aims. Only the weapons have changed and they have changed in¹ spectacular style. The 1970s witnessed an alarming increase of terrorism. Using their criteria of events that altered world or national affairs, Dobson and Payne derived a list of over 160 incidents in that decade.(Appendix)

Some Firsts in the 1970s

Terrorism in the 1970s saw a lot of "firsts": the first of the diplomatic kidnappings; the first overt international incident of the Japanese Red Army; the first of the multiple hijackings; the first attacks by the PLO coordinated abroad; the first attempts to destroy airborne aircraft; the first successful assault on a hijacked aircraft; the first use of surface to air missiles (SAMs) by terrorists; the first proof of the developing international nature of terrorism and the first indications of fractionalization within the PLO. Additionally the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran and a subsequent abortive rescue attempt may have altered the outcome of an American presidential election. Americans in general seemed frustrated at an apparent inability of their government to deal with the terrorist phenomenon.

Munich and U.S. Policy

Much has been written about the Munich massacre in September 1972. Some call it the incident that galvanized the West into action against international terrorism. Others point to the subsequent Israeli destruction of Black September and the perpetrators of the massacre as a template for effective action against terrorism. Whatever view one subscribes to, the massacre at Munich coming on top of the murders at Lod Airport in May of 1972, were

broadcast into living rooms around the world and caused many governments to take a more serious approach to terrorism.

The Munich Olympics were designed to mark the reacceptance of the German people by the rest of the world. The ugly memories of Hitler's Olympics in Berlin in 1936 were going to be wiped away in a festival of brotherhood and friendly competition. Germany, rich and self-confident, was to be host to the world's sportsmen and women and, through the medium of television, to the whole world. It was to be a ceremony of reconciliation.²

Instead, the world was treated to its initial first hand exposure to international terrorism.

The American response to Munich was swift in the law and order administration of President Nixon but has met with mixed reviews. According to Marc Celmer in his book, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies:

...the tragic events of the Munich Olympic Games in 1972 altered many nations' views of terrorism. The total lack of awareness of the terrorist threat and the lack of antiterrorist capabilities were addressed by the members of the international community with varying degrees of success. The U.S. response to the Munich incident, the formulation of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism and its working group, represents the first and perhaps most significant American response to international terrorism. Additionally, it represents the institutional foundation on which the U.S. antiterrorism policy was to be based.³

The policy adopted seemed to be one of no concessions in line with President Nixon's law and order administration, however, the program was flawed from the start. Celmer offers a critique of the early attempts:

The Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism met for the first and only time on October 2, 1972. The meeting was attended by eight of the committee's ten members....The committee was in existence from

September 25, 1972 to the latter part of the summer of 1977. During those five years, the actual work of the committee was done by its working group...by 1974, 11 more agencies and departments were added....By 1974 the quality of the working group's endeavors was being negatively affected by a number of factors....First, a number of agencies...were not exchanging needed information....Some...felt that information should be released on a need to know basis...the huge size of the working group....Finally, members of the working group were losing interest in the working group itself.⁴

Although many of the problems of U.S. policy and in particular the structure for U.S. terrorist response were seen early on, it was not until the initial stages of the Carter administration that they were addressed.

J. Bowyer Bell in A Time of Terror, offers a different assessment of early American policy, strategy, and attempts to deal with terrorism as a result of Munich.

Although no Americans had been involved in the Munich massacre, the events of September 1972 had a profound impact in Washington. As leader of a law and order administration, President Nixon saw Munich as a direct challenge to world order, a most serious provocation. He announced the formation of the Inter Department Working Group on Terrorism, chaired by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Located in the State Department and initially directed by Armin Meyer, the former Ambassador to Lebanon, the board consisted of representatives from State, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defense, Treasury, Transportation, and other relevant departments. The mission of the group was to coordinate governmental policy and intelligence, cooperate with concerned countries and regional organizations, consider tactics, and in an emergency set up task forces. But in the deepening morass of Watergate, Kissinger had little time for a Cabinet committee on terror, and most of the group members had little leverage, a most limited brief, and no real budget. The group was in fact a traditional American response to political trauma, a commission to ease public anxiety. It was, of course, seen by the Arabs as only an institutionalized step to join in Israel's antiterrorist campaign...⁵

The practical impact of Munich on the United States was to awaken the American public to the threat of international terrorism, and at least caused the American government to seriously address the issue.

Ford Policy 1974-1977

President Ford assumed office in the wake of the Watergate scandal and faced other issues he viewed as more important than international terrorism. As Alvin H. Buckelew observes in Terrorism and the American Response, "...mechanisms developed by Nixon to combat terrorism were not changed during Ford's presidency. Neither was there an alteration in the basic policy of refusal to negotiate with terrorists or to accede to their demands."⁶

However, the Mayaguez incident did occur during President Ford's term and his reaction caused some interesting results on the international scene. Buckelew notes "...following President Ford's swift use of force to free the Mayaguez from the Cambodians in May, 1975, there were relatively few attacks on American official personnel and property during the balance of his term in office. The chief targets were American businessmen and American private property."⁷

The Carter Legacy

Soon after his inauguration, President Carter initiated reform in the Antiterrorist Program of the United States. Presidential Review Memorandum on Terrorism number 30 initiated a comprehensive review of the entire

antiterrorist organization. The review assessed the U.S. abilities both to develop effective, consistent policies for dealing with terrorism and to handle any specific terrorist incidents which emerged.⁸ A massive reorganization and restructuring of the American antiterrorist organization followed aimed at streamlining the effort and making it more responsive and effective. President Carter seems to have followed the Nixon policy of no concessions to terrorists demands, at least on the surface, however the Carter Administration drew severe criticism for its antiterrorism programs. The criticisms reached their zenith at the failure in the dessert of Iran during the abortive hostage rescue mission.

President Carter's antiterrorist program and actions have been criticized by many. Former Under Secretary of State Richard T. Kennedy has stated that the Carter administration's antiterrorist program lacked activity and teeth. James B. Brian Jenkins' statements of the late 1970s has outlined the Carter administration's command structure as a group merely providing a means of keeping in touch with one another, a useful but inadequate exercise. Real decisions were made in the individual departments and agencies.⁹

Although the Carter Administration received harsh criticism, others give credit to the Administration for the accomplishments that it was able to achieve. Neil C. Livingstone, Director of Terrorism and Low Level Warfare at the American Security Council feels:

...in the area of revamping the institutional machinery for dealing with terrorism, the Carter administration's record is a good one.¹⁰

CHAPTER VI

THE REAGAN ERA

The Reagan era opened with most of the recognized terrorist groups active in 1980 and 1981. The focus of terrorist activities seemed to be shifting away from attacks on civilians to government officials, structures, and businesses. In a sense, with some notable exceptions, terrorist organizations in general seemed to view attacks on innocent civilians as counterproductive. The use of violence remained the weapon of choice. There was increased evidence of international linkage and of ties to international drug trafficking. The role of the media assumed greater proportions. As a result of the explosion of terrorism in the 1970s the West was now well aware of the new threat and was well under way in efforts to combat and control terrorism. One of the features of the early 1980s was the continued war between factions of the PLO, the group that many feel spawned international terrorism, and that we still see evidence of today. Additionally, after a small decline, State Department figures show a¹ rise from 500 to 800 incidents from 1981 to 1985.

Dobson and Payne see terrorism slowing perceptively in 1980 then picking up tempo in 1981 as the new Administration came on board. An analysis of terrorist incidents by Dobson and Payne in The Terrorists shows a subtle shift away from targeting innocent civilians.

1980

April 30: The Iranian Embassy in London was occupied by Iranians demanding autonomy for "Arabistan". Operation planned by Iraqis. Five terrorists and two hostages die. Group of the Martyr, Iraqi Secret Service

1981

February 5: Chief engineer at a Spanish nuclear power plant murdered by terrorists in an attempt to close the plant. ETA-M

May 9: Bomb explodes while Queen Elizabeth tours North Sea oil terminal. Provisional IRA

August 5: Abu Daoud, PLO official wounded in Warsaw hotel. First such incident in Eastern Europe. Black June

October 2: Spanish destroyer used in antiterrorist patrols damaged by bomb in harbor. ETA-M

October 6: President Sadat assassinated. Al Takfir Wal Higma

October 9: PLO director of information killed by bomb in Rome. Black June

Early Reagan Policy

The Reagan Administration initially made no major changes to the antiterrorism program structure, however some substantive changes were made to make the effort better coordinated and effective. Celmer provides a nice wrap up of the transition in thinking during the Reagan Administration leading up to the commissioning of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism.

Although the Reagan administration has not radically altered either the government's antiterrorist policy of bureaucracy, it has redirected the focus of the American response to international terrorism. The U.S. response to terrorism from the early 1970s until the spring of 1984 was an approach based on a passive and reactive defense. However on April 3, 1984, President Reagan signed NSDD 138. This directive represents a change in the American approach toward terrorism, in the words of former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Noel C. Koch, from the reactive mode to recognition that proactive steps are needed. This redirection of U.S. antiterrorist efforts represented by the signing of NSDD 138 illustrates...an important occurrence in the evolution of American policy and response.³

Although National Security Decision Directive 138 (NSDD 138) is not without its critics, the document signaled to the world American willingness to use force even in a preemptive role in combatting terrorism and American intent to take more active measures in countering the terrorist threat.

NSDD 138

On April 3, 1984, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 138 which, in the words of Defense Department official Noel Koch, "represents a quantum leap in countering terrorism, from the reactive mode to recognition that proactive steps are needed."⁴ According to Livingstone, although the main elements of NSDD are still classified, the chief themes underlying the policy are these:

No nation can condone terrorism.

Every country has the right to defend itself.

Terrorism is a problem for all nations.

The United States will work with other governments to deal with terrorism.

U.S. policy aims to deal with all forms of terrorism but regards state terrorism as a special problem.

States that use or support terrorism cannot be allowed to do so without consequences.

The United States will use all available channels to dissuade states from supporting terrorism.

The United States will heighten its efforts to prevent attacks and to warn and protect its citizens and allies.

The United States will seek to hold acts of state terrorism up to the strongest public condemnation.

When these efforts fail, the United States has a right to defend itself.⁵

The significance of NSDD 138 is that it signaled a shift in U.S. policy from one of a multilateral to more of a unilateral, where necessary, reaction to terrorism. It represented a decision to use force where deemed fit against terrorism, and required a multiple of agencies to report on how to implement the new antiterrorism approach. In other words, the United States shifted from a more or less passive approach to combatting terrorism to an active overt and covert program in countering the terrorism threat.

Celmer raises questions as to the effectiveness of NSDD 138 in the form of what he terms key foreign policy questions:

The first question is concerned with the legality of using self help measures in combatting international terrorism....The primary international legal concern is over the use of coercive measures or force in dealing with terrorists and their supporters.

The second question is associated with the possible economic consequences of an aggressive response to terrorism and its supporters.

The third centers around the fact that many of the states that support terrorism are clients of the USSR, increasing the risk of major power conflict if dealt with aggressively.

Another set of issues raised...is concerned with the political consequences of using force.⁶

Celmer doesn't give any answers, however, if the key objective of terrorism is to influence the populations of the world through fear and violent actions, NSDD 138 goes a long way in leveling the playing field. One year later President Reagan directed Vice President Bush to report on the progress made in countering terrorism and make any further recommendations needed.

Vice Presidential Task Force

In July of 1985, President Reagan directed Vice President Bush to chair the Cabinet Level Task Force on Combatting Terrorism. In February of 1986 the Vice President reported back to the President with findings and recommendations. While the paint is still very fresh on the report and recommendations, it is possible to see the impact of the report on the American antiterrorism program and the phenomenon of terrorism as it exists in the world today.

In the cover letter accompanying the Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, Vice President Bush cites increasing public concern, the loss of American lives and terrorist threats as the President's reasons for directing his Vice President to

chair a Cabinet Level Task Force on Combatting Terrorism.

Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force
on Combatting Terrorism, February 1986

As specified in his letter, Vice President Bush saw his mandate from the President as reassessing the U.S. priorities and policies, ensuring that current programs make the best use of available assets, and determining if the national program is properly coordinated to achieve the most effective results.

U.S. Policy

As Celmer points out from the late 1960s to the fall of 1972, the U.S. antiterrorist program relied heavily on the use of international law and organizations.⁷ International terrorism was seen by the United States as a secondary foreign policy issue. The rise of terrorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s changed much of that perception. The massacre at Munich caused much of the world to reevaluate their antiterrorist programs and indeed their perceptions of terrorism in general.

The U.S. response to the Munich incident - the formulation of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism and its working group - represents the first and most significant American response to international terrorism. It represents the institutional foundation on which the antiterrorism policy was to be based.⁷

As the 1970's progressed additional institutional infrastructure was added to the antiterrorist program with mixed results.

...this period also demonstrated institutional and policy weaknesses. The Carter administration addressed these problems by restructuring the command structure

of the antiterrorist bureaucracy and by establishing the Delta Force. However, the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran and the tragic failure of Operation Eagle Claw on the desert sands of Iran once again called into question the existing U.S. antiterrorist capabilities and helped defeat President Carter in his 1980 reelection effort.⁷

As discussed in an earlier chapter, the Reagan Administration initially made few changes in the antiterrorism program. The President did mark terrorism as one of his priorities and, as discussed earlier, the signing of NSDD 138 signaled a shift in the approach America would take toward terrorism. In what has become known as the "Shultz Doctrine" the Secretary laid out what directions U.S. policy was taking regarding terrorism. Celmer's somewhat harsh analysis of elements of the policy seem to miss the point of a shift in U.S. thinking on combatting terrorism. "Shultz's assertion that the public must understand before the fact that there is the potential for the loss of life of some of our fighting men and the loss of life raises troubling moral questions that are only reinforced by the raid on Libya."⁸ Secretary Shultz in Foreign Affairs, Spring 1985, saw a strategy for combatting terrorism as one encompassing several things. "We and our allies must work harder to improve security, share information, coordinate police efforts and collaborate in other ways. We in this country must also think hard about the moral stakes involved. If we truly believe in our democratic values and our way of life, we must be willing to defend them."⁹ The Secretary goes on to discount the

value of passive measures and called for more active defense and deterrence.

Task Force Report

This then was the context in which the Vice President's Task Force operated. In very general terms the Task Force concluded that the U.S. policy and program to combat terrorism was "tough and resolute." The report goes on to say the U.S. opposes terrorism in all forms and wherever it takes place. The U.S. is prepared to act in concert with other nations or alone to prevent or respond to terrorist acts. According to the report, the U.S. will make no concessions to terrorists. At the same time, we will use every available resource to gain the safe return¹⁰ of American citizens who are held hostage.

In terms of the national program the Task Force found it to be "well conceived and working. The United States currently has in place antiterrorism activities in virtually every federal department and agency. Specific agencies have been assigned to respond to any threat or attack directed at our citizens whether on foreign soil,¹⁰ here at home, in the air or at sea." The Task Force also made several recommendations to improve the antiterrorism program in several different areas with mixed results.

Impact of the Report

It is difficult to assess the impact of the Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting

Terrorism because of its relative newness and classified nature. Evidence suggests only half of the recommendations have been accepted or signed into law. In a survey of State Department Current Policy Bulletins over the past two years on the subject of terrorism and related topics by the Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, L. Paul Bremer III, little or no reference to the Task Force or its report exist.

The Vice President, in an unclassified letter to the President on 2 June, 1987, sums up his review of the report.

Overall we have found progress has been excellent and the improvement in our counterterrorism capability has been evident in the results. Most of the taskings have been completed. Others of a continuing nature are being effectively managed. In a few cases, usually requiring the cooperation of foreign governments, our final objectives have not yet been attained, but the efforts of the Administration have been vigorous and sustained.

According to the statistics for 1986, the year following the issuance of the report, the number of Americans who died world wide as the result of terrorists incidents declined to 12 from 38 in 1985.

...no one in the United States was killed by terrorists in 1986 and a dozen intended terrorist acts in the U.S. were avoided.

...there was a noticeable drop in Mideast related, state sponsored, terrorism in Europe in the second half of last year.

...tightened airport and travel security has also contributed to fewer hijackings and incidents.10

Business Risk Assessment offers a different view. They do not see 1986 as a downward trend year. However in 1987 the trend of terrorist incidents against U.S. interests did go down and in 1988 the trend remained lower

than in 1986 even though there were 190 American fatalities
 11
 on Flight 103.

Quarterly Risk Assessment

	<u>Quarter</u>	<u>Number</u>
1986	Jan-Mar	22
	Apr-Jun	52
	Jul-Sep	25
	Oct-Dec	<u>24</u>
Total		123
1987	Jan-Mar	6
	Apr-Jun	29
	Jul-Sep	5
	Oct-Dec	<u>14</u>
Total		54
1988	Jan-Mar	18
	Apr-Jun	18
	Jul-Sep	12
	Oct-Dec	<u>9</u>
Total		57

If the trends continue, 1989 should be another
 11
 down year.

Celmer is less charitable to the Reagan Administration and the counterterrorism effort. He maintains in one line of thought that the Administration really has not changed much in terms of impact in the counterterrorism effort.

Despite all of its harsh rhetoric, the Reagan administration's approach has had no positive impact on the deterrence, prevention and suppression of international terrorism, nor has it created a greater degree of safety for Americans traveling and living abroad.

...The United States is not adequately prepared to deal with international terrorism either psychologically or

physically. The present administration has spoken of and taken some tough actions to combat terrorism and its supporters. Instead of enhancing American efforts at dealing with the problem of terrorism, however, the administration's actions may very well have placed the United States in a position in which only unilateral actions are possible.¹²

Finally in his article "Bush's Toothless War Against Terrorism," Steve Emerson writing in U.S. News and World Report poses the question "The Vice President called for many improvements in counterterror operations. Why¹² were so few adopted?"

Emerson contends the administration has ignored the recommendations of the Task Force as much as it has heeded them. He cites interviews with key counterterrorism officials in the Pentagon, CIA, State Department, and FBI, in contending 22 of the 42 recommendations of the report were not implemented. Emerson states "...intelligence sources complain that the administration has failed to carry out major policy changes that could have helped in the fight against international terrorists." Emerson continues:

...the Vice President, in a letter to Ronald Reagan last year (1987), gave this account of the task force: 'Progress has been excellent...[but] in a few cases - usually requiring the cooperation of foreign governments - our final objectives have not been attained.' On other fronts, Bush's defenders say he should be given credit for the changes that were made, such as tougher antiterrorism laws. In the intelligence community, however, reaction to the administration's lack of attention to its own report is scathing. 'They made their big splash and then left the water' says one senior counterintelligence expert. 'There was no follow up.' The report was a complete farce.¹³

The report may be a farce, however, with the election of President Bush and the announcement by his new Secretary of State, James Baker, that terrorism is one of the top five issues the administration wishes to resolve with the Soviets, it might be time for the Washington bureaucracy to dust off copies of the Task Force Report.

Current Policy and Programs

On February 12, 1988, speaking in Palm Beach, Florida, Secretary of State Shultz delineated the current U.S. policy and thought on international terrorism. His theme was that the right policies are in place and are working. The Secretary outlined a four part
14
counterterrorism effort.

First, we must understand terrorist aims and strategy. The facts show most acts of terrorism are committed against the citizens of the democracies... they believe they can turn our regard for human rights into a vulnerability...our compassion for the innocent against our instinct for self defense....Our first response...must be clear thinking...the best approach to countering terrorism is to act with cool reason and cold calculation....To sum up our position, we believe that behavior rewarded is behavior repeated.

The second element of America's four part counterterrorism effort is to obtain reliable intelligence....Solid intelligence on terrorism is not easy to develop. Technical means of collection...are good, but to do a better job we need people on the spot....The resources devoted to improved intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing are paying off. In the past three years we may have averted more than 200 terrorist attacks through intelligence efforts.

The third critical element of our policy against terrorism is to improve our security measures...our policy is not simply government people protecting themselves. Our ambassadors are sensitive to security threats to any Americans abroad, whatever their status, and we have established an Overseas Security Advisory Council designed specifically to help U.S. businessmen abroad.

Finally, the terrorists are waging war against us. We have every right under international law to defend ourselves. Part of (our) defense is to take the offense. The first goal of our action program is to pressure states which support terrorism....The American raid on Libya opened a new chapter in the international fight against terrorism. It brought home...the United States was not going to take it anymore. We would use military action against terrorism....Officially designated North Korea a terrorist supporting state. Realistically the United States has little leverage it can use directly against North Korea. But other governments have more leverage. We have indicated we want their help. The second goal of our program to take the offensive is to streamline international legal procedures and promote closer cooperation among law enforcement agencies....At last, thanks to good police work and including international cooperation, we are bringing the terrorists to justice.¹⁴

The Secretary seemed to be addressing the critics of NSDD 138. He espoused the use of force as a right of the United States under international law in defense of itself. In fact, NSDD 138 seems crafted with just that thought in mind, that self defense under international law is an inherent right. He also recognized the United States may have very little direct leverage over terrorist supporting states. However, he points out, we may have leverage over nations that do exert influence with the state sponsors of terrorism.¹⁴

L. Paul Bremer III, the Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, addressed the use of force.

...sometimes international realities limit the use of the law. Simply put, our writ did not run to Qadhafi headquarters....Moreover, military actions have nonmilitary consequences far removed from the scene. While some friendly governments questioned the wisdom of our limited attack, the message of U.S. resolve was unequivocal and as surely understood in Western capitols as it was understood in the terrorist training camps.¹⁵

In the same address, Ambassador Bremer delineated his view of U.S. counterterrorism policy.

...the American government has fashioned a three part policy designed to suppress terrorism:

Firmness Toward Terrorists;...behavior rewarded is behavior repeated. That is why we must make no concessions to terrorists....We will talk to anyone, anywhere...but, we will not change our policies, pay ransoms, release prisoners, or engage in any other behavior which might encourage further acts of terrorism.

Pressure Terror Supporting States;...to be sure that...(state sponsors) understand that practicing terrorism is unacceptable.

A Program of Action to Bring Terrorists to Justice; ...we know that most terrorists are not eager to be killed or imprisoned. So if we can identify, track, arrest, and punish terrorists, treat them like criminals, we can reduce the number of terrorists attacks.¹⁵

Ambassador Bremer concluded his remarks stating that we are not likely to eliminate terrorism completely, but by demythologizing it, by dealing with realities and concentrating on common sense responses, we can set about the business of making the world a safer place.¹⁵

CHAPTER VII

SOME PERSPECTIVES

Terrorism and the counterterrorism efforts of the United States exist in a fluid environment. Some of the recurring themes in the terrorism environment are state sponsorship, terrorism on the domestic scene, and the role of the media. Much has been written and said about each facet. The following reflects the views of the current counterterrorism team.

While it is extremely early to draw any firm conclusions, the election of President Bush may not bring major changes in the counterterrorism and antiterrorism programs. However it seems the administration has made it clear that it places a premium on countering terrorism. In his opening statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Baker listed as one of five guiding principles for U.S.-Soviet affairs, the establishment of a new category in¹ relations addressing terrorism.

State Sponsorship

On 29 November, 1980, in Tripoli, Qadhafi confirmed to Dobson and Payne that he intended to continue to use his teams to assassinate opponents of his regime in foreign² countries. This points up one of the more important features of terrorism the world saw beginning to develop in the 1970s and continuing on into the 1980s, the

internationalization of terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorist incidents and operations. As Ambassador Bremer points out, the world does not know the name Qadhafi because of his wisdom but because of his support for international terrorism. Libya and Qadhafi are not alone. Syria, Iran, Iraq and others most notably some Eastern Bloc Soviet clients have been involved in terrorism as state policy. Although the Soviet Union denounces the use of terrorism, it is clear without at least tacit approval, many of the Soviet client states would not be as deeply involved in terrorism as they currently are.³

In an address given on 3 June, 1987, Ambassador Bremer sums up the heart of the issue and explains the attractiveness of sponsoring terrorist groups to a state and the benefits of state sponsorship to the terrorist.

In recent years the international terrorist threat has become particularly difficult to deal with because certain nations find it useful to employ terrorists or support their activities as part of their foreign policies. The state sponsorship of terrorism has benefits for both the state supporting terrorism and for the terrorist. State sponsorship gives clear advantage to the terrorist. For example: when a terrorist obtains legitimate travel and identification documents from a country it becomes harder to identify and track him; a terrorist who enjoys the patronage of a state has a ready source of weapons and a legitimate means to transport them; countries like Libya, Syria, and Iran make a terrorist's work easier by providing a place to train; similarly, states also can provide terrorists with refuge, an important support; finally, financial support from state sponsors allows terrorists to spend more time on operations because they need not rob banks or traffic in drugs to raise money.³

Ambassador Bremer points out that even though the terrorist benefits greatly from state sponsorship of his

acts, those states sponsoring terrorism also benefit for giving support to the terrorist.

There are also advantages for a state giving these benefits to terrorists: terrorist units are less expensive to support per year than a company of regular soldiers but can do much more to intimidate another state; using terrorist surrogates makes it easier for the sponsoring state to deny responsibility for actions which, if taken overtly, could lead to war; terrorists can be useful in dealing with political opponents or dissidents; through terrorism a small state can attract the attention of the world.³

State sponsored terrorism had become one of the major focal points of the Reagan Administration. This coupled with a shift in policy from a reactive, multilateral approach to a proactive, unilateral approach, where appropriate, led to the raid on Libya. Current policy seems to be clear. When appropriate and where possible, the Administration intends to punish state sponsorship of terrorism using whatever means deemed appropriate.

Domestic Scene

The word "terrorism" more likely than not, brings visions of the Mid East or perhaps Europe, but the United States does have an extensive domestic program to counter terrorism. First, some words on definitions. Chapter II gives the definition of terrorism as the FBI defines it:

The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.

The FBI also lists four distinct groupings of terrorist activity.

Vigilante terrorism...initiated by private groups...aimed at other private groups.
Insurgent terrorism...directed by private groups against public authorities with three variations.
Single issue terrorism...pressuring authorities to grant some privilege to a larger group
Separatist terrorism...on the behalf of the secession of an ethnic or national group
Social revolutionary terrorism...taking power
Transnational terrorism...terrorists, targets, objectives originate in another country from the one where the incidents occur.
State terrorism...used by authorities to intimidate private groups or citizens.⁴

With the foregoing as a setting, the record on combatting domestic terrorism is encouraging. In his testimony to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, the Director of the FBI, William H. Webster, pointed to declining terrorist incidents in the U.S. and increasing interception of planned terrorist activities. The Director saw the keys to an effective counterterrorist posture as development of a solid intelligence base, innovative and aggressive application of criminal statutes, and close cooperation between agencies⁵ both in the international sphere and domestically.

Our entire strategy rests on an underpinning composed of these elements, together with a keen awareness of our special responsibility to proceed within constitutionally appropriate parameters. This strategy seems to be working....We have always been and continue to be convinced that within our system the most effective approach to dealing with terrorists through the courts is to seek prosecution for the specific crimes they commit. This enables us to concentrate more on the criminality of the activities than on the motives. We prefer to use this approach over the creation of generic antiterrorism legislation.⁵

The domestic program seems to be paying dividends.
Data from the FBI Terrorist Research and Analytical Center

reflects a decrease from over 2000 bombing incidents in
the United States and Puerto Rico in 1975, to 858 in 1986.⁶
The same data bank reflects a drop in incidents of
terrorism from 129 in 1975 to 17 in 1986. In his article
"Political Terrorism in the United States: Historical
Antecedents and Contemporary Trends," included in Stohl's
book, The Politics of Terrorism, Ted Gurr concludes
"...political terrorism does not seem to pose a serious
threat to public order in the United States of the late
1980s. All statistical measures of terrorist and related
activities show that such acts have been declining for a
decade....The lack of meaningful social support for U.S.
revolutionaries and public reactions against their
occasional use of violence have much simplified the
authorities' task in identifying and prosecuting them."⁷

Role of the Media

The target of most terrorist incidents is not the
immediate act in itself but rather a wider audience. The
intent in most cases seems to be to influence the wider
world community and draw attention to their cause. The
media and how terrorist incidents are covered assumed much
greater proportions. Some feel the media can in fact
strongly influence the outcome of a terrorist incident if
not determine the actual outcome.

The interplay of terrorism and the media is a
special focus of L. Paul Bremer III, the current Ambassador

at Large for Counter-Terrorism. Although he gives no solutions, Ambassador Bremer in an address before the International Association of Airline Security Officers on 25 June, 1987, gave the press eight questions to answer in the coverage of terrorist incidents.

1. Have my competitive instincts run away with me? (Occasionally competitive instinct has overridden common sense.)
2. What is the benefit in revealing the professional and personal history of a hostage before he or she is released? (In the unique circumstances of political terrorism, even facts verified by family members or coworkers could have deadly consequences.)
3. When reporting on the statements made by hostages and victims, a journalist might ask himself or herself: have I given sufficient weight to the fact that all such statements are made under duress? If I decide to go ahead with the report, have I given my audience sufficient warning?
4. Should I use statements, tapes, and the like provided by the terrorists?
5. How often should I use live coverage? Should I put a terrorist on TV live? (Giving extensive coverage to terrorist statements may encourage future acts of terrorism.)
6. Am I judging sources as critically as I would at other times? (During terrorist incidents we all have seen reporting of what amounts to nothing but rumors.)
7. Should I even try to report on possible military means to rescue the hostage? (Reports on military activities designed to surprise an armed foe are just about as secret as things get.)
8. What about honest consideration for the family members of a victim? (One former hostage recounts how his teenage son received a telephone call at 2 a.m. The journalist calling had a question: The latest reports indicate that your father will be executed in 2 hours. Any response?

The questions essentially were aimed at insuring responsible journalism. In the same address Ambassador Bremer remarked:

Terrorist threats to our people, to friendly countries, and to democracy itself, are all made more complex by the interplay among media, governments, and terrorists.

The very nature of terrorism, its desire to gain the widest possible publicity for its act, makes this completely inevitable. The most difficult issue involved is media coverage of a terrorist incident in progress. Because news organizations, especially electronic media, can have a major impact on the outcome of a terrorist incident, journalists must exercise special care and judgment. Innocent lives can be lost by even the slightest miscalculation on the part of the media.⁸

Ambassador Bremer sums up the difficult nature of the problem as the administration's focal point for terrorism in dealing with the issue of the media.

After considerable reflection, I believe that U.S. law and custom, our country's profound commitment to freedom of the press, and the individual circumstances of each terrorist incident make it impractical to develop universally accepted guidelines on media's response to terrorism.⁸

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

The formal United States policy response to international terrorism is a recent occurrence. Prior to the late 1960s, the American response was a passive one, with a predilection to rely on international law and convention. Starting with the Nixon Administration and continuing through the Ford, Carter, and Reagan Administrations, the United States policy response shifted from the reactive and passive to the proactive. Along with the awakening to the international terrorist threat and policy shift, the American response has also included substantive additions to the counterterrorism infrastructure. In some cases these additions have been deleterious.

One of the most nagging problems of the counterterrorism program is one of definition. There is a basic inability of the international community and national government elements to agree on a definition of terrorism and this basic disagreement has made it difficult to coordinate the counterterrorism effort on an international basis. The FBI's definition of terrorism and approach to terrorist acts discussed in the preceding chapter may offer the best hope for the future in controlling terrorism. This approach concentrates on the criminality of terrorism, prosecutes the terrorist as a law breaker, and avoids the

emotional discussions on motives and the nature of terrorists that seem to hamstring the war against terrorism. The recent capture of hijacker Fawaz Yunis in international waters by the FBI and his trial and conviction in American courts may signal a new era in the counterterrorism effort. On the domestic side of the counterterrorism national program, prosecution of terrorist activity has been kept in the context of existing criminal codes and avoids the confusion caused by generic counterterrorism legislation.

The emotional response the term terrorism engenders is a second problem area that sometimes clouds judgment as to the size and nature of the threat and proper response. Current U.S. policy outlined by Secretary of State Shultz emphasizes a cool, level headed, calculating, proactive and reactive, unemotional response.

The Palestinian question is a third road block in the path of any permanent solution to the phenomenon of modern terrorism. This conflict is at the roots of modern terrorism but is one that is long standing. To the extent that fundamentalists on both sides of the conflict, Israeli and Palestinian Moslems alike, gain ascendancy in their respective camps, then there is a decreased hope for peaceful settlement and appreciable diminution to the phenomenon called international terrorism.

On the international level, cooperation is increasing at an accelerated rate between political

institutions, law enforcement agencies, and the military in the West and other interested nations. To the extent the Soviets and their satellites view cooperation and decreased tension with the West as in their national interests, the West should be better able to leverage those states that sponsor international terrorism.

The media, and how the media handles coverage of a terrorist incident, has assumed greater proportions. Although, as Livingstone and Arnold point out, the U.S. has not tried to change the laws to restrict freedom of the press, other nations have passed such laws. Livingstone and Arnold go on to say, "...the guide for determining the basis of freedom of speech today is still the clear and present danger test...prior restraint may be constitutionally permissible where specific harm of a grave nature would surely result from media dissemination of certain information." ¹ However, given U.S. law and custom, strict control of the media is unlikely.

The shape and form of American policy response is difficult to predict partly due to the newness of the current administration. However, the Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, published in February, 1986, may prove to be the most accurate predictor of future U.S. policy.

NOTES

CHAPTER II (Pages 4-11)

1. Senator Henry Jackson, excerpted from an address given by Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead, Brookings Institute, December 10, 1986.
2. L. Paul Bremer III, "Terrorism: Myths and Reality," an address to the Norwegian Atlantic Council, Oslo, February 4, 1988.
3. Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987 pp. 7-87.
4. Walter Laqueur, "The Futility of Terrorism," Harper's Magazine, March, 1976.
5. U.S. Department of State, "The Impact of International Terrorism," Department of State Bulletin, January 1982, p. 55.
6. Dr. James E. Winkates, lecture delivered at The Air War College, November 16, 1988.
7. "Bundy Executed," The Alabama Journal, 25 January, 1988, Montgomery, Alabama, p. 2.
8. L. Paul Bremer III, "Counterterrorism: U.S. Policy and Proposed Legislation," statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism Narcotics, and International Operations, October 15, 1987.
9. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1987, August, 1988, pp. 1-5.
10. Harold Lamb, The Earth Shakers, Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Company, 1949, pp. 644-646.
11. Dr. James E. Winkates, lecture delivered at The Air War College, AY 89.
12. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, February, 1986, p. 1.

CHAPTER III (Pages 12-17)

1. Michael Waltzer, The New Terrorists, New York: The New Republic, 30 August, 1975, p. 9.
2. Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 6.

3. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Carlos Complex, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1977, pp. 7-9.

4. Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell E. Arnold, Fighting Back, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987, p. 12.

5. Michael Stohl, The Politics of Terrorism, New York: Marcel Dekker, INC. 1987, pp. 35-41.

6. Michael Stohl, The Politics of Terrorism, New York: Marcel Dekker, INC. 1987, p. 48.

7. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1968, New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1969, p. xi.

8. Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1978, p. 113.

CHAPTER IV (Pages 18-32)

1. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists, New York: New York, Facts on File, 1982, pp. 229-254.

2. Maxime Rodinson, The Arabs, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981, p. 57.

3. Abraham B. Yehoshua, Between Right and Wrong, New York: Doubleday & CO. 1981, p. 24.

4. Abraham B. Yehoshua, Between Right and Wrong, New York: Doubleday & CO. 1981, p. 9.

5. Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 p. 600.

6. Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 660.

7. Abraham B. Yehoshua, Between Right and Wrong, New York: Doubleday & CO, 1988, pp. 82-86.

8. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Carlos Complex, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1977, p. 16.

9. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and International Order, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986, p. 43.

10. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Carlos Complex, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1977, p. 16.

11. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and International Order, New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986, p. 43.

12. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Carlos Complex, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1977, p. 11.

13. Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1987, p. 266.

14. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Carlos Complex, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1977, p. 12.

15. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Carlos Complex, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1977, p. 13.

16. Roger W. Fontaine, Terrorism: the Cuban Connection, New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1988, p. 37.

17. Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: the Soviet Connection, New York: Crane and Russak, 1984, p. 13.

18. Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: the Soviet Connection, New York: Crane and Russak, 1984, p. 16.

19. Neil C. Livingstone, The War Against Terrorism, Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982, p. 12.

CHAPTER V (Pages 33-38)

1. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists, New York: Facts on File, 1982, p. 1.

2. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Carlos Complex, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1977, p. 15.

3. Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and the Reagan Policies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 113.

4. Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and the Reagan Policies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 18.

5. J. Bowyer Bell, A Time of Terror, New York: Basic Books, INC. 1978, p. 88.

6. Alvin H. Buckelew, Terrorism and the American Response, San Rafael: MIRA Academic Press, 1984, p. 47.

7. Alvin H. Buckelew, Terrorism and the American Response, San Rafael: MIRA Academic Press, 1984, p. 48.

8. Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and Reagan Policies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 19.

9. Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and Reagan Policies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 23.

10. Neil C. Livingstone, The War Against Terrorism, Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982, p. 248.

CHAPTER VI (Pages 39-52)

1. L. Paul Bremer, Current Policy, "Practical Measures for Dealing With Terrorism," No 913.

2. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists, New York: Facts on File Inc. 1982, p. 252.

3. Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and Reagan Policies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1982, p. 24.

4. Noel Koch, "Preemptive Anti Terrorist Raids Allowed," The Washington Post, April 16, 1984, p. 19.

5. Neil C. Livingstone, and Terrell Arnold Fighting Back, Mass: Lexington Books, 1987, pp. 112-113.

6. Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and Reagan Policies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1987, pp. 91-92.

7. Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and Reagan Policies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 113.

8. Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and Reagan Policies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 115.

9. George P. Shultz, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," Foreign Relations, Spring 1985, p. 717.

10. George Bush, Letter to the President, extracted from "International Terrorism: A Compilation of Major Laws, Treaties, Agreements and Executive Documents, Committee on Foreign Affairs," August 1987.

11. Business Risk Assessment Quarterly, excerpts 1986, 1987, 1988.

12. Marc A. Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and Reagan Policies, New York: Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 119.

13. Steven Emerson, "Bush's Toothless War Against Terrorism," U.S. News and World Report, October 31, 1987, p. 25.

14. George P. Shultz, "The Struggle Against Terrorism," address in Palm Beach Florida, February 12, 1988.

15. L. Paul Bremer III, "Terrorism: Myths and Reality," address before the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Oslo, Norway, February 4, 1988.

CHAPTER VII (Pages 53-59)

1. James A. Baker, remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The New York Times, January 18, 1988, p. 10.

2. Christopher Dobson, and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists, New York: Facts on File, 1982, p. 252.

3. L. Paul Bremer III, Terrorism, Vol 10, United Kingdom: Crane Rusk and Co. 1987, pp. 338-339.

4. Michael Stohl, The Politics of Terrorism, New York: Marcel Dekker, INC. 1988, p. 551.

5. William H. Webster, testimony to the House Judiciary Committee, February 24, 1986.

6. Michael Stohl, The Politics of Terrorism, New York: Marcel Dekker, INC. 1988, p. 552.

7. Michael Stohl, The Politics of Terrorism, New York: Marcel Dekker, INC. 1988, pp. 572-573.

8. L. Paul Bremer III, "Terrorism and the Media," Current Policy, No 986.

CHAPTER VIII (Pages 60-62)

1. Neil C. Livingstone and Terrell Arnold, Fighting Back, Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1987, p. 222.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alexander, Yonah. International Terrorism: National, And Global Perspectives. New York: Praeger, 1976.
- Bell, David. Resistance And Revolution. Atlanta, Dallas: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973.
- Bell J. Bowyer. A Time of Terror. New York: Basic Books INC. 1978.
- Billington, James H. Fire in the Minds of Men. New York: Basic Books, 1980.
- "Bundy Executed," The Alabama Journal, 25 January, 1988.
- Burton, Anthony M. Urban Terrorism. London: Leo Cooper, 1985.
- Bucklew, Alvin H. Terrorism. San Rafael California: MIRA Academic Press, 1984.
- Cambell, Arthur. Guerillas. New York: The John Day Company, 1968.
- Celmer, Marc A. Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987.
- Cline, Ray S. and Yonah Alexander. Terrorism. Arlington: HERO Books, 1986.
- Terrorism: The Soviet Connection. New York: Cline Russak, 1984.
- Dobson, Christopher, and Ronald Payne. The Terrorists. New York: Facts on File Inc. 1982.
- The Carlos Complex. New York: G.P.Putnam and Sons, 1977.
- Counterattack: The West's Battle Against Terrorism. New York: Facts of File Inc. 1982.
- The Never Ending War. New York: Facts on File Inc. 1987.
- Emerson, Steven. "Taking on the Terrorists." U.S. News and World Report, 12 September, 1988, p. 26.
- "Bush's Toothless War Against Terrorism." U.S. News and World Report, 31 October, 1988, p. 25.

- Evans, Ernest. Calling a Truce to Terror. Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1979.
- Fontaine, Roger W. Terrorism: The Cuban Connection. New York: Crowe Russak and Company, 1988.
- Freedman, Hill, Roberts, Vincent, Wilkinson, Windsor. Terrorism and International Order. New York: Chatham House, 1986.
- Gaucher, Roland. The Terrorists. London: Secker and Warburg, 1965.
- Gellner, John. Bayonets in the Street. Canada: Colliw and Macmillan, 1974.
- Grosscup, Beau. The Explosion of Terrorism. New Jersey: New Horizon Press, 1987.
- Hacker, Fredrick J. Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies. New York: W.W. Norton, 1976.
- "International Terrorism," Hearing before the Sub Committee of Foreign Assistance, United States Senate, 1977.
- Keen, Steven. Faces of the Enemy. New York: Harpers and Row, 1986.
- Koch, Noel. "Preemptive Antiterrorist Raids Allowed." The Washington Post, April 16, 1984.
- Lamb, Harrold. The Earth Shakers. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co. 1949.
- Laqueur, Walter. "The Futility of Terrorism." Harper's, March, 1976.
- Lillich, Richard B. Transnational Terrorism: Conventions and Comentary. New York: The Mische Company, 1982.
- Lineberry, William. The Struggle Against Terrorism. New York: Wilson, 1982.
- Livingstone, Neil C. and Terrell Arnold. Fighting Back. Massachusetts: Lexington Press, 1987.
- The War Against Terrorism. Massachusetts: Lexington Press, 1982.
- McCuen, Gary. Political Murder in Central America. Hudson, Wisconsin: GEM, 1985.
- Merari, Ariel, (ed). On Terrorism and Combatting

- Terrorism. Tel Aviv: University Publications, 1985.
- INTER: International Terrorism in 1987. Tel Aviv:
The Jerusalem Post, 1987.
- INTER: International Terrorism in 1986. Tel Aviv:
The Jerusalem Post, 1986.
- Netanyahu, Benjamin. Terrorism, How the West Can Win. New
York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1986.
- Parry, Albert. Terrorism. New York: Vanguard Press, 1976.
- Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1987. DOS Pub 9661, Office
of the Secretary of State, August, 1988.
- Rivers, Gayle. The War Against the Terrorists. New York:
Stein and Day, 1986.
- Rubin, Jerry. "Terrorist and Their Audiance," Current,
July/August, 1986.
- Shultz, George P. "New Realities and Ways of Thinking,"
Foriegn Affairs, Spring, 1985.
- Sloan, Steven. Beating International Terrorism. Air
University: Air University Press, 1986.
- Sofaer, Abraham D. "Terrorism and the Law," Foreign
Affairs. Summer 1986.
- Specter, A. Senator, "Anti Terrorism," U.S. News and World
Report, 3 October, 1988, p. 5.
- Stohl, Michael. The Politics of Terrorism. New York:
Marcel Dekker, INC. 1988.
- "Terrorscope," Counter-Terrorism, 5 September, 1988, p 1.
- "The Impact of International Terrorism," U.S. Department
of State Bulletin, January 1982.
- Waltzer, Michael. The New Terrorists. The New Republic,
30 August, 1985.
- White, Theodore H. The Making of the President, 1968. New
York: Antheneum Publishers, 1969.
- Winkates, James E. Dr. Air War College, AY 88/89
- Wright, Robin B. Sacred Rage. New York: Linden, 1985.

GLOSSARY

ALN.....National Liberation Action. BRAZIL
CIA.....Central Intelligence Agency. USA
DOD.....Department of Defense. USA
DOS.....Department of State. USA
ERP.....Popular Revolutionary Army. EL SALVADORE
ETA-M.....Basque Nation and Liberty. SPAIN
FALN.....Armed Forces of Liberation. VENEZ. PUERTO RICO
FBI.....Federal Bureau of Investigation. USA
FLQ.....Quebec Liberation Front. CANADA
IRA.....Irish Republican Army. IRELAND
JDL.....Jewish Defense League. USA
JRA.....Japanese Red Army. JAPAN
MR-8.....Revolutionary Movement of the 8th. BRAZIL
NAYLP.....National Arab Youth for the Liberation of
Palestine. PALESTINE-LIBYA
NSDD.....National Security Defense Directive
PFLP.....Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
PALESTINE
PFLP-GC...PFLP General Command. PALESTINE
PLO.....Palestine Liberation Organization.
SAM.....Surface to Air Missile
SAS.....Special Air Service. BRITAIN
SLA.....Symbionese Liberation Army. USA
UDA.....Ulster Defense Association. IRELAND

APPENDIX

Significant Events in the 1970s - Highlights

1970

February 21: Swiss airliner destroyed in flight with forty-seven fatalities. PFLP

March 31: The Japanese Red Army's first international incident. JRA

July 31: In a series of kidnappings in Uruguay two diplomats were kidnapped and attempts were made on two others. One was killed. Tupamaros

September 6: Four aircraft hijackings occur and a fifth was attempted but failed when an Israeli sky marshal shot the terrorist. This event caused King Hussein to expel the Palestinian terrorist groups out of Jordan and led to the creation of Black September. PFLP

October 10: The Minister of Labor in Canada is kidnapped and murdered when terrorist demands are not met. FLQ

1971

March 1: A bomb exploded in the Senate wing of the U.S. Capitol. Weather Underground

March 14: In Rotterdam the first coordinated attack mounted from Paris results in the bombing of fuel tanks. Fatah

July 20: The first of a series of attacks on Jordanian offices were launched in revenge for Black September. Fatah

July 28: First attempt to blow up an airliner by giving a suitcase bomb to an innocent passenger to carry on the aircraft occurred in Tel Aviv. PFLP-GP

October 20: Jewish extremists fired rifle shots into an apartment occupied by Soviet U.N. delegates. JDL

November 28: Jordanian prime minister assassinated in Cairo in the first acknowledged operation by Black September. The prime minister was blamed for the September 1970 expulsion from Jordan. Black September

1972

January 27: Two New York policemen were assassinated by black extremists. Black Liberation Army

February 6: Five Jordanian workers were assassinated in Cologne. Black September

February 22: Hijacked Lufthansa airliner flown to Aden. Aircraft and passengers ransomed for 5 million. The South Yemen government extracted an additional 1 million for "landing rights". PFLP

May 31: The first Japanese/Arab and the first transnational murder attacks were carried out at Lod airport by Japanese kamikazes. JRA PFLP

September 5: The Munich massacre occurred. Black September

1973

This turned out to be the most destructive year for the IRA as some 467 died in acts of political violence.

March 1: A number of diplomats were seized at the Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum. When demands for the release of several convicted terrorists were not met three diplomats were murdered. Terrorists were eventually released. Black September

April 10: Israeli commandos attacked the apartments of leading Palestinian guerillas in Beirut killing 17. Mossad

June 28: Mohammed Boudia, the leading Arab terrorist in Europe died in a car bomb incident in Paris. Cleared the way for Carlos to assume his position and create a truly transnational terrorist network with West German, Dutch, Japanese and French terrorists. Moussad

July 21: Innocent bystander killed by Jewish assassination team in Norway. He was mistaken as the leader of the Munich massacre terrorists. Several Jewish team members arrested. Proved to be the last of the Israeli assassinations in Europe. Moussad

September 5: Italian police arrested Arabs armed with two Scud. Strella SAMs in an apartment on the flight path to Rome airport. Black September

1974

January 31: Japanese and Palestinian terrorists attack Shell oil facilities in Singapore. PFLP/JRA

April 11: First PFLP-GC ground attack occurred. Attacked a residential area in Israel. PFLP-GC

May 31: Six Symbionese Liberation Army members died in gun battle with Los Angeles police. SLA

October 11: Because of Israeli tip, Moroccan police arrest 15 assassins in Rabat. Probable target was King Hussein and other moderate Arab leaders meeting in Rabat. PFLP

November 22: British Airways airliner hijacked by Abu Nidal's group. Two terrorists plus the Rabat group released as ransom. NAYLP

1975

January 13: Members of Carlos group tried to destroy El Al aircraft on ground in Paris with hand held missiles. Fail and tried again on the 19th and failed again.

June 27: PFLP member led Paris police to Carlos' apartment. He kills member and two police before escape to Algeria. First time his identity was made known. PFLP

December 21: OPEC headquarters seized in Vienna. Ministers held for ransom. Last known operation of Carlos "in the field". Carlos-PFLP, Baader-Meinhof

December 2: South Moluccans seize train in Holland and Indonesian embassy. Three victims killed, terrorists arrested. South Moluccans.

1976

May 4: A member of the Baader-Meinhof gang admits the group's responsibility for three lethal bombings. On May 8 Ulricke Meinhof hangs herself in her cell in Stammheim. Baader-Meinhof (RAF)

June 18: The chief of the Federal Police in Buenos Aires is killed by a bomb in his home. He was the second police chief killed in two years. ERP

June 27: A mixed group of West German and Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Air France airbus to Entebbe. Jews separated from the other passengers. At least three governments were involved on the terrorist side, Uganda, Somalia, and Libya. In the first great defeat of the

international terrorists, Israeli paratroopers assaulted Entebbe airport killing seven terrorists PLFP

July 31: British ambassador murdered with bomb in Dublin. Provisional IRA

October 28: Provisional IRA leader shot to death in hospital in Belfast while recovering from an operation. UDA splinter group.

1977

January 9: Five communist lawyers killed in submachine gun attack in Madrid. Warriors of Christ the King

March 9: Gunmen seized three buildings in Washington D.C. and hold 134 hostages for two days before surrendering. Hanafi Muslims

April 7: West German chief of police assassinated in revenge for Ulricke Meinhof's suicide. Baader-Meinhof

April 10: Former Yemeni prime minister and his wife killed in the Yemeni Embassy in London by Palestinian hit man. The murder was committed because the minister was working for the Saudis to form a Western oriented alliance of Arab countries. PFLP

July 31: Two office buildings bombed in New York with one fatality and several injuries. FALN

August 7: One of Germany's most influential bankers murdered in Frankfurt. Assassins were led into his heavily fortified home by his granddaughter. Baader-Meinhof

October 20: Andreas Baader and two others commit suicide in their cells. Baader-Meinhof

December 31: Two Syrian diplomats were killed by car bomb in Mayfair. They were suspected Syrian intelligence officers enroute to plant the bomb in an Egyptian office in London. Syrian intelligence

1978

January 4: PLO representative assassinated in London. He was being used to conduct negotiations with Israelis by Arafat. PFLP or Black June

March 9: Trial of Red Brigades leader and forty-seven members begins in Rome. Judge and prison official murdered the next day. Aldo Moro kidnapped and murdered during the next month. Red Brigades

April 24: Egyptians smash terrorist ring masterminded by Nidal. Twenty-four arrested including German and Swiss nationals said to be connected to the Red Brigades.

June 24: Iraq embassy bombed in Brussels. Signaled the start of the mini war between Arafat and Nidal. PLO

July 26: Britain expelled eleven Iraqi "diplomats" because of their involvement in acts of terrorism.

September 7: Georgi Markov murdered by poison pellet fired into his thigh by umbrella gun. Bulgarian Secret Service

September 13: Alunni, prime suspect in Moro murder arrested in Milan in apartment filled with guns, explosives, and false documents. Red Brigades

1979

January 12: Civilian airliner shot down in Rhodesia by SAM 7. ZAPU

January 22: Planner of the Munich massacre killed in car bomb incident in Beirut. Moussad

April 29: Israeli government reinstates the death penalty for serious acts of terrorism.

June 29: Assassination attempt on General Haig, Commander Allied Forces Europe failed as car bomb exploded under his car on the way to SHAPE Headquarters. Baader-Meinhof

August 27: Earl Mountbatten murdered by radio bomb on his boat. Provisional IRA

November 5: American Embassy seized with approval of Iranian government. Hostages released for 6 billion in frozen assets. Revolutionary Guards