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RESEARCH REPORT


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ASEAN STATES SECURITY:
RESILIENCE THROUGH SECURITY COOPERATION

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ABDUL RAHMAN RAIS
ROYAL MALAYSIAN AIR FORCE

1989

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AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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ASEAN STATES SECURITY:
RESILIENCE THROUGH SECURITY COOPERATION

by
Abdul Rahman Rais
Colonel, RMAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Dr David E. Albright

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

March 1989

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: ASEAN States Security: Resilience through Security Cooperation

AUTHOR: Colonel Abdul Rahman Rais, RMAF

→ National resilience and regional resilience are important to the security of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is comprised of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand. Since its early formation, ASEAN has overcome great cultural and economic diversity among its member states to become one of the world's most successful regional organizations. ASEAN's greatest achievement has been the growth of its solidarity and cohesion, as a result of the challenge posed by the communist threat to this region, and of a sense of collective identity as a group of like-minded countries working together for their common good.

As a regional grouping, ASEAN has, however, excluded security alliance from its objective, although security cooperation between states is quite substantial. The question remains how ASEAN could face the challenge of a security threat to the region in the absence of collective security alliances within ASEAN. This is more pertinent in light of the US withdrawal →

from Vietnam in 1975 following its Guam Doctrine, and the departure of another Western power, Great Britain, from "East of Suez" following its decolonization policy in this region. Both policies placed the burden of security and defense on member states (Indonesia is not directly affected by either policy as she was a former Dutch colony). (R) ←

ASEAN owes much of its rapid economic growth and prosperity to the political and economic support of Western countries. This prosperity must be protected for further growth through security and regional stability. ASEAN countries, therefore, need to enhance their security cooperation, not only within ASEAN but with other friendly countries, if necessary.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Abdul Rahman Rais, RMAF, was born in Johore and is a graduate of Royal Military College, Malaysia. He was commissioned in the Logistic Branch of the Royal Malaysian Air Force in 1965. For three years, he served as Air Movements Officer in Labuan and Kuala Lumpur Base, and then he had another tour of four years as Squadron Supply Officer in Kuala Lumpur and Kuantan. He went to Squadron Officer School at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, in 1971. His next assignment was at the Malaysian Mission in Canada as Services Attache until 1975. He attended the Air Command and Staff College in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1976. In 1977, he went for a study tour at the University of Manchester Institute of Technology in England, where he obtained a post graduate diploma in International Business. On his return, he was assigned to the Air Staff Division as Supply Staff Officer, and he later commanded the RMAF Supply Depot until 1982. He attended Armed Forces Defence College, Malaysia, in late 1982 and served for five years as Chief of Staff, Logistic, in Air Support Command and later in Air Defence Command. He is a graduate of Air War College, class of 1989, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

National resilience and regional resilience are important to the security of Southeast Asia, and particularly to the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)--Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand. Since its formation, ASEAN has overcome great cultural and economic diversity among its member states to become one of the world's most successful regional organizations. ASEAN's greatest achievement has been the growth of its solidarity and cohesion, particularly in the realm of political and people-to-people cooperation. This solidarity and cohesion can be attributed to two factors: firstly, to the uncertainty and the challenge posed by the communist threat in the region, and secondly, to a sense of collective identity as a group of like-minded countries working together for their common good.

As a regional grouping, ASEAN, however, has left out the subject of security cooperation from its agenda, although in various degrees military cooperation among ASEAN states is quite substantial. It is most evident in the face of the Vietnam invasion of Kampuchea in 1978 and the continued occupation of Kampuchea to this date by Vietnamese forces.

The ASEAN states have built up their individual military forces and carried out numerous bilateral military exercises among their forces, as well as with outside friendly countries.

The question remains how ASEAN could meet the security threat posed to the region in the absence of ASEAN collective security cooperation and in view of the inevitable burden of the increase in defense spending. ASEAN states have had to look at alternative options for their defense needs since the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, and also in light of the Guam Doctrine of the United States and the "East of Suez" policy of Great Britain. Both policies placed the burden of dealing with regional and internal threats on local allies. In the case of the United States, the Guam Doctrine affects Thailand and the Philippines; and Great Britain's "East of Suez" policy affects Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei, being the former colonies of Great Britain.

This paper will examine the attributes and the success of ASEAN as a cohesive regional political and economic grouping since its inception, and its potential for the development of security cooperation in the face of its perceived threat to the region. Chapter II will cover the achievements of ASEAN in political and economic cooperation which can lead to the development of greater ASEAN military cooperation. ASEAN owes much of its rapid economic growth to the economic and political support given by the United States and the western countries as well as the security stability derived from their presence

and their previous commitments to this region. ASEAN economic prosperity needs to be protected for further growth through regional stability.

Chapter III will cover security threats to ASEAN states, both immediate and in the near future, and how each state copes with those real and perceived threats. As ASEAN member states are also facing internal threats and foreign supported insurgencies, the burden of regional security and defense also rests with them--especially so in light of the US Guam Doctrine, which affects Thailand and the Philippines, and the British "East of Suez" policy, which affects Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei.

Chapter IV will review the security measures that have been developed by the individual states and the extent of bilateral security cooperation among them and with outside friendly countries in the face of perceived threats. The review will also cover the achievements and the constraints that member countries confront in promoting cooperation.

Chapter V will present the prospects for security cooperation among the member countries to enhance national and regional resilience, the limitations of such cooperation, and the extent of ASEAN dependency on security assistance and cooperation with outside powers.

CHAPTER II

ASEAN OBJECTIVES AND ACHIEVEMENTS

At the core of Southeast Asia are the ASEAN countries which form the most important component of the region because of their geostrategic location, size (in terms of population and area), and economic importance. For over two decades now, ASEAN has been engaged in the pursuit of socio-economic development within the context of regional collaboration. (1:16-17)

ASEAN has made tremendous progress since its early formation. The member states were able to forge ASEAN as a common vehicle for the attainment of their separate, as well as collective, goals of socio-economic development and internal stability in the context of regional peace and stability. ASEAN's original objectives were to promote regional cohesion and self-reliance, with specific emphasis on economic, social, and cultural cooperation and development. (2:18-19) The six nations of ASEAN have emerged as some of the world's most successful and prosperous developing countries. Their 290 million people boast a per capita income of nearly \$2,000, as compared with \$220 for mainland China and \$16,710 for the United States. The most successful ASEAN member state of Singapore had a gross national product (GNP) in 1986 of \$18.03 billion and a per capita income of \$5,847. Malaysia had a GNP of

\$25 billion, with a \$1,574 per capita income. Thailand had a GNP of over \$37 billion and a per capita income of \$600. Indonesia, the most populous state, had a GNP of \$80.7 billion and a per capita income of \$540. The Philippines had a GNP of \$32 billion and a per capita income of \$535. The newest ASEAN member, Brunei, had a GNP of \$7.5 billion and a large per capita income of \$33,931. (3:6-7)

The effect of global recession on ASEAN's export-oriented economies in the early 1980s was serious. This situation resulted in ASEAN's branching off into new directions in intra-ASEAN cooperation and in relations with Third World countries. However, the stability and progress of ASEAN's economies depend very much on the industrialized countries' increase in volume of imports to boost commodity prices.

Although significant progress has been made by ASEAN in the fields of political, cultural, and social cooperation, trade among ASEAN countries is still small and only amounts to 20 percent of ASEAN's global trade. While there are several items that ASEAN needs and that are produced by some member countries, ASEAN continues to obtain them from outside the region. Intra-ASEAN cooperation on commodities is one area in which the combined voice of ASEAN could carry considerable weight and influence commodities trade. (4:20)

ASEAN's relations with Third World countries have improved tremendously in line with ASEAN's socio-economic development goals. (5:21)

ASEAN's concerted effort in the past has generated interest among ASEAN's dialogue partners: Australia, Canada, the European Community, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Nations Development Program. ASEAN now represents a market of well over \$70 billion, providing a ready outlet for all kinds of products and services that encourage ASEAN's dialogue partners to develop better relations. Major areas of mutual interest range from market access for ASEAN exports to collaboration in food technologies, forestry, marine resources, civil aviation, energy, drugs control, tourism, and investments. High in ASEAN priorities is the question of market access for ASEAN exports, especially to Japan, Europe, and the United States.

ASEAN countries are facing a number of critical economic problems. These include growing protectionism, agricultural subsidies, depressed commodity prices, and external financial imbalances. (6:32-33)

ASEAN has been successful, too, in projecting the organization as a vehicle for dealing with various international issues other than economic and trade ones. Among these are political and social issues faced by the Palestinian refugees, apartheid policies of South Africa, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Vietnam invasion of Kampuchea, drugs and narcotics problems, and the concern over the global arms race.

As stated earlier, ASEAN's greatest achievement has been the growth of its solidarity and cohesion, particularly

in the realm of political and people-to-people cooperation. Such cooperation was brought about by the need to counter the regionwide threat of communist-led insurgencies and the expansionist posture of Vietnam. Close ASEAN cooperation also helps to contain intra-ASEAN conflicts and produces an increased sense of belonging and collective identity. Collectively, the six ASEAN states have emerged economically as some of the world's most successful and prosperous developing countries by overcoming cultural and economic diversity between its member states; indeed, the success of ASEAN's economic cooperation and collaboration was due to its ability to reconcile a number of conflicting interests on the part of member states. (7:34)

The thrust of ASEAN's development has been on cooperation rather than integration among its members. For example, ASEAN states cooperate on such matters as counterinsurgency and maintaining free passage through the region's vital sea-lanes. (8:1-2) The unity of ASEAN countries will continue within the framework of close cooperation and coordination.

ASEAN owes much of its rapid economic growth to the political and economic support given by the United States and the Western countries, and to the regional stability achieved through their presence and their previous commitments to this region. As ASEAN's economies prosper and its growth is assured, ASEAN needs to evaluate its security development and cooperation to ensure its future growth and survival. This

development will lead to more meaningful security cooperation and coordination, such as that which they have attained in the political and economic fields.

CHAPTER III

COMMON THREATS TO ASEAN

Internal Threats

Most ASEAN member states have undergone a period of internal peace and stability in recent years. The last major political crisis in Brunei was the rebellion of December 1962; in Singapore, its separation from Malaysia in August 1965; in Indonesia, the abortive coup of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) in 1965; in Thailand, the military coup of 1976. The Philippines, however, continues to experience internal instability as a result of the revolts that have occurred since President Corizon Aquino took over the presidency from Ferdinand Marcos in 1986.

Aside from the Philippines, the ASEAN governments also face no serious threats to their power from opposition political parties. Such parties exist except in the state of Brunei.

(9:33-34)

Although the legal opposition parties in ASEAN, where they exist, do not have any prospect of gaining power through the polls, there are tendencies in these societies that could create problems for the governments concerned. The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia and Malaysia, as an

example, is believed to be influenced by agents infiltrated by an Islamic fundamentalist country in the Middle East.

There are also illegal opposition parties in ASEAN countries seeking to overthrow the governments by the use of force. These range from armed separatists to communist movements. In Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, armed separatist movements have long existed, and over the years they have attempted to obtain greater autonomy and even separation from the central governments.

The East Timorese of Indonesia, under the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (FRETILIN) and the free Papuan Movement, continue their rebellion against the government. In the Philippines, the Muslims in the southern region are in a state of rebellion against the central government. The strongest separatist force is the Moro National Liberation Front. Southern Thailand's Muslim community has long been alienated from the Bangkok government, with various separatist groups trying to establish their own power centers. The strongest of these groups is the Patani National Liberation Front, which seeks autonomy but has not been successful.

A long-standing threat to peace and stability to all ASEAN states except for Brunei has been their illegal communist parties. In Indonesia, the most serious threat took place in 1965, when the then legal PKI staged an unsuccessful coup against the government. Since then the PKI has been banned and weakened. In Malaysia, the Malaysian Communist Party (CPM)

still retains a small force along the Malaysian-Thai jungle sanctuaries. Singapore still experiences problems occasionally when the underground communists infiltrate various labor movements, but these communist elements have little or no influence over any organization. In Thailand, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) has experienced large desertions because of lack of leadership and the Thai government's effective amnesty program.

Only in the Philippines does the Communist party present a growing threat. The military arm of the Philippines Communist Party, the New Peoples Army (NPA), will remain a serious threat to Philippines security. Meanwhile, all the ASEAN states where armed separatist and communist insurgencies exist have embarked on extensive long-term counterinsurgency programs that include social, economic, political, and military means. (10:35-37)

External Threats

The ASEAN states have thus far demonstrated their solidarity and cohesiveness, forsaking differences among states for ASEAN progress and regional stability. This close cooperation will provide continuity in their foreign policy orientation.

Most governments strongly favor a nonaligned foreign policy. On matters of security, however, they tend to lean toward the Western alliance. Five ASEAN members, excluding Indonesia, have close ties with Western military powers. Malaysia and Singapore, together with Brunei, have close military links with the Commonwealth countries--namely Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The Philippines and Thailand continue to maintain security alliances with the United States. Even Indonesia, which has no formal ties with any of the Western powers, receives substantial military aid from the United States. (11:38)

Strategically, the ASEAN countries favor a balance-of-power situation in the Asian/Pacific region, particularly the present development toward a "loose coalition" of forces among the United States, Japan, and ASEAN. Such a coalition can effectively balance the growing presence of the USSR and its alliance with the Indochina states.

What may threaten the stability of the region is a future coalition among the communist powers of the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam. At the moment, there does not seem to be any prospect of a full-blown Sino-Soviet rapprochement or a Sino-Vietnamese normalization. At present, there are too many issues preventing cooperation among the communist powers. China has given her conditions for a normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. These include total Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, removal of Soviet troops from

Afghanistan, removal of Soviet troops from their common border, and the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and the support of Vietnamese occupation in Kampuchea.

Although some of these conditions have already been met, all will probably not be totally complied with by the Soviets.

Both China and Vietnam have ambitions to be the hegemonic power in Indochina; consequently, there will in all likelihood be a long struggle and conflict between these communist powers.

The peace and the stability of Southeast Asia could be affected particularly by the escalation of the Kampuchean issue. At the moment, the situation favors ASEAN, for the United Nations has adopted an ASEAN resolution and voted against the continued Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. That resolution calls for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea; the restoration of independence and sovereignty to the Kampuchean people; and the participation in free elections for all Kampuchean parties. Unless the security threat that Vietnam perceives as coming from China through Kampuchea is removed, it is unlikely that Vietnam will agree to any kind of negotiation toward the settlement of the Kampuchean conflict. Although Hanoi has pledged to total troop withdrawal from Kampuchea by September 1989, it does not preclude them from returning on other pretexts. If this situation continues, it will in a way strengthen ASEAN's resolve to cooperate more closely in order to support Thailand against the Vietnamese

threat, and to pressure Vietnam to seek a peaceful settlement of the Kampuchean problem. (12:39)

Vietnam

ASEAN's immediate threat comes from expansionist Vietnam whose order of battle is quantitatively and qualitatively much superior to those of ASEAN states combined. Hanoi maintained armed forces of 1,277,000 in 1984, with a People's Army of 1 million combat ready all the time. These forces are supported by a combined quick-reinforcement reserve 3-million strong and by a strategic rear reserve and a militia of close to 3 million in strength. Vietnam also possesses an array of modern weaponry, and it is being supported externally by a powerful ally, the Soviet Union. (13:201-221)

The invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces in late 1978 and their continued occupation of Kampuchea has threatened the security of ASEAN's frontline state in particular. The threat of war spilling over to Thailand is ever-increasing and dangerous. Despite the absence of military targets in Thai-Kampuchean border areas, Vietnamese forces have continued mounting military operations against civilian camps there. The Vietnamese actions also violate Thailand's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Besides inflicting death and casualties among Kampuchean civilians and Thai villagers living along the border, the Vietnamese have also planted millions of landmines in the border areas. As a result, many lives have been lost, and the landmines have caused serious injuries to the Thai and Kampuchean civilians living along the border.

The Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea has resulted in an exodus of refugees into Thailand and other ASEAN countries, with demographic changes being brought about in Kampuchea by a large number of Vietnamese settlers and the ongoing Vietnamization process of Kampuchea. Since November 1985, over a quarter of a million Kampucheans have been evacuated to camps inside Thailand alone, and a further 200,000 Thai villagers in the border areas have been relocated for their own safety. Hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees and displaced persons are still being cared for and sheltered in other ASEAN countries. (14:222)

Clearly, Vietnam's policy with respect to Indochina and her continued occupation of Kampuchea have not only undermined the stability of Southeast Asia but have produced intervention by the two major communist powers, the Soviet Union and China. The stalemate in Kampuchean peace negotiations and the continuous fighting between the contending factions may bring these major powers dangerously closer than ever to this region.

With her large population still under arms, Vietnam pays little attention to the urgent need of economic recovery and the rebuilding of its war-torn country. The continuation of her present policy in Indochina will force Vietnam to face serious economic problems in the future. This circumstance presents the greatest potential for regional instability in the years to come.

The Soviet Union

The formation of ASEAN in August 1967 under the Bangkok Declaration was seen by the Soviet Union as an American creation aimed at "containing" the southward spread of communism in Southeast Asia. For this reason, the Soviet Union pursued a policy of outright hostility towards ASEAN, although with some moderations when the organization's non-aligned actions suited or coincided with Soviet interests.

As competition for regional influence grew between Moscow and the United States and the People's Republic of China, however, the Soviets ardently endorsed ASEAN as a "constructive" regional organization set up for the purpose of enhancing economic, social, and cultural cooperation.

(15:138-139) They also sought to win ASEAN's acceptance of Vietnam, the Soviet ally in Indochina, and of its policies in mainland Southeast Asia. But, when ASEAN's resolution calling for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea was

adopted by the United Nation's General Assembly in 1979, the Soviets openly threatened ASEAN with future support of insurgents in ASEAN countries. (16:140) More recently, soon after Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok during July 1986, the USSR has renewed its efforts to mend its fences with ASEAN.

(17:141-142)

There are two areas of concern to ASEAN with regard to the Soviet presence in the region. The first is the growing presence of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the South China Sea; the second is the Soviet support to its client state of Vietnam and Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. As a result of the Soviet military alliance with Vietnam, the USSR has acquired military facilities at DaNang Air Base and Cam Ranh Naval Base. These facilities provide the Soviet Union with forward bases and staging points in the region for its power projection in Southeast Asia, the West Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. This, in turn, has had great implications for the regional and global strategic balance. (18:143-145)

The USSR's military alliance with Vietnam and its policy of backing that country's expansionism in Indochina has made ASEAN wary of Moscow's intention in the region. For these reasons the Soviet Union will continue to remain a distant power with little influence in the ASEAN region even though it has acquired a strategic foothold in Indochina.

The People's Republic of China

The history of communist insurgencies in most ASEAN countries involves support from the Communist Party of China (CPC). Undeniably, the CPC's links with the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM), the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), and the Communist Party of Philippines (CPP) constitute a major obstacle to ASEAN realtions with the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Malaysia and Indonesia in particular believe that China is the major threat to their nations. Malaysia's and Indonesia's perceptions of the PRC, of course, have been influenced by their own fear of their own large Overseas Chinese populations and by China's past links with the communist insurgents against the legal governments of Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia experienced twelve years' emergency and insurgency war which ended only in 1960, and it is still fighting the few hundred remaining CPM members along the Malaysia-Thai border and in East Malaysia. Populous Indonesia had a close call as a consequence of the PKI coup against the nationalist government of President Soekarno in 1965. This was blunted by the military under the leadership of now President Suharto. The PRC, although it has retracted its earlier declaration of citizenship status for overseas Chinese, continues to maintain its Overseas Chinese Affairs Department,

and this body continues to provide facilities to Chinese citizens of ASEAN countries travelling illegally to China.
(19:36-37)

Relations between the PRC and ASEAN countries are dual track--government-to-government and party-to-party. This situation does not allow much improvement in bilateral relations. Of immediate concern to ASEAN is the involvement of the PRC in Indochina's conflicts--an involvement which also drew in the Soviet Union and brought about its support to Vietnam. Meanwhile, the supply of arms by the PRC to the contending factions in the Kampuchean conflicts through Thailand and its supply of arms to Thailand may jeopardize the security of Thailand.

The PRC is also in direct confrontation with the ASEAN countries of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines in the South China Sea over the resource-rich Spratly Island group and atolls. The PRC has extended its claim more than 1,000 kilometers south of its shore, thereby encroaching on areas within ASEAN member' Exclusive Economic Zones.

ASEAN countries are naturally very concerned about the rapprochement between the PRC and the United States and about US support of PRC military modernization and its long-term implication. A modern military capability for the PRC together with the political will of its large population could prove to be a potential threat to this region in the very near future. ASEAN remains concerned over the PRC's long-term designs with

respect to Southeast Asia, which ASEAN believes remain the subjugation of the region--especially in light of its maintenance of party-to-party relations with illegal Communist parties in ASEAN countries. (20:38)

As a modernized military power, the PRC will project its strength through a larger role for its modernized navy. The decade 1970-1980 saw a three-fold increase in China's conventional submarine force to 100, and an increase in missile craft to 2,000 ships. In that decade also, two nuclear-powered missile submarines were launched, and guided missiles, frigates, and various auxiliary vessels were constructed. As more PRC naval vessels operate further south of its shores, ASEAN states fear that the PRC may use force to settle the disputed offshore islands issue. (21:39)

ASEAN Needs for Security Cooperation

ASEAN countries will be cautious in their future dealings with the communist powers. Both the PRC and the Soviet Union are intensifying their power projections in this region, and together they present a potential threat to ASEAN security. Vietnam, with the Soviet Union as its ally, remains an immediate threat to ASEAN.

The stalemate in the current Kampuchean peace negotiations in a way helps to strengthen ASEAN's resolve to cooperate more closely. It also provides breathing space for the

preparation and the enhancement of each state's defense and security. The ASEAN countries need to cooperate more closely with one another and even with outside powers in light of the reduced commitments of the United States and the United Kingdom to the security of this region.

CHAPTER IV

ASEAN RESILIENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION

In essence, national resilience is the end product of security. It can be defined as the ability to be self-reliant in every respect, including the social, economic, political, and military spheres. (22:77)

To some degree, the ASEAN states are making progress toward achieving national reliance. Each state has a socio-political system which is nationally accepted, growing economic prosperity, a capacity to cope with problems, and a capacity to mobilize the population for nation building. Although the progress towards achieving national resilience varies from country to country, the strong desire of all to achieve it has helped them overcome internal differences and promoted better security cooperation among the member states.

The formation of ASEAN in the late 1960s took place in the context of an imminent threat of the "dominos" further south of Indochina falling to Communism and the prospect of total American withdrawal from Vietnam. As ASEAN countries were also facing internal insurgencies supported by foreign powers, it was necessary therefore for the ASEAN leaders to consider the necessity of shouldering the burden of defense and the security of its member states. (23:141)

Following the fall of South Vietnam in 1975 and the invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces in 1978, the ASEAN countries frantically reviewed their defense and security policies and purchased additional arms to boost their defense. ASEAN's security policy subsequently changed from focusing on the needs of counterinsurgency and internal security to improving conventional defense capabilities against external threats.

Except for the Philippines, this period saw the growth of an extensive network of bilateral military arrangements among ASEAN states. (The Philippines' external defense needs were being met by the United States under the Manila Pact and Basing Agreement.) There were frequent joint training exercises involving the armed forces of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, with the presence of member forces on one another's soil. Increased military exchanges among military training establishments further enhanced the spirit of regionalism and strong military cooperation within ASEAN. ASEAN leaders showed their commitments through frequent visits and discussions of the common threats.

ASEAN's effort to acquire new defense capabilities was reflected in their defense allocations and programs during 1979-80, the period immediately after the Vietnam invasion of Kampuchea. ASEAN's defense expenditures during the period gave priority to military personnel increases, infrastructure development, weapon procurements, and training. The new

defense and force developments drastically increased the roles of their navies and air arms. (24:201-202)

ASEAN Defense Expansion

Thailand

The invasion of Kampuchea by the expansionist forces of Vietnam in late 1978 removed the security buffer between ASEAN and Vietnam. The threat to the ASEAN frontline state of Thailand became even more serious with numerous border incursions by Vietnamese regulars into Thailand while on hot pursuit of Khmer resistance forces.

This period saw a rapid expansion of Thai forces as well as their armament, and a change in defense philosophy from a counterinsurgency force to a conventional defense against external threats. Defense spending was given priority over social and economic development. Thailand was fortunate to have the support of the United States under the Manila Treaty; hence, Thailand's rapid expansion to enhance military readiness was made possible. The United States also increased her military assistance programs to Thailand and carried out joint military exercises annually under the exercise code name of Cobra Gold. (25:213)

The Royal Thai Army (RTA) has received the major share of the national defense budget, making the 160,000 RTA a more

credible force to deter threats. The upgrading of the Thai Army has included the acquisition of additional M-48 medium battle tanks, anti-tank rockets, and missiles. (26:213)

The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has acquired fast attack craft equipped with Exorcet and Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles. Other larger ships such as frigates and corvettes are on order, plus possibly two submarines. The majority of the RTN fleet operates in the Gulf of Thailand, and the rest along the Indian Ocean coast. (27:214)

The capabilities of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) in the air defense role have been boosted with the recent purchase of a squadron of F-16A/F-16B aircraft. The new purchase has greatly enhanced the Fighter Ground Attack and the Air Defense squadrons of F-5A/F-5B/F-5Es. The United States has also delivered a Redeye surface-to-air missile defense system that will further enhance Thai air defenses. (28:214)

Malaysia

The Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) underwent a dramatic transformation during the early 1980s. The MAF acquired a new role of preparing itself to meet external threats. Government spending on defense was increased by nearly 200 percent during this period. From 1983 onward, because of economic recession, it was sustained at 5-6 percent of the national GNP. The new military programs were directed at deterring and repelling

external aggressors and thereby securing and maintaining national sovereignty.

Under the new expansion programs, the Malaysian Army will reach 120,000, double its pre-1979 strength. Moreover, it is undergoing massive reequipping and retraining to suit conventional warfare requirements. Among the new equipment it is acquiring are APCs, ATPCs, and a number of items of medium and heavy artillery. A new Cavalry Corps has been created to upgrade its light infantry to a mechanized one along with its supporting arms.

The Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) and the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) have been given additional responsibilities under the new defense policy. The RMAF will be responsible for not only air defense of Peninsula Malaysia and East Malaysia, but also for air defense over the islands and atolls within the Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea. To help meet these obligations, the RMAF has acquired new surveillance radar and a new command and control system that integrates all air traffic radars and the air defense radars of the nation. This system also integrates the newly purchased E2C airborne surveillance aircraft of Singapore under the integrated air defense system of the Five Power Defense Arrangement involving Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the RMAF is planning to purchase a new generation fighter aircraft as well as a surface-to-air

missile defense system, and it is restructuring its organization and carrying out training programs to achieve conventional air defense and warfare capabilities. (29:203-204)

Under its programs, the RMN has acquired its own repair capabilities, and it will purchase anti-submarine-warfare (ASW) helicopters, corvettes, and possibly submarines in the near future. More ships and weapon systems are needed by the RMN in line with its maritime role over the waters of the long Malaysian coast, the Strait of Malacca, and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea. (30:205)

Singapore

The island nation of Singapore's Armed Forces (SAF) are well equipped, especially its Air Force (RSAF). The RSAF is currently acquiring a new generation of fighter/attack aircraft, the F-16A/F-16B and possibly the F-18A; a command and control system to complement its several squadrons of air defense; and fighter and ground attack aircraft, comprised of F-5E/F-5F/Skyhawks/Hunter and Super Puma helicopters for ASW and anti-ship roles.

The Singapore Army is a force of conscripts who put in 24 months of national service. Its 45,000 force is organized into one brigade of mechanized infantry and one brigade of armor, which is equipped with 350 AMX-13 light tanks.

Singapore maintains a permanent training base in Brunei. It carries out military exercises with the forces of ASEAN countries, and with Australia and New Zealand under the RPFA protocol. (31:206-207)

Brunei

The Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) has a strength of 4,000, but it is well equipped and is being complemented by a Gurkha battalion under a bilateral arrangement with Great Britain. Brunei, like the other ASEAN countries, is acquiring new weapons to enhance her defense capabilities. These will complement the existing Rapier air defense battery, Bolkow 105 gunships, FAC armed with Exorcet, and Scorpion tanks. Brunei and Malaysia have an overlapping maritime jurisdiction and interest in the Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea, and the two countries maintain a coordinated maritime patrol in offshore oil mining areas adjacent to their coasts as well as in the EEZ. (32:208)

Indonesia

The period of 1976-83 saw the transformation of the Indonesia Armed Forces (ABRI) from a territorial defense force into a maritime defense force with capabilities against external threats. The ABRI is about 280,000 men strong, of which

210,000 belong to the Army. The Army Strategic Command remains the core of the force's conventional capability. It is well equipped and highly mobile, and it can be deployed at very short notice to any part of Indonesia--from Sabang in North Sumatra to Marauke in the west of Irian Jaya.

The Indonesian Navy has a formidable task of maintaining surveillance and protecting an area of 2.5 million square miles under its jurisdiction. At present, its naval craft include two submarines, corvettes, and FAC, of which most are equipped with the Exorcet surface-to-surface missile.

The Indonesian Air Force is currently acquiring a squadron of F-16A/F-16Bs to complement its three squadrons of F-5E/F-5F and Skyhawk aircraft. It has a large fleet of transport craft made up of C-130A/C-130H/C-130-100s to support the Army Strategic Command. To meet this command's requirements, the Air Force is being supported by the Indonesian national aviation industry (IPTN), which assembles short-range transport aircraft of CN-212 and CN-235, and helicopters such as Super Puma, Bolkow 105, and Bell 412 for export and local needs. The Air Force is also acquiring a surface-to-air missile air defense system from Great Britain. (33:209-211)

The ABRI has participated in a number of joint exercises with Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. It has also carried out joint patrols along their common borders.

The Philippines

Unlike other ASEAN countries, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) enjoys security protection from external threat, under the bilateral agreement with the United States in return for the basing rights for the United States forces in the Philippines. Hence, the AFP has been able to pay more attention to improving its capabilities to combat the ongoing insurgencies of the Communist New Peoples Army (NPA) and the separatist Moro Peoples Liberation Front movement in the south.

US forces, however, are not committed to the defense of the Philippine's offshore islands in the Exclusive Economic Zone which are being contested by Vietnam, the PRC, and Taiwan. Thus, the Philippine Air Force is in the process of acquiring a squadron of F-16A/F-16Bs and a number of naval craft and vessels to protect its offshore islands as well as combat the insurgents in the south.

Although the Philippines and Malaysia share a common sea border in the South China Sea, the two countries' forces do not carry out joint patrols or exercises, for the Philippines currently claim Sabah, which is a territory within Malaysia. But there are military exchanges between the training establishments of the two countries. (34:212)

ASEAN Security Cooperation

While ASEAN remains committed to its original concept of regional political and economic cooperation, that concept does not prevent each member state from engaging in bilateral military cooperation with other member states or with outside powers. ASEAN has created its own identity. Despite its non-aligned outlook in international relations and its commitment to the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality (ZOPFAN), ASEAN member states (with the exception of Indonesia) maintain military links with the United States (in the cases of the Philippines and Thailand), and with the Commonwealth countries (in the cases of Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore). Intra-ASEAN military cooperation is apparent through the number of joint exercises, joint patrols, and exchanges between military establishments that have taken place. The joint exercises between Malaysian forces and Indonesian forces have been under the code names of Kekar Malindo (Army), Elang Malindo (Air Force), and Malindo Jaya (Navy). The respective forces have hosted these exercises alternately (every two years) on different scenarios each time in line with conventional warfare doctrine. The joint exercises between Thai and Malaysian forces have been carried out under the code names of Kris Sakti (Army), Air Tamal (Air Force), and Sea Tamal (Navy). The naval exercises between

Malaysia and Singapore have been under the code name of Malapura series. Malaysia, however, has not conducted military exercises with the Philippines. (35:216)

Malaysia and Singapore have carried out several air, sea, and land exercises together with the Commonwealth countries of Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom on Malaysia's territory under the code names of Bersatu Padu and Adex. A number of land exercises have also taken place in Australia and New Zealand under the FPDA protocol.

Indonesian forces have in the past carried out air and sea exercises under the code names of Elang Indrapura and Englek respectively. Exercises between the armed forces of Singapore and Thailand have been conducted under the code name Sing Siam series.

Joint land and sea patrols between bordering countries have been intensified to prevent piracy, insurgency, and drug trafficking across borders. This cooperation, however, does not exist between Malaysia and the Philippines due to the latter's claim on Sabah.

In the past, the defense of ASEAN countries, with the exception of Indonesia, has been oriented toward and in favor of the Western powers. This trend will continue for the foreseeable future. Extra-regional military cooperation has been made possible under the protocol of FPDA in the case of Singapore and Malaysia, while Brunei has had a bilateral arrangement with Britain. The other two member states of

ASEAN, namely Thailand and the Philippines, have maintained close military cooperation under the Manila Pact protocol and US basing rights in the Philippines. The United States has also carried out annual exercises with Thailand and the Philippines and has extended substantial military assistance to Indonesia to strengthen Indonesian defense capabilities.

The close relations existing between the United States and the ASEAN countries does promote security and stability in the region. A US presence in the region affords military balance to counter the growing influence of the communist powers. Such military balance is favored by ASEAN, and for this reason ASEAN has also given its tacit support for the maintenance of US bases in the Philippines.

CHAPTER V

PROSPECTS FOR ASEAN SECURITY COOPERATION

Cooperation and Constraints

ASEAN member states have embarked on an extensive program as a result of their defense policy review in the aftermath of the Vietnam invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978. More resources have been made available to acquire new weapon systems, carry out training exercises with member states as well as with outside friendly countries, and restructure their defense forces toward conventional warfare against external threats.

In the past, ASEAN countries have resisted any suggestion to turn the organization into a security pact or a close security alliance. This idea has been raised by two prominent leaders of ASEAN. Singapore's Premier, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, suggested the possibility of organizing all-ASEAN joint exercises in early 1982 with the aim of enhancing the conventional capabilities of ASEAN collectively. A more direct proposal was made by Mr Adam Malek, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, in 1984. He proposed to conduct such exercises on Thai territory, the frontline state of ASEAN, which was supported by Singapore.

(36:219)

In reality, any attempts by the member states of ASEAN to forge a closer security alliance beyond bilateral cooperation have been constrained by the organization's earlier accord and its foreign policy outlook. Such a move could be seen as an effort by ASEAN to form a military bloc closely identified with the Western powers, and contrary to ASEAN's original goals and concept of organization. Indeed, ASEAN was criticized by the Soviet Union during ASEAN's early days as a creation of the United States and a threat to regional stability. A military alliance within ASEAN would also be counterproductive to ASEAN's calls for a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality (ZOPFAN). The concept of ZOPFAN is essentially to insulate Southeast Asia from superpower rivalry, such as was demonstrated during the Second Indochina War. ZOPFAN calls for recognition of the right of this region to chart its destiny and for creation of a conflict-free region, access to which would not be threatened by any regional power. Finally, the nonaligned policy of Indonesia and Malaysia has restrained these two countries from openly advocating the security alliance promoted by its partners in ASEAN. Thus, ASEAN is widely recognized as a nonmilitary alliance and has managed to steer away from direct involvement in the regional rivalries of the superpowers. (37:219-221)

ASEAN Future Security Cooperation

ASEAN defense forces collectively are no match for potential adversaries such as Vietnam, whose forces are battle-tested and combat ready--especially when these forces are supported by a powerful ally in the Soviet Union. However, ASEAN forces can prove difficult to defeat when adequately trained and organized. Indeed, although there are constraints on the formation of a military alliance within ASEAN, ASEAN could enhance its national resilience and security cooperation with added vigor and resilience.

ASEAN's present unilateral action to enhance the defense capabilities of each individual state is an important step toward development of national resilience. Moreover, the stalemate in peace negotiation in the Kampuchean conflict has provided a breathing space for ASEAN states to prepare their defense forces against the potential threat. As ASEAN's economic outlook becomes brighter, the members' ability to increase their defense spending will further strengthen ASEAN's forces. In addition, ASEAN security cooperation through bilateral arrangements, although remarkable, could still be accelerated. The Philippines' claim to Sabah, however, remains an obstacle to better security cooperation with Malaysia.

Malaysia's recent invitation to Singapore for a joint land exercise in Kota Belud in Sabah is another achievement in bilateral military cooperation between the two countries.

(38:27) In the absence of a formal military alliance structure, the current bilateral security cooperation through military exercises can serve to establish and improve battlefield command and control procedures between forces. This is in view of the understanding that visiting forces will be under the control of the host country during conflict against an external threat.


Since bilateral cooperation also includes joint border patrols, it also helps protect states from insurgencies, drug trafficking, and piracy on the high seas, and it provides cover for search and rescue operations. As a result of close cooperation between Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysian security forces, the sealane along the Strait of Malacca has been kept open and safe for international shipping.

Another dimension of ASEAN security cooperation is the ongoing cooperation with outside powers. Firstly, under the protocol of FPDA and Brunei bilateral relations with Great Britain, the ASEAN states of Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei maintain security links with the Commonwealth countries of Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain. Through numerous military exercises in the air, on land, and on the seas of each other's territory, the ASEAN member countries have gained much knowledge about conventional warfare capabilities. Furthermore, the military assistance provided by the Commonwealth countries to Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei has benefited ASEAN in general.

The United States, for its part, has provided much security assistance to Thailand and the Philippines under the Manila Pact protocol. Moreover, the continuous US presence in the region has offset the growing influence of the two communist powers, namely the PRC and the Soviet Union. The present stability of the region has also afforded ASEAN a breathing space for its defense buildup against potential threats such as that of Vietnam, supported by its ally, the Soviet Union.

While ASEAN continues with its defense buildup and improves bilateral cooperation among its members and with external friendly countries, the organization needs the support of the Western powers to boost its defense forces and military equipment. ASEAN's economic growth and security stability depends heavily on support from the Western countries.

APPENDIX A. REGIONAL MAP OF ASEAN



(Source: United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1986)

APPENDIX B

ASEAN SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS

	Area Sq KM (.000)	Population (millions)	Growth Rate	Per Capita GNP US\$	Per Capita GNP US\$ Billion	Real GDP Growth %
Brunei	5.8	0.237	5.7	16,065	3.8	1.23
Indonesia	1,919	113.4	2.3	482	79.0	6.8
Malaysia	330	15.7	2.5	1,901	29.8	7.4
Philippines	300	54.6	2.6	598	32.6	4.1
Singapore	0.6	2.6	1.4	6,223	15.9	8.1
Thailand	514	51.3	2.4	725	37.2	6.5

(Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators of Developing Member Countries of ADB, April 1985)

APPENDIX C

ASEAN ARMED FORCES

	<u>Brunei</u>	<u>Indonesia</u>	<u>Malaysia</u>	<u>Philippines</u>	<u>Singapore</u>	<u>Thailand</u>
Military Expenditure	0.3b	2.05b	1.8b	0.5b	1.2b	1.5b
Reserves	-	800,000	100,000	48,000	182,000	500,000
Regular Forces	4,050	281,000	120,000	113,000	55,500	256,000
Army	3,380	216,000	100,000	70,000	45,000	166,000
Navy	470	38,000	8,000	26,000	4,500	42,000
Air Force	200	27,000	12,000	17,000	6,000	48,000
Combat A/C	-	64	70	71	155	83
NAVAL VESSELS/CRAFT						
Submarine	-	2	-	-	-	-
Frigate	-	13	2	7	-	6
Corvette	-	-	2	10	-	-
Fast Attack Craft	3	8	8	-	12	9
Petrol Craft	5	31	30	86	12	98
Minesweeper/Mines Counter Vessels	-	2	4	-	2	12

(Source: Asian Study Centres, Backgrounder No. 60, April 21, 1986)

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