


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RESEARCH REPORT

NEW ZEALAND'S DEFENCE FORCE STRUCTURE
DETERMINING PRIORITIES IN A BENIGN ENVIRONMENT

WING COMMANDER BRUCE R. FERGUSON, AFC, RNZAF

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
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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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NEW ZEALAND'S DEFENCE FORCE STRUCTURE:
DETERMINING PRIORITIES IN A BENIGN ENVIRONMENT

by

Wing Commander Bruce R. Ferguson, AFC, RNZAF.

A DEFENCE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM REQUIREMENT

Research Advisors: Doctor David E. Albright and
Colonel Bruce S. Goodhue

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
May 1989

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: New Zealand's Defence Force Structure: Determining Priorities in a Benign Environment.

AUTHOR: Wing Commander Bruce R. Ferguson, AFC, RNZAF.

Remarks

△ Since 1985, New Zealand has been forced to re-think its defence objectives as a result of the split in the ANZUS relationship. In addition to the loss of United States cooperation, the Government had directed that New Zealand's primary area of defence responsibility was now the South Pacific.

These two factors should have caused a major reassessment of New Zealand's capabilities, but the benign nature of the environment, combined with the minimal threat perceptions projected by the Government, have resulted in much discussion but little cohesion of purpose.

The purpose of this research paper is to assess the current and future environment; account for the political and economic inputs; then determine appropriate priorities for New Zealand's armed forces. (S. 11)

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Wing Commander Bruce R. Ferguson joined the Royal New Zealand Air Force in 1969, and trained as a pilot. On graduation he converted to the helicopter role and served in Malaysia and Singapore until 1973. He then served as the first RNZAF Aide-de-Camp to the Governor General of New Zealand. By December 1974 he had become a flying instructor, and served in various capacities as such until 1980. Following a further tour in Singapore, he became the Officer Commanding Central Flying School. During this tour he formed and led the RNZAF formation aerobatic team, the "Red Checkers". He then became the Personal Staff Officer to the Chief of Air Staff, following which he became the Director of Officer Postings. He was awarded the Queen's Commendation for Valuable Service in the Air in 1977, and the Air Force Cross in 1984. He graduated from the USAF Air War College in 1989.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
DISCLAIMER	i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	ii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH	iii
1 INTRODUCTION	1
AIM	4
2 BACKGROUND	6
The ANZUS Treaty	6
The New Zealand Environment	13
Summary	15
3 THREAT PERCEPTIONS	16
The Soviet Threat	18
The Libyan Influence	20
The French Connection	21
The Threat of Dispossession	22
Threats External to the Region	23
Terrorism	25
Low Level Threats	26
4 THE AUSTRALIAN CONNECTION	27
The Loss of US Assistance to NZ	28
The Benefits to Australia	28
New Zealand's Self-Reliance	30
Summary	33
5 RESPONSE TO PERCEIVED THREATS	35
Global War	36
Joint ANZAC Approach to the South-West Pacific?	37
Intelligence and Surveillance	39
Threat Sources External to the Region	41
Protection of SLOC	42
Threat to EEZ's of Island States	44
Insurgency Threats	46
Other Contingencies	47
Ethnic Sense of Dispossession	48
6 ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES FOR NEW ZEALAND'S DEFENCE FORCE STRUCTURE	49
General Priorities	55

	Detailed Priorities	57
	Intelligence	58
	Surveillance	59
	Maritime Strike	61
	Land Force	62
	Protection of SLOC	65
	Anti-Terrorism	68
	Peacekeeping Forces	69
	Disaster Relief	70
	Summary	70
7	CONCLUSION	73
	LIST OF REFERENCES	79

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

It is not enough for a small country to focus only on national or even regional security, important as that contribution may be to general stability and peace if well directed. In this age of super-powers and nuclear weapons, security must be seen in global terms. Local defence policies must be set in that context if they are not to undercut wider alliance interests and so be self-defeating in the long term.

Sir Ewan Jamieson
Air Marshal (Ret) RNZAF

The snap election called for July 1984 by the Prime Minister of the time, Sir Robert Muldoon, set the stage for what was to become the most substantial shift in New Zealand's defence policies in this century. The Labour Party's triumph in that election and its adoption of a policy of not allowing nuclear-armed or -powered ships into New Zealand created a schism in the defence relationship between New Zealand and the United States of America, and strained the long-standing relationship with Australia on defence matters.

For the first time in its history, New Zealand has found itself in the position of having to consider seriously its future Defence Force structure without the "umbrella" of a larger power necessarily sheltering it. Although this development should have had a profound impact

on New Zealand's strategic thinking, the change had come at a time of minimal threat perception. Without such a catalyst, there has been little unity or cohesion within New Zealand as to what the country should do to structure its forces.

The history of New Zealand's defence policies has been essentially one of complete reliance on alliances, be they formal or by association. The close and traditional relationship with Great Britain stemming from the days of colonization has been sufficient of itself to see New Zealand enter two World Wars at precisely the same time as Great Britain. Indeed, the New Zealand Government declared war on Germany at 9.30pm New Zealand Standard Time, on 3 September 1939. This selection of time coincided precisely with 11am British Summer Time, 3 September 1939 (21:6)- the time of the British declaration.

This close tie with the "mother country" also ensured that little questioning was done of any proposed employment of New Zealand's forces by the imperial power (Great Britain). Such examples as the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 serve as pointers to what could best be described as blind obedience to a superior power. In addition, the commitment of a division to Greece in March 1941 at the request of the British Prime Minister, was little short of total acquiescence to Great Britain, although the War

Cabinet of the time did weigh all the factors given them before committing New Zealand's troops. Unfortunately, they were not given all the relevant information on which to make a reasoned judgment.

In defence terms, New Zealand has long lacked the maturation of nationalistic feeling to push it toward independent stances within its area of responsibility--be that global or regional. New Zealand has never taken the action that Australia did in 1942, for example, when it withdrew two divisions from the Middle East theatre and re-routed them to the defence of Australia against the advice of Winston Churchill, and then took strong exception to Churchill and his cabinet when they, in turn, diverted the divisions unilaterally to the defence of Burma. The divisions did not land in Burma owing to the Australian Government's firm stand against both Churchill and US.President Franklin D. Roosevelt. (22:238)

So, the 1985 unshackling of New Zealand's major defence alliance - the Australia, New Zealand, United States, Treaty (ANZUS)--as the result of the implementation of the New Zealand Labour Government's commitment to keep New Zealand nuclear free (a policy it propounded as part of its election manifesto) has caused New Zealand to look to itself for its future defence needs. ANZUS, and before it the Great Britain connection, had given New Zealand the

ability to have a minimal expenditure on defence while retaining a maximum impression of security. This has been used to the full by succeeding governments, but the scenario is now different. The umbrella is no longer up, but the 'weather' has not changed for the better.

Does New Zealand have the defence force structure in place to cover the country's security needs? If not, then on what basis should the structure be developed?

AIM

The purpose of this paper is to determine the priorities for establishing an appropriate Defence Force Structure for New Zealand by assessing the present and likely future environment in which such a force may operate.

To achieve this, the paper will initially reflect on the historical background of New Zealand's defence commitments by outlining the nation's changing world view this century. It will show the refinement that has developed as a result of this, leading to a greater awareness of regional responsibilities. The threats, both known and perceived, will then be analyzed. This will lead to a study of the relationship with our closest neighbour-Australia-so that some sort of concept of future operations and

responsibilities within the region may be postulated. The analysis will then be guided towards determining responses to the threats, and to New Zealand's ability to meet these. Finally, a determination of the priorities which should be apportioned to New Zealand's Defence Force structure will be made.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

New Zealand has long had a non-antipodean world view. That is, although displaced by half a world from Europe, it has maintained a view as if it were not. This was quite natural considering the ties of family, trade, and tradition that have permeated New Zealand's history. But it has also caused a late realization by New Zealand as to its place in the world order. New Zealand has quite literally had its position thrust upon it by events largely beyond its control, but which impact directly on the nation.

This holds true for commitments, responsibilities, alliances, and relationships. It is these that this chapter will study, drawing together relevant aspects of New Zealand's historical background in order to provide a focus for where the nation should be headed with respect to its defence commitments.

The ANZUS Treaty

As has been mentioned, New Zealand's armed forces have traditionally been shaped as an adjunct to some larger formation. This has been true from the command and control level through to the necessary "nuts and bolts".

Security thinking has reflected the same influence. The situation cited with respect to Australia in 1942 is relevant, because at that time Darwin had been bombed (19 February 1942) and Japanese troops were in Java. An extrapolation of the Japanese advance to that stage could have seen New Zealand itself under direct threat. Yet no action was taken to withdraw the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force from the Middle East to defend the homeland.

On 12 August 1940, the Prime Minister of Great Britain had sent the following cable to the Australian and New Zealand Governments:

If....Japan set about invading Australia or New Zealand on a large scale, I have explicit authority of Cabinet to assure you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediterranean and proceed to your aid, sacrificing every interest except only the defence position of this island on which all depends. (22:148)

With such an assurance, the decision to remain in the Middle East should have been relatively straightforward. Yet history shows the promise to have been a hollow one, and it further shows that irrespective of such a promise, Australia acted as decisively as it could to ensure its own defence.

The conclusion of World War II saw the emergence of the United States as the dominant Pacific (and world) power, and the virtual disappearance of Great Britain from

any real position of influence. But it was not until after the communist victory in mainland China and the commencement of the Korean War that any formalisation of what was to become the ANZUS Treaty was feasible. It was the threat of a resurgent Japan--remote though it was-- that provided the catalyst for the treaty. (1)

Still, New Zealand's enthusiasm for ANZUS as early as 1951 was not full-hearted. The exclusion of the British from the treaty and the possibility of New Zealand's being drawn into another conflict outside its region by virtue of its membership had the Government of the day very concerned. They feared that "New Zealand might be asked in some unpredictable circumstances to involve itself in military adventures in the Pacific." (4) So New Zealand somewhat reluctantly entered another sphere of its military development in 1951 by structuring its forces to work with and alongside those of the United States.

This relationship lasted through to 1985 and included involvement in the Vietnam War, although that involvement did not take place under the auspices of ANZUS. Rather, it was a show of solidarity with the United States in order to "assure wider US involvement and interest in the East Asia and Pacific area." (1:9)

Nonetheless, New Zealand remained associated with Great Britain rather than the United States in many

areas. As most of New Zealand's trade in the 1950's was with Britain, it was reasonable to expect this close association to continue. In other realms such as foreign policy, New Zealand continued a somewhat independent stance from that of the United States. As early as 1954, certain members of New Zealand's Government wished to recognise Communist China. This proved to be a concern to the US National Security Council later that decade.(4:33)

So, although New Zealand had good cause to shift its military ties from Great Britain to the United States, it did so only tentatively. It did not make the change in the style of Australia, which displayed a much more pragmatic approach to the issue with its wholehearted adoption of the United States as an ally.

The ANZUS Treaty, signed in San Francisco on 1 September 1951, is remarkable for its simplicity, consisting of only eleven articles and short enough to be printed on one standard page. Yet since 1985 it has been at the very centre of the political dispute between New Zealand and the United States.

The treaty in no way gives ascendancy to any of the three parties. Indeed, the intent of Australia and New Zealand in signing the treaty was doubtless to secure the cover of a superpower, but the treaty does not state this. Nor is it implied in the text.

Therefore, it was an interesting situation which was created on 27 June 1986, when the US Secretary of State George Shultz stated:

Neither the United States nor Australia has any plan to alter the ANZUS treaty. The problem is it is minus one member for the moment. (24:13)

It seems that although there is no stated hierarchy in ANZUS, the United States has used its powerful position to unilaterally remove one member from the alliance.

In fact, this is in direct contradiction to Article 10 of the treaty, which says:

This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the governments of the other parties of the deposit of such notice.

No such notice has been given by the New Zealand Government. On the contrary, a statement in the Defence White Paper of 1987, the Government declared that New Zealand continues to adhere to the ANZUS Treaty alliance as signed at San Francisco in 1951.

Irrespective of any political persuasion, this action by the United States could be labeled high-handed and must cast some doubt on the potential for success of any future arrangements that New Zealand might enter into with a superpower. In his paper "Defence and Security: What New Zealand Needs," Malcolm Templeton, Director of the

Institute of Policy Studies at Victoria University, said:

The United States, regrettably, appears in recent times to be succumbing more and more to a tendency towards unilateral reinterpretation of its legal commitments. Small and militarily weak states like New Zealand, on the other hand, have a vested interest in maintaining and strengthening international law, and therefore in the strict observance of treaties to which they are party. (24:14)

Much has been said about the requirements to remain an effective member of an alliance in order to retain a global perspective of the world, and to project influence--whether political or economic--outside New Zealand's area. The "loss" of ANZUS has been seen by those opposed to the Government's action as a large step toward isolationism.

If this were true, then the character of New Zealand and its people must have changed, for there were no formal treaties which caused New Zealand to become involved in two World Wars. It was a profound sense of right versus wrong and strong ties through heritage that produced that commitment. Troops were sent to Korea in 1950 as part of a UN force--not as a requirement of an alliance. Nor did New Zealand's Vietnam involvement come about under the auspices of the ANZUS treaty. So it does not follow that outside of ANZUS, New Zealand will become isolationist.

What needs to be addressed is whether New Zealand needs an alliance at all. There can be little dispute here if New Zealand is to take seriously its commitment to the

maintenance of world peace and its own recognition of its area of direct interest. Government policy was clearly stated in 1987 with the following:

It is the Government's view that, given our limited resources, we can best meet our ANZUS obligations, and make an effective contribution to Western security, by playing a constructive role in maintaining the peace and promoting the collective security of our own part of the world. (7:19)

There is much inherent logic in this statement. It reiterates that which President Nixon said in 1969. In what has become known as the Guam Doctrine, he stated:

...we will keep our treaty commitments...but... except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons...the United States is going to encourage and has the right to expect that this problem (of military defence) will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by the Asian nations themselves. (24:33)

New Zealand should be looking after its own area first and doing that well. Such action will lessen the protective burden of the United States and in no way circumvents any "global" responsibilities that New Zealand may see itself having.

The New Zealand Environment

The 1987 Defence White Paper defined New Zealand's area of direct strategic concern as ranging from the Ross Dependency in Antarctica to the south, to Kiribati (on the equator) to the north, and from Western Australia to

the Cook Islands in the east. This area encompasses some 16 percent of the world. Within this area New Zealand has a responsibility for an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) covering 3.1 million square kilometers. This is one of the world's largest zones. (7:25)

In addition, New Zealand has constitutional responsibilities for the Tokelau Islands, for Niue, and for the Cook Islands. (7:25) This constitutional relationship provides for the exercise by New Zealand of certain responsibilities for the defence and external relations of the Cook Islands and Niue. (17:95) Although both the Cook Islands and Niue have the full constitutional capacity to conduct their own foreign relations, and indeed frequently do so, they continue with a close relationship with New Zealand. This bond was described in 1973 by the then Prime Minister of New Zealand, the Right Honorable Norman Kirk, as "one of partnership, freely entered into and freely maintained." (17:96) Both these countries rely on New Zealand for the provision of defence cover, with special emphasis on surveillance of their respective EEZs.

The Tokelau Islands are not yet independent. New Zealand is, however, assisting the Tokelauans toward self-government and toward a greater economic independence. Meanwhile, the responsibility for the surveillance of this area falls directly on New Zealand. (17:96)

Besides these countries with specific ties to New Zealand and a degree of dependence on it for defence support, New Zealand has many less formal, but no less demanding, responsibilities. One example is the state of Western Samoa, which until 1962 was administered by New Zealand. This state has little means of patrolling its EEZ, so it has come to rely on New Zealand and Australia for assistance. Another country which has traditionally relied on both Australia and New Zealand for defence assistance is Fiji. Although Fiji does have its own army, its navy is totally inadequate to undertake extensive surveillance. Nor does Fiji have an air force.

The region described is becoming increasingly important from a commercial perspective for New Zealand. In the 1985-86 period, New Zealand's exports to this area totaled \$386 million. (17:96) The balance of trade is distinctly in New Zealand's favor, with imports from the same countries totaling only \$85 million. However, New Zealand and Australia have created a regional trade agreement with the South Pacific countries which allows for non-reciprocal duty-free access to the Australian and New Zealand markets for the island states. Also, there are now substantial financial incentives for Australia and New Zealand industries to set up branches in the South Pacific. (17:96)

Summary

Thus, it is indeed quite a massive area for which New Zealand has assumed either a direct or indirect responsibility. In a 1986 public opinion poll, 85 percent of respondents considered that the existing responsibilities for the defence of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau should continue and be a factor in any future defence planning for New Zealand. (5:39) For a country of 3.3 million people with the approximate land area of Japan or Great Britain, New Zealand seems to be taking on an overwhelming responsibility when seen in global terms. It has approximately 0.06 percent of the world's population, yet claims an area of direct interest of 16 percent of the globe. It is little wonder that New Zealand has looked to alliances to fulfill its obligations, as with a total strength of 13,000 personnel in its armed forces, it could hardly expect to discharge this commitment fully on its own. Indeed, it would be naive to suggest this, and worse if it were expected from the existing force structure.

CHAPTER 3

THREAT PERCEPTIONS

To describe the South Pacific as a benign environment is not new. That is, after all, how the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean came by its name. It was tranquil, non-threatening, a quiet place. Least-wise, that is how it appeared to its discoverers. But like any ocean, it can be tempestuous, unpredictable, and life-threatening. It was just not seen as such at the time.

The 1987 White Paper stated that "the contingency of invasion is so remote that it need not form the basis of our defence strategy." (7:11) It went on, to argue that New Zealand's defence efforts must focus on the more credible and feasible lower-level threats. This "threat of direct invasion", however, had formed the basis for public bias on defence matters for many years. So the departure from such a scenario, which was first postulated in the 1978 Defence Review, is a major change for New Zealand's strategic thinking.

Although global war, whether nuclear or conventional, must remain the single greatest threat to New Zealand by virtue of its sheer magnitude and widespread repercussions, it is probably the threat which is least likely to happen. Even if the "Armageddon" were to occur,

New Zealand could not influence the outcome, although it should not neglect giving some thought to how it would handle the aftermath.

Therefore, it is not unreasonable to concentrate from the outset on determining force structures appropriate to the New Zealand environment. But then some threat perceptions must be postulated, for if it could be proved that no threat existed or is likely to exist, there is no requirement for New Zealand to have armed forces.

No serious military historian or analyst would be so bold (or naive) as to make such a suggestion. But, interestingly, this lack of need for armed forces was postulated in the New Zealand Party Election Manifesto during the 1984 elections (in which the party failed to gain a single seat). Moreover, the party leader, Mr. Robert Jones, often cited Costa Rica as an example of a state having no armed forces. Such a reference, of course, completely overlooked the fact that Costa Rica has a 4,500 member Civil Guard (armed) and a 3,500 member Rural Guard (also armed) (29). These forces defend a country one-fifth the size of New Zealand, but with only slightly less population. An exercise in semantics can result in dangerous--and incorrect--conclusions.

The Report of the Defence Committee of Enquiry 1986 defined three components to threat perception. They were:

- the likelihood of an event occurring
- the seriousness of that event if it occurred, and
- the country posing the threat. (5:39)

These components were then put to the New Zealand public in the poll previously discussed. The threat to New Zealand's EEZ in the form of poaching was seen as the most likely threat by 91 percent of the respondents yet regarded as the most serious by only 23 percent of them. Global nuclear and conventional war were rated as the most serious by 44 percent and 43 percent of the respondents respectively.

The Soviet Union was viewed as the most threatening country, with a 31 percent showing, but, interestingly, the United States was second at 14 percent closely followed by France at 13 percent. Here we have the three major influential powers in the region grouped at the top as those perceived to be most threatening to the region. (5:40)

What was not covered in the poll were the more insidious threats. These may not (yet) have a direct bearing on New Zealand's security but should also be analysed by defence planners to formulate the necessary structure for the armed forces of the 21st century.

The Soviet Threat

Mikhail Gorbachev has taken the West by storm with

his articulation of perestroika and glasnost. He has proved to be a master of political rhetoric and is so different from his predecessors that he readily fits the image of what the West would like a Soviet Leader to be.

The nations of the Pacific basin, however, should not overlook his speech of 28 July 1986 in Vladivostok. In it, he said:

The situation in the Far East, in Asia and the ocean expanses adjoining it, where we are permanent inhabitants and of long standing, is to us of national, state interest. (19)

This was nothing less than a reminder that the Soviet Union is a major Asia-Pacific power, and will continue to be so. Gorbachev went on to propose an extension of ties with "the youngest independent participants in the region's political life," and listed these as Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. (11)

Another indicator which should at the very least be noted, is the creation of a Pacific Branch within the Soviet Foreign Ministry. This branch has a responsibility to cover all the Pacific island states, and includes New Zealand and Australia.

The Soviet Union, in short, is intent on expanding its influence in the South Pacific and it has taken concrete steps to do so. In August 1987, it established diplomatic

relations with Vanuatu, and it subsequently signed a fishing agreement with Vanuatu which allows for on-shore access. The relevance of this fishing agreement was arguably politically based from the Soviet perspective, for the fishing grounds around Vanuatu are more suited to the Japanese/Taiwanese method of fishing (long-lining) than the Soviet (purse seine) (11). Although the government of Vanuatu did not renew this agreement when it came up for renegotiation during 1988, this should not necessarily be taken as an indication of a change in political persuasion by it.

The Soviets also came close to signing a fishing contract with Kiribati, but the intransigence of Kiribati in not allowing on-shore access rather dulled the attraction for the Soviets. Although the fishing would not have been affected by lack of land-based facilities, this was obviously enough to stem this initiative. Similar approaches have been made to other island states, including Fiji, but to date none has come to fruition.

The Libyan Influence

The Prime Minister of Vanuatu, Father Walter Lini, in his open admiration and support for Libya's Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, has caused considerable consternation in the region. Gaddafi has nurtured this connection by

establishing diplomatic relations with Vanuatu and by hosting visits to Libya of selected people. It is a small step from there to the training of terrorists--an art for which Libya has become notorious.

The French Connection

France's role in the South Pacific is an issue which arouses as much emotion as it does rational debate. The continuing French nuclear tests at Mururoa do little for the French cause in the region. This perseverance by France is rational if one is to accept the French world view of independence outside of NATO (France withdrew from the command structure in 1967, but remains a member) and the necessity for maintenance of its own nuclear arsenal, but to the nations of the region it seems the arrogance of a "colonial" power indifferent to its environment. Such perceptions of France by its neighbours do not bode well for the future stability of French interests in the region.

New Caledonia and its path to independence are likely to become increasingly sensitive issues in the region. France's new security measures there, and its committed hard-line response to the "separatist" movement are virtually ensuring confrontation within the country.

This situation has allowed Libya scope for expanding its influence. In 1984, 17 young Kanaks (the

indigenous race) received training in Tripoli. (11) The assumption is that this was terrorist training, as organised "resistance" in New Caledonia is becoming increasingly sophisticated.

The Threat of Dispossession

All the foregoing perceived threats have one thing in common. The potential threat does not emanate from the indigenous people of the South Pacific. Rather, it is external powers and their influence which generate the perceived threats. This will be an important consideration when discussing any reaction to potential threats, as these external powers bring with them technology levels that will require equipment and training to combat.

There is, however, one other threat to the region which is self-made but has all the hallmarks necessary for exploitation by foreign powers. That is the "angry sense of dispossession felt by many indigenous people." (14:5)

Both Australia and New Zealand are having problems coming to terms with the claims of their own indigenous people, so they lack credibility as arbiters of the problems of the South Pacific island states. In addition, the hasty responses of these two countries to the 1987 coup in Fiji took little or no account of ethnic sensitivities, so these responses did little to help their image in the region.

With Australia and New Zealand having had their images tarnished in the eyes of the island states, there is considerable scope for a "sympathetic" outside power to intervene. Such openings for exploitation need not be limited to the island states. Both Australia and New Zealand themselves need to be wary of such intervention.

Threats External To The Region

In studying potential threats, it would be unwise to limit the scope geographically, for events outside the area can have considerable bearing when considering future force structure. For example, Australia's potential threats may well be New Zealand's. Australia looks to the north-west for its possible threats. Does NZ need to? This topic will be dealt with more extensively in a later chapter.

A resurgent Japan is a possibility which cannot be discounted. In a speech on 15 January 1988, Huan Xiang stated that:

Japan has risen as the strongest financial power in the world, but it will be in no way content with things as they are. It is advancing toward a political and military power....As time goes by, changes will take place in Japan's relations with the United States and China, but no amazing and dramatic changes will occur in a period of 5 to 10 years.
(9:119)

The bilateral economic problems that the United States and Japan are now experiencing have the ability to

become a regional issue in context. Japan's emergence as the No.1 financier of economic aid is building Japan's credibility as a foreign policy maker, and Japan is set to challenge the United States for power sharing in foreign policy, for a voice in how the money is used. Japan is on the verge of becoming a competitor of the United States in arms manufacture and sale, especially in the fighter aircraft area. This is creating political problems for the United States, for on the one hand it wishes to help its ally toward greater self-sufficiency in its own defence, yet this action will require considerable technology transfer to a country with which the United States already has a trade deficit of \$50 billion (1989 dollars). The likely resolution of this in Japan's favour must be regarded with some disquiet by the nations of the Pacific.

There is a danger that by the late 1990's Japan will be so strong economically and militarily that it may part company with the United States and proceed independently. All indications are that Japan will pose no direct threat to the region, but a relatively simple change in scenario, in which Japan's vital sea lines of communications (SLOC) are threatened or cut, could see Japan expand militarily for its own survival. It has done so before.

The renegotiation of US bases in the Philippines during 1988 ensured a US presence in that region to 1991 at

least. But the rising nationalism of that country could lead to the abrogation of US bases before the turn of the century. If this were to occur, and the US and Japan drifted apart, then some destabilisation of South East Asia would result. Such destabilisation, in turn, would expose Japan's SLOC to possible interference from the Soviets, or other Asian states. This would push Japan toward remilitarisation.

Terrorism

The 1987 White Paper gave due regard to the threat of terrorism, stating that "it is proper to take some steps to counter this possible threat." (7:10) Terrorism, in its many forms, is a reality which the armed forces must be prepared for. They must be capable of handling the missions of deterrence, pre-emption, reprisal, or hostage rescue.

Although terrorism itself is not new, the increasing sophistication of the threat is of considerable concern. The "US Army Analytical Review of Low-Intensity Conflict" stated

What is new is the emergence of full-time, professional terrorists, some of whom are available for hire, along with internationally funded training institutes, a host of trainers and training aids, and a virtual parallel international system that supports them. (30:5-1)

This threat must not be underestimated by New Zealand in either the domestic or regional environment. The potential for the introduction of high technology weaponry is real. There must be in place the expertise to counter this threat. As before, a joint civil/military approach will remain appropriate.

Low-Level Threats

Finally, the low-level threats of smuggling, drug-running, and illegal immigration must be considered. The 1987 White Paper held that these were "more appropriately contained by civilian rather than military action." This may indeed be the case at present, but New Zealand's current civilian capabilities to intercept or interdict such activities would soon be found wanting if much escalation occurred. The situation in the United States where admittedly the problem is much greater, has degenerated to the point where the US Congress is now seeking ways of involving the military directly in countering these activities. In his inaugural address on 20 January 1989, President George Bush singled out the drug problem as one which will have top priority when he said: "Take my word for it, this scourge will stop." The probability of military involvement is high, and New Zealand should not overlook this possibility in the future.

CHAPTER 4

THE AUSTRALIAN CONNECTION

Australia and New Zealand share a defence relationship which is of basic importance to the security of both countries, because of our common history and traditions, our proximity and our shared strategic concerns.

The Defence of Australia, 1987 (6:5)

New Zealand's 1987 Defence White Paper expanded on the importance of defence links with Australia, calling it "one of the strands of the evolving trans-Tasman relationship that also covers political, commercial and personal links." (7:14) The paper went on to maintain that "the security of either New Zealand or Australia would be at severe risk if the other was seriously threatened and it is inconceivable that a joint response would not be forthcoming." (7:16)

While all this is true, the importance placed on it has shifted considerably since the split with the United States over the port access issue, and the official New Zealand attitude increasingly appears to be moving toward some form of association with Australia. This is despite firm assurances that such was not the case. In 1986, for example, the Prime Minister of New Zealand replied to a question about the possibility of New Zealand looking to

Australia as a US substitute, that "such a position is quite alarmingly bizarre." (18)

The Loss of US Assistance to NZ

The reality of the loss of US assistance in such vital roles as surveillance and training has been slow to register on New Zealand. This is mainly owing to the very low level of threat perceived to its strategic interests. But the loss is there, and the effect is becoming apparent.

The 1987 White Paper recognised this effect clearly.

It noted:

New Zealand will itself be doing more to enhance the effectiveness of the role it can play in protecting the strategic interests we share with Australia and it must be recognised that this will inevitably involve additional expenditure on our part. (7:15, 7:19)

However, this recognition was somewhat qualified twelve pages later by the statement that "the Government should be able to pursue the objectives indicated by this White Paper at about the current level of defence funding." (7:27). This observation apparently reflects a rearrangement of priorities and capital equipment purchases to achieve the previous aim.

The Benefits to Australia

New Zealand and Australia have been drawn closer

together since 1984. There is little doubt that this development will assist New Zealand, but what of Australia? What advantage is there for Australia to maintain close links?

Paul Dibb, in his Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, stated it clearly when he said:

Our defence relationship with New Zealand is of particular importance because of proximity and shared strategic concerns. New Zealand lies on the flank of our trade and military supply routes across the Pacific. It provides them and the Tasman Sea with a measure of security by virtue of its location, military potential, and our joint activities in the South Pacific
(8:47)

This is an important statement, particularly when examined in light of the main thrust of the Dibb Report. The Report introduced a "strategy of denial" (8:49) which essentially used the "sea and air" gap around Australia to deny enemy access to Australia. This approach was to be backed by developing force structures capable of "defence in depth." Such a defence takes into account the possibility of lodgment of enemy troops on Australian soil and their subsequent engagement by Australian forces. Essentially, this strategy of denial means, as Dibb said, "focusing on the north, which is our most vulnerable approach." (8:51)

This strategy has been implemented by the Australian Government through such actions as:

- developing an advanced Over-the-Horizon Radar

(OTHR) system to allow for 24 hour surveillance of Australia's northern approaches;

- placing a major portion of the surface and submarine fleet in Western Australia;

- basing a squadron of F/A-18 aircraft at the newly completed base of Tindall, inland from Darwin; and

- strengthening the northern defences by basing major elements of the Australian Army permanently in northern Australia. (3:1X)

So Australia clearly is looking to the northwest for the development of any threat, although it is not neglecting the southeast. Australia does not, however, intend structuring its defence forces on the basis of projecting power into the South Pacific. (8:4) That is where the advantage lies for Australia in maintaining close links with New Zealand. New Zealand can cover the eastern approaches and help protect the vital trade links. But there will be considerable difficulties here for both countries that can only get worse, so long as the US/New Zealand stand-off continues.

New Zealand's Self-Reliance

Paul Dibb indicated where Australia stood with respect to the United States on Australia's path to greater self-reliance. He said that greater self-reliance was only

possible because of the Australian access to United States "intelligence, surveillance, defence science, logistic support and weapons arrangements. (8:4)

Much of this Australia is not permitted to pass on to New Zealand. Such a circumstance places Australia in a very difficult position as an ally of both the United States and New Zealand. So long as New Zealand faces a dearth of US materiel assistance, Australia will confront an increasing burden from having to work on two different levels.

As time passes, New Zealand will inevitably become more reliant on Australia if it is to "promote the collective security of our own part of the world." (7:19; m: emphasis) Access to the technology required will necessarily come through Australia, if interoperability of the two countries' military forces remains the objective that the New Zealand White Paper suggests. Therefore, New Zealand will play very much the subordinate role in any capital equipment acquisition programme. (15:47)

The extent to which potential existed for Australian and New Zealand forces to develop and maintain an ability to operate together was summed up by the 1987 Australian White Paper as depending "among other things, on the compatibility of the equipment and capabilities of the two forces." (6:5) These compatibilities were outlined by the Australian Minister of Defence in March 1987 as

including long-range maritime patrolling by aircraft; a blue water navy with anti submarine capability; and a deployment and support capability for a Ready Reaction Force. (15:48)

It seems clear, then, that Australia sees New Zealand as playing its part in the collective security of the region by developing and maintaining the ability to project power over the maritime expanses to the east of Australia. This consideration would make for simplified prioritizing of New Zealand's defence force structure, but the issue is complicated by New Zealand's official statement that if Australia faced a direct external threat, "it is inconceivable that a joint response would not be forthcoming." (7:16)

What does this statement mean? Australia's strategy of denial would fit well with New Zealand's maritime force structure, but "defence in depth," utilizing the land mass of northern Australia, conjures up a continental type of defence strategy based on land warfare.

As has already been mentioned, Australia does not intend to let its commitment to the South Pacific dictate its force structure. Australia's own perception of the threat from the north is that it is remote. The 1987 Australian White Paper stated:

No neighbouring country harbours aggressive designs on Australia, and no country has

embarked on the development of the extensive capabilities to project maritime power which would be necessary to sustain intensive military operations against us.(6:19)

Nonetheless, Australia is developing a force structure that will serve its articulated strategy of denying access to its shores by any potential enemy while ensuring its ability to "dislodge" any force on Australian soil.

These capabilities will be useful in other regions, should they be required, but such a consideration is secondary and will not affect force structure development.

Should New Zealand, then, allow the possibility of involvement in a land war in northern Australia to dictate its force structure? The answer is "no". New Zealand should concentrate its force structure on what it perceives its primary requirements are. It should avoid any temptation to develop a structure which has complementing the Australian "defence in depth" strategy, as its aim, for such a structure would be meaningless in the New Zealand environment.

Summary

Both New Zealand and Australia have recognised and articulated the requirement for both countries to cooperate and coordinate in defence matters, including assistance to the island states, maritime surveillance, combined exercises and training programmes, exchanges of technical and

operational information, and co-operation in intelligence, defence science and logistics (8:5). But New Zealand also has its own role to play. It should note the 1987

Australian White Paper's advice to New Zealand:

New Zealand has an important role in the South-West Pacific, where it has strong political, economic and military ties - in some cases more substantial than our own. (8:5)

That is the area for which New Zealand must structure its forces to operate.

CHAPTER 5

RESPONSE to PERCEIVED THREATS

How New Zealand responds to the threats that it perceives will determine not only the structure of its forces but also the extent to which they are able to meet these threats. That is, economics will necessarily impinge on force structure. Despite the somewhat contradictory passages of the 1987 White Paper, the intent of the Government seems clear. It plans to keep defence funding at the current level except "for special purposes." (7:27) Most of this extra funding would support the maintenance and improvement of New Zealand's "close defence relationship with Australia." (7:27)

But, as Sir Ewan Jamieson is quoted as saying at the beginning of this paper, it will not be enough for New Zealand to concentrate only on those threats that are seen or judged as likely to impinge on its direct area of interest. If it is indeed, as has been stated, Government policy that New Zealand will carry its share of collective security (7:19), then New Zealand's local defence policies must be set in global terms "if they are not to undercut wider alliance interests and so be self-defeating in the long term." (13:10)

This is perhaps the key to determining what response

New Zealand will make towards its threats. In the spirit of a close defence relationship, we must know to what extent Australia will respond, and to what extent will Australia expect New Zealand to respond independently. Our method of response must also be complementary to those of the Western alliance. Specifically, even though New Zealand structures its forces for operating in the South Pacific, the possibility that they may need to operate as part of an international force should not be ignored. The 1987 Defence White Paper recognised this responsibility.(7:24)

In the first instance, it is not, of course, a response to a threat which is required. It is deterrence of a threat which is the primary reason for the presence of armed forces. So perceived threats serve the purpose of illuminating those areas most in need of a deterring factor. Responses per se are required only when deterrence fails.

Global War

The 1987 White Paper was clear in its enunciation of future policy when it stated:

...(it) represents a major change from the past where the concept of operations for our armed forces was for each service to be individually a component of a larger allied force operating in a wider sphere.(7:38)

The possibility of New Zealand's becoming embroiled in a global war, whether nuclear or conventional, is real, but

that possibility is (perhaps) more remote now than any time in the past.

The Australian Government recognised that there existed no current or prospective situations beyond their own region where Australia's direct strategic interests require a significant defence role or local circumstances offer scope for one. (6:8) New Zealand has done the same. The prospect of involvement in global war outside of the New Zealand environment, in short, will have little bearing on New Zealand's defence force structure. This is not a contradiction, it should be stressed, of previous statements that New Zealand must retain the capacity to operate outside its region. To structure forces for involvement in global war would, in today's context, mean a return to the "forward-defence" strategy, and the total integration that this would require with the major forces of the West. Such a strategy drifted out of New Zealand's thinking from the mid-1960's.

A Joint ANZAC Approach to the South-West Pacific?

The 1987 White Paper put considerable emphasis on self-reliance. It effectively summed up this oft repeated theme as requiring that:

...this country must exercise greater self-reliance and, as far as possible, maintain the ability to meet or deter credible threats to our security or interests using our own resources. (7:7)

However, it went on to say that:

It is important to ensure that, should circumstances warrant it, we are able to work with others. Collective security has long been the basis for New Zealand defence policy. (7:8)

Essentially this means that where New Zealand is able to work alone to achieve its aims, it should do so, but when help is required, New Zealand's forces should be able to integrate effectively.

As has been pointed out in a previous chapter, Australia expects New Zealand to provide a buffer in the southeastern approaches to Australia, and it recognises that, in the South-West Pacific, New Zealand's influence is in all likelihood stronger than Australia's. So, from these two countries' viewpoint, a certain mutually agreed polarising of interests occurs in this region. But how would the regional states view the situation?

Simplistically, if we were to split Australia's and New Zealand's main interests, we would end up dividing the Melanesian states from the Polynesian states. This division happens already to a limited extent, with the "Melanesians in particular tending to caucus together and to adopt a more radical line on political issues of regional concern." (24:40) Thus, any division of interests could make this delineation stronger, which would not be in the interests of harmony for the region. Also, such a division

could be seen by the island states as a revival of old colonial attitudes--something from which they have only recently broken away. (24:40)

Finally, with the huge area to be covered by New Zealand in particular, it would just not be practical for New Zealand to consider a "go-it-alone" policy, given its finite (and small) resources. As Malcolm Templeton said in "Defence and Security: What New Zealand Needs.":

A joint defence effort would surely be more impressive both to the source of any potential threat and to the island countries themselves, among whose leaders some signs of anxiety may be detected at the holes they see appearing in the ANZUS umbrella. (24:40)

Paul Dibb also recognised this, and in recommending cooperation with New Zealand, he cautioned Australian planners:

New Zealand's association with some of the island states is more substantial than our own--it has a traditional affinity with them. In cooperating with New Zealand in pursuit of our desire to assist South Pacific states, we should not attempt to provide a rival focus of support. (8:47)

Intelligence and Surveillance

The 1987 White Paper recognised that "intelligence gathering and analysis must...be given the highest priority." (7:32) It detailed the need for good, accurate information so that New Zealand can watch for developments within the region and (perhaps) detect the capacity and

intent of outsiders to influence developments. (7:32)

There is, however, a large question mark concerning New Zealand's ability in this realm since the United States ceased cooperation with it. The White Paper rather glosses over the loss, saying that " New Zealand still has access to non-United States sourced intelligence material through existing arrangements with other countries." (7:32) It is outside the parameters of this paper to comment further on intelligence other than to reiterate that without accurate and timely information, New Zealand's armed forces will largely be absorbed by the vast Pacific to no useful effect.

With respect to surveillance and reconnaissance, these were described as "essential contributions to defence objectives." (7:33) New Zealand's surveillance activity is no longer coordinated under ANZUS, and Australia has increased its commitment to the region, as has been mentioned in a previous chapter. This increased commitment was doubtless because New Zealand was seen as no longer able to cover its previous responsibilities.

New Zealand claims its own EEZ as encompassing 1,058,100 square nautical miles. If this figure is then increased by New Zealand's direct commitments to the Cook Islands (556,100), Niue (87,300) and the Tokelaus (91,300), the total is an impressive 1,792,800 square nautical miles. (15:31) This is an area approximately twenty times the size

of New Zealand itself, yet covers four specific EEZs. Were the total EEZs within New Zealand's area of responsibility taken into account, then the area would expand to 5,568,000 square nautical miles, or an area fifty five times the size of New Zealand. And this does not include the vast expanses of ocean outside EEZs, but within New Zealand's area. If, indeed, New Zealand is firm in its stand that "the previous assumption that other countries could make up for our deficiencies is not appropriate to a policy of increased self reliance", (7:33) then the task ahead in maritime surveillance and reconnaissance is truly awesome.

Threat Sources External to the Region

Although New Zealand will not structure its forces to meet threats outside its region, this does not mean that the armed forces need not prepare for the sophistication of modern, global warfare. Nor should it ignore the lower-level threats to the region which could entail equally sophisticated weaponry. To do so would not only be foolish in the extreme, it would also be an abrogation of its policy of making "an effective contribution to Western security by playing a constructive role in maintaining the peace and promoting the collective security of our own part of the world." (7:19)

The degree of sophistication that can be brought to

bear in a small conflict or insurrection is out of proportion to the size of the force applying it. One need only note the effect of the introduction of "Stinger" missiles into the Afghanistan conflict on the might of Soviet power. By 15 February 1989, the last Soviet forces had left that country in what can only be termed a major defeat of a superpower by a determined though small adversary. The key was the supply of state-of-the-art weaponry to the anti-Soviet forces. New Zealand forces could well face such a threat if they were to be deployed at some future time against a low-level threat in the region.

Protection of SLOC

A distinct threat that can be applied by outside powers and one which Australia recognises that New Zealand should play an important part in preventing, is interdiction of the region's sea lines of communications (SLOC). The 1987 White Paper stated that "although New Zealand is heavily dependent on overseas trade...any substantial interdiction of our trade would pose difficulties for any aggressor." (7:27). It seems that these "difficulties" include the geographic diversity of overseas markets and the number of export ports that New Zealand uses. This rationale would stand little close scrutiny and should not be relied on to deter a potential aggressor, for serious attempts to

disrupt New Zealand's SLOC could succeed with relative ease.

New Zealand will need to maintain and enhance its capability to counter low-level surface threats to its SLOC. This will require the projection of maritime power over the area of potential threat to New Zealand. Both surface and airborne resources will be required to face this possibility, which could well incorporate small but highly sophisticated adversaries. Also, the requirement for New Zealand's counter to this threat to be wide ranging should be self-evident, considering the geographic size of its acknowledged responsibilities.

The requirement at least to maintain an ability to locate and prosecute a submarine threat to SLOCs must be recognized. This capability should be regarded as a prerequisite for New Zealand to retain credibility as a protector of Australia's eastern flank. Certainly, Australia would see such a capability in these terms. Although the likelihood of such a threat is remote, the advances in the technology levels of this threat make it essential that New Zealand's maritime (air, navy) forces retain the expertise to counter this.

The other threat to New Zealand's SLOC for which there is presently no ability to counter, is the threat of mining to its harbours and approaches. This threat can be employed relatively easily in a low level contingency, as

proved by the Iranians in the Arabian Sea, and would have substantial political and economic effect. (8:69) Paul Dibb summed up the requirement to counter this threat for Australia as:

There are complex skills involved in minehunting and minesweeping. Were we not to have them now in some basic form, we might not be able to acquire such skills in time to match the emergence of a threat in a period of deteriorating security.
(8:69)

Although only given passing mention in New Zealand's White Paper, (7:35) this aspect of naval capability should be given some close attention for the future.

Threat to EEZ's of Island States

The small size of the national economies and the limited defence forces in the South-West Pacific fundamentally affect the ability of these countries to protect their interests.
(6:17)

Essentially, the island states of the region are just too small to look after their own interests with respect to their Extended Economic Zones (EEZ); therefore, they have come to rely on Australia and New Zealand to assist them. These island's economies are, in the main, inextricably bound up in the security of their surroundings. Moreover, their vulnerability ensures that "maintaining their sense of security assumes disproportionate importance in ensuring their political stability." (24:41)

This is a most important consideration for New Zealand. Irrespective of what either New Zealand or Australia sees as the likelihood of a significant threat to the region, or part of it, the perceptions of a small island state will be magnified disproportionately in this regard.

Australia has recognised this fact with specifics such as increasing the number of Long Range Maritime Patrol aircraft deployments to the region and increasing naval ship visits. (6:18) It is intended that these deployments will be co-ordinated with those undertaken by New Zealand.

New Zealand's policy is that it will "continue to cooperate with Australia to provide the surveillance necessary to protect the resources within the extensive maritime economic zones which cover the region." (7:13) It may not be enough, however, for New Zealand to "continue." Some expansion of its own efforts may inevitably be necessary in order to cover the "holes that may be appearing in the ANZUS umbrella." (24:40) As with the Australian response, this will entail both airborne and naval responses. Such an undertaking, as has already been mentioned, will be a huge one, quite beyond New Zealand's current resources.

Insurgency Threats

Insurgency can be described as "an organised

movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict." (28) This is probably the threat against which New Zealand's land forces are most likely to be involved--outside of the natural disaster scenario. It will involve the transportation of suitable forces to an area, with subsequent beach-crossing or airborne landing abilities.

The advent of the Army's Ready Reaction Force (RRF) is a clear recognition of this requirement. (7:35) The presence of ground forces is an absolute necessity in any scenario where the restoration of peace and a maintenance of stability are required. It just cannot be done by other means if there is a likelihood of armed resistance.

Support of the RRF, then, becomes a priority task for both the naval and air forces. This has been recognised by the purchase of a fleet tanker for the Navy and the stated requirement for a logistic support ship. (7:35) For the Air Force, the "important role of deploying and supporting ground forces with fixed wing, helicopter and fighter attack aircraft"(7:36) has been recognised, and the acquisition of an air refueling system has been programmed.

However, the sheer range and geographic size of possible areas of involvement throughout the South Pacific make this task one of mammoth proportions for our small resources. As the British found when prosecuting the South

Atlantic War in 1983, for instance, huge commitments were required to ensure even a modest end result with respect to the direct application of airpower.

Despite New Zealand's new "self-reliant" stance, it could not hope to succeed in providing close air support (CAS) to the RRF unless it has the backing of island states close to the conflict from which to mount a continuing operation. If such backing cannot be guaranteed, then irrespective of the acquisition of an air-refueling capability, New Zealand will need the assistance of its allies.

Other Contingencies

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, there will remain an ongoing commitment to counter such occurrences as terrorism, hijacking, and drug trafficking. Planning is taking place to meet both the terrorism and hijacking threats, with the Special Air Service (SAS) of the New Zealand Army in particular taking responsibility for these. But drug trafficking is "more appropriately contained by civilian rather than military action," according to the 1987 White Paper. (7:10)

New Zealand's ability to interdict the drug traffic while still offshore is negligible if only civilian authorities are to be involved. While the present threat

of this illegal trade may still be small, defence planners should not ignore the probability of escalation and eventual involvement of the military. As has been the case overseas, the profits of this trade can be used to fuel insurrection and promote instability both within New Zealand itself and in its area of responsibility.

Ethnic Sense of Dispossession

As has already been seen in Fiji, the ethnic peoples of the region, particularly if in the minority in their country, could be the cause of unrest or worse. The sense of dispossession that many feel (and often with some justification) can, and possibly will, lead to situations whereby armed forces will be required to restore order.

Preparation for such an undertaking is difficult to quantify. Perhaps the best response to such a scenario is the insertion of forces versed in the sensitivities of the particular area. To remain effective as armed forces and to respond to local sensitivities will be a major challenge. It is a return to the "hearts and minds" policies of Vietnam, but in this region if we do not get it right, then we will have to live with the results.

CHAPTER 6

ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES FOR NEW ZEALAND'S DEFENCE FORCE STRUCTURE

What a society gets in its armed services is exactly what it asks for, no more and no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces, it is looking in a mirror; if the mirror is a true one, the face that it sees there will be its own.

Sir John Winthrop Hackett (10:177)

Before any attempt is made to prioritize a defence force structure, some appreciation must be developed for the conceptual basis for the undertaking. This necessarily should take into account all of the relevant factors influencing, or likely to influence, a future force structure. Such factors as the threat assessment, the economic base on which the structure will be dependent, and the degree of national independence of the armed forces as an instrument of national power will bear directly on the development of a force structure. The priorities apportioned to the separate elements of the armed forces should also enter into this process.

The first element that must be considered is the threat assessment. As was stated by the Defence Committee of Enquiry, "the application of operations research processes is most appropriate to defence planning." (5:69)

Essentially, this entails linking threats--their severity and likelihood--with possible responses to them. But this in itself creates considerable problems for planners, as "severity" and "likelihood" can be exclusive terms. The most probable threat can also be the least severe or threatening. In addition, the time needed to prepare for one kind of threat will, in all probability, be considerably different from the time needed to get ready for another.

Indeed, this dichotomy could well prove to be the catalyst for New Zealand to slip into isolationism if the wrong priorities are used to structure its forces. On the one hand, the perceived most likely threat--that of incursions into our EEZ--is also the one least dangerous in terms of our national security; on the other hand, the least likely threats--those of direct invasion or interdiction of our SLOCs--are potentially the most dangerous for the nation.

So a defence structure based on the most likely threat could well be inappropriate in broader strategic terms. It could leave New Zealand not only in a position where it might not be able to counter a more serious threat, but also in a position whereby it could not respond effectively to a commitment outside its defined area.

Similarly, a response based on the most severe threat (e.g., nuclear war) could well be wholly inadequate

in other circumstances. Since the conclusion of World War II, the major Western powers have concentrated their force structures on just such a threat. There were, and still are, good reasons for this, for a nuclear deterrent force is the most cost-effective defence in today's world. But as the British found in 1982 (Falklands) and the United States in 1983 (Grenada), such a force structure can encounter difficulties when faced with "low-intensity conflict" situations.

The capacity to wage total war does not necessarily confer on the armed forces involved the ability to wage limited war. Similarly, constraints on a small nation's fighting ability should not, as a matter of course, debar it from being useful in wider conflicts. This latter consideration applies to New Zealand, and it is in this context that a balance must be found that will ensure both regional stability and wider alliance interests.

The New Zealand Government has made clear its intention to structure the country's armed forces to operate in New Zealand's own environment, and to make such operations more self-reliant than in the past. It has also, however, stated the probability (not otherwise substantiated) that certain operations will be carried out in concert with Australia. (7:38) Does this mean a commonality of purpose?

In Chapter 4 it was argued that Australia is not structuring its forces to operate in the South-West Pacific, although they are capable of so operating. Australia sees New Zealand as protecting the flank of their trade and military supply routes across the Pacific, (8:47) allowing Australia to develop its northern defence. Australia will assist, and at times take a lead role in the Pacific, but it is in neither country's interest, nor is it in the interest of the region, for one to dominate.

Similarly, although New Zealand has clearly recognised that any threat to Australia will be considered a threat to New Zealand, (7:16) this does not mean that New Zealand should structure its forces directly to complement Australia's. Such interoperability is no doubt highly desirable, but it should not be the criteria on which to base our force structure.

Each country has different specific areas of primary interest, with a linked dependence of one to the other. That is the conceptual basis for the development of interoperability between the forces of the two countries.

The benign nature of the South Pacific is perhaps the major factor contributing to dissension when it comes to prioritizing forces. It is this very quality that gives some plausibility to the arguments of those who would see New Zealand without any defence forces. But that position is not

at issue here. The controversy over prioritization can wind up being settled by who argues most forcefully or, on an even triter note, which service's turn it is to get new equipment. It is easy to generate a threat to justify a purchase; it is harder to justify a requirement that may prevent a threat from materialising, especially when dealing with a present-day benign environment. That is the situation in which New Zealand finds itself.

This leads to another important consideration-- that of time. The dimension of time will have an impact on all aspects of the prioritization of forces. It may be inappropriate, for example, to react to a short-term threat with a force structure which will be long in its development. Likewise, it may be foolhardy to base priorities on what is now, rather than on what may be in the future. This is especially true in a benign environment, for in such an environment the temptation is great (for mainly economic reasons) to be frugal in structuring forces to the point of non-effectiveness. Such a situation must be avoided--hence the need to consider potential threats and projections of threats rather than accepting the realities of today. But reasoned judgement is only that. Forecasting the future is dubious at best, but that is what must be done to give some basis from which to proceed.

The economic base on which to structure and

prioritize forces is fundamental to the problem. Successive New Zealand governments have routinely established arbitrary limits within which the armed forces must operate. The 1987 White Paper also expected the "new" objectives of the forces to be met within the current level of defence funding. (7:27) Interestingly, this was stated before any detailed analysis of capabilities vis-a-vis responsibilities was undertaken.

Such a situation serves merely to exacerbate the arbitrary nature of the funding method. As was said by the Defence Committee of Enquiry in 1986:

Determining the level of overall expenditure on defence is not a simple matter. Rather than arbitrarily establishing an upper limit there is a need to establish the capabilities, and level of readiness the Armed Forces require to secure New Zealand's interests. (5:69)

It is easy for reality to part company with idealism in the vast expanses of the Pacific. Nonetheless, it is accepted that there will be financial constraints. What must be appreciated, however, is that expectations of the military's capabilities must be tied into economic constraints that are placed on them.

The priorities for New Zealand's force structure must be in keeping with the national objectives. These objectives must be realistic, and the force envisaged needs to be capable of enforcing the objectives. If not, then change must occur.

GENERAL PRIORITIES

So now to the specifics of prioritization. The New Zealand Government has concluded that "a regionally focused defence policy is the most appropriate for New Zealand's strategic circumstances." (7:31) In so doing, it has prioritized its defence objectives. The first three of these may be summarised as follows:

- To preserve the integrity and security of New Zealand, and the island states for which it has defence responsibilities;
- To be able to mount an effective military response to any low-level contingency within New Zealand's area of direct strategic concern; and
- To maintain an expansion base within the military. (7:31)

The remaining objectives essentially complement these first three, adding such ancillary things as disaster relief, rescue and medical evacuation, and peacekeeping.

Within these principal objectives, there is ample scope for development. Indeed, these should be looked on as the broad strategic aims of New Zealand's defence policy, within which defence planners must prioritize the structure.

The first objective defines the primary mission of the military. As has been said in a previous chapter, this task equates to safeguarding land and sea masses totaling an area roughly 55 times the size of New Zealand

(excluding all of the vast areas of ocean outside the EEZs). This task must now also be done without the resources of the United States to assist. These considerations highlight where the top priorities must lie. It is essential that we have the best information possible, on a regular basis, about our area of responsibility. We must then have the capability to process this data into usable intelligence.

Assuming that we can gather such information, then we must ensure that the ability to act on it is available. That is, the capacity to gather the knowledge must not be separated from the capability to police the area and, if necessary, to act against any transgressors. One must complement the other.

This policing ability must be three-dimensional--land, sea, and air--encompassing both known and perceived threats. It must also be able to integrate with the resources and actions of our friends and allies so that duplication is minimised and efficiency is maximized.

The time factor and its impact on technology levels need to be taken into account in the development of the forces necessary. The less likely but more dangerous threats perceived must be acknowledged, and their likelihood must be balanced against the time that would be required to produce a credible counter to them. It is here that the development of an ability in excess of that which is

required in the short term may well be prudent.

The naval and air forces must be structured so that they can operate against a low-level but sophisticated threat. This threat will most likely be a maritime or seaborne one. Its challenge to national security will cover the spectrum of possibilities.

Similarly, the land forces will need to be equipped to handle a wide range of contingencies that they may have to face in the future. The obvious priority for the land forces is to develop the capability to use the full Ready Reaction Force anywhere within the previously defined area. This would ensure all lesser contingencies are well covered.

Other more specialized missions for the land forces continue to need a high degree of attention. Of particular note is the ability to counter terrorism in its many forms. Also, the threat of insurgency will require constant heed--particularly with respect to the degree of sophistication and support possible to the enemy.

DETAILED PRIORITIES

The following specific priorities for New Zealand's defence force structure have been developed within the parameters set down by the Government in its 1987 White Paper. They take cognizance of the primary mission of the armed forces--the defence of the nation and those dependent

on it--the broad strategic aims of New Zealand's foreign policy; the association and integration of New Zealand with its neighbours (principally Australia); and the practical capabilities of New Zealand to revise its force structure.

Intelligence

In the words of Paul Dibb, "The foremost peacetime defence requirement is reliable and comprehensive intelligence about our own strategic environment." (8:43) This statement was meant for an Australian audience, but is no less pertinent to New Zealand. The interruption of information and intelligence as a result of the ANZUS split has hurt New Zealand, but the exact extent of the damage may never be known because of the covert nature of much of it.

The New Zealand government has recognised the requirements for upgrading New Zealand's gathering and processing ability, and has indicated that these will be the subject of a separate review. The establishment of an effective intelligence organisation which is capable of fulfilling New Zealand's local and strategic interests is the top priority for New Zealand's defence force structure. This system must be capable of interfacing with the Australian system and be compatible with other friendly sources.

The economics of this undertaking should need no

elaboration. It is interesting to note in the Dibb Report that:

Much important raw data is provided through allied arrangements. Some of these sources could not be duplicated from our own resources. Were they not available, we would need considerably to increase our intelligence investment, and yet still not match some of the capabilities currently available to us.

(8:16)

This observation contrasts sharply with the New Zealand Defence White Paper 1987. The latter commented on the loss of U.S. sourced material, but then stated that:

Our own ability to make assessments, particularly on developments in our region, provides a solid basis for continuing links. (7:32)

Either Australia is underestimating its abilities, or New Zealand has greater abilities than seem obvious to the casual (informed) observer.

Surveillance

With by far the major thrust of New Zealand's defence policy directed toward the South Pacific, the importance of effective maritime surveillance is self-evident. The Australian Minister for Defence, Mr. Kim Beazley, cited surveillance by long-range maritime aircraft and a blue-water-capable navy as two of the three capabilities that New Zealand would need, to retain credibility as an ally in the South Pacific (15:48). As such

credibility is one of the stated aims of the New Zealand government, these requirements should then become fundamental to its force structure considerations.

Neither naval nor air surveillance capabilities has precedence, as each has indispensably unique yet complementary qualities. A ship has long on-station times, and its pervasive presence serves as a strong signal to those of ill-intent yet is reassuring to all who rely on the protection it offers. An aircraft's presence is fleeting. This is particularly true for New Zealand, with six P-3K Orion aircraft to patrol up to 16 percent of the globe. But an aircraft can cover much more area than a ship and has tremendous flexibility. Its ability to cross the vast expanses of the Pacific in short time and carry out its task needs no amplification.

The capability to gather useful (and sometimes vital) information covertly by land must also continue. In the Falklands War, the reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities of units of the British Army (in New Zealand's case the Special Air Service has this role) proved pivotal to the outcome of the conflict. This capability stands alongside those of the other two services in terms of priority.

The necessity for a small, highly trained and well equipped force to operate clandestinely within New Zealand's

area of interest to observe, report, and if necessary intervene, will become more apparent should any of the threat perceptions materialise. Indeed, a small, highly mobile party of, say, six soldiers, could well detect and engage a hostile element in the South Pacific island environment much more successfully than a full air strike utilizing close air support. The risk of collateral damage by air could well negate the purpose of the strike, and that assumes the air strike would hit the target, which is by no means certain.

Maritime Strike

Surveillance by itself is insufficient. It must include the means to detect, identify, and if necessary prosecute any threat or infringement found. A hawk with no talons is little better off than the sparrow it pursues.

All roles --air, naval, and land-- must have adequate equipment of the most up-to-date technology (commensurate with cost and availability) to carry out these tasks. To downgrade this requirement would clearly result in a compromise of effectiveness at the lower end of the threat spectrum, and might even condemn our forces to failure (and casualties) against a more sophisticated threat utilizing high-technology weapons.

The recent modernization of the Skyhawk aircraft

equips it to complement the P-3K in the task of prosecution, but at present the lack of air refueling capability limits the Skyhawk to a close-to-base radius. The recognised requirement for air-to-air refueling must be given some priority. (7:36)

The current and ongoing argument regarding the proposed purchase of frigates for New Zealand needs to be resolved. If we are serious in our endeavours to become more self-reliant, then this should not even be at issue. Without such vessels, the ability to project power is minimal. Also, the means to prosecute threats would be very limited.

Land Force

The third part of the triad enunciated by Mr. Beazley was the capability for New Zealand to deploy and support a Ready Reaction Force (RRF) within the South Pacific (15:48). Essentially this force is to contain elements of the "teeth" arms (infantry, artillery, and armour) and be largely self-supporting--at least for short-duration operations.

The RRF itself is in being, and by late 1989 it will be supplemented by the infantry battalion returning from Singapore. But the key words of "deploying" and "supporting" provide considerable scope for prioritization.

The 1987 White Paper identified the RRF as a

"deployable battalion group of up to 1500 regular force personnel maintained at a high state of readiness." (7:35) This is the force by which New Zealand will project its power to assist its neighbours as a major aspect of its self-reliant stance. That is, if it can get there, and if it can be supported. It is also the force which will bear the brunt of any land threat to New Zealand itself.

Although the Air Force has a reasonably-sized transport fleet, the task of rapidly moving 1,500 fully equipped soldiers over a long distance (normal for the South Pacific) and then supporting them while they engage in a low-intensity conflict would be quite beyond its capacity. With five C-130's and ten Andover aircraft, and a crew-to-aircraft ratio of one to one (an aircrew retention problem), it could only hope to carry out such operating on a protracted time scale. And this takes no account of the limited number of C-130 capable airfields in the South Pacific.

The maintenance of an effective utility helicopter force will help alleviate the shorter-range tactical transport requirements. But this in itself adds to the problems, for the positioning forward of a viable helicopter fleet would entirely utilize the C-130 fleet.

Study should begin now into the next generation of vertical takeoff and landing aircraft (VTOL) that may be

able to self-deploy over large distances and then operate in a VTOL environment. The enhancement and/or replacement of the air transport resources also needs priority study.

The requirement for a logistic support ship has been recognised (7:35). Such a vessel could transport elements of the RRF to where they are required, but then the problem of landing them arises. New Zealand has little amphibious capability--certainly nothing of the nature required for a ship-to-shore landing across coral reefs (a strong likelihood in the event of RRF deployment).

So where does this leave prioritization of the land force? New Zealand has one element of what Mr. Beazley asked for. It has a RRF. But it can neither deploy nor support it at full strength outside of New Zealand, except to certain specific (and unopposed) locations where time is not critical.

Other than the purchase of the logistic support ship, little can be done within the existing force structure to alleviate the difficulties, irrespective of priorities. As our structure stands, New Zealand cannot deploy operationally a full strength RRF without the support of an ally.

So within the present structure, the maintenance and enhancement of the RRF are priority tasks. So too is development of a joint doctrine with Australia for the

deployment of the RRF. This should not neglect the possibility of deploying to Northern Australia.

Meanwhile, the development of a capability for across-the-beach landings or ship-originated airborne landings (helicopter) should be given priority. Otherwise New Zealand cannot even pretend to be self-reliant with its RRF.

Protection of SLOC

The priority already given to surveillance and the inherent requirement to prosecute transgressors, if required, covers much of that which is needed for protection of our trade routes. This is where that dichotomy referred to earlier ceases to be so divisive. Although the perceived threats of EEZ intrusions and the threats to New Zealand's SLOCs differ greatly, the technology required to counter the latter only enhances the effectiveness of the detection of the former. There are exceptions to this, however. These are in the areas where highly specialised and specific equipment is needed to counter particular and unique threats. The threats created by submarines and mines are such exceptions. In New Zealand's environment, its requirements in anti-submarine-warfare (ASW) capabilities should be similar to Australia's. As Paul Dibb recommended in his report:

...the preferred ASW systems would be towed acoustic arrays for surveillance, with long range maritime aircraft to localise and prosecute detections.(8:69)

This particular requirement for the projection of maritime power has been recognised by the 1987 White Paper, and the subsequent--and on going--negotiations for the purchase of "ANZAC" ships supports this commitment. However, one concern is the wording of the White Paper when it stated that the ship must have:

...basic self defence capability against air and surface attack and some ability against submarines...

(7:34) (my emphasis)

This appears to down play a skill which requires constant updating to remain effective. If New Zealand wishes to retain ASW ability, then it must recognise this in unequivocal terms. There is no low-level way to retaining ASW skills. Australia recognised both the low-level of threat and the necessity nonetheless to counter it when, in its 1987 Defence White Paper it stated that:

The threat to Australia from submarines is low. Nevertheless, because the necessary skills are difficult to acquire and the lead times for adapting and developing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology for the Australian environment are long, we need to maintain our expertise in anti-submarine warfare.

(6:38)

New Zealand has not kept pace with the means to counter this threat. Advances in the development of submarines necessitate a commensurate enhancement of the

means of detection.

There is a need to recognise that acquisition of state-of-the-art detection equipment will be necessary in order to maintain some credibility in the ASW role. Of particular relevance here is the new towed array equipment that is now becoming available. Australia recognised that this "new technology, coupled with advanced computer processing, offers prospects of long range detection of modern submarines."(6:38) New Zealand should cooperate with Australia in the development of this skill as a matter of some priority.

The use of embarked ASW helicopters should remain an important contribution to the ASW task. With the impending replacement of the present fleet of naval helicopters, their increasing importance in the detection and attack phases of ASW must not be overlooked.

The other major anomaly in the stated rationale is the detection and clearance of mines. The 1987 White Paper said that it was "important to maintain the capability to counter any mine threat, and have the resources and expertise to clear a major port of mines."(7:35) This assumes capabilities which New Zealand does not have. The Australian Government, in its 1987 White Paper, stated that:

a high priority (is given) to the development of a capable mine counter-measures force. The present force consists of a single minehunting ship. This is inadequate. (my emphasis) (6:45)

If one ship is inadequate for Australia, then how can New Zealand "maintain the ability to counter any mine threat" with no dedicated ships?

The lessons learnt by the United States in the Arabian Sea during 1987/88 should not be lost on New Zealand. The threat is too easily deployed; too effective; and near-impossible to counter if the expertise and equipment is lacking. It is possible that the roles of towed acoustic arrays and mine countermeasures could be combined. (12:8) Close cooperation with Australia in this sphere is essential if New Zealand is to honour the protection of Australia's eastern approaches, as was mentioned by Paul Dibb in his report. (8:47)

Anti-Terrorism

The Special Air Service (SAS) of the New Zealand Army has the task, in cooperation with the civil police, of training to counter terrorism. New Zealand has already experienced state-sponsored terrorism with the "Rainbow Warrior" affair, so cannot relax in this regard. But counter terrorism is not an exact art-far from it. There is little to compare between the "Rainbow Warrior" bombing, where collateral damage was not the aim, and the indiscriminate and wanton violence that characterises terrorism seen in Europe and the Middle East.

It is the nonterritorial terrorist groups--those who need not operate within geographical boundaries to pursue their aims--that may become the threat to New Zealand in the future. (23:11) These groups could well support disaffected groups within New Zealand, as well as form unholy cartels with the drug-dealing community.

The sophistication of weaponry that may be introduced, along with sabotage skills of high finesse--like computer "hacking"--will require a continuing emphasis on anti-terrorist training. This should not be limited to strictly combat skills, but should encompass a wide range of countermeasures. An increasing requirement for accurate international intelligence on these operations will become vital.

Peacekeeping Forces

The New Zealand government's objective of "promoting peace and international security through contributions to United Nations peace-keeping operations"(7:31) continues to be an important role for the military. But it must not be forgotten that this is a policing role and is not linked to sovereignty protection, which is the main role of armed forces.

New Zealand has proved many times that it is able to integrate effectively with other forces in the execution of

this task. No special preparation is required regarding force structure. What is needed is sound education of the likely participants in the task required of them.

Disaster Relief

The priorities established for the structuring of New Zealand's defence forces lend themselves well to operate in major civil defence emergencies or natural disasters. Integration with the civilian authorities concerned should continue to be given special attention.

SUMMARY

The priorities that have been established in this chapter have taken into account the national aims, perceived threats to these, and likely responses to the threats. While recognizing that the primary mission of the armed forces is the defence of New Zealand, it has argued that in the South Pacific context this is best achieved by ensuring that the greater area is secure.

New Zealand's priorities for structuring its defence forces have been determined by this paper as follows:

- **Intelligence.** An effective intelligence operation capable of interfacing with Australia and other friends and allies must be developed.

- **Surveillance.** The means to detect and deter transgressors, must be enhanced to offset the loss of U.S. assistance and the increasingly sophisticated threats of the multipolar world of the future.

- **Maritime Strike.** The ability to prosecute a diverse spectrum of possible threats is essential. Account must be taken of the less likely but more dangerous potential challenges to national security.

- **Land Force.** The maintenance and support of the RRF is the top priority for the land force. This is not limited to the Army, but incorporates elements of all three services in the support role.

- **Protection of SLOCs.** The structure required to meet the higher priority tasks will largely take care of things here. The exception is mine detection and clearance.

- **Anti-Terrorism.** There is a requirement for the continuing development of skills necessary to counter this threat, which has considerable potential for becoming highly sophisticated.

- **Peace-Keeping.** The skills necessary will be similar to those required to meet the higher priorities.

- **Disaster Relief.** As in the case of peace-keeping, the inherent skills of armed forces lend themselves well to this task.

What must not be forgotten in prioritizing defence

resources is that their purpose is first, foremost, and absolutely the defence of New Zealand. All other considerations are secondary to that. Support for the community should, of course, be complementary to this task, but should never outweigh its pursuit.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

*The friends thou hast and their adoption tried
Grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel
But do not dull thy palm with entertainment
of each new-hatched, unfledged comrade.*

Shakespeare's Hamlet

New Zealand has undergone a dramatic change in its defence posture since the Labour Party came to power in July 1984. There has been a split in the close relationship that New Zealand had with the United States, and a straining of other important defence associations--namely, those with Great Britain and Australia.

Although it was neither intended nor forecast by the New Zealand government, this schism provided the catalyst for a political redirection of New Zealand's defence commitment from one of reliance on alliances and the attendant obligations, to one of greater self-reliance. The timing was good for such a change, with an increasing sense of nationalism helped by the benign nature of New Zealand's surroundings.

But these very same factors also managed successfully to cover up the realities of such a change. Because there is no defined threat against which to measure performance, it becomes easy to postulate change and declare

its viability. It is a different matter entirely to convince those responsible for safeguarding the West that the actions that New Zealand has taken constitute a measurable commitment to maintaining the values espoused by the democratic nations of the world--values that New Zealand has been at the forefront in protecting in its past. New Zealand's credibility as a member of the Western Alliance has been challenged.

This paper has explored the background for New Zealand's new defence posture, then has introduced threat perceptions against which its armed forces may have to operate. The association with Australia was then studied, which led to the method and means of response to the threat perceptions. From this was drawn the rationale for prioritizing New Zealand's defence force structure and then the priorities themselves.

The priorities have taken account of New Zealand's changed view of its commitments and have concentrated on New Zealand's area of direct concern. Of particular importance, they have laid out what is required in order to fulfill at least some of the responsibilities that New Zealand has to its friends and neighbours. They have not focused only on national or regional security, although these have been particularly important. They have incorporated requirements for national and regional security with those entailing a

broader world view. In so doing, care has been taken to propose changes and priorities that will largely preserve New Zealand's identity and independence, although in many areas New Zealand just cannot manage on its own.

The immediate problem for New Zealand is to recognize this limitation and act accordingly. It should not attempt to fill the gaps left by the suspension of ANZUS. To do so without a major increase in commitment to defence would be nothing short of foolhardy and would damage or destroy whatever credibility New Zealand has left. Indeed, even to claim that New Zealand is now more self-reliant than before is presently deluding no-one but ourselves.

If it is accepted that the time had arrived for New Zealand to adopt a more independent stance, then the transition needed to be well planned and have the concurrence of our allies. After all, it was not only New Zealand itself which had a stake in this, but also all those island states of the South Pacific which have come to rely on the protection afforded by New Zealand. Also, our large neighbour to the west should expect New Zealand to continue to do its part in protecting the flank. All of this depended in large measure on the support New Zealand received from her allies. That support is no longer there, yet little has been done in real terms to counter this loss.

New Zealand's growing recognition of the need for

alliances is evidenced by the increasing call for closer co-operation with Australia. A strong regional alliance gives weight to the argument that New Zealand does not need a close association with a superpower, but this belies the fact that Australia itself needs the full support of the United States in order to pursue a greater self-reliant stance. Paul Dibb made this clear in his report. This logic is backed by the "Guam Doctrine".

A contradiction seems apparent here. New Zealand now sees little need for a close relationship with a superpower and will develop close regional ties. Yet the backbone of these ties is itself provided by a superpower. This strikes at the heart of the New Zealand rationale and places at risk the very relationship that New Zealand is trying to foster.

Australia has accepted the informal and undeclared role of mediator, but the idea that it will become a surrogate United States is "quite bizarre", according to the New Zealand Prime Minister.(18) But that is exactly what it will become if the present impasse between the United States and New Zealand continues. There is little alternative for New Zealand other than isolationism. And this now comes back to New Zealand's responsibilities.

New Zealand has never backed away from its responsibilities when the commitment of military forces has

been called for. This in turn has ensured its place with a voice in the free world. But now New Zealand has taken a new stance whereby its stated commitments are sound but its ability to see these through is suspect. The island states and allies that have come to rely on New Zealand now view us with an element of skepticism. Like Mikhail Gorbachev, we have made much about changing, but have yet to back it up with reality.

Australia has recognised the fact that "we (cannot) expect the respect or support of other states if we do not possess the appropriate military capacity and the will to use it if necessary." (8:44) This is so appropriate for New Zealand.

The priorities set are attainable, and are able to be achieved in the short to medium term. Indeed, many of them are already extant. The danger is in asking too much of the existing forces or expecting them to be effective without some vital components. Also, the armed forces themselves must be prepared to declare themselves unable to meet the task set them if, indeed, that is the case. To do otherwise would be irresponsible.

New Zealand did, and still does have friends, but the "hoops of steel" have been sorely tested by New Zealand's courting of untried ideals. The gulf between idealism and realism must be closed for the sake of New

Zealand itself and for all those who depend on her. The
blessing of a benign environment is finite.

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