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
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THE JOINT COMMANDER'S AUTHORITY

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AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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THE JOINT COMMANDER'S AUTHORITY

by

Joe R. McDonald
Colonel, USAF

A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Colonel Robert I. Bond

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: The Joint Commander's Authority

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→ The operational command of United States military force falls under the command of theater warfighting commander in chiefs. They have operational control of their assigned forces, but do not control most force training, acquisition of equipment, etc. Unity of command has been a historical problem for United States forces. This study looks historically at the United States chain of command, unity of command, and those aspects of the issue that contribute to the problem. Additionally, it looks at the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 and its major changes to the way of doing business. Finally, remaining issues are discussed, with recommendations on those issues. Three major issues still face the United States military and national command authority: budget participation by the joint commanders; joint planning; and chain of command. Unity of command is affected by all three issues, and remains a real problem area.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Joe R. McDonald earned a BS degree from Oklahoma State University in 1967 and a MA degree from Central Michigan University in 1977. He completed intelligence training at Lowry APB, Colo. Next, he served with the 8th Recce Tech Sqd at Westover APB, Mass. In July 1969, he was assigned to the 12th Recce Tech Sqd, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN,. Next, came a Pentagon tour in the National Military Intel Center, DIA. Graduating from the Signals Intel Course at Goodfellow APB, Tx., in December 1973, he went to the 6987th Security Sqd, Shu Lin Kou AS, Taipei, Taiwan. In March 1976, he returned to the Pentagon as Chief, Air Force Special Security Office. Following graduation from ACSC in July 1980, he was Operations Officer, 6931st Electronic Security Sqd, Iraklion AS, Crete, Greece. In July 1982, he was assigned to the ESC IG team. In June 1984, he became Commander, 6922d Electronic Security Sqd, Clark AB, Philippines. He then served as Director of Long-Range Planning, HQ ESC, Kelly AFB, Tx. He is a graduate of the Air War College, Class of 1989.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The growth of Soviet military power continues to be one of the most serious trends in the international security environment facing the United States (U.S.). The geographic scope of challenges has also expanded significantly. The Soviet's expanding influence is becoming global, while Soviet military capabilities to project that influence are rapidly improving. There has also been a proliferation of relatively inexpensive, highly destructive and effective weapons to Third World countries, which increases the chance of, and intensity of, regional conflicts. Political, economic, and military power has diffused in the past two decades. This contributed to an overall weakening of the international order. (1:283-284)

If the United States goes to war in the future, it will face significant challenges with a resource base that definitely does not provide enough military "to go around." In almost any confrontation, large or small, the U.S. military will fight as a joint force. The National Command Authority (NCA) exercises command of the U.S. Armed Forces through the joint combatant command, which have operational control. Unity of effort toward a common objective assigned to the commands is achieved by operational command through the joint commander. Additionally, adherence to strategic

objectives, and a sound operational and administrative command organization are essential to unity of effort. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the combatant commands have given strategic and operational direction to our armed forces, while the military departments retained responsibility for administering, training, and equipping their forces assigned to the combatant commands. Specified commands have a broad, continuing mission and are normally composed of forces from one service. In unified commands, or subordinate unified commands, forces from two or more services are commanded by a single commander, with operational command and control of assigned forces normally exercised through subordinate component commanders. Service forces may also be organized into a joint task force (JTF) or a uni-service force. Jointness demands mutual confidence, common understanding of primary and supporting missions, and a common doctrine for unified action by those involved.

(2:preface)

The Commander-in-Chief (CINC) or warfighting joint commander has a very difficult task, and it is made even more difficult because he is at the mercy of the individual services to a certain extent. The services, not the warfighting commanders, design force structure, and control and develop budgets. (3:30) Joint commanders, on the other hand, have the ultimate responsibility for the planning and

conduct of the operational end of the warfighting process, the combat campaign. The primary tools used by the joint commanders, for the application of force, below the combined level in the warfighting system, are the sub-unified command and the joint task force. (4:35)

The operational commands were established at a time when security threats to the U.S were clearer and fewer in number. The international security environment has become significantly more complex since the 1940s. Today, the missions of the operational commander encompass a wide spectrum. The U.S. must be sure of the adequacy of the command structure, and the organization and command arrangements of the operational commands. (5:283)

Another factor that plays into the equation of CINC power and control is the effect of improved communications capabilities on command and control. The original post-World War II concept for the joint commander envisioned decentralized execution of joint military operations. However, improvements in communications capabilities have enabled the NCA to control forward deployed military forces. Another aspect of improved communications capabilities is the ability to circumvent portions of the military chain of command in the field. (6:284-285) It has almost become a "requirement for increased presidential control in efforts to

manage certain crises, primarily those with the potential for superpower confrontation." (7:285)

Unity of command in joint operations has been somewhat elusive in U.S. military history. This study will briefly look at the problem as it has presented itself historically in the U.S. from the Spanish-American War through the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. Intertwined in joint command issues are command and control problems within the NCA and JCS structure. Next, the study will look at what problems remain for joint commanders.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY

Early Years

Historically, there is evidence that the U.S. military services were unable or unwilling to work together, which led the Nation to military disaster or near disaster. It happened repeatedly and plagued defense efforts for much of the century. (8:12)

The problem was two-fold: first, there was lack of true "unity of command," and second, there was inadequate cooperation among services when called upon to perform joint operations. (9:12) Prior to World War II, the War Department and the Navy Department existed basically as independent entities and rarely did Army and Navy units operate together. (10:276)

In the Spanish-American War, the admiral and general in charge of their respective forces in the Cuban campaign were on such bad terms that the general refused to permit the admiral's representative to sign the surrender agreement. Those two commanders could not agree on a plan for the one major joint operation of the war--seizure of Santiago. Compromise was not forthcoming, thus the army had to capture

the city with only minimal support from the navy which placed American lives at much greater risk.

World War II

Circumstances were not exactly the same in Hawaii during 1941. The two commanders were not feuding; they were just not talking to each other. This fact was considered a major factor in the devastating success of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Additionally, at Pearl Harbor the Army assumed the Navy was conducting long-range air reconnaissance, while the Navy assumed the Army's radar was fully operational--both wrong assumptions. At the national level, no one below President Roosevelt had unity of command. No one had access to all the intelligence information on Japan's plans, and only the president had authority to order the army and navy to act. The joint committee who investigated the Pearl Harbor attack suggested (first recommendation): "That immediate action be taken to ensure that unity of command is imposed at all military and naval outposts." (11:12)

Within two months of the U.S. entry into World War II, President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill created the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) to provide direction to the U.S.-British war effort. The U.S. had no organization equivalent to the British to provide

representation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Thus, President Roosevelt created an informal Joint Chiefs of Staff without legal mandate or formally defined duties. During the war, the organization consisted of the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of the Army Air Force, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet/Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. (12:136, 138)

Even after Pearl Harbor, the Pacific war was divided into two theaters with two commanders: General MacArthur "owned" the southwest Pacific region, while Admiral Nimitz was responsible for the rest of the Pacific Ocean. Each received his orders from his own Service chief acting for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Nowhere below the Joint Chiefs was there authority to make decisions for the entire Pacific region. (13:12) During the war, it became increasingly evident that modern warfare required combined operations which required a unified operational command of forces and also a coordinated process for achieving the most effective force structure and logistical support. (14:24) General George C. Marshall, USA, realized that the complexity of modern warfare demanded unified command as indicated in the following statement:

I am convinced that there must be one man in command of the entire theater--air, ground, and ships. We cannot manage by cooperation....there would be an emphatic unwillingness to place portions of troops under another service. If we made a plan for unified command now, it

would solve nine-tenths of our troubles. There are difficulties in arriving at a single command, but they are much less than the hazards that must be faced if we do not do this. (15:276)

The JCS decided during World War II that unified command was necessary in war and peace, but it was the public and Congress that demanded it as a result of the Pearl Harbor investigation. (16:276)

Post World War II

Congress tried, after the war, to correct unity of command problems with the National Security Act of 1947, which provided for unified commands in strategic areas. Congress' intent was to provide for "Strategic direction of the armed forces and their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces...." Individual services retained responsibility as executive agents for their service. (17:12-13) The Act also established the JCS as a permanent body. The JCS consisted of individual service chiefs who were dual-hatted as members of the JCS. They were to represent their own service's viewpoint and also sacrifice that view for the common good. As a joint body, they had almost no role in resource allocation. They did not command forces in the field. (18:16)

President Eisenhower used an Executive Order in 1953 to revise the executive agent concept to provide that the military department rather than a service chief would serve as executive agent for each unified command. Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 explained and justified the change as follows:

Under this new arrangement the channel of responsibility and authority to a commander of a unified command will unmistakably be from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the designated civilian Secretary of a military department. This arrangement will fix responsibility along a definite channel of accountable civilian officials as intended by the National Security Act. (19:277)

President Eisenhower attempted, in 1958, to strengthen the unity of the armed forces and their ability to conduct joint operations. He told Congress: "Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands..., singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of Service." (20:13) This was one of the last serious attempts to correct flaws in the unified command system, until the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 took the military departments and the service chiefs out of the operational chain of command, and the executive agent arrangement was ended. Then the chain ran from the President

to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to commanders of the unified and specified commands. (21:2)

There continued to be unity of command problems in Vietnam. General Westmoreland never had command over all forces in the Vietnam theater. General David C. Jones observed that: "Each Service, instead of integrating efforts with the others, considered Vietnam its own war and sought to carve out a large mission for itself." Inter-service rivalry and incompatibility of equipment and training is not restricted to the past. In recent years, Grenada provides an excellent example. (22:13-14)

Grenada was successful. However, it is sobering to review what went wrong. Coordination was generally a failure, as was communications. Marine and army forces on Grenada were not under a joint ground commander. Each reported directly to the commander of the Joint Task Force, who was a navy admiral afloat. (23:14) Grenada highlighted the fact that time may not be available for coping with the lack of jointness and C3I coordination. U.S. military forces must practice jointness through exercises with joint and coalition forces, and initiatives must be undertaken that coordinate programs of development and acquisition. When equipment is delivered to fighting forces, the equipment must be reliable and interoperable. (24:17) As late as 1984, Admiral Crowe, then CINCPAC stated:

Component commands are independent entities organized and commanded on a day-to-day basis along unilateral Service lines....This situation diffuses authority and complicates operational/strategic decisionmaking. (25:20)


The original operational commands were those that were in place at the end of World War II. The first peacetime unified command established was U.S. Forces, European Theater, when General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force was dissolved on July 14, 1945. The JCS developed the Unified Command Plan, which created unified and specified commands. The plan divided the world into theaters, each headed by a CINC who coordinated U.S. military activities in that area. The plan was approved by President Truman in December 1946, but has not been comprehensively reviewed since its original development. If it were, the structure might look significantly different from what it does now. The addition or deletion of commands has evolved over the years as shown on Chart 1-1. (26:278-279)

There have been evolutionary changes in national command authority arrangements from the National Security Act of 1947 to the Goldwaters-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986. The changes centered around an effort to strengthen the unity of command, and command and control of U.S. forces. The Reorganization Act of 1986 was the latest effort to improve the system. (27:2-1)

However, despite the specific recommendation of the Pearl Harbor commission in 1946 and subsequent efforts, 43 years later, the U.S. is still struggling with unity of command. (28:12)

CHART 1-1 (29:282)

CHANGES IN THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE



CHAPTER III

DOD REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986

Background

There exists a saying that "if it isn't broken, don't fix it." Senator Barry Goldwater said the following about the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its system: "The system is broke and it must be fixed...." (30:136) The Goldwaters-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 required a new look at how U.S. armed forces plan, train, and fight in a joint environment. (31:24) General Robert T. Herres, the new Vice Chairman of the JCS summed up the purpose of the 1986 Act as "increasing the clout of the CINCs and the Chairman." The CINC and the Chairman have become much stronger voices in what some see as an increasingly "purple-suited" military. The legislation allows the CINCs to keep a distance from their respective service chiefs. (32:42)

Summary of Major Changes

The Reorganization Act resulted in major changes. The Chairman of the JCS became the principal military advisor to the president, national security council, and the secretary of defense, with the other JCS members' ideas presented by him. He will also assist in providing strategic

direction of the armed forces. The chairman can recommend changes to service roles and missions. He continues to serve as a member of the National Security Council in an advisory capacity.

The position of Vice Chairman was created. This person will be senior to the service chiefs and preside in the absence of the chairman.

The joint staff is now responsible to the chairman, rather than the entire membership of the JCS. The staff is also responsible for unified doctrine. To promote a more professional joint staff, the joint officer career specialty was created. Joint duty was intended by the Act to be mandatory for promotion to flag rank.

The CINCs were given more authority in operations, training, and logistics. They were also permitted to approve the selection of their subordinates. The CINCs may prescribe a subordinate's chain(s) of command. Administration and support authority over subordinates was also mandated. The joint commanders were given their own budgets for designated activities. Finally, all military forces were assigned to a combatant commander. No services have operational authority. This is what was mandated. What actually evolves, remains to be seen. (33:145)

Budget

CINC budget involvement has been a long term problem. The Act provided for a vastly stronger voice for the CINCs in the allocation of resources they require to fight their forces. The Act required DoD to submit to Congress:

A separate budget for such activities of each of the unified and specified combatant commands. It shall include funding proposals for such activities of the combatant command as the Secretary (after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) determines to be appropriate for inclusion. Activities of a combatant command for which funding may be requested in such a proposal include the following: (1) joint exercises, (2) force training, (3) contingencies, (4) selected operations. (34:18)

The newest unified command--U.S. Special Operations Command--is not only charged with planning, command and control, and providing forces to the warfighting CINCs, but has its own budget submission.

Planning

The 1986 Act gave the Chairman new responsibilities for joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures. There are six primary systems used today that drive joint planning and operations: the National Security Council System, Joint Strategic Planning System, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, Joint Operations Planning System, Joint Development System, and the Worldwide Military Command and Control System. The Joint Doctrine System is the

responsibility of the new Directorate of Operations Plans and Interoperability (J-7), which produces the Joint Doctrine Master Plan. The Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) is also new to the joint staff. These directorates bring the joint staff more directly into the warfighting business, which should result in more efficient joint warfighting in the future. (35:31-32)

CHAPTER IV

CURRENT ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Effective jointness does not come totally from laws. It requires constant attention and commitment to ensure acquisition of equipment and systems that operate effectively with those of other services and allies. Diligence is also needed to insure doctrine and operating procedures are coordinated; to insure forces can function jointly through readiness exercises; and to ensure material requirements reflect joint needs to the fullest extent possible. In 1984, the Air Force and Army established a joint force development process between the two services to ensure that doctrine, procedures, and acquisition programs were closely coordinated. There has been some success. Thirty-five initiatives were agreed to with a cost avoidance of \$1 billion between the two services. (36:18) This is a positive step, but there need to be more. There are a number of issues that require further attention: budget participation, planning, logistics, and unity and chain of command.

Budget

One issue that deserves a more detailed look is the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). The Chairman has been the voice for the warfighting CINCs in

validating and prioritizing their requirements and supporting them in the PPBS process. Some people feel the resource managers--the services--have too much control of the budget, at the expense of the warfighters, with equipment being procured without sufficient thought to effective joint integration and interoperability. (37:44) With the U.S. facing a continued high budget deficit and with future service budgets expected to be static, the military services cannot afford to make mistakes in organization, interoperability, etc. (38:9) General Bernard Rogers, as Commander-in-Chief of the European Command, stated: "There is an imbalance between my responsibilities...and influence on resource decisions...." (39:20) Admiral Crowe, then CINCPAC, said that: "...I am persuaded that giving the unified commanders an earlier and stronger voice in the resource allocation process would strike a better balance between responsibility and accountability." (40:26) The CINCs generally felt they needed: an earlier voice in the budget process; more effective communications between unified commanders and their component commands; greater visibility of the CINCs' major issues; either direct contact or a review process between the CINCs and services during budget build; component input to service budgets which reflected CINCs' warfighting needs; and feedback from the services during the budget cycle on how the CINCs' needs are being met. (41:16)

The CINCs are allowed to comment on the Defense Guidance which is an output of the planning phase of the PPBS, and personally meet with the Secretary of Defense and Defense Resource Board to discuss their views and recommendations. The CINCs are also called to testify before Congressional committees on the adequacy of service budgets. However, by this time, the Secretary of Defense has already issued his program decisions and the CINCs must support him or take issue with his position(s). Additionally, CINCs submit an Integrated Priority List (IPL) of their higher priority needs directly to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the JCS, and the services. (42:17)

There are claims that the military departments are investment-oriented, while the operating commands are readiness-oriented. The joint commander must be ready to fight his war now, while the services are looking some years down the road. (43:33) Readiness vs modernization is a key issue. The operational commands are geographically separated from the Washington area, which makes it more difficult to continually provide direct influence. The JCS has in the past been dominated by the services, thus modernization has had the upper-hand to readiness. (44:50) Both are important. The services and the CINCs should be heard, so that the U.S. is as prepared as it can be and at the same time, not ignore its future, because modernization is forgotten. (45:41)

Recent service emphasis seems to have shifted toward readiness. The army's latest five-year budget placed modernization third behind readiness and sustainability, and a stable force structure. A common theme from the CINCs in the mid-1980s when asked, was that their primary responsibility was to prepare for war. To require them to submit a separate budget and manage it through the PPBS life-cycle and then control the funds would be a detractor from their primary mission. Generally, the CINCs do not have the staff or staff expertise to work a budget. For example, CINCLANT's budget staff in 1988 consisted of one GS-12 and one colonel. (46:16, 18-19)

However, as mentioned earlier, USSOC, the newest unified command, is not only charged with planning, command and control, and providing special operations forces to the warfighting CINC, but it has its:

...own major force program identifier (budget) giving CINCSOC control over his own acquisition systems from requirement identification to end product. This separate budget makes USSOC unique and creates special problems for the services who must man, train, and organize the resulting forces. (47:41)

In summary, the CINCs' have had little influence in the budget process. There is now increased participation in the process due to DoD reforms and the Reorganization Act of 1986. However, heavy involvement in the process may not

be necessary, and may be counter productive in light of the warfighters' primary mission. (48:19)

Planning

Joint commanders are responsible for the planning, operations, and intelligence in their assigned areas of the world. (49:36) In their planning, the joint commander must do threat analysis, study force requirements, campaign plans, deployments, and support of forces. (50:25)

However, Grenada was planned in JCS Current Operations (J3), not within CINCLANT's staff whose theater it was in.

There are many opinions on the subject of joint planning. Until recently there was no single individual or agency overall responsible for joint planning. The process was not standardized and there was no definition for joint tactics. No regulation identified the warfighters as participants in the planning process. There was also no clear differentiation between joint doctrine and multi-service doctrine. Both the services and the joint staff developed joint doctrine, normally without CINC participation, though joint commanders are now staffing joint doctrine. Existing doctrine received little or no evaluation. Joint doctrine publications were generally outdated. The new Joint Doctrine Center is a subordinate

element of J-7. Its charter is to provide doctrine development and coordination, and to identify voids, conflicts, and omissions. The U.S. is hopefully improving its ability to integrate defense resources and warfighting capabilities. The new Joint Doctrine Master Plan will be basic to any such integration, and it blends individual service doctrine. The Joint Doctrine Center will also provide informal connectivity, conduct evaluations, and maintain a library of joint doctrine documents. (51:48)

Joint planning should be closely monitored to see if recent changes in the planning process truly improve the system, so that the warfighter can better execute coordinated, joint operations if required.

Logistics

"The fact that the logistical chain of command runs around the unified commander greatly weakens his authority over his Service component commands." (52:309) When reinforcing U.S. Army divisions arrive in Europe, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe determines priority for those divisions, but he does not control distribution of their prepositioned equipment in Europe. (53:26)

The CINC needs more voice in influencing service logistics and training decisions which affect his operational and strategic responsibilities. (54:20)

Joint interoperability is a must. The introduction of new equipment and systems into the field is often the first time interoperability disconnects are considered or found. The field commander must find the problem and hope for a fix. Interoperability must be addressed on the drawing board to prevent waste and mission degradation. (55:25)

Both the JCS and CINCs must be authoritatively involved in making persuasive inputs into resource (equipment) analysis, design, and selection.

Unity and Chain of Command

A weak unified command structure inhibits the ability of the U.S. to defend itself and protect its interests in regions vital to U.S. national security. In a sense, such a structure is the result of individual interests and service rivalry for resources. There are imbalances between service and joint interests as indicated previously when it comes to modernization and readiness. Many military officers have a strong loyalty to their parent service and at times that loyalty overrides making the best decision for the good of all. Service influence will probably remain a problem, unless something drastic occurs, such as a true purple-suited service. (56:13, 41)

Operational command flows through the joint command, while full command less operational command comes from the

military service. The CINC depends on component commanders under his operational control to provide him a fighting force, manned, equipped, and trained. The component commander is operationally responsible to the CINC and also to his own service. "...to provide unity of effort and efficient use of scarce resources, it is imperative that the efforts of the separate services be closely integrated." (57:38-39)

The CINC, in peacetime, must ensure his forces maintain a high state of readiness through constant training and frequent exercises. They must also worry issues such as intelligence for their area of responsibility and interoperability. (58:7, 15) While CINCs are keyed in on readiness, they must be vitally concerned with modernization, and not leave that problem to the individual services and others.

There appears to be confusion in the minds of some players in the chain of command as to the exact flow between the president and the CINC. This exists in spite of laws on the books that lay it out fairly well. It may be that some disagree and simply ignore the chain, or feel that surely that cannot be what "they" meant when "they" wrote the laws. In some cases, however, the laws are not crisp and clear. There is also "de facto influence that individual service chiefs retain over the operational commands." (59:303)

The chain of command also varies within the unified commands. In most of the commands, the commander deals only with service component commands. However, in LANTCOM and SPACOM, the unified commander deals with service component commanders and commanders of subordinate (sub-unified) commands. The service component command is a protective device that dates back to 1948 and the Key West Agreement, where service chiefs wanted to protect service integrity. (60:307)

Operational command by the unified commander will be exercised through the Service component commander...or through the commanders of subordinate commands established in accordance with the procedures and criteria set forth herein. Unless authorized by the establishing authority, the unified commander will not also act as the commander of any of the Service components or other subordinate commands. In exercising operational command, the unified commander shall take cognizance of the prerogatives and responsibilities of his Service component commanders....Commanders of Service components will communicate directly with their respective Chiefs of Service on matters which are the responsibilities of the Military Department and Services. (61:307)

While the above does place certain constraints, most of the CINCs, in 1985, stated that they were not overly restricted by the provisions. A majority of the joint commanders also felt, in 1985, that there was sufficient unification of command. However, while there may be "sufficient" unification, there is room for improvement. It is doubtful that anyone would dispute that. Greater emphasis on joint training should improve united actions. An issue

that deserves a complete study on its own, is the U.S. Navy's concept of "in-support-of" forces. Under this concept, naval forces are not placed under the operational control of the commander of the joint operation, but rather support the operation, which means divided command. This concept seems to truly fly in the face of unity of command. (62:308, 313, 319) Supposedly this issue was cleared up by the 1986 Reorganization Act, however, only time will tell.

Another related problem with the chain of command appears during times of crisis. Due to improved communications already mentioned, there exists the real possibility for micro-management of tactical operations and circumvention of the chain of command. Communications capabilities and the need for presidential involvement in situations that are extremely sensitive make the possibility of loss of unity of command a real possibility.

"Overinvolvement" is the way some people see this situation. It is real, and doubtful to go away. CINCs must anticipate it and plan to handle it as best they can. They must ensure proper guidance is available and understood; and then maintain initiative(s). (63:321)

Bottom line on unity of command is that there must be a clear line of authority, understood and respected by all. The author's recommendation would be a chain of command running from the president to the Chairman of the JCS to the

joint commander. It would be clearly understood. The Secretary of Defense, other members of the JCS, etc. would serve as advisors to the president and Chairman of the JCS. Placing the Chairman of the JCS in the chain would make him a commander and make his role much more forceful and effective. (64:325-326)

Removing the Secretary of Defense makes sense, because he: (1) is normally relatively inexperienced for such a role; (2) has limited time to devote to this responsibility; and (3) lacks the staff to support him on operational matters. (65:336)

Placing the chairman in the chain places an experienced military officer officially in the process as a single point of contact and voice from the defense department. Now that the chairman is not just a part of the JCS "committee," it is reasonable to do so. (66:338)

Unity of command becomes much less a problem, if there is a clear chain of command from the president, to the chairman, to the the joint warfighter.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Does the joint commander have sufficient authority? He must, because to a great extent the U.S. places its security in his hands. He has operational command of U.S. forces. This study looked at the NCA, the JCS, the joint warfighters, and their relationships in command and control, planning, and budget. The historical review clearly indicated problems with U.S. command and control structures; joint warfighting unity of command; and acquisition of men and equipment. Attempts have been made to "fix" what are now fairly well-defined issues. Currently, the CINCs appear to be in an increased position of influence., with additional authority in the areas of operations, training, and logistics. He approves the selection of subordinates, and may prescribe a subordinate's chain of command. Administration and support authority over subordinates was mandated by the 1986 DoD Reorganization Act, though this authority has generally not been acted on. Additionally, he is becoming more involved in the budget process. There will probably continue to be problems; however, the warfighting CINC is in a better position today than ever before to influence what happens to equipment, supplies, and people that will come under his operational control.

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